welcome addition, small as it is, to our painfully weak force.
JULY 26th.--The guard on the Herat Gate was fired on during the early
morning. I again urged the necessity for demolishing all cover near
the gates, but the measure was deemed too strong. I am determined, if
possible, to catch the scoundrels who go about, and hold parties of
Cavalry and Infantry in readiness all night to go without delay to any
place where firing of this desultory nature is heard. This is harassing
to the troops, but cannot be helped. 2 more companies of the 28th N.I.
arrived.
JULY 27th.--I got information that some of the enemy were concealed in
the hills above old Kandahar, so, obtaining permission from General
Primrose to make a raid on them, I despatched parties of the 7th
Fusiliers and 4th N.I. to see if the report was correct, and if so
to attack and defeat them. I rode out myself in the afternoon to see
how the search through the very difficult ground was being carried on,
and quite approved the arrangements made by Major Marshall who was in
command. No one, however, was found, though there were evident signs
that several places had been recently inhabited, and very hurriedly
evacuated.
[Sidenote: First alarming account of disaster.]
JULY 28th.--I was woke at 1·30 a.m. by Colonel La Touche, of the
Cavalry, who came to report to me that a small portion (a native
officer and 30 men) of one of the Cavalry regiments with General
Burrows' Force had just reached camp, having, they said, rode 60
miles without drawing rein to bring the information of the total
annihilation, by Ayoob Khan's army, of the force under General Burrows.
They declared that a great battle had been fought the previous day
about noon; that after holding out for 5 hours under a terrible fire,
that the whole force had been broken up and taken to flight, and been
cut to pieces in detail. Both Generals, Burrows and Nuttall, were
said to be dead, that no one, but these men themselves, was saved.
The story was a terrible one, and enough to shock the stoutest heart
and nerves. I could not, and would not, believe it in its entirety,
and told Colonel La Touche that I felt sure things were not as black
as they were painted, though I feared they were bad enough. The first
thing, however, was to take the news to General Primrose, so, pulling
on a few clothes, I ran over to his house with Colonel La Touche
and told him the bad news, at the same time recommending caution in
accepting, without some reserve, the story of the native officer and
men of the Sind Horse. A disaster had, without doubt, occurred, and the
only question was whether or not a remnant had escaped, and if so of
what strength. A hurried consultation was held, and it was unanimously
agreed that, with the certainty of the whole country rising like one
man against us, it would be worse than madness for our small force to
attempt to hold the altogether indefensible military position which the
parsimony and want of military forethought on the part of Sir Donald
Stewart had bequeathed to us. As I have often remarked hitherto on
the hopeless position, from a military point of view, of the Kandahar
Cantonments, it is useless repeating all the objections to them again.
Suffice it to say, that they have no independant water supply; that
they are commanded on one side by two low hills, and that they are
straggling, and entirely without military defences of any kind, and
that no amount of labor or money could have made them tenable in
[Sidenote: City to be occupied versus cantonments.]
the few days at our disposal. Our only alternative was to accept
another utterly false military position, and to occupy the whole City
of Kandahar, it being impossible to place our force, small as it was,
in the Citadel, nor (could we have done so) to have held the Citadel
against an enemy in possession of the City. It is hardly necessary
to point out the dangers in, and objections to, the occupation of the
City, as they are self-evident, the first and chief one being the
vastness of its size in comparison with the force at our disposal.
The City, of which I give a rough plan on one of the foregoing pages,
is a sort of irregular parallelogram, one side (N.) being 1,200
yards long; the W. 1,900 yards long, the S. 1,300 yards long, and
the E. 2,000 yards long, a total length of wall of something under
4 miles, to protect which, and an additional half mile of wall in
the Citadel, we should have, unless some portion of General Burrows'
force returned, not quite 1,500 men. When I mention that to defend
lines of this length, according to military rules, a force of 18,000
men is considered the correct thing--the almost hopelessness of the
position may be imagined. Behind and within these walls lay a city
with a population of 30,000, of whom 14,000 were men, out of whom it
was no exaggeration to feel that half at least must of necessity be
our deadly enemies, and that consequently, in addition to offering
resistance to hordes without, we had to guard against treachery from
within. The position, for these two reasons alone, was utterly wrong,
but it was the sole possible alternative, and had to be accepted, and
its difficulties and dangers dealt with as might be possible. The
question of water was the urgent one, but as we knew the City had a
sufficient supply for its inhabitants, of which we purposed to turn
out at least one half, we trusted we should get enough for ourselves.
