274.
_Whose will to power is morality?_--The _common factor_ of all European
history since the time of _Socrates_ is the attempt to make the _moral
values_ dominate all other values, in order that they should not be
only the leader and judge of life, but also: (1) knowledge, (2) Art,
(3) political and social aspirations. "Amelioration" regarded as the
only duty, everything else used as a _means_ thereto (or as a force
distributing, hindering, and endangering its realisation, and therefore
to be opposed and annihilated ...).--A similar movement to be observed
_in China_ and _India._
What is the meaning of this _will to power on the part of moral
values,_ which has played such a part in the world's prodigious
evolutions?
_Answer:--Three powers lie concealed behind it_; (1) The instinct
of the _herd_ opposed to the strong and the independent; (2) the
instinct of all _sufferers_ and all _abortions_ opposed to the happy
and well-constituted; (3) the instinct of the mediocre opposed to
the exceptions.--_Enormous advantage of this movement,_ despite the
cruelty, falseness, and narrow-mindedness which has helped it along
(for the history of the _struggle of morality with the fundamental
instincts of life_ is in itself the greatest piece of immorality that
has ever yet been witnessed on earth ...).
275.
The fewest succeed in discovering a problem behind all that which
constitutes our daily life, and to which we have become accustomed
throughout the ages--our eye does not seem focussed for such things:
at least, this seems to me to be the case in so far as our morality is
concerned.
"Every man should be the preoccupation of his fellows"; he who thinks
in this way deserves honour: no one ought to think of himself.
"Thou shalt": an impulse which, like the sexual impulse, cannot fathom
itself, is set apart and is not condemned as all the other instincts
are--on the contrary, it is made to be their standard and their judge!
The problem of "equality," in the face of the fact that we all thirst
for distinction: here, on the contrary, we should demand of ourselves
what we demand of others. That is so tasteless and obviously insane;
but--it is felt to be holy and of a higher order. The fact that it is
opposed to common sense is not even noticed.
Self-sacrifice and self-abnegation are considered distinguishing, as
are also the attempt to obey morality implicitly, and the belief that
one should be every one's equal in its presence.
The neglect and the surrender of Life and of well-being is held to be
distinguished, as are also the complete renunciation of individual
valuations and the severe exaction from every one of the same
sacrifice. "The value of an action is once and for all _fixed_: every
individual must submit to this valuation."
We see: an authority speaks--who speaks?--We must condone it in human
pride, if man tried to make this authority as high as possible, for
he wanted to feel as humble as he possibly could by the side of it.
Thus--God speaks!
God was necessary as an unconditional sanction which has no superior,
as a "Categorical Imperator": or, in so far as people believed in the
authority of reason, what was needed was a "unitarian metaphysics" by
means of which this view could be made logical.
Now, admitting that faith in God is dead: the question arises once
more: "who speaks?" My answer, which I take from biology and not from
metaphysics, is: "the _gregarious instinct speaks._" This is what
desires to be master: hence its "thou shalt!"--it will allow the
individual to exist only as a part of a whole, only in favour of the
whole, it hates those who detach themselves from everything--it turns
the hatred of all individuals against him.
276.
The whole of the morality of Europe is based upon the values _which
are useful to the herd_: the sorrow of all higher and exceptional men
is explained by the fact that everything which distinguishes them from
others reaches their consciousness in the form of a feeling of their
own smallness and egregiousness. It is the _virtues_ of modern men
which are the causes of pessimistic gloominess; the mediocre, like the
herd, are not troubled much with questions or with conscience--they
are cheerful. (Among the gloomy strong men, Pascal and Schopenhauer are
noted examples.)
_The more dangerous a quality seems to the herd, the more completely it
is condemned._
277.
The morality of _truthfulness_ in the herd. "Thou shalt be
recognisable, thou shalt express thy inner nature by means of clear
and constant signs--otherwise thou art dangerous: and supposing
thou art evil, thy power of dissimulation is absolutely the worst
thing for the herd. We despise the secretive and those whom we
cannot identify.--_Consequently_ thou must regard thyself as
recognisable, thou mayest not remain _concealed_ from thyself, thou
mayest not even believe in the possibility of thy ever _changing_."
Thus, the insistence upon truthfulness has as its main object the
_recognisability_ and the _stability_ of the individual. As a matter
of fact, it is the object of education to make each gregarious
unit believe in a certain _definite dogma_ concerning the nature
of man: education _first creates this dogma_ and thereupon exacts
"truthfulness."
278.
