_(a)_ It depreciated the joy of living and the gratitude felt towards
Life, etc.
_(b)_ It checked the tendency to beautify and to ennoble Life.
_(c)_ It checked the knowledge of Life.
_(d)_ It checked the unfolding of Life, because it tried to set the
highest phenomena thereof at variance with itself.
E. Contra-account: the _usefulness_ of morality to Life.
(1) Morality may be a preservative measure for the general whole, it
may be a process of uniting dispersed members: it is useful as an agent
in the production of the man who is a "_tool_."
(2) Morality may be a preservative measure mitigating the inner danger
threatening man from the direction of his passions: it is useful to
"_mediocre people_."
(3) Morality may be a preservative measure resisting the life-poisoning
influences of profound sorrow and bitterness: it is useful to the
"_sufferers_."
(4) Morality may be a preservative measure opposed to the terrible
outbursts of the mighty: it is useful to the "_lowly_."
267.
It is an excellent thing when one can use the expressions "right" and
"wrong" in a definite, narrow, and "bourgeois" sense, as for instance
in the sentence: "Do right and fear no one";[4]--that is to say, to
do one's duty, according to the rough scheme of life within the limit
of which a community exists.--Let us not think meanly of what a few
thousand years of morality have inculcated upon our minds.
[Footnote 4: "Thue Recht und scheue Niemand."]
268.
Two types of morality must not be confounded: the morality with which
the instinct that has remained healthy defends itself from incipient
decadence, and the other morality by means of which this decadence
asserts itself, justifies itself, and leads downwards.
The first-named is usually stoical, hard, tyrannical _(Stoicism_ itself
was an example of the sort of "drag-chain" morality we speak of); the
other is gushing, sentimental, full of secrets, it has the women and
"beautiful feelings" on its side (Primitive Christianity was an example
of this morality).
269.
I shall try to regard all moralising, with one glance, as a
phenomenon--also as a _riddle._ Moral phenomena have preoccupied me
like riddles. To-day I should be able to give a reply to the question:
why _should_ my neighbour's welfare be of greater value to me than
my own? and why is it that my neighbour himself _should_ value his
welfare differently from the way in which I value it--that is to say,
why should precisely _my_ welfare be paramount in his mind? What is
the meaning of this "Thou shalt," which is regarded as "given" even by
philosophers themselves?
The seemingly insane idea that a man should esteem the act he performs
for a fellow-creature, higher than the one he performs for himself,
and that the same fellow-creature should do so too (that only those
acts should be held to be good which are performed with an eye to
the neighbour and for his welfare) has its reasons--namely, as the
result of the social instinct which rests upon the valuation, that
single individuals are of little importance although collectively
their importance is very great. This, of course, presupposes that they
constitute a _community_ with one feeling and one conscience pervading
the whole. It is therefore a sort of exercise for keeping one's eyes in
a certain direction; it is the will to a kind of optics which renders a
view of one's self impossible.
My idea: goals are wanting, and _these must be individuals._ We see the
general drift: every individual gets sacrificed and serves as a tool.
Let any one keep his eyes open in the streets--is not every one he sees
a slave? Whither? What is the purpose of it all?
270.
How is it possible that a man can respect himself _only_ in regard
to moral values, that he subordinates and despises everything in
favour of good, evil, improvement, spiritual salvation, etc.? as,
for instance, Henri Fréd. Amiel. What is the meaning of the _moral
idiosyncrasy_?--I mean this both in the psychological and physiological
sense, as it was, for instance, in Pascal. In cases, then, in which
_other_ great qualities are not wanting; and even in the case of
Schopenhauer, who obviously valued what he did not and _could_ not have
...--is it not the result of a merely mechanical _moral interpretation_
of real states of pain and displeasure? is it not a particular form
of _sensibility_ which does _not_ happen to _understand_ the cause
of its many unpleasurable feelings, but _thinks to explain them with
moral hypotheses?_ In this way an occasional feeling of well-being and
_strength_ always appears under the optics of a "clean conscience,"
flooded with light through the proximity of God and the consciousness
of salvation.... Thus the _moral idiosyncratist_ has (1) _either_
acquired his real worth in approximating to the virtuous type of
society: "the good fellow," "_the upright man_"--a sort of medium
state of high respectability: _mediocre_ in all his abilities,
but honest, conscientious, firm, respected, and tried, in all his
aspirations; (2) _or,_ he imagines he has acquired that worth, simply
because he cannot otherwise understand all his states--he is unknown to
himself; he therefore interprets himself in this fashion.--Morality is
the only _scheme of interpretation_ by means of which this type of man
can tolerate himself:--is it a form of vanity?
271.
_The predominance of moral values._--The consequence of this
predominance: the corruption of psychology, etc.; the fatality which
is associated with it everywhere. What is the _meaning_ of this
predominance? What does it point to?
To a certain _greater urgency_ of saying nay or yea definitely in
this domain. All sorts of _imperatives_ have been used in order to
make moral values appear as if they were for ever fixed:--they have
been enjoined for the longest period of time: they almost appear
to be instinctive, like inner commands. They are the expression of
_society's preservative measures,_ for they are felt to be almost
_beyond question._ The practice--that is to say, the _utility_ of being
agreed concerning superior values, has attained in this respect to
a sort of sanction. We observe that every care is taken to paralyse
reflection and criticism in this department--look at Kant's attitude!
not to speak of those who believe that it is immoral even to prosecute
"research" in these matters.
272.
_My desire_ is to show the absolute homogeneity of all phenomena, and
to ascribe to moral differentiations but the value of _perspective_; to
show that all that which is praised as moral is essentially the same
as that which is immoral, and was only made possible, according to
the law of all moral development--that is to say, by means of immoral
artifices and with a view to immoral ends--just as all that which
has been decried as immoral is, from the standpoint of economics,
both superior and essential; and how development leading to a greater
abundance of life necessarily Involves _progress_ in the realm _of
immorality_. "Truth," that is the extent to which we _allow_ ourselves
to comprehend _this_ fact.
273.
But do not let us fear: as a matter of fact, we require a great deal of
morality, in order to be immoral in this subtle way; let me speak in a
parable:--
A physiologist interested in a certain illness, and an invalid who
wishes to be cured of that same illness, have not the same interests.
Let us suppose that the illness happens to be morality,--for morality
is an illness,--and that we Europeans are the invalid: what an amount
of subtle torment and difficulty would arise supposing we Europeans
were, at once, our own inquisitive spectators and the physiologist
above-mentioned! Should we under these circumstances earnestly desire
to rid ourselves of morality? Should we want to? This is of course
irrespective of the question whether we should be _able_ to do
so--whether we can be _cured_ at all?