It was found impossible to procure a sufficient number of boats
to lay a bridge over the Ebro at Alfaro: thus the reinforcements
intended for O’Neil were forced to make a circuit by Tudela, and
lost three or four days. On the 14th O’Neil arrived at Caparosa,
after breaking the bridge of Sanguessa; the 15th the reinforcements
joined him. On the 17th, the day appointed for the execution of
the plan, Castaños received notice of his own dismissal from the
command, but he persevered in his project; La-Peña and Coupigny
were put in motion to pass the bridges of Logroña and Lodosa,
and the fords between them; but general O’Neil, instead of
executing his part, first refused to stir without an order from
Joseph Palafox who was at Zaragoza, and then changing his ground,
complained that he was without bread. Castaños besought him to move
upon the 18th, urging the necessity of the measure, and the danger
of delay. But the deputy, Palafox, who had hitherto approved
of the project, suddenly quitted the head-quarters, and went to
Caparosa, from whence, in concert with O’Neil, he wrote to demand a
farther reinforcement from the centre, of six thousand infantry and
some more cavalry, without which, they affirmed, that it would be
dangerous to pass the Aragon river. Castaños preserved his temper,
invited the deputy to return to the right bank of the Ebro, and
opposed the demand for more troops on the ground of the delay it
would cause; but now the captain-general Palafox, agreeing with
neither side, proposed a new plan. It is difficult to say how long
these strange disputes would have continued if an umpire had not
interposed, whose award was too strongly enforced to be disregarded.
[Sidenote: Castaños’ Vindication.]
[Sidenote: Castaños’ Account of the Battle of Tudela.]
Castaños was with the divisions of Coupigny and La-Peña at
Calahorra on the 19th, when he received information that a French
corps was advancing upon Logroña. It was Lasnes’, with Lagrange’s
and Colbert’s troops, but the Spaniard concluded it to be Ney, for
he was ignorant of the changes which had taken place since the 8th
of the month. It was likewise reported, that Moncey, whose force
he estimated at twelve thousand, when it really was above twenty
thousand, had concentrated at Lodosa, and, at the same time, the
bishop of Osma announced that twelve thousand men, under Dessolles,
were marching from the side of Aranda de Douero. On the 21st, the
intelligence that Dessolles had passed Almazan, and that Moncey
was in motion, was confirmed. Then Castaños, relinquishing his
offensive projects, prepared to retire, and it was full time. For
marshal Ney, who left Aranda on the 19th, had passed Almazan on
the 20th, dispersed several small bands of insurgents, and entered
Soria on the 21st, so that when Castaños determined to fall back
on the 21st, his flank was already turned, and his retreat upon
Madrid in the enemy’s power. His artillery was at Centruenigo, and
a large detachment of his army was with O’Neil at Caparosa.
[Sidenote: Castaños’ Official Account of the Battle of Tudela.]
During the night of the 21st and 22d he retired to the heights
which extend from Tudela by Cascante, Novellas, Taranzona, and
Monteguda. The advanced guard of Lasnes was in sight of the
Spanish rear-guard at Calahorra on the morning of the 22d. At
this moment the only supply of money which the central junta had
yet transmitted for the use of the army arrived at Tudela, and,
to complete the picture of distracted councils, O’Neil refused to
fall back from Caparosa without the orders of the captain-general.
The latter, however, fortunately arrived at Tudela in person, and
a conference taking place between him and Castaños the same day,
they agreed that the Aragonese army should cross the Ebro, and
occupy the heights over Tudela, while the rest of the troops should
stretch away in line as far as Taranzona; but in defiance of all
orders, entreaties, or reasoning, the obstinate O’Neil remained in
an olive wood on the right bank of the river during the night of
the 22d, leaving the key of the position open to the enemy.
[Sidenote: Ibid, and his Vindication.]
A council of war was held, but the discussion was turbulent, and
the opinions were discordant. Palafox insisted on the defence of
Aragon, as the principal, or rather the only object to be attended
to, and he wished the whole army to pass to the left bank of the
Ebro, and confine its operations to the protection of Zaragoza on
that side, a proposal which alone was sufficient to demonstrate his
total incapacity for military affairs. Castaños reasoned justly
against this absurdity, but the important moments passed in
useless disputation, and the generals came to no conclusion.
In the meantime, marshal Lasnes, bringing with him a division of
the sixth corps (Maurice Mathieu’s), which had just arrived from
France, concentrated above thirty thousand infantry, four or five
thousand cavalry, and sixty pieces of artillery, at Lodosa on the
22d, and marching by Alfaro, appeared, at eight o’clock in the
morning of the 23d, in front of the Spanish outposts, close to
Tudela, just at the moment when the Aragonese were passing the
bridge and ascending their position. From forty to fifty guns were
distributed along the front of the Spanish army, which, numbering
about forty-five thousand fighting men, was extended on a range
of easy hills from Tudela to Taranzona, a distance of more than
ten miles. Two divisions of the army of the centre connected the
Aragonese with the fourth division, which occupied Cascante. Three
divisions were in Taranzona, and there were no intermediate posts
between these scattered bodies. The weakness attendant on such an
arrangement being visible to the enemy at the first glance, Lasnes
hastened to make his dispositions, and at nine o’clock commenced
THE BATTLE OF TUDELA.
General Morlot, with one division, attacked the heights above
the town. Maurice Mathieu, supported by the cavalry, of Lefebre
Desnouettes, assailed the centre, and general Lagrange advanced
against Cascante. The whole of the artillery followed the columns
of attack. The Aragonese resisted Morlot with vigour, and even
pressed him in the plain at the foot of the hills, but Maurice
Mathieu having gained possession of an olive wood, and a small
ridge which was connected with the centre of the Spanish position,
after some sharp fighting pierced the line, and Lefebre, breaking
through the opening with his cavalry, wheeled up to his left, and
threw the right wing into hopeless confusion. The defeated soldiers
fled towards the bridge of Tudela, pursued by the victorious
horsemen. In the meantime La-Peña, descending from Cascante with
the fourth division, drove in Lagrange’s advanced guard of cavalry,
and pressed forward briskly; but being met at a charging pace by
the infantry, was beaten, and fell back to Taranzona, where three
divisions remained during the whole of the action, which, strictly
speaking, was confined to the heights above Tudela. Palafox, with
the right wing and the centre, fled to Zaragoza with such speed
that some of the fugitives are said to have arrived there the same
evening.
When La-Peña was driven back upon Taranzona, the four divisions
of the left wing commenced an orderly retreat towards Borja, but
some cavalry, detached by Ney from the side of Soria, coming in
sight, the Spaniards got into confusion; a magazine blew up, and
in the midst of the disorder cries of treason were heard, the
columns dissolved in a few moments, the road to Borja was covered
with a disorganised multitude; and so ended the celebrated battle
of Tudela, in which forty thousand men were beaten and dispersed
by an effort that, being in itself neither very vigorous nor
well sustained, was nevertheless sufficient for its purpose, and
demonstrative of the incapacity of Spanish generals, and the want
of steadiness in Spanish soldiers.
[Sidenote: Eleventh Bulletin. Victoires et Conquêtes.]
Several thousand prisoners, thirty pieces of artillery, and all
the ammunition and baggage, fell into the hands of the French,
who rated the killed and wounded very high. The total loss may
be estimated at eight or nine thousand men. Fifteen thousand
escaped to Zaragoza; a detachment of two thousand, under the Conde
de Cartoajal and general Lille, left in the mountains of Nalda,
were cut off by the result of the action, and two divisions, whose
numbers were increased by fugitives from the others, were rallied
at Calatayud on the 25th, but they were half starved and mutinous.
[Sidenote: Castaños’ Account of the Battle of Tudela, and
Vindication.]
At Calatayud, Castaños received two despatches from the central
junta, virtually restoring him to the command. For the first
empowered him to unite the Aragonese army with his own; and the
second, informing him that St. Juan was at the Somosierra, required
his co-operation with that general to protect the capital. The
battle of Tudela disposed of the first despatch, the second induced
Castaños to march by Siguenza upon Madrid.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.]
[Sidenote: Eleventh Bulletin.]
In the meantime, Napoleon, recalling the greatest part of his
cavalry from the open country of Castille, left seven or eight
thousand men in Burgos, and fixed his head-quarters at Aranda de
Douero on the 23d. From the difficulty of transmitting despatches
through a country in a state of insurrection, intelligence of the
victory at Tudela only reached him on the 26th. He was exceedingly
discontented that Castaños should have escaped the hands of Ney.
That marshal had been instructed to reach Soria by the 21st, to
remain there until Lasnes should be in front of the Spaniards, and
then to pass by Agreda, and intercept the retreat of the latter.
On the evening of the 21st, general Jomini and colonel D’Esmenard,
staff officers of the sixth corps, arrived at Soria with an escort
of eighty cavalry. That town is situated upon a rocky height, with
a suburb below, and the conde de Cartoajal, who was retiring from
the mountain of Nalda, happening to be in the upper part, the
magistrates endeavoured to entrap the French officers. The latter
were met at dusk by the municipality, and invited to enter the town
with great appearance of cordiality; but their suspicions were
excited, and the plan failed. Cartoajal marched during the night,
and the next day the sixth corps occupied the place.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.]
General Jomini, whose profound knowledge of the theory of war
enabled him to judge accurately of the events which were likely to
occur, urged Ney to continue his march upon Calatayud, without any
rest; but the marshal, either offended with the heat of Jomini’s
manner, or from some other cause, resolved to follow the letter of
his instructions, and remained at Soria the 23d and 24th, merely
sending out some light cavalry on the side of Medina Celi and
Agreda. On the 25th he marched to the latter town; the 26th he
crossed the field of battle, passing through Cascante. The 27th,
he arrived, with one division, at Mallen, a town situated between
Tudela and Zaragoza, his advanced guard being at Arlazon on the
Zilo.
To the erroneous direction and dilatory nature of these movements,
Castaños owed the safety of the troops, which were reassembled
at Calatayud. Ney must have been acquainted with the result of
the battle on the 25th, and it is remarkable that he should have
continued on the road towards Agreda, when a single march by Medina
Celi would have brought him upon the line of retreat from Calatayud
to Siguenza. By some writers these errors have been attributed to
Ney’s jealousy of marshal Lasnes; by others it has been asserted
that the plunder of Soria detained him. The falsehood of the latter
charge is evident from the fact, that, with the exception of a
requisition for some shoes and great coats, no contribution was
exacted from Soria, and no pillage took place at all; and with
respect to the former accusation, a better explanation may be found
in the peculiar disposition of this extraordinary man, who was
notoriously indolent, and unlearned in the abstract science of war.
It was necessary for him to see, in order to act; his character
seemed to be asleep until some eminent danger aroused all the
marvellous energy and fortitude with which nature had endowed him.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.]
The success at Tudela fell short of what Napoleon had a right to
expect from his previous dispositions, but it sufficed to break
the Spanish strength on that side, and to lay the kingdoms of
Aragon and Navarre, and the province of New Castille, as bare as
the northern part of Spain was laid by the victory of Espinosa.
From the frontiers of France to those of Portugal, from the
sea-coast to the Tagus, the country was now overwhelmed. Madrid,
Zaragoza, and the British army, indeed, lifted their heads a little
way above the rising waters, but the eye looked in vain for an
efficient barrier against the flood, which still poured on with
unabated fury. The divided, weak state of the English troops led
the emperor to conclude that sir John Moore would instantly retire
into Portugal. Lasnes he commanded to pursue Palafox, to seize
the important position of Monte Toreño, to summon Zaragoza, and
to offer a complete amnesty to all persons in the town, without
reservation, thus bearing testimony to the gallantry of the first
defence. His own attention was fixed on Madrid. That capital was
the rallying point of all the broken Spanish, and of all his own
pursuing divisions, and it was the centre of all interests, a
commanding height from whence a beneficial stream of political
benefits might descend to allay, or a driving storm of war pour
down to extinguish, the fire of insurrection.
CHAPTER II.
The French patroles sent towards the Somosierra ascertained, on the
21st, that above six thousand men were entrenching themselves in
the gorge of the mountains; that a small camp at Sepulveda blocked
the roads leading upon Segovia; and that general Heredia was
preparing to secure the passes of the Guadarama. Napoleon, however,
having resolved to force the Somosierra, and reach the capital
before Castaños could arrive there, ordered Ney to pursue the army
of the centre without intermission, and directed the fourth corps
to continue its march from Carion by Palencia, Valladolid, Olmedo,
and Segovia.
The movement of this corps is worthy of the attention of military
men. We shall find it confusing the spies and country people;
overawing the flat country of Leon and Castile; protecting the
right flank of the army; menacing Gallicia and Salamanca; keeping
the heads of Moore’s and Baird’s columns from advancing, and
rendering it dangerous for them to attempt a junction; threatening
the line of Hope’s march from the Tagus to the Guadarama;
dispersing Heredia’s corps, and finally turning the pass of
Somosierra, without ever ceasing to belong to the concentric
movement of the great army upon Madrid.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.]
