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ALL CAPITALS.
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[Illustration: LIEUT.-GENERAL NIKOLAI ALEXANDROVITCH TRETYAKOV,
COMMANDING 5TH REGIMENT.
_Frontispiece._]
MY EXPERIENCES AT NAN SHAN AND PORT ARTHUR
WITH THE FIFTH EAST SIBERIAN RIFLES
by
LIEUT.-GENERAL N. A. TRETYAKOV
Translated by Lieutenant A. C. Alford, R.A.
Edited by Captain F. Nolan Baker, R.A.
With Maps and Illustrations
London
Hugh Rees, Ltd.
119 Pall Mall, S.W.
1911
All Rights Reserved
Printed and Bound by
Hazell, Watson and Viney, Ld.,
London and Aylesbury.
PREFACE
In 1909 there appeared in the Russian military journal, “Voenny
Sbornik,” twelve articles from the pen of a distinguished Russian
officer.
The writer—Lieutenant-General (then Colonel) Tretyakov—as commander of
the Western Section of the Defences had taken a prominent and gallant
part in the historic struggle for the possession of Port Arthur.
His narrative—of which this work is a translation—placed before his
countrymen, in simple and intimate language, his experiences at Nan
Shan and within the beleaguered fortress. The impression created
throughout Russia was deep and immediate.
No more touching and direct appeal to judge its beaten heroes
sympathetically and fairly has ever been made to a nation. Six thousand
miles from the Fatherland the author’s regiment, the 5th Siberian
Rifles—and many another—fought to the death for God and the Czar. This
plain tale is a fitting record of their soldierly devotion. As such we
offer it to English readers, assured that every page must bring home
the conviction that here we have the actual history of the fighting
line—as perhaps nothing else in our language gives it.
We follow the fortunes of the General’s own unit, we live with his
men amidst the bloodstained wreck of their trenches on 203 Metre Hill,
losing all thought of the general conduct of the attack and defence
of the fortress—in a word, we are transported from the dry bones of
military history to the living realities of the battlefield.
To the soldier these annals afford example after example, deeply
interesting and instructive, of military cause and effect. In theory a
specialist’s business, here we see laid bare the foundation on which
stands scientific siege warfare. The infantry soldier’s readiness to
die makes possible the rôle of the gunner and the sapper—his blood
cements their work.
From the historical point of view these pages exemplify the rare
incident of a writer of the beaten side giving to the world an
opportunity of comparing his account with that of the victor—not
years after the strife, but while the sword is yet barely sheathed.
The student of war will doubtless fully appreciate the value of such
contemporary history.
In Semenov’s “Rasplata” we have a bitter lament for “what might have
been.” The psychological contrast is now before us—a commander who
rarely criticizes, but, instead, shows us every one cheerfully doing
his best to make bricks without straw.
In him the British soldier will recognize a brother-in-arms, whose
unassuming character and cheerful self-restraint in the midst of
adversity must appeal to his national instincts.
This is perhaps hardly the place to enter upon a critical discussion of
the strategy and tactics of the conflict, but we cannot refrain from
reminding the reader that in this great siege we beheld the remarkable
spectacle of an army sacrificing itself to secure for its fleet the
command of the sea. No more eloquent testimony to the value to an
island power of that command has ever been presented.
In conclusion, we add a short biographical sketch of the author, and we
take this opportunity to acknowledge with gratitude his most kind and
invaluable assistance in the translation and illustration of the work.
* * * * *
Lieutenant-General Nikolai Alexandrovitch Tretyakov was born in the
Simbirsky Government in 1856. Educated in Moscow, he passed through
the Constantine Military School and the Engineer Academy before being
gazetted in 1875 to the 6th Sapper Battalion as Second-Lieutenant.
On the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War he accompanied this battalion
to the front, and, volunteering to serve in the 4th Battalion before
Plevna, took part in that famous siege, and was the first to enter the
Turkish stronghold by the Grivitsa road, which he did at the head of
a company of sappers. He was rewarded for his services with the 3rd
Class of the Order of Stanislav and the 3rd Class of the Order of Anne,
together with the rank of Staff-Captain.
At the conclusion of the war Staff-Captain Tretyakov passed through
the Nicholas Engineer Academy, and was then appointed to the command
of a company in a sapper battalion stationed at Kiev. Retaining this
post for eight years, he attained the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in
1893, and in the same year was sent to the Far East at the head of an
East Siberian Engineer battalion. During the Boxer Rising he helped
to fortify the Nan Shan position, and was present at the capture of
the Ta-ku Forts, afterwards joining in the advance on Pekin. General
Lineivitch marked his appreciation of the good work done in this
campaign by Lieutenant-Colonel Tretyakov by recommending him for “the
gold sword.” This honour was followed by appointment to the command of
the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, and for the next two years he was
engaged in protecting the railway from Pekin against the attacks of the
Hunhutzes, and was again decorated, this time with the 3rd Class of the
Order of Vladimir.
On the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War the Czar conferred upon
him the much-coveted “George Cross,” the 1st Class of the Order
of Stanislav, the 1st Class of the Order of Anne, and the rank of
Major-General. On his return to Russia he commanded the 3rd Sapper
Brigade at Kiev until, on promotion to the rank of Lieutenant-General,
he became Inspector-General of Engineers in the Kiev District.
F. N. B.
NOTE.—The notes and explanations throughout this work are by the
Translator or Editor.
_COPY OF LETTER FROM GENERAL TRETYAKOV TO THE TRANSLATOR_
JELIESNOVODSK,
_July 16th, 1909_.
_Dear Sir_,
_I have been rather long in answering your letter, as it was
forwarded to me here from Kiev_.
_I hasten to inform you that, not only have I no objection to your
translating my articles into English, but I am very glad of it, as it
is to the interest of the Russian Garrison that all the circumstances
of the defence of Port Arthur should be fully stated; and I take this
opportunity of thanking you beforehand for undertaking the task_.