The walls vary in height from 18 feet in the lowest place to 25 feet
in the highest, and are about 20 feet thick at the base, and 12 to 14
feet broad at the parapet. There are 6 Gates--four principal ones--from
which the various faces take their names, and 2 minor ones. The
northern gate is called the Eedgah; the southern the Shikarpore, being
the gate from which the main road to India leads; the western gate is
the Kabul gate, and near it a smaller one known as the Bar Dourani;
the eastern gate is the Herat gate, and close to it another called the
Topkhana or Artillery gate. Along the walls, at intervals of 100 yards,
are high turrets, which give the only flanking defence, very poor in
quality and degree. This point hurriedly, but definitely and decidedly,
settled, we had no time for conversation or consideration, as immediate
action was necessary, the carrying out of which General Primrose placed
unreservedly in my hands. The first thing to be done was to have the
sick and ammunition conveyed to a place of safety in the Citadel, and
as it was clear we could not use our heavy battery (viz., 4 40-pounders
and 2 six-inch mortars), drawn by bullocks in the field, I sent it also
without delay into the Citadel, and issued orders to all commanding
officers to move all public and private property belonging to their
regiments to the Citadel also.
[Sidenote: Further details of General Burrows' defeat.]
About 4 a.m. one or two native stragglers from General Burrows' Force
came in and gave a less terrible account of the destruction which
had befallen it than the Sind Horse had done, and at ¼ to 5 a.m.
Veterinary-Surgeon Oliver, of the Horse Artillery, arrived and was
brought to me. He was greatly exhausted, but I learned from him that
there was a very considerable proportion of the force saved, and that
the main body was covering the retreat, and was probably then about
10 miles off, Generals Burrows and Nuttall being with them. I sent
Mr. Oliver on to General Primrose, who had ridden down to the Citadel
to start work there, to tell his story, and convey a message from me
that I requested permission to take a small force and move out in the
direction of Kokeran to cover General Burrows' retirement. Feeling sure
the proposal would be approved, I ordered
1 troop of Cavalry,
2 guns,
4 companies of Infantry,
to be held in readiness to march at once. About ¾ of an hour later
General Primrose arrived from the Citadel and authorized my starting at
once, urging on me, however, to use great caution, and avoid, as far
as possible, any considerable loss of life. Being anxious to be off at
once, I had no time to give any attention to getting my own property
into the Citadel, but had to leave the matter to my native servant,
telling him to do the best he could, and to take the most useful
things into safety first, and I may here say that he must have worked
admirably, as, when I got to the Fort at 7 o'clock in the evening,
I found he had brought off in safety every single thing I possessed.
At ½ past 5 o'clock (¾ of an hour after I first heard that any
remnants of Burrows' force was saved, and trying to return) I paraded
my little force, which was, I was horrified to find, much smaller
than I had intended, as the full number of men were not at the moment
available. Time was precious to our poor comrades wearily fighting
their way back to Camp, so I decided not to wait till I could get my
numbers, and started with only
40 Sabres Native Cavalry,
2 Guns R. A.,
70 of the 7th Fusiliers.
100 of the 28th Native Infantry,
I knew there could be no organized resistance, and that if I was
cautious I could come to no harm, but, all the same, I am free to
confess that I could not avoid feeling anxious about my guns, as the
loss of 2 more would have been simply ruin to us. I must here describe
the route I had to follow, as its peculiarities added much to the
difficulties and dangers of the enterprise. Immediately after leaving
the Barracks the road passes for about ½ a mile through walled
gardens, each garden forming a little fortification of itself, and
giving cover for any number of armed men. These passed through, the
Village of Abasabad is reached through the main street of which the
road goes. This street is so narrow that in places it was a close shave
to get the R.A. carriages through, and it twists and winds about most
unpleasantly. Beyond the village is another quarter of a mile of walled
gardens, and then an open plain is come to with, however, commanding
hills all along the road to the right (about 300 yards off), and on the
left a string of strongly placed villages about the same distance from
the road. It is evident, therefore, that every inch of road offered
extraordinary facilities for the enemy to resist our
[Sidenote: Terrible accounts of the retreat.]
advance. As we left the camp we began to meet the first of the
long string of fugitives, who continued afterwards to pass us till
we reached Kokeran, a more terrible sight I never witnessed; all
appearance of organization or discipline gone; each man, whether
European or native, was fighting, as it were, for his own life, careful
of nothing but getting into safety. All were wearied and harrassed,
and many unable hardly to move one foot before the other, as indeed
was not wonderful, considering that since 4 p.m. the previous day they
had been marching, with a cruel enemy on all sides of them, shooting
and stabbing every man who, too wearied to drag on, sat down for a
moment's rest. To add to the horrors of the march they had, in the
whole distance of over 50 miles, found water only twice, and what this
means no one who has not lived and worked in this climate can tell.