Within the confines of a herd or of a community--that is to say, _inter
pares,_ the _over-estimation_ of truthfulness is very reasonable. A
man must not allow himself to be deceived--and _consequently_ he
adopts as his own personal morality that he should deceive no one!--a
sort of mutual obligation among equals! In his dealings with the
outside world caution and danger demand that he should _be on his guard
against deception_: the first psychological condition of this attitude
would mean that he is also on his guard against _his own people._
Mistrust thus appears as the source of truthfulness.
279.
_A criticism of the virtues of the herd._--Inertia is active: (1)
In confidence, because mistrust makes suspense, reflection, and
observation necessary. (2) In veneration, where the gulf that
separates power is great and submission necessary: then, so that
fear may cease to exist, everybody tries to love and esteem, while
the difference in power is interpreted as a difference of value:
and thus the relationship to the powerful _no longer has anything
revolting in it._ (3) In the sense of truth. What is truth? Truth
is that explanation of things which causes us the smallest amount
of mental exertion (apart from this, lying is extremely fatiguing).
(4) In sympathy. It is a relief to know one's self on the same level
with all, to feel as all feel, and to _accept_ a belief which is
already current; it is something passive beside the activity which
appropriates and continually carries into practice the most individual
rights of valuation (the latter process allows of no repose). (5) In
impartiality and coolness of judgment: people scout the strain of being
moved, and prefer to be detached and "objective." (6) In uprightness:
people prefer to obey a law which is to hand rather than to _create_
a new one, rather than to command themselves and others: the fear of
commanding--it is better to submit than to rebel. (7) In toleration:
the fear of exercising a right or of enforcing a judgment.
280.
The instinct of the herd values the _juste milieu_ and the _average_
as the highest and most precious of all things: the spot where the
majority is to be found, and the air that it breathes there. In this
way it is the opponent of all order of rank; it regards a climb from
the level to the heights in the same light as a descent from the
majority to the minority. The herd regards the _exception,_ whether
it be above or beneath its general level, as something which is
antagonistic and dangerous to itself. Their trick in dealing with
the exceptions above them, the strong, the mighty, the wise, and the
fruitful, is to persuade them to become guardians, herdsmen, and
watchmen--in fact, to become their _head-servants_: thus they convert
a danger into a thing which is useful. In the middle, fear ceases:
here a man is alone with nothing; here there is not much room even for
misunderstandings; here there is equality; here a man's individual
existence is not felt as a reproach, but as the _right_ existence;
here contentment reigns supreme. Mistrust is active only towards the
exceptions; to be an exception is to be a sinner.
281.
If, in compliance with our communal instincts, we make certain
regulations for, ourselves and forbid certain acts, we do not of
course, in common reason, forbid a certain kind of "existence," nor
a certain attitude of mind, but only a particular application and
development of this "existence" and "attitude of mind." But then the
idealist of virtue, the _moralist,_ comes along and says: "God sees
into the human heart! What matters it that ye abstain from certain
acts: ye are not any better on that account!" Answer: Mr. Longears
and Virtue-Monger, we do not want to be better at all, we are quite
satisfied with ourselves, all we desire is that we should not _harm_
one another--and that is why we forbid certain actions when they take
a particular direction--that is to say, when they are against our
own interests: but that does not alter the fact that when these same
actions are directed against the enemies of our community--against
you, for instance--we are at a loss to know how to pay them sufficient
honour. We educate our children up to them; we develop them to the
fullest extent. Did we share that "god-fearing" radicalism which your
holy craziness recommends, if we were green-horns enough to condemn
the source of those forbidden "acts" by condemning the "heart" and the
"attitude of mind" which recommends them, that would mean condemning
our very existence, and with it its greatest prerequisite--an attitude
of mind, a heart, a passion which we revere with all our soul. By
our decrees we prevent this attitude of mind from breaking out and
venting itself in a useless way--we are prudent when we prescribe
such laws for ourselves; we are also _moral_ in so doing.... Have
you no idea--however vague--what sacrifices it has cost us, how much
self-control, self-subjection, and hardness it has compelled us to
exercise? We are vehement in our desires; there are times when we even
feel as if we could devour each other.... But the "communal spirit" is
master of us: have you observed that this is almost a definition of
morality?
282.
_The weakness of the gregarious animal_ gives rise to a morality
which is precisely similar to that resulting from the weakness of the
decadent man: they understand each other; they _associate_ with each
other (the great decadent religions always rely upon the support of
the herd). The gregarious animal, as such, is free from all morbid
characteristics, it is in itself an invaluable creature; but it is
incapable of taking any initiative; it must have a "leader"--the
priests understand this.... The state is not subtle, not secret
enough; the art of "directing consciences" slips its grasp. How is the
gregarious animal infected with illness by the priest?
