to take in hands, without delay, measures for the evacuation of the
Cantonments, and the safe conduct of all the troops there into the
Citadel. The operation was most distasteful, but I had agreed to the
necessity for it, and quite saw it was the only possible course.
When I came to enquire into the position of affairs I was horrified
to find that the 8 precious hours while I had been absent had been
wasted in the most inexplicable way. Apparently little or nothing of
the Government or private property in charge of regiments had been
moved to the Fort, and all had yet to be done. It was then past 2
o'clock, and General Primrose telegraphed to me from the Citadel, to
say he wished me to move in there as quickly as possible. (I ought to
explain that the Citadel or Fort of Kandahar is about 1¼ miles from
the Cantonments.) I at once set everyone to work, excusing no one and
superintending all personally, to get as much property as possible
into the Fort, sending there for all available carts, camels, ponies
and mules, each of which, immediately it had got rid of its load, came
back again, and so the afternoon passed away all too rapidly. At last
all was safely sent in, except the baggage of the 66th, which was one
of the regiments of General Burrows' Brigade, who, when going out to
Girishk, had left some tons of things in a most careless and unpacked
condition. I saw it would be hopeless had I had a day instead of an
hour to get all in, but I put on big working parties, and worked
away, putting off my departure from half hour to half hour, until it
approached 6 o'clock, and I had been called on three or four times by
General Primrose to move into the Citadel. I then saw it was useless to
try and save more, and so I fixed ¼ past 6 o'clock as the hour for
our departure, deciding that all not packed then must be abandoned.
All this time I had been pressed all round by marauding bands of armed
men, who were sweeping round, trying to kill and steal who and what
they could. These necessitated strong picquets, and, from time to time,
small expeditions, so my hands were full. At ¼ past 6 I paraded my
force as follows:--
4th Native Infantry,
28th Native Infantry,
C/2 Royal Artillery,
7th Fusiliers,
Poona Horse,
Detacht. 3rd Light Cavalry,
---- 3rd Sind Horse,
and in this order commenced my mournful and humiliating march. I had
previously gone carefully round the whole place myself, had had it
carefully searched by an officer with a picquet, and had made each
Commanding Officer and the Chief Medical Officer report to me that
nothing was left behind.
[Sidenote: Marched into Citadel after hard day's work.]
At the moment I marched I withdrew my picquets and guards, and covering
my rear with Cavalry, moved on the Fort. When every man had left the
large Barrack square I returned to it myself and made my Staff and
escort, who were with me, pass out before me, so that I might have
the melancholy satisfaction of being the last man in the place. At 7
p.m. I followed the last man of the Force into the Citadel and shut
the gates, and so began a fresh act of this extremely painful drama.
With the exception of a portion of the clothing of the 66th Regiment,
I had succeeded in getting the property of the regiments which were
under me into safety, but I fear much, owing to some mismanagement, I
am inclined almost to fear a panic, after we had started for Kokeran,
several of the regiments hurriedly and unnecessarily evacuated their
barracks early in the morning, when they were at once entered by the
enemy and plundered. On starting, I made over the command to the next
senior officer, giving him distinct instructions how to act, but as he
himself lost some of the baggage of his regiment (in my absence), he
cannot have paid much attention to them. Late as it was when I entered
the Citadel, my work was not yet done, as I was the only General
Officer available to issue orders or do work, as General Primrose,
who was seedy, was thoroughly wearied out, and Generals Burrows and
Nuttall were sound asleep, and poor fellows badly they needed it
after the terrible night they had gone through. I had, therefore, to
set to work to put the Guards and necessary defences for the night in
some state of order, and as this involved a walk and ride round the
City and Fort walls, 4½ miles, it was a pleasant ending to a long
day. At 8 o'clock I snatched a hurried dinner with General Primrose,
the first food, except a cup of chocolate and a biscuit, I had had
in the day, and at half-past nine went the round of the ramparts and
guards, getting to bed at 1 a.m., having had 23½ hours of intense
work of mind and body, 18 of which I had spent in the saddle. I did
not want much rocking, and was horrified to find, long before I was
half satisfied with sleep, that it was 5 a.m. on the 29th July, and
that I had to get up to start off a reconnoitering party of Cavalry to
ascertain the state of affairs round our old Cantonments. They found
the whole country covered with armed men, and the Cantonment looted,
and such parts of it as would burn, burned down. They were fired on at
several places, but returned unopposed to Camp. We were hard at work
all day, improving our defences and removing the cover which surrounded
the outside of the gates, but it was clear this was, with our small
force, the work of many days, and that if we were soon attacked we
would have to make the best of things as they were. In the afternoon
the enemy's Cavalry appeared in large numbers on our left front. We
immediately turned out our Cavalry Brigade, who, however, could not
get near the enemy's, as they retired under the shelter of their guns,
where we did not care to follow them. The night passed quite quietly,
there being strong guards on all the walls, and everyone sleeping in
their clothes, ready to turn out at a moment's notice. It is necessary
I should mention that on the previous day, while I was at Kokeran,
General Primrose was busy in the City, seizing on all the principal
parts, closing and securing the Gates, and keeping the inhabitants
overawed--all works, any failure in which would have been utter
destruction to us. On the morning of the 28th, therefore, our small
force had three important duties to perform: 1st, to go out and assist
the retiring column; 2nd, to seize and hold the City, and fortify it,
and prepare for the siege; 3rd, to hold the Cantonments--any one of
them a task quite sufficient for the strength of the Force, so that our
accomplishing all three was a matter of great satisfaction.
