shape of the Head Qrs. Wing of the 4th N.I., which marched in from
Quetta. The remainder of the regiment will follow shortly. There was a
report that Ayoub Khan, with his army, had actually left Furrah, and
that his advance guard was at Washir, but there is no confirmation of
the collision between his and the Wāli's forces there, which has
probably never occurred. There is much excitement in the city, and the
merchants, jewellers, &c., are hiding and burying their property, which
means, I assume, that they don't believe in our power to defend the
city against Ayoub Khan. A gathering of the enemy is reported as being
at Karkrez, about 30 miles off, and there is much excitement among the
tribes in the Arghastan Valley. There is no doubt it is very desirable
that our force at Girishk should have an opportunity of administering
a lesson to some one, or we shall probably have to do something in that
way ourselves here.
JULY 14th.--Information received that one of the Wāli's regiments,
composed of men from Kabul, is mutinous. They are in the fort of
Girishk with the Wāli. Ayoub Khan is said to have with him 1,800
cavalry and 4,000 infantry, and 30 guns. So General Burrows' force of
2,500 men and 6 guns have not much to fear. I visited all the guards on
the city gates in the evening, and walked round the whole city on the
ramparts, and had a good view of the inhabitants preparing to go to bed
on the roofs of their houses, which are flat, and always used as the
sleeping apartments of the family. The ramparts are 20 to 25 feet high,
and as the houses are all one-storied, the roofs were much below us,
and we saw more of Afghan domestic life than usual, as the people did
not anticipate that anyone would be passing round then, and the roofs
were covered with ladies, who, however, very quickly let down their
veils when they saw us in the distance.
[Sidenote: Guns recovered from mutinous troops.]
JULY 15.--News from General Burrows received this morning states, that
the whole of the Wāli's army was mutinous, and that the situation
was so critical that he had decided it was necessary he should
disregard the positive orders he had received not to cross the Helmund,
and that he proposed to do so, and disarm the mutineers. I should
explain that our force is, under orders from the Viceroy, halted on the
Kandahar side of the Helmund, while the Wāli and his army are in the
fort of Girishk, which is on the Herat side of the Helmund. Later in
the day news arrived from the Wāli (which was apparently authentic),
that early the previous morning (14th) the whole of his army left
him, taking with them the Battery of guns our Government had been so
idiotic as to give the Wāli. The letter, which was from the Wāli
to his son, who is here, went on to say, that immediately General
Burrows heard this, he had crossed the river with his cavalry and Horse
artillery, and pursued the mutineers, and coming up with them had
killed 200 and recovered the guns. This report seems authentic, though
probably exaggerated, but as yet no confirmation has been received from
General Burrows. True or not, the report has had a good effect in the
city, and will help to show that the people are not likely to improve
matters by trying conclusions with us. I had a deputation from the
Parsee shopkeepers, who have followed the army from India, and have
shops in our camp, where they sell us wine and provisions, &c., at most
exorbitant rates, to beg me to give them a place in the fort for their
stores, as they were in a dreadful fright for their lives and their
property. Even if I had considered they were in danger, I would not
have acceded to their request, as I would much prefer their running
certain risks, to giving public confidence the shock of supposing I
thought it necessary for our camp followers to take refuge in the fort,
so I laughed at their fears, refused their petition, and comforted
them by saying, that even if they now lost the whole contents of their
shops, they would still be great gainers, as they have made their
fortunes already by swindling us. They did not seem to see this in the
light I did, but had to accept the inevitable, and take their share of
the risks. As there is a large number of evilly-disposed men in the
city, it was decided that it was desirable to show
[Sidenote: 40-pounder guns moved into fort.]
them we were determined to put down any disturbances with a strong
hand, so we moved down two of our 40 pounder guns into the fort,
and placed them in position to shell the city, and at the same time
established a system of strong patrols, which night and day visit the
city, and go through all the main streets. There is no denying these
patrols would be in an unpleasant position if attacked, as street
fighting is, of all, the most disagreeable, but I have given clear
and distinct orders for the guidance of the officers in command, from
which they learn what they are expected to do, and which will cover
their responsibility in resorting, if necessary, to strong measures.
