Upon the 1st of January the emperor took possession of Astorga.

On that day seventy thousand French infantry, ten thousand

cavalry, and two hundred pieces of artillery, after many days of

incessant marching, were there united. The congregation of this

mighty force, while it evinced the power and energy of the French

monarch, attested also the genius of the English general, who,

with a handful of men, had found the means to arrest the course

of the conqueror, and to draw him, with the flower of his army,

to this remote and unimportant part of the Peninsula, at the

moment when Portugal, and the fairest provinces of Spain, were

prostrate beneath the strength of his hand. That Spain, being in

her extremity, sir John Moore succoured her, and in the hour of

weakness intercepted the blow which was descending to crush her,

no man of candour and honesty can deny. For what troops, what

preparations, what courage, what capacity, was there in the south

to have resisted, even for an instant, the progress of a man, who,

in ten days, and in the depth of winter, crossing the snowy ridge

of the Carpentinos, had traversed two hundred miles of hostile

country, and transported fifty thousand men from Madrid to Astorga

in a shorter time than a Spanish diligence would have taken to

travel the same distance?

[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations. MS.]

This stupendous march was rendered fruitless by the quickness of

his adversary; but Napoleon, though he had failed to destroy the

English army, resolved, nevertheless, to cast it forth of the

Peninsula, and being himself recalled to France by tidings that

the Austrian storm was ready to burst, he fixed upon the duke of

Dalmatia to continue the pursuit, adding for this purpose three

divisions of cavalry, and three of infantry to his former command;

but of these last, the two commanded by generals Loison and

Heudelet, were several marches in the rear, and general Bonnet’s

remained always in the Montagna de St. Ander; hence the whole

number bearing arms, which the duke led immediately to the pursuit,

was about twenty-five thousand men, of which four thousand two

hundred were cavalry[22]. The guns were fifty-four. Loison’s and

Heudelet’s divisions, however, followed him by forced marches, and

he was supported by marshal Ney with the sixth corps, wanting its

third division; but mustering above sixteen thousand men under

arms, (the flower of the French army), together with thirty-seven

pieces of artillery. Thus including Laborde, Heudelet, and Loison’s

division, nearly sixty thousand men and ninety-one guns were put on

the track of the English army.

The emperor returned to Valladolid, where he received the addresses

of the notables and deputies from Madrid and the great towns, and

strove, by promises and other means, to win the good opinion of the

public. Appointing Joseph to be his lieutenant-general, he allotted

separate provinces for each “_corps d’armée_,” and directing the

imperial guard to return to France; after three days he departed

himself with scarcely any escort, but with a speed that frustrated

the designs that (as some say) the Spaniards had formed against his

person.

CHAPTER V.

The duke of Dalmatia, a general, who, if the emperor be excepted,

was no wise inferior to any of his nation, commenced his pursuit

of the English army with a vigour that marked his eager desire to

finish the campaign in a manner suitable to the brilliant opening

at Gamonal.

[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations. MS.]

The main body of his troops followed the route of Foncevadon and

Ponteferrada, a second column took the road of Cambarros and

Bembibre, and general Franceschi, with the light cavalry, entering

the valley of the Syl, ascended the course of that river, and

turned the position of Villa Franca del Bierzo. Thus sir John

Moore, after having twice baffled the emperor’s combinations, was

still pressed in his retreat with a fury that seemed to increase

every moment. The separation of his light brigades, a measure

which he adopted, after the advice of his quarter-master-general,

weakened the army by three thousand men; but he still possessed

nineteen thousand of all arms, good soldiers to fight, and strong

to march, yet by the disorders at Valderas and Astorga, much shaken

in their discipline; for the general’s exertions to restore order

and regularity were by many officers slightly seconded, and by some

with scandalous levity disregarded.

There was no choice but to retreat. The astonishing rapidity with

which the emperor had brought up his overbearing numbers, and

thrust the English army into Gallicia, had rendered the natural

strength of the country unavailing. The resources were few, even

for an army in winter quarters, and for a campaign in that season,

there were none at all. All the draft cattle that could be procured

would scarcely have supplied the means to transport ammunition for

two battles, but the French, sweeping the rich plains of Castille

with their powerful cavalry, might have formed magazines at Astorga

and Leon, and from thence have been supplied in abundance, while

the English were starving.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, sections 2 and 8.]

[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Papers. MSS.]

Before he advanced from Salamanca, sir John Moore, foreseeing

that his movement must sooner or later end in a retreat, had sent

officers to examine the roads of Gallicia and the harbours which

offered the greatest advantages for embarkation. By the reports of

those officers, which arrived from day to day, and by the state

of the magazines he had directed to be formed, his measures were

constantly regulated. The magazines of Astorga, Benevente, and

Labaneza, we have seen, were, by untoward circumstances, and the

deficiency of transport, rendered of no avail beyond the momentary

supply they afforded; and part of their contents falling into the

enemy’s hands, gave him some cause of triumph; but those at Villa

Franca and Lugo contained about fourteen days’ consumption; and

there were other small magazines formed on the line of Orenze and

Vigo; more than this could not have been accomplished.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 28.]

It was now only the fifteenth day since sir John Moore had left

Salamanca, and already the torrent of war, diverted from the south,

was foaming among the rocks of Gallicia. Nineteen thousand British

troops, posted in strong ground, might have offered battle to very

superior numbers; but where was the use of merely fighting an

enemy who had three hundred thousand men in Spain? Nothing could

be gained by such a display of courage; but the English general,

by a quick retreat, might reach his ships unmolested, embark, and

carrying his army from the narrow corner in which it was cooped, to

the southern provinces, establish there a good base of operations,

and renew the war under favourable circumstances. It was by this

combination of a fleet and army, that the greatest assistance

could be given to Spain, and the strength of England become most

formidable. A few days’ sailing would carry the troops to Cadiz;

but six weeks’ constant marching would not bring the French army

from Gallicia to that neighbourhood. The northern provinces were

broken, subdued in spirit, and possessed few resources. The

southern provinces had scarcely seen an enemy, were rich and

fertile, and there also was the seat of government. Sir John Moore

reasoned thus, and resolved to fall down to the coast and embark,

with as little loss or delay as might be. Vigo, Coruña, and Ferrol

were the principal harbours; and their relative advantages could

not be determined except by the reports of the engineers, none of

which were yet received, so rapidly had the crisis of affairs come

on; but as those reports could only be obtained from day to day,

the line of retreat became of necessity subject to daily change.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 2d, see colonel Carmichael

Smith’s report.]

When the duke of Dalmatia took the command of the pursuing army,

Hope’s and Fraser’s divisions were, as I have said, at Villa

Franca, sir David Baird’s at Bembibre, the reserve and cavalry

at Cambarros, six miles from Astorga. Behind Cambarros the

mountains of Gallicia rose abruptly, but there was no position,

because, after the first rise at the village of Rodrigatos, the

ground continually descended to Calcabellos, a small town, only

four miles from Villa Franca, and the old road of Foncevadon and

Ponteferrada, which turned the whole line, was choked with the

advancing columns of the enemy. The reserve and the cavalry marched

during the night to Bembibre: on their arrival Baird’s division

proceeded to Villa Franca, but the immense wine-vaults of Bembibre

had such temptations, that many hundred of his men remained behind

inebriated; the followers of the army crowded the houses, and a

number of Romana’s disbanded men were mixed with this heterogeneous

mass of marauders, drunkards, muleteers, women, and children; the

weather was dreadful, and, notwithstanding the utmost exertions of

the general-in-chief, when the reserve marched the next morning,

the number of those unfortunate wretches was not diminished.

Leaving a small guard to protect them, sir John Moore proceeded

to Calcabellos; but scarcely had the reserve marched out of the

village, when some French cavalry appeared. In a moment the road

was filled with the miserable stragglers, who came crowding after

the troops, some with loud shrieks of distress and wild gestures,

others with brutal exclamations; many, overcome with fear, threw

away their arms. Those who preserved theirs were too stupidly

intoxicated to fire; and kept reeling to and fro, alike insensible

to their danger and to their disgrace. The enemy’s horsemen

perceiving this confusion, bore down at a gallop, broke through the

disorderly mob, cutting to the right and left as they passed, and

riding so close to the columns, that the infantry were forced to

halt in order to check their audacity.

At Calcabellos the reserve took up a position, and the

general-in-chief went on to Villa Franca. In that town great

excesses had been committed by the preceding divisions; the

magazines were plundered, the bakers driven away from the ovens,

the wine stores forced, and the commissaries prevented from making

the regular distributions; the doors of the houses were broken,

and the scandalous insubordination of the soldiers proved that a

discreditable relaxation of discipline on the part of the officers

had taken place. The general immediately arrested this disorder,

caused one man taken in the act of plundering a magazine to be

shot in the market-place, and issued severe orders to prevent a

recurrence of such inexcusable conduct, after which he returned to

the reserve at Calcavellos.

The Guia, a small, but at this season of the year a deep stream,

run through that town, and was crossed by a stone bridge. On the

Villa Franca side, a lofty ridge, rough with vineyards and stone

walls, was occupied by two thousand five hundred infantry, with

a battery of six guns. Four hundred[23] riflemen and about the

same number of cavalry were posted on a hill two miles beyond the

river, to watch the two roads of Bembibre and Foncevadon. The 3d of

January, a little after noon, the French general Colbert approached

this hill with six or eight squadrons; but observing the ground

behind Calcabellos strongly occupied, he demanded reinforcements.

Marshal Soult, believing that the English did not mean to make a

stand, sent orders to Colbert to charge without delay; and the

latter, stung by the message, obeyed with precipitate fury. From

one of those errors so frequent in war, the British cavalry,

thinking a greater force was riding against them, retired at speed

to Calcabellos. The riflemen, who, following their orders, had

withdrawn when the French first came in sight, were just passing

the bridge, when a crowd of staff officers, the cavalry, and the

enemy, came in upon them in one mass; in the confusion thirty or

forty men were taken, and Colbert crossing the river, charged

on the spur up the road. The remainder of the riflemen threw

themselves into the vineyards, and permitting the enemy to approach

within a few yards, suddenly opened such a deadly fire, that the

greatest number of the French horsemen were killed on the spot,

and among the rest Colbert himself. His fine martial figure, his

voice, his gestures, and, above all, his daring valour had excited

the admiration of the British, and a general feeling of sorrow was

predominant when the gallant soldier fell. The French voltigeurs

now crossed the river; a few of the 52d regiment descended from

the upper part of the ridge to the assistance of the riflemen, and

a sharp skirmish commenced, in which two or three hundred men of

both sides were killed or wounded: towards evening Merle’s division

of infantry appeared on the hills in front of the town, and made

a demonstration of crossing the river opposite to the left of

the English position; but the battery of the latter checked this

movement, and night coming on the combat ceased.

From Villa Franca to Lugo the road led through a rugged country;

the cavalry were therefore sent on to the latter town at once.

During the night the French patroles broke in upon the rifle

piquets, and wounded some men, but were beaten back without being

able to discover that the English troops had abandoned the position.

The reserve reached Herrerias, a distance of eighteen miles, on the

morning of the 5th. Baird’s division was at Nogales, Hope’s and

Fraser’s near Lugo. At Herrerias, sir John Moore, who constantly

directed the movements of the rear-guard himself, received the

first reports of the engineers relative to the harbours. It

appeared that Vigo, besides its greater distance, offered no

position to cover the embarkation, but Coruña and Betanzos did.

This induced him to relinquish his first intention of going to

Vigo, and made him regret the absence of his light brigades. The

transports were now ordered round from Vigo to Coruña; and in the

mean time the general sent orders to the leading division to halt

at Lugo, his intention being to rally the army there, to restore

discipline, and to offer battle to the enemy if he was inclined to

accept it.

These orders were carried to sir David Baird by one of the

aides-de-camp of the commander-in-chief; but sir David forwarded

them by a private dragoon, who got drunk and lost the despatch.

This blameable irregularity was ruinous to general Fraser’s troops:

in lieu of resting two days at Lugo, that general unwittingly

pursued his toilsome journey towards St. Jago de Compostella, and

then returned without food or rest, losing by this pilgrimage

above four hundred stragglers. The 4th, the reserve reached

Nogales, having by a forced march of thirty-six miles gained

twelve hours’ start of the enemy. At the entrance of this village

they met a large convoy, consisting of English clothing, shoes,

and ammunition; intended for Romana’s army but moving towards the

enemy; a circumstance perfectly characteristic of the Spanish mode

of conducting public affairs. There was a bridge at Nogales which

the engineers failed to destroy; but this was a matter of little

consequence, as the river was fordable above and below; indeed

the general was unwilling, unless for some palpable advantage,

which seldom presented itself, to injure the communications of a

country that he was unable to serve. The bridges were commonly very

solidly constructed, and the arches having very little span, could

be rendered passable again in a shorter time than they could be

destroyed.

