to Versailles, to give the King an account of his operations. He had a
strange passion for signal projects; and he proposed several to his
Majesty, the least of which was to deliver Genoa, to make Spain mistress
of the greater part of Italy, and strip the King of Sardinia of all his
dominions, &c.
He was sent again to Provence, where the sum of his exploits amounted
only to the taking of the small castle of Saint Margaret’s island. A man
of genius was lately saying to me, that if good chimerical projects, and
imaginary plans, made a man great, M. Belleisle was indisputably the
greatest man in Europe.
In the mean time Holland, having created a Stadtholder, determined on
the continuance of the war. I saw that Lewis XV. was manifestly
affected with this news, whether from a concern for his people, or that
the elevation of the Prince of Orange disconcerted his projects. He said
in my presence to a courtier, _These Dutchmen are terrible folks; I wish
their republic was a thousand leagues from any of my frontiers; it gives
me more trouble than all the rest of Europe put together_.
France having now no hopes of bringing the United Provinces to a
neutrality, thought of invading them; and politicians said, that it was
the only way left to restore the balance in Europe, which had been lost
by the continual advantages of the English at sea.
Effectual measures were taken for the invasion. The King won the battle
of Lafeldt. At the same time it was determined to besiege
Bergen-op-Zoom. This expedition was committed to count Lowendahl, who
merrily promised to make a present of it to the King on St. Lewis’s day.
Bergen-op-Zoom was taken, which threw the Dutch into the greatest
consternation, as they had all imagined the carrying of that place to be
an impossibility. This event shewed, that in war there is no such thing
as certainty, its operations being ever subject to the caprice and
inconstancy of fortune.
The congress at Breda was removed to Aix-la-Chapelle; but the courts
still continued planning sieges and battles. Whilst the
plenipotentiaries were settling the preliminaries, the levies for fresh
troops went on with all possible vigour, and France prepared for war
more than ever; but the difficulty was to procure soldiers. It has been
affirmed to me, that there were large country-towns in France, which
could not furnish so much as one militia-man, so that it became
necessary to make the married men carry arms, though this was hurting
posterity. All manner of taxes and imposts were also contrived to supply
the want of money. M. Machault, comptroller-general, who had succeeded
M. Orry, proposed expedients, but all of a very destructive tendency.
The parliament clamoured, and openly declared in its representations,
that if all the edicts concerning the finances took place, as proposed,
the kingdom was undone; but it received for answer, that great evils
required great remedies; and this silenced it.
At length a way being opened into Holland, by taking of Bergen-op-Zoom,
and Marshal Saxe threatening to put an end to the republic; on the other
hand, the southern provinces of France being reduced to a starving
condition; this, with other circumstances, disposed the several powers
to sign preliminaries of peace, which was soon followed by a definitive
treaty. Such a situation of things promoted the public tranquility more
than all the studied harangues of the plenipotentiaries at
Aix-la-Chapelle.
I had the treaty read to me at Versailles; all the articles appeared
very suitable to the present state of Europe, except that of Canada. It
seemed to me that the appointing commissioners to settle that great
affair, would only perplex it the more. I spoke of it to Marshal
Belleisle, who told me that article was a state secret: we could have
given it another turn, but this is best for us; it leaves things in
America as they are, and we have twenty Savage nations in Canada who
will revenge our loss. This revenge some years after cost us the game.
The Prince de Soubise told me some time after, that this peace had been
a child of necessity; that there was not one of all the signing Princes,
who could not have wished that the war had continued. Yet I can take
upon me to say, that the King of France was of a different mind. He was
visibly more gay than usual, and the great joy of his heart displayed
itself in his countenance.
Thus at length the public calamities were suspended. Genoa, which under
the Duke de Richelieu had continued to defend itself against the
Germans, grounded its arms. The Spaniards and French, after being in
continual action to settle Don Philip in Italy, discontinued their
operations; and it was agreed that every thing should remain quiet till
the publication of the definitive treaty. I longed for it more than any
minister in Europe. The King had no quiet; the concerns of his crown and
personal glory kept him in Flanders, and took up all his thoughts, never
returning to Versailles till the campaign was quite over. My private
satisfaction I could have willingly sacrificed to the happiness of the
state, but sieges and battles only encreased the public distresses.