[Sidenote: Enemy cavalry treated to some shells.]
JULY 30.--Sent out a reconnoitering party of Cavalry, and directed the
Officer so to approach the enemy's Camp as to try and draw him out,
which he did very successfully, giving us an excellent opportunity of
treating him with good effect to a few shells. General Burrows and I
urged on General Primrose the absolute necessity for turning out of
the City the whole of the Pathans, and he authorized us to go to the
Political Officer and the Wāli, and urge the great importance of
this matter, and notify his determination to have it carried out. A
little explanation on this subject is necessary. The population of the
City of Kandahar is made up of three sections, the largest of which
are Pathans, who are all Orthodox Mahomedans, very bitter against all
foreigners or infidels, and our irreconcilable enemies. The next are
the Moghuls or Parsiwans, who, though Mahomedans, are accounted a
species of dissenter by the true Mahomedans, and hated and persecuted
by them accordingly. Their sympathies are therefore (speaking
comparatively) with us. The third and last are the Hindoo Merchants, an
influential and numerous community, settlers from India, intent only on
making money, despised by both sects of Mahomedans, who, in turn, prey
on them and rob them. They are quite valueless as friends or foes, but
such as they were their feelings are with us. The Pathans, to a man,
were our enemies, and their presence in the City our deadliest danger,
and it seemed to me quite useless to fortify our position or take
measures against the enemy without, if we wilfully permitted a base and
treacherous foe to remain within, our walls. The measure of turning
out many innocent people was a hard and painful one, but it was one on
which our very existence rested, and so I was most urgent on the point.
As
[Sidenote: Politicals objected to Pathan ejectment.]
I expected, the Political Officers objected, and tried to persuade
us that the risk was imaginary, &c. However, I was firm, and after
a long and hot conversation which, at one time, seemed likely to
culminate in a row, I carried the day, and an order was issued that
all Pathans (men) should leave the City, and that in the afternoon
search parties would go round to ascertain that the order was being
obeyed. This unpleasant duty was confided to me, and I made all
preparations for resistance, but in no case met with any, and it was
clear the exodus had commenced, and eventually resulted in about 12,000
persons leaving the City of their own free will. This was a gain not
only in getting rid of a certain set of desperate enemies, but also in
reducing the number of mouths to be fed and supplied with water, the
latter more especially. Though this was a good beginning, I was by no
means satisfied that all the dangerous element had been removed, and
from time to time persistently urged my views to this effect, until
eventually it seemed we had reduced the evil to a minimum. I cannot
say that even yet (written August 14th) I am quite satisfied, but I
hope and believe the internal danger is greatly reduced. Throughout
we got no hearty assistance from the Political Officers, the Wāli,
or the City Authorities, the Chief of which (called the Kotwal) is, I
believe, the prime villain of the lot, and I informed Colonel St. John
(the Political Officer) that I considered he ought to be arrested, and
that I should myself, on my own responsibility, assuredly seize him if
there was the sign of an emeute in the town. I have no doubt Colonel
St. John will hereafter try to prove I was too decided, and too hard
in this matter, but I am convinced I was right, and only wish I had
more certainty that we were as safe from danger from within as he tries
to make me believe. If I were General Primrose I would relieve him of
all political powers while the present state of affairs lasted, and
constitute myself _only_ and chief Political Officer, and this I have
urged on him. When I found it quite impossible, as it seemed to be at
first, to move the Pathans out, I threatened (having received authority
from General Primrose to act as might seem best) to throw a few shells
into the Pathan quarter, and certainly would have done so when all
other means failed, but never desired or wished to resort to so extreme
a measure until all fair means had been tried.