The time lost in transmitting the intelligence of the victory
at Tudela was productive of serious consequences. The officer
despatched with these fresh instructions, found Ney and Moncey
(Lasnes remained sick at Tudela), each advanced two days’ march in
the wrong direction.
The first, as we have seen, was at Mallen, preparing to attack
Zaragoza; the second was at Almunio, near Calatayud, pursuing
Castaños. They were consequently obliged to countermarch, and
during the time thus lost, the people of Zaragoza recovering from
the consternation into which they were at first thrown by the
appearance of the flying troops, made arrangements for a vigorous
defence. Castaños also escaped to Siguenza, without any further
loss than what was inflicted in a slight action at Burvieca, where
general Maurice Mathieu’s division came up with his rear-guard.
The emperor quitted Aranda on the 28th with the guards, the
first corps, and the reserve, and marched towards Somosierra.
Head-quarters were at Boucequillas on the 29th. A detachment sent
to attack the camp at Sepulveda failed, with a loss of fifty or
sixty men; but the Spaniards, struck with a panic after the action,
quitted their post, which was very strong, and fled in disorder
towards Segovia. The 30th, the French advanced guard reached
the foot of the Somosierra. General St. Juan, whose force now
amounted to ten or twelve thousand men, was judiciously posted;
sixteen pieces of artillery, planted in the neck of the pass,
swept the road along the whole ascent, which was exceedingly steep
and favourable for the defence. The infantry were advantageously
placed on the right and left, in lines, one above another, and some
entrenchments made in the more open parts strengthened the whole
position.
PASSAGE OF THE SOMOSIERRA.
At day-break, three French battalions attacked St. Juan’s right,
three more assailed his left, and as many marched along the
causeway in the centre, six guns supported the last column. The
French wings soon spread over the mountain side, and commenced a
warm skirmishing fire. At this moment Napoleon arrived. He rode
into the mouth of the pass, and attentively examined the scene
before him. The infantry were making no progress; a thick fog mixed
with smoke hung upon the ascent; suddenly, as if by inspiration, he
ordered the Polish lancers of his guard to charge up the causeway,
and seize the Spanish battery. The first squadron was thrown into
confusion, by a fire which levelled the foremost ranks. General
Krazinski rallied them in a moment, and under cover of the smoke,
and the thick vapours of the morning, the regiment, with a fresh
impetus, proceeded briskly up the mountain, sword in hand. As those
gallant horsemen passed, all the Spanish infantry fired, and fled
from the entrenchments on each side, towards the summit of the
causeway; so that, when the Poles fell in among the gunners, and
took the battery, the whole Spanish army was in flight, abandoning
arms, ammunition, baggage, and a number of prisoners.
This surprising exploit, in the glory it conferred upon one party,
and the disgrace it heaped upon the other, can hardly be paralleled
in the annals of war. It is indeed almost incredible, even to
those who are acquainted with Spanish armies, that a position, in
itself nearly impregnable, and defended by twelve thousand men,
should, without any panic, but merely from a deliberate sense of
danger, be abandoned, at the wild charge of a few squadrons, which
two companies of good infantry would have effectually stopped. Yet
some of the Spanish regiments so shamefully beaten here, had been
victorious at Baylen a few months before; and general St. Juan’s
dispositions at Somosierra were far better than Reding’s at the
former battle; but thus absolutely does Fortune govern in war!
The charge of the Poles, viewed as a simple military operation,
was extravagantly foolish, but taken as the result of Napoleon’s
sagacious estimate of the real value of Spanish troops, and his
promptitude in seizing the advantage, offered by the smoke and fog
that clung to the side of the mountain, it was a felicitous example
of intuitive genius.
[Sidenote: Col. Graham’s Correspond^{ce}.]
The routed troops were pursued towards Buitrago by the French
cavalry. St. Juan himself broke through the French on the side
of Sepulveda, and gained the camp of Heredia at Segovia; but the
cavalry of the fourth corps approached, and the two generals
crossing the Guadarama, united some of the fugitives from
Somosierra, on the Madrid side of the mountains, and endeavoured to
enter that capital. The appearance of a French patrole terrified
the vile cowards that followed them; the multitude once more fled
to Talavera de la Reyna, and there consummated their intolerable
villany by murdering their unfortunate general, and fixing his
mangled body to a tree; after which, dispersing, they carried
dishonour and fear into their respective provinces.
The Somosierra being forced, the imperial army came down from the
mountains; the sixth corps hastened up from the side of Alcala and
Guadalaxara; the central junta fled from Aranjuez; and the remnant
of the forces under Castaños, being intercepted on the side of
Madrid, and pressed by Ney in the rear, turned towards the Tagus.
The junta, while flying with indecent haste, spread a thousand
false reports, and with more than ordinary pertinacity, endeavoured
to deceive the people and the English general; a task, in which
they were strongly aided by the weak credulity of Mr. Frere, the
British plenipotentiary, who accompanied them in their flight to
Badajos. Mr. Stuart, with greater discretion and firmness, remained
at Madrid until the enemy had actually commenced the investment of
that town.
[Sidenote: Castaños’ Vindication.]
The army of the centre, after the combat of Burvieca, had continued
its retreat unmolested by Ney. The time lost, in the false movement
upon Mallen, was never recovered. The Spaniards escaped the sword,
but their numbers daily diminished; their sufferings increased, and
their insubordination kept pace with their privations. At Alcazar
del Rey, Castaños resigned the command to general La-Peña, and
proceeded to Truxillo himself, with an escort of thirty infantry
and fifteen dragoons, a number scarcely sufficient to protect his
life from the ferocity of the peasants, who were stirred up and
prepared, by the falsehoods of the central junta, and the villany
of the deserters, to murder him.
Madrid was in a state of anarchy seldom equalled. A local and
military junta were formed, to conduct the defence; the inhabitants
took arms, a multitude of peasants from the neighbourhood entered
the place, and the regular forces, commanded by the marquis of
Castellar, amounted to six thousand men, with a train of sixteen
guns. The pavement was taken up, the streets were barricadoed, the
houses were pierced, and the Retiro, a weak irregular work, which
commanded the city, was occupied in strength. Don Thomas Morla, and
the prince of Castelfranco, were the chief men in authority. The
people demanded ammunition, and when they received it, discovered,
or said, that it was mixed with sand. Some person accused the
marquis of Perales, a respectable old general, of the deed; a mob
rushed to his house, murdered him, and dragged his body about the
streets. Many others of inferior note fell victims to this fury,
for no man was safe, none durst assume authority to control, none
durst give honest advice; the houses were thrown open, the bells of
the convents and churches rung incessantly, and a band of ferocious
armed men traversed the streets in all the madness of popular
insurrection.
Eight days had now elapsed since the first preparations for
defence were made; each day the public effervescence increased,
the dominion of the mob became more decisive, their violence more
uncontrollable, and the uproar was extreme, when, on the morning
of the 2d of December, three heavy divisions of French cavalry
suddenly appeared on the high ground to the north-west, and like a
dark cloud overhung the troubled city.
[Sidenote: Fourteenth Bulletin.]
At twelve o’clock the emperor himself arrived, and the duke of
Istria, by his command, summoned the town. The officer employed
was upon the point of being massacred by the irregulars, when
the Spanish soldiers, ashamed of such conduct, rescued him. This
determination to resist was, notwithstanding the fierceness
displayed at the gates, very unpalatable to many of the
householders, numbers of whom escaped from different quarters;
deserters also came over to the French, and Napoleon, while waiting
for his infantry, examined all the weak points of the city.
Madrid was for many reasons incapable of defence. First, there
were no bulwarks; secondly, the houses, although strong and well
built, were not like many Spanish towns, fire proof; thirdly, there
were no outworks, and the heights on which the French cavalry were
posted, the palace, and the Retiro, completely commanded the city;
fourthly, the perfectly open country around would have enabled
the French cavalry to discover and cut off all convoys, and no
precaution had been taken to provide subsistence for the hundred
and fifty thousand people contained within the circuit of the place.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3.]
The desire of the central junta, that this metropolis should risk
the horrors of a storm, was equally silly and barbarous. Their own
criminal apathy had deprived Madrid of the power of procrastinating
its defence until relieved from without, and there was no sort
of analogy between the situation of Zaragoza and this capital.
Napoleon knew this well; he was not a man to plunge headlong into
the streets of a great city, among an armed and excited population;
he knew that address in negotiation, a little patience, and a
judicious employment of artillery, would soon reduce the most
outrageous to submission, and he had no wish to destroy the capital
of his brother’s kingdom.
[Sidenote: Fourteenth Bulletin.]
In the evening the infantry and artillery arrived; they were posted
at the most favourable points; the night was clear and bright, the
French camp was silent and watchful; but the noise of tumult was
heard from every quarter of the city, as if some mighty beast was
struggling and howling in the toils.
At midnight a second summons was sent through the medium of a
prisoner. The captain-general Castellar attempted to gain time by
an equivocal reply, but he failed in his object. The French light
troops then stormed some houses, and one battery of thirty guns
opened against the Retiro, while another threw shells from the
opposite quarter, to distract the attention of the inhabitants.
The Retiro, situated on a rising ground, was connected with a range
of buildings erected on the same side of the Prado, a public walk
which nearly encircled the town. Some of the principal streets
opened into the Prado nearly opposite to those buildings. In the
morning a practicable breach being made in the Retiro wall, the
difference between military courage and ferocity became apparent,
for Villatte’s division breaking in easily, routed the garrison,
and pursuing its success, seized the public buildings above spoken
of, crossed the Prado, gained the barriers erected at the entrance
of the streets, and took possession of the immense palace of the
duke of Medina Celi, which was in itself the key to the city on
that side. This vigorous commencement created great terror, and the
town was summoned for the third time.
In the afternoon, Morla and another officer came out to demand
a suspension of arms, necessary, they said, to persuade the
people to surrender. Being admitted to the emperor’s presence, he
addressed Morla in terms of great severity; he reproached him for
his scandalous conduct towards Dupont’s army. “Injustice and bad
faith,” he exclaimed, “always recoil upon those who are guilty
of either.” This saying was well applied to that Spaniard, and
Napoleon himself confirmed its philosophic truth in after times.
“The Spanish ulcer destroyed me,” was an expression of deep anguish
which escaped from him in his own hour of misfortune.
Morla returned to the town: his story was soon told: before six
o’clock the next morning Madrid must surrender or perish. A
division of opinion arose; the violent excitement of the populace
was considerably abated, but the armed peasantry from the country,
and the poorest inhabitants, still demanded to be led against
the enemy. A constant fire was kept up from the houses in the
neighbourhood of the Prado; the French general Maison was wounded,
and general Bruyeres was killed; but the disposition to fight
became each moment weaker, and Morla and Castelfranco prepared a
capitulation. The captain-general Castellar refused to sign it, and
as the town was only invested on one side, he effected his escape
with the regular troops during the night, carrying with him sixteen
guns. The people now sunk into a quiescent state, and at eight
o’clock in the morning of the 4th, Madrid surrendered.
That Morla was a traitor there is no doubt, and his personal
cowardice was excessive; but Castelfranco appears to have been
rather weak and ignorant than treacherous, and certainly the
surrender of Madrid was no proof of his guilt; that event was
inevitable. The boasting uproar of the multitude when they are
permitted to domineer for a few days is not enthusiasm. The retreat
of Castellar with the troops of the line during the progress of
the negotiation was the wisest course to pursue, and proves that
he acquiesced in the propriety of surrendering. That the people
neither could nor would defend the city is quite evident, for it
is incredible that Morla and Castelfranco should have been able to
carry through a capitulation in so short a period, if the generals,
the regular troops, the armed peasantry, and the inhabitants, had
been all, or even a part of them, determined to resist.
The emperor, cautious of giving offence to a population so lately
and so violently excited, carefully provided against any sudden
reaction, and preserved the strictest discipline. A soldier of
the imperial guard was shot in one of the squares for having a
plundered watch in his possession. The infantry were placed in
barracks and convents, and the cavalry were kept ready to scour
the streets at the first alarm. The Spaniards were disarmed, and
Napoleon fixed his own quarters at Chamartin, a country house four
miles from Madrid. In a few days every thing presented the most
tranquil appearance; the shops were opened, the public amusements
recommenced, and the theatres were frequented. The inhabitants of
capital cities are easily moved, and easily calmed; self-interest
and the pursuit of pleasure unfit them for noble and sustained
efforts; they can be violent, ferocious, cruel, but are seldom
constant and firm.