283.
_The hatred directed against the privileged in body and spirit_:
the revolt of the ugly and bungled souls against the beautiful, the
proud, and the cheerful. The weapons used: contempt of beauty, of
pride, of happiness: "There is no such thing as merit," "The danger is
enormous: it is right that one _should_ tremble and feel ill at ease,"
"Naturalness is evil; it is right to oppose all that is natural--even
'reason'" (all that is antinatural is elevated to the highest place).
It is again the _priests_ who exploit this condition, and who win the
"people" over to themselves. "The sinner" over whom there is more joy
in heaven than over "the just person." This is the struggle against
"paganism" (the pang of conscience, a measure for disturbing the
harmony of the soul).
_The hatred of the mediocre_ for the _exceptions,_ and of the herd for
its independent members. (Custom actually regarded as "morality.") The
revulsion of feeling _against_ "egotism": that only is worth anything
which is done "for another." "We are all equal";--against the love of
dominion, against "dominion" in general;--against privilege;--against
sectarians, free-spirits, and sceptics;--against philosophy (a
force opposing mechanical and automatic instincts); in philosophers
themselves--"the categorical imperative," the essential nature of
morality, "general and universal."
284.
The qualities and tendencies which are _praised_: peacefulness, equity,
moderation, modesty, reverence, respectfulness, bravery, chastity,
honesty, fidelity, credulity, rectitude, confidence, resignation,
pity, helpfulness, conscientiousness, simplicity, mildness, justice,
generosity, leniency, obedience, disinterestedness, freedom from envy,
good nature, industry.
We must ascertain to what extent _such qualities_ are conditioned
as means to the attainment of certain desires and _ends_ (often an
"_evil_" end); or as results of dominating passions (for instance,
_intellectuality_): or as the expressions of certain states of
need--that is to say, as _preservative measures_ (as in the case of
citizens, slaves, women, etc.).
In short, every one of them is not _considered "good" for its own
sake,_ but rather because it approximates to a standard prescribed
either by "society" or by the "herd," as a means to the ends of the
latter, as necessary for their preservation and enhancement, and also
as the result of an actual _gregarious instinct_ in the individual;
these qualities are thus in the service of an instinct which is
_fundamentally different_ from these _states of virtue._ For the herd
is _antagonistic, selfish, and pitiless_ to the outside world; it is
full of a love of dominion and of feelings of mistrust, etc.
In the "herdsman" this _antagonism_ comes to the _fore_ he must have
qualities which are _the reverse of_ those possessed by the herd.
The mortal enmity of the herd towards all _order of rank_: its
instinct is in favour of the _leveller_ (Christ). Towards all _strong
individuals (the sovereigns)_ it is hostile, unfair, intemperate,
arrogant, cheeky, disrespectful, cowardly, false, lying, pitiless,
deceitful, envious, revengeful.
285.
My teaching is this, that the herd seeks to maintain and preserve one
type of man, and that it defends itself on two sides--that is to say,
against those which are decadents from its ranks (criminals, etc.), and
against those who rise superior to its dead level. The instincts of the
herd tend to a stationary state of society; they merely preserve. They
have no creative power.
The pleasant feelings of goodness and benevolence with which the just
man fills us (as opposed to the suspense and the fear to which the
great innovating man gives rise) are our own sensations of personal
security and equality: in this way the gregarious animal glorifies
the gregarious nature, and then begins to feel at ease. This judgment
on the part of the "comfortable" ones rigs itself out in the most
beautiful words--and thus "morality" is born. Let any one observe,
however, the _hatred of the herd_ for all truthful men.
286.
Let us not deceive ourselves! When a man hears the whisper of the moral
imperative in his breast, as altruism would have him hear it, he
shows thereby that he belongs to the _herd._ When a man is conscious
of the opposite feelings,--that is to say, when he sees his danger and
his undoing in disinterested and unselfish actions,--then he does not
belong to the herd.
287.
My philosophy aims at a new _order of rank: not_ at an individualistic
morality.[5] The spirit of the herd should rule within the herd--but
not beyond it: the leaders of the herd require a fundamentally
different valuation for their actions, as do also the independent ones
or the beasts of prey, etc.
[Footnote 5: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE--Here is a broad distinction between
Nietzsche and Herbert Spencer.]