M^r Brearly moved that the Presid^t write to the Executive of N.
Hampshire, informing it that the business depending before the
Convention was of such a nature as to require the immediate attendance
of the deputies of that State. In support of his motion he observed that
the difficulties of the subject and the diversity of opinions called for
all the assistance we could possibly obtain, (it was well understood
that the object was to add N. Hampshire to the n^o of States opposed to
the doctrine of proportional representation, which it was presumed from
her relative size she must be adverse to).
M^r Patterson seconded the motion.
M^r Rutlidge could see neither the necessity nor propriety of such a
measure. They are not unapprized of the meeting, and can attend if they
choose. Rho. Island might as well be urged to appoint & send deputies.
Are we to suspend the business until the deputies arrive? if we proceed
he hoped all the great points would be adjusted before the letter could
produce its effect.
M^r King, said he had written more than once as a private correspondent,
& the answers gave him every reason to expect that State would be
represented very shortly, if it sh^d be so at all. Circumstances of a
personal nature had hitherto prevented it. A letter c^d have no effect.
M^r Wilson wished to know whether it would be consistent with the rule
or reason of secrecy, to communicate to N. Hampshire that the business
was of such a nature as the motion described. It w^d spread a great
alarm. Besides he doubted the propriety of soliciting any State on the
subject; the meeting being merely voluntary--on motion of M^r Brearly
Mas^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a not on y^e floor. Del.
not on floor. M^d div^d V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. not on floor.
The motion of M^r Elseworth resumed for allowing each State an equal
vote in y^e 2^d branch.
M^r Wilson did not expect such a motion after the establishment of y^e
contrary principle in the 1^{st} branch; and considering the reasons
which would oppose it, even if an equal vote had been allowed in the
1^{st} branch. The Gentleman from Connecticut (M^r Elseworth) had
pronounced that if the motion should not be acceded to, of all the
States North of Pen^a one only would agree to any Gen^l Government. He
entertained more favorable hopes of Conn^t and of the other Northern
States. He hoped the alarms exceeded their cause, and that they would
not abandon a Country to which they were bound by so many strong and
endearing ties. But should the deplored event happen, it would neither
stagger his sentiments nor his duty. If the minority of the people of
America refuse to coalesce with the majority on just and proper
principles, if a separation must take place, it could never happen on
better grounds. The votes of yesterday ag^{st} the just principle of
representation, were as 22 to 90 of the people of America. Taking the
opinions to be the same on this point, and he was sure if there was any
room for change, it could not be on the side of the majority, the
question will be shall less than 1/4 of the U. States withdraw
themselves from the Union; or shall more than 3/4 renounce the inherent,
indisputable and unalienable rights of men, in favor of the artificial
systems of States. If issue must be joined, it was on this point he
would chuse to join it. The Gentleman from Connecticut in supposing that
the preponderancy secured to the majority in the 1^{st} branch had
removed the objections to an equality of votes in the 2^d branch for the
security of the minority, narrowed the case extremely. Such an equality
will enable the minority to controul in all cases whatsoever, the
sentiments and interests of the majority. Seven States will controul
six: Seven States, according to the estimates that had been used,
composed 24/90 of the whole people. It would be in the power then of
less than 1/3 to overrule 2/3 whenever a question should happen to
divide the States in that manner. Can we forget for whom we are forming
a Government? Is it for _men_, or for the imaginary beings called
_States_? Will our honest Constituents be satisfied with metaphysical
distinctions? Will they, ought they to be satisfied with being told,
that the one-third compose the greater number of States? The rule of
suffrage ought on every principle to be the same in the 2^d as in the
1^{st} branch. If the Government be not laid on this foundation, it can
be neither solid nor lasting. Any other principle will be local,
confined & temporary. This will expand with the expansion, and grow with
the growth of the U. States.--Much has been said of an imaginary
combination of three States. Sometimes a danger of monarchy, sometimes
of aristocracy has been charged on it. No explanation however of the
danger has been vouchsafed. It would be easy to prove both from reason &
history that rivalships would be more probable than coalitions; and that
there are no coinciding interests that could produce the latter. No
answer has yet been given to the observations of (M^r Madison) on this
subject. Should the Executive Magistrate be taken from one of the large
States would not the other two be thereby thrown into the scale with the
other States? Whence then the danger of monarchy? Are the people of the
three large States more aristocratic than those of the small ones?