_I remain_,
_Your most obedient servant_,
_N. TRETYAKOV_.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
Arrival of the 5th Regiment at Chin-chou—Rumours of war—Declaration
of war—Restoring the fortifications on the Nan Shan position—Watching
for the Japanese—First signs of the enemy—A reconnaissance in force
—Fighting to the north of Chin-chou, May 16
Pages 1–31
CHAPTER II
Further account of the actions at Chang-chia-tun and Shih-san-li-tai
—Preliminary skirmishes round Chin-chou—The battle of Nan Shan,
May 26, 1904
Pages 32–61
CHAPTER III
Night alarm during the march to Nan-kuan-ling—Disappearance
of the baggage train—Continuation of the retreat towards
Port Arthur—Occupation and fortification of the “Position
of the Passes”—Japanese attacks on the position on July 26,
27, and 28—Capture of Yu-pi-la-tzu and Lao-tso Shan—General
retirement to new positions, July 29
Pages 62–84
CHAPTER IV
Retreat from Feng-huang Shan, July 30—Fortifying 174 Metre Hill
—Capture of Kan-ta Shan—Attacks on the advanced hills, August 13,
14, and 15—Retreat to Namako Yama and Division Hills—Losses
Pages 85–111
CHAPTER V
The fighting round 174 Metre Hill—Capture of 174 Metre Hill and
evacuation of Connecting Ridge—Fortifying 203 Metre Hill—Defence
and capture of Extinct Volcano
Pages 112–146
CHAPTER VI
Continuing the work of fortifying the various hills—End of the first
general assault, August 22 and 23—Attacks on Namako Yama from August
24 to September 19
Pages 147–170
CHAPTER VII
Continuation of the struggle for Namako Yama, and abandonment
of the hill, September 20—The first attacks on 203 Metre Hill,
September, 19–22
Pages 171–194
CHAPTER VIII
Making good damages, and strengthening and supplementing the
works on the various hills
Pages 195–211
CHAPTER IX
Fortifying 203 Metre Hill—Situation at the beginning of
November—Mining operations
Pages 212–229
CHAPTER X
Events on 203 Metre Hill from November 23 to 30
Pages 230–252
CHAPTER XI
The fighting on December 1—Reconnoitring at night—The “ideal
officer”—The attacks on 203 Metre Hill on December 4—Events on
Akasaka Yama from November 27 to December 4
Pages 253–278
CHAPTER XII
The author severely wounded—Final assault and capture of 203 Metre
Hill on December 5—The hospitals—Death of General Kondratenko,
December 15—Retreat from Interval Hill, December 25—Evacuation of
Fort Erh-lung and part of the Chinese Wall, December 28—Japanese
attack on the Chinese Wall, December 30—Destruction of Fort Sung-shu,
December 31—Capture of Wang-tai, December 31—Surrender of the
fortress, January 2, 1905
Pages 279–301
NOTES
Pages 302–304
INDEX
Pages 305–312
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
LIEUT.-GENERAL TRETYAKOV _Frontispiece_
FACING PAGE
GUN-PITS 8
LIEUT.-COL. BIELOZOR 25
LIEUT.-COL. SAIFOOLIN 34
GENERAL STESSEL INSPECTING ONE OF THE FORTS 36
MAJOR STEMPNEVSKI (SEN.) 43
VIEW OF THE COUNTRY AT THE POSITION OF THE PASSES 66
NEIGHBOURHOOD OF YU-PI-LA-TZU 70
TRIPLE PEAK AND YU-PI-LA-TZU 73
VIEW FROM SADDLE BETWEEN 203 METRE HILL, ETC. 91
CONSTRUCTING THE ROAD ON THE REVERSE SLOPE OF
203 METRE HILL 116
EXTINCT VOLCANO: TAKEN FROM RIGHT FLANK OF NAMAKO YAMA 136
RED HILL ON THE RIGHT, WITH TOWN AND BAY IN THE VALLEY,
ETC. 146
DR. TROITSKI 152
FATHER SLOUNIN 158
VIEW TAKEN FROM 203 METRE HILL, SHOWING WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS 180
STAFF HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5TH REGIMENT, ETC. 187
JAPANESE BODIES ON THE TOP OF 203 METRE HILL 193
WATCHING A BOMBARDMENT OF FORT ERH-LUNG, ETC. 210
BLINDAGE ON THE LEFT FLANK OF 203 METRE HILL, ETC. 215
GROUP OF OFFICERS AT DINNER, ETC. 227
BLINDAGES ON 203 METRE HILL WRECKED BY SHELL FIRE 236
THE LAST RESERVES FOR 203 METRE HILL DURING NOVEMBER 240
RUSSIAN DEAD ON 203 METRE HILL AWAITING INTERMENT 247
LAST RESERVES GOING TOWARDS 203 METRE HILL, ETC. 254
ROAD BEHIND 203 METRE HILL AFTER FIGHTING ON
NOVEMBER 28 268
BOMBPROOF IN THE REDOUBT ON THE TOP OF 203 METRE HILL 272
GENERAL VIEW LOOKING SOUTH FROM 203 METRE HILL, ETC. 286
KUROPATKIN’S LUNETTE 290
KUROPATKIN’S LUNETTE 292
GUN IN KUROPATKIN’S LUNETTE 294
SHELL BURSTING IN KUROPATKIN’S LUNETTE 296
PLATES OF TRENCHES
I.—TRENCHES MARKED A. AND B. 175
II.—TRENCHES MARKED C. AND D. 199
MAPS
1. NAN SHAN POSITION 60
2. KUAN-TUNG PENINSULA 84
3. PORT ARTHUR 230
4. WESTERN DEFENCES OF PORT ARTHUR 252
5. DEFENCES OF 203 METRE HILL 278
6. COUNTRY AROUND PORT ARTHUR _At end of book_
MY EXPERIENCES
AT
NAN SHAN AND PORT ARTHUR
CHAPTER I
Arrival of the 5th Regiment at Chin-chou—Rumours of war—Declaration
of war—Restoring the fortifications on the Nan Shan position—Watching
for the Japanese—First signs of the enemy—A reconnaissance in
force—Fighting to the north of Chin-chou, May 16.
The Staff of the 5th East Siberian Rifles, with the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th
Companies, arrived at Chin-chou on April 1, 1903. The regiment, for the
past three years, had been stationed at various points on the Yellow
Sea, engaged in guarding from the attacks of the Hunhutzes the railways
rebuilt by our railway battalion in conjunction with the 1st East
Siberian Sappers, the unit which I commanded during the Boxer campaign.
The regiment began to settle down at Chin-chou and to transfer its
baggage there from Novokievsk, after which, the men having first been
housed, some large buildings were run up for the accommodation of
the horses and transport vehicles, both of which were in a splendid
condition, notwithstanding the wear and tear of the campaign just gone
through. Our two-wheeled carts were all in good repair; the horses I
had bought from the Germans at Tientsin, when they offered for sale a
magnificent lot of animals, brought at enormous cost from Austria and
America, and, though costing us only about 80 roubles[1] per head,
one could not speak too highly of them. I handed over our former
small horses to our mounted scout detachment,[2] which, owing to some
misunderstanding, was without any. Thus, the best-equipped unit of
all our forces in China, we spent the whole of the summer of 1903 at
Chin-chou.
