M^r L. Martin resumed his discourse,[116] contending that the Gen^l
Gov^t ought to be formed for the States, not for individuals: that if
the States were to have votes in proportion to their numbers of people,
it would be the same thing whether their representatives were chosen by
the Legislatures or the people; the smaller States would be equally
enslaved; that if the large States have the same interest with the
smaller as was urged, there could be no danger in giving them an equal
vote; they would not injure themselves, and they could not injure the
large ones on that supposition without injuring themselves and if the
interests, were not the same, the inequality of suffrage w^d be
dangerous to the smaller States: that it will be in vain to propose any
plan offensive to the rulers of the States, whose influence over the
people will certainly prevent their adopting it: that the large States
were weak at present in proportion to their extent; & could only be made
formidable to the small ones, by the weight of their votes: that in case
a dissolution of the Union should take place, the small States would
have nothing to fear from their power; that if in such a case the three
great States should league themselves together, the other ten could do
so too; & that he had rather see partial Confederacies take place, than
the plan on the table. This was the substance of the residue of his
discourse which was delivered with much diffuseness & considerable
vehemence.
[116] Yates gives Martin's speech more fully:
"On federal grounds, it is said, that a minority will govern
a majority--but on the Virginia plan a minority would tax a
majority. In a federal government, a majority of states must
and ought to tax. In the local government of states,
counties may be unequal--still numbers, not property,
govern. What is the government now forming, over states or
persons? As to the latter, their rights cannot be the object
of a general government. These are already secured by their
guardians, the state governments. The general government is
therefore intended only to protect and guard the rights of
the states as states.
"This general government, I believe, is the first upon earth
which gives checks against democracies or aristocracies. The
only necessary check in a general government ought to be a
restraint to prevent its absorbing the powers of the state
governments. Representation on federal principles can only
flow from state societies. Representation and taxation are
ever inseparable--not according to the quantum of property,
but the quantum of freedom.
"Will the representatives of a state forget state interests?
The mode of election cannot change it. These prejudices
cannot be eradicated--Your general government cannot be just
or equal upon the Virginia plan, unless you abolish state
interests. If this cannot be done, you must go back to
principles purely federal.
"On this latter ground, the state legislatures and their
constituents will have no interests to pursue different from
the general government, and both will be interested to
support each other. Under these ideas can it be expected
that the people can approve the Virginia plan? But it is
said, the people, not the state legislatures, will be called
upon for approbation--with an evident design to separate the
interests of the governors from the governed. What must be
the consequence? Anarchy and confusion. We lose the ideas of
the powers with which we are intrusted. The legislatures
must approve. By them it must, on your own plan, be laid
before the people. How will such a government, over so many
great states, operate. Wherever new settlements have been
formed in large states, they immediately want to shake off
their independency. Why? Because the government is too
remote for their good. The people want it nearer home.
"The basis of all ancient and modern confederacies is the
freedom and the independency of the states composing it. The
states forming the amphictionic council were equal, though
Lacedemon, one of the greatest states, attempted the
exclusion of three of the lesser states from this right. The
plan reported, it is true, only intends to diminish those
rights, not to annihilate them--It was the ambition and
power of the great Grecian states which at last ruined this
respectable council. The states as societies are ever
respectful. Has Holland or Switzerland ever complained of
the equality of the states which compose their respective
confederacies? Bern and Zurich are larger than the remaining
eleven cantons--so of many of the states of Germany; and yet
their governments are not complained of. Bern alone might
usurp the whole power of the Helvetic confederacy, but she
is contented still with being equal.
"The admission of the larger states into the confederation,
on the principle of equality, is dangerous--But on the
Virginia system it is ruinous and destructive. Still it is
the true interest of all the states to confederate--It is
their joint efforts which must protect and secure us from
foreign danger, and give us peace and harmony at home.
"(Here Mr. Martin entered into a detail of the comparative
powers of each state, and stated their probable weakness and
strength.)
"At the beginning of our troubles with Great Britain, the
smaller states were attempted to be cajoled to submit to the
views of that nation, lest the larger states should usurp
their rights. We then answered them--your present plan is
slavery, which on the remote prospect of a distant evil, we
will not submit to.
"I would rather confederate with any single state, than
submit to the Virginia plan. But we are already
confederated, and no power on earth can dissolve it but by
the consent of _all_ the contracting powers--and four
states, on this floor, have already declared their
opposition to annihilate it. Is the old confederation
dissolved, because some of the states wish a new
confederation?"--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 177.
M^r Lansing & M^r Dayton moved to strike out "not," so that the 7 art.
might read that the rights of suffrage in the 1^{st} branch ought to be
according to the rule established by the Confederation."
M^r Dayton expressed great anxiety that the question might not be put
till tomorrow; Govern^r Livingston being kept away by indisposition, and
the representation of N. Jersey thereby suspended.
M^r Williamson, thought that if any political truth could be grounded on
mathematical demonstration, it was that if the States were equally
sovereign now, and parted with equal proportions of sovereignty, that
they would remain equally sovereign. He could not comprehend how the
smaller States would be injured in the case, and wished some Gentleman
would vouchsafe a solution of it. He observed that the small States, if
they had a plurality of votes would have an interest in throwing the
burdens off their own shoulders on those of the large ones. He begged
that the expected addition of new States from the Westward might be kept
in view. They would be small States, they would be poor States, they
would be unable to pay in proportion to their numbers; their distance
from market rendering the produce of their labour less valuable; they
would consequently be tempted to combine for the purpose of laying
burdens on com[~m]erce & consumption which would fall with greatest
weight on the old States.
M^r Madison, s^d he was much disposed to concur in any expedient not
inconsistent with fundamental principles, that could remove the
difficulty concerning the rule of representation. But he could neither
be convinced that the rule contended for was just, nor necessary for the
safety of the small States ag^{st} the large States. That it was not
just, had been conceded by M^r Breerly & M^r Paterson themselves. The
expedient proposed by them was a new partition of the territory of the
U. States. The fallacy of the reasoning drawn from the equality of
Sovereign States in the formation of compacts, lay in confounding
together mere Treaties, in which were specified certain duties to which
the parties were to be bound, and certain rules by which their subjects
were to be reciprocally governed in their intercourse, with a compact by
which an authority was created paramount to the parties, & making laws
for the government of them. If France, England & Spain were to enter
into a Treaty for the regulation of commerce &c. with the Prince of
Monacho & 4 or 5 other of the smallest sovereigns of Europe, they would
not hesitate to treat as equals, and to make the regulations perfectly
reciprocal. W^d the case be the same, if a Council were to be formed of
deputies from each with authority and discretion, to raise money, levy
troops, determine the value of coin &c.? Would 30 or 40, million of
people submit their fortunes into the hands of a few thousands? If they
did it would only prove that they expected more from the terror of their
superior force, than they feared from the selfishness of their feeble
associates. Why are Counties of the Same States represented in
proportion to their numbers? Is it because the representatives are
chosen by the people themselves? So will be the representatives in the
Nation^l Legislature. Is it because, the larger have more at stake than
the smaller? The Case will be the same with the larger & smaller States.
Is it because the laws are to operate immediately on their persons &
properties? The same is the case in some degree as the articles of
confederation stand; the same will be the case in a far greater degree,
under the plan proposed to be substituted. In the cases of captures, of
piracies, and of offences in a federal army, the property & persons of
individuals depend on the laws of Cong^s. By the plan proposed a
compleat power of taxation, the highest prerogative of supremacy is
proposed to be vested in the National Gov^t. Many other powers are added
which assimilate it to the Gov^t of individual States. The negative
proposed on the State laws, will make it an essential branch of the
State Legislatures & of course will require that it should be exercised
by a body established on like principles with the other branches of
those Legislatures.--That it is not necess[~a]y to secure the small States
ag^{st} the large ones he conceived to be equally obvious: Was a
combination of the large ones dreaded? This must arise either from some
interest common to V^a Mass^{ts} & P^a & distinguishing them from the
other States, or from the mere circumstance of similarity of size. Did
any such common interest exist? In point of situation they could not
have been more effectually separated from each other by the most jealous
citizen of the most jealous State. In point of manners, Religion, and
the other circumstances which sometimes beget affection between
different communities, they were not more assimilated than the other
States--In point of the staple productions they were as dissimilar as
any three other States in the Union. The Staple of Mass^{ts} was _fish_,
of P^a _flower_, of V^a _Tob^o_. Was a Combination to be apprehended
from the mere circumstance of equality of size? Experience suggested no
such danger. The journals of Cong^s did not present any peculiar
association of these States in the votes recorded. It had never been
seen that different Counties in the same State, conformable in extent,
but disagreeing in other circumstances, betrayed a propensity to such
combinations. Experience rather taught a contrary lesson. Among
individuals of superior eminence & weight in Society, rivalships were
much more frequent than coalitions. Among independent Nations,
pre-eminent over their neighbours, the same remark was verified.
Carthage & Rome tore one another to pieces instead of uniting their
forces to devour the weaker nations of the Earth. The Houses of Austria
& France were hostile as long as they remained the greatest powers of
Europe. England & France have succeeded to the pre-eminence & to the
enmity. To this principle we owe perhaps our liberty. A coalition
between those powers would have been fatal to us. Among the principal
members of antient & Modern confederacies, we find the same effect from
the same cause. The contentions, not the Coalitions of Sparta, Athens &
Thebes, proved fatal to the smaller members of the Amphyctionic
Confederacy. The contentions, not the combinations of Prussia & Austria,
have distracted & oppressed the German empire. Were the large States
formidable _singly_ to their smaller neighbours? On this supposition the
latter ought to wish for such a General Gov^t as will operate with equal
energy on the former as on themselves. The more lax the band, the more
liberty the larger will have to avail themselves of their superior
force. Here again Experience was an instructive monitor. What is y^e
situation of the weak compared with the strong in those stages of
civilization in which the violence of individuals is least controuled by
an efficient Government? The Heroic period of Antient Greece, the feudal
licentiousness of the middle ages of Europe, the existing condition of
the American Savages, answer this question. What is the situation of the
minor sovereigns in the great society of independent nations, in which
the more powerful are under no controul but the nominal authority of the
law of Nations? Is not the danger to the former exactly in proportion to
their weakness. But there are cases still more in point. What was the
condition of the weaker members of the Amphyctionic Confederacy.
Plutarch (life of Themistocles) will inform us that it happened but too
often that the strongest cities corrupted & awed the weaker, and that
Judgment went in favor of the more powerful party. What is the condition
of the lesser states in the German Confederacy? We all know that they
are exceedingly trampled upon: and that they owe their safety as far as
they enjoy it, partly to their enlisting themselves, under the rival
banners of the pre-eminent members, partly to alliances with
neighbouring Princes which the Constitution of the Empire does not
prohibit. What is the state of things in the lax system of the Dutch
Confederacy? Holland contains about 1/2 the People, supplies about 1/2
of the money, and by her influence, silently & indirectly governs the
whole republic. In a word; the two extremes before us are a perfect
separation & a perfect incorporation, of the 13 States. In the first
case they would be independent nations subject to no law, but the law of
nations. In the last, they would be mere counties of one entire
republic, subject to one common law. In the first case the smaller
States would have every thing to fear from the larger. In the last they
would have nothing to fear. The true policy of the small States
therefore lies in promoting those principles & that form of Gov^t which
will most approximate the States to the condition of counties. Another
consideration may be added. If the Gen^l Gov^t be feeble, the large
States distrusting its continuance, and foreseeing that their importance
& security may depend on their own size & strength, will never submit to
a partition. Give to the Gen^l Gov^t sufficient energy & permanency, &
you remove the objection. Gradual partitions of the large, & junctions
of the small States will be facilitated, and time may effect that
equalization, which is wished for by the small States now, but can never
be accomplished at once.
M^r Wilson. The leading argument of those who contend for equality of
votes among the States is that the States as such being equal, and being
represented not as districts of individuals, but in their political &
corporate capacities, are entitled to an equality of suffrage. According
to this mode of reasoning the representation of the boroughs in Engl[~d]
which has been allowed on all hands to be the rotten part of the
Constitution, is perfectly right & proper. They are like the States
represented in their corporate capacity like the States therefore they
are entitled to equal voices, old Sarum to as many as London. And
instead of the injury supposed hitherto to be done to London, the true
ground of Complaint lies with old Sarum: for London instead of two which
is her proper share, sends four representatives to Parliament.[117]
[117] According to King's Notes, Charles Pinckney spoke after
Madison: "_Charles Pinckney._ The Honors & offices may
become the objects of strong desire and of combination to
acquire them. If Representatives be apportioned among the
States in the Ratio of numbers, the Citizens will be free
and equal but the States will be unequal, and their
sovereignty will be degraded."--King's _Life and
Correspondence of Rufus King_, i., 610.
M^r Sherman. The question is not what rights naturally belong to man;
but how they may be most equally & effectually guarded in Society. And
if some give up more than others in order to obtain this end, there can
be no room for complaint. To do otherwise, to require an equal
concession from all, if it would create danger to the rights of some,
would be sacrificing the end to the means. The rich man who enters into
Society along with the poor man, gives up more than the poor man, yet
with an equal vote he is equally safe. Were he to have more votes than
the poor man in proportion to his superior stake the rights of the poor
man would immediately cease to be secure. This consideration prevailed
when the articles of Confederation were formed.[118]
[118] According to Yates, Madison followed Sherman: "Mr.
Madison. There is danger in the idea of the gentleman from
Connecticut. Unjust representation will ever produce it. In
the United Netherlands, Holland governs the whole, although
she has only one vote. The counties in Virginia are
exceedingly disproportionate, and yet the smaller has an
equal vote with the greater, and no inconvenience
arises."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 182.
The determination of the question from striking out the word "not" was
put off till tomorrow at the request of the Deputies of N. York.
Doc^r Franklin. M^r President.
The small progress we have made after 4 or five weeks close attendance &
continual reasonings with each other--our different sentiments on almost
every question, several of the last producing as many noes as ays, is
methinks a melancholy proof of the imperfection of the Human
Understanding. We indeed seem to feel our own want of political wisdom,
since we have been running about in search of it. We have gone back to
ancient history for models of Government, and examined the different
forms of those Republics which having been formed with the seeds of
their own dissolution now no longer exist. And we have viewed Modern
States all round Europe, but find none of their Constitutions suitable
to our circumstances.
In this situation of this Assembly, groping as it were in the dark to
find political truth, and scarce able to distinguish it when presented
to us, how has it happened, Sir, that we have not hitherto once thought
of humbly applying to the Father of lights to illuminate our
understandings? In the beginning of the Contest with G. Britain, when we
were sensible of danger we had daily prayer in this room for the divine
protection.--Our prayers, Sir, were heard, & they were graciously
answered. All of us who were engaged in the struggle must have observed
frequent instances of a superintending providence in our favor. To that
kind providence we owe this happy opportunity of consulting in peace on
the means of establishing our future national felicity. And have we now
forgotten that powerful friend? or do we imagine that we no longer need
his assistance? I have lived, Sir, a long time, and the longer I live,
the more convincing proofs I see of this truth--_that God Governs in the
affairs of men_. And if a sparrow cannot fall to the ground without his
notice, is it probable that an empire can rise without his aid? We have
been assured, Sir, in the sacred writings that "except the Lord build
the House they labour in vain that build it." I firmly believe this; and
I also believe that without his concurring aid we shall succeed in this
political building no better than the Builders of Babel: We shall be
divided by our little partial local interests; our projects will be
confounded, and we ourselves shall become a reproach and bye word down
to future ages. And what is worse, mankind may hereafter from this
unfortunate instance, despair of establishing Governments by Human
wisdom and leave it to chance, war and conquest.
I therefore beg leave to move--that henceforth prayers imploring the
assistance of Heaven, and its blessings on our deliberations, be held in
this Assembly every morning before we proceed to business, and that one
or more of the Clergy of this City be requested to officiate in that
Service--
M^r Sherman seconded the motion.
M^r Hamilton & several others expressed their apprehensions that however
proper such a resolution might have been at the beginning of the
convention, it might at this late day, 1. bring on it some disagreeable
animadversions, & 2. lead the public to believe that the embarrassments
and dissensions within the Convention, had suggested this measure. It
was answered by Doc^r F. M^r Sherman & others, that the past omission of
a duty could not justify a further omission--that the rejection of such
a proposition would expose the Convention to more unpleasant
animadversions than the adoption of it: and that the alarm out of doors
that might be excited for the state of things within, would at least be
as likely to do good as ill.
M^r Williamson, observed that the true cause of the omission could not
be mistaken. The Convention had no funds.
M^r Randolph proposed in order to give a favorable aspect to y^e
measure, that a sermon be preached at the request of the convention on
4^{th} of July, the anniversary of Independence; & thenceforward prayers
be used in y^e Convention every morning. D^r Frank^n 2^{ded} this
motion. After several unsuccessful attempts for silently postponing this
matter by adjourn^g the adjournment was at length carried, without any
vote on the motion.