From

Rt. Hon. Hugh Childers, M.P.,

War Office.

To

Mrs. Brooke,

Ashbrooke,

Brookeboro'.

I deeply regret to have to announce to you that General BROOKE fell

in a sortie from Kandahar on the Sixteenth of August. Pray accept my

most sincere condolences on the terrible loss to yourself and to the

country.

* * * * *

From Her Majesty the Queen.

Balmoral Castle,

August 27th, 1880.

Lt.-General Sir Henry Ponsonby presents his compliments to Mrs. Brooke.

He has been commanded to convey the Queen's sincere and earnest

sympathy with her in her grief, and Her Majesty's sorrow at the loss

sustained by Mrs. Brooke in the recent action near Kandahar, where the

Queen has had to lament the death of so many brave officers and men.

The accounts which Her Majesty has received of Brigadier-General

BROOKE only increase her deep regret that she should have been

deprived of the services of so gallant and worthy a soldier.

* * * * *

From

H. E. The Governor,

Bombay.

To

Mrs. Brooke,

Ashbrooke,

Brookeboro'.

Viceroy desires me to convey to you his deep sympathy, in which I beg

to join. It is reported your gallant Husband was killed while trying

to carry off Captain Cruikshank when wounded.

* * * * *

From Major General Dillon.

Horse Guards, Pall Mall,

London, August 30th, 1880.

My dear Mrs. Brooke,

I have waited for some days before carrying out the wishes of the Duke

of Cambridge, received from Kissengen, to convey to you by letter

an expression of His Royal Highness' deep sympathy with you in your

great affliction, and his sense of the loss which the service has

sustained by the death of a gallant soldier and distinguished officer.

In alluding to the sad event in the last letter received from Germany

only to-day, His Royal Highness continues--"I am too sorry for General

BROOKE'S death, a good officer lost to the service at a critical

moment for the garrison of Kandahar. Lord Napier will feel it much."

Believe me,

Dear Mrs. Brooke,

Yours very sincerely,

M. A. DILLON.

* * * * *

From Lord Napier of Magdala.

August 25th, 1880.

Dear Lady Arabella,

I cannot resist writing you a few lines to express my most sincere

sympathy with you, and my sorrow at the loss of your gallant son at

Kandahar, which the telegram has to-day announced to us. I have felt

so much confidence in your son being with the Force, that I look upon

his loss as a great public misfortune, as well as a domestic calamity,

the bitterness of which you and his widow alone can tell. I much

entreat you, dear friend, to try and remember that he fell nobly doing

his duty, and I trust that God in his mercy will give you strength

to bear this heavy bereavement, and will in His own time comfort you

and the poor widow. Lady Napier joins me in the truest and deepest

sympathy.

Believe me,

Dear Lady Arabella,

Yours most sincerely,

NAPIER OF MAGDALA.

* * * * *

Statement of Sergeant-Major Rickard, 2/7th Royal Fusiliers.

Sergeant-Major T. Rickard, of the 2/7th Fusiliers, states:--On the

16th August, 1880, I was one of the Party ordered out for the storming

of Deh Khoja, under General BROOKE. We attacked the village at the

South end about 5.30 a.m. under a very heavy fire in all directions

from the enemy. When we arrived in the centre of the village, Captain

Cruikshank, R.E., got wounded. General BROOKE assisted in helping

him along. We then advanced further on, to force our way through the

village, when we halted and got under a wall, as we thought under

cover, but the enemy's fire from all directions kept getting heavier,

and the longer we stopped the heavier the fire got. General BROOKE

said to me, "Sergeant-Major, we shall never get out of this, I am

afraid." He then ordered us to retire back out of the village. We did

so. After we got out of the village about 300 yards, we halted again

under cover about 10 minutes, and fired on the enemy as fast as we

could. General BROOKE asked me to send him another man to help him

along with Captain Cruikshank. I did so, and we retired again towards

the Fort, and had only got about 200 yards when General BROOKE was

shot in the head (dead), and the other man that was helping was shot.

I was with General BROOKE the whole time, till he was shot.

T. RICKARD,

Sergeant-Major 2/7th Royal Fusiliers.

* * * * *

From Colonel French, R.A., Commanding Artillery in Kandahar.

Kandahar, 26th August.

My Dear Annie,

Most sincerely do I sympathize with you in the loss of your dear good

Husband, poor HENRY; he was so genial, cheery, kind, and courteous

to all who came in contact with him, and much beloved and respected

by everyone in this Force. No braver or truer soldier lost his life

in that ill-fated attack on Deh Khoja. I miss him so very much, we

were thrown so much together during the last four months. No man was

more keen for a fight than poor HENRY, and when the day of battle did

come, right gallantly he led his men, sacrificing his life in the

humane effort to rescue a wounded man from falling into the hands

of the enemy. From Trumpeter McGlynn, C/2 R.A., who was his Orderly

Trumpeter on the 16th August, I have heard the following account of

how poor HENRY fell:--After half an hour's skirmishing they reached

the village, and on entering, HENRY and the Trumpeter had just

dismounted, when a volley from the enemy so startled their horses

they broke away, and galloped back to within the City. HENRY advanced

through the village on foot, cheering on his men amidst a galling fire

of musketry, which the enemy poured on them from loop-holed walls.

Arrived in the centre of the village, Captain Cruikshank, R.E., fell

badly wounded. At this time our men were being driven back by superior

numbers and the heavy fire from the houses. HENRY helped to carry

Cruikshank; succeeded in getting him out of the village, of which

they had got clear about 30 yards, HENRY still supporting Cruikshank,

when he was struck down by apparently a bullet in the head. Trumpeter

McGlynn states that he fell forward on his face and never moved after;

so poor HENRY'S death must have been instantaneous. The Trumpeter and

a few men of the 7th Fusiliers tried to carry off the body, but were

compelled to desist owing to the enemy making a rush on them. Deh

Khoja was evacuated on the night of the 24th, and on the following day

search was made for the bodies of our fallen. HENRY'S was found and

buried near where he fell, under a Peepul tree, the Rev. Mr. Cane,

our Chaplain, having read the Burial Service. This terrible loss of

life at Maiwand and Deh Khoja has cast a gloom on all here, and no man

is more generally sorrowed for and regretted than poor HENRY--every

inch a soldier. No man worked harder to put this City in a state of

defence. I looked upon him as one of our rising Generals, who, later

on, would have shone out with much distinction.

* * * * *

From Colonel B.

Kandahar, 14th September, 1880.

My dear Major H.,

I am sorry I have been unable, through press of work, to fulfil my

promise before now, and send you the particulars of the unfortunate

affair of Deh Khoja, on the 16th August, as far as they are known by

me, which cost us so many valuable lives, and more especially that of

my dear friend General BROOKE, whose loss was deeply felt by everyone

here, for he was not only much loved by all, but he had proved himself

to be possessed of the greatest energy and cool good judgment, and

had consequently gained the confidence of all ranks, both senior and

junior. I have no hesitation in saying that we are indebted to him

for much that was done to strengthen our position here, and in the

arrangements for the defence. He never rested until he got the Pathans

turned out of the City, and the place disarmed. How much he did do,

and how much his wise influence effected will probably never be known

fully by the Public; but from a perusal of his Diary which I gave you,

it will be seen how continually active he was in carrying out the work

assigned to him, and what his opinions were on many subjects. He was

strongly opposed to the attack on Deh Khoja, for many reasons, which

he gives in his Diary, and he was mainly instrumental in its being

abandoned the week before, when it had been resolved on. The attack

was finally decided on, the following week, on the advice, I believe,

of the Commanding Engineer, in consequence of our working parties

employed outside the Kabul Gate, in demolishing some buildings,

having been prevented by the fire from Deh Khoja completing the work.

His objections to it were stronger than before, as it was known

that the enemy had been busily employed all the week in fortifying

the village, and he feared that the loss would be greater than we

could afford, or than the good to be gained. He could not, however,

urge his objections, as he had done on the previous occasion, as he

was nominated to command the attack. The force was composed of 300

Cavalry, 300 Royal Fusiliers, and 500 Native Infantry. The Cavalry

left the Eedgar Gate at 4 o'clock in the morning, and making a wide

detour of the village of Kairabad took up a position in the rear of

Deh Khoja, _i.e._, on the west. Our guns on the walls then commenced

a bombardment to prepare the Infantry attack, and at 5·30 a.m. the

Infantry moved out of the Kabul Gate, covered by riflemen from the

walls. Immediately they got out into the open they came under a very

heavy fire from the village, which is from 700 to 800 yards from the

City, but the troops advanced in splendid form and were never once

checked. They entered the village at the south, as had been previously

decided on, and we then lost sight of them, but we could hear them

hard at work with their rifles. I need not describe the village, for

you have seen it and know what a labyrinth of narrow streets and high

walls it is, every enclosure being a regular little fortification, so

that as soon as the enemy was driven out of one position they ran

into another like a lot of rats, and our force was too weak to hold

the positions as they were taken. General BROOKE, however, pushed

on with his troops right through the village from south to north,

and leaving a strong party of the Fusiliers at the latter part, he

retraced his steps with a view of completing the capture, but by this

time the enemy began to pour in from the south of the village; these

were reinforcements sent by Ayoob Khan from the cantonments as soon

as he had heard the firing going on. They advanced by the gardens and

village on the south of the City, which afforded them shelter from

our fire until they came opposite our S. E. Bastion where we had a

40-pounder and 9-pounder which gave them several rounds, but did not

do them much damage, the practice being bad. It did not at any rate

check them. Our cavalry, however, seeing them coming, moved down

in that direction and stopped them for some little time, but being

exposed to a heavy fire from the enclosures when they could not act,

they had to be withdrawn. On finding that the enemy were crowding into

the village from the south, General BROOKE sent his Brigade-Major to

General Primrose to report matters and to ask for orders, the reply to

which was to retire his Force at once, but by the time this officer

got back to the village the enemy held it in such force he could not

get to General BROOKE, who was still in the centre of it. A Trumpeter

of C/2, who was with General BROOKE all the time, informed me that

when they returned from the north of the village and had reached about

the centre, they found Captain Cruikshank, R.E., severely wounded,

and unable to move, and finding that the enemy was closing in on them

all round, General BROOKE looked out for some defensible place into

which he could get the party which was with him, consisting of men of

the Fusiliers and Native Sappers, and for this purpose he made for a

court-yard in which there were buildings, but directly they entered

it they were met by a heavy fire. It was here that Captain Cruikshank

begged him to leave him to his fate, and save himself and party, but

he nobly refused to do this, and thinking there were still some of

his party in the south of the village where he had left them, he

determined to push on in that direction, so calling for volunteers

of the Fusiliers to carry poor Cruikshank, they moved down to the

south under a heavy fire and got out into the open. All the parties

had been compelled to withdraw, and there was nothing left for them

but to make the best of their way back to the City, taking advantage

of what cover they could find. They were much hampered by having to

carry poor Cruikshank, and they had frequently to change the men who

were carrying him. It was during one of these changes, when they had

got about 100 yards from the village, and poor BROOKE was supporting

Cruikshank with his left arm while the men were being relieved, that

he was shot through the back, just between the shoulders, and fell

dead; at the same time a number of Ghazis made a rush on them from the

village, and the remainder of the party retreated hastily towards the

City. On the 25th August the village was evacuated by the enemy, and

we went out to bury the bodies. I found and recognised poor BROOKE'S

body. He was lying among several others, and Cruikshank and a Sergeant

Strong were close to him. It was a fearfully melancholy sight, but

it was a great satisfaction to recover the bodies and to give them

burial, which we did under a tree close to the spot where they fell.

While deeply grieving and lamenting over his death and those who died

with him, one cannot but feel proud of his noble and gallant conduct

in sacrificing himself in endeavouring to save a brother officer.

Among the papers which I gave you, you will find one containing his

views on the situation in Afghanistan, which will repay perusal, and

which will, no doubt, be valuable to his family. I have his sword,

which I forgot to give you with the other things I had selected to

send home. I will take care of it till I get an opportunity of sending

it home.

* * * * *

From Mrs. L.

11th October.

My dear B.,

I am enclosing one sheet of the letter which was written on the 16th

August, the day of the sortie.