It was during this operation that La-Peña, after escaping from
the sixth corps, arrived at Guadalaxara with about five thousand
men. On the 2d, the dukes of Infantado and Albuquerque having
left Madrid, joined him, and on the 4th, Venegas came up with
two thousand men. While the generals were hesitating what course
to pursue, Napoleon being apprized of their vicinity, directed
Bessieres with sixteen squadrons upon Guadalaxara, supporting him
by Ruffin’s division of the first corps. At the approach of the
cavalry, the main body retired through the hills by Sanctorcaz
towards Aranjuez, and the artillery crossed the Tagus at Sacedon.
Ruffin’s division immediately changed its direction, and cut the
Spaniards off from La Mancha by the line of Ocaña. A mutiny among
the Spanish troops having forced La-Peña to resign his command, the
duke of Infantado was chosen in his place, the army crossed the
Tagus at several points, and after some slight actions with the
advanced cavalry of the French, this miserable body of men finally
saved themselves at Cuenca. Many deserters and fugitives, and the
brigades of Cartoajal and Lilli, which had escaped the different
French columns, also arrived there, and the duke proceeded to
organize another army.
[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Papers.]
In the mean time the fourth French corps reached Segovia, passed
the Guadarama, dispersed some armed peasants assembled at the
Escurial, and then marched toward Almaraz, to attack general
Galluzzo, who, having assembled five or six thousand men to defend
the left bank of the Tagus, was, with the usual skill of a Spanish
general, occupying a line of forty miles. The first corps entered
La Mancha; Toledo immediately shut its gates, and the junta of that
town publicly proclaimed their resolution to bury themselves under
the ruins of the city; but at the approach of a French division,
betrayed the most contemptible cowardice.
Thus, six weeks had sufficed to dissipate the Spanish armies;
the glittering bubble bursted, and a terrible reality remained.
From St. Sebastian to the Asturias, from the Asturias to Talavera
de la Reina, from Talavera to the gates of the noble city of
Zaragoza, all was submission, and beyond that boundary all was
apathy or dread. Ten thousand French soldiers could safely (as far
as regarded the Spaniards) have marched from one extremity of the
Peninsula to the other.
After the fall of Madrid, king Joseph remained at Burgos, issuing
proclamations, and carrying on a sort of underplot, through the
medium of his native ministers. The views of the latter being
naturally turned towards the Spanish interests as distinct from the
French, a source of infinite mischief to Joseph’s cause was opened;
for that monarch, anxious to please and conciliate his subjects,
ceased to be a Frenchman without becoming a Spaniard. At this time
Napoleon assumed and exercised all the rights of conquest; and
it is evident, from the tenor of his speeches, proclamations, and
decrees, that some ulterior project, in which the king’s personal
interests were not concerned, was contemplated by him. It appeared
as if he wished the Spaniards to offer the crown to himself a
second time, that he might obtain a plausible excuse for adopting a
new line of policy by which to attract the people, or at least to
soften their pride, which was now the main obstacle to his success.
[Sidenote: Moniteur.]
An assemblage of the nobles, the clergy, the corporations, and the
tribunals of Madrid, waited upon him at Chamartin, and presented an
address, in which they expressed their desire to have Joseph among
them again. The emperor’s reply was an exposition of the principles
upon which Spain was to be governed, and offers a fine field for
reflection upon the violence of those passions which induce men
to resist positive good, and eagerly seek for danger, misery, and
death, rather than resign their prejudices.
“I accept,” said he, “the sentiments of the town of Madrid. I
regret the misfortunes that have befallen it, and I hold it as a
particular good fortune that I am enabled, under the circumstances
of the moment, to spare that city, and to save it from yet greater
misfortunes.
“I have hastened to take measures fit to tranquillize all classes
of citizens, knowing well that to all people, and to all men,
uncertainty is intolerable.
“I have preserved the religious orders; but I have restrained
the number of monks. No sane person can doubt that they are too
numerous. Those who are truly called to this vocation by the grace
of God will remain in their convents; those who have lightly
adopted their vocation, or from worldly motives, will have their
existence secured among the secular ecclesiastics, from the
surplus of the convents. I have provided for the wants of the most
interesting and useful of the clergy, the parish priests.
“I have abolished that tribunal against which Europe and the age
alike exclaimed. Priests ought to guide consciences; but they
should not exercise any exterior and corporal jurisdiction over men.
“I have taken the satisfaction which was due to myself and to my
nation, and the part of vengeance is completed. Ten[19] of the
principal criminals bend their heads before her; but for all others
there is absolute and entire pardon.
“I have suppressed the rights usurped by the nobles during civil
wars, when the kings have been too often obliged to abandon their
own rights to purchase tranquillity and the repose of their people.
“I have suppressed the feudal rights; and every person can now
establish inns, mills, ovens, weirs, and fisheries, and give free
play to their industry; only observing the laws and customs of the
place. The self-love, the riches, and the prosperity of a small
number of men, was more hurtful to your agriculture than the heats
of the dog days.
“As there is but one God, there should be in one estate but
one justice; wherefore all the particular jurisdictions having
been usurped, and being contrary to the national rights, I have
destroyed them. I have also made known to all persons that which
each can have to fear, and that which they may hope for.
“The English armies I will drive from the Peninsula. Zaragoza,
Valencia, Seville, shall be reduced either by persuasion or by the
force of arms.
“There is no obstacle capable of retarding for any length of time
the execution of my will. But that which is above my power, is to
constitute the Spaniards a nation, under the orders of the king,
if they continue to be imbued with the principle of division,
and of hatred towards France, such as the English partizans and
the enemies of the continent have instilled into them. I cannot
establish a nation, a king, and the Spanish independence, if that
king is not sure of the affection and fidelity of his subjects.
“The Bourbons can never again reign in Europe. The divisions in the
royal family were concerted by the English. It was not either king
Charles or his favorite, but the duke of Infantado, the instrument
of England, that was upon the point of overturning the throne.
The papers recently found in his house prove this; it was the
preponderance of England that they wished to establish in Spain.
Insensate project! which would have produced a land war without
end, and caused torrents of blood to be shed.
“No power influenced by England can exist upon the continent. If
any desire it, their desire is folly, and sooner or later will
ruin them. I shall be obliged to govern Spain, and it will be
easy for me to do it by establishing a viceroy in each province.
However, I will not refuse to concede my rights of conquest to the
king, and to establish him in Madrid, when the thirty thousand
citizens assemble in the churches, and on the holy sacrament
take an oath, not with the mouth alone, but with the heart, and
without any jesuitical restriction, ‘to be true to the king, to
love and to support him.’ Let the priests from the pulpit and in
the confessional, the tradesmen in their correspondence and their
discourses, inculcate these sentiments in the people; then I will
relinquish my rights of conquest, then I will place the king
upon the throne, and I will take a pleasure in showing myself the
faithful friend of the Spaniards.
“The present generation may differ in opinions; too many passions
have been excited; but your descendants will bless me as the
regenerator of the nation: they will mark my sojourn among you as
memorable days, and from those days they will date the prosperity
of Spain. These are my sentiments: go, consult your fellow
citizens, choose your part, but do it frankly, and exhibit only
true colours.”
The dispositions now made by Napoleon indicated a vast plan of
operations. It would appear that he intended to invade Gallicia,
Andalusia, and Valencia, by his lieutenants, and to carry his arms
to Lisbon in person. Upon the 20th December the sixth corps, the
guards, and the reserve, were assembled under his own immediate
control. The first corps was stationed at Toledo, but the light
cavalry attached to it scoured the roads leading to Andalusia, up
to the foot of the Sierra Morena. The fourth corps was at Talavera,
on the march towards the frontier of Portugal. The second corps
was on the Carrion river, preparing to advance against Gallicia.
The eighth corps was broken up; the divisions composing it ordered
to join the second, and Junot, who commanded it, repaired to the
third corps, to supply the place of marshal Moncey, who was called
to Madrid for a particular service; doubtless an expedition against
Valencia. The fifth corps, which had arrived at Vittoria, was
directed to reinforce the third, then employed against Zaragoza.
The seventh was always in Catalonia.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 28.]
Vast as this plan of campaign appears, it was not beyond the
emperor’s means; for without taking into consideration his own
genius, activity, and vigour, he counted on his muster-rolls, above
three hundred and thirty thousand men, and above sixty thousand
horses; above two hundred pieces of field artillery followed
the corps to battle, and as many more remained in reserve. Of
this monstrous army, two hundred and fifty-five thousand men,
and fifty thousand horses, were actually under arms, with their
different regiments; thirty-two thousand were detached or in
garrisons, preserving tranquillity in the rear, and guarding the
communications of the active force. The remainder were in hospital,
and so slight had been the resistance of the Spanish armies, that
only nineteen hundred prisoners were to be deducted from this
multitude. Of the whole host, two hundred and thirteen thousand
were native Frenchmen, the residue were Poles, Germans, and
Italians.
Of the disposable troops, thirty-five thousand men and five
thousand horses were appropriated to Catalonia, and about the same
number to the siege of Zaragoza. Above one hundred and eighty
thousand men, and forty thousand horses, were therefore available
for any enterprise, without taking a single man from the service of
the lines of communication.
What was there to oppose this fearful array? What consistency or
vigour in the councils? What numbers? What discipline and spirit
in the armies of Spain? What enthusiasm among the people? What was
the disposition, the means? What the activity of the allies of
that country? The answers to these questions demonstrate, that the
fate of the Peninsula hung at this moment upon a thread, and that
the deliverance of that country was due to other causes than the
courage, the patriotism, or the constancy of the Spaniards.
[Sidenote: Infantado’s Letters. Narrative of Moore’s Campaign.]
First, with regard to their armies. The duke of Infantado resided
among, rather than commanded, a few thousand wretched fugitives at
Cuenca, destitute, mutinous, and cowed in spirit. At Valencia there
was no army, for that which belonged to the province was shut up in
Zaragoza, and dissensions had arisen between Palafox and the local
junta in consequence.
[Sidenote: Stuart’s and Frere’s Letters.]
[Sidenote: Sir J. Moore’s Papers.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, Section 5.]
The passes of the Sierra Morena were occupied by five thousand raw
levies, hastily made by the junta of Seville, after the defeat of
St. Juan. Galluzzo, who had undertaken to defend the Tagus, with
six thousand timid and ill-armed soldiers, was at this time in
flight, having been suddenly attacked and defeated at Almaraz by a
detachment of the fourth corps. Romana was near Leon, at the head
of eighteen or twenty thousand runaways, collected by him after the
dispersion at Reynosa; but of this number only five thousand were
armed, and none were subordinate or capable of being disciplined;
for when checked for misconduct, the marquis complained that they
deserted. In Gallicia there was no army; in the Asturias, the local
government were so corrupt, so faithless, and so oppressive, that
the spirit of the people was crushed, and patriotism reduced to a
name.
[Sidenote: Stuart.]
The central junta, having first repaired to Badajos, were
terrified, and fled from thence to Seville, and their inactivity
was more conspicuous in this season of adversity than before,
and contrasted strangely with the pompous and inflated language
of their public papers. Their promises were fallacious, their
incapacity glaring, their exertions ridiculous and abortive; and
the junta of Seville, still actuated by their own ambitious views,
had now openly reassumed all their former authority.
In short, the strength and spirit of Spain was broken, the
enthusiasm was null, except in a few places, and the emperor was,
with respect to the Spaniards, perfectly master of his operations.
He was in the centre of the country; he held the capital; the
fortresses; the command of the great lines of communication between
the provinces; and on the wide military horizon, no dark cloud
intercepted his view, save the heroic city of Zaragoza on the one
side, and a feeble British army on the other. Sooner or later, he
observed, and with truth, that the former must fall; it was an
affair of artillery calculation. The latter, he naturally supposed
to be in full retreat for Portugal; but the fourth corps were
nearer to Lisbon than the British general; a hurried retreat alone
could bring the latter in time to that capital, and consequently
no preparations for defence could be made sufficient to arrest the
sixty thousand Frenchmen which the emperor could carry there at the
same moment. The subjugation of Spain appeared inevitable, when
the genius and vigour of one man frustrated Napoleon’s plans at
the very moment of execution; and the Austrian war breaking out at
the instant, drew the master-spirit from the scene of contention.
England then put forth all her vast resources; fortunately
those resources were wielded by a general equal to the task of
delivering the Peninsula, and it was delivered. But through what
changes of fortune; by what unexpected helps; by what unlooked-for
and extraordinary events; under what difficulties; and by whose
perseverance, and in despite of whose errors, let posterity judge;
for in that judgment only will impartiality and justice be found.
CHAPTER III.
The 20th of December, Napoleon became aware that sir John Moore
(having relinquished his communication with Lisbon, and adopted a
new one upon Coruña) was menacing the French line of operations on
the side of Burgos. This intelligence obliged him to suspend all
his designs against the south of Spain and Portugal, and to fix his
whole attention upon
THE OPERATIONS OF THE BRITISH ARMY.