The great objection one feels to returning a fire in a street is, that
in such cases it is always unfortunate children and women who suffer,
and not the men who deserve it, and who take precious good care to
remain under cover. I visited the city myself, and found all quiet, and
went with the Wāli's chief man to arrange for certain improvement
to the fortifications, and was quite civilly received everywhere. It
was satisfactory to find that already the arrival of the guns in the
fort was known and appreciated, and one Afghan said to me, "They" (the
guns) "are very big: two discharges from them and the city would be
destroyed." I answered in the language of the country, "I believe you,
my boy."
JULY 16th.--Rode out to Kokeran, and on arrival there, met a well armed
caravan, the people composing which could give but an unsatisfactory
account of themselves, so one of our native cavalry patrols coming up
at the moment, I made the lot prisoners, and sent them into the city
to be examined. They may only be peaceful traders armed for their own
defence, as they were perfectly civil, but even in that case some
information will be got out of them. No news yet from General Burrows,
who possibly has gone on in hopes of meeting Ayoub Khan. We have
decided to disarm every Afghan approaching Kandahar, and I have issued
the necessary orders to ensure this being done.
JULY 16th.--Rode out to Kokeran in the morning, returning by the
Argandab, all seemed quiet. Visited the city in the evening, and found
all quiet there also.
JULY 17th.--Was woke at 2·30 a.m. by the Brigade-Major bringing the
officer commanding the cavalry patrol (which is on duty round the camp
all night), who reported that a considerable fire was burning in the
direction of Kokeran. As these fires very often indicate a collection
of men bent on mischief, I desired him to proceed cautiously with
his patrol in the direction of the fire, and ascertain its cause,
and bring me information, and at the same time I ordered a troop of
cavalry to follow in support. The fire proved to be caused by some
evilly-disposed persons having set a light to the corn and straw stacks
of a peaceably-disposed native, living some 8 or 9 miles from camp, and
the patrol found no signs of a gathering of men, so returned to camp.
Confirmation was received from General Burrows of his successful fight
at Girishk against our _supposed_ friends, the troops of the Wāli,
in which he had succeeded in recovering the Battery of artillery which
our Government had given as a present to the Wāli, and the first
time it was used was to fire upon us! General Burrows also recovered
a great deal of stores and baggage belonging to the Wāli, and much
ammunition, and on the whole made a very successful business, losing
but very few men himself, the loss of the enemy being computed by
themselves at 400, but was probably not more than half that number.
There being a want of supplies at Girishk, General
[Sidenote: Retrograde movement on Kushki-Nakud.]
Burrows thought it right to fall back to a place 25 miles nearer to
Kandahar, called Kushki-Nakud. There were many good reasons, I confess,
for this move, but personally I would never willingly, in Eastern
warfare, take a retrograde step, except under the strongest compulsion,
as Afghans know nothing, and care less, about the laws of strategy,
and see only defeat in any but forward movements. The fact is, had we
known that the Wāli's army intended to mutiny, we would never have
advanced beyond Kushki-Nakud, as there are many good objections to
the position at Girishk. That we did not know the shaky state of the
Wāli's troops is all the fault of the Political officer with the
Wāli, who, wishing to see all things _couleur de rose_, persuaded
himself that all was right, and could not, or would not, believe any
evil of them. Even he must now see what we have felt sure of all along,
that Shere Ali is quite without power or influence, and quite unable
to maintain his own authority for a day without our assistance. We
have, of course, here, the reflex of the events at Girishk, as there
has been a very marked increase of excitement and turbulence in the
city, since the news of the mutiny of the Wāli's troops has arrived,
and had not, at the same time, the intelligence of the licking they
had received from us reached the city, we should certainly have had an
outbreak there.
JULY 18th.--Moved another 40 pounder gun into the fort, and mounted it
on a very commanding position, from which we could soon destroy the
best part of the city. Of course there is no intention of a measure
of this kind, but a big gun ready for action has a very _soothing_
effect on the warlike feelings of Afghans, or Easterns generally.