Whence then the danger of aristocracy from their influence? It is all a
mere illusion of names. We talk of States, till we forget what they are
composed of. Is a real & fair majority, the natural hot-bed of
aristocracy? It is a part of the definition of this species of Gov^t or
rather of tyranny, that the smaller number governs the greater. It is
true that a majority of States in the 2^d branch cannot carry a law
ag^{st} a majority of the people in the 1^{st}. But this removes half
only of the objection. Bad Govern^{ts} are of two sorts. 1. that which
does too little. 2. that which does too much: that which fails thro'
weakness; and that which destroys thro' oppression. Under which of these
evils do the U. States at present groan? Under the weakness and
inefficiency of its Govern^t. To remedy this weakness we have been sent
to this Convention. If the motion should be agreed to, we shall leave
the U. S. fettered precisely as heretofore; with the additional
mortification of seeing the good purposes of y^e fair representation of
the people in the 1^{st} branch, defeated in the 2^d. Twenty four will
still controul sixty six. He lamented that such a disagreement should
prevail on the point of representation, as he did not foresee that it
would happen on the other point most contested, the boundary between the
Gen^l & the local authorities. He thought the States necessary &
valuable parts of a good system.
M^r Elseworth. The capital objection of M^r Wilson, "that the minority
will rule the majority" is not true. The power is given to the few to
save them from being destroyed by the many. If an equality of votes had
been given to them in both branches, the objection might have had
weight. Is it a novel thing that the few should have a check on the
many? Is it not the case in the British Constitution the wisdom of which
so many gentlemen have united in applauding? Have not the House of
Lords, who form so small a proportion of the nation a negative on the
laws, as a necessary defence of their peculiar rights ag^{st} the
encroachm^{ts} of the Commons. No instance of a Confederacy has existed
in which an equality of voices has not been exercised by the members of
it. We are running from one extreme to another. We are razing the
foundations of the building, when we need only repair the roof. No
salutary measure has been lost for want of _a majority of the States_,
to favor it. If security be all that the great States wish for the
1^{st} branch secures them. The danger of combinations among them is not
imaginary. Altho' no particular abuses could be foreseen by him, the
possibility of them would be sufficient to alarm him. But he could
easily conceive cases in which they might result from such combinations.
Suppose that in pursuance of some commercial treaty or arrangement,
three or four free ports & no more were to be established would not
combinations be formed in favor of Boston--Philad^a & some port of the
Chesapeak? A like concert might be formed in the appointment of the
Great officers. He appealed again to the obligations of the federal pact
which was still in force, and which had been entered into with so much
solemnity; persuading himself that some regard would still be paid to
the plighted faith under which each State small as well as great, held
an equal right of suffrage in the general Councils. His remarks were not
the result of partial or local views. The State he represented
(Connecticut) held a middle rank.
M^r Madison did justice to the able and close reasoning of M^r E. but
must observe that it did not always accord with itself. On another
occasion, the large States were described by him as the Aristocratic
States, ready to oppress the small. Now the Small are the House of Lords
requiring a negative to defend them ag^{st} the more numerous Commons.
M^r E. had also erred in saying that no instance had existed in which
confederated States had not retained to themselves a perfect equality of
suffrage. Passing over the German system in which the K. of Prussia has
nine voices, he reminded M^r E. of the Lycian Confederacy, in which the
component members had votes proportioned to their importance, and which
Montesquieu recommends as the fittest model for that form of Government.
Had the fact been as stated by M^r E. it would have been of little avail
to him, or rather would have strengthened the arguments ag^{st} him; the
History & fate of the several confederacies modern as well as Antient,
demonstrating some radical vice in their structure. In reply to the
appeal of M^r E. to the faith plighted in the existing federal compact,
he remarked that the party claiming from others an adherence to a common
engagement ought at least to be guiltless itself of a violation. Of all
the States however Connecticut was perhaps least able to urge this plea.