JULY 31st.--After a quiet night I was up at 4·30 and sent out a
reconnoitering party, which got well into Cantonments without
resistance, and returned almost unopposed. While, however, they were so
employed, a large body of Cavalry and Infantry appeared on our right
front, in the direction of Mandi Hissar, and occupied 2 villages within
1,000 yards of the wall. General Primrose ordered me to take out some
Cavalry and Infantry to clear them off, which I did, and had a smart
little fight, effecting our object, and killing about 30 of the enemy,
with a loss to ourselves of one man killed and 3 wounded. I sent in
to ask General Primrose to send me some guns, as the enemy had fallen
back into a strong village, against the loopholed walls of which I did
not care to rush the men until I had got a practicable breach. No guns
coming, and the object of the little expedition having been effected,
I withdrew my party to the Fort, where I found that General Primrose
had not wished to push the affair further, and had sent to tell me so,
but the message had not reached me. Hard at work all day improving
our defences. Everyone is on duty always, and despite the hot sun and
incessant labor, all are in first-rate
[Sidenote: Demolitions of cover outside city gates.]
health. Now the General regrets that he did not take advantage of the
opportunity offered by the firing on our guards and picquets, to have
all the cover, which lies round the City Gates outside, down. It must
all be done now, and as our working parties are always opposed, we
lose men daily over the business. We all feel that we owe more than
half our troubles and difficulties to the happy-go-lucky style adopted
by General Stewart, who steadily objected to any military precautions
whatever being taken at Kandahar. He is certainly the luckiest man in
the world--having got safe away before his faults and oversights began
to bear fruit.
AUGUST 1st.--Sent out very heavy working parties to clear the front of
the Kabul Gate, which is a mass of houses and bazaars. These parties
are relieved every four hours, and have to be protected by strong
covering parties who are in conflict with the enemy the whole day, but
both sides taking advantage of the cover afforded by the numerous
walls, little serious loss results as a rule, though there is seldom a
day that 4, 5, or more men are not killed and wounded. At 2 p.m. took
direction of a small force to endeavour to find more of the Pathans,
who are, I am confident, still lurking in the City intent on no good.
It was a most unpleasant duty, but I hardened my heart, and made all I
found go out. We got over 700 out on this occasion. I cannot say I am
yet satisfied, and think we are being fooled and possibly betrayed by
the Wāli and his servants.
AUGUST 2nd.--Up at 5 a.m. to direct an attack on a garden opposite
our S.W. Bastion, which is the salient of my line of defence. Gave
the executive charge to Colonel Bannerman, who carried out the affair
in accordance with my instruction in an excellent manner, and most
successfully, and though the resistance was steady, our loss was only 1
man killed and 1 wounded, the enemy losing very considerably.
[Sidenote: Walls divided into separate commands.]
AUGUST 3rd.--My birthday; 44 years old to-day; could not help thinking
much of all the dear ones at home, knowing how anxious they would be,
and feeling sure I would not be forgotten on this day especially. Still
working hard at our defences. The walls were divided into 4 sections
for commands, as follows:--
General Primrose--The North or Eedgah Front.
General Burrows--W. or Herat Front.
General Nuttall--E. or Kabul Front.
General Brooke--S. or Shikarpore Front.
Though mine is shorter a good deal than either General Burrows' or
General Nuttall's, it has the drawback of being farthest from the
Citadel, and it is generally supposed it will be the one on which
the heaviest attack will come. Each front is covered outside with a
net-work of walls which must be destroyed.
AUGUST 4th.--All at the works. The enemy was rather troublesome, but
a few shot and shell, and a steady fire from our selected marksmen,
kept them off. The Wāli's Cavalry--about 80 men--went out of the
Shikarpore Gate and looted some forage, about a mile to the front,
in very good style. Prepared an Abatis in front of my gate, and cut
off the water supply of a village 1,000 yards due south. Slept on the
ramparts, and visited all my line twice between 11 p.m. and 4 a.m. I
have a camp bed up on the walls, but no one undresses, and sleep is
taken in very small snatches. I may say now I live on my wall, as,
except returning to the Citadel for breakfast and dinner and a wash, I
never leave the ramparts. We have rather a snug little mess, managed by
Colonel Beville, consisting of General Burrows and his Brigade Major,
Captain Law; Colonel Beville, and Captain Leckie, my Brigade Major,
and myself. So far we have fared very comfortably, as there is a good
deal to be bought, and we had a good deal of stores, &c., when we came
in. I have quite given up any sort of wine or spirits during the day,
and drink nothing but water or cold tea until dinner, when I have one
glass of sherry, and sometimes a little hock and water, but generally,
when I can get it, lime juice and water. I never touch spirits at all,
and am convinced that for hard work there is nothing like drinks that
do not inebriate.