Throughout that summer we were worried by the Hunhutzes, and not only
were the scouts constantly engaged in encounters with these brigands,
but we were also obliged to send out strong detachments, as the
police and scouts combined proved insufficient to deal with them. The
authorities at home knew very little about all this, since the local
commanders refrained from sending in reports about the Hunhutze bands.
Seeing that the police could not cope with them, I personally took all
measures in my power against them; but when I spoke to the commandant
about taking further steps, saying that I could not understand why he
did not call in the help of the regular troops, the answer was always
the same: “My dear Colonel, the authorities think that we do nothing
at all, or else suspect us of pusillanimity; there has already been
some unpleasantness about it, and the civil governor has flatly refused
to make any report to the Viceroy.” So the people had to pay more and
more tribute per head, and the Hunhutzes threatened our military posts
as well as those of the Chinese police. In the end we had regular
pitched battles with them, and the scouts and various regiments in the
Kuan-tung Peninsula, as well as the 5th Regiment, lost a considerable
number in killed and wounded.
“What’s their little game?” we asked.
“Ah!” said some; “the Chinese say that there are Japanese among them.”
“But what are the Japanese after?”
“They say they are going to fight _us_. Our people from Shanghai tell
us that the Japanese officers speak to ours about nothing but politics:
‘You,’ they say, ‘must take Persia under your protection; but we will
have Korea, which we have tried to obtain for centuries.’”
At the end of the summer we received orders to prepare quarters for all
the companies of our regiment (except the 6th, which was at Pi-tzu-wo),
and in August they all arrived. From the first moment of the
concentration of the regiment it became clear to us that relations with
Japan had become strained, and that a rupture might be expected. Soon
after we heard it rumoured that the 3rd Battalion was going to join us,
and then we heard that they were forming a 7th Rifle Division in Port
Arthur. The officers spoke of war, but as, according to those who ought
to know, the Japanese could only put 300,000 men into the field, we
all felt quite confident. However, when it became known that General
Kashtalinski’s division was going to the Yalu, we did not feel quite
the same assurance, since it would be very difficult to defend Port
Arthur with only two divisions. French officers, we heard, were greatly
surprised that we did not think seriously of war when we really were
on the very eve of it. It must be admitted that, while contemplating
the peaceful aspect of Port Arthur, we did indeed forget that we were
living on the edge of a volcano.
The awakening came on the night of February 8–9, when I was roused up
and given a telegram from General Glinski, on opening which I rubbed my
eyes as I read:
“The Japanese fleet is fifty miles from the coast and making for Port
Arthur. Be on the alert.”
“Well,” I thought to myself, “there is nothing to fear; our fleet will
soon make an end of theirs.”
I do not know why, but we always believed in the invulnerability of our
fleet, more especially since we heard that the Admiralty had refused
to buy from Argentina the two splendid armoured cruisers _Nisshin_ and
_Kasuga_, saying that we were strong enough without them. (This may be
a misconception, but I am speaking of what we heard at the time.)
Having sent for the commander of the 1st Scout Detachment, I told him
to proceed to Kerr Bay and the Ta-ku Shan Peninsula, to keep a look-out
on the shore. I then lay down, and was just dozing of! when they called
me again. Another telegram from General Glinski; it only contained
three words: “War declared. Glinski.” This did not worry me very much.
“Let them come first and destroy our fleet, and then they can land in
Southern Korea,” I thought to myself.
However, I sent the detachment, and with it ten mounted scouts to
act as orderlies. Early in the morning I went out on to the Nan Shan
position, where, as I had expected, all the trenches and batteries were
in a ruined condition, and in the winter, when the ground was as hard
as rock, it would be extremely difficult to restore the fortifications.
Returning from the position, I met an officer coming out of Port
Arthur, who told me that three of our battleships had been blown up
suddenly by Japanese destroyers.[3]
This news was a great shock to me. A landing was now possible, not
only in Southern Korea, but even in our rear, and it was absolutely
essential to hurry on with the strengthening of the position. But now
we had nothing whatever to work with, and so I had to collect all the
tools available in the town, which, thanks to the help of Captain
Preegorovski, a very smart and energetic officer, was done remarkably
quickly. I told off working parties, who set to work to restore the
advanced trenches, but the frozen earth would not yield, and the
shovels only served for throwing up the lumps of soil loosened by the
picks.
Our first recruits and reservists arrived on February 16, and had all
to be thoroughly drilled. According to our mobilization plans all the
companies of the regiment, except the 1st,[4] should be at the disposal
of the officer commanding, and orders were given accordingly, and the
5th and 6th Companies immediately called in, the latter having all this
time been engaged with the Hunhutzes. The town of Chin-chou became so
crowded that I quartered about half the companies in barracks behind
the Nan Shan position, and had the regimental baggage transferred to
Port Arthur, where I had hired a private house for its storage, the
authorities having refused to give us Government buildings.
Some mounted scouts were sent out to watch the shore under the command
of Major Pavlovski, commandant of the Gandzalinski district, and a
section of rifles was also allotted to him under Acting Ensign[5]
Shiskin of the reserve, as he had complained that the Hunhutzes had
become so daring as to be threatening his quarters. We ourselves
watched Kerr Bay and the bays adjoining by establishing posts and a
chain of mounted scouts, the practice of hunting up the Hunhutzes being
abandoned.
Now began a period of activity such as I had never before experienced
in the whole of my service. We fortified the positions, brought up
stores, instructed the recruits and reservists, of whom more than half
the regiment was now composed, and, lastly, kept a look-out for the
enemy, for which latter duty two hundred men were required daily. All
this made the situation of the regiment a very difficult one, the
more so, as the enemy was free to effect a landing between Chin-chou
and Port Arthur, and cut us off from the fortress. For these reasons I
considered our situation not only difficult, but dangerous.
The 3rd Battalion arrived on April 2. They were a fine lot of men.
I quartered them in the town, and disposed the old companies in the
villages situated in front of the position.
Major[6] Schwartz, an engineer officer, was attached to us to help us
with the fortifications, and had brought money with him for the hire
of workmen. From this time, too, we began practising manœuvring on
the position while yet the enemy gave us a short respite, which we
endeavoured to make the most of.
Sixty versts[7] from Port Arthur, on the isthmus joining the southern
part of Kuan-tung to the mainland beyond, and occupying half the
breadth of the isthmus, is some high ground cut up lengthwise and
crossways by a number of deep ravines, which mark the well-known Nan
Shan position.