New lotteries and new taxes were established to raise the means for
signing the peace; thus the public ease began with draining them to the
last drop.
The Pretender’s son, who seemed quite forgotten, now makes his
appearance again. Concluding, as he well might, that nobody would think
of him at the congress of Aix-la-Chapelle; he began by protesting
against every thing which should be done there. So little regard was
paid to the manifesto which he caused to be set up, that all parties
signed without minding his protestations. To this opposition he added
another still more extravagant at Paris, refusing to comply even with
the King’s express orders.
One of the first articles laid down between England and France, had
been, that the Chevalier de St. George’s son should quit the kingdom.
Lewis XV. several times signified to him the indispensable necessity he
was under of adhering to the agreement. Prince Edward plainly told those
who first mentioned the King’s pleasure to him, that he would not
comply. I have often heard the excuse he gave for this refractoriness.
_The King of France_, said he, _promised me that I should always find an
asylum in his dominions; for this I have his sign manual in my pocket. A
Prince who has a sense of honour, knows what obligations his word lays
him under, and how greatly he exposes himself in violating it._
He treated with the King of France as with a private gentleman. He
forgot that Sovereigns may fail in their word, without any breach in
their honour, the good of their people so requiring. The Pretender’s son
was taken into custody, as he was going to the opera. Strange reverse of
fortune! On his arrival in France, he had been received with great joy,
and marks of consideration. I was something concerned for this young
Prince’s fate, and dropped a word or two about him to the King, who
answered me with some heat, _What would you have me do, Madam? Should I
continue the war with all Europe for Prince Edward? England will not
allow him to be in my dominions; it was only on this condition, that she
came into the peace. Should I have broke off the conference at
Aix-la-Chapelle, and distressed my people more and more, because the
Pretender’s son is for living at Paris?_
It must be owned that this Prince shewed an obstinacy beyond example.
The King sent all Paris to represent to him the state of affairs, and
express the concern it gave him, that he was obliged to remove him from
his court. Though these messages were delivered to him in the King’s
name, his answers were so many menaces. The Count de Maurepas spoke to
him on this occasion, in the following words:
“It is with the greatest grief that the King sees himself obliged to
desire your Highness to quit his dominions. I come in his name to assure
you that no other consideration than the welfare of his subjects would
have prevailed on him to take this step. You would have seen him
inflexibly supporting your claim, had not the unhappy turn of the war
laid him under a necessity of yielding to the present juncture. The
greatest Monarchs cannot always do as they would. There are critical
seasons where policy requires them to be pliant. Your Highness knows
that; since the unhappy time when the Stuart family lost the crown of
England, the Bourbon family has made several efforts for their
restoration. You ought to take his intentions kindly, rather than blame
his inability. I wish you had been witness to his conversation with me,
when he called me into his closet to give me his orders, by which I was
to signify to you his desire that you will quit the kingdom; it must
have affected you. He sincerely laments your situation, but he cannot
turn the tide of fate; and should you force him to take violent
measures, it would give him the deepest concern.
“Lewis XV. has sent me to you, not as a King, not as a master, but as an
ally, and as a friend; and, what is more, he directed me to ask it of
you as a favour, that you would leave his dominions.”
Prince Edward was very laconic in his answer, drawing a pistol out of
his pocket, and vowing to shoot the first man that should offer to lay
hands on him. The archbishop of Paris likewise conjured him in the name
of God and the Pope, but with no greater effect; religion had no more
weight with him than politics, so that the extremity which the King
would have avoided, became necessary. The Chevalier de St. George’s son
was arrested as he was going to the opera.
The enemies of France failed not to exclaim against this violence,
exaggerating it with the most odious appellations.