AUGUST 5th.--Large covering and working parties in front of the Herat
Gate to remove heavy cover between it and the General's old garden.
Hardly any resistance offered by the enemy. I completed the Abatis and
wire entanglements opposite my gate, and the S.E. and S.W. Bastions,
both of which come within my charge. I consider the S.W. Bastion the
weakest point of my line, and the one where the heaviest and worst
attack will be. I have a 40-pounder gun in the S.E. Bastion, and 2
9-pounders in the S.W. Bastion. Urged thereto by General Burrows and
myself, General Primrose had the Kotwal of the City arrested, and in
the presence of General Burrows, Colonel St. John, the Nawab Hussun
Ali, and myself, warned him of the precarious position in which he
stood in case of any outbreak in the City, and told him of the reason
of his arrest, &c. He was then conveyed to safe quarters, where he is
kept under a European guard, no one seeing him except in the presence
of the officer. I feel sure he was a traitor to us, and had some bad
scheme in contemplation, and his arrest will nip his machinations in
the bud. Even Colonel St. John was glad he was arrested.
AUGUST 6th.--At 3 a.m. every man was turned out and occupied the post
he would hold in case of attack, to ascertain that all knew their
places. Everything was very quietly done, and the arrangements worked
well. The working parties in front of my gate were much annoyed by the
enemy firing at long distances. One officer, Lieut. De Trafford, 7th
Fusiliers, was wounded. We brought down a mortar and cleared out one
of the most troublesome villages. Ayoob Khan's Camp was observed to be
pitched behind Picquet Hill in the old Cantonments.
[Sidenote: Enemy's camp successfully shelled.]
AUGUST 7th.--Threw some shells (40-pounders) with excellent effect
into Ayoob's Camp. A regular stampede ensued, and many tents were seen
to be on fire, and the Camp was quickly deserted. The distance from
us being 3,500 yards (2 miles) they thought they were quite safe, and
their horror and astonishment was all the greater. We heard afterwards
that one shell had killed 10 and wounded 2 men, burning down the tent
in which they were lying. Busy all day on my walls improving the fire
capacity which, owing to the peculiar formation of the walls and
towers, is very defective, and, do what we may, will never be really
good. The heat is very great, inducing great lassitude, which is not
wonderful, seeing one barely gets 4 hours sleep out of 24, and never
has one's clothes off except for one's tub, the great luxury of the
day, and which I always have now just before dinner.
AUGUST 8th.--Heavy firing from the enemy on the working parties
in front of the Durani and Kabul Gates, and it took a serious
administration of mortar shells to quiet the enemy. For the first time
the enemy opened their Artillery on us from a well constructed battery
on Picquet Hill. Our 40-pounder at the N.W. angle, however, made
excellent practice, and dismounted one of their guns. The enemy have
moved their Camp to a position beyond Abasabad, 5,000 yards from our
guns. They are busy throwing up batteries against the Herat face.
[Sidenote: First proposal to attack Deh Kojah.]
AUGUST 9th.--Large working and covering parties (under Colonel Daubeny)
in front of the S.W. Bastion to complete necessary demolitions. We
lost several men, killed and wounded, but did good work. A large force
of the enemy collected in the village opposite Shikarpore Gate, but
were turned out by our mortar fire. It was proposed to attack the
village of Deh Kojah, which is 900 yards from the Kabul Gate, in view
to inflicting a lesson on the enemy. It was clear we could not think
of holding it, or any other place beyond the walls, and therefore we
should have no real advantage to recompense us for the certain loss
the enterprise would entail. For many good reasons I objected to the
plan, as useless and involving a certain heavy loss and discouragement
to the men, and eventually it was given up, a short bombardment being
substituted for it, which was, I fear, not very useful either.
AUGUST 10th.--Quiet night; but at 6·30 a.m. enemy opened, on the S.W.
Bastion, with a gun which had been placed in position during the night
in village opposite Shikarpore Gate. The shells fell short, doing no
damage, and our artillery forced him to evacuate the position. Enemy
appear to be busy throwing up entrenchments on Picquet Hill, also in a
corner of the garden opposite S.W. Bastion. He threw some shells into
the Citadel, one bursting in a room next to the Church. For the first
time I had leisure, and went round and visited all the wounded officers
and men, all doing well, though Major Iredell's wound is very serious.