From all I can hear there were some marvellous instances of self-denial
in this matter: men giving up their last drop of water, which was more
than their lives to them, to men more feeble than themselves, and,
apparently, none equalled or exceeded in this respect Captain Slade,
of the Horse Artillery, as noble a soldier as ever lived. Officers and
men have since told me of his heroic efforts to save his guns, to give
assistance and to sacrifice his life, or deny himself to save or help
anyone; all also join in saying General Burrows' conduct was splendid,
and that he had fairly won the Victoria Cross 3 or 4 times. Once when
all hope seemed lost, for dismounted men he got off his horse, put two
wounded officers on it, and led it himself for 3 miles, with a howling
crowd of savages following him, anxious for his life. I had never seen
the retreat of a panic-stricken military force before, and I trust
I never may do so again, as it is too horrible for description, and
this retreat excelled in terror any that I have ever read of. As each
inch of the road (till my little force was seen) had to be fought for
against a set of blood-thirsty savages, rather than fall into whose
hands alive, it is said several men shot themselves, knowing the
horrible fate that would otherwise be in store for them. Then the want
of water was a fearful aggravation of the sufferings of the wretched
men, and the length of the march, 50 miles, made the hope of escape
seem impossible. I must now go back to my own enterprise, which, I
rejoice to think, was successful, and resulted in the saving of many
valuable lives. I had hardly got my little force in column of route
outside the Barrack gates, when the enemy commenced
[Sidenote: Relieving force meet with oppositions.]
a desultory and harmless fire on us from behind the walls of the
neighbouring gardens. I at once sent forward some skirmishers to the
front, and a cavalry picquet to the extreme right and left, and was
glad to see the spirit with which all advanced, which at once told
on the rabble opposed to us, who gave up their positions and ran for
their lives, several being killed as they ran. In this way, pressing on
steadily, I cleared the gardens and the Village of Abasadad, and was
able to bring my guns and remainder of my column through that extremely
awkward position. On the other side of the village the skirmishers had
advanced, driving the enemy before them, till the more open ground was
reached. Here I formed up my column once more, preparatory to pushing
on for Kokeran. On the range of high hills which ran along the left of
the road, at about 300 yards off, were small bodies of the enemy, as
also in the strongly placed villages on my left. Before advancing I had
to send out small parties on either flank to dislodge these people,
which they did with the greatest ease. My way was again clear, and I
advanced without opposition for about a mile, when, on a low hill,
about 2,000 yards to my right-front, I saw a considerable force posted,
which was being increased every moment by contingents from the villages
in the rear of the hill, from which we could see people hurrying in
great numbers. Seeing a good position about 1,000 yards ahead, I pushed
on to it rapidly, and getting my guns into action, threw forward the
Cavalry to threaten the left flank, while the Infantry moved slowly to
the front. A couple of shells planted, with charming precision, by my
friend Captain Law had a most happy effect, and, as we could see, shook
the confidence of the enemy, good as their position was. They did not,
however, seem disposed to take the hint, and kept up a constant, but,
owing to the distance, harmless fire on us as we advanced. Presently,
however, on a repetition of the dose equally well administered,
assisted by a few volleys from our rifles, they broke, the greater
part rushing to the rear, but some, as I had hoped, trying to cross
the road and gain the shelter of the hills on the left. This was the
moment for the Cavalry, who charged with excellent effect, doing good
execution at the same time. I gave the fugitives to the rear a couple
of shells at 2,000 yards where, thinking themselves safe, they had
halted to breathe. Serious as the work on hand was, we could not help
a hearty laugh at the consternation caused by the unexpected visitors.
The mass of people broke away in all directions, leaving, as we could
see afterwards as we advanced, a good percentage on the ground. I dare
say there are some critics who will think that this position ought to
have been carried at the point of the bayonet, in order that a severe
lesson might have been inflicted, and under other circumstances I
might have thought so myself, but, placed as we were when the loss of
every man was serious, I had determined to utilize to the utmost the
long range of our weapons, and to do all the fighting I could at long
bowls, and by sticking steadily to this, I succeeded in carrying out my
object which entailed a march of 14 miles, every inch of which had to
be contested or defended, with the loss only of 1 man killed and two
or three slightly wounded. I quite acknowledge there are objections to
the arrangement, but I feel sure it was the right one for the occasion.
