Doc^r Johnson. The controversy must be endless whilst Gentlemen differ
in the grounds of their arguments; Those on one side considering the
States as districts of people composing one political Society; those on
the other considering them as so many political societies. The fact is
that the States do exist as political Societies, and a Gov^t is to be
formed for them in their political capacity, as well as for the
individuals composing them. Does it not seem to follow, that if the
States as such are to exist they must be armed with some power of
self-defence. This is the idea of (Col. Mason) who appears to have
looked to the bottom of this matter. Besides the aristocratic and other
interests, which ought to have the means of defending themselves, the
States have their interests as such, and are equally entitled to like
means. On the whole he thought that as in some respects the States are
to be considered in their political capacity, and in others as districts
of individual citizens the two ideas embraced on different sides,
instead of being opposed to each other, ought to be combined; that in
_one_ branch the _people_, ought to be represented, in the _other_ the
_States_.
M^r Ghoram. The States as now confederated have no doubt a right to
refuse to be consolidated, or to be formed into any new system. But he
wished the small States which seemed most ready to object, to consider
which are to give up most, they or the larger ones. He conceived that a
rupture of the Union w^d be an event unhappy for all, but surely the
large States would be least unable to take care of themselves, and to
make connections with one another. The weak therefore were most
interested in establishing some general system for maintaining order. If
among individuals, composed partly of weak, and partly of strong, the
former most need the protection of law & Government, the case is exactly
the same with weak & powerful States. What would be the situation of
Delaware (for these things he found must be spoken out, & it might as
well be done at first as last) what w^d be the situation of Delaware in
case of a separation of the States? Would she not be at the mercy of
Pennsylvania? would not her true interest lie in being consolidated with
her, and ought she not now to wish for such a union with P^a under one
Gov^t as will put it out of the power of Pen^a to oppress her? Nothing
can be more ideal than the danger apprehended by the States from their
being formed into one nation. Mass^{ts} was originally three colonies,
viz old Mass^{ts} Plymouth--& the province of Mayne. These apprehensions
existed then. An incorporation took place; all parties were safe &
satisfied; and every distinction is now forgotten. The case was similar
with Connecticut & New haven. The dread of Union was reciprocal; the
consequence of it equally salutary and satisfactory. In like manner N.
Jersey has been made one society out of two parts. Should a separation
of the States take place, the fate of N. Jersey w^d be worst of all. She
has no foreign commerce & can have but little. P^a & N. York will
continue to levy taxes on her consumption. If she consults her interest
she w^d beg of all things to be annihilated. The apprehensions of the
small States ought to be appeased by another reflection Mass^{ts} will
be divided. The province of Maine is already considered as approaching
the term of its annexation to it; and P^a will probably not increase,
considering the present state of her population, & other events that may
happen. On the whole he considered a Union of the States as necessary to
their happiness, & a firm Gen^l Gov^t as necessary to their Union. He
sh^d consider it as his duty if his colleagues viewed the matter in the
same light he did to stay here as long as any other State would remain
with them, in order to agree on some plan that could with propriety be
recommended to the people.
M^r Elseworth, did not despair. He still trusted that some good plan of
Gov^t w^d be devised & adopted.
M^r Read. He sh^d have no objection to the system if it were truly
national, but it has too much of a federal mixture in it. The little
States he thought had not much to fear. He suspected that the large
States felt their want of energy, & wished for a Gen^l Gov^t to supply
the defect. Mass^{ts} was evidently labouring under her weakness and he
believed Delaware w^d not be in much danger if in her neighbourhood.
Delaware had enjoyed tranquillity & he flattered himself w^d continue to
do so. He was not however so selfish as not to wish for a good Gen^l
Gov^t. In order to obtain one the whole States must be incorporated. If
the States remain, the representatives of the large ones will stick
together, and carry everything before them. The Executive also will be
chosen under the influence of this partiality, and will betray it in his
administration. These jealousies are inseparable from the scheme of
leaving the States in existence. They must be done away. The ungranted
lands also which have been assumed by particular States must also be
given up. He repeated his approbation of the plan of M^r Hamilton, &
wished it to be substituted in the place of that on the table.