Intelligence was brought in, that attacks on the posts of Mandi Hissar
and Abdul Rahmon were likely, and though it was not thought there was
much chance of these places, which are now very fairly strong, being
attacked, it was thought wise to send some cavalry to reconnoitre,
which was done; but the officer, on arrival at Abdul Rahmon (25
miles off), was able to telegraph that all was quiet and no sign of
gatherings or excitement. If, however, the existing state of feeling in
the country grows or becomes intensified, it is quite possible these
posts may be attacked, but if so they should be well able to hold their
own.
[Sidenote: Cavalry patrol fired upon--officer wounded.]
JULY 19th.--Was suddenly woke at 2 a.m. by the sound of a volley
of musketry close to our quarters, followed by the noise of horses
galloping. I at once recognised what had happened--indeed it was the
only thing which could have happened--that the cavalry patrol had been
fired on by some of the enemy. I lost no time in getting to the best
place for a view, and presently one of the patrol rode up and reported
that as they had been passing along, about 200 yards from our quarters,
a volley had been fired into them from behind a low wall, and that
several men and horses had been hit. I immediately sent off orders
for 2 companies of the 7th Fusiliers and a troop of cavalry to turn
out, and getting dressed as quickly as possible, was mounted and ready
before the troops could come. We then carefully swept the whole ground
round the camp, but of course failed to find the attackers, although
we certainly were on their track ten minutes after they had fired. The
country round our camp lends itself in the most unsatisfactory manner
to small attacks of this kind, as on all sides there are enormous
cemeteries, with thousands of graves and vaults, into any of which a
few men could get and hide with absolute safety. The night was dark,
the moon having set, and a haze come up, as it generally does here
towards morning. On investigation I found that the native officer
commanding the patrol was badly wounded in the arm, and that 2 horses
were slightly wounded, and one soldier and one horse were killed.
While I and the Brigade-Major, and the Cavalry Colonel, were standing
together, near the man who was killed, an intelligent? native sentry
who was posted about 400 yards off, took it into his wise head to
decide that we were a party of the enemy, and putting a bullet into his
rifle, took a deliberate and, I must say, extremely good shot at us,
aiming, I am glad to say, just a few feet too high. I had not heard the
whiz of a rifle bullet since the China days, but I had no difficulty
in recognizing it again, and as soon as weightier matters allowed, I
had my friend, the sentry, made a prisoner of, and properly punished
the next morning. All things considered, we have had very little wild
firing by sentries here, but, as is always the case, there have been
some few instances which I have not failed to punish without accepting
any excuses. This little affair of the patrol is another excellent
instance of how little Sir Donald Stewart did to make the position here
as good in a military sense as it could be--as had he done so, he would
not have left a wall or enclosure standing within a thousand yards of
our camp anywhere. He, however, would have none of them touched, first
because he wanted to conciliate the people; and next, because he wanted
to save the expense of pulling them down. When General Primrose came
he accepted the existing state of affairs, and would allow nothing
to be done, although General Burrows and I naturally have wished to
have things more ship-shape. I lost no time in pointing a moral, and
adorning a tale after the affair of the patrol, and got permission to
take down all walls and enclosures in the _immediate_ vicinity of the
Barracks, of which permission I have availed myself to the full, and
a little over, and made a very perceptible improvement, though I am
by no means contented yet. I asked General Primrose to insist on the
Wāli's people levelling various big enclosures between our position
and the city walls, but as they surround very holy shrines and mosques,
they begged for a respite on promise of good behaviour, and I am
sorry to say it has been granted. However, what has been done is most
useful, and makes the work of the patrols easier and safer. It was very
unfortunate that the native officer commanding the patrol should have
been shot in the right arm, and his horse wounded, as he was unable to
pull up the horse for some distance, and so did not succeed in seeing
where the men who attacked him went to.
[Sidenote: Daily visits into city--all quiet.]
JULY 20th.--Paid my usual visit to the city, and found all very quiet,
and the people by no means uncivil. In the evening I took all the
cavalry officers, English and native, round the camp, and gave them my
ideas of the way in which they should patrol, and what a patrol should
do when fired on (_i.e._, _not_ run away).
JULY 21.--Having arranged with Major Adam, the Assistant
Quartermaster-General, to make a reconnaisance through the villages in
the Argandab, we started from camp at half-past 4 o'clock (a lovely
fresh morning), and, crossing the Baba-i-Wali Pass, rode for several
miles up the Valley as far as a village called Sardeh Bala.--(N.B.--You
will find all these places on the big map I sent you last mail, which
will give you a capital idea of the events I have now to tell of).