After this no regular opposition was offered till I reached Kokeran,
which is a large village with a fortified enclosure in its midst, which
was full of the enemy, who had been ill treating the stragglers of
General Burrows' force all morning. Knowing the ground well, I at once
selected my position, and was quickly placed to command the whole of
the country round. I was
[Sidenote: Kokeran--General Burrows' force sighted.]
just going to give the order for the guns to come into action, when,
to my delight, at about a mile off, at the spot where I knew was the
ford of the Argandab, where the road from Girishk crossed the river,
I saw a mass of men which I at once recognized as what remained of
General Burrows' Force. I decided, therefore, before hammering Kokeran
to communicate with them, and sent some Cavalry to make a circuit to
the right and join General Burrows, informing him that I was clearing
his way, and that he might, I felt sure, advance in 20 minutes, by
which time I would have his way open. The Cavalry had hardly started
before I recognized that the enemy, seeing that the position I had
taken up had rendered Kokeran untenable, had suddenly evacuated that
place, and taken up an extremely strong position on my right flank,
from which, without delay, they opened a heavy fire on us. A few shells
and a rapid demonstration, for it never reached a hand-to-hand fight,
soon, however, did their business, and, to my great satisfaction, I
found myself able to ask General Burrows to come on along a perfectly
safe road. It was a sad cavalcade, many wounded, all well nigh tired
to death. The gun carriages, alas, reduced by 2, which had been lost,
covered with sick, wounded, dead and dying, while the wretched horses,
dying themselves of thirst and fatigue, were hardly able to drag them
along. Many poor fellows, wounded almost to death, trying with a
terrible anxiety to cling to the back of a horse or a camel, knowing
too well the fate that would await them if they failed to keep their
seats. To these latter my appearance was a double blessing, as I had
brought with me 25 litters (palanquins), into which the worst cases
were placed, and they were able to finish their journey in comparative
comfort. One poor fellow (Major Iredell) had a compound fracture of the
ankle, and his foot was merely hanging on by the skin, and yet he had
ridden for 18 hours, and was wonderfully well, and is, I hope, now in
a fair way to recovery. Almost last of all, followed only by a Cavalry
escort, came poor Burrows himself, who, poor fellow, completely broke
down when he saw me, and could not say a word. I made him get off his
horse and take a little whiskey and water I had with me, and a bit of
biscuit, and soon he was more composed and better. He, like them all,
was relieved beyond measure to see me, and my diminutive following, as
they knew their troubles were at an end. I agreed that they should all,
to the last straggler, pass me, and that when they were half a mile
ahead I should follow slowly, and bring up the rear of all, covering
them from all annoyance. Soon (all too soon, for they were but a very
little company) they had filed passed, and I then recalled my Cavalry,
which had been watching the ford of the Argandab a mile to
[Sidenote: Small cavalry charge--one man killed.]
my front. On their return over this mile the enemy, emboldened by our
preparations for departure, suddenly rushed down in great numbers to
cut them off, but Captain Anderson was equal to the occasion, and
setting at nought the difference of numbers, charged them, and cut
his way through, leaving, however, his very best soldier dead on the
ground. Although I would have liked to have punished the enemy for this
affair, prudence said no, and so I commenced my return for Kandahar,
keeping half a mile in rear of General Burrows' column, and picking up
many poor fellows (putting them on my guns), who, even in this short
distance, had begun to fall out again. For the first three miles after
leaving Kokeran, all was absolute quiet, the result of the lessons
of the morning, and the wearied column from Girishk passed along in
unaccustomed peace. At this time, however, I received information from
the front, that the enemy had collected in great force on the hills
around and in the Village of Abasabad, and that help to turn them out
was wanted. I immediately hurried my guns and Cavalry to the front, and
followed on with the Infantry, desiring Captain Law to pass General
Burrows' force, and getting to his front open fire on the enemy. This
he did in good style, and was making an advance to a second position,
when I and the Infantry, who had also passed through General Burrows'
Force, which were halted, came up. We completed the dispersion of the
enemy with Artillery fire, and then throwing out skirmishers swept, for
a second time that day, the gardens round Abasabad. This accomplished,
and the road again clear for General Burrows' Force, I formed up on
one flank and allowed them again to pass me, following them into the
Cantonments, which I reached about ½ past one or two o'clock, very
thankful indeed that I had gone out, and but little less delighted that
I had managed to effect my object at such a very small loss. To ensure
a safe conduct to any unfortunate straggler that might, by accident,
have escaped notice, I sent a fresh company of the 7th Regiment to hold
the entrance to the Village of Abasabad, and kept them there till all
hopes of anyone coming in had gone, when I withdrew them. My column
had constantly been on the move from half-past 5 a.m. till half-past
one p.m., the most of the time under a burning sun, which made us all,
even those who were riding, suffer from an intolerable thirst, and
as there was no water between Kokeran and Kandahar, this was a great
addition to our labors. On arrival in Cantonments General Burrows'
[Sidenote: Property in cantonments taken into fort.]