M^r Madison agreed with Doc^r Johnson, that the mixed nature of the
Gov^t ought to be kept in view; but thought too much stress was laid on
the rank of the States as political societies. There was a gradation, he
observed from the smallest corporation, with the most limited powers, to
the largest empire with the most perfect sovereignty. He pointed out the
limitations on the sovereignty of the States, as now confederated their
laws in relation to the paramount law of the Confederacy were analagous
to that of bye laws to the supreme law within a State. Under the
proposed Gov^t the powers of the States will be much farther reduced.
According to the views of every member, the Gen^l Gov^t will have powers
far beyond those exercised by the British Parliament, when the States
were part of the British Empire. It will in particular have the power,
without the consent of the State Legislatures, to levy money directly on
the people themselves; and therefore not to divest such _unequal_
portions of the people as composed the several States, of an _equal_
voice, would subject the system to the reproaches & evils which have
resulted from the vicious representation in G. B.
He entreated the gentlemen representing the small States to renounce a
principle w^{ch} was confessedly unjust, which c^d never be admitted, &
if admitted must infuse mortality into a Constitution which we wished to
last forever. He prayed them to ponder well the consequences of
suffering the Confederacy to go to pieces. It had been s^d that the want
of energy in the large states w^d be a security to the small. It was
forgotten that this want of energy proceeded from the supposed security
of the States ag^{st} all external danger. Let each state depend on
itself for its security, & let apprehensions arise of danger, from
distant powers or from neighbouring States, & the languishing condition
of all the States, large as well as small, w^d soon be transformed into
vigorous & high toned Gov^{ts}. His great fear was that their Gov^{ts}
w^d then have too much energy, that these might not only be formidable
in the large to the small States, but fatal to the internal liberty of
all. The same causes which have rendered the old world the Theatre of
incessant wars, & have banished liberty from the face of it, w^d soon
produce the same effects here. The weakness & jealousy of the small
States w^d quickly introduce some regular military force ag^{st} sudden
danger from their powerful neighbours. The example w^d be followed by
others, and w^d soon become universal. In time of actual war, great
discretionary powers are constantly given to the Executive Magistrate.
Constant apprehension of war, has the same tendency to render the head
too large for the body. A standing military force, with an overgrown
Executive will not long be safe companions to liberty. The means of
defence ag^{st} foreign danger, have been always the instruments of
tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a standing maxim to excite a
war, whenever a revolt was apprehended. Throughout all Europe, the
armies kept up under the pretext of defending, have enslaved the people.
It is perhaps questionable, whether the best concerted system of
absolute power in Europe c^d maintain itself, in a situation, where no
alarms of external danger c^d tame the people to the domestic yoke. The
insular situation of G. Britain was the principal cause of her being an
exception to the general fate of Europe. It has rendered less defence
necessary, and admitted a kind of defence w^{ch} c^d not be used for the
purpose of oppression.--These consequences he conceived ought to be
apprehended whether the States should run into a total separation from
each other, or sh^d enter into partial confederacies. Either event w^d
be truly deplorable; & those who might be accessary to either, could
never be forgiven by their Country, nor by themselves.