The reasons which induced the English general to divide his army,
and to send general Hope with one column by the Tagus, while the
other marched under his own personal command, by Almeida and Ciudad
Rodrigo, have been already related; as likewise the arrangements
which brought sir David Baird to Coruña, without having permission
to land his troops, and without money to equip them, when they were
at last suffered to disembark.
The 8th of November, sir John Moore being at Almeida, on the
frontier of Portugal, his artillery was at Truxillo, in Spanish
Estremadura, and sir David Baird’s division was at Coruña.
General Blake, pursued by fifty thousand enemies, was that day
flying from Nava to Espinosa, and Castaños and Palafox were
quarrelling at Tudela.
The conde de Belvedere was at Burgos, with thirteen thousand bad
troops.
Napoleon was at Vittoria with a hundred and seventy thousand good
troops.
At this time the letters of lord William Bentinck and colonel
Graham, exposing all the imprudence of the Spanish generals, being
received, created uneasiness in the mind of sir John Moore; he
already foresaw that his junction with the other divisions of
his army might be impeded by the result of an action, which the
Spaniards appeared to be courting, contrary to all sound policy;
but as no misfortune had yet befallen them, he continued his march,
hoping, “that all the bad which might happen, would not happen.”
[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Journal, MSS.]
The 11th he crossed the frontier of Spain, and marched to Ciudad
Rodrigo; on that day Blake was completely discomfited at Espinosa,
and the Estremaduran army beaten the day before at Gamonal, was
utterly ruined and dispersed.
The 13th, the head of the British columns entered Salamanca, at
the moment when Blake’s fugitive force was finally disorganized
at Reynosa, leaving the first, second, and fourth French corps,
amounting to near seventy thousand men, free to act against any
quarter.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 14.]
Sir John Moore participated at first in the universal belief,
that the nation was enthusiastic, and fixed in a determination to
dispute every step with the invaders; even after he had detected
the exaggerations of the military agents, and perceived the want
of capacity in the Spanish generals and rulers, he trusted that
the spirit of the people would compensate for their deficiency
of skill, and his mind was bent upon succouring them with all
his power; what then was his surprise to find, that the defeat
of the conde de Belvedere, an event which laid Castille open to
the incursions of the enemy, which uncovered the march of the
British, and compromised their safety, had created no sensation
among the people; that the authorities had spread no alarm, taken
no precautions, delivered out no arms, although many thousands
were stored in the principal towns, and neither encouraged the
inhabitants by proclamations, nor enrolled any of them for defence?
He himself was informed of this important occurrence a full week
after it had happened, and then through a single official channel.
Valladolid was but three marches from Salamanca, and only four
thousand British troops had arrived in the latter town; if the
enemy had advanced in force, a retreat upon Ciudad Rodrigo would
have become inevitable. The general, therefore, assembled the
local authorities, explained to them the danger of his position,
and endeavoured to excite their ardour; his exhortations produced
no effect, either upon the junta or the people; the latter loudly
declared their detestation of the invaders, but remained tranquil;
the former were timid and stupid. The first feeling of indignation
against the French was exhausted, and there was nothing to supply
its place; the fugitives from the armies passed daily, without
shame, and without reproach from their countrymen. Notwithstanding
this unfavourable appearance, sir John Moore resolved not to retire
until forced to do so; but hastening the arrival of his own rear
divisions, he sent orders to sir David Baird and to sir John Hope
to concentrate their troops, yet to be prepared for a retreat if
the enemy advanced.
[Sidenote: Mr. Frere’s Letter to the Junta.]
In this state he remained until the 18th, his army was closing
up, and the French cavalry withdrew from Valladolid to Placentia.
But the news of Blake’s defeat now reached Salamanca, not by
rumour, or by any direct communication from the Montagna St.
Ander, but through Mr. Stuart, eight days subsequent to the date
of the action; the central junta did not even inform the minister
plenipotentiary until thirty hours after having received official
intelligence of it themselves.
The want of transport and supplies obliged the British to march
in small and successive divisions. It was, therefore, the 23d of
November before the centre, consisting of twelve thousand infantry,
and a battery of six guns, were concentrated at Salamanca. On that
day Castaños and Palafox were defeated at Tudela, their armies
scattered without a chance of rallying again in the field, and the
third and sixth French corps became disposable.
[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Papers.]
The emperor, victorious on both flanks, and with a fresh base of
operations fixed at Burgos, was free to move, with the guards
and the reserve, either against Madrid or in the direction of
Salamanca; and detachments of his army were already in possession
of Valladolid; the very town which, a few days before, the
Spanish government had indicated for the base of sir John Moore’s
operations, and the formation of his magazines.
The 26th the head of sir David Baird’s column was in Astorga, but
the rear extended beyond Lugo. The head of general Hope’s division
was at the Escurial, the rear at Talavera. The second French corps
was on the Deba, threatening Leon and the Asturias; the cavalry
covered the plains; the fourth corps was descending by Carrion and
Valladolid, to seize the pass of the Guadarama; and the emperor
himself was preparing to force the Somosierra.
From this summary of contemporary events, it is evident, that
notwithstanding sir John Moore had organised, equipped, supplied,
and carried his troops four hundred miles in the space of six
weeks, he was too late in the field. The campaign was decided
against the Spaniards before the British had, strictly speaking,
entered Spain as an army; it is also certain, that if, instead of
being at Salamanca, Escurial, and Astorga, on the 23d, the troops
had been united at Burgos on the 8th, such was the weakness of
the Spanish forces, the strength of the enemy, and such the skill
with which Napoleon directed his movements, that a difficult and
precarious retreat was the utmost favour that could be expected
from Fortune by the English general.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, sect. 1 and 4.]
The situation in which he was placed on his arrival at Salamanca,
gave rise to serious reflections in the mind of sir John Moore. He
had been sent forward without a plan of operations, or any data
upon which to found one. By his instructions he was merely directed
to open communication with the Spanish authorities, for the purpose
of “framing the plan of campaign;” but general Castaños, with
whom he was desired to correspond, was superseded immediately
afterwards, and the marquis of Romana, his successor, was engaged
in rallying the remains of Blake’s force in the Asturias, at a
distance of two hundred miles from the only army with which any
plan of co-operation could be formed, and of whose proceedings
he was as ignorant as sir John Moore. No channel of intelligence
had been pointed out to the latter, and as yet a stranger in the
country, and without money, he could not establish any certain
one for himself. It was the will of the people of England, and
the orders of the government, that he should push forward to the
assistance of the Spaniards; and he had done so, without magazines,
and without money to form them; trusting to the official assurance
of the minister, that above a hundred thousand Spanish soldiers
covered his march, and that the people were enthusiastic and
prepared for any exertion to secure their deliverance; but he found
them supine and unprepared; the French cavalry, in parties as weak
as twelve men, traversed the country, and raised contributions,
without difficulty or opposition. This was the state of Castille.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, sect. 5 and 6.]
The letters of Mr. Stuart and lord William Bentinck amply exposed
the incapacity, selfishness, and apathy of the supreme government
at Aranjuez.
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
The correspondence of colonel Graham painted in the strongest
colours the confusion of affairs on the Ebro, the jealousy, the
discord of the generals, the worse than childish folly of the
deputy, Palafox, and his creatures.
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
Sir David Baird’s experience proved, that in Gallicia the people
were as inert as in Castille and Leon, and the authorities more
absurd and more interested. General Hope expressed a like opinion
as to the ineptitude of the central junta; and even the military
agents, hitherto so sanguine, had lowered their tone of exultation
in a remarkable manner.
The real force of the enemy was unknown to sir John Moore, but he
knew that it could not be less than eighty thousand fighting men,
and that thirty thousand more were momentarily expected, and might
have arrived; he knew that Blake and the conde de Belvedere were
totally defeated, and that Castaños must inevitably be so if he
hesitated to retreat.
The only conclusion to be drawn from these facts was, that the
Spaniards were unable, or unwilling, to resist the enemy, and
that the British would have to support the contest alone, unless
they could form a junction with Castaños, before the latter was
entirely discomfited and destroyed; but there was no time for such
an operation, and the first object was, to unite the parcelled
divisions of the English army. From Astorga to Salamanca was four
marches, from Salamanca to the Escurial was six marches; but it
would have required five days to close up the rear upon Salamanca,
six days to enable Hope to concentrate at the Escurial, and sixteen
to enable Baird to assemble at Astorga. Under twenty days it would
have been impossible for the English army to unite and act in a
body; and to have advanced in their divided state would have been
equally contrary to military principle and to common sense.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 14.]
A retreat, although it was prescribed by the rules of scientific
war, and in unison with the instructions of the government, which
forbad the general to commit his troops in any serious affair,
before the whole were united, would have been (while the Spanish
army of the centre still held the field) ungenerous, and the idea
was repugnant to the bold and daring spirit of Moore. Rather than
resort to such a remedy for the false position his government had
placed him in, he contemplated a hardy and dangerous enterprise,
such as none but great minds are capable of. He proposed, if he
could draw the extended wings of his army together in good time, to
abandon all communication with Portugal, and throwing himself into
the heart of Spain, to rally Castaños’ army (if it yet existed)
upon his own, to defend the southern provinces, and trust to the
effect which such an appeal to the patriotism and courage of the
Spaniards would produce. But he considered that the question was
not purely military; the Spanish cause was not one which could be
decided by the marches of a few auxiliary troops; its fate rested
on the vigour of the rulers, the concert of the generals, the
unity of the exertions, and the fixed resolution of the people to
suffer all privations, and die rather than submit. To sir John
Moore it appeared doubtful that such a spirit, or the means of
creating it, existed, and more doubtful that there was capacity in
the government to excite or to direct it when aroused. No men of
talent had yet appeared, and good-will was in itself nothing if
improperly treated.
With the English plenipotentiary, who had just superseded Mr.
Stuart near the central junta, the general had been directed by the
ministers to communicate upon all important points, and to receive
with deference his opinion and advice. The present was an occasion
to which those instructions were peculiarly applicable. Mr. Frere
had come fresh from the English government, he was acquainted with
its views, and he was in the most suitable position to ascertain
what degree of elasticity the Spanish cause really possessed. The
decision of the question belonged as much to him as to the general;
it involved the whole policy of the English cabinet with respect
to Spain. As a simple operation of war the proposed movement was
rash; all the military and many political reasons called for a
retreat upon Portugal, which would take the army back upon its own
resources, ensure its concentration, increase its strength, protect
British interests, and leave it free either to return to Spain
if a favourable opportunity should occur, or to pass by sea to
Andalusia, and commence the campaign in the south.
Such were the reflections that induced sir John Moore to solicit
Mr. Frere’s opinion upon the general policy of the proposed
operation, but in so doing he never had the least intention of
consulting him upon the mode of executing the military part, of
which he conceived himself to be the best judge.
While awaiting the reply, he directed sir David Baird, if the
enemy showed no disposition to molest him, to push the troops on
to Salamanca as fast as they should arrive at Astorga. Sir David
was proceeding to do so, when Blake advised him that a considerable
French force was collecting at Rio Seco and Ampudia with a view
of interrupting the march. This arrested the movement, and Baird,
after destroying some of his stores at Astorga, fell back to Villa
Franca. As sir John Moore’s information led him to believe that
Blake’s report was false, he recalled Baird; but valuable time was
thus lost. It was the march of the fourth corps, then traversing
the line from Carrion to the Guadarama, that gave rise to the
contradictory intelligence.
At this time, the various changes in the French positions, and the
continual circulation of their light cavalry through the plains,
bewildered the spies and the peasants. The force of the enemy on
different points also confused the higher agents, who, believing
the greatest amount of the invading army to be from a hundred
to a hundred and twenty thousand men, could never reconcile the
reports with this standard, and therefore concluded that Napoleon
exaggerated his real numbers to create terror.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 14.]
Sir John Moore wrote to Mr. Frere on the 27th of November, and the
arrangements for the execution of his project were all prepared.
Baird was to march by Benevente on the 1st, Hope was to move on
Tordesillas, and the force at Salamanca was to advance to Zamora
and Toro; but in the night of the 28th, a despatch from Mr. Stuart
made known the disaster at Tudela. This changed the aspect of
affairs; the question proposed to Mr. Frere was no longer doubtful;
the projected movement had been founded upon _the chance of
rallying the Spanish armies behind the Tagus_; a hazardous and
daring experiment when first conceived; but now that Castaños had
no longer an army, now that the strength of Spain was utterly
broken, to have persisted in it would have been insanity. The
French could be over the Tagus before the British, and there were
no Spanish armies to rally. The defeat at Tudela took place the
23d of November; Baird’s brigades could not be united at Astorga
before the 5th of December, and to concentrate the whole of the
army at Salamanca required a flank march of several days over an
open plain; an operation not to be thought of, within a few marches
of a skilful enemy who possessed such an overwhelming force of
artillery and cavalry. As long as Castaños and Palafox kept the
field there was reason to believe that the French stationed at
Burgos would not make any serious attempt on the side of Astorga,
but that check being now removed, an unmilitary flank march would
naturally draw their attention, and bring them down upon the
parcelled divisions of the English troops. The object of succouring
the Spaniards called for great but not for useless sacrifices.
The English general was prepared to confront any danger and to
execute any enterprise which held out a chance of utility, but he
also remembered that the best blood of England was committed to
his charge, that not an English army, but the very heart, the pith
of the military power of his country was in his keeping, it was
entrusted to his prudence, and his patriotism spurned the idea of
seeking personal renown by betraying that sacred trust.
The political reasons in favour of marching towards Madrid,
scarcely balanced the military objections before the battle of
Tudela; but after that event, the latter acquiring double force,
left no room for hesitation in the mind of any man capable of
reasoning at all; and sir John Moore resolved to fall back into
Portugal. He ordered sir David Baird to regain Coruña or Vigo, and
to carry his troops by sea to Lisbon; but wishing, if possible,
to unite with Hope before the retrograde movement commenced, he
directed Baird to show a bold front for a few days in order to
attract the enemy’s attention.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 5.]
The negligence, the false intelligence, the frauds, the opposition
approaching to hostility, experienced by sir David Baird during
his march from Coruña, had so reduced that general’s hopes, that
he prepared to retreat without reluctance. He was in direct
communication with Romana, but the intercourse between them had
rather confirmed than weakened the impression on sir David’s
mind, that it was impossible to depend upon the promises, the
information, or the judgment of any Spanish general.
[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Papers. Hope’s Letters.]
In the meantime, Napoleon forced the Somosierra, and summoned
Madrid. The supreme junta fled to Badajos. St. Juan was murdered
at Talavera. The remnant of Castaños’s army was driven towards
the Tagus; and as the fourth corps approached Segovia, sir John
Hope’s situation became very critical. His column, consisting of
three thousand infantry, nine hundred cavalry, the artillery, and
the great parc of ammunition had been obliged, from the want of
money and supplies, to move in six divisions, each being a day’s
march behind the other. At Almaraz, Hope endeavoured to discover
a way across the mountains to Ciudad Rodrigo; a road did exist,
but the peasants and muleteers declared it to be impracticable
for carriages, and consequently unfit for the convoy. The truth of
their assertions was much doubted; but sir John was daily losing
horses from the glanders, and, with a number but just sufficient to
drag his guns and convoy along a good road, he feared to explore a
difficult passage over the Sierras.
[Sidenote: Lord W. Bentinck’s Letters.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 6.]
When his leading division had reached Talavera, don Thomas Morla,
then secretary at war, anxious to have the troops more minutely
divided, proposed that the regiments should march through Madrid in
ten divisions on as many successive days, the first to reach the
capital on the 22d of November, which would exactly have brought
the convoy into the jaws of the French army. Hope immediately
repaired in person to Madrid, held a conference with Morla, and
quickly satisfied himself that every thing was in confusion, and
that the Spanish government had neither arranged a general plan,
nor was capable of conducting one. Convinced of this unfortunate
truth, he paid no attention to Morla’s proposition, but carried his
troops at once to the Escurial by the road of Naval Carnero. At the
Escurial he halted to close up the rear, and to obtain bullocks to
assist in dragging the parc over the Guadarama. The 28th he crossed
the mountain, and entered the open flat country. The 28th and 29th
the infantry and guns were at Villa Castin and St. Antonia, the
parc being at Espinar, and the cavalry advanced on the road to
Arevalo. General Heredia was still at Segovia. The duke of Dantzic
was at Valladolid and Placentia, and his patroles were heard of at
Coca, only a few miles from Arevalo.
[Sidenote: General Hope’s Reports. MS.]
In the course of the day a despatch from Mr. Stuart announced the
catastrophe at Tudela, and the flight from the camp of Sepulveda.
At the same time the outposts of cavalry in the front reported
that four hundred French horse were at Olmedo, only twelve
miles from Arevalo, and that four thousand others were in the
neighbourhood. The scouts at St. Garcia, on the right, also tracked
the French again at Añaya, near Segovia. The general’s situation
was now truly embarrassing. If he fell back to the Guadarama, the
army at Salamanca would be without ammunition or artillery. If he
advanced, it must be by a flank march of three days, with a heavy
convoy, over a flat country, and within a few hours march of a
very superior cavalry. If he delayed where he was even for a few
hours, the French on the side of Segovia might get between him and
the pass of Guadarama, and then, attacked in front, flank, and
rear, he would be reduced to the shameful necessity of abandoning
his convoy and guns to save his men in the mountains of Avila. A
man of less intrepidity and calmness would have been ruined; but
Hope, as enterprising as he was prudent, without any hesitation
ordered the cavalry to throw out parties cautiously towards the
French, and to maintain a confident front if the latter approached;
then moving the infantry and guns from Villacastin, and the convoy
from Espinosa by cross roads to Avila, he continued his march
day and night until they reached Peneranda: the cavalry covering
this movement closed gradually to the left, and finally occupied
Fontiveros on the 2d of December.
The infantry and the draft animals were greatly fatigued, but the
danger was not over; the patroles reported, that the enemy, to the
number of ten thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and forty
guns, were still in Olmedo. This was the eternal fourth corps,
which thus traversing the country, continually crossed the heads
of the English columns, and seemed to multiply the forces of the
French at all points. Hope now drew his infantry and cavalry up
in position, but obliged the artillery and the convoy to proceed
without rest to Alba de Tormes, where a detachment from Salamanca
met them, and covered their march to that town. This vigorous and
skilful operation concluded, the division remained at Peneranda,
collected its stragglers, and pushed outposts to Medina del Campo,
Madrigal, and Torecilla, while the fourth corps unwittingly pursued
its march to the Guadarama.
[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence.]
[Sidenote: Narrative of Moore’s Campaign.]
Sir John Moore’s resolution to retreat upon Portugal created a
great sensation at Madrid and at Aranjuez. The junta feared, and
with reason, that such a palpable proof of the state to which their
negligence and incapacity had reduced the country would endanger
their authority, and perhaps their lives; and although they were
on the point of flying to Badajos themselves, they were anxious
that others should rush headlong into danger. Morla, and those who,
like him, were prepared to abandon the cause of their country,
felt mortified at losing an opportunity of commemorating their
defection by a signal act of perfidy. The English plenipotentiary
was surprised and indignant that a general of experience and
reputation should think for himself, and decide upon a military
operation without a reference to his opinion. Mr. Frere, although
a person of some scholastic attainments, greatly overrated his own
talent for public affairs. He was ill qualified for the duties of
his situation, which at this moment required temper, sagacity, and
judgment. He had come out to Spain impressed with false notions of
what was passing in that country, and clinging tenaciously to the
pictures of his imagination, he resented the intrusion of reason,
and petulantly spurned at facts. The defeat of the conde de
Belvedere at Gamonal, a defeat that broke the centre of the Spanish
line, uncovered the flank and rear of Castaños’s army, opened a way
to Madrid, and rendered the concentration of the British divisions
unsafe, if not impossible; he curiously called the “unlucky affair
of the 10th at Burgos.” After the battle of Tudela he estimated the
whole French army on the side of Burgos and Valladolid at eleven
thousand men, when they were above one hundred thousand; and yet,
with information so absurdly defective, he was prompt to interfere
with, and eager to control, the military combinations of the
general, although they were founded upon the true and acknowledged
principles of the art of war.
[Sidenote: Moore’s Papers. Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence.]
[Sidenote: Moore’s Papers. Frere’s Correspondence.]
While sir John Moore was anxiously watching the dangerous
progress of sir John Hope, he was suddenly assailed by the
representations and remonstrances of all these offended, mortified,
and disappointed persons. The question of retiring was, by the
defeat of Tudela, rendered so purely military, and the necessity
of it was so palpable, that the general, although anticipating
some expressions of discontent from the Spanish government, was
totally unprepared for the torrent of puerile impertinencies with
which he was overwhelmed. Morla, a subtle man, endeavoured first
to deceive Mr. Stuart; by treating the defeat of Castaños lightly,
and stating officially that he had saved the greatest part of his
army at Siguenza, and was on the march to join St. Juan at the
Somosierra; to this he added, that there were only small bodies of
French cavalry in the flat country of Castille and Leon, and no
force on that side capable of preventing the junction of sir John
Moore’s division. This was on the evening of the 30th. The emperor
had forced the pass of the Somosierra on that morning, and the
duke of Dantzic was at Valladolid. The same day Mr. Frere, writing
from Aranjuez, (in answer to the general’s former communication,
and before he was acquainted with his intention to fall back),
deprecated a retreat upon Portugal, and asserted, that the
enthusiasm of the Spaniards was unbounded, except in Castille and
Leon, where he admitted they were more passive than they should be.
He even stated, that twenty thousand men were actually assembled
in the vicinity of the capital, and that Castaños was falling
back upon them; that reinforcements were arriving daily from the
southern provinces, and that the addition of the British army would
form a force greatly superior to any the French could bring against
that quarter, in sufficient time. It was certain, he said, that
the latter were very weak, and would be afraid to advance, while
the whole country, from the Pyrenees to the capital, was in arms
upon their left flank. Rumours also were rife that the conscription
had been resisted, and this was the more probable, because every
great effort made by France was accompanied by weakness and
internal disturbance; and a pastoral letter of the bishop of
Carcassonne seemed to imply that it was so at that time. “Good
policy, therefore, required, that the French should be attacked
before their reinforcements joined them, as any success obtained
at that moment would render a conscription for a third attempt
infinitely difficult, if not impracticable; but if, on the other
hand,” said this inconsiderate person, “the French are allowed,
with their present forces, to retain their present advantages, and
to wait the completion of their conscription, they would pour into
Spain, with a number of troops which would give them immediate
possession of the capital and the central provinces.” Two days
after the date of this letter, the emperor was actually at the
capital; and Mr. Frere, notwithstanding the superior Spanish force
which his imagination had conjured up, was, with the junta, flying
in all haste from those very central provinces: France remaining,
meanwhile, strong, and free from internal dissension. This rambling
letter was not despatched when the general’s intention to fall back
upon Portugal was made known to Mr. Frere; but the latter thought
it so admirably calculated to prevent a retreat, that he forwarded
it, accompanied by a short explanatory note, which was offensive in
style, and indicative of a petulant disposition.
[Sidenote: Moore’s Papers.]
At this time, don Augustin Bueno and don Ventura Escalente arrived
at head-quarters. These two generals were deputed by the junta
to remonstrate against sir John Moore’s intended retreat; and
they justified the choice of their employers, being in folly and
presumptuous ignorance the very types of the government they
represented. They began by asserting, that St. Juan, with twenty
thousand men under his command, had so fortified the pass of the
Somosierra, that it could not be forced by any number of enemies,
and then affirming that reinforcements were daily joining him,
they were proceeding to create immense Spanish armies, when the
general stopped their garrulity by introducing colonel Graham,
who had been a witness of the dispersion of Castaños’s army, and
had just left the unfortunate St. Juan at Talavera, surrounded
by the villanous runagates, who murdered him the next day. It
may be easily supposed, that such representations and from such
men could have no weight with the commander of an army; in fact,
the necessity of retreating was rendered more imperious by these
glaring proofs that the junta and the English plenipotentiary were
totally ignorant of what was passing around them. But Napoleon was
now in full career; he had raised a hurricane of war, and directing
its fury as he pleased, his adversaries were obliged to conform
their movements to his, and as the circumstances varied from hour
to hour, the determination of one moment was rendered useless in
the next.
The appearance of the French cavalry in the plains of Madrid
sent the junta and Mr. Frere headlong to Badajos; but the people
of Madrid, as we have seen, shut their gates, and displayed the
outward signs of a resolution to imitate Zaragoza. The neighbouring
peasants flocked in to aid the citizens, and a military junta
(composed of the duke of Infantado, the prince of Castel Franco,
the marquis of Castellar, and don Thomas Morla) was appointed to
manage the defence. Morla now resolved to make a final effort to
involve the British army in the destruction of his own country, and
as the duke of Infantado was easily persuaded to quit Madrid on a
mission to the army of the centre, the traitor was left sole master
of the town, because the duke and himself only had any influence
with that armed mob, which had murdered the marquis of Perales, and
filled the city with tumult.
When the French emperor summoned the junta to surrender, Morla, in
concert with the prince of Castel Franco, addressed a paper to sir
John Moore, in which it was stated that twenty-five thousand men
under Castaños, and ten thousand from the Somosierra, were marching
in all haste to the capital, where forty thousand others were in
arms; but that, apprehending an increase of force on the enemy’s
side, the junta hoped that the English army would either march to
the assistance of the capital, or take a direction to fall upon the
rear of the French, and not doubting that the English general had
already formed a junction with Blake’s army, they hoped he would
be quick in his operations. This paper was sent by a government
messenger to Salamanca; but ere he could reach that place, Morla,
who had commenced negotiations, before the despatch was written,
capitulated, and Napoleon was in Madrid. This communication
alone would not have been sufficient to arrest sir John Moore’s
retrograde movement. He was become too well acquainted with what
facility Spanish armies were created on paper, to rely on any
statement of their numbers; but Mr. Stuart also expressed a belief
that Madrid would make a vigorous resistance, and the tide of false
information having set in with a strong current, every moment
brought fresh assurances that a great spirit had arisen.
On the day that Morla’s communication arrived, there also appeared
at head-quarters one Charmilly, a French adventurer. This man, who
has been since denounced in the British parliament as an organizer
of assassination in St. Domingo, and a fraudulent bankrupt in
London, came as the confidential agent of Mr. Frere. He had been
in Madrid during the night of the 1st, and left it (immediately
after having held a conference with Morla), on the morning of the
2d. Taking the road to Talavera, he met with the plenipotentiary,
to whom he spoke with enthusiasm of the spirit and preparations
of the inhabitants in the capital. Mr. Frere readily confided in
him, and imparting his own views, not only intrusted this stranger
with letters to the British general, but charged him with a mission
to obstruct the retreat into Portugal. Thus instructed, Charmilly
hastened to Salamanca, and presented Mr. Frere’s first missive, in
which that gentleman, after alluding to former representations,
and to the information of which colonel Charmilly was the bearer,
viz. the enthusiasm in the capital, made a formal remonstrance, to
the effect that propriety and policy demanded an immediate advance
of the British to support this generous effort. Charmilly also
demanded a personal interview, which was granted; but sir John
Moore having some suspicion of the man, whom he had seen before,
listened to his tale of the enthusiasm and vigorous character
displayed at Madrid, with an appearance of coldness that baffled
the penetration of the adventurer, who retired under the impression
that a retreat was certain.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 7.]
For many years so much ridicule had been attached to the name of
an English expedition, that weak-headed men claimed a sort of
prescriptive right to censure without regard to subordination, the
conduct of their general. It had been so in Egypt, where a cabal
was formed to deprive lord Hutchinson of the command; it had been
so at Buenos Ayres, at Ferrol, and in Portugal. It was so at this
time in sir John Moore’s army; and it will be found in the course
of this work, that the superlative talents, vigour, and success
of the duke of Wellington, could not even at a late period of the
war secure him from such vexatious folly. The three generals who
commanded the separate divisions of the army, and who were in
consequence acquainted with all the circumstances of the moment,
were perfectly agreed as to the propriety of a retreat; but in
other quarters indecent murmurs were so prevalent among officers
of rank as to call for rebuke. Charmilly, ignorant of the decided
character of the general-in-chief, concluded that this temper was
favourable to the object of his mission, and presented a second
letter, which Mr. Frere had charged him to deliver, should the
first fail of effect. The purport of it was to desire that if
sir John Moore still persisted in his intention of retreating,
“_the bearer might be previously examined before a council of
war_,” in other words, that Mr. Frere, convinced of sir John
Moore’s incapacity and want of zeal, was determined to control
his proceedings even by force. And this to a British general of
long experience and confirmed reputation, and by the hands of a
foreign adventurer!! The indignation of a high spirit at such a
foolish, wanton insult, may be easily imagined. He tore the letter
in pieces, and ordered Charmilly to quit the cantonments of the
British army without delay. His anger, however, soon subsided.
Quarrels among the servants of the public could only prove
detrimental to his country, and he put his personal feelings on
one side. The information brought by Charmilly, separated from the
indecorum of his mission, was in itself important. It confirmed
the essential fact, that Madrid was actually resisting, and that
the spirit and energy of the country was awaking. Hitherto his own
observation had led sir John Moore to doubt, if the people took
sufficient interest in the cause to make any effectual effort; all
around himself was apathetic and incapable, and his correspondents,
with the exception of Mr. Frere, nay, even the intercepted letters
of French officers, had agreed in describing the general feeling of
the country as subsiding into indifference. To use his own words,
“_Spain was without armies, generals, or a government_.” But now
the fire essential to the salvation of the nation appeared to be
kindling, and Moore feeling conscious of ability to lead a British
army, hailed the appearance of an enthusiasm which promised success
to a just cause, and a brilliant career of glory to himself.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 14.]
That the metropolis should thus abide the fury of the conqueror
was surprising. It was a great event and full of promise. The
situation of the army was likewise improved; general Hope’s
junction was accomplished, and as the attention of the French was
turned toward Madrid, there was no reason to doubt that Baird’s
junction could likewise be effected. On the other hand, there
was no certainty, that the capital would remain firm when danger
pressed, none that it would be able to resist, none that the
example would spread; yet without it did so, nothing was gained,
because it was only by an union of heart and hand throughout
the whole country, that the great power of the French could be
successfully resisted.
In a matter so balanced, sir John Moore, as might be expected from
an enterprising general, adopted the boldest and most generous
side. He ordered sir David Baird to concentrate his troops at
Astorga, and he himself prepared for an advance; but as he remained
without any further information of the fate of Madrid, he sent
colonel Graham to obtain intelligence of what was passing, and to
carry his answer to Morla. This resolution being taken, he wrote
to Mr. Frere, calmly explaining the reasons for his past conduct,
and those which actuated him in forming a fresh plan of operation.
“I wish anxiously,” said this noble-minded man in conclusion,
“I wish anxiously, as the king’s minister, to continue upon the
most confidential footing with you, and I hope as we have but one
interest, the public welfare, though we occasionally see it in
different aspects, that this will not disturb the harmony which
should subsist between us. Fully impressed as I am with these
sentiments, I shall abstain from any remarks upon the two letters
from you delivered to me last night and this morning by colonel
Charmilly, or on the message which accompanied them. I certainly
at first did feel and expressed much indignation at a person like
him being made the channel of a communication of that sort from you
to me. Those feelings are at an end, and I dare say they never will
be created towards you again.”
The plan of operations now occupied his mind. The Somosierra and
the Guadarama were both in possession of the enemy, no direct
movement could therefore be made towards Madrid; besides, the rear
of Baird’s troops was still several marches behind Astorga, and
a general movement on the side of the capital could not commence
before the 12th of the month. Zaragoza, the general knew, was
determined to stand a second siege, and he had the guarantee of the
first that it would be an obstinate stand. He had received from
the junta of Toledo a formal assurance of their resolution to bury
themselves under the ruins of the town sooner than submit; and he
was informed from several quarters that the southern provinces were
forwarding crowds of fresh levies. Romana at this time also was
in correspondence with him, and with the usual exaggeration of a
Spaniard, declared his ability to aid him with an army of twenty
thousand men. Upon this data sir John Moore formed a plan, bearing
the stamp of genuine talent and enterprise, whether it be examined
as a political or a military measure.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 14.]
He supposed the French emperor to be more anxious to strike a
heavy blow against the English, and to shut them out of Spain,
than to overrun any particular province, or get possession of any
town in the Peninsula. He resolved, therefore, to throw himself
upon the communications of the French army, hoping, if fortune
was favourable, to inflict a severe loss upon the troops which
guarded them before aid could arrive. If Napoleon, suspending
his operations against the south, should detach largely, Madrid
would thereby be succoured; if he did not detach largely, the
British could hold their ground. Sir John Moore knew well that
a great commander would in such a case be more likely to unite
his whole army, and fall upon the troops which thus ventured to
place themselves on his line of operations. But, to relieve the
Spaniards at a critical moment, and to give time for the southern
provinces to organise their defence and recover courage, he was
willing thus to draw the whole of the enemy upon himself. He felt
that in doing so, he compromised the safety of his own army, that
he must glide along the edge of a precipice, that he must cross a
gulf on a rotten plank; but he also knew the martial qualities of
his soldiers, he had confidence in his own genius; and the occasion
being worthy of a great deed, he dared essay it even against
Napoleon.
Colonel Graham returned on the 9th, bringing the first intimation
of the capitulation of the capital. He had been able to proceed
no further than Talavera, where he encountered two members of the
supreme junta. By them he was told that the French, being from
twenty to thirty thousand strong, possessed the Retiro, but that
the people retained their arms, and that La-Peña, with thirty
thousand men of the army of the centre, was at Guadalaxara; that
fourteen thousand of St. Juan’s and Heredia’s forces were assembled
at Almaraz, and that Romana, with whom they anxiously desired that
sir John Moore would unite, had likewise an army of thirty thousand
fighting men. Finally, they assured colonel Graham that the most
energetic measures were in activity wherever the enemy’s presence
did not control the patriots.
Mortifying as it was to find that Madrid, after so much boasting,
should have held out but one day, the event itself did not destroy
the ground of sir John Moore’s resolution to advance. Undoubtedly
it was so much lost; it diminished the hope of arousing the nation,
and it increased the danger of the British army by letting loose a
greater number of the enemy’s troops; but as a diversion for the
south it might still succeed; and as long as there was any hope,
the resolution of the English general was fixed, to prove that he
would not abandon the cause even when the Spaniards were abandoning
it themselves.
CHAPTER IV.
The forward movement of the British army commenced on the 11th
of December. Sir John Moore’s first intention was to march with
his own and Hope’s division to Valladolid, with a view to cover
the advance of his stores and to protect the junction of sir
David Baird’s troops, the rear of which was still several marches
behind Astorga. The preparations for a retreat upon Portugal were,
however, continued, and sir David was ordered to form magazines
at Benevente, Astorga, Villa Franca, and Lugo. This arrangement
secured two lines of operation, and permitted a greater freedom of
action.
The 13th, head-quarters were at Alaejos. Two brigades, and the
cavalry under lord Paget at Toro. General Hope was at Torrecilla.
The cavalry under brigadier-general Charles Stewart, was at Rueda;
having the night before surprised a French post of fifty infantry
and thirty dragoons, killing or taking almost the whole number. The
prisoners declared that in the French army it was believed that the
English were retreating to Portugal.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 4.]
At Alaejos an intercepted despatch of the prince of Neufchatel was
brought to head-quarters; the contents were important enough to
change the direction of the march. It was addressed to the duke
of Dalmatia. Madrid was said to be perfectly tranquil, the shops
opened, and the public amusements going forward as in a time of
profound peace. The fourth corps of the army was at Talavera, on
its way towards Badajos; this movement, it was observed, would
force the English to retire to Portugal, if, contrary to the
emperor’s belief, they had not already done so. The fifth corps
were on the march to Zaragoza, and the eighth to Burgos. The duke
was directed to drive the Spaniards into Gallicia, to occupy Leon,
Benevente, and Zamora, and to keep the flat country in subjection,
for which purpose his two divisions of infantry, and the cavalry
brigades of Franceschi and Debelle, were considered sufficient.
It is remarkable that the first correct information of the
capitulation of Madrid should have been acquired by the perusal of
this document, ten days after the event had taken place; nor is it
less curious, that while Mr. Frere’s letters were filled with vivid
descriptions of Spanish enthusiasm, Napoleon should have been so
convinced of their passiveness as to send this important despatch
by an officer, who rode post, without an escort and in safety,
until his abusive language to the postmaster at Valdestillos
created a tumult, by which he lost his life. Captain Waters, an
English officer sent to obtain intelligence, happening to arrive
in that place, heard of the murder, and immediately purchased
the despatch for twenty dollars. The accidental information thus
obtained was the more valuable, that neither money nor patriotism
had induced the Spaniards to bring any intelligence of the enemy’s
situation, and each step the army had hitherto made was in the dark.
It was now certain that Burgos was or would be strongly protected,
and that Baird’s line of march was unsafe if Soult, following these
instructions, advanced. On the other hand, as the French appeared
to be ignorant of the British movements, there was some chance of
surprising and beating the second corps before Napoleon could come
to its succour. Hope immediately passed the Douero at Tordesillas,
and directed his march upon Villepando; head-quarters were removed
to Toro, and Valderas was given as the point of junction to Baird’s
division, the head of which was now at Benevente.
[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Papers. MSS.]
The 16th, Mr. Stuart arrived at Toro, accompanied by don F^e. X^r.
Caro, a member of the Spanish government, who brought two letters,
the one from the junta, the other from Mr. Frere. That from the
junta complained, that when Romana proposed to unite fourteen
thousand picked men to the British army, with a view to make a
forward movement, his offer had been disregarded, and a retreat
determined upon, in despite of his earnest remonstrances; this
retreat they declared to be uncalled for, and highly impolitic,
“as the enemy was never so near his ruin as in that moment.” If
the Spanish and British armies should unite, they said, it would
give “liberty to the Peninsula,” that “Romana, with his fourteen
thousand select men,” was still ready to join sir John Moore, and
that “thirty thousand fresh levies would in a month be added to the
ranks of the allied force.”