Kandahar, August 16th.

This is a very sad day for us. There was a great sortie this morning

against a village outside the Kabul Gate. We sent out 800 Infantry and

300 Cavalry under General BROOKE. They got into the village, and there

they suffered considerable loss. The Fusiliers lost 2 Officers, Marsh

and Wood, both young boys, 25 killed, and 29 wounded; the 28th one

Officer, Colonel Newport, killed, and 30 killed and 19 wounded; the

19th 2 Officers, Major Trench and Lieut. Stayner, killed. Their return

of men have not yet come in. Major Vandeleur, 7th Fusiliers, is badly

wounded; Colonel Nimmo, 28th, dangerously; Colonel Shewell, of the

Commissariat, wounded; Lieut. Wood, of the Transport, badly wounded;

Captain Cruikshank, of the Engineers, killed; the Rev. Gordon,

dangerously wounded; and last and worst, General BROOKE killed. I

feel so sad about it, I can hardly speak, for I had learnt almost to

love him, indeed I may say quite. He was shot through the head as he

was carrying poor Cruikshank away from the village; and the worst of

it is, that, in the opinion of many of us, this sortie was a quite

useless waste of life. I believe we inflicted considerable loss of

life on the enemy; but it was mere madness attacking with such a small

force, a labyrinth of lanes and houses like that. BROOKE knew it, but

could not protest, as he was ordered to command the Force. Burrows

knew it, but he was not consulted. A man of the Fusiliers, whom I

questioned about BROOKE'S death, says, the party he was with would

never have got out of the village but for him. He is a great loss, for

he was the best head we had, and I think the whole Force deplores his

loss, nearly--though not quite as much as I do. When you write to B.,

let her and her husband know how he was loved, and how nobly he died.

I cannot write any more. There is a great deal to be done; but no more

sorties, I trust. We ought merely to have waited, but somebody got an

idea we ought to do something.

"Poor BROOKE was warned that he was going to certain death when he

went back for Cruikshank, but he would go. Cruikshank was mortally

wounded, and begged them to leave him and save themselves. BROOKE had

ordered the Cavalry to cover the retreat of the Infantry, which was

construed into an order to retire, and the consequence was that the

Cavalry was withdrawn, and crowds of men rushed into the village,

which had been kept in check on the far side of the Cavalry--even

before our men were out of the village. I cannot tell you how I miss

BROOKE, he was always so cheery and jolly, and had such sound views;

he was the best head we had in the Force." In another letter he says,

"BROOKE'S loss shows day by day more seriously; his cheery temper and

sound views had the best influence.

"We miss his counsels greatly, in another way he is a great loss, as

he knew every yard of the country round, and would have been the very

man to lead a turning column. If it were not for the loss of BROOKE, I

should feel quite jolly, but I can't get him out of my head."

* * * * *

From Mrs. P.

21st October, 1880.

Dear Mr. Brooke,

We had this morning letters from my brother Colonel H., at Kandahar,

and we think you would like to hear what he says of your Brother.

To my husband my brother writes:--Poor BROOKE, as gallant a fellow

as ever stepped, led the attack, and after doing gallant deeds was

recalled by the orders of General Primrose (from the walls of the

City), and in retiring and trying to save a brother officer's life

lost his own. The three columns, as is invariably the case, lost all

sight and touch of each other, and nobody knew where the others were;

in spite of it all, the effect on the enemy was very great, and the

siege to all intents and purposes ended.

Poor BROOKE was full of zeal and energy, and died a soldier's death in

being the last to leave the village, and in attempting to carry poor

Cruikshank, who had been fatally wounded, out of action. It may be a

satisfaction to Mrs. Brooke to know that he behaved so gallantly and

was spared all suffering while carrying his brother officer under a

most murderous fire. 24 were killed round about him, and the heaviest

loss occurred where he fell; he did not retire of his own accord, and

was greatly surprised to get the order which was sent him by General

Primrose; on receiving it he sent orders for the several parties

to retire, and fell back himself last of all with a few men. Being

ordered to retire, he had no opportunity to carry out his plan to the

end; it might have been a grand success or a heavy loss, but his loss

was very heavily felt by the Force.