Threw some shells into enemy's work in front of S.W. Bastion. Effect
not satisfactory, and the distance being only 400 yards, portions of
the shells flew back over us, and one bit killed one of our mules. On
going my rounds at 10 p.m. I heard decided indications of men at work
in the village opposite the Shikarpore Gate, and also sounds of wheels
(artillery), from which I judged the enemy were throwing up a battery
there. Reinforced parties on walls, and remained expecting an attack
all night, but none came.
AUGUST 11th.--At daylight discovered that the village in front of my
Gate has, as I anticipated, been much fortified since the previous
evening, but were quite unable to discover where the battery, if there
is one, is placed. Letters received for the first time from India,
but only two in cypher, for General Primrose and Colonel St. John. By
them we are informed that Sir F. Roberts left Kabul on the 7th, with
a division to assist us--he cannot be here before the 1st of next
month--and that General Phayre was doing all he could to gather a force
to bring to our relief. He was at Quetta on the 6th, so it is unlikely
that he either can arrive until the end of the month. Bombarded village
in front of Shikarpore Gate with good effect.
[Sidenote: Gallant act of two R.E. Officers.]
AUGUST 12th.--A quiet night. Being grouse-shooting day, we acted as
grouse, and were heavily shot at as we had a large covering and working
party out opposite the S.W. Bastion, in hopes of effecting some much
wanted demolitions. The whole were under the command of Lieut.-Colonel
Griffiths, 1st N.I., who, in my judgment, by no means made the most of
his opportunities, and little or no work was done. The gardens which
had to be taken were full of the enemy, who were, however, smartly
driven out by the Fusiliers and 19th N.I., but owing to supports not
being brought up, the enemy returned in force, and the position became
untenable, unless we wished to precipitate a general action, which was
undesirable. All sorts of wild reports were sent in of large gatherings
of the enemy approaching, which I did not credit, but it was considered
wiser to recall the parties, which was done, and all fell back under
a fierce fire, during which many of our men fell. I was standing on
the parapet, directing matters as far as I could, when I witnessed,
just 20 feet beneath me, a grand piece of gallantry on the part of two
young R.E. Officers (Lieuts. Jones and Waller), who, under a galling
fire, returned from safe cover and carried into safety a wounded sepoy,
during which operation one of the men who was with them, a private of
the 7th, was killed--shot through the head. I can personally testify
to the hotness of the fire, and I have recommended both for the V. C.,
which I think they fully deserve. I am opposed altogether to these
small fights which cost many lives and have but little results, but the
next there is I shall, I think, take myself and try to make a better
job of it than was done to-day.
AUGUST 13th.--Quiet night and morning. Not a soul to be seen all
round. After breakfast went on the Signal Tower to watch the effect
of a few 40-pounder shells, which we were going to throw into the
enemy's new camp, at 5,000 yards' range. The shots were excellent, and
evidently created much consternation, but the enemy had evidently seen
our group on the Signal Tower, and at once sent a 12-pounder shell at
us, which went beyond the Tower, his second trial was short and went
into the City, but his third shot was so far successful that he hit
the lower part of the Tower. At 6 p.m. we shelled a Battery in Deh
Khoja. The enemy replied briskly for ½ an hour, and then finding
it too hot, shut up. On this occasion we used 7-pounder shells in
the 9-pounder guns, to which they had been adapted by an ingenious
contrivance of Major Caldecott. They proved a great success, and are a
grand addition to our firing powers, as we have 1,100 of them in the
Arsenal. On coming back to the walls after dinner I found a telegram
from the Herat Gate, to say that large bodies of men were advancing
with music, &c. Knowing the anxious nature of my friend in command
there the information did not much excite me, and I waited till I could
get down to the S.W. Bastion before deciding if any special measures
were necessary. Getting there I heard the music (most discordant), and
concluded it was in the Engineer Garden in our old Cantonments, and
was merely the enemy having a musical evening. The fact that there was
music was rather a proof that the enemy did not contemplate an attack.
There were, no doubt, many people about, but on the whole I decided
there was nothing at the moment worth turning out the Garrison for, so
sent a re-assuring telegram to Head Quarters, which was justified by a
quiet night.
[Sidenote: Further attacks on the Shikapore Gate.]
AUGUST 14th.--At 6·30 the enemy opened a Battery on the Shikarpore
Gate, to which we quickly replied, shutting him and his guns up in ½
an hour. A spy came in who reports our shells have created much damage
among the enemy; also that they lost 60 men in the little affair of the
12th, among them Mahomed Azim Khan, Governor of Furrah, a very great
man indeed. The spy says there is an Artillery Officer prisoner with
Ayoub Khan, and that he is very well treated in every way; he also says
that the enemy have 1,500 wounded now lying at Maiwand.
Here the Diary ends!
APPENDIX.