In the last China campaign,[8] there being a danger of Chinese troops
moving on Port Arthur from the north, this position was turned into a
vast series of fortified batteries by Colonel—now General—Kholodovski,
and when the sapper battalion, of which I was in command at that
time, came up to the position to complete its fortification, all the
commanding points were found to be crowned by batteries, armed with
heavy guns. We set to work at the time to build trenches for the
infantry, a work already partially done on the right flank, whereupon
we built two redoubts in front of the batteries in advanced positions,
and one central one near Battery No. 13.
All these fortifications, now almost completely in ruins, had to form
part of our present line of defence. I was put in command, and Schwartz
and myself set to work to restore the forts. I was told that the 5th
Regiment would have to defend the position against the Japanese, and
I recognized at once that we had not sufficient men. Having carefully
calculated the minimum numbers required to hold these works, I arrived
at the conclusion that for a more or less successful defence it was
necessary to have at least three regiments. (The peninsula was 3 versts
across,[9] with 2 versts of shallow water on either flank, increasing
to 8 versts at low tide.)
[Illustration: GUN-PITS.
p. 8]
In front of the position, and 2 versts from it, stood Chin-chou, a
town surrounded by an old Chinese wall, 3-1/2 versts in length, and
proof against field-artillery fire. It would be extremely difficult to
storm the wall in face of artillery fire from the main position, and
as also it gave good cover from the enemy’s rifle and gun fire, it was
decided to occupy the town as an advanced post. It did, in fact,
cover the front of the position, and it would be a difficult matter to
attack the heights beyond without having first taken it. The state of
affairs became, however, more complicated, as at least two companies
were necessary for the defence of the town, thus leaving us only nine
companies for the main position.
We were ordered to defend ourselves to the last drop of blood. When I
told General Fock of the difficulty of defending the position with one
regiment, which was not even up to full strength, he replied: “Do you
know, if I were in your place, I should say to my commanding officer:
‘Leave me only two companies, and I shall know better how to die with
_them_, than with a whole regiment.’” From this I concluded that,
instead of a successful defence, he had some other object in view, the
nature of which I could not then fathom.
It was, in fact, impossible to defend this position successfully. The
enemy’s fleet could make an appearance on both flanks and at the rear.
Our opponent, moreover, had vastly superior numbers, and his batteries
eventually spread out in a circle which commanded the crowded mass of
our guns on the Nan Shan heights, while the absence of a sufficient
number of bomb-proofs and cover for reserves completed the difficulties
of the position of the defenders. We built field bakeries, and dug
wells on the position, and, as the possibility of a landing in our
rear was realized, we were ordered to fortify the rear as well as the
front, which is really saying that the position assumed the nature of a
fortress.
I had indicated the position lying immediately to the south of the Nan
Shan position as being an incomparably better one. On it we could have
met the enemy, while he was in the act of filing across the isthmus, on
a broad front and with a numerous and well-placed artillery, our flanks
on this position being protected from any action on the part of the
enemy’s fleet. General Kholodovski’s idea, however, prevailed, perhaps
because the work needed to carry it out was almost completed (they
did not realize that to restore the fortifications and to build new
ones was practically one and the same thing). Be this as it may, the
constant talk about the Nan Shan position had made it so popular, that
for many its very name became a “mascot.” The view and field of fire
from it were certainly splendid, and I took good care to see that the
defenders should feel that the position could be successfully held, and
satisfied myself that they felt confident of their capability to do so.
Continuing incessantly to fortify the position, the 5th Regiment
watched the shore 30 versts to the north by mounted and infantry Scout
detachments, sometimes employing the regular companies on this service.
We received orders every day by wire to be on the alert and to watch
for a landing, and I did everything possible to prevent being taken
by surprise. Half of the mounted detachment I sent to Pi-tzu-wo, the
most likely point for a landing, and all the mounted scouts of the 14th
Regiment were sent to the same locality to watch the coast. A section
of a company, under an officer, and ten mounted scouts were sent to
Godzarlin[10] to watch Terminal Point. In Kerr Bay and Deep Bay was
Lieutenant Vaseeliev with the 1st Infantry Scout Detachment, and ten
mounted scouts, and on a headland in Sulivan Bay a post of twenty-five
sharp-shooters and six mounted scouts, while the shores of Chin-chou
Bay were guarded by the men occupying the town. From Godzarlin up to
the position I had distributed a flying post of the 2nd half of the
Mounted Scouts, ten of whom I kept with me for orderly duties.
At this time the regiment was disposed as follows: in the town
of Chin-chou, the 10th Company under Major Goosov, the 3rd Scout
Detachment under Captain Koudriavtsev, and a mixed force of sixty men
under Lieutenant Golenko, an officer who had distinguished himself
against the Hunhutzes. The 3rd Company occupied the village of
Lu-chia-tun, in front of the centre of the position, while the 2nd
Company was in the village of Ma-chia-tun, in front of the right flank,
and the 6th Company in the village of Ssu-chia-tun, behind the left
flank, the remainder being quartered behind the centre of the position.
Major Schwartz, with about a dozen men, was quartered in some shelters
in the centre of the position. All the regimental and officers’ baggage
was stored near the position and in Port Arthur. Lieutenant-Colonel
Eremeiev, who had voluntarily joined the regiment from the reserve, and
whom I had personally known at the Academy and the Engineer College, I
appointed commandant of the town.
As soon as the men of the regiment had settled down in their various
quarters, work on the position was pushed forward with feverish haste.
Every day thousands of Chinese[11] and soldiers worked at it; they
brought up building material, constructed obstacles, dug wells, and the
soldiers concurrently underwent musketry and field training; and all
this at a time when we expected a landing every moment either in front
or in rear. As the regiment might have to withstand a regular siege,
we set to work to make splinter-proofs for storing food, supplies,
and small-arm ammunition, though the means at our disposal were very
limited. We had in hand no more than 60,000 roubles, and so we only
made two splinter-proofs, neither of them remarkably long or broad, and
began the construction of four wells without, however, much hope of
finding water. The cold weather hampered us sadly. The soil was frozen
hard, and our shovels and picks, of which we only had a limited supply,
kept on breaking. The companies occupying the town, too, worked hard at
putting it also into a state of defence. It was proposed to strengthen
the existing caponiers and the corners of the town wall, and to build
bomb-proofs for the protection of the reserves against splinters.
The enemy was evidently waiting for something, and we felt more secure
every day. We improvised an entertainment hall from one of the barrack
rooms, decorated it as well as we could, and put a gramophone in it;
hence our dinners and suppers went off in right merry style. We used to
get a lot of people coming out to see the position, and gladly received
them, as we got news from them of what was going on in the outside
world. Of course, one could not be sure that the information was
exactly correct, but, such as it was, it generally emanated from the
staff. The majority of our informants held the opinion that we should
never see a shot fired, and that the whole action of the war would
be limited to sea fighting and the occupation of the southern part
of Korea by the Japanese, as the latter could never raise more than
300,000 men, and, when our battleships had been repaired, we should
smash up their fleet and they would have to make terms. No one doubted
that our fleet _would_ destroy the Japanese navy, because our naval
commanders were more active than the Japanese, our sailors infinitely
better at gunnery, and, finally, our ships’ armour was very much
stronger, as it was “annealed.”[12] Our naval experts told us all this.