Turning back from there we proposed to return into the Kandahar plain
by the pass across the range of hills (which separates the plain from
the Argandab Valley) which is called the Kotal-i-Murcha. This range
of hills, which is very clearly marked on the big map, rises to a
considerable height, being often as much as 2,000 to 2,500 feet above
the plain. The two passes through the range are the Baba-i-Wali and the
Kotal-i-Murcha. The first is passable by men and horses, and we have
made a road for guns over it. The second is a mere mountain track, up
which not more than one man can go abreast, and part of which is so
strewn with detached rocks that it is absolutely necessary to dismount
and lead a horse along it. This pass, however, is a short cut from
the city into the Argandab, and we have all used it regularly when
riding out there. I myself rode that way on the 16th, and there was,
therefore, nothing rash or unwise in our returning that way. From the
commencement of the ascent to the top of the pass is about ½ a mile,
and the rise in that distance is 700 to 800 feet, and therefore very
steep. We had just commenced the ascent when one of our escort drew our
attention to some men dodging behind the rocks over our head, who had
guns, and were evidently trying to avoid being seen. An armed man is
so usual a sight in this country that I did not for the moment think
anything of the matter, and indeed prevented Major Adam, who said
he would like to take a shot at the nearest man from doing so. As a
precaution, however, I ordered 3 of the escort to dismount and get out
their carbines, and Major Adam took a carbine, and so did I, and we
slowly ascended, keeping our eye on our friends, or rather on the place
they had been, for we could not see them then. Presently (all this
occurred in less time than I write it) we saw one scoundrel pop his
head up from behind a stone and take aim. We were too
[Sidenote: Fired upon in Kotal-i-Murcha pass.]
quick for him, for Major Adam and one of the escort let fly at him,
and so threw out his aim, that he fired high, and no one was touched.
Immediately, however, 3 more shots were fired, one killing one of the
horses of the escort, our fire in return being quite harmless, as our
assailants were behind rocks, and we were out in the open. Still it
served to unsteady their aim, and we got to the top and under cover
without further damage, though most of the shots had been fairly well
directed for us. I had one shot as I came up, which, I am sorry to say,
was not successful, though I made my friend "leave that," as Paddy Roe
used to say when I fired at a hare and, according to my custom, missed
it. As soon as I got the party under cover I sent men down on each
side of the hill (having first sent off to Kandahar, 4½ miles off,
for 20 infantry to help in the hunt through the rocks) to prevent the
enemy getting down and running away, and Major Adam and I, each with
2 men and a pocketful of ammunition, essayed climbing the hill. He
first descended a good bit and hit off a fairish path which took him
a long way up, and during the ascent he had 4 or 5 shots, but never
could get near the fellows at all, they being all mountaineers, and
we being burdened with heavy riding boots, spurs, &c., and knowing
nothing of the paths. I, with my two men, made excellent progress at
first, but found ourselves regularly stuck on the top of a precipice,
across which, at about 300 yards, we could see one of the men making
off. I took, as I thought, very good aim, making one of the men with
me fire too, but we again missed, whereupon the runaway turned round
and let fly at us, but expecting this we were safely behind a rock,
and I don't think his bullet came near us. I had then to descend, and
before I could hit off another path, the whole lot were out of sight.
It was dreadfully hot, and we were dying of thirst, and not a drop of
water within 3 miles, but of course had to stay until the infantry
came. I sent off one of my two men to Kandahar with news to tell them
the direction the enemy had run in, and I and the other man comfortably
behind a good rock with our carbines ready, waited in hopes of getting
a better shot, but never saw our assailants again. In due course first
some cavalry, and then, after a considerable interval, some infantry
came out to me, and we hunted the hill, but it was so precipitous
and so full of caves that our search was without result. I did not,
of course, accompany this party as I wanted to get back to camp, and
besides was nearly dead with thirst. I cannot, I fear, give a good idea
of the difficulties of climbing or searching this range of hills which
are nothing but limestone rocks, not a tree, blade of grass, or inch of
earth on them, so one might as well be trying to climb the cliffs at
Bundoran, only that these hills are much higher. I dare say you will
think it was a good deal of trouble and time to spend over a small
party of marauders of this kind, and so it was, but my reason was that
I was anxious to impress by practice what I have so often preached,
the necessity for officers and men on such occasions as this always
trying to give as good as they get, and not considering they had done
their duty when they followed the example of Captain Carey and others
by galloping away as fast as they could. With this object in view, I
don't think I was wrong to turn myself for an hour or so into a private
soldier, and do a little skirmishing on foot with a carbine. We had
eight men of the Native Cavalry with us, and they were as staunch as
steel
[Sidenote: Attack exaggerated by messengers sent.]