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
This tissue of falsehoods, for Romana had approved of the intention
to retreat, and never had above six thousand men armed, was
addressed to Mr. Frere, and by him transmitted to the general,
together with one from himself, which, in allusion to the retreat
upon Portugal, contained the following extraordinary passages: “I
mean the immense responsibility with which you charge yourself by
adopting, upon a supposed military necessity, a measure which must
be followed by immediate, if not final, ruin to our ally, and by
indelible disgrace to the country with whose resources you are
entrusted.” “I am unwilling to enlarge upon a subject in which
my feelings must be stifled, or expressed at the risk of offence,
which, with such an interest at stake, I should feel unwilling to
excite, but this much I must say, that if the British army had been
sent abroad for the express purpose of doing the utmost possible
mischief to the Spanish cause, with the single exception of not
firing a shot against their troops, they would, according to the
measures now announced as about to be pursued, have completely
fulfilled their purpose.”
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 7.]
These letters were dated at Truxillo; for the junta, not thinking
themselves safe at Badajos, had proceeded so far on their way to
Seville. On that side the French had continued to advance, the
remnants of the Spanish armies to fly, and every thing bore the
most gloomy appearance. Mr. Frere knew this. In a subsequent letter
he acknowledged that the enthusiasm was extinguished, and a general
panic commencing, at the moment when he was penning these offensive
passages. He was utterly ignorant of the numbers, the situation,
and the resources of the enemy, but he formed hypotheses, and upon
the strength of them insulted sir John Moore, and compromised the
interests of his country; and in this manner the British general,
while struggling with unavoidable difficulties, had his mind
harassed by a repetition of remonstrances and representations in
which common sense, truth, and decency were alike disregarded. On
this occasion he furnished a remarkable instance of the control he
exercised over his personal feelings, when the public welfare was
at stake. As Mr. Frere had acknowledged the receipt of a letter of
the 10th, it was probable that he had also received the general’s
answer (written before the 10th) to the communication made through
Charmilly; but as he did not say so, Sir John Moore took advantage
of the omission, and with singular propriety and dignity thus
replied to him: “With respect to your letter delivered to me at
Toro by Mr. Stuart, I shall not remark upon it. It is in the style
of the two which were brought to me by colonel Charmilly, and
consequently was answered by my letter of the 6th, of which I send
you a duplicate; that subject is I hope at rest!”
[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Papers. Col Symes’ Corresp^{ce}.]
[Sidenote: Gen. Leith.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 5.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, Section 7.]
At Toro sir John Moore ascertained that Romana, although aware
of the advance of the British, and engaged to support them, was
retiring into Gallicia. That nobleman, nominally commander-in-chief
of the Spanish armies, was at the head of a few thousand miserable
soldiers; for the Spaniards, with great ingenuity, contrived to
have no general when they had an army, and no army when they had
a general. After the dispersion of Blake’s people at Reynosa,
Romana rallied about five thousand men at Renedo, in the valley
of Cabernigo, and endeavoured to make a stand on the borders of
the Asturias, but without any success, for the vile conduct of
the Asturian junta, joined to the terror created by the French
victories, had completely subdued the spirit of the peasantry, and
ruined the resources of that province. Romana complained that,
when checked for misconduct, his soldiers quitted their standards;
indeed that any should have been found to join their colours is
to be admired; for among the sores of Spain there were none more
cankered, more disgusting, than the venality, the injustice, the
profligate corruption of the Asturian authorities, who, without a
blush, openly divided the English subsidies, and defrauded, not
only the soldiers of their pay and equipments, but the miserable
peasants of their hire, doubling the wretchedness of poverty, and
deriding the misery they occasioned by pompous declarations of
their own virtue. From the Asturias the marquis led the remnants
of Blake’s force to Leon about the period of sir John Moore’s
arrival at Salamanca; like others, he had been deceived as to the
real state of the country, and at this time repented that he had
returned to Spain.
Romana was a person of talent, quickness, and information, but
disqualified by nature for military command; a lively principle of
error pervaded all his notions of war; no man ever bore the title
of a general who was less capable of directing an army, neither
was he exempt from the prevailing weakness of his countrymen. At
this moment, when he had not the strength to stand upright, his
letters were teeming with gigantic offensive projects, and although
he had before approved of the intention to retreat, he was now as
ready to urge a forward movement, promising to co-operate with
twenty thousand soldiers when he could scarcely muster a third
of that number of men, who, half armed, were hardly capable of
distinguishing their own standards; and at the very time he made
the promise, he was retiring into Gallicia; not that he meant to
deceive, for he was as ready to advance as to retreat, but this
species of boasting is inherent in his nation, and Romana was a
true Spaniard.
It has been asserted that Caro offered the chief command of the
Spanish armies to sir John Moore, and that the latter refused it;
this is not true: Caro had no power to do so, and if he had, there
were no armies to command; but that gentleman in his interview
either was, or affected to be, satisfied of the soundness of the
English general’s views, and ashamed of the folly of the junta.
The 18th, head-quarters were at Castro Nuevo; from that place
sir John Moore wrote to Romana, informing him of his intention
to fall upon Soult, desiring his co-operation, and requesting
that the Marquis would, according to his own plan given to the
British minister in London, reserve the Asturias for his line of
communication, and leave the Gallicias open to the British.
The army was now in full march, Baird was at Benevente, Hope
at Villapando; the cavalry scoured the country on the side of
Valladolid, and in several successful skirmishes took a number of
prisoners. The French could be no longer ignorant of the march, and
the English general brought forward his columns rapidly. On the
20th the whole of the forces were united; the cavalry at Melgar
Abaxo, and the infantry at Mayorga, and as much concentrated as
the necessity of obtaining cover in a country devoid of fuel, and
deep with snow, would permit. The weather was exceedingly severe,
and the marches long, but a more robust set of men never took
the field: their discipline was admirable, and there were very
few stragglers; the experience of one or two campaigns alone was
wanting to make a perfect army.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 25.]
The number was however small; nominally it was nearly thirty-five
thousand, but four regiments were still in Portugal, and three more
were left by sir David Baird at Lugo and Astorga. One thousand six
hundred and eighty-seven men were detached, and four thousand and
five were in hospital. The actual number present under arms on
the 19th of December was only nineteen thousand and fifty-three
infantry, two thousand two hundred and seventy-eight cavalry, and
one thousand three hundred and fifty-eight gunners, forming a total
of twenty-three thousand five hundred and eighty-three men, with
sixty pieces of artillery: the whole being organized in three
divisions, a reserve, and two light brigades of infantry, and one
division of cavalry. Of the artillery four batteries were attached
to the infantry, and two to the cavalry; one was kept in reserve.
Romana, who had been able to bring forward very few men, promised
to march in two columns by Almanzer and Guarda, and sent some
information of the enemy’s position; but sir John Moore depended
little upon his intelligence, when he found him, even so late
as the 19th of December (upon the faith of information from the
junta), representing Madrid as still holding out; and when the
advanced posts were already engaged at Sahagun, proposing an
interview at Benevente to arrange the plan of operations.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations. MS.]
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.]
On the French side, Soult’s corps was concentrating on the
Carrion. After the rapid and brilliant success of this marshal
at the opening of the campaign, his corps was ordered to remain
on the defensive until the movements against Tudela and Madrid
were completed; the despatches commanding him to recommence his
offensive operations were, as we have seen, intercepted on the
12th, but on the 16th he became acquainted with the advance of the
English army. At that period general Bonnet’s division occupied
Barquera de San Vincente and Potes, on the Deba; and watched some
thousand Asturians that Ballasteros had collected near Llanes.
Merle’s and Mermet’s divisions were on the Carrion; Franceschi’s
dragoons at Valladolid; and general Debelle’s at Sahagun. The
whole formed a total of sixteen or seventeen thousand infantry,
and twelve hundred cavalry, present under arms, of which only
eleven thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry could, without
uncovering the important post of St. Andero, be opposed to the
advance of the British. Soult, alarmed at this disparity of force,
required general Mathieu Dumas, commandant at Burgos, to direct all
the divisions and detachments passing through that town, (whatever
might be their original destination) upon the Carrion; and this
decisive conduct was approved of by the emperor. The 21st, Bonnet’s
division remaining on the Deba, Mermet’s occupied the town of
Carrion; Merle’s was at Saldaña; and Franceschi’s cavalry retired
from Valladolid to Riberos de la Cuesca. Debelle’s continued at
Sahagun, and thirteen hundred dragoons, under general Lorge,
arrived at Palencia from Burgos.
Meanwhile, the fifteenth and tenth British hussars quitting Melgar
Abaxo during the night, arrived close to Sahagun before daylight
on the 21st; the tenth marched straight to the town, the fifteenth
turned it by the right, and endeavoured to cut off the enemy, but
meeting with a patrole, the alarm was given, and when lord Paget,
with four hundred of the fifteenth, arrived at the rear of the
village, he was opposed by a line of six hundred French dragoons.
The tenth not being in sight, the fifteenth, after a few movements,
charged, broke the enemy’s line, and pursued them for some
distance. Fifteen to twenty killed, two lieutenant-colonels, and
eleven other officers, with a hundred and fifty-four men prisoners,
were the result of this affair, which lasted about twenty minutes.
Debelle then retired to Santerbas.
The English infantry occupied Sahagun, and head-quarters were
established there. Romana remained at Mancilla, and it was evident
that no assistance could be expected from him; the truth was,
that ashamed of exposing the weakness and misery of his troops,
he kept away, for, after all his promises, he could not produce
six thousand fighting men; his letters, however, were, as usual,
extremely encouraging. _The French force in Spain was exceedingly
weak, Palafox had not been defeated at Tudela, Soult, including
Sonnet’s division, had scarcely nine thousand men of all arms.
It was an object to surround and destroy him before he could be
succoured_--and other follies of this nature.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.]
The English troops having outmarched their supplies, halted the
22d and 23d. Soult, whose intention was to act on the defensive,
hastened the march of the reinforcements from the side of Burgos,
and being fearful for his communication with Placentia, abandoned
Saldaña on the 23d, and concentrated his infantry at Carrion.
Debelle’s cavalry again advanced to Villatilla and Villacuenda,
Franceschi remained at Riberos, the dragoons of general Lorge
occupied Paredes, and general Dumas pushed on the divisions of the
eighth corps, of which, Laborde’s was already arrived at Palencia,
and Loison’s and Heudelet’s followed at the distance of two days’
march; but these last were very weak.
Sir John Moore’s plan was to move during the night of the 23d,
so as to arrive at Carrion by daylight on the 24th, to force the
bridge, and afterwards ascending the river, fall upon the main body
of the enemy, which his information led him to believe was still
at Saldaña. This attack was however but a secondary object, his
attention was constantly directed towards Madrid. He might beat
the corps in his front, but the victory could be of little use
beyond the honour of the day, for the eighth and third corps were
too near to admit of farther success. The whole operation, was one
of time, a political bait to tempt the emperor, whose march from
Madrid must be the signal for a retreat that sooner or later was
inevitable. To draw Napoleon from the south was the great object,
but it behoved the man to be alert that interposed between the lion
and his prey.
The 23d, Romana gave notice that the French were in motion on the
side of Madrid. The night of the 23d the troops were in march
towards Carrion, when Romana’s intelligence was confirmed by the
general’s spies; all their reports agreed that the whole French
army was in movement to crush the English. The fourth corps had
been halted at Talavera, the third at Vittoria, the eighth was
closing up to reinforce the second, and the emperor in person was
marching towards the Guadarama; the principal objects of sir John
Moore’s advance were thus attained. The siege of Zaragoza was
delayed, the southern provinces were allowed to breathe, and it now
remained for him to prove, by a timely retreat, that this offensive
operation, although hazardous, was not the result of improvident
rashness, nor weakness of mind, but the hardy enterprise of a
great commander acting under peculiar circumstances: as a military
measure, his judgment condemned it; as a political one, he thought
it of doubtful advantage, because Spain was really passive, but
he was willing to give the Spaniards an opportunity of making
one more struggle for independence. That was done. If they could
not, or would not profit of the occasion, if their hearts were
faint or their hands feeble, the shame and the loss were their
own; the British general had done enough, enough for honour,
enough for utility, more than enough for prudence; but the madness
of the times required it. His army was already on the verge of
destruction, the enemy’s force was hourly increasing in his front;
the first symptoms of a retreat would bring it headlong on; and
in the meantime the emperor threatened the line of communications
with Gallicia, and by the rapidity of his march left no time for
consideration.
After the first burst, by which he swept the northern provinces,
and planted his standards on the banks of the Tagus, that monarch
had put all the resources of his subtle genius into activity,
endeavouring to soften the public mind, and by engrafting benefits
on the terror his victories had created, to gain over the people;
but, at the same time, he was gathering in his extended wings, and
preparing for a new flight, which would have carried him over the
southern kingdoms of the Peninsula, and given him the rocks of
Lisbon as a resting-place for his eagles.