No attention whatever was paid to the fact that the Japanese had five
first-class battleships while we had only two,[13] and that torpedo
craft, of which the Japanese possessed a hundred, had not yet proved
their full power of independent action. Our informants did not say
how they had come by their knowledge, but they always laid particular
stress on the bravery of our sailors.
“Never mind if you do see drunken sailors on shore, nor how rudely
officers may answer to any remark addressed to them—on shore; on their
ships they cultivate an iron discipline.”
If any one stated that the Japanese fleet was considerably stronger
than ours, our tellers of fairy tales would contemptuously answer,
especially if the individual was a naval man: “A lot you know! Why do
you think the Government refused to buy the _Nisshin_ and _Kasuga_ from
Argentina? Because we are strong enough without them; otherwise they
would not have refused such a purchase.” And we listeners, satisfied
with such arguments, were quickly laughing and joking and telling
stories. I always sat at the head of the table, and it was a pleasure
to me to listen to the stories and watch the happy faces of those round
me, many of whom felt no forebodings then of the destiny awaiting them.
While fortifying the position we made some experiments on the effect of
rifle fire directed against targets sheltered by loopholed parapets,
as compared with that against targets in the open. It always happened
that at a range of 200 yards the effect was considerably greater
against loopholed targets, while at longer ranges the latter suffered
most. Since, in addition, we ran the risk of hostile shrapnel, we also
experimented with this type of fire, and found that 20 rounds at a
range of 1 verst put out of action half the defenders of the earth-work,
when they stood in the open on the glacis. It was therefore decided to
make loopholes everywhere and to provide the detachments with plank
overhead cover, which, with General Fock’s approval, was carried out on
the succeeding days.
Senior officers frequently visited the position. General Kondratenko
came out before we started working, and said that we must occupy
the town as strongly as possible. Generals Fock and Nadyein were
frequently with us, sometimes staying two or three days. General Fock
talked a great deal with the officers, giving his opinion on the way
of defending the position and ground in front of it. He thought of
meeting the enemy in front of the position, near the villages lying to
the north of Mount Sampson, and we often went out reconnoitring with
him, and thoroughly studied the ground, but though he insisted on the
necessity of fortifying it, we had no means of doing so. The general,
it seems, had not told off the regiments of his own division to any
work. Only the 5th Regiment continued working, and the nearer the
time of our meeting with the enemy approached, the further advanced
and stronger became our field works. Judging from what I heard from
superior officers, it was _not_ intended to defend the Nan Shan
position stubbornly; hence they would not let us have enough money for
its fortification, and they sent up no artillery. But the closer our
meeting with the enemy impended, the more I became convinced that the
position _would_ be stubbornly defended.
From certain remarks of General Fock it seemed as if it was not
necessary to make a stubborn defence. The general, for instance, once
said to me: “You know that less heroism is required to defend this
position than to retreat from it. Those who do not understand the true
position of affairs are beginning to call General Fock a traitor!”
Indeed, it was impossible not to fear a landing of the Japanese in rear
of the position simultaneously with a landing at Pi-tzu-wo, and this
was so obvious that the position was ordered to be fortified in rear.
The regiment was in a bad way, and I felt downhearted at not being able
to carry out many of General Fock’s suggestions as to the fortification
of the position and the means of defending it.
Attaching great importance to the grazing effect of shell, General Fock
insisted that the defensive line should be continued right down to the
foot of the Nan Shan Hills. Without making a single exception, without
taking into consideration that the slopes of the hills were long and
gentle, and served as a most difficult obstacle to an attacker, and
also completely losing sight of the fact that by carrying our trenches
down to the foot of the hills we exposed our companies to fire from
the opposite hills, and thus assisted the attackers, he stuck to his
point and insisted on our extending our line to a total frontage of
8 versts. In speaking of them, he called our top tier of trenches
“swallows’ nests,” and always added: “You, of course, are glad to put
your regiment right up under the sky!” I at once pointed out to the
general that he had completely ignored the fact that the heights formed
a natural and difficult obstacle to pass, that every inequality in the
ground below (of which there were many) gave the enemy cover from our
fire, and that shot bursting on graze would not have any effect; that
we had only one regiment with which to defend the position, and that
we ought to make our dispositions with due regard to this unpleasant
circumstance. Upon this, General Fock lost his temper, exclaiming that
only traitors placed their men under the artillery fire of the enemy,
and that the intervals between men in trenches should be 20 paces, or
certainly not less than 10 paces, and then there would be no swallows’
nests for them to occupy. I answered that if we should place our
unseasoned troops, the majority of whom were recruits and reservists,
at 20-paces interval, each one would feel himself isolated and thrown
out before an advancing foe without any support, and it might prove
that in the moment of need he would be without the moral support of his
commander. At the same time I did not lose the opportunity of saying
that we had but eleven companies in the regiment, and that if they were
spread out over a frontage of 8 versts I should have a very weak line
of defence, liable to be broken through at the slightest pressure, and
if I were to keep only one company in reserve, which was absolutely
indispensable, I should then have a large gap in the line absolutely
unoccupied; was a stubborn defence possible under these circumstances?
Of course, I understood that General Fock, by throwing his firing line
well forward, wished to lessen their losses from the enemy’s rifle and
shrapnel fire. Granted, this was important, and was quite feasible at
the beginning of the battle. If I had had only a few reserves with
which to strengthen threatened points, I should have had nothing to
urge against the 20-paces interval even. But there were no reserves
told off for the 5th Regiment, although General Nadyein told me that I
should be supported, and that the 15th Regiment would be posted near
Ta-fang-shen[14]; but when I asked him, “Then, when they are needed,
I can use them?” he said: “You want to command a whole division then,
do you?” On the whole, therefore, the plan of action at Nan Shan was
not very plain to me. One thing was at length clear—I had it from
General Kondratenko—that we must defend the position to our last drop
of blood, and to this end I prepared both officers and men. We began
to make field kitchens in the trenches; we brought up provisions to
the position and put them in bomb-proofs, cleared the ground for
bivouacking in places covered from the enemy’s fire, and built shelters
for the men in the trenches themselves and in the fortifications.
The enemy made no sign, the weather was splendid, and we peacefully
continued our work of constructing cover from shrapnel fire and of
preparing obstacles.