Besides the various omissions to perform the stipulated acts from which
no State was free, the Legislature of that State had by a pretty recent
vote, _positively refused_ to pass a law for complying with the
Requisitions of Cong^s, and had transmitted a copy of the vote to
Cong^s. It was urged, he said, continually that an equality of votes in
the 2^d branch was not only necessary to secure the small, but would be
perfectly safe to the large ones whose majority in the 1^{st} branch was
an effectual bulwark. But notwithstanding this apparent defence, the
majority of States might still injure the majority of people. 1. they
could _obstruct_ the wishes and interests of the majority. 2. they could
_extort_ measures repugnant to the wishes & interest of the Majority. 3.
they could _impose_ measures adverse thereto; as the 2^d branch will
prob[~l]y exercise some great powers, in which the 1^{st} will not
participate. He admitted that every peculiar interest whether in any
class of Citizens, or any description of States, ought to be secured as
far as possible. Wherever there is danger of attack there ought to be
given a Constitutional power of defence. But he contended that the
States were divided into different interests not by their difference of
size, but by other circumstances; the most material of which resulted
partly from climate, but principally from the effects of their having or
not having slaves. These two causes concurred in forming the great
division of interests in the U. States. It did not lie between the large
& small States: It lay between the Northern & Southern. And if any
defensive power were necessary, it ought to be mutually given to these
two interests. He was so strongly impressed with this important truth
that he had been casting about in his mind for some expedient that would
answer the purpose. The one which had occurred was that instead of
proportioning the votes of the States in both branches, to their
respective numbers of inhabitants computing the slaves in the ratio of 5
to 3, they should be represented in one branch according to the number
of free inhabitants only; and in the other according to the whole n^o
counting the slaves as free. By this arrangement the Southern Scale
would have the advantage in one House, and the Northern in the other. He
had been restrained from proposing this expedient by two considerations:
one was his unwillingness to urge any diversity of interests on an
occasion where it is but too apt to arise of itself--the other was, the
inequality of powers that must be vested in the two branches, and which
w^d destroy the equilibrium of interests.
M^r Elseworth assured the House that whatever might be thought of the
Representatives of Connecticut the State was entirely federal in her
disposition. He appealed to her great exertions during the war, in
supplying both men & money. The muster rolls would show she had more
troops in the field than Virg^a. If she had been Delinquent, it had been
from inability, and not more so than other States.
M^r Sherman. M^r Madison had animadverted on the delinquency of the
States, when his object required him to prove that the Constitution of
Cong^s was faulty. Cong^s is not to blame for the faults of the States.
Their measures have been right, and the only thing wanting has been, a
further power in Cong^s to render them effectual.
M^r Davy was much embarrassed and wished for explanations. The Report of
the Committee allowing the Legislatures to choose the Senate, and
establishing a proportional representation in it, seemed to be
impracticable. There will according to this rule be ninety members in
the outset, and the number will increase as new States are added. It was
impossible that so numerous a body could possess the activity and other
qualities required in it. Were he to vote on the comparative merits of
the report as it stood, and the amendment, he should be constrained to
prefer the latter. The appointment of the Senate by electors chosen by
the people for that purpose was he conceived liable to an insuperable
difficulty. The larger Counties or districts thrown into a general
district, would certainly prevail over the smaller Counties or
Districts, and merit in the latter would be excluded altogether. The
report therefore seemed to be right in referring the appointment to the
Legislatures, whose agency in the general System did not appear to him
objectionable as it did to some others. The fact was that the local
prejudices & interests which could not be denied to exist, would find
their way into the national Councils whether the Representatives should
be chosen by the Legislatures or by the people themselves. On the other
hand if a proportional representation was attended with insuperable
difficulties, the making the Senate the Representative of the States,
looked like bringing us back to Cong^s again, and shutting out all the
advantages expected from it. Under this view of the subject he could not
vote for any plan for the Senate yet proposed. He thought that in
general there were extremes on both sides. We were partly federal,
partly national in our Union, and he did not see why the Gov^t might not
in some respects operate on the States, in others on the people.
M^r Wilson admitted the question concerning the number of Senators, to
be embarrassing. If the smallest States be allowed one, and the others
in proportion, the Senate will certainly be too numerous. He looked
forward to the time when the smallest States will contain 100,000 souls
at least. Let there be then one Senator in each for every 100,000 souls
and let the States not having that n^o of inhabitants be allowed one. He
was willing himself to submit to this temporary concession to the small
States; and threw out the idea as a ground of compromise.
Doc^r Franklin. The diversity of opinions turns on two points. If a
proportional representation takes place, the small States contend that
their liberties will be in danger. If an equality of votes is to be put
in its place, the large States say their money will be in danger. When a
broad table is to be made, and the edges of planks do not fit, the
artist takes a little from both, and makes a good joint. In like manner
here both sides must part with some of their demands, in order that they
may join in some accommodating proposition. He had prepared one which he
would read, that it might lie on the table for consideration. The
proposition was in the words following
"That the Legislatures of the several States shall choose & send
an equal number of Delegates, namely ---- who are to compose the
2^d branch of the General Legislature--
That in all cases or questions wherein the Sovereignty of
individual States may be affected, or whereby their authority
over their own Citizens may be diminished, or the authority of
the General Government within the several States augmented, each
State shall have equal suffrage.
That in the appointment of all Civil officers of y^e Gen^l Gov^t
in the election of whom the 2^d branch may by the Constitution
have part, each State shall have equal suffrage.
That in fixing the Salaries of such Officers, and in all
allowances for public services, and generally in all
appropriations & dispositions of money to be drawn out of the
general Treasury; and in all laws for supplying that Treasury,
the Delegates of the several States shall have suffrage in
proportion to the Sums which their respective States do actually
contribute to the Treasury."
Where a ship had many owners this was the rule of deciding on her
expedition. He had been one of the Ministers from this Country to France
during the joint war and w^d have been very glad if allowed a vote in
distributing the money to carry it on.
M^r King observed that the simple question was whether each State should
have an equal vote in the 2^d branch; that it must be apparent to those
Gentlemen who liked neither the motion for this equality, nor the report
as it stood, that the report was as susceptible of melioration as the
motion; that a reform would be nugatory & nominal only if we should make
another Congress of the proposed Senate: that if the adherence to an
equality of votes was fixed & unalterable, there could not be less
obstinacy on the other side, & that we were in fact cut asunder already,
and it was in vain to shut our eyes against it: that he was however
filled with astonishment that if we were convinced that every _man_ in
America was secured in all his rights, we should be ready to sacrifice
this substantial good to the Phantom of _State_ sovereignty: that his
feelings were more harrowed & his fears more agitated for his Country
than he could express, that he conceived this to be the last opportunity
of providing for its liberty & happiness: that he could not therefore
but repeat his amazement that when a just govern^t founded on a fair
representation of the _people_ of America was within our reach, we
should renounce the blessing, from an attachment to the ideal freedom &
importance of _States_: that should this wonderful illusion continue to
prevail, his mind was prepared for every event, rather than to sit down
under a Gov^t founded in a vicious principle of representation, and
which must be as short lived as it would be unjust. He might prevail on
himself to accede to some such expedient as had been hinted by M^r
Wilson; but he never could listen to an equality of votes as proposed in
the motion.
M^r Dayton. When assertion is given for proof, and terror substituted
for argument, he presumed they would have no effect however eloquently
spoken. It should have been shewn that the evils we have experienced
have proceeded from the equality now objected to; and that the seeds of
dissolution for the State Governments are not sown in the Gen^l
Government. He considered the system on the table as a novelty, an
amphibious monster; and was persuaded that it never would be rec^d by
the people. M^r Martin w^d never confederate if it could not be done on
just principles.
M^r Madison would acquiesce in the concession hinted by M^r Wilson, on
condition that a due independence should be given to the Senate. The
plan in its present shape makes the Senate absolutely dependent on the
States. The Senate therefore is only another edition of Cong^s. He knew
the faults of that Body & had used a bold language ag^{st} it. Still he
would preserve the State rights, as carefully as the trials by jury.
M^r Bedford, contended that there was no middle way between a perfect
consolidation and a mere confederacy of the States. The first is out of
the question, and in the latter they must continue if not perfectly, yet
equally sovereign. If political Societies possess ambition avarice, and
all the other passions which render them formidable to each other, ought
we not to view them in this light here? Will not the same motives
operate in America as elsewhere? If any gentleman doubts it let him look
at the votes. Have they not been dictated by interest, by ambition? Are
not the large States evidently seeking to aggrandize themselves at the
expense of the small? They think no doubt that they have right on their
side, but interest had blinded their eyes. Look at Georgia. Though a
small State at present, she is actuated by the prospect of soon being a
great one. S. Carolina is actuated both by present interest & future
prospects. She hopes too to see the other States cut down to her own
dimensions. N. Carolina has the same motives of present & future
interest. Virg^a follows. Mary^d is not on that side of the Question.
