On the question for allowing each State one vote in the second branch as
moved by M^r Elseworth, Mass^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a
no. Del. ay. M^d ay. M^r Jenifer being not present M^r Martin alone
voted V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. div^d. M^r Houston no. M^r
Baldwin ay.
M^r Pinkney thought an equality of votes in the 2^d branch inadmissible.
At the same time candor obliged him to admit that the large States would
feel a partiality for their own Citizens & give them a preference, in
appointments: that they might also find some common points in their
Commercial interests, and promote treaties favorable to them. There is a
real distinction [between] the Northern & South^n interests. N. Carol^a
S. Carol: & Geo. in their Rice & Indigo had a peculiar interest which
might be sacrificed. How then shall the larger States be prevented from
administering the Gen^l Gov^t as they please, without being themselves
unduly subjected to the will of the smaller? By allowing them some but
not a full, proportion. He was extremely anxious that something should
be done, considering this as the last appeal to a regular experiment.
Cong^s have failed in almost every effort for an amendment of the
federal System. Nothing has prevented a dissolution of it, but the
appointm^t of this Convention; & he could not express his alarms for the
consequence of such an event. He read his motion, to form the States
into classes, with an apportionment of Senators among them (see Art: 4,
of his plan).
General Pinkney was willing the motion might be considered. He did not
entirely approve it. He liked better the motion of Doc^r Franklin (which
see Saturday June 30). Some Compromise seemed to be necessary, the
States being exactly divided on the question for an equality of votes in
the 2^d branch. He proposed that a Committee consisting of a member from
each State should be appointed to devise & report some compromise.
M^r L. Martin had no objection to a commitment, but no modifications
whatever could reconcile the Smaller States to the least diminution of
their equal Sovereignty.
M^r Sherman. We are now at a full stop, and nobody he supposed meant
that we sh^d break up without doing something. A committee he thought
most likely to hit on some expedient.
[123]Mr. Gov^r Morris. thought a Com^e adviseable as the Convention had
been equally divided. He had a stronger reason also. The mode of
appointing the 2^d branch tended he was sure to defeat the object of it.
What is this object? To check the precipitation, changeableness, and
excesses of the first branch. Every man of observation had seen in the
democratic branches of the State Legislatures, precipitation--in
Congress changeableness, in every department excesses ag^{st} personal
liberty private property & personal safety. What qualities are necessary
to constitute a check in this case? _Abilities_ and _virtue_, are
equally necessary in both branches. Something more then is now wanted,
1. the checking branch must have a personal interest in checking the
other branch, one interest must be opposed to another interest. Vices as
they exist, must be turned ag^{st} each other. 2. It must have great
personal property, it must have the aristocratic spirit; it must love to
lord it thro' pride. Pride is indeed the great principle that actuates
both the poor & the rich. It is this principle which in the former
resists, in the latter abuses authority. 3. It should be independent. In
Religion the Creature is apt to forget its Creator. That it is otherwise
in Political Affairs, the late debates here are an unhappy proof. The
aristocratic body, should be as independent & as firm as the democratic.
If the members of it are to revert to a dependence on the democratic
choice, the democratic scale will preponderate. All the guards contrived
by America have not restrained the Senatorial branches of the
Legislatures from a servile complaisance to the democratic. If the 2^d
branch is to be dependent we are better without it. To make it
independent, it should be for life. It will then do wrong, it will be
said. He believed so; He hoped so. The Rich will strive to establish
their dominion & enslave the rest. They always did. They always will.