From the end of February the enemy’s ships constantly appeared in Deep
and Kerr Bays; luckily we had already set up a telephone there and
connected it with the Naval Observing Station, of which the gallant
and enterprising Naval Lieutenant Ditchmann held charge. There was a
certain amount of firing from the Japanese ships and an attempt to
land from one of their gunboats, but our men drove them off. In view
of this, the scouts under Lieutenant Kragelski were reinforced by the
addition of some mounted scouts under Lieutenant Sietchko, and on
March 7 Major Stempnevski (jun.), with the 7th Company, was sent to
Kerr Bay. Two mountain guns, under Lieutenant Naoomov, were sent with
the 7th Company. This detachment was formed from the 5th Regiment; the
horses were taken from the transport, the guns we had brought with us
from China, and the drivers were our own men, but the officers and gun
detachments were sent out from Port Arthur.
General Nadyein wished to acquaint himself personally with the position
of affairs in the two bays, and on March 23 I accompanied him to Kerr
Bay. While still some way off, we saw three large Japanese ships and
five destroyers. On arriving we found the 7th Company and our two guns
on the position. They were so disposed as to be able to sweep the
entrance to Kerr Bay and to oppose the enemy’s advance if he effected a
landing on the end of the Ta-ku Shan Peninsula, where we had two weak
advanced posts. The Japanese shells pitched as far up as the ravine
behind which the company had taken cover, and the Japanese gunners
fired even on single individuals if they exposed themselves for a
moment.
We were told that our artillery (two small 32-mm. guns forming the
section under the command of Naoomov) had done some excellent practice
on the enemy’s destroyers, which had consequently retreated from the
bay. General Nadyein came to the conclusion that the enemy intended to
land in the bay, and gave me some orders in case this should prove to
be the case. It was 12 versts from the bay to the position, and 24 to
the end of the Ta-ku Shan Peninsula. In the event of a landing, I was
to support the 7th Company and the scout detachments with a battalion.
If, however, they had wished to force a landing in considerable
strength, the whole of the 5th Regiment would not have been able to
prevent it. To oppose a landing is a very difficult business, and
here the rugged coast added considerably to the difficulties of the
defender. The bays cut right into the coast-line, and the hills made
intercommunication exceedingly difficult. Having enticed the defenders
to some point off the shore by a small feint landing, or by threatening
a landing in force, the attacker could, in a quarter of an hour, make
a sudden rush from another point, where he could then land without
any opposition on the part of the regiment defending the shore. For
this reason we did not hope to prevent a landing, but thought that the
defence of the position would considerably delay the enemy’s advance on
Port Arthur.
More than all I feared a landing in Dalny Bay, which was eminently
suited for such an enterprise. Such a landing would divide the strength
of the garrison, and would free the enemy from the necessity of an
attack on the Nan Shan position. Under cover of the great guns of the
fleet a landing was possible at all places where the depth of water was
sufficient for the large ships to come in close enough for effective
gun fire.
Having inspected the bay and the detachment, we, accompanied by shots
from large naval guns, returned to the position untouched. On the
following day the 7th Company and scout detachments beat back a small
attempt at a landing, for which the officers were recommended for high
orders, which, however, they never received. Lieutenant Ditchmann sank
one of the enemy’s ships; I myself went to Kerr Bay and saw two masts
projecting from the sea.
About this time, _i.e._ March 24, the Nan Shan position was armed with
artillery, and we awaited the enemy with light hearts, thinking that
our artillery, consisting of 56-mm. and 6-in. short guns, were superior
to the enemy’s field pieces. When, however, we continued to complain
that one regiment was insufficient for defending the whole position,
our commanders reassured us by saying that the enemy would not attack
the position from all sides at once, but would choose one special point
for the assault. I did not ask for explanations, as this view appeared
to be sound enough. About April 2 General Smirnov came out, and, in a
fearful rain-storm, inspected the whole position; he seemed surprised
that the position was fortified to the south as well. I explained to
him that we anticipated an attack from the rear, as the enemy could
land behind Dalny. Having told me that I must construct a large redoubt
behind the position, in order to cover a retreat, the general went to
Dalny.
On the night of May 4 one of our scouts came up with a report from
Major Pavlovski that a Japanese squadron had appeared north of Terminal
Point,[15] and was landing an army. On the morning of the 5th, it was
reported that a Japanese fleet of thirty-nine transports,[16] covered
by three large warships, one of which flew the Admiral’s flag, was
landing troops near the mouth of the Ta-scha River, and in a bay to
the north; about a battalion was said to have already landed. We
immediately reported this to higher authority, whereupon the regiment
occupied its positions and did not leave them day or night.
Captain Andreievski was ordered to watch the movements of the enemy
closely, and from this time forth to the end of the siege our mounted
corps were in touch with the Japanese. A large force, with cavalry and
guns, had been disembarked, and soon after we received a telegram to
the effect that a landing had also taken place near Pi-tzu-wo.
On the night of May 5 three wounded men of the Mounted Scout
Detachment, two of the 14th Regiment, and one of ours, were brought
in. The enemy had sent out his magnificently mounted cavalry from
the eastern to the western shore towards the railway. It was said
that a battalion, to which had been added a mounted scout detachment,
with which we never obtained touch, had detrained at Shih-san-li-tai
station, having come from General Kuropatkin’s army.
General Fock decided to make a reconnaissance in force, as nobody
knew the exact strength of the troops which had landed. The enemy’s
cavalry, in very considerable numbers, strengthened by infantry and
Hunhutzes,[17] completely screened from us the landing points and the
early movements of the Japanese. It was reported that they were moving
towards Shih-san-li-tai, and that their landing place had been strongly
fortified.