and very quiet and cool, except the 2 men who I sent into Kandahar with
the order to send me out help, which order I _wrote_, and in a most
guarded way, saying "I want 20 infantry, and a few cavalry as scouts."
However, once away from the influence of the officers, the imagination
of my orderlies magnified the whole affair, and as they rode through
the camp they told every one that the General Sahib had been fired at
and was engaged in a great battle with thousands of the enemy who were
pressing on to Kandahar. This, unfortunately, was believed, and all the
troops were turned out, and a regular commotion got up in the city, and
altogether a very objectionable state of alarm was arrived at. When
I came in and heard of it, I gave all concerned a lecture which they
won't forget, for if there is one thing I hate more than another it
is false alarms, and so far I have not had one. And now I must defend
myself against the idea everyone seems to have that I go about here
rashly, as I really do not, as I always have my escort, and till the
last ten days it was quite safe to move about, and in this particular
instance it never for a moment entered Major Adam's or my mind that
there was the slightest risk going over the Murcha Pass. Had we thought
so we would have avoided it, but once being in the business there was
only one thing for us to do, and that was to see it through. Lots of
men, women, and children had crossed the pass that morning, and we
had met them and spoken to them. My rides are now much circumscribed,
and I don't think just at present of going any distance from camp
merely for _amusement_. Yesterday we went on business, and with what
is considered, and what proved to be, a quite sufficient escort. I
was riding my white horse, Selim, and he behaved like an angel, and
took no notice of the firing, and when I had to dismount at the bad
piece of the pass, followed me up without any difficulty. Afterwards I
fastened him to a stone, and he stood quite quietly there for 4 hours
without giving any trouble. I did not get in till ½ past one, very
thirsty, very hungry, and very hot, but this kind of work never does me
any harm, and I was as fit as possible as soon as I had a bath and my
breakfast.
JULY 22nd.--Heard from the Government of India that Abdul Rahman is to
be proclaimed Amir of Kabul forthwith by Sir D. Stewart. I cannot think
this a wise step, but the desire to get out of the war at any cost
is, I think, blinding the Government to the many weak points in the
arrangement.
JULY 23rd.--Visited the city in order that I might give General
Primrose my views of an idea of his to occupy a certain portion of
it without troops should we be attacked here. The arrangement does
not seem to me to be either necessary or desirable, as I would prefer
keeping all our small force, except the garrison of the Fort and the
City walls, in the open, striking at the enemy whenever opportunity
offered. I have explained this, and I hope it will, if necessity arise,
be carried out. When riding to the Fort this morning I was stopped by
a native who informed me he had something very important to tell me,
which was, that this being the Mahomedan
[Sidenote: Rumours of a rising.]
Sunday (Friday) a rising was to take place to-day. The old gentleman,
who belonged to the Moghul or Persian tribe, who hate the Afghans, was
in an awful fright, and I think he allowed his fears to magnify matters
much. However, I am keeping my eyes open, have taken all precautions,
and am ready, but fear the Afghans won't come to the point.
JULY 24th.--The guard on the Shikarpore Gate of the City was fired on
by some armed men during the night, the fire being returned by the
guard. In reporting the matter to General Primrose, I strongly urged
that the walls and buildings outside the City gates, which afforded
cover to villains of sorts to approach and fire at our guards, should
be demolished. This, however, would have involved much distress and
annoyance to the Afghans, and he did not care to push the matter
strongly (after events, however, proved that the suggestion was a
proper one). We received news that 150 of our cavalry, under General
Nuttall, had completely routed 600 of Ayoob Khan's Cavalry.