In the Battle of Pir Paimal we formed, with one of Roberts' Brigades,

the Reserve, while two Brigades attacked. Our Reserve had a grand

chance of distinguishing themselves, and had BROOKE been alive, I

believe it would have been done.

* * * * *

Extract from another Brother's Letter.

August 27th, 1880.

The day before yesterday we got the news of the sortie of the Garrison

(Kandahar) on the 16th: it has had good results, and was successful;

yet the heavy loss in Senior Officers does not read well. General

BROOKE is amongst the killed, and I am very sorry at this, for, no

doubt, he was one of the best men in the Garrison, and is sure to have

been always plucky and cheery.

* * * * *

From Col.

Kandahar, September, 1880.

... BROOKE was constantly at General Primrose about our weakness in

Troops and the defencelessness of the Citadel, but he would never

sanction any money being spent on it. Everything he did, or rather did

not do, was bad enough, but I shall never forgive him the Deh Khoja

business on the 16th August, which lost us poor BROOKE's life, and

the lives of so many brave men, without any object. General Primrose

had ordered the assault on Deh Khoja the week before, but BROOKE

and Burrows got him to countermand it for the following reasons,

namely:--The village was built of thick mud walls and roofs, so that

it could not possibly be burned; it was known to be very strongly

held by the enemy, and would therefore require a _large_ Force to

take it, and we should therefore lose a great many more men than we

could spare, and if we captured it we could not hold it, as we had

not enough men to man our own walls properly, and as it could not

be burned, or destroyed, or held, the enemy would simply walk back

into it the minute we left it; and the last and best reason was, that

as there were two Forces coming to our relief, our duty was to hold

Kandahar, and do nothing to endanger our position, and certainly not

to go outside the walls to fight the enemy, giving up the advantage

that we had. We all thought the insane idea had been given up for

good, but the following week General Primrose sent for BROOKE and

Burrows, and told them that he had made up his mind to attack the

village next morning, and told BROOKE he was to command the Force.

This, of course, effectually prevented BROOKE saying what he thought,

as he told me he could not raise objections against it, under these

circumstances, as it might be thought that he was afraid, but he said,

"the objections against it are greater than they were before, as it is

known that the enemy have been hard at work all the week fortifying

the place." Burrows ought to have done his best to oppose it, but as

BROOKE did not oppose, for the above reason he, said nothing, and

so the attack unfortunately took place the next morning. Being on

the Head Quarter Staff, I was not, of course, allowed to go, but I

watched it from the walls where our riflemen covered the advance of

the attacking party and our big guns. The village of Deh Khoja was

only 700 yards off, and the enemy fired at us tremendously. The troops

advanced under a very heavy fire, very steadily and well, and entered

the village and went right through it, but the place was like a rabbit

warren right through it, with very large loop-holed walls, from which

the enemy kept up an incessant fire without our men being able to see

them, and as soon as they were turned out of one enclosure they ran

into another, and back again into those they had been turned out of,

for our Forces were not strong enough to hold the enclosures as they

were taken, and all this time the enemy was pouring into the village

from Ayoub Khan's main Force. At last General Primrose sent to order

the Force to retreat, and no doubt poor BROOKE could have got away

unhurt, but he stopped to bring away a wounded officer, and so lost

his life. We did not recover the bodies of the killed until the 25th,

10 days after, when the village was deserted by the enemy. I went to

search for poor BROOKE, whom I recognised, and I buried him myself. I

cannot get over his loss. We have lived together since we came here,

and I have become very fond of him; I am sure he liked me, and that I

have lost a good friend in him. He was a fine fellow, brave as a lion,

and a thorough soldier in every way; clear-headed and with excellent

judgment. It is indeed grievously sad such a fine fellow should have

been lost, for he is a loss to the whole army, in such a needless

manner.

* * * * *

From Lieut. F.

26th February, 1881.

My dear Mrs. Brooke,

Private Journal of Henry Francis Brooke Late Brigadier-General Commanding 2nd Infantry Brigade, Kandahar Field Force, Southern Afghanistan, from April 22nd to August 16th, 1880 · 第 10 / 12 段