[94] From June 21 to July 18 inclusive not copied by M^r
Eppes.--Madison's Note. This applies evidently to notes he
permitted Hon. George W. Eppes, Jefferson's son-in-law, to
take.
Doc^r Johnson.[95] On a comparison of the two plans which had been
proposed from Virginia & N. Jersey, it appeared that the peculiarity
which characterized the latter was its being calculated to preserve the
individuality of the States. The plan from V^a did not profess to
destroy this individuality altogether, but was charged with such a
tendency. One Gentleman alone (Col. Hamilton) in his animadversions on
the plan of N. Jersey, boldly and decisively contended for an abolition
of the State Gov^{ts}. M^r Wilson & the gentleman from Virg^a who also
were adversaries of the plan of N. Jersey held a different language.
They wished to leave the States in possession of a considerable, tho' a
subordinate jurisdiction. They had not yet however shewn how this c^d
consist with, or be secured ag^{st} the general sovereignty &
jurisdiction, which they proposed to give to the National Government. If
this could be shewn in such a manner as to satisfy the patrons of the N.
Jersey propositions, that the individuality of the States would not be
endangered, many of their objections would no doubt be removed. If this
could not be shewn their objections would have their full force. He
wished it therefore to be well considered whether in case the States, as
was proposed, sh^d retain some portion of sovereignty at least, this
portion could be preserved, without allowing them to participate
effectually in the Gen^l Gov^t, without giving them each a distinct and
equal vote for the purpose of defending themselves in the general
Councils.
[95] "D^r Johnson is a character much celebrated for his
legal knowledge; he is said to be one of the first classics
in America, and certainly possesses a very strong and
enlightened understanding.
"As an Orator in my opinion, there is nothing in him that
warrants the high reputation which he has for public
speaking. There is something in the tone of his voice not
pleasing to the Ear,--but he is eloquent and clear,--always
abounding with information and instruction. He was once
employed as an Agent for the State of Connecticut to state
her claims to certain landed territory before the British
House of Commons; this Office he discharged with so much
dignity, and made such an ingenious display of his powers,
that he laid the foundation of a reputation which will
probably last much longer than his own life. D^r Johnson is
about sixty years of age, possesses the manners of a
Gentleman, and engages the Hearts of Men by the sweetness of
his temper, and that affectionate style of address with
which he accosts his acquaintance."--Pierce's Notes, _Am.
Hist. Rev._, iii., 326.
M^r Wilson's respect for Doc^r Johnson, added to the importance of the
subject led him to attempt, unprepared as he was, to solve the
difficulty which had been started. It was asked how the Gen^l Gov^t and
individuality of the particular States could be reconciled to each
other; and how the latter could be secured ag^{st} the former? Might it
not, on the other side be asked how the former was to be secured ag^{st}
the latter? It was generally admitted that a jealousy & rivalship would
be felt between the Gen^l & particular Gov^{ts}. As the plan now stood,
tho' indeed contrary to his opinion, one branch of the Gen^l Gov^t (the
Senate or second branch) was to be appointed by the State Legislatures.
The State Legislatures, therefore, by this participation in the Gen^l
Gov^t would have an opportunity of defending their rights. Ought not a
reciprocal opportunity to be given to the Gen^l Gov^t of defending
itself by having an appointment of some one constituent branch of the
State Gov^{ts}. If a security be necessary on one side, it w^d seem
reasonable to demand it on the other. But taking the matter in a more
general view, he saw no danger to the States from the Gen^l Gov^t. In
case a combination should be made by the large ones it w^d produce a
general alarm among the rest; and the project w^d be frustrated. But
there was no temptation to such a project. The States having in general
a similar interest, in case of any propositions in the National
Legislature to encroach on the State Legislatures, he conceived a
general alarm w^d take place in the National Legislature itself, that it
would communicate itself to the State Legislatures, and w^d finally
spread among the people at large. The Gen^l Gov^t will be as ready to
preserve the rights of the States as the latter are to preserve the
rights of individuals; all the members of the former, having a common
interest, as representatives of all the people of the latter, to leave
the State Gov^{ts} in possession of what the people wish them to retain.