Towards evening on May 8 all the regiments of the division, except
the 15th which was with Stessel in Port Arthur, and I with my two
battalions, moved out along the road leading towards the place of
the landing, and all had to pass the night in positions detailed to
them along that road. Having reached their allotted destinations,
the regiments received further orders to continue their night march,
the object of which was, apparently, to sweep the stretch of country
to the south-east of Shih-san-li-tai station (this operation was
termed “Manœuvre” in the order). The enemy, in unknown strength, was
somewhere between Chang-chia-tun and Shih-san-li-tai. Up to the time
our regiments had occupied their positions, our scouts had reported
nothing trustworthy about the enemy, and I expected to meet them every
minute. The 5th Regiment, like all the others probably, was ordered:
“At 1 a.m. to move from its bivouacs and be at dawn at height No.
so-and-so.” I did not know what to do; all our maps had the names of
the villages defaced, the contours were scarcely marked, none of the
heights of the various hills were given, and how to find, at night, a
certain unknown height No. so-and-so, which might be a good 10 versts
from where we were, was too much for me. I must add, too, that we had
no guides with us; no amount of money could buy them. So I repaired
to General Fock with my doubts. The staff had already settled down to
sleep, and fatigue and the certainty of the forthcoming battle had
made them all very irritable. Be it said, however, to the honour of
the staff, they realized fully the difficulties of the night march,
and an order was sent out immediately, postponing the time of the
advance until 3 a.m., when they knew that the dawn would just begin
to break, forgetting, however, that the dawn comes very quickly, and
that it is quite dark till just before the sun actually rises. It was
decided that the chief of the staff would himself guide the leading
column. Returning to my staff, I gave the necessary orders, and tried
to get some sleep, but I could not, as one alarming thought followed
upon another. Should we succeed in reaching height No. so-and-so? What
if the enemy suddenly fell upon our rear from Chang-chia-tun, or our
flank from Shih-san-li-tai, or the surrounding country (all was quite
possible)? It was doubtful if we could make good our retreat to our
positions at Nan Shan, the more so, as the road from Chang-chia-tun to
Chin-chou had been left absolutely unprotected by us. These thoughts
were justifiable in view of the fact that the enemy had landed from
forty transports north of Terminal Point, under our very noses, and,
supposing there was a battalion in each, that meant forty battalions to
our eleven or twelve.
At 2 a.m. I got up. Every one was sound asleep. Reaching the men’s
bivouacs, I saw them served out with a pound of meat and a large
quantity of bread; they had no tea, as orders had been given that fires
were not to be lighted, and from this it was clear that General Fock
expected a brush with the enemy. About 3 a.m. the battalions stood to
arms, but, as it happened, there was some delay, and the chief of the
staff did not turn up until 5 o’clock, when we at last made a start.
[Illustration: LIEUT.-COLONEL BIELOZOR, KILLED AT THE
BATTLE OF NAN SHAN.
p. 25]
I was put in command of a detachment consisting of the two battalions of
the 5th Regiment and a battery under Lieutenant-Colonel Romanovski.
We started off well enough, but the trouble was that the horse of the
chief of the staff was a particularly good one, and the column fell
considerably behind him; the country was very intersected and covered
by a regular network of roads, and very bad ones at that. The chief
of the staff, leading the way with his map, forgot to leave guides at
the cross-roads, the result being that the column stopped when it came
to a cross-road, not knowing which direction to take. We lost a lot
of time owing to these halts, but we nevertheless preserved the right
direction. (I do not mention the order of march, as that was as usual:
skirmishers, advanced guard with mounted scouts, and main body.)
To the north and north-west was our screen of scouts, and as they
constantly showed themselves on the skyline we kept wondering:
“Are not these the enemy’s scouts?” Two hours had already passed
since we started, and we had gone down into a wide valley, when
Lieutenant-Colonel Bielozor, commanding the 2nd Battalion, came up to
me and drew my attention to the peculiar movements of our artillery.
Instead of following us, it had moved off to a height lying on the
left flank of our line of march; behind it was a chain of skirmishers
from the rear of our column, and behind this line compact companies.
Not understanding its doings, I galloped up to the battery, and in the
midst of the moving columns, unaccompanied by his staff, I saw General
Fock. I had hardly got up to him, when he shouted to me: “What kind
of a company commander have you got? See how he lets that battery get
in front of him; he is a perfect fool! Such officers are a curse to
us!” I answered that I would overtake the company at once, but I wished
to know what was happening, as the battery under my command was going
off somewhere, and I had not been informed of it. “That is its right
position,” answered the general, pointing to the hill the artillery
were making for. “Then we are going to stop there?” “No,” replied
General Fock; “we are going on farther under cover of this battery.”
I then saw that, far ahead of the battery, our dense columns were
advancing, apparently attacking some one. The regiment advancing on
the left of my column had sent out a line of skirmishers to the flank
on one side of our advance, and I learnt that they had noticed a
hostile column in a hollow on our left flank. It turned out that this
was a company of that regiment which had advanced on Shih-san-li-tai
from the south, and occupied the position covering Chin-chou from the
Shih-san-li-tai side.
“Form a reserve for the attackers, and with one company occupy the hill
towards which the head of your column is moving,” ordered General Fock.
I galloped off to comply with this order.
This advance went on for an hour. We occupied a succession of
positions, but it was very noticeable that our men did not take full
advantage of the ground, but rather tried not to lose touch with each
other. It was all right when the officers were actually keeping them
together, but what would happen when they were not there to do so? Our
men are not accustomed to act on their own initiative, and a long
skirmishing line does not permit of the officers directing their men by
voice and example. It was lucky that we were the defenders and not the
attackers!
While occupied with these thoughts, I heard the “assembly” sounded
by our buglers; our men remained where they were, but the commanders
hurried off to the general, who had called them by this signal. The
enemy had not been encountered; he was at Chang-chia-tun, or perhaps
to the north of Shih-san-li-tai. The operation had been thought out in
great detail by the general. For me it was remarkable in that we had
manœuvred under the enemy’s very nose, while contemptuously leaving him
also in the rear. After a short halt we returned to the position with
the men singing loudly.[18]
After this expedition we received an order which brought home to me the
exactness with which General Fock gauged the situation. His directions
were clear and fully conformed to the real state of affairs. Here are
some characteristic paragraphs of the order: “God save us from those
commanders who wait for orders in the heat of battle: they won’t get
any given them, so let them get that idea out of their heads.” Or: “I
ask all company and battalion commanders, as soon as they meet the
enemy, to raise their heads, open their eyes, and keep their ears shut.
Believe me, your eyes are everything: your ears won’t help you much,
though, unfortunately, this is not a generally accepted idea. Even
an old captain of twenty-two years’ service will, during manœuvres,
begin to prick up his ears like a hare so as to catch some order from
his commander; but his commander is dead, or is himself engaged with
something else.” These golden rules are worthy of a place in every
book on tactics, and in all regulations on the general direction of an
action.
Immediately after our return our scouts brought us news that the enemy
was near Shih-san-li-tai station in small numbers, and massed on the
shores of the bay, a little to the south of Chang-chia-tun. This was
about May 11, and from this time onward our scouts had daily skirmishes
with the enemy.