On searching his house, it was found turned into an Arsenal. He had arms
enough to stand a siege in form. It was talked at court that he had
determined to fight singly himself against a whole regiment, and then
set fire to a barrel of powder, which communicated with others, and thus
blow up himself, with all that belonged to him. The King, on being told
this, said, “A very ill-timed bravery, indeed!”
The peace, however, spread an universal joy through all ranks. There
were only two men in the kingdom who were not satisfied with it, the
Marshals Saxe and Lowendahl. The former expressed his discontent to the
secretary of war in this manner: “After the battle of Fontenoy, said he,
we were in a fair way of making ourselves masters of Holland, and
putting an end to that troublesome republic; for these merchants, with
their shipping and their wealth, are the mischief-makers of Europe; they
are the necessary allies of our natural enemies the English. The great
work of their destruction was nearly finished; why did we not go through
with it? If we again give the republicans time to fortify themselves,
they will be as daring as before; and the time may come when France with
all its forces will not be able to bring them to reason. Destroying
Holland is cutting off England’s right arm; and every body knows, that
all France’s policy should center in weakening Great Britain.
“Of what consequence has the victory of Fontenoy been? What is France
the better for the taking of Bergen-op-Zoom? All those efforts of
courage, all the lives of so many gallant officers who fell in Flanders,
were purely thrown away. If these places were to be restored, and the
Dutch and the house of Austria to be put on the same footing as each of
them was before the war, it had been much better there had been no war
at all. France’s giving back its conquests, was making war against
herself; her very victories have ruined her; her enemies have retained
all their former strength, whilst she alone has weakened herself. Her
subjects are fewer by a million, and her finances reduced to little or
nothing.”
These speeches reaching the King’s ears, he said, “I understand the
language of those generalissimos; they are for ever dwelling on red-hot
bullets.”
The count de St. Severin d’Arragon, who had made the peace, undertook to
demonstrate the fallacy of such reasonings; and the King has often
repeated to me his arguments. “Sire, said he, the conquest of Holland
made no part of the plan of this war. All France aimed at, was to keep
the Dutch from declaring. The end of our many sieges and battles, was
not to destroy their republic, but only to bring it to pacific terms; so
that in forcing them to lay aside their arms, the council of state’s
view is fully answered.
“Your Generals will have it, that after the battle of Fontenoy, and the
taking of Bergen-op-Zoom, the United Provinces might easily have been
overrun, and the States-General have been brought under the dominion of
France. They are mistaken; the weapons of despair are invincible. To
compel a people to the necessity of being conquered, is the ready way to
lose a conquest. The sovereignties once settled, are no longer subject
to destruction; they are reciprocal counterpoizes; should only one fall
under the power of another, the whole balance of Europe would be
destroyed. It is long since war has afforded any of those decisive
blows, which, in the time of the Romans, changed the face of the
political world. A province may be mastered, but the invading of
kingdoms is out of date.
“Granting, Sir, that the ardour of your troops, breaking through the
common ways, had reduced Holland, it would have been a conquest not only
useless, but have thrown France into fresh troubles; all Europe, in a
body, would have declared war against you. The great powers, jealous of
the house of Bourbon, have long been watching an opportunity of giving
it a decisive blow.
“Right policy, instead of making a noise, silently takes a bye-way to
its ends; let us insensibly weaken the Dutch, but never think of
destroying them. They are a barrier against the great northern powers.
They secure us from the incursions of the Germans, whom the Romans
themselves could not check, and who at last overthrew the empire of the
Cæsars.
“But a great deal is said about the easiness of our conquering, and not
a word how easy it was to conquer us. What induced me, Sire, to put the
finishing hand to the great work of the peace, is the disorder of the
finances, the depopulation of the state, and the scarcity of
provisions.
“The Comptroller-general has acquainted me that he knows not where to
find any more money. The intendants of the provinces have wrote to the
war-office, that it is utterly impossible to raise another militia; to
which the intendant of Guienne adds, that in his province the people are
starving; those, Sire, were my motives for hastening the conclusion of
the peace.”
These reasons, however, did not prevail with the great men of the army,
who still wanted to be fighting. They were big with hopes, which the
peace seemed to quash. I remember Lewis XV. one day talking on this
subject, said to me, _that he had not a general officer in his troops
who cared what became of the state, if he could but get a Marshal’s
staff_.
The King, who had rewarded Marshal Saxe, did not forget the Count St.
Severin, making him a minister of state. This Count, though not a great
genius, had good rational sense, which he made to answer as well as a
superior understanding. He was slow in business, but sure; and his
phlegmatic disposition was better adapted to surmount those
difficulties, which ever put fervid and eager minds to a full stand. He
was a stranger to agitations; his passions moved in subordination to
political laws. Resentment, anger, sallies of passion, spirit of party,
with all the other prepossessing foibles which ruled most ministers,
were never seen in him. Those he used to call the reverse of the medal
of plenipotentiaries. In a negociation he moved straight on to his
drift, without stopping by the way. He had a natural love for peace, and
thus the more chearfully applied himself to forward a definitive treaty.
M. de Belleisle told me, that he found one great fault in him, which was
the want of a proper regard to military men, however illustrious by
their rank or merit; for after all, added he, there is no making a good
peace but by dint of victories; and it is the general, and not the
plenipotentiary, who gains battles.
France however was quite spent; the means made use of for supporting the
war had been so violent as to break all the springs of power. The
ministers complained greatly of the state of France, and openly said, at
the peace, that they did not know where to begin the administration.
Paris is not the place where the general distress most manifests itself.
The luxury, such as it is, prevailing there conceals the public
indigence. There poverty itself appears in embroidery and ribbons,
whilst in all the other parts of France it goes quite bare. The court
had written into the provinces for a report of the state of things. M.
de Belleisle has shewn me several memoirs of those times, transmitted
to Versailles by the intendants of the provinces. The tenour of the
first way this:
“MY LORD,
“You ask me for a state of the finances in this province; that is
soon done: there are none. I don’t believe that the whole province
could produce a hundred thousand livres in specie: the poverty is
so general, that all distinction of ranks is at an end. The louis
d’ors are like to become scarce pieces, so as soon to be seen only
in the cabinets of the curious.”
The other is from the intendant of a province naturally very fertile,
but which could not be cultivated for want of money. His report to the
minister was as follows:
“MY LORD,
“There is no representing to your Excellency the present distress
of this province; the land yields little or nothing; most of the
farmers, unable to live by the produce of their farms, have quitted
them; some are gone a begging, others have lifted in the army, and
not a few have escaped into foreign countries; the gentry and
nobility are little better off, being put to the utmost difficulty
to answer the taxes and impositions on them.
“Of fifteen hundred thousand acres of arable land, which used to
support this people, at present six hundred lie fallow; what a
diminution this must be to the general subsistence, your Excellency
readily sees. A village which, before the war, supported fifteen
hundred inhabitants, can now scarce support six hundred; and a
particular family, which was able to feed six children, and as many
labourers, can now provide food only for five. The cattle are
diminished no less than the men, so as not to be sufficient for
tillage; and in most of the villages men do the work of oxen.
“I have traced this calamity to its source, and I find the evil
proceeds from the general want of cash: to prevent the consequences
of this diminution, I could wish that the court would be pleased to
advance to this province, by way of loan, the sum of fifteen
hundred thousand livres, to be geometrically distributed among the
industrious poor. This, in my opinion, is the only remedy left to
avert greater evils.”
The third of these memoirs was from another intendant, who paints the
depopulation in these sad colours.
“MY LORD,
“The king’s subjects are daily decreasing in this province; it will
soon be without inhabitants. Having directed the parish-priests to
bring in lists of the christenings and burials, I find that the
number of the dead exceeds that of the living; so that, should this
depopulation go on twenty years longer, and God continues my life
during that time, by my calculation, I shall be the only living
creature, of the human species, in this province. Fifteen years
before the last revolution of the finances, this district contained
fifteen hundred thousand souls, and now if there are nine hundred
thousand, it is the most. Yet how, my Lord, can it be otherwise? Of
fifty of the king’s subjects, scarce two have any thing of a
subsistence; the others must necessarily perish. A marriage is
seldom heard of; so that all the new-born children are the fruits
of debauchery.