He could not discover, therefore any danger whatever on the side from
which it was apprehended. On the contrary, he conceived that in spite of
every precaution the General Gov^t would be in perpetual danger of
encroachments from the State Gov^{ts}.
M^r Madison was of opinion that there was 1. less danger of encroachment
from the Gen^l Gov^t than from the State Gov^{ts} 2. that the mischief
from encroachments would be less fatal if made by the former, than if
made by the latter. 1. All the examples of other confederacies prove the
greater tendency in such systems to anarchy than to tyranny; to a
disobedience of the members than usurpations of the federal head. Our
own experience had fully illustrated this tendency.--But it will be said
that the proposed change in the principles & form of the Union will vary
the tendency; that the Gen^l Gov^t will have real & greater powers, and
will be derived in one branch at least from the people, not from the
Gov^{ts} of the States. To give full force to this objection, let it be
supposed for a moment that indefinite power should be given to the Gen^l
Legislature, and the States reduced to Corporations dependent on the
Gen^l Legislature; Why sh^d it follow that the Gen^l Gov^t w^d take from
the States any branch of their power as far as its operation was
beneficial, and its continuance desireable to the people? In some of the
States, particularly in Connecticut, all the Townships are incorporated,
and have a certain limited jurisdiction. Have the Representatives of the
people of the Townships in the Legislature of the State ever endeavoured
to despoil the Townships of any part of their local authority? As far as
this local authority is convenient to the people they are attached to
it; and their representatives chosen by & amenable to them, naturally
respect their attachment to this, as much as their attachment to any
other right or interest. The relation of a General Gov^t to State
Gov^{ts} is parallel. 2. Guards were more necessary ag^{st}
encroachments of the State Gov^{ts} on the Gen^l Gov^t than of the
latter on the former. The great objection made ag^{st} an abolition of
the State Gov^{ts} was that the Gen^l Gov^t could not extend its care to
all the minute objects which fall under the cognizance of the local
jurisdictions. The objection as stated lay not ag^{st} the probable
abuse of the general power, but ag^{st} the imperfect use that could be
made of it throughout so great an extent of country, and over so great a
variety of objects. As far as its operation would be practicable it
could not in this view be improper; as far as it would be impracticable,
the conveniency of the Gen^l Gov^t itself would concur with that of the
people in the maintenance of subordinate Governments. Were it
practicable for the Gen^l Gov^t to extend its care to every requisite
object without the cooperation of the State Gov^{ts} the people would
not be less free as members of one great Republic than as members of
thirteen small ones. A Citizen of Delaware was not more free than a
Citizen of Virginia: nor would either be more free than a Citizen of
America. Supposing therefore a tendency in the Gen^l Government to
absorb the State Gov^{ts} no fatal consequence could result. Taking the
reverse as the supposition, that a tendency should be left in the State
Gov^{ts} towards an independence on the General Gov^t and the gloomy
consequences need not be pointed out. The imagination of them, must have
suggested to the States the experiment we are now making to prevent the
calamity, and must have formed the chief motive with those present to
undertake the arduous task.
On the question for resolving "that the Legislature ought to consist of
two Branches"
Mass. ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. Jersey, no. P^a ay.
Del. no. M^d div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
The _third_ resolution of the Report taken into consideration.
Gen^l Pinkney moved "that the 1^{st} branch, instead of being elected by
the people, sh^d be elected in such manner as the Legislature of each
State should direct." He urged 1. that this liberty would give more
satisfaction, as the Legislatures could then accommodate the mode to the
conveniency & opinions of the people. 2. that it would avoid the undue
influence of large Counties which would prevail if the elections were to
be made in districts as must be the mode intended by the Report of the
Committee. 3. that otherwise disputed elections must be referred to the
General Legislature which would be attended with intolerable expence and
trouble to the distant parts of the Republic.