At this period of the retreat the road was crowded with stragglers

and baggage; the peasantry, although armed, did not molest the

French; but fearing both sides alike, drove their cattle and

carried off their effects into the mountains on each side of the

line of march; even there the villanous marauders contrived to

find them, and in some cases were by the Spaniards killed; a just

punishment for quitting their colours. Under the most favourable

circumstances, the tail of a retreating force exhibits terrible

scenes of distress; and on the road near Nogales, the followers

of the army were dying fast from cold and hunger. The soldiers,

barefooted, harassed, and weakened, by their excesses at Bembibre

and Villa Franca, were dropping to the rear by hundreds. Broken

carts, dead animals, and the piteous appearance of women with

children, struggling or falling exhausted in the snow, completed a

picture of war, which, like Janus, has a double face.

Towards evening the French recovered their lost ground, and passed

Nogales, galling the rear-guard with a continual skirmish; and

here it was that dollars to the amount of twenty-five thousand

pounds were abandoned. This small sum was kept near head-quarters

to answer sudden emergencies, and the bullocks that drew it being

tired, the general, who could not save the money without risking

an ill-timed action, had it rolled down the side of the mountain;

part of it was gathered by the enemy, part by the Gallician

peasants[24].

[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.]

This day also, general Franceschi, who after turning Villa Franca

and scouring the valley of the Syl, had ascended the banks of the

Minho with his cavalry, fell into the line of march at Becerea, and

rejoined the French army. Towards evening the reserve approached

Constantino; the French were close upon the rear, and a hill within

pistol shot of the bridge offered them such an advantage, that

there was little hope to effect the passage without great loss.

The general caused the riflemen and artillery to take possession

of the hill, under cover of which the remainder of the reserve

hastily passed across the river without being perceived by the

enemy, who were unusually cautious, and not aware of the vicinity

of the bridge; the guns then descended at a trot, the riflemen

followed, and when the French, now undeceived, came up at a brisk

pace, the passage was effected, and a good line of battle formed

at the other side; a fight commenced, but notwithstanding that the

assailants were continually reinforced as their columns of march

arrived, general Paget maintained the post with two regiments until

nightfall, and then retired to Lugo, in front of which the whole

army was assembled. A few of the French cavalry showed themselves

on the 6th, but the infantry did not appear.

The 7th, sir John Moore, in a general order, gave a severe but just

rebuke to the officers and soldiers for their previous want of

discipline, and at the same time announced his intention to offer

battle. It has been well said, that a British army may be gleaned

in a retreat, but cannot be reaped. Whatever may be their misery,

the soldiers will always be found clean at review, and ready at a

fight. Scarcely was this order issued, when the line of battle, so

attenuated before, was filled with vigorous men, full of confidence

and valour. Fifteen hundred had fallen in action, or dropped to

the rear; but as three fresh battalions left by sir David Baird in

his advance to Astorga had joined the army between Villa Franca

and Lugo, nineteen thousand combatants were still under arms when

the French columns appeared in sight. The right of the English

position was in comparatively flat ground, and partially protected

by a bend of the Minho. The centre was amongst vineyards, with

low stone walls. The left, which was somewhat withdrawn, rested

on the mountains, being supported and covered by the cavalry. It

was the intention of the general to engage deeply with his right

and centre before he closed with his left wing, in which he had

posted the flower of his troops, hoping thus to bring on a decisive

battle, and trusting to the valour of the men to handle the enemy

in such sort as that he should be glad to let the army continue its

retreat unmolested. Other hope than this, to re-embark the troops

without loss, there was none, except by stratagem; for Soult, an

experienced general, commanding soldiers habituated to war, might

be tempted, but could never be forced to engage in a decisive

battle among those rugged mountains, where whole days would pass in

skirmishing, without any progress being made towards crippling an

adversary.

It was mid-day before the French marshal arrived in person at the

head of ten or twelve thousand men; the remainder of his power

followed in some disarray; for the marches had not been so easy

but that many even of the oldest soldiers had dropped behind. As

the French columns came up, they formed in order of battle along

a strong mountainous ridge fronting the English. The latter were

not distinctly seen, from the inequalities of the ground, and

Soult feeling doubtful if they were all before him, took four

guns, and some squadrons commanded by colonel Lallemande, advanced

towards the centre, and opened a fire, which was soon silenced by

a reply from fifteen pieces. The marshal being then satisfied that

something more than a rear guard was in his front, retired. About

an hour after he made a feint on the right, and at the same time

sent a column of infantry and five guns against the left. On that

side the three regiments which had lately joined were drawn up. The

French pushed the outposts hard, and were gaining the advantage;

when the English general-in-chief arriving, rallied the light

troops, and with a vigorous charge broke the adverse column, and

treated it very roughly in the pursuit. The estimated loss of the

French was between three and four hundred men.

[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.]

As it was now evident that the British meant to give battle, the

duke of Dalmatia hastened the march of Laborde’s division, which

was still in the rear, and requested marshal Ney, who was then at

Villa Franca, to detach a division of the sixth corps by the Val

des Orres to Orense. Ney, however, merely sent some troops into the

valley of the Syl, and pushed his advanced posts in front as far as

Nogales, Poyo, and Dancos.

[Sidenote: Ibid.]

At daybreak on the 8th the two armies were still embattled. On the

French side, seventeen thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry,

and fifty pieces of artillery were in line, but Soult deferred

the attack until the 9th. On the English part, sixteen thousand

infantry, eighteen hundred cavalry, and forty pieces of artillery,

impatiently awaited the assault, and blamed their adversary for

delaying a contest which they ardently desired; but darkness fell

without a shot having being fired, and with it fell the English

general’s hope to engage his enemy on equal terms.

What was to be done? assail the French position? remain another

day in expectation of a battle? or, in secrecy, gain a march,

get on board without being molested, or at least obtain time to

establish the army in a good situation to cover the embarkation?

The first operation was warranted neither by present nor by future

advantages, for how could an inferior army expect to cripple a

superior one, posted as the French were, on a strong mountain,

with an overbearing cavalry to protect their infantry should the

latter be beaten; and when twenty thousand fresh troops were at

the distance of two short marches in the rear. The British army

was not provided to fight above one battle. There were no draught

cattle, no means of transporting reserve ammunition, no magazines,

no hospitals, no second line, no provisions. A defeat would have

been ruin, a victory useless. A battle is always a serious affair;

but two battles under such circumstances, though both should be

victories, would have been destruction.

But why fight at all, after the army had been rallied, and the

disasters of the march from Astorga had been remedied? What, if

beating first Soult and then Ney, the British had arrived once more

above Astorga, with perhaps ten thousand infantry, and half as

many hundred cavalry? From the mountains of Gallicia their general

might have cast his eyes as far as the Sierra Morena, without

being cheered by the sight of a single Spanish army; none were

in existence to aid him, none to whom he might give aid. Even Mr.

Frere acknowledged that at this period six thousand ill-armed men

collected at Despeñas Peros formed the only barrier between the

French and Seville, and sir John Moore was sent out not to waste

English blood in fruitless battles, but to assist the universal

Spanish nation!

[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Papers.]

The second proposition was decided by the state of the magazines;

there was not bread for another day’s consumption remaining in

the stores at Lugo. It was true that the army was in heart for

fighting, but distressed by fatigue and bad weather, and each

moment of delay increased privations that would soon have rendered

it inefficient for a campaign in the south, which was the only

point where its services could now be effectual. For two whole days

sir John Moore had offered battle; this was sufficient to rally

the troops, to restore order, and to preserve the reputation of

the army. Lugo was strong ground in itself, but it did not cover

Coruña. The road leading from Orense to St. Jago de Compostella

turned it; the French ought to have been on that line, and there

was no reason to suppose that they were not. Soult, we have seen,

pressed Ney to follow it. It was then impossible to remain at Lugo,

and useless if it had been possible.

The general adopted the third plan, and prepared to decamp in the

night; he ordered the fires to be kept bright, and exhorted the

troops to make a great exertion, which he trusted would be the last

required of them.

The country immediately in the rear of the position was intersected

by stone walls and a number of intricate lanes; precautions were

taken to mark the right tracks, by placing bundles of straw

at certain distances, and officers were appointed to guide the

columns. At ten o’clock the troops silently quitted their ground,

and retired in excellent order; but a moody fortune pursued sir

John Moore throughout this campaign, baffling his prudence, and

thwarting his views, as if resolved to prove the unyielding

firmness of his mind. A terrible storm of wind and rain, mixed

with sleet, commenced as the army broke up from the position; the

marks were destroyed, and the guides lost the true direction; only

one of the divisions happily gained the main road, the other two

were bewildered, and when daylight broke, the rear columns were

still near to Lugo. The fatigue, the depression of mind, occasioned

by this misfortune, and the want of shoes, broke the order of

the march, and the stragglers were, becoming numerous, when

unfortunately, one of the generals commanding a leading division,

thinking to relieve the men during a halt which took place in the

night, desired them to take refuge from the weather in some houses

a little way off the road. Complete disorganization followed this

imprudent act: from that moment it became impossible to make the

soldiers of the division keep their ranks; plunder succeeded, the

example was infectious, and what with real suffering, and evil

propensity encouraged by this error of inexperience, the main body

of the army, which had _bivouaced_ for six hours in the rain,

arrived at Betanzos on the evening of the 9th, in a state very

discreditable to its discipline.

[Sidenote: Mr. James Moore’s Narrative.]

The commander-in-chief, with the reserve and the cavalry, as

usual, covered the march; in the course of it he ordered several

bridges to be destroyed, but the engineers failed of success

in every attempt. Fortunately, the enemy did not come up with

the rear before the evening, and then only with their cavalry,

otherwise many prisoners must have fallen into their hands. The

number of stragglers uncovered by the passage of the reserve was

so numerous, that being pressed by the enemy’s horse, they united

in considerable bodies and repulsed them, a signal proof that the

disorder was occasioned as much by insubordination in the regiments

as by the fatigue of the march.

The reserve, commanded by general Edward Paget, an officer

distinguished during the retreat by his firmness, ability, and

ardent zeal, remained in position, during the night, a few miles

from Betanzos. The rest of the army was quartered in that town,

and as the enemy could not gather in strength on the 10th; the

commander-in-chief halted that day, and the cavalry passed from the

rear-guard to the head of the column.

The 11th, the French interrupted those employed to destroy the

bridge of Betanzos; the twenty-eighth regiment repulsed the

skirmishers, but the bridge, though constructed of wood, was only

partially destroyed.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 26.]

In the meantime sir John Moore assembled the army in one solid

mass. The loss of men in the march from Lugo to Betanzos had been

greater than that in all the former part of the retreat, added to

all the waste of the movement in advance and the loss sustained

in the different actions: nevertheless fourteen thousand infantry

were still in column, and by an orderly march to Coruña under the

personal direction of the commander-in-chief, demonstrated, that

inattention and the want of experience in the officers was the true

cause of those disorders which had afflicted the army far more

than the sword of the enemy or the rigour of the elements.

As the troops approached Coruña the general’s looks were directed

towards the harbour; an open expanse of water painfully convinced

him, that to Fortune at least he was no way beholden; contrary

winds detained the fleet at Vigo, and the last consuming exertion

made by the army was thus rendered fruitless! The men were now put

into quarters, and their leader awaited the progress of events.

Three divisions occupied the town and suburbs, the reserve was

posted with its left at the village of El Burgo, and its right

on the road of St. Jago de Compostella. For twelve days these

hardy soldiers had covered the retreat, during which time they

had traversed eighty miles of road in two marches, passed several

nights under arms in the snow of the mountains, were seven times

engaged with the enemy, and they now assembled at the outposts,

having fewer men missing from the ranks (including those who had

fallen in battle) than any other division in the army. An admirable

instance of the value of good discipline, and a manifest proof of

the malignant injustice with which sir John Moore has been accused

of precipitating his retreat beyond the measure of human strength.

The bridge of El Burgo was immediately destroyed, and an engineer

was sent to blow up that of Cambria, situated a few miles up the

Mero river; this officer was mortified at the former failures, and

so anxious to perform his duty in an effectual manner, that he

remained too near the mine, and was killed by the explosion; but

there was also a bridge at Celas, two leagues higher up, and at

that place Franceschi’s cavalry crossed on the 12th, intercepted

some stores coming from St. Jago, and made a few prisoners.

The town of Coruña, although sufficiently strong to oblige an

enemy to break ground before it, was weakly fortified, and to

the southward commanded by some heights close to the walls. Sir

John Moore caused the land front to be repaired and strengthened,

and also disarmed the sea face of the works, and occupied the

citadel. The inhabitants cheerfully and honourably joined in the

labour, although they were fully aware that the English intended

to embark, and that they compromised their own safety by aiding

the operation. Such flashes of light from the dark cloud which at

this moment covered Spain may startle the mind of the reader, and

make him doubt if the Spaniards could have been so insufficient to

their own defence as they have been represented in the course of

this history. I can only answer, that the facts were as I have told

them, and that it was such paradoxical indications of character

that deceived the world at this time, and induced men to believe

that the reckless daring defiance of the power of France so loudly

proclaimed by the patriots, would be strenuously supported. Of

proverbially vivid imagination and quick resentments, the Spaniards

feel and act individually rather than nationally; and during this

war, that which appeared to be in them constancy of purpose, was in

reality a repetition of momentary fury, a succession of electric

sparks generated by a constant collision with the French army, and

daily becoming fainter as custom reconciled them to those injuries

and insults which are commonly the attendants of war.

Procrastination and improvidence are the besetting sins of the

nation: at this moment a large magazine of arms and ammunition was

in Coruña; these stores had been sent in the early part of the

preceding year from England, and they were still unappropriated

and unregarded by a nation infested with three hundred thousand

enemies, and possessing a hundred thousand soldiers unclothed and

without weapons.

Three miles from the town, four thousand barrels of powder were

piled in a magazine built upon a hill; a smaller quantity,

collected in another storehouse, was at some distance from the

first: to prevent these magazines from falling a prey to the

enemy, they were both exploded on the 13th. The inferior one blew

up with a terrible noise and shook the houses in the town; but

when the train reached the great store, there ensued a crash like

the bursting forth of a volcano, the earth trembled for miles,

the rocks were torn from their bases, and the agitated waters

rolled the vessels as in a storm; a vast column of smoke and dust,

shooting out fiery sparks from its sides, arose perpendicularly

and slowly to a great height, and then a shower of stones, and

fragments of all kinds, bursting out of it with a roaring sound,

killed several persons who remained too near the spot. A stillness,

only interrupted by the lashing of the waves on the shore,

succeeded, and the business of the war went on.

The ground in front of Coruña is impracticable for cavalry, and

as the horses still left alive were generally foundered, and that

it was impossible to embark them all in the face of an enemy,

a great number were reluctantly ordered to be shot. These poor

animals, already worn down and feet broken, would otherwise have

been distributed among the French cavalry, or used as draft cattle,

until by procrastinated sufferings of the nature they had already

endured, they should be killed.

The enemy were now collecting in force on the Mero, and it

became necessary to choose a position of battle. A chain of rocky

elevations commencing on the sea-coast, north-west of the place,

and ending on the Mero just behind the village of El Burgo, offered

an advantageous line of defence; covered by a branch of the

Mero, which, washing a part of the base, would have obliged the

enemy to advance by the road of Compostella; but this ridge was

too extensive for the English army, and if not wholly occupied,

the French might have turned it by the right, and moved along a

succession of eminences to the very gates of Coruña. There was no

alternative but to take post on an inferior range, enclosed as

it were within the other, and completely commanded by it within

cannon-shot.

The French army had been so exhausted by continual toil, that it

was not completely assembled on the Mero before the 12th. The

infantry took post opposite El Burgo; the cavalry of La Houssaye

lined the river as far as the ocean, and Franceschi, as we have

seen, crossed at the bridge of Celas, seven miles higher up. The

14th, the bridges of El Burgo being rendered practicable for

artillery, two divisions of infantry, and one of cavalry, passed

the river. To cover this march some guns opened on the English

posts at El Burgo, but were soon silenced by a superior fire. The

same evening, the transports from Vigo hove in sight, and soon

after entered the harbour of Coruña, and the dismounted cavalry,

the sick, all the best horses, and fifty-two pieces of artillery,

were embarked during the night; eight British, and four Spanish

guns, were, however, retained on shore ready for action.

[Sidenote: Noble’s Expedition de Galice.]

The 15th, La Borde’s division arrived, and the French occupied the

great ridge enclosing the British position, placing their right on

the intersection of the roads leading from St. Jago and Betanzos,

and their left upon a rocky eminence which overlooked both lines.

Towards evening, their cavalry, supported by some light troops,

extended towards the left, and a slight skirmish took place in

the valley below. At the same time the English piquets opposite

the right of the French, got engaged, and being galled by the

fire of two guns, colonel M’Kenzie of the fifth, at the head of

some companies, endeavoured to seize the battery; but a line of

infantry, hitherto concealed by some stone walls, arose, and poured

in such a fire of musketry, that the colonel was killed, and his

men forced back with loss.

[Sidenote: Noble’s Expedition de Galice.]

In the course of the night, marshal Soult with great difficulty

established a battery of eleven guns, (eight and twelve-pounders,)

on the rocks which formed the left of his line of battle. Laborde’s

division was posted on the right; half of it occupied the high

ground, the other half was placed on the descent towards the river.

Merle’s division was in the centre. Mermet’s division formed

the left. The position was covered in front of the right by the

villages of Palavia Abaxo, and Portosa, and in front of the centre

by a wood; the left was strongly posted on the rugged heights where

the great battery was established. The distance from that battery

to the right of the English line was about twelve hundred yards,

and, midway, the little village of Elvina was held by the piquets

of the latter nation.

[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Letter to L^d. Castle^h.]

The late arrival of the transports, the increasing force of the

enemy, and the disadvantageous nature of the ground, augmented the

difficulty and danger of the embarkation so much, that several

general officers proposed to the commander-in-chief, that he should

negotiate for leave to retire to his ships upon terms. There was

little chance of such a proposal being agreed to by the enemy, and

there was no reason to try. The army had suffered, but not from

defeat; its situation was dangerous, but far from desperate; and

the general would not consent to remove the stamp of energy and

prudence which marked his retreat, by a negotiation that would have

given an appearance of timidity and indecision to his previous

operations, as opposite to their real character as light is to

darkness. His high spirit and clear judgment revolted at the idea,

and he rejected the degrading advice without hesitation.

All the encumbrances of the army were shipped in the night of the

15th and on the morning of the 16th, and every thing was prepared

to withdraw the fighting men as soon as the darkness would permit

them to move without being perceived. The precautions taken

would, without doubt, have insured the success of this difficult

operation, but a more glorious event was destined to give a

melancholy but graceful termination to the campaign. About two

o’clock in the afternoon a general movement along the French line

gave notice of the approaching

BATTLE OF CORUÑA.

[Sidenote: Vide Plan of the Battle.]

The British infantry, fourteen thousand five hundred strong,

occupied the inferior range of hills already spoken of. The right

was formed by Baird’s division, and, from the oblique direction of

the ridge, approached the enemy, while the centre and left were

of necessity withheld in such a manner that the French battery on

the rocks raked the whole of the line. General Hope’s division,

crossing the main road, prolonged the line of the right’s wing,

and occupied strong ground abutting on the muddy bank of the

Mero. A brigade from Baird’s division remained in column behind

the extremities of his line, and a brigade of Hope’s was posted on

different commanding points behind the left wing. The reserve was

drawn up near Airis, a small village situated in the rear of the

centre. This last point commanded the valley which separated the

right of Baird’s division from the hills occupied by the French

cavalry; the latter were kept in check by a regiment detached

from the reserve, and a chain of skirmishers extending across the

valley connected this regiment with the right of Baird’s line.

General Fraser’s division remaining on the heights immediately

before the gates of Coruña, was prepared to advance to any point,

and also watched the coast road. These dispositions were as able

as the unfavourable nature of the ground would admit of, but the

advantage was all on the enemy’s side. His light cavalry, under

Franceschi, reaching nearly to the village of St. Christopher, a

mile in the rear of Baird’s division, obliged sir John Moore to

weaken his front by keeping back Fraser’s division until Soult’s

plan of attack should be completely developed. There was, however,

one circumstance to compensate for these disadvantages. In the

Spanish stores were found many thousand English muskets; the troops

exchanged their old rusty and battered arms for these new ones;

their ammunition also was fresh, and their fire was therefore very

superior to their adversary’s in proportion to the numbers engaged.

General Laborde’s division being come up, the French force could

not be less than twenty thousand men; and the duke of Dalmatia

having made his arrangements, did not lose any time in idle

evolutions, but distributing his lighter guns along the front of

his position, opened a heavy fire from the battery on his left,

and instantly descended with three solid masses to the assault. A

cloud of skirmishers led the way, and the British piquets being

driven back in disorder, the village of Elvina was carried by the

first column, which afterwards dividing, one half pushed on against

Baird’s front, the other turned his right by the valley. The second

column made for the centre. The third engaged the left by the

village of Palavia Abaxo. The weight of the French guns overmatched

the English six-pounders, and their shot swept the position to the

centre.

Sir John Moore observing, that, according to his expectations, the

enemy did not show any body of infantry beyond that which, moving

up the valley, outflanked Baird’s right, ordered general Paget

to carry the reserve to where the detached regiment was posted,

and, as he had before arranged with him, to turn the left of the

French attack and menace the great battery. Then directing Fraser’s

division to support Paget, he threw back the fourth regiment,

which formed the right of Baird’s division, opened a heavy fire

upon the flank of the troops penetrating up the valley, and with

the fiftieth and forty-second regiments met those breaking through

Elvina.

[Sidenote: Moore’s Narrative.]

The ground about that village was intersected by stone walls and

hollow roads; a severe, scrambling fight ensued, but in half an

hour the French were borne back with great loss. The fiftieth

regiment entered the village with them, and after a second struggle

drove them for some distance beyond it. Meanwhile the general

bringing up a battalion of the brigade of guards to fill the space

in the line left vacant by those two regiments, the forty-second

mistook his intention, and retired, and at that moment the enemy,

being reinforced, renewed the fight beyond the village, the officer

commanding the fiftieth[25] was wounded and taken prisoner, and

Elvina became the scene of a second struggle; this being observed

by the commander-in-chief, who directed in person the operations

of Baird’s division, he addressed a few animating words to the

forty-second, and caused it to return to the attack. General Paget,

with the reserve, now descended into the valley, and the line of

skirmishers being thus supported, vigorously checked the advance

of the enemy’s troops in that quarter, while the fourth regiment

galled their flank. At the same time the centre and left of the

army also became engaged; sir David Baird was severely wounded, and

a furious action ensued along the line, in the valley, and on the

hills.

[Sidenote: Mr. James Moore’s Narrative. Hardinge’s Letter.]

Sir John Moore, while earnestly watching the result of the fight

about the village of Elvina, was struck on the left breast by a

cannon shot; the shock threw him from his horse with violence; he

rose again in a sitting posture; his countenance unchanged, and

his stedfast eye still fixed upon the regiments engaged in his

front; no sigh betrayed a sensation of pain; but in a few moments,

when he was satisfied that the troops were gaining ground, his

countenance brightened, and he suffered himself to be taken to the

rear. Then was seen the dreadful nature of his hurt; the shoulder

was shattered to pieces, the arm was hanging by a piece of skin,

the ribs over the heart broken, and bared of flesh, and the muscles

of the breast torn into long strips, which were interlaced by their

recoil from the dragging of the shot. As the soldiers placed him in

a blanket his sword got entangled, and the hilt entered the wound.

Captain Hardinge, a staff officer, who was near, attempted to take

it off, but the dying man stopped him, saying, “_It is as well as

it is. I had rather it should go out of the field with me._” And

in that manner, so becoming to a soldier, Moore was borne from the

fight.

During this time the army was rapidly gaining ground. The reserve,

overthrowing every thing in the valley, and obliging La Houssaye’s

dragoons (who had dismounted) to retire, turned the enemy’s left,

and even approached the eminence upon which the great battery

was posted. On the left, colonel Nicholls, at the head of some

companies of the fourteenth, carried Palavio Abaxo (which general

Foy defended but feebly), and in the centre, the obstinate dispute

for Elvina terminated in favour of the British; so that when the

night set in their line was considerably advanced beyond the

original position of the morning, and the French were falling back

in confusion.

If at this time general Fraser’s division had been brought into

action along with the reserve, the enemy could hardly have escaped

a signal overthrow; for the little ammunition Soult had been able

to bring up was nearly exhausted, the river Mero, with a full tide,

was behind him, and the difficult communication by the bridge of El

Burgo was alone open for a retreat. On the other hand, to continue

the action in the dark was to tempt fortune, for the French were

still the most numerous, and their ground was strong. The disorder

they were in offered such a favourable opportunity to get on

board the ships, that sir John Hope, upon whom the command of the

army had devolved, satisfied with having repulsed the attack,

judged it more prudent to pursue the original plan of embarking

during the night, and this operation was effected without delay;

the arrangements being so complete that neither confusion nor

difficulty occurred.

[Illustration: _SKETCH OF THE_ BATTLE OF CORUÑA 16^{th}. Jan^y.

1808.]

The piquets kindling a number of fires, covered the retreat of the

columns, and were themselves withdrawn at daybreak, and embarked,

under the protection of general Hill’s brigade, which was posted

near the ramparts of the town. When the morning dawned, the French,

observing that the British had abandoned their position, pushed

forward some battalions to the heights of St. Lucie, and about

mid-day succeeded in establishing a battery, which playing upon the

shipping in the harbour, caused a great deal of disorder among the

transports. Several masters cut their cables, and four vessels went

ashore; but the troops being immediately removed by the men of

war’s boats, the stranded vessels were burnt, and the whole fleet

at last got out of harbour. General Hill’s brigade then embarked

from the citadel; but general Beresford, with a rear guard, still

kept possession of that work until the 18th, when the wounded being

all put on board, his troops likewise embarked[26]. The inhabitants

faithfully maintained the town against the French, and the fleet

sailed for England.

Thus ended the retreat to Coruña; a transaction which, up to this

day, has called forth as much of falsehood and malignity as servile

and interested writers could offer to the unprincipled leaders of a

base faction, but which posterity will regard as a genuine example

of ability and patriotism.

[Sidenote: Captain’s Hardinge’s Letter.]

[Sidenote: Mr. James Moore’s Narrative.]

From the spot where he fell, the general who had conducted it

was carried to the town by a party of soldiers. The blood flowed

fast, and the torture of his wound increased; but such was the

unshaken firmness of his mind, that those about him judging

from the resolution of his countenance that his hurt was not

mortal, expressed a hope of his recovery. Hearing this, he looked

stedfastly at the injury for a moment, and then said, “_No, I feel

that to be impossible._” Several times he caused his attendants

to stop and turn him round, that he might behold the field of

battle, and when the firing indicated the advance of the British he

discovered his satisfaction, and permitted the bearers to proceed.

Being brought to his lodgings the surgeons examined his wound, but

there was no hope; the pain increased, and he spoke with great

difficulty. At intervals he asked if the French were beaten, and

addressing his old friend colonel Anderson, he said, “_You know

that I always wished to die this way._” Again he asked if the

enemy were defeated, and being told they were, observed, “_It is

a great satisfaction to me to know we have beaten the French._”

His countenance continued firm, and his thoughts clear; once only,

when he spoke of his mother, he became agitated. He inquired after

the safety of his friends, and the officers of his staff, and he

did not even in this moment forget to recommend those whose merit

had given them claims to promotion. His strength was failing fast,

and life was just extinct, when, with an unsubdued spirit, as

if anticipating the baseness of his posthumous calumniators, he

exclaimed, “_I hope the people of England will be satisfied! I hope

my country will do me justice!_” The battle was scarcely ended,

when his corpse, wrapped in a military cloak, was interred by the

officers of his staff in the citadel of Coruña. The guns of the

enemy paid his funeral honours, and Soult, with a noble feeling of

respect for his valour, raised a monument to his memory.

Thus ended the career of sir John Moore, a man whose uncommon

capacity was sustained by the purest virtue, and governed by a

disinterested patriotism more in keeping with the primitive than

the luxurious age of a great nation. His tall graceful person, his

dark searching eyes, strongly defined forehead, and singularly

expressive mouth, indicated a noble disposition and a refined

understanding. The lofty sentiments of honour habitual to his

mind, adorned by a subtle playful wit, gave him in conversation an

ascendancy that he could well preserve by the decisive vigour of

his actions. He maintained the right with a vehemence bordering

upon fierceness, and every important transaction in which he was

engaged increased his reputation for talent, and confirmed his

character as a stern enemy to vice, a stedfast friend to merit, a

just and faithful servant of his country. The honest loved him,

the dishonest feared him; for while he lived, he did not shun but

scorned and spurned the base, and, with characteristic propriety,

they spurned at him when he was dead.

A soldier from his earliest youth, he thirsted for the honours of

his profession, and feeling that he was worthy to lead a British

army, hailed the fortune that placed him at the head of the troops

destined for Spain. The stream of time passed rapidly, and the

inspiring hopes of triumph disappeared, but the austerer glory

of suffering remained; with a firm heart he accepted that gift

of a severe fate, and confiding in the strength of his genius,

disregarded the clamours of presumptuous ignorance; opposing sound

military views to the foolish projects so insolently thrust upon

him by the ambassador, he conducted a long and arduous retreat with

sagacity, intelligence, and fortitude. No insult could disturb, no

falsehood deceive him, no remonstrance shake his determination;

fortune frowned without subduing his constancy; death struck, and

the spirit of the man remained unbroken when his shattered body

scarcely afforded it a habitation. Having done all that was just

towards others, he remembered what was due to himself. Neither

the shock of the mortal blow, nor the lingering hours of acute

pain which preceded his dissolution, could quell the pride of his

gallant heart, or lower the dignified feeling with which (conscious

of merit) he asserted his right to the gratitude of the country he

had served so truly.

If glory be a distinction, for such a man death is not a leveller!

CHAPTER VI.

OBSERVATIONS.

GENERAL VIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN.

Mr. Canning, in an official communication to the Spanish deputies

in London, observed, that “the conduct of the campaign in

Portugal was unsatisfactory, and inadequate to the brilliant

successes with which it opened.” In the relation of that campaign

it has been shown how little the activity and foresight of the

cabinet contributed to those successes, and the following short

analysis will prove that, with respect to the campaign in Spain,

the proceedings of the ministers were marked by tardiness and

incapacity.

Joseph abandoned Madrid the 3rd of August, and on the 11th of the

same month the French troops from the most distant parts of Europe

were in motion to remedy the disasters in the Peninsula.

The 1st of September a double conscription, furnishing one hundred

and sixty thousand men, was called out to replace the troops

withdrawn from Poland and Germany.

The 4th of September the emperor announced to the senate, that

“he was resolved to push the affairs of the Peninsula with the

greatest activity, and to destroy the armies which the English had

disembarked in that country.”

The 11th, the advanced guard of the army coming from Germany

reached Paris, and was there publicly harangued by the emperor.

The 8th of November he burst into Spain at the head of three

hundred thousand men, and the 5th of December not a vestige of the

Spanish armies remaining, he took possession of Madrid.

Now the Asturian deputies arrived in London the 6th of June.

The 20th of August (the battle of Vimiero being then unfought, and,

consequently, the fate of the campaign in Portugal uncertain,)

the English minister invited sir Hew Dalrymple to discuss three

plans of operations in Spain, each founded upon data utterly

false, and all objectionable in the detail. He also desired that

sir Arthur Wellesley should go to the Asturias to ascertain what

facilities that country offered for the disembarkation of an

English army; and the whole number of troops disposable for the

campaign (exclusive of those already in Portugal) he stated to be

twenty thousand, of which one half was in England and the other

in Sicily. He acknowledged that no information yet received had

enabled the cabinet to decide as to the application of the forces

at home, or the ulterior use to be made of those in Portugal,

yet, with singular rashness, the whole of the southern provinces,

containing the richest cities, finest harbours, and most numerous

armies, were discarded from consideration, and sir Hew Dalrymple,

who was well acquainted with that part of Spain, and in close and

friendly correspondence with the chiefs, was directed to confine

his attention to the northern provinces, of which he knew nothing.

The reduction of Junot’s army in Portugal, and the discomfiture

of Joseph’s on the Ebro, were regarded as certain events. The

observations of the minister were principally directed, not to the

best mode of attacking, but to the choice of a line of march that

would ensure the utter destruction or captivity of the whole French

army; nay, elated with extravagant hopes and strangely despising

Napoleon’s power, he instructed lord William Bentinck to urge the

central junta to an invasion of France, as soon as the army on the

Ebro should be annihilated.

Thus it appears that the English ministers were either profoundly

ignorant of the real state of affairs, or that with a force

scattered in England, Portugal, and Sicily, and not exceeding

forty-five thousand men, they expected in one campaign, first to

subdue twenty-six thousand French under Junot, and then destroying

eighty thousand under Joseph, to turn the tide of war, and to

invade France.

The battle of Vimiero took place, and sir Arthur Wellesley

naturally declined a mission more suitable to a staff captain than

a victorious commander; but before sir Hew’s answer, exposing the

false calculations of the minister’s plans, could be received in

England, a despatch, dated the 2d of September, announced the

resolution of the government to employ an army in the northern

provinces of Spain, and directed twenty thousand men to be held

in readiness to unite with other forces to be sent from England;

nevertheless, this project also was so immature, that no intimation

was given how the junction was to be effected, whether by sea or

land; nor had the ministers even ascertained that the Spaniards

would permit English troops to enter Spain at all; for three weeks

later, lord William Bentinck, writing from Madrid, says, “I had an

interview with Florida Blanca: he expressed his surprise that there

should be a doubt of the Spaniards wishing for the assistance of

the English army.” Such also was the confusion at home, that lord

Castlereagh repeatedly expressed his fears lest the embarkation of

Junot’s troops should have “absorbed all the means of transport”

in the Tagus, when a simple reference to the transport office in

London would have satisfied him, that although the English army

should also be embarked, there would still remain a surplus of

twelve thousand tons.

When the popular cry arose against the convention of Cintra, the

generals in chief were recalled in succession, as rapidly as they

had been appointed; the despatches addressed to one generally fell

into the hands of his successor; but the plans of the ministers

becoming at last mature, on the 6th of October sir John Moore was

finally appointed to lead the forces into Spain. At this period

the head of the grand French army was already in the passes of the

Pyrenees, and the hostile troops on the Ebro coming to blows. The

Spaniards were weak and divided, and the English were forty marches

from the scene of action; yet, said the minister to sir John

Moore, “there will be full time to concert your plan of operations

with the Spanish generals before the equipment of your army can

be completed.” Was this the way to oppose Napoleon! Could such

proceedings lead to ought but disaster! It has been said, that sir

Hew Dalrymple’s negligence was the cause of this delay; that he

should have had the troops in readiness: but that general could not

prudently incur the expense of equipping for a march, an army that

was likely to be embarked; he could not, in short, divine the plans

of the ministers before they were formed; and it is evident that

the error attaches entirely to the government.

The incapacity of the Spanish generals has been already

sufficiently exposed by occasional observations in the narrative;

their faults, glaring and fatal, call for no further remark; but

the exact combinations, the energy and rapidity of the French

emperor, merit the most careful examination; his operations were

not, as they have been generally considered, a pompous display of

power, to create an appearance of conquest that was unreal, not a

mere violent irruption with a multitude of men, but a series of

skilful and scientific movements, worthy of so great a general and

politician. It is true that his force was immense, and that the

Spaniards were but contemptible soldiers; but he never neglected

the lessons of experience, nor deviated from the strictest rules

of art. With astonishing activity, and when we consider the state

of his political relations on the continent, we may add, with

astonishing boldness, he first collected ample means to attain his

object, then deceiving his enemies with regard to his numbers,

position, and intentions, and choosing his time with admirable

judgment, he broke through the weak part of their line, and seized

Burgos, a central point, which enabled him to envelop and destroy

the left wing of the Spaniards before their right could hear of his

attack, the latter being itself turned by the same movement, and

exposed to a like fate. This position also enabled him to menace

the capital, to keep the English army in check, and to cover the

formation of those magazines and stores which were necessary to

render Burgos the base and pivot of further operations.

Napoleon’s forces were numerous enough to have attacked Castaños

and Palafox, while Blake was being pursued by the first and fourth

corps; but trusting nothing to chance, he waited for twelve days,

until the position of the English army was ascertained, the

strength of the northern provinces quite broken, and a secure

place of arms established. Then leaving the second corps to cover

his communications, and sending the fourth corps into the flat

country, to coast, as it were, the heads of the English columns

on his right, and to turn the passes of the Carpentino mountains,

he caused the Spanish right wing to be destroyed, and himself

approached the capital, at a moment when not a vestige of a

national army was left, when he had good reason to think that the

English were in full retreat, when the whole of his own corps were

close at hand, and consequently when the greatest moral effect

could be produced, and the greatest physical power concentrated

at the same time to take advantage of it. Napoleon’s dispositions

were indeed surprisingly skilful; for although marshal Lefebre’s

precipitation at Zornoza, by prolonging Blake’s agony, lost six

days of promise, it is certain that reverses in battle could

neither have checked the emperor, nor helped the Spaniards.

For if Soult had been beaten at Gamonal, Napoleon was close at hand

to support the second corps, and the sixth corps would have fallen

upon the flank and rear of the Spaniards.

If the first corps had been defeated at Espinosa, the second and

fourth corps, and the emperor’s troops, would have taken Blake in

flank and rear.

If Lasnes had been defeated at Tudela, he could have fallen back on

Pampeluna; the fifth and eighth corps were marching to support him,

and the sixth corps would have taken the Spaniards in flank.

If the emperor had been repulsed at the Somosierra, the sixth corps

would have turned that position by Guadalaxara, and the fourth

corps by Guadarama.

If sir John Moore had retreated on Portugal, the fourth corps was

nearer to Lisbon than he was.

If he had overthrown Soult, the fifth and eighth corps were ready

to sustain that marshal, and Napoleon, with fifty thousand men,

as we have seen, was prepared to cut the British line of retreat

into Gallicia. In short, no possible event could have divided the

emperor’s forces, and he constantly preserved a central position

that enabled him to unite his masses in sufficient time to repair

any momentary disaster. By a judicious mixture of force and

policy also, he obliged Madrid to surrender in two days, and thus

prevented the enthusiasm which would doubtless have arisen if the

capital had been defended for any time, and the heart burnings if

it had been stormed. The second sweep that he was preparing to make

when sir John Moore’s march called off his attention from the south

would undoubtedly have put him in possession of the remaining great

cities of the Peninsula. Then the civil benefits promised in his

decrees and speeches would have produced their full effect, and the

result may be judged of by the fact that in 1811 and 12, Andalusia

and Valencia were under the able administration of marshals Soult

and Suchet, as tranquil and submissive as any department of France,

and the former even raised numerous Spanish battalions, and

employed them not only to preserve the public peace, but to chase

and put down the guerillas of the neighbouring provinces.

Sir John Moore’s talents saved the Peninsula from this great

danger, and here perhaps a military error of Napoleon’s may be

detected. Forgetting that war is not a conjectural art, he took for

granted that the English army was falling back to Portugal, and

without ascertaining that it was so, acted upon the supposition.

This apparent negligence, so unlike his usual circumspection, leads

to the notion, that through Morla he might have become acquainted

with the peculiar opinions and rash temper of Mr. Frere, and

trusted that the treacherous arts of the Spaniard, in conjunction

with the presumptuous disposition of the plenipotentiary, would so

mislead the English general, as to induce him to carry his army to

Madrid, and thus deliver it up entire and bound. It was an error;

but Napoleon could be deceived or negligent only for a moment.

With what vigour he recovered himself, and hastened to remedy his

error! How instantaneously he relinquished his intentions against

the south, turned his face away from the glittering prize, and

bent his whole force against the only man among his adversaries

that had discovered talent and decision! Let those who have seen

the preparations necessary to enable a small army to act, even

on a pre-conceived plan, say what uncontrollable energy that man

possessed, who, suddenly interrupted in such great designs, could,

in the course of a few hours, put fifty thousand men in movement

on a totally new line of operations, and in the midst of winter

execute a march of two hundred miles with a rapidity hardly to be

equalled under the most favourable circumstances.

The indefatigable activity of the duke of Dalmatia greatly

contributed to the success of the whole campaign, and it is a

remarkable circumstance, that Soult and Napoleon, advancing from

different bases, should have so combined their movements, that

(after marching, the one above a hundred, and the other two hundred

miles, through a hostile country) they effected their junction

at a given point, and at a given hour, without failure; and it

is no less remarkable that such a decided and well-conducted

operation should have been baffled by a general at the head of an

inexperienced army.

OBSERVATIONS ON SIR JOHN MOORE’S RETREAT.

When Sylla, after all his victories, styled himself a happy,

rather than a great general, he discovered his profound knowledge

of the military art. Experience had taught him that the urgent

speed of one legion, the inactivity of another, the obstinacy,

the ignorance, or the treachery of a subordinate officer,

was sufficient to mar the best concerted plan, nay, that the

intervention of a shower of rain, an unexpected ditch, or any

apparently trivial accident, might determine the fate of a whole

army. It taught him that the vicissitudes of war are so many, that

disappointment will attend the wisest combinations; that a ruinous

defeat, the work of chance, often closes the career of the boldest

and most sagacious of generals; and that to judge of a commander’s

conduct by the event alone, is equally unjust and unphilosophical,

a refuge for vanity and ignorance.

These reflections seem to be peculiarly applicable to sir John

Moore’s campaign, which has by sundry writers been so unfairly

discussed. Many of the subsequent disasters of the French can now

be distinctly traced to the operations of the British army. It

can be demonstrated that the reputation of that excellent man was

basely sacrificed at the period of his death, and that the virulent

censures passed upon his conduct have been as inconsiderate as they

were unmerited and cruel.

[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Journal, MSS.]

The nature of the commands held by sir John Moore in the years

1807-8-9, forced him into a series of embarrassments from which few

men could have extricated themselves. After refusing the charge

of the absurd expedition to Egypt in 1806, which ended, as he

judged it must do, unfavourably, he succeeded to the command of

the troops in Sicily, a situation which immediately involved him

in unpleasant discussions with the queen of Naples and the British

envoy: discussions to which the subsequent well-known enmity

of the cabinet of that day may be traced. By his frank conduct,

clear judgment, and firm spirit, he obtained an influence over the

wretched court of Palermo that promised the happiest results. The

queen’s repugnance to a reform was overcome, the ministers were

awed, and the miserable intrigues of the day were for the time

put down. The Sicilian army was reorganized, and a good military

system was commenced under the advice of the British general. This

promising state of affairs lasted but a short time; the Russian

fleet put into the Tagus, the French threatened Portugal, and

Sicily was no longer considered! Sir John Moore was ordered to

quit that island, and to assemble a large force at Gibraltar for

a specific service; but the troops to be gathered were dispersed

in the Mediterranean from Egypt to the straits, and their junction

could not be effected at all unless the English ambassador at

Constantinople should succeed in bringing a negotiation then

pending between the Turks and Russians to a happy issue. The

special service in question had two objects, 1º. to aid sir Sydney

Smith in carrying off the royal family of Portugal to the Brazils;

and 2º. to take possession of Madeira; but neither were made known

to the general before his arrival at Gibraltar, which was not

until after Junot had taken possession of Lisbon. Sir John Moore

then (following his instructions) proceeded home, and thus our

interests in Sicily were again abandoned to the vices and intrigues

of the court of Palermo. On the passage he crossed general Spencer

going with a force against Ceuta, and soon after he had reached

England, he was despatched to Sweden, without any specific object,

and with such vague instructions, that an immediate collision with

the unfortunate Gustavus was the consequence. Having with much

dexterity and judgment withdrawn himself and his army from the

capricious violence of that monarch, sir John was superseded and

sent to Portugal, with the third rank in an army which at that time

no man had such good claims to command as himself[27].

The good fortune of England was never more conspicuous than at this

period, when her armies and fleets were thus bandied about, and

a blind chance governed the councils at home. For first a force

collected from all parts of the Mediterranean was transported to

the Baltic sea, at a time when an expedition composed of troops

which had but a short time before come back from the Baltic were

sailing from England to the Mediterranean. An army intended to

conquer South America was happily assembled in Ireland at the

moment when an unexpected event called for their services in

Portugal, and a division destined to attack the Spaniards at

Ceuta arrived at Gibraltar at the instant when the insurrection

of Andalusia fortunately prevented them from making an attempt

that would have materially aided Napoleon’s schemes against the

Peninsula. Again, three days after sir John Moore had withdrawn

his army from Sweden, orders arrived to employ it in carrying

off the Spanish troops under Romana, an operation for which it

was not required, and which would have retarded, if not entirely

frustrated, the campaign in Portugal; nor was it the least part of

that fortune, that in such long continued voyages in bad seasons,

no disaster befell those huge fleets thus employed in bearing the

strength of England from one extremity of Europe to the other.

After the convention of Cintra, sir John Moore was again placed

at the head of an army; an appointment unexpected by him, for

the frank and bold manner in which he expressed himself to the

ministers on his return from Gottingen left him little to hope;

but the personal good-will of the king, and other circumstances,

procured him this command. Thus, in a few months after he had

quitted Sweden, Moore, with an army not exceeding twenty-four

thousand men, was in the heart of Spain, opposed to Napoleon, who

having passed the Pyrenees at the head of three hundred and thirty

thousand men, could readily bring two hundred thousand to bear on

the British; a vast disproportion of numbers, and a sufficient

answer to all the idle censures passed upon the retreat to Coruña.

The most plausible grounds of accusation against sir John Moore’s

conduct rest on three alleged errors:

1st. That he divided his forces.

2dly. That he advanced against Soult.

3dly. That he made a precipitate and unnecessary retreat.

When a general, aware of the strength of his adversary, and of

the resources to be placed at his own disposal, arranges a plan

of campaign, he may be strictly judged by the rules of art; but

if, as in the case of sir John Moore, he is suddenly appointed to

conduct important operations without a plan being arranged, or the

means given to arrange one, then it is evident that his capacity

or incapacity must be judged of, by the energy he displays, the

comprehensive view he takes of affairs, and the rapidity with which

he accommodates his measures to events, that the original vice of

his appointment will not permit him to control.

The first separation of the English army was the work of the

ministers, who sent sir David Baird to Coruña. The after separation

of the artillery was sir John Moore’s act; the reasons for which

have been already stated; but it is worth while to examine what

the effect of that measure was, and what it might have been;

and here it may be observed, that, although a brigade of light

six-pounders did accompany the troops to Almeida, the road was

_not practicable_; for the guns were in some places let down the

rocks by ropes, and in others, carried over the difficult places;

a practicable affair with one brigade; but how could the great

train of guns and ammunition waggons that accompanied sir John Hope

have passed such places without a loss of time that would have

proved more injurious to the operations than the separation of the

artillery?

The advance of the army was guided by three contingent cases,

any one of which arising would have immediately influenced the

operations; 1º. Blake on the left, or Castaños and Palafox upon the

right, might have beaten the French, and advanced to the Pyrenees.

2º. They might have maintained their position on the Ebro. 3º.

The arrival of reinforcements from France might have forced the

Spaniards to fall back upon the upper Douero, on one side, and to

the mountains of Guadalaxara on the other. In the first case, there

was no risk in marching by divisions towards Burgos, which was the

point of concentration given by the British and Spanish ministers.

In the second case, the army could safely unite at Valladolid; and

in the third case, if the division of sir David Baird had reached

Toro early in November (and this it was reasonable to expect, as

that general arrived at Coruña the 13th of October), the retrograde

movement of the Spanish armies would probably have drawn the

English to the Guadarama, as a safe and central point between

the retiring Spanish wings. Now the artillery marching from the

Alemtejo by the roads of Talavera and Naval Carnero, to Burgos,

would pass over one hundred and two Spanish leagues. To Aranda de

Douero, eighty-nine leagues. To Valladolid, ninety-two leagues.

While the columns that marched by Almeida and Salamanca would pass

over one hundred and sixteen leagues to Burgos, and ninety-eight

to Valladolid. Wherefore supposing the Spaniards successful, or

even holding their own, the separation of the artillery was an

advantage, and if the Spaniards were driven back, their natural

line of retreat would have brought them towards Madrid, Blake by

Aranda to the Somosierra, and Castaños and Palafox by Siguenza

and Tarancon, to cover the capital, and to maintain an interior

communication between the Somosierra and the Henares river. The

British artillery would then have halted at Espinar, after a march

of only eighty leagues, and Baird and Moore’s corps uniting at

Salamanca early in November, might, by a flank march to Arevalo,

have insured the concentration of the whole army.

[Illustration: _Plate VIII_

_To Face Page 516_

_London. Published March 1828, by John Murray, Albermarle Street._]

Thus, in the three anticipated cases, the separation of the

artillery was prudent, and promised to be advantageous. There was

indeed a fourth case, that which really happened. All the Spanish

armies were dispersed in an instant!--utterly effaced! but sir

John Moore could not have divined such a catastrophe, while his

ears were ringing with the universal clamour about the numbers and

enthusiasm of the patriots; and if he had foreseen even a part of

such disasters, he would never have advanced from Portugal. With

the plans of the Spanish government he was unacquainted; but he

was officially informed that above one hundred and forty thousand

Spanish soldiers were between him and a feeble dispirited enemy;

and as the intercepted letter from the governor of Bayonne stated

that reinforcements would only arrive between the 18th of October

and the 18th of November, it was reasonable to suppose that the

French would not commence offensive operations before the latter

period, and that ample time would be afforded to concentrate the

English troops under the protection of the Spanish armies. If

sir John Moore could have suspected the delusion under which the

British government acted, the incredible folly of the central junta

and the Spanish generals, or the inaccuracy of the military agents,

if he could have supposed that the Spanish armies were weak in

numbers, weaker in spirit, and destitute of food and clothing; or

that, while the Spanish authorities were pressing him to advance,

they would wantonly detain sir David Baird’s troops seventeen

days on board the transports; if he could have imagined all this,

undoubtedly his arrangements ought and would have been different;

his army would have been kept together, and the road through Coria,

however difficult, would have been preferred to a divided march.

The dangerous and absurd position of the Spanish armies, and the

remote situation of the British troops in October, may be explained

by the annexed diagram. Lisbon being taken as a centre, and the

distance A between Lisbon and Coruña being the radius, let a circle

passing through Madrid be described. Let the tangential line C

be drawn perpendicular to the radius A, meeting the secant B at

Sanguessa.

The extreme right of the Spaniards was posted at Sanguessa.

Castaños was at Calahorra, and Blake was near Durango, but the

main body of the French was at Vittoria; and not only divided the

Spaniards, but was actually twenty-five miles nearer to Burgos and

Valladolid, (the points of concentration for Moore’s and Baird’s

corps) than either Castaños or Blake, and seventy-five miles nearer

than Palafox.

The 10th, the emperor struck the first blow, by beating Belvedere

and seizing Burgos. Sir David Baird did not march from Coruña until

the 12th, and did not bring up the whole of his troops to Astorga

before the 4th of December; hence it is clear, that whatever road

the artillery had taken, the British army could not have averted

the ruin of the Spaniards. Let us suppose the troops assembled at

Salamanca on the 13th of November. They must have advanced either

to Valladolid or to Madrid. If to Valladolid, the emperor was at

Burgos with the imperial guards, ten or twelve thousand cavalry,

and a hundred pieces of artillery. The first corps was within a

day’s march, the second and fourth corps within three marches, and

the sixth corps within two marches. Above a hundred thousand French

soldiers could, therefore, have been concentrated in three days;

and it is to be observed that sir John Moore never had twenty-five

thousand in the field.

It is said, he might have gone to Madrid: in that case the

separation of the artillery was a decided advantage, and the

separation of Baird’s corps (which was not the general’s

arrangement) was the error. The army could not have marched from

Salamanca to Madrid in less than seven days; on the 21st of

November then, twenty-four thousand British soldiers could have

been collected in the capital; but the fourth French corps, which

reached Segovia the 1st of December, would have cut off their

communication with Portugal, and the emperor with forty thousand

men was at Aranda de Douero. Castaños was defeated on the 23d;

the remnants of his army were only at Guadalaxara about the 1st

of December, and the sixth corps was in full pursuit of them. The

English general must then have done one of three things; advanced

to the relief of Castaños’s retreating army, joined St. Juan at

the Somosierra, or retreated across the Tagus. In the first case,

the emperor would have forced the Somosierra, and uniting with the

fourth corps, have placed sixty thousand men upon sir John Moore’s

rear; in the second case, the sixth and fourth corps, turning both

his flanks, would have effected a junction behind the Somosierra,

and cut him off from Madrid, while Napoleon, with forty thousand

men, assailed him in front. To retreat over the Tagus was to adopt

the southern provinces for a new base of operations, and might

have been useful if the Spaniards would have rallied round him

with enthusiasm and courage; but would they have done so when the

emperor was advancing with his enormous force? After-experience

proves that they would not. The duke of Dalmatia, in 1810, with an

army very inferior to that under Napoleon, reached the gates of

Cadiz without a serious blow being struck to oppose him, and at

this time the people of the south were reckless of the opportunity

procured for them by sir John Moore’s march on Sahagun; but, it

has been said, that twenty-four thousand British troops acting

vigorously, could have checked the emperor, and raised the courage

of the Spaniards. To such an observation I will oppose a fact. In

1815, Napoleon crossed the Sambre with one hundred and fifteen

thousand men, and the two hundred and ten thousand regular troops

in his front, among which were more than thirty thousand English,

could with difficulty stop his progress after four days’ fighting,

in three of which he was successful.

If sir John Moore, at a subsequent period, was willing to risk

the danger of a movement on the capital, it was because he was

misinformed of the French strength, and the Spaniards were

represented to be numerous and confident; he was also unacquainted

with the defeat at Tudela. His object was, by assisting Castaños,

to arouse the spirit of the patriots: and nothing more strongly

evinces his hardihood and prompt judgment, for, in his letter to

Mr. Frere, he distinctly stated the danger to be incurred, and

carefully separating the military from the political reasons, only

proposed to venture the army if the envoy was satisfied that the

Spanish government and people would answer to such an appeal, and

that the British cabinet would be willing to incur the risk for

such an object. If he did not follow up his own proposal, it was

because he had discovered that the army of Castaños was, not simply

defeated, but destroyed; because the Somosierra had been forced by

a charge of cavalry, and because the passes of the Guadarama, on

his line of march to Madrid, were seized by the enemy before his

own army could be concentrated.

Why then did he not retreat into Portugal? Because Napoleon, having

directed the mass of his forces against the capital, the British

army was enabled to concentrate; because Madrid shut her gates;

because Mr. Frere and the Spanish authorities deceived him by false

information; because the solemn declaration of the junta of Toledo,

that they would bury themselves under the ruins of that town rather

than surrender, joined to the fact that Zaragoza was fighting

heroically, seemed to guarantee the constancy and vigour of that

patriotic spirit which was apparently once more excited; because

the question was again become political, and it was necessary to

satisfy the English people, that nothing was left undone to aid a

cause which they had so much at heart; and, finally, because the

peculiar position of the French army at the moment, afforded the

means of creating a powerful diversion in favour of the southern

provinces. These are the unanswerable reasons for the advance

towards Sahagun. In the details of execution, that movement may

be liable to some trifling objections; perhaps it would have been

better to have carried the army on the 21st at once to Carrion

and neglected Sahagun and Saldanha; but in its stratagetical and

political character it was well conceived and well timed, hardy and

successful.

The irritating interference that sir John Moore was called upon

to repel, and the treachery and the folly, equal in its effects

to treachery, that he was obliged to guard against, have been

sufficiently dwelt upon already; but before discussing the retreat

from Astorga, it may be of some military interest to show that the

line of Portugal, although the natural one for the British army

to retire upon, was not at this period necessarily either safe or

useful, and that greater evils than those incurred by a retreat

through Gallicia would probably have attended a retrograde march

upon Lisbon.

The rugged frontier of Portugal lying between the Douero and the

Tagus, is vulnerable in many points to an invading army of superior

force. It may be penetrated between the Douero and Pinhel, and

between Pinhel and Guarda, by roads leading into the valleys of

the Zezere and the Mondego. Between the Sierra de Estrella and

the Sierra de Gata, by the road from Alfayates to Sabugal and

Penamacor, or that by Guarda and Coria. Again, it may be pierced

between the Sierra de Gata and the Tagus by Idanha Velha, Castello

Branco, and Sobreira Formosa; and from the Tagus to the Guadiana,

a distance of about twenty leagues, the Alentejo presents an open

country without any strong fortress, save Lalippe, which may be

disregarded and passed without danger.

Sir John Moore commenced his forward movement from Salamanca on the

12th of December, and at that period, the fourth corps being at

Talavera de la Reyna, was much nearer to Lisbon than the British

army was, and the emperor was preparing to march on that capital

with the sixth corps, the guards, and the reserve. He could, as

the duke of Berwick did, penetrate by both sides of the Tagus, and

what was to prevent him from reaching Lisbon before the British

force, if the latter had retreated from Salamanca? he marched on

a shorter line and a better road; he could supply his troops by

requisitions, a system that, however fatal it may be in the end, is

always advantageous at first. Sir John Moore must, from a scanty

military chest, have purchased his supplies from a suspicious

peasantry, rendered more distrustful by the retreat. In Lisbon, sir

John Craddock commanded six thousand infantry and two hundred and

fifty-eight cavalry; but the provisional government, who had only

organized a few ill-composed battalions, were so inactive, that it

was not until the 8th of December that a proclamation, calling on

the people to arm, was issued. In the arsenal there were scarcely

musquets and equipments for eight thousand men, and the new levies

were only required to assemble when Portugal should be actually

invaded. Sir Robert Wilson, indeed, having with great activity

organized about two thousand of the Lusitanian legion, marched in

the middle of December from Oporto; but this was all that could

be opposed to an army more numerous, more favourably situated for

invasion, and incomparably better commanded than that with which

Massena invaded the country in 1810. Thus it may be affirmed,

that if a retreat from Lisbon was advisable, before Napoleon took

Madrid, it was not a safe operation after that event, and it is

clear that sir John Moore neither lightly nor injudiciously adopted

the line of Gallicia.

The arguments of those who deny the necessity of falling back, even

behind the Esla, are scarcely worth notice; a simple reference to

the numbers under the emperor, and the direction of his march,

is sufficient to expose their futility; but the necessity of the

continued, and as it has been unjustly called, the precipitate

retreat to Coruña, may not be quite so obvious. The advance to

Sahagun was intended to create a diversion, and give the Spaniards

an opportunity of making head in the south; but although it

succeeded in drawing away the enemy, the Spaniards did not make any

head. The central junta displayed no energy or wisdom; a few slight

demonstrations by the marquis of Palacios, on the side of the

Sierra Morena, and by the duke of Infantado on the side of Cuenca,

scarcely disturbed the first corps which remained in La Mancha;

ten thousand men were sufficient to maintain Madrid in perfect

tranquillity, and a part of the fourth corps even marched from

Talavera by Placentia on Salamanca. By the letters of Mr. Stuart,

and the reports of his own spies, sir John Moore was informed

of all these disheartening circumstances; but the intelligence

arrived slowly and at intervals, and he, hoping that the Spaniards

would finally make an effort, announced his intention to hold the

Gallicias; but Mr. Stuart’s correspondence deprived him of that

hope; and the presence of the emperor, the great amount of his

force, and the vehemence with which he pressed forward, confirmed

the unhappy truth that nothing could be expected from the south.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, sect. 2.]

Sir John Moore could not with twenty-three thousand men maintain

himself against the whole French army, and until he reached

Astorga his flanks were always exposed. From thence, however, he

retreated in comparative security; but the natural strength of the

country between that town and Coruña misled persons of shallow

judgment, who have since inconsiderately advanced many vague

accusations, such as that passes where a hundred men could stop an

army were lightly abandoned; that the retreat was a flight, and

the general’s judgment clouded by the danger of his situation.

There might be some foundation for such observations if military

commanders were like prize-fighters, bound to strike always at the

front; but as long as armies are dependent for their subsistence

and ammunition upon lines of communication, the safety of their

flanks and rear must be considered as of consequence. Sir John

Moore was perfectly aware that he could fight any number of men

in some of the mountainous positions on the road to Coruña; but

unless he could make a permanent defence, such battles would have

been worse than useless, and a permanent defence was impossible,

inasmuch as there were none but temporary magazines nearer than

Coruña, and there were neither carriages of transport, nor money

to procure them; a severe winter had just set in, and the province

being poor, and the peasantry disinclined to aid the troops, few

resources could be drawn from the country itself, neither was

there a single position between Astorga and Coruña which could

be maintained for more than a few days against a superior force,

for that of Rodrigatos could be turned by the old road leading to

Villa Franca, Villa Franca itself by the valley of the Syl, and

from thence the whole line to Coruña might be turned by the road

of Orense, which also led directly to Vigo, and until he reached

Nogales, sir J. Moore’s intention was to retire to Vigo. The French

could have marched through the richest part of Gallicia to St.

Jago and Coruña on the left, or from the Asturias, by the way of

Mondonedo, on the right. If it be asked why they did not do so?

the answer is prompt. The emperor having quitted the army, the

jealousies and misunderstandings usual between generals of equal

rank impeded the operations. A coolness subsisted between marshal

Ney and the duke of Dalmatia, and without entering into the grounds

of their difference it is plain that, in a military point of view,

the judgment of the latter was the soundest. The former committed

a great error by remaining at Villa Franca instead of pushing his

corps, or a part of it, (as recommended by Soult) along the valley

of Orense to St. Jago de Compostella. The British army would have

been lost if the sixth corps had reached Coruña before it; and

what would have been the chances in the battle if three additional

French divisions had been engaged?

Granting, therefore, that the troops could have been nourished

during the winter, Villa Franca, Nogales, Constantino, and Lugo,

were not permanently defensible by an army whose base of operations

was at Coruña. Hence it was that sir John Moore resolved to regain

his ships with the view to renew the war in the south, and Hannibal

himself could have done no more. Nor was the mode of executing the

retreat at all unbecoming the character of an able officer.

Lord Bacon observes, that “honourable retreats are no ways inferior

to brave charges, as having less of fortune, more of discipline,

and as much of valour.” That is an honourable retreat in which

the retiring general loses no trophies in fight, sustains every

charge without being broken, and finally, after a severe action,

re-embarks his army in the face of a superior enemy without being

seriously molested. It would be honourable to effect this before

a foe only formidable from numbers, but it is infinitely more

creditable, when the commander, while struggling with bad weather

and worse fortune, has to oppose veterans with inexperienced

troops, and to contend against an antagonist of eminent ability,

who scarcely suffers a single advantage to escape him during

his long and vigorous pursuit. All this sir John Moore did, and

finished his work by a death as firm and glorious as any that

antiquity can boast of.

Put to lord Bacon’s test, in what shall the retreat to Coruña be

found deficient? something in discipline perhaps, but that fault

does not attach to the general. Those commanders who have been

celebrated for making fine retreats were in most instances well

acquainted with their armies; and Hannibal, speaking of the elder

Scipio, derided him, although a brave and skilful man, for that,

being unknown to his own soldiers, he should presume to oppose

himself to a general who could call to each man under his command

by name: thus inculcating, that, unless troops be trained in the

peculiar method of a commander, the latter can scarcely achieve any

thing great. Now sir John Moore had a young army suddenly placed

under his guidance, and it was scarcely united, when the superior

numbers of the enemy forced it to a retrograde movement under very

harassing circumstances; he had not time, therefore, to establish

a system of discipline, and it is in the leading events, not the

minor details, that the just criterion of his merits is to be

sought for.

Was the retreat uncalled for? Was it unnecessarily precipitate?

Was any opportunity of crippling the enemy lost? Was any weakness

to be discovered in the personal character of the general? These

are the questions that sensible men will ask; the first has been

already examined, the second is a matter of simple calculation.

The rear guard quitted Astorga on the 1st of January; on the 3rd,

it repulsed the enemy in a sharp skirmish at Calcabelos; the 6th

it rejoined the main body at Lugo, having three times checked

the pursuers during the march. It was unbroken, and lost no gun,

suffered no misfortune; the whole army offered battle at Lugo

for two successive days, it was not accepted, and the retreat

recommencing, the troops reached Betanzos on the morning of the

10th, and Coruña on the 11th; thus in eleven days, three of which

were days of rest, a small army passed over a hundred and fifty

miles of good road. Now Napoleon, with fifty thousand men, left

Madrid on the 22d of December, the 28th he was at Villapando,

having performed a march, on bad roads, of a hundred and sixty-four

miles in seven days. The retreat to Coruña was consequently not

precipitate, unless it can be shown, that it was unnecessary to

retreat at all beyond Villa Franca, neither can it be asserted,

that any opportunity of crippling the enemy was lost. To fight a

battle was the game of the French marshal, and if any censure will

apply to his able campaign, it is that he delayed to attack at

Lugo; victorious or beaten, the embarrassments of his adversary

must have been increased; sir John Moore must have continued his

retreat encumbered with the wounded, or the latter must have been

abandoned without succour in the midst of winter.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 26.]

[Sidenote: Ibid.]

At Coruña the absence of the fleet necessarily brought on a battle;

that it was honourable to the British troops is clear from the

fact that they embarked without loss after the action; and that it

was absolutely necessary to embark notwithstanding the success, is

as certain a proof how little advantage could have been derived

from any battle fought farther inland, and how prudently sir John

Moore acted in declining an action the moment he had rallied his

army at Lugo, and restored that discipline which the previous

movements had shaken; but, notwithstanding the clamour with which

this campaign has been assailed, as if no army had ever yet

suffered such misfortunes, it is certain that the nominal loss

was small, the real loss smaller, and that it sinks into nothing

when compared with the advantages gained. An army which, after

marching in advance or retreat above five hundred miles before

an enemy of immensely superior force, has only lost, including

those killed in battle, four thousand men, or a sixth part of its

numbers, cannot be said to have suffered severely, nor would the

loss have been so great but for the intervention of the accidental

occurrences mentioned in the narrative. Night marches are seldom

happy; that from Lugo to Betanzos cost the army in stragglers more

than double the number of men lost in all the preceding operations;

nevertheless the reserve in that, as in all the other movements,

suffered little; and it is a fact, that the light brigades detached

by the Vigo road, which were not pursued, made no forced marches,

slept under cover, and were well supplied, left, in proportion

to their strength, as many men behind as any other part of the

army; thus accumulating proof upon proof that inexperience was

the primary and principal cause of the disorders which attended

the retreat. Those disorders were sufficiently great, but many

circumstances contributed to produce an appearance of suffering

and disorganization which was not real. The intention of sir John

Moore was, to have proceeded to Vigo, in order to restore order

before he sailed for England: instead of which the fleet steered

home directly from Coruña; a terrible storm scattered it; many

ships were wrecked, and the remainder, driving up the channel, were

glad to put into any port. The soldiers, thus thrown on shore, were

spread from the Land’s End to Dover. Their haggard appearance,

ragged clothing, and dirty accoutrements, things common enough in

war, struck a people only used to the daintiness of parade, with

surprise; the usual exaggerations of men just escaped from perils

and distresses were increased by the uncertainty in which all were

as to the fate of their comrades; a deadly fever, the result of

anxiety, and of the sudden change from fatigue to the confinement

of a ship, filled the hospitals at every port with officers and

soldiers, and thus the miserable state of sir John Moore’s army

became the topic of every letter, and a theme for every country

newspaper along the coast. The nation, at that time unused to great

operations, forgot that war is not a harmless game, and judging of

the loss positively, instead of comparatively, was thus disposed

to believe the calumnies of interested men, who were eager to cast

a shade over one of the brightest characters that ever adorned the

country. Those calumnies triumphed for a moment; but Moore’s last

appeal to his country for justice will be successful. Posterity,

revering and cherishing his name, will visit such of his odious

calumniators as are not too contemptible to be remembered with a

just and severe retribution; for thus it is that time freshens

the beauty of virtue and withers the efforts of baseness; and if

authority be sought for in a case where reason speaks so plainly,

future historians will not fail to remark, that the man whose

talents exacted the praises of Soult, of Wellington, and of

Napoleon, could be no ordinary soldier.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 16.]

“Sir John Moore,” says the first, “took every advantage that the

country afforded to oppose an active and vigorous resistance,

and he finished, by dying in a combat that must do credit to his

memory.”

[Sidenote: Vivian’s Conversations at Elba.]

[Sidenote: Voice from St. Helena]

Napoleon more than once affirmed, that if he committed a few

trifling errors they were to be attributed to his peculiar

situation, for that his talents and firmness alone had saved the

English army from destruction.

“In sir John Moore’s campaign,” said the duke of Wellington, “I

can see but one error; when he advanced to Sahagun he should have

considered it as a movement of retreat, and sent officers to the

rear to mark and prepare the halting-places for every brigade;

but this opinion I have formed after long experience of war, and

especially of the peculiarities of a Spanish war, which must have

been seen to be understood; finally, it is an opinion formed after

the event.”

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

The following five Notes, dictated by the emperor Napoleon,

and signed by general Bertrand, were found in king Joseph’s

portfolio, at the battle of Vittoria.

No. I.

OBSERVATIONS ADDRESSÉES AU GÉNÉRAL SAVARY SUR LES AFFAIRES

D’ESPAGNE.

_Le 13 Juillet, 1808._

1^{ere} _Observation_.--Les affaires des Français en Espagne

seroient dans une excellente position si la division Gobert avait

marché sur Valladolid, et si la division Frère eut occupé San

Clemente, ayant une colonne mobile à trois ou quatre journées sur

la route du général Dupont.

Le g^{al} Gobert ayant été dirigé sur le général Dupont, le g^{al}

Frère étant avec le maréchal Moncey, harassé et affaibli par des

marches et des contremarches, la position de l’armée Française est

devenue moins belle.

2^e _Observation_.--Le maréchal Bessières est aujourd’hui à

Medina del Rio Secco avec 15 mille hommes, infanterie, cavalerie,

artillerie. Le 15 ou le 16, il attaquera Bénavente, se mettra en

communication avec le Portugal, jettera les rebelles en Galice, et

s’emparera de Léon. Si toutes les opérations réussissent ainsi,

et d’une manière brillante, la position de l’armée Française

redeviendra ce qu’elle était.

Si le général Cuesta se retire de Bénavente sans combattre, il

se retirait sur Zamora, Salamanque, pour venir gagner Avila et

Segovia, certain qu’alors le maréchal Bessières ne pourrait point

le poursuivre, puisque, dans cette supposition, il serait menacé

par l’armée de Galice, dont l’avant-garde est réunie à Léon.

Alors il faut que le général qui commande à Madrid puisse

promptement réunir 6 à 7000 hommes pour marcher sur le général

Cuesta. Il faut que la citadelle de Ségovie soit occupée par

quelques pièces de canon, trois à 400 convalescens, avec six

semaines de biscuit.

C’est une grande faute de n’avoir pas occupé cette citadelle, quand

le major-général l’a mandé. De toutes les positions possibles,

Ségovie est la plus dangereuse pour l’armée: capitale d’une

province, assise entre les deux routes, elle ôterait a l’armée

toutes ses communications, et l’ennemi une fois posté dans cette

citadelle, l’armée Française ne pourrait plus l’en déloger. Trois

ou 400 convalescens et un bon chef de bataillon, une escouade

d’artillerie, rendront le château de Ségovie imprégnable pendant

bien de tems, et assureront à l’armée l’importante position de

Ségovie.

Si le général Cuesta se jette en Galice, sans combattre, sans

éprouver de défaite, la position de l’armée devient toujours

meilleure; à plus forte raison, s’il est jetté en Galice après

avoir éprouvé une forte défaite.

3^e _Observation_.--Si le maréchal Bessières, arrivé devant

Bénavente, reste en présence sans attaquer le g^{al} Cuesta, ou

s’il est repoussé, son but sera toujours de couvrir Burgos, en

tenant le plus possible l’ennemi en échec; il peut être renforcé

de 3000 hommes de troupes de ligne, qui accompagnent le roi, mais

alors il n’y a point à hésiter. Si le maréchal Bessières a fait

une marche rétrograde sans bataille, il faut sur le champ lui

envoyer 6000 hommes de renforts. S’il a fait son mouvement après

une bataille, où il ait éprouvé de grandes pertes, il faudra faire

de grandes dispositions: rappeller à marche forcée sur Madrid le

g^{al} Frère, le g^{al} Caulaincourt, le g^{al} Gobert, le g^{al}

Vedel, et laisser le g^{al} Dupont sur les montagnes de la Sierra

Morena, ou le rapprocher même de Madrid, en le tenant toujours,

cependant, à sept ou huit marches, afin de pouvoir écraser le

g^{al} Cuesta et toute l’armée de Galice, pendant que le g^{al}

Dupont servira d’avant-garde pour tenir l’armée d’Andalousie en

échec.

4^e _Observation_.--Si le général Dupont éprouvait un échec, cela

serait de peu de conséquence. Il n’aurait d’autre résultat que de

lui faire repasser les montagnes; mais le coup qui serait porté au

maréchal Bessières serait un coup porté au cœur de l’armée, qui

donnerait le _tetanos_, et qui se ferait sentir à toutes les points

extrêmes de l’armée. Voilà pourquoi il est très malheureux que

toutes les dispositions ordonnées n’aient pas été suivis. L’armée

du maréchal Bessières devrait se trouver avoir au moins huite mille

hommes de plus, afin qu’il n’y eut aucune espèce de chance contre

l’armée du maréchal Bessières.

La vraie manière de renforcer le général Dupont, ce n’est pas

de lui envoyer des troupes, mais c’est d’envoyer des troupes

au maréchal Bessières. Le général Dupont et le général Vedel

sont suffisans pour se maintenir dans les positions qu’ils ont

retranchés; et si le maréchal Bessières avait été renforcé, et

l’armée de Galice écrasée, le général Dupont immédiatement après se

trouverait dans la meilleure position, non seulement par des forces

qu’on pourrait alors lui envoyer, mais encore par la situation

morale des affaires. Il n’y a pas un habitant de Madrid, pas un

paysan des vallées qui ne sente que toutes les affaires d’Espagne

aujourd’hui sont dans l’affaire du maréchal Bessières. Combien

n’est-il pas malheureux que dans cette grande affaire on se soit

donné volontairement 20 chances contre soi.

_5^e Observation_.--L’affaire de Valence n’a jamais été d’aucun

considération. Le maréchal Moncey seul était suffisant. C’était une

folie que de songer à le secourir. Si le m^{al} Moncey ne pouvait

pas prendre Valence, 20 mille hommes de plus ne le lui auraient pas

fait prendre, parcequ’alors c’était un affaire d’artillerie, et non

une affaire d’hommes: car on ne prend pas d’un coup de collier une

ville de 80 ou 100 mille âmes, qui a barricadé ses rues, mis de

l’artillerie à toutes les portes et dans toutes les maisons. Or,

dans cette hypothèse, le m^{al} Moncey était suffisant pour former

une colonne mobile, faire face à l’armée de Valence, et faire

sentir dans toute leur force les horreurs de la guerre.

Le g^{al} Frère ne pouvait donc rien pour faire prendre Valence,

et le g^{al} Frère pouvait beaucoup posté à San Clemente, soit

qu’il dût revenir à Madrid, soit qu’il dût prendre une position

intermédiaire pour secourir le g^{al} Dupont.

C’était une autre erreur que de songer à faire aller le m^{al}

Moncey à Valence pour ensuite le faire marcher en Murcie et sur

Grenade. C’était vouloir fondre ce corps d’armée en détail et sans

fruit. Comme le dit fort bien le général Dupont, il valait mieux

lui envoyer directement un régiment que de lui envoyer trois dans

cette direction là.

Dans les guerres civiles ce sont les points importans qu’il faut

garder: il ne faut pas aller partout. Si cependant on a dirigé le

m^{al} Moncey sur Valence, c’était à une époque où la situation des

affaires n’était pas la même; c’était lorsque l’armée de Valence

pouvait envoyer en Catalogne ou à Saragosse comme elle en menaçait.

6^e _Observation_.--Le but de tous les efforts de l’armée doit

être de conserver Madrid. C’est là qu’est tout. Madrid ne peut

être menacé que par l’armée de Galice. Elle peut l’être aussi

par l’armée de l’Andalousie, mais d’une manière beaucoup moins

dangereux, parcequ’elle est simple et directe, et que par toutes

les marches que fait le g^{al} Dupont sur ses derrières, il

se renforce. Les généraux Dupont et Vedel étaient suffisans,

ayant plus de 20,000 hommes; le m^{al} Bessières ne l’est pas

proportionnellement, vû que sa position est plus dangereuse. Un

échec que recevrait le g^{al} Dupont serait peu de chose; un échec

que recevrait le m^{al} Bessières serait plus considérable et se

ferait sentir à l’extremité de la ligne.

_Résumé._--Faire reposer et rapprocher de Madrid le g^{al} Frère,

le g^{al} Caulaincourt, le g^{al} Gobert, afin qu’ils puissent

arriver à Madrid avant le g^{al} Cuesta, si celui-ci battait le

m^{al} Bessières. Immédiatement après l’événement qui aura lieu

le 15 ou le 16, prendre un part selon les événemens qui auront eu

lieu, et dans le but d’écraser l’armée ennemie en Galice.

Si le maréchal Bessières a eu grand succès, sans éprouver de

grandes pertes, tout sera bien dans la direction actuelle. S’il

a un succès après avoir éprouvé beaucoup de pertes, il faut se

mettre en mésure de le renforcer. S’il se tient en observation

sans attaquer, il faut le renforcer. S’il a été défait et bien

battu, il faut se concentrer et rassembler toutes ses troupes

dans le cercle de sept ou huit journées de Madrid, et étudier les

dispositions dans les différentes directions pour savoir où placer

les avant-gardes, afin de profiter de l’avantage qu’on a d’être

au milieu, pour écraser successivement avec toutes ses forces les

divers corps de l’ennemi. Si on n’ordonne pas sur le champ au

g^{al} Dupont de repasser les montagnes, c’est qu’on espère que

malgré la faute faite, le m^{al} Bessières a la confiance (qu’on

partage) qu’à la rigueur il est suffisant pour écraser l’ennemi.

Le m^{al} Bessières a eu le bon esprit de tellement réunir toutes

ses forces, qu’il n’a pas même laissé un seul homme à St. Ander.

Quelqu’ avantage qu’il y eut à laisser là un millier d’hommes, il a

senti qu’un millier d’hommes pouvait décider sa victoire.

Quant à la division du g^{al} Verdier devant Saragosse, elle a

rempli aux trois quarts son but. Elle a désorganisé tous les

Arragoniens, a porté le découragement parmi eux, les a reduits à

défendre les maisons de leur capitale, a soumis tous les environs,

a bloqué la ville, et réuni tous les moyens pour s’en emparer sans

que cela devienne trop conteux.

Voilà l’esprit de la guerre d’Espagne.

* * * * *

Dictated by the emperor Napoleon. Taken at the battle of Vittoria.

No. II.

NOTE POUR LE ROI D’ESPAGNE.

_Bayonne, le Juillet, 1808._

L’armée d’Espagne a son quartier général à Madrid; voici sa

composition actuelle:

1º. _Corps des Pyrénées Occidentales._

Le maréchal Bessières commande le corps des Pyrénées Occidentales,

qui est fort de 23 mille hommes, infanterie, cavalerie, artillerie,

occupe la place de St. Sebastian, les trois Biscays, les montagnes

de St. Ander, la place de Burgos, et est chargée de combattre

l’armée ennemie des Asturies et de Galice.

Toutes les troupes sont en mouvement pour composer l’armée de la

manière suivante.

{ {le 4^e reg^t d’infanterie }

{ {legère }

{1^{ere} _brigade_, { 15^e d’infanterie de }

{le g^{al} Reynaud. { ligne }

{ {1^{er} bat^{on} de Paris en}

{ {marche }

{ }

{total 3000 hom. présens sous les armes, }

Division { et 6 pièces de canon, ci 3000 h^{es} }

du g^{al} {(_Cette brigade marche sur Bénévent._) } 5100 h^{es}

Mouton. {2^e _brigade_, {2^e reg^t d’infanterie legère }

{le g^{al} Rey. {12^e idem }

{total 2100 hommes et 6 pièces de }

{ canon, ci 2100 }

{(_Cette brigade est à Burgos avec le roi, }

{ et doit joindre sa division._) }

----

À reporter 5100 h^{es}

De l’autre part 5100 h^{es}

{Brigade d’Armagnac 1800 }

Division {Brigade Gaulois 1800 }

du g^{al} {Brigade Sabathier 2800 } 8400 h^{es}

Merle. {Brigade Ducos 2000 }

----

Total 8400 h^{es}

et 16 pièces de canon.

Garde. {Infanterie 1900 h^{es}

{et 6 pièces de canon.

(_Toutes ces troupes marchent sur Bénévent._)

{10^e de chasseurs 450 }

{22^e id. 450 }

{Garde 300 }

{(_Ces troupes marchent }

{ sur Bénévent._) }

{Escadrons de dragons 200 }

Cavalerie. {(_Ces escadrons sont }

{ en marche et ont dépassé } 1950 h^{es}

{ et ont dépassé la frontière._) }

{26^e de chasseurs 450 }

{(_Arrivant à Bayonne sous peu }

{ de jours._) }

{ ---- }

{ Total de la cavalerie 1950 h^{es}

{ ====

Les forces actives du maréchal Bessières sont donc de 17,000

h^{es}. Il n’en a guère que 15,000 pour l’affaire de Bénévent.

S’il obtenait à Bénévent et à Léon un grand succès contre l’armée

de Galice, peut-être serait-il convenable pour profiter de la

victoire et de la terreur des premiers moments de se jetter dans la

Galice. Toutesfois, il devrait d’abord prendre position à Léon, en

s’emparant de la plaine, jettant l’ennemi dans les montagnes, et

interceptant au moins à Astorga la communication de la grande route.

_Garnison de Burgos_.--Il y a dans le château

de Burgos une garnison _de dépôt_[28] 600 h^{es}

------

À reporter 17,950 h^{es}

------

De l’autre part 17,950 h^{es}

_Colonne du général Bonnet._--Il y a encore à }

Burgos le g^{al} de division Bonnet, faisant partie }

du corps du m^{al} Bessières: ce g^{al} va avoir }

sous ses ordres une colonne mobile de 1200 }

hommes, pour maintenir la tranquillité dans }

la ville et ses environs. Cette colonne est composée }

comme il suit: }

}

4^e bataillon du 118^e, formant 450 h^{es} }

(_Actuellement existant à Burgos._) }

}

3^e bataillon du dépôt g^{al} actuellement }

à Vittoria 450 } 1500 h^{es}

}

2 comp^{ies} du 4^e d’infanterie legère, }

formant un petit bataillon 400 }

(_En marche, ayant passé la frontière._) }

---- }

1300 h^{es} }

Escadron de dragons (en marche) 200 }

2 pièces de canon en marche }

---- }

1500 h^{es} }

==== }

_Colonne d’Aranda._--Cette colonne, formée du 1^{er}

bataillon de marche, fort de 1000 h^{es} et de 4

pièces de canon, peut se réunir au bésoin avec la

colonne du g^{al} Bonnet: elles doivent assurer la

communication jusqu’aux montagnes en avant

d’Aranda, ci 1000 h^{es}

_Colonne de Vittoria._--Le général de brigade

Monthion, et le colonel Barerre, occupent Vittoria

avec une colonne composée comme il suit:

2 compagnies du 15^e de ligne, formant un petit

bataillon de 300 h^{es}

Le 2^e bat^{on} du 12^e d’infanterie legère 600

Le 2^e bat^{on} du 2^e id. 600

----

(Ce qui fait en infanterie) 1500 h^{es}

1 escadron de dragons (en marche) 200

2 pièces de canon.

----

(Tous ces corps sont en marche) 1700 ci 1700

------

À reporter 22,150 h^{es}

De l’autre part 22,150 h^{es}

_Garnison de St. Sebastian._--Le général Thouvenot

commande à St. Sebastian avec mille

hommes de garnison, ci 1000

------

_Recapitulation._--Le corps du m^{al} Bessières

est de 23,150

Et 36 pièces de canon. ======

Les détachemens et troisièmes bataillons des corps qui sont aux

divisions actives du m^{al} Bessières pourront sous 15 jours le

réjoindre, vû qu’ils seront remplacés à Vittoria et à Burgos par

d’autres corps.

2º. _Arragon._

Jusqu’à cette heure les troupes qui sont en Arragon, faisaient

partie du corps des Pyrénées Occidentales. Mais le corps des

Pyrénées Occidentales se portant sur la Galice, il devient

indispensable d’en faire une division à part.

Aujourd’hui, ce commandement comprend Pampelune, la Navarre, et

les troupes qui forment le siège de Saragosse, sous les ordres du

général Verdier.

Ces troupes sont divisées en quatre brigades, et sont composées

ainsi qu’il suit:

3 regimens d’infanterie de ligne de la Vistule, ayant

sous les armes 3600 h^{es}

Les 4^{e}, 6^{e} et 7^{e} bataillons de marche 1500

Le 3^{e} bataillon du 14^{e} provisoire 1300

Le 1^{er} regiment supplementaire 900

Les 47^{e}, 15^{e} et 70^{e} 1600

Un bataillon des gardes nationales d’élite 600

-----

Total. 9500 h^{es}

La cavalerie consiste dans un regiment de

lanciers Polonais 700 } 1100

Plus un escadron de marche 400 }

_À Pampelune_ le g^{al} Dagout commande.

Indépendamment d’une dépôt de 800 hommes, (ci 800

formant 800 la garnison de la citadelle; il a

une colonne mobile composée du 1^{er} bataillon

de marche du Portugal, du troisième bataillon du

118^{e}, fort de 650 hommes, et d’un escadron de

dragons, ce qui forme un total de 1400 hommes

disposibles pour se porter sur tous les points

de la Navarre, et sur

------

À reporter 11,400

De l’autre part 11,400

Et les communications de Saragosse, pour y mettre

l’ordre: ci 1,400

Artillerie 200

------

Il y a donc en cernement en Arragon et en Navarre 13,000

======

Aussitôt que Saragosse sera pris, et que le corps de l’Arragon

sera constitué, il sera nécessaire de fairer entrer au corps

du mar^l Bessières le bataillon du 47^e, celui du 15^e, et les

trois bataillons du 14^e provisoire; ce qui augmentera le m^{al}

Bessières de deux mille hommes, afin de tenir les corps réunis.

Il est possible qu’on fasse partir de Bayonne le 19,300 hommes de

bonnes troupes de ligne, pour se diriger sur Saragosse et enlever

la prise de cette place, si toutefois elle n’est pas encore prise.

Si Saragosse était pris, le corps du m^{al} Bessières pourrait

être renforcé de ces trois mille hommes d’élite et de 2000 hommes

du corps de Saragosse, ce qui lui ferait un corps nombreux pour la

campagne de Galice.

Indépendamment de Saragosse, les rebelles occupent la ville de Jaca

et plusieurs points dans les vallées. À tous les débouchés des

vallées en France il y a un général de brigade avec une colonne

mobile. On attendra la prise de Saragosse pour entrer dans ces

vallées et y marcher dans les deux sens. En général l’esprit des

vallées est bon; mais des troupes de contrebandiers que les chefs

des rebelles ont enrégimentés les vexent.

3º. _Catalogne._

Le général Duhesme occupe Barcelone, qui est une place qui a deux

très belles forteresses, qui la dominent. C’est la plus grande

ville de la monarchie.

Le général Duhesme a deux divisions, la division Chabran et la

division Lechi, formant 11,000 h^{es} d’infanterie, 1600 h^{es} de

cavalerie et 18 pièces de canon.

Le général Duhesme a eu plusieurs événemens; il a brulé un grand

nombre de villages, et maintenu en respect le pays à 15 lieues à la

ronde.

La ville de Géronne, n’ayant pas été occupée, les insurgés de la

Catalogne ont établis là leur Junte, d’où ils donnent le mouvement

au reste de la province. 2000 insurgés assiégeaint le fort de

Figuéras. On y avait heureusement laissé 300 Français: ils ont

été obligés de tirer beaucoup de coups de canon et de bruler le

village.

Le g^{al} de division Reille, avec deux bataillons Toscans; a

marché sur Figuéras, l’a débloqué, le 6 du mois, et y a fait

entrer une grande quantité de vivres, dont on manquait. Le 10, il

réunissait sa division, qui arrivait de divers points de la France;

il avait déjà 6000 hommes, et il doit avoir aujourd’hui 9000

h^{es}; il doit s’assurer de Roses et marcher sur Géronne, établir

ses communications avec le général Duhesme et ensemble pacifier la

Catalogne.

Les forces réunies des généraux Duhesme et Reille

s’élevent donc à 22,000 h^{es}

Ainsi le corps des Pyrénées Occidentales est fort de 23,000

Celui d’Arragon, de 13,000

Celui de Catalogne, de 22,000

------

Total 68,000 h^{es}.

======

Nous venons de faire connaître la situation de l’armée dans les

provinces de la Biscaye, de St. Ander, de la Castille, de la

Navarre, de l’Arragon et de la Catalogne; c’est à dire, sur toute

la frontière de France.

Voici actuellement la situation dans les autres points:

Les deux corps qui se sont rendus à Madrid sous les ordres du

général Dupont et du m^{al} Moncey portaient, et portent encore;

le premier, le nom de corps d’observation de la Gironde, commandé

par le g^{al} Dupont; le second, le nom de corps d’observation des

Côtés de l’Océan, commandé par le m^{al} Moncey.

_Le corps d’observation de la Gironde_ est composé de trois

divisions: deux sont en Andalousie avec le général Dupont; la

3^{eme}, celle du général Frere, doit être à present à San Clemente.

_Le corps d’observation des Côtés de l’Océan_ est composé également

de trois divisions. La première est avec le maréchal Moncey,

sous Valence: les deux autres sont à Madrid, et disséminés en

differentes colonnes, pour maintenir la communication avec le

général Dupont. Les états de situation vous feront connaître la

force de ces divisions: mais on peut en général les considérer les

unes dans les autres comme fortes de 6000 hommes présens sous les

armes.

Il y a _à Madrid_ deux bataillons de la garde, formant 1000 hommes,

et à-peu-près 900 hommes de cavalerie de la garde.

Ainsi il y a _à Madrid_, et du côté _de Valence_ et _de

l’Andalousie_, la valeur de 40,000 hommes d’infanterie, huit mille

hommes de cavalerie et 80 pièces de canon attelées.