[119]M^r Hamilton observed that individuals forming political Societies
modify their rights differently with regard to suffrage. Examples of it
are found in all the States. In all of them some individuals are
deprived of the right altogether, not having the requisite qualification
of property. In some of the States the right of suffrage is allowed in
some cases and refused in others. To vote for a member in one branch, a
certain quantum of property, to vote for a member in another branch of
the Legislature, a higher quantum of property is required. In like
manner States may modify their right of suffrage differently, the larger
exercising a larger, the smaller a smaller share of it. But as States
are a collection of individual men which ought we to respect most, the
rights of the people composing them, or of the artificial beings
resulting from the composition. Nothing could be more preposterous or
absurd than to sacrifice the former to the latter. It has been s^d that
if the smaller States renounce their _equality_, they renounce at the
same time their _liberty_. The truth is it is a contest for power, not
for liberty. Will the men composing the small States be less free than
those composing the larger. The State of Delaware having 40,000 souls
will _lose power_, if she has 1/10 only of the votes allowed to P^a
having 400,000: but will the people of Del: _be less free_, if each
citizen has an equal vote with each citizen of P^a He admitted that
common residence within the same State would produce a certain degree of
attachment; and that this principle might have a certain influence in
public affairs. He thought however that this might by some precautions
be in a great measure excluded: and that no material inconvenience could
result from it, as there could not be any ground for combination among
the States whose influence was most dreaded. The only considerable
distinction of interests, lay between the carrying & non-carrying
States, which divides instead of uniting the largest States. No
considerable inconvenience had been found from the division of the State
of N. York into different districts of different sizes.
[119] From this date he was absent till the ---- of
----.--Madison's Note.
Some of the consequences of a dissolution of the Union, and the
establishment of partial confederacies, had been pointed out. He would
add another of a most serious nature. Alliances will immediately be
formed with different rival & hostile nations of Europes, who will
foment disturbances among ourselves, and make us parties to all their
own quarrels. Foreign Nations having American dominion are & must be
jealous of us. Their representatives betray the utmost anxiety for our
fate, & for the result of this meeting, which must have an essential
influence on it.--It had been said that respectability in the eyes of
foreign Nations was not the object at which we aimed; that the proper
object of republican Government was domestic tranquillity & happiness.
This was an ideal distinction. No Government could give us tranquillity
& happiness at home, which did not possess sufficient stability and
strength to make us respectable abroad. This was the critical moment for
forming such a Government. We should run every risk in trusting to
future amendments. As yet we retain the habits of union. We are weak &
sensible of our weakness. Henceforward the motives will become feebler,
and the difficulties greater. It is a miracle that we were now here
exercising our tranquil & free deliberations on the subject. It would be
madness to trust to future miracles. A thousand causes must obstruct a
reproduction of them.
M^r Pierce considered the equality of votes under the Confederation as
the great source of the public difficulties. The members of Cong^s were
advocates for local advantages. State distinctions must be sacrificed as
far as the general good required, but without destroying the States.
Tho' from a small State he felt himself a Citizen of the U. S.
M^r Gerry, urged that we never were independent States, were not such
now, & never could be even on the principles of the Confederation. The
States & the advocates for them were intoxicated with the idea of their
_sovereignty_. He was a member of Congress at the time the federal
articles were formed. The injustice of allowing each State an equal vote
was long insisted on. He voted for it, but it was ag^{st} his Judgment,
and under the pressure of public danger, and the obstinacy of the lesser
States. The present Confederation he considered as dissolving. The fate
of the Union will be decided by the Convention. If they do not agree on
something, few delegates will probably be appointed to Cong^s. If they
do Cong^s will probably be kept up till the new System should be
adopted. He lamented that instead of coming here like a band of
brothers, belonging to the same family, we seemed to have brought with
us the spirit of political negotiators.
M^r L. Martin remarked that the language of the States being _sovereign
& independent_, was once familiar & understood; though it seemed now so
strange & obscure. He read those passages in the articles of
Confederation, which describe them in that language.
On the question as moved by M^r Lansing. Shall the word "not" be struck
out.
Mass^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. ay.
M^d div^d. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On the motion to agree to the clause as reported, "that the rule of
suffrage in the 1^{st} branch ought not to be according to that
established by the Articles of the Confederation
Mass. ay. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no.
M^d div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Doc^r Johnson & M^r Elseworth moved to postpone the residue of the
clause, & take up y^e 8 Resol: