[96] After Martin's second, according to Yates:
"M^r Madison. I oppose the motion--there are no
difficulties, but they may be obviated in the details
connected with the subject."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_,
etc., 149.
Col. Hamilton considered the Motion as intended manifestly to transfer
the election from the people to the State Legislatures, which would
essentially vitiate the plan. It would increase that State influence
which could not be too watchfully guarded ag^{st}. All too must admit
the possibility, in case the Gen^l Gov^t sh^d maintain itself, that the
State Gov^{ts} might gradually dwindle into nothing. The system
therefore sh^d not be engrafted on what might possibly fail.
M^r Mason urged the necessity of retaining the election by the people.
Whatever inconveniency may attend the democratic principle, it must
actuate one part of the Gov^t. It is the only security for the rights of
the people.
M^r Sherman, would like an election by the Legislatures best, but is
content with the plan as it stands.
M^r Rutlidge could not admit the solidity of the distinction between a
mediate & immediate election by the people. It was the same thing to act
by oneself, and to act by another. An election by the Legislature would
be more refined than an election immediately by the people: and would be
more likely to correspond with the sense of the whole community. If this
Convention had been chosen by the people in districts it is not to be
supposed that such proper characters would have been preferred. The
Delegates to Cong^s he thought had also been fitter men than would have
been appointed by the people at large.
M^r Wilson considered the election of the 1^{st} branch by the people
not only as the Corner Stone, but as the foundation of the fabric: and
that the difference between a mediate & immediate election was immense.
The difference was particularly worthy of notice in this respect: that
the Legislatures are actuated not merely by the sentiment of the people;
but have an official sentiment opposed to that of the Gen^l Gov^t and
perhaps to that of the people themselves.
M^r King enlarged on the same distinction. He supposed the Legislatures
w^d constantly choose men subservient to their own views as contrasted
to the general interest; and that they might even devise modes of
election that w^d be subversive of the end in view. He remarked several
instances in which the views of a State might be at variance with those
of the Gen^l Gov^t: and mentioned particularly a competition between the
National & State debts, for the most certain & productive funds.
Gen^l Pinkney was for making the State Gov^{ts} a part of the General
System. If they were to be abolished, or lose their agency, S. Carolina
& other States would have but a small share of the benefits of Gov^t.
On the question for Gen^l Pinkney motion to substitute election of the
1^{st} branch in such mode as the Legislatures should appoint, in stead
of its being elected by the people"
Mass^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. ay.
M^d div^d. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
General Pinkney then moved that the 1^{st} branch be elected _by the
people_ in such mode as the Legislatures should direct; but waived it on
its being hinted that such a provision might be more properly tried in
the detail of the plan.