“I cannot point out any remedy to these distresses. In the present
crisis of the monarchy, it is God alone who can rescue it out of
the abyss into which the misfortunes of the times have cast it.”
The fourth was from a sea-port, whose deputy thus delivered himself
before the ministry.
“Trade, which had been declining for several years, is now fallen into a
total stagnation. Our ships lie in the harbours, useless both to the
state and their owners. We have little or nothing for exportation; the
produce of the country scarce affords a very scanty subsistence; and our
manufactures are at the lowest ebb. All our trade is in the hands of the
English and Dutch.
“Most of our monied men, who fitted out privateers, have been ruined by
the war; others so reduced, that instead of ten ships, which they used
to have at sea, they find it difficult to have one: both seas are
covered with foreign fleets, so that the white flag begins to be
forgotten.
“All other nations are carriers to France, whereas France carries for
none. This general stagnation animates others, and throws our marine
into a fatal lethargy, &c. &c. &c.”
The navy has been utterly ruined, all the ships being taken by the
English, except a few unserviceable ones in the harbours; and the funds
appointed for fitting out a fleet are exhausted; but had there been no
want of money, seamen were wanting; most of them had died in English
prisons, and they who escaped the enemy perished by distress. It was
impossible for France, being thinned of men, to furnish seamen.
M. Belleisle, who interfered in every branch of government, said one day
to the King, in my hearing, _Sire, should all the powers of Europe
declare war against you, I engage to raise in your dominions a hundred
and fifty thousand soldiers, who should keep them all at bay; but were I
to fight an English fleet of a hundred ships of the line, where I
should get twenty thousand seamen, I know not_.
Another misfortune, beyond any remedy, was the necessary reduction of
the troops. A hundred and fifty thousand subjects, who had fought for
the crown, at the peace came to want bread: most of them, though they
had been husbandmen before the war, were now no longer so. I have
several times heard the Marshal de Noailles say, that a countryman,
leaving the plough for the musket, is very seldom known to take to it
when discharged; and he used to add, that on a hundred thousand
husbandmen quitting their labour, a hundred thousand others must labour
to provide them bread, otherwise a famine, and the ruin of the state,
must be the consequence.
Some regulations were made to prevent the disorders to be apprehended
from these reduced troops; but the remedy was more dangerous than the
disease.
Of all the incumbrances, that of the military rewards were the greatest;
money was required to pay the bravery of the officers in ready cash, for
the military gentlemen are most impatient creditors. Formerly a St.
Lewis’s cross sufficed, but it has since appeared to the officers, that
a yearly sum gives a greater lustre to gallant actions.
Above ten thousand different pensions were settled on the Exchequer. A
churchman who, at my desire, used sometimes to read to me the memorials
on this head delivered to me for the king, would often say, that the
glory accompanying fine actions must be of very little value in France,
as the gentlemen of the army would not take it for a reward. The
archbishop of Paris likewise used to say, that victories cost the state
more than defeats.
The claimants would set forth their services with an arrogant modesty,
which gave great offence to the court; especially they who had lost a
limb were quite insupportable. One of these gentlemen (it was indeed
after several journies to court to obtain a pension) said to me before
several foreign ministers, _Madam, since the King cannot give me an arm,
which I have lost in his service, he should at least give me money_.
Once an officer being come express with the news of the loss of a battle
in Germany, the king said, _Thank God, this time I shan’t be teazed
about rewards_. He was mistaken; for fifteen hundred officers, who had
escaped the slaughter, came to Versailles, clamouring to be paid only
for the great service of their being present at that action.
A lieutenant of grenadiers, to whom the secretary at war had procured a
Saint Lewis’s cross without a pension, said to him, _Sir, your
Excellency has tied to my button-hole the sign of my courage, but you
have forgot the reality of my bravery_, meaning that he wanted a
pension.