General Fock remained true to his decision to meet the enemy in front
of the Nan Shan position. We only roughly knew the enemy’s strength,
so he decided to carry out another reconnaissance in force, and
again moved his forces forward to the villages of Chang-chia-tun
and Shih-san-li-tai, and thus blocked the line of the enemy’s
advance southward along the Pu-lan-tien and Nan Shan road. All the
regiments of the 4th Rifle Division, except the 15th, were employed;
our eight companies were in the advanced guard; the 3rd and 4th at
Shih-san-li-tai, and the 6th and 8th, and the 3rd Scout Detachment
at Chang-chia-tun, our 3rd Battalion being placed in the interval
between these two detachments. The positions to be occupied by us
were well studied beforehand. The companies moved out and took up
their positions. On the night of May 15, and the morning of the 16th,
other troops with guns moved off, two batteries were placed near the
railway bridge on the road to Pi-tzu-wo, and one (Romanovski’s) with
the regimental half-battery under Second-Lieutenant Sadykov on the
hills above Shih-san-li-tai. After our battalions had occupied their
positions an order came from General Fock that our 3rd Battalion,
under the command of Colonel Dounin, was to return to the position.
In order not to give the enemy a chance of working round behind us,
I was ordered to move the 7th Company and the scout detachment with
Lieutenant Naoomov’s two guns through the space between the shore of
Kerr Bay and Mount Sampson to the old Chinese fortifications, and to
form half the 9th Company as a reserve to the 7th, but I myself was
left on the position with three companies.
At daybreak on May 16 I went to Battery No. 13,[19] and had an
excellent view of the engagement[20] and the movements of our troops.
Our companies and guns were already in position on the left flank. The
other regiments were moving round towards the foot of Mount Sampson in
a south-westerly direction, and the head of the column had just reached
the hill, when heavy rifle fire broke out, and Lieutenant-Colonel
Romanovski’s and the bullock battery on the left began to speak. In
five minutes the fire of these batteries had become awful, and thick
smoke completely hid them from my view (this smoke was caused by
bursting Japanese shells). After half an hour, when the tail of our
main column had passed Mount Sampson, the batteries on the right flank
opened fire. Firing continued for an hour from both flanks, and we
followed the course of the fight most intently. I was very much afraid
that the enemy would try to get round our rear, but the 7th Company was
silent, and its commander reported that no movement was noticeable in
his front. The fire on the left flank began to slacken, and carts and
stretchers were seen moving from that direction. Half an hour later I
noticed Romanovski’s battery on the road from Shih-san-li-tai, followed
by our bullock battery, both moving towards us at a walk. An orderly
from the left flank came up and reported that we were retreating, but
he had not seen the Japanese infantry, having only observed that the
Japanese had swept our battery with shells, thereby silencing it and
compelling it to retreat behind the hill. At the same moment that the
batteries on the left flank moved, I saw that the reserves had occupied
a shoulder of Mount Sampson facing the village of Shih-san-li-tai.
Dense lines of skirmishers quietly lay on the crest of this ridge,
allowing the guns, and subsequently the skirmishers of our left flank,
to pass through them. From this I concluded that the enemy was pressing
our right and that General Fock thought that we could not hold our
ground, and had, therefore, strengthened his left flank, which had, so
far, not been assailed by the Japanese. After another hour had passed,
our retreating lines came into view from behind Mount Sampson, and the
guns near the railway bridge opened a terrific fire. The rifle and gun
fire behind Mount Sampson continued, now weaker, now stronger, till
at last the lines of reserves, passing through the left flank, quickly
collected and began to retreat on our position. I expected to see the
Japanese in pursuit, but none appeared. At last the batteries on the
right flank retired and our companies followed in their wake, but still
the Japanese did not pursue. It was now that I saw a picture of a truly
wonderful retreat, in which our men marched in column as at manœuvres.
The left flank had already reached our position, when General Nadyein
came in wounded in the hand, and Lieutenant-Colonel Romanovski with a
wound in the leg. The situation naturally gave rise to a good deal of
questioning and surmise. It appears that Second-Lieutenant Sadykov, who
commanded our bullock battery, had himself gone to the assistance of
Lieutenant-Colonel Romanovski and commanded his half-battery to the end
of the engagement.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Somewhat less than £8 at the rate of exchange of 9·5 roubles to the
pound sterling.
[2] The term “scout detachment” is used in all official accounts, and
will be used throughout this work, to denote a detachment, either
mounted or on foot, composed of volunteers (“okhotnik”) and attached to
various regiments. All Russian volunteers were thus organized.
[3] Accounts received on the Nan Shan position were probably greatly
exaggerated, as something of the nature of a panic ensued upon the
first Japanese torpedo attack (see Official History, Part III., pp. 10
_et seq._). Two battleships and one cruiser were injured in this attack.
[4] This company formed part of the Legation Guard at Pekin.
[5] An “Acting Ensign” is a senior non-commissioned officer who has
done his service with the colours, and ranks next to an Ensign in the
Reserve, and, like him, wears officer’s uniform.
[6] Though the rank of Major does not exist in the Russian Army, it is
used in this translation to denote the Captain Commanding a Battery,
Company, or Squadron, in contradistinction to Captain, which term
must be understood as applying to a Russian Staff Captain, a rank
corresponding to the rank of Second-Captain formerly existing in the
British Royal Artillery.
[7] Sixty versts is roughly forty miles, one verst being equal to 1,166
yards.
[8] This refers to the Boxer rising (see Official History, Part II., p.
16).
[9] This seems to be underestimated, as the Official History gives
4,400 yards as the breadth of the position. The author evidently means
that at low water the _whole_ breadth of the peninsula was 8 versts,
which agrees with other accounts.
[10] On the Pi-tzu-wo road, but not shown on map.
[11] Official accounts state that as many as 5,000 Chinese coolies were
employed.
[12] As a fact the armour of the Japanese ships built in England was as
good as any of its date, all of it being hardened in accordance with
modern processes.
[13] General Tretyakov was evidently still under the impression that
three Russian battleships had been _blown up_. The Russians had in
reality four first-class battleships still unharmed—_Petropavlovsk_,
_Pobieda_, _Poltava_, and _Peresviet_.
[14] The 13th, 14th, and 15th Regiments were actually posted in rear of
the 5th during the battle, but did little to support it.
[15] See Note 3 at end of book.
[16] See Official History, Part II., p. 11. This news must have come
from some of Colonel Rantsov’s cossacks.
[17] It seems unlikely that any of these marauding bands were assisting
the Japanese. It must be remembered that the Russians had no good word
for the Japanese at this time.
[18] The Russian soldiers invariably sing on the march, when the band
is not playing.
[19] Battery No. 13 is situated in rear of the centre of the Nan Shan
position.
[20] In our Official History (Part II.) this action is briefly
described as an engagement with General Nadyein’s rearguard, but it
is evident that two separate reconnaissances were made on May 8 and
16 respectively, and that no rearguard was left as indicated in that
report.