Pen^a has a direct and future interest. Mass^{ts} has a decided and
palpable interest in the part she takes. Can it be expected that the
small States will act from pure disinterestedness. Look at G. Britain.
Is the Representation there less unequal? But we shall be told again
that that is the rotten part of the Constitution. Have not the boroughs
however held fast their constitutional rights? And are we to act with
greater purity than the rest of mankind. An exact proportion in the
Representation is not preserved in any one of the States. Will it be
said that an inequality of power will not result from an inequality of
votes. Give the opportunity, and ambition will not fail to abuse it. The
whole History of mankind proves it. The three large States have a common
interest to bind them together in commerce. But whether a combination as
we suppose, or a competition as others suppose, shall take place among
them, in either case, the small States must be ruined. We must like
Solon make such a Govern^t as the people will approve. Will the smaller
States ever agree to the proposed degradation of them. It is not true
that the people will not agree to enlarge the powers of the present
Cong^s. The language of the people has been that Cong^s ought to have
the power of collecting an impost, and of coercing the States where it
may be necessary. On The first point they have been explicit &, in a
manner, unanimous in their declarations. And must they not agree to this
& similar measures if they ever mean to discharge their engagements. The
little States are willing to observe their engagements, but will meet
the large ones on no ground but that of the Confederation. We have been
told with a dictatorial air that this is the last moment for a fair
trial in favor of a Good Governm^t. It will be the last indeed if the
propositions reported from the Committee go forth to the people. He was
under no apprehensions. The Large States dare not dissolve the
Confederation. If they do the small ones will find some foreign ally of
more honor and good faith, who will take them by the hand and do them
justice. He did not mean by this to intimidate or alarm. It was a
natural consequence, which ought to be avoided by enlarging the federal
powers not annihilating the federal system. This is what the people
expect. All agree in the necessity of a more efficient Gov^t and why not
make such an one as they desire.
M^r Elseworth. Under a National Gov^t he should participate in the
National Security, as remarked by (M^r King) but that was all. What he
wanted was domestic happiness. The Nat^l Gov^t could not descend to the
local objects on which this depended. It could only embrace objects of a
general nature. He turned his eyes therefore for the preservation of his
rights to the State Gov^{ts}. From these alone he could derive the
greatest happiness he expects in this life. His happiness depends on
their existence, as much as a new born infant on its mother for
nourishment. If this reasoning was not satisfactory, he had nothing to
add that could be so.
M^r King was for preserving the States in a subordinate degree, and as
far as they could be necessary for the purposes stated by M^r Elseworth.
He did not think a full answer had been given to those who apprehended a
dangerous encroachment on their jurisdictions. Expedients might be
devised as he conceived that would give them all the security the nature
of things would admit of. In the establish^t of Societies the
Constitution was to the Legislature what the laws were to individuals.
As the fundamental rights of individuals are secured by express
provisions in the State Constitutions; why may not a like security be
provided for the Rights of States in the National Constitution. The
articles of Union between Engl^d & Scotland furnish an example of such a
provision in favor of sundry rights of Scotland. When that Union was in
agitation, the same language of apprehension which has been heard from
the smaller States, was in the mouths of the Scotch patriots. The
articles however have not been violated and the Scotch have found an
increase of prosperity & happiness. He was aware that this will be
called a mere _paper security_. He thought it a sufficient answer to say
that if fundamental articles of compact, are no sufficient defence
against physical power, neither will there be any safety ag^{st} it if
there be no compact. He could not sit down, without taking some notice
of the language of the honorable gentleman from Delaware (M^r Bedford).
It was not he that had uttered a dictatorial language. This intemperance
had marked the honorable Gentleman himself. It was not he who with a
vehemence unprecedented in that House, had declared himself ready to
turn his hopes from our common Country, and court the protection of some
foreign hand. This too was the language of the Honbl member himself. He
was grieved that such a thought had entered into his heart. He was more
grieved that such an expression had dropped from his lips. The gentleman
c^d only excuse it to himself on the score of passion. For himself
whatever might be his distress, he w^d never court relief from a foreign
power.
Adjourned.