The proper security ag^{st} them is to form them into a separate
interest. The two forces will then controul each other. Let the rich mix
with the poor and in a Commercial Country, they will establish an
Oligarchy. Take away commerce, and the democracy will triumph. Thus it
has been all the world over. So it will be among us. Reason tells us we
are but men: and we are not to expect any particular interference of
Heaven in our favor. By thus combining & setting apart, the aristocratic
interest, the popular interest will be combined ag^{st} it. There will
be a mutual check and mutual security. 4. An independence for life,
involves the necessary permanency. If we change our measures nobody will
trust us: and how avoid a change of measures, but by avoiding a change
of men. Ask any man if he confides in Cong^s if he confides in the State
of Pen^a if he will lend his money or enter into contract? He will tell
you no. He sees no stability. He can repose no confidence. If G. B. were
to explain her refusal to treat with us, the same reasoning would be
employed.--He disliked the exclusion of the 2^d branch from holding
offices. It is dangerous. It is like the imprudent exclusion of the
military officers during the war, from civil appointments. It deprives
the Executive of the principal source of influence. If danger be
apprehended from the Executive what a left-handed way is this of
obviating it? If the son, the brother or the friend can be appointed,
the danger may be even increased, as the disqualified father &c. can
then boast of a disinterestedness which he does not possess. Besides
shall the best, the most able, the most virtuous citizens not be
permitted to hold offices? Who then are to hold them? He was also
ag^{st} paying the Senators. They will pay themselves if they can. If
they can not they will be rich and can do without it. Of such the 2^d
branch ought to consist; and none but such can compose it if they are
not to be paid--He contended that the Executive should appoint the
Senate & fill up vacancies. This gets rid of the difficulty in the
present question. You may begin with any ratio you please; it will come
to the same thing. The members being independ^t & for life, may be taken
as well from one place as from another.--It should be considered too how
the scheme could be carried through the States. He hoped there was
strength of mind eno' in this House to look truth in the face. He did
not hesitate therefore to say that loaves & fishes must bribe the
Demagogues. They must be made to expect higher offices under the general
than the State Gov^{ts}. A Senate for life will be a noble bait. Without
such captivating prospects, the popular leaders will oppose & defeat the
plan. He perceived that the 1^{st} branch was to be chosen by the people
of the States; the 2^d by those chosen by the people. Is not here a
Gov^t by the States, a Govern^t by Compact between Virg^a in the 1^{st}
& 2^d branch, Mass^{ts} in the 1^{st} & 2^d branch &c. This is going
back to mere treaty. It it no Gov^t at all. It is altogether dependent
on the States, and will act over again the part which Cong^s has acted.
A firm Govern^t alone can protect our liberties. He fears the influence
of the rich. They will have the same effect here as elsewhere if we do
not by such a Gov^t keep them within their proper sphere. We should
remember that the people never act from reason alone. The Rich will take
the advantage of their passions & make these the instruments for
oppressing them. The Result of the Contest will be a violent
aristocracy, or a more violent despotism. The schemes of the Rich will
be favored by the extent of the Country. The people in such distant
parts cannot communicate & act in concert. They will be the dupes of
those who have more knowledge & intercourse. The only security ag^{st}
encroachments will be a select & sagacious body of men, instituted to
watch ag^{st} them on all sides. He meant only to hint these
observations, without grounding any motion on them.
[123] He had just returned from N. Y. hav^g left y^e Convention
a few days after it commenced business.--Madison's Note.
M^r Randolph favored the commitment though he did not expect much
benefit from the expedient. He animadverted on the warm & rash language
of M^r Bedford on Saturday; reminded the small States that if the large
States should combine some danger of which he did not deny there would
be a check in the revisionary power of the Executive, and intimated that
in order to render this still more effectual, he would agree that in the
choice of an Executive each State should have an equal vote. He was
persuaded that two such opposite bodies as M^r Morris had planned, could
never long co-exist. Dissentions would arise, as has been seen even
between the Senate and H. of Delegates in Maryland, appeals would be
made to the people; and in a little time commotions would be the
result--He was far from thinking the large States could subsist of
themselves any more than the small; an avulsion would involve the whole
in ruin, and he was determined to pursue such a scheme of Government as
would secure us ag^{st} such a calamity.
M^r Strong was for the co[~m]itment; and hoped the mode of constituting
both branches would be referred. If they should be established on
different principles, contentions would prevail, and there would never
be a concurrence in necessary measures.
Doc^r Williamson. If we do not concede on both sides, our business must
soon be at an end. He approved of the co[~m]itment, supposing that as
the Com^e w^d be a smaller body, a compromise would be pursued with more
coolness.
M^r Wilson objected to the Committee, because it would decide according
to that very rule of voting which was opposed on one side. Experience in
Cong^s had also proved the inutility of Committees consisting of members
from each State.
M^r Lansing w^d not oppose the commitment, though expecting little
advantage from it.
M^r Madison opposed the Co[~m]itment. He had rarely seen any other
effect than delay from _such_ Committees in Cong^s. Any scheme of
compromise that could be proposed in the Committee might as easily be
proposed in the House; and the report of the Committee where it
contained merely the _opinion_ of the Com^e would neither shorten the
discussion, nor influence the decision of the House.
M^r Gerry was for the commitm^t. Something must be done, or we shall
disappoint not only America, but the whole world. He suggested a
consideration of the State we should be thrown into by the failure of
the Union. We should be without an Umpire to decide controversies and
must be at the mercy of events. What too is to become of our
treaties--what of our foreign debts, what of our domestic? We must make
concessions on both sides. Without these the Constitutions of the
several States would never have been formed.
On the question "for co[~m]iting," generally:
Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P. ay.
Del. no. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.