Madrid was tranquil; Toledo, notwithstanding her heroic promises,
never shut her gates; one division of the first corps occupied that
town, another was in Ocaña, and the light cavalry scoured the whole
of La Mancha, even to the borders of Andalusia. The fourth corps,
and Milhaud’s and Lasalle’s horsemen, were at Talavera preparing
to march to Badajos, and sixty thousand men, with one hundred and
fifty guns and fifteen days’ provisions in carts, were reviewed at
the gates of Madrid upon the 19th. Three days afterwards they were
in full march to intercept the line of sir John Moore’s retreat.
The emperor was informed of that general’s advance on the 21st;
in an instant the Spaniards, their juntas, and their armies were
dismissed from his thoughts; the different corps were arrested in
their movements, ten thousand men were left to control the capital,
and on the evening of the 22d, fifty thousand men were at the foot
of the Guadarama. A deep snow choked the passes of the Sierra, and,
after twelve hours of ineffectual toil, the advanced guards were
still on the wrong side; the general commanding reported that the
road was impracticable, but Napoleon, rebuking him fiercely, urged
the columns to another attempt, and the passage of the mountain was
effected amidst storms of hail and drifting sleet. The cold and
fatigue being so intense that many soldiers and draft animals died
during the two days that the operation lasted.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.]
Personally urging on the troops with unceasing vehemence the
emperor arrived at Villacastin, fifty miles from Madrid, on the
24th, and the 26th he was at Tordesillas with the guards and the
divisions of La-Pisse and Dessolles. The dragoons of La Houssaye
were at Valladolid on the same day, and marshal Ney, with the sixth
corps, was at Rio Seco. From Tordesillas Napoleon communicated with
Soult, informed him of these movements, and concluded his despatch
thus: “_Our cavalry scouts are already at Benevente. If the English
pass to-day in their position, they are lost; if on the contrary,
they attack you with all their force, retire one day’s march: the
farther they proceed the better for us. If they retreat, pursue
them closely_;” and then, full of hope, he hastened to Valderas,
but had the mortification to learn that, notwithstanding his rapid
march, having scarcely rested night or day, he was twelve hours too
late. The British were across the Esla!
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.]
In fact Soult was in full pursuit when this letter was written,
for sir John Moore, who was well aware of his real situation, had
given orders to retreat the moment the intelligence of Napoleon’s
march from Madrid reached him. The heavy baggage and stores had
been immediately moved to the rear; but the reserve, the light
brigades, and the cavalry remained at Sahagun, the latter pushing
their patroles up to the enemy’s lines and skirmishing, with a view
to hide the retrograde march. The 24th, general Hope, with two
divisions, fell back by the road of Mayorga, and general Baird,
with another, by that of Valencia de San Juan, where there was a
ferry-boat to cross the Esla river. The marquis of Romana undertook
to guard the bridge of Mansilla. The enemy’s dragoons, under Lorge,
arrived the same day at Frechilla, and the division of Laborde at
Paredes. The 25th the general-in-chief, with the reserve and light
brigades, followed the route of Hope’s column to Valderas; the 26th
Baird passed the Esla at Valencia, and took post on the other side,
but with some difficulty, for the boat was small, the fords deep,
and the river rising. The troops, under the commander-in-chief,
approached the bridge of Castro Gonzalo early in the morning of the
26th. The stores and baggage were a long time passing, a dense fog
intercepted the view, and so nicely timed was the march that the
scouts of the imperial horsemen were already infesting the flank
of the column, and even carried off some of the baggage. The left
bank of the river being high, and completely commanding the bridge,
the second light brigade, under general Robert Crawfurd, and two
guns, were posted on that side to protect the passage, for the
cavalry were still on the march from Sahagun, and Soult, aware of
the retreat, was pressing forward vigorously. When lord Paget had
passed Mayorga he discovered a strong body of horse, appertaining
to Ney’s corps, embattled on a swelling mound close to the road.
The soil was deep, and soaked with snow and rain. Two squadrons of
the tenth riding stiffly against the enemy, mounted the hill, and,
notwithstanding the superiority of numbers and position, overthrew
him, killed twenty men, and took a hundred prisoners. This was a
bold and hardy action; but the English cavalry had been engaged
more or less for twelve successive days, and with such fortune and
bravery that above five hundred prisoners had already fallen into
their hands, and their leaders being excellent, their confidence
was unbounded. From Mayorga lord Paget proceeded to Benevente,
but the duke of Dalmatia, with great judgment, directed his march
towards Astorga by the road of Mancilla; and Romana, leaving three
thousand men and two guns to defend the bridge at that place, fell
back to Leon.
Thus by a critical march, sir John Moore had recovered his
communications with Astorga and so far baffled the emperor; but
his position was by no means safe, or even tenable. The town of
Benevente, a rich open place, remarkable for a small but curious
Moorish palace or castle containing a fine collection of ancient
armour, is situated in a plain that, extending from the Gallician
mountains to the neighbourhood of Burgos, appeared to be boundless.
On the left it was skirted by the hills near the town of Leon,
which was enclosed with walls, and capable of resisting a sudden
assault. The river Esla winded through the plain about four miles
in front of Benevente, and the bridge of Castro Gonzalos was the
key to the town, but the right bank of the Esla, as I have before
observed, was completely commanded from the further side, and there
were many fords. Eighteen miles higher up, at Valencia de San Juan,
a shorter road from Mayorga to Astorga, crossed the river by the
ferry-boat, and at Mancilla, the passage being only defended by
Spaniards, was, in a manner, open to Soult, for Romana had not
destroyed the arches of the bridge. In this exposed situation
sir John Moore resolved to remain no longer than was necessary to
clear out his magazines at Benevente, and to cover the march of his
stores; but the road to Astorga by Leon being much shorter than
that through Benevente, he wrote to Romana to request that he would
maintain himself at Leon as long as he could; hearing also that the
marquis intended to retreat into Gallicia, sir John repeated his
desire to have that road left open for the English army. Romana,
who assented to both these requests, had a great rabble with him,
and as Leon was a walled place, and that a number of citizens and
volunteers were willing, and even eager, to fight, the town might
have made a formidable resistance. Sir John Moore hoped that it
would do so, and gave orders to break down the bridge at Castro
Gonzalo in his own front, the moment the stragglers and baggage
should have passed.
At this time the bad example of murmuring given by officers of
high rank had descended lower; many regimental officers neglected
their duty, and what with the dislike to a retreat, the severity of
the weather, and the inexperience of the army, the previous fine
discipline of the troops was broken down. Very disgraceful excesses
had been committed at Valderas, and the general issued severe
orders, justly reproaching the soldiers for their evil deeds, and
appealing to the spirit of the men and of the officers, to amend
them.
On the night of the 26th, the chasseurs of the imperial guard rode
close up to the bridge of Castro Gonzalo, and captured some women
and baggage[20]. The 27th, the cavalry and the stragglers being
all over the river, general Crawfurd commenced the destruction of
the bridge; torrents of rain and snow were descending; and half the
troops worked while the other half kept the enemy at bay from the
heights on the left bank, for the cavalry scouts of the imperial
guard were spread over the plain. At ten o’clock at night a large
party following some waggons endeavoured to pass the piquets
and gallop down to the bridge; that failing, a few dismounted,
and extending to the right and left, commenced a skirmishing
fire, while others remained ready to charge, if the position of
the troops, which they expected to ascertain by this scheme,
should offer an opportunity; but the event did not answer their
expectations. This anxiety to interrupt the work induced general
Crawfurd to destroy two arches of the bridge, and to blow up the
connecting buttress; but the masonry was so solid and difficult
to pierce, that it was not until twelve o’clock in the night of
the 28th that all the preparations were completed. The troops
then descended the heights on the left bank, and passing with the
greatest silence by single files over planks laid across the broken
arches, gained the other side without loss; an instance of singular
good fortune, for the night was dark and tempestuous; the river
rising rapidly with a roaring noise, was threatening to burst over
the planks, and the enemy was close at hand. To have resisted an
attack in such an awkward situation would have been impossible, but
happily the retreat of the troops was undiscovered, and the mine
being sprung with good effect, Crawfurd marched to Benevente, where
the cavalry and the reserve still remained[21].
The army gained two days rest at Benevente, but as very little
could be done to remove the stores, the greater part of them were
destroyed. The troops were, and had been from the first, without
sufficient transport, the general was without money to procure
it, and the ill-will of the Spaniards, and the shuffling conduct
of the juntas, added infinitely to these difficulties. The 28th,
Hope’s and Fraser’s divisions marched to Labaneza; and the 29th,
to Astorga, where Baird’s division joined them from Valencia San
Juan. On the same day the reserve and Crawfurd’s brigade quitted
Benevente, but the cavalry remained in the town, leaving parties to
watch the fords of the Esla. Soon after daybreak, general Lefebre
Desnouettes, seeing only a few cavalry posts on the great plain,
rather hastily concluded that there was nothing to support them,
and crossing the river at a ford a little way above the bridge with
six hundred horsemen of the imperial guards, he advanced into the
plain. The piquets at first retired fighting, but being joined
by a part of the third German hussars, they charged the leading
French squadrons with some effect. General C. Stewart then took the
command, and the ground was obstinately disputed. At this moment
the plain was covered with stragglers, and baggage-mules, and
followers of the army; the town was filled with tumult; the distant
piquets and vedettes were seen galloping in from the right and
left; the French were pressing forward boldly, and every appearance
indicated that the enemy’s whole army was come up and passing the
river. Lord Paget ordered the tenth hussars to mount and form
under the cover of some houses at the edge of the town; he desired
to draw the enemy, whose real situation he had detected at once,
well into the plain before he attacked. In half an hour, every
thing being ready, he gave the signal: the tenth hussars galloped
forward, the piquets, that were already engaged, closed together,
and the whole charged. In an instant the scene changed: the enemy
were seen flying at full speed towards the river, and the British
close at their heels; the French squadrons, without breaking their
ranks, plunged into the stream, and gained the opposite heights,
where, like experienced soldiers, they wheeled instantly, and
seemed inclined to come forward a second time; but a battery of
two guns being opened upon them, after a few rounds they retired.
During the pursuit in the plain, an officer was observed separating
from the main body, and making towards another part of the river;
being followed, and refusing to stop when overtaken, he was cut
across the head and brought in a prisoner. He proved to be general
Lefebre.
[Sidenote: Surgical Campaigns.]
Although the imperial guards were outnumbered in the end, they
were very superior at the commencement of this fight, which was
handsomely contested on both sides. The British lost fifty men
killed and wounded; the French left fifty-five killed and wounded
on the field, and seventy prisoners, besides the general and
other officers. According to baron Larrey, seventy other wounded
men escaped, making a total loss of above two hundred excellent
soldiers. Lord Paget maintained his posts on the Esla under an
occasional cannonade until the evening, and then withdrew to La
Baneza.
[Sidenote: Bulletin.]
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations. MS.]
While these things were passing, Napoleon arrived at Valderas,
Ney at Villaton, and Lapisse at Toro; the French troops were worn
down with fatigue, yet the emperor still urged them forward. The
duke of Dalmatia, he said, would intercept the retreat of the
English at Astorga, and their labours would be finally rewarded;
but the destruction of the bridge of Castro Gonzalo was so well
accomplished, that twenty-four hours were required to repair it,
and the fords were now impassable. It was the 30th before Bessieres
could cross the Esla; but on that day he passed through Benevente
with nine thousand cavalry, and bent his course towards La Baneza.
The same day, Franceschi forced the bridge of Mansilla de las
Mulas by a single charge of his light horsemen, and captured the
artillery and one half of the division left by Romana to protect
it. The latter immediately abandoned Leon and many stores. The 31st
the duke of Dalmatia entered that town without firing a shot, and
the duke of Istria, with his cavalry, took possession of La Baneza;
the advanced posts were pushed forward to the Puente d’Orvigo on
one side, and the Puente de Valembre on the other.
The rear of the English army was still in Astorga, the
head-quarters having arrived there on the day before. In the
preceding month large stores had been gradually brought up to
that town by sir David Baird, and as there were no means of
transport to remove them, orders were given, after supplying the
immediate wants of the army, to destroy them; but Romana, who would
neither defend Leon nor Mansilla, had, contrary to his promises,
pre-occupied Astorga with his fugitive army; and when the English
divisions marched in, such a tumult and confusion arose, that no
orders could be executed with regularity, no distribution made,
nor the destruction of the stores be effected. The disorder thus
unexpectedly produced was very detrimental to the discipline of
the troops, which the unwearied efforts of the general had partly
restored. The resources which he had depended on for the support
of his soldiers became mischievous, and contributed to disorganise
instead of nourishing them, and he had the farther vexation to hear
Romana the principal cause of this misfortune, proposing, (with
an army unable to resist a thousand light infantry), to commence
offensive operations and plans, in comparison of which the visions
of don Quixote were wisdom.
The 31st, the light brigades separated from the army at Bonillas,
and bent their course by cross roads towards Orense and Vigo. This
detachment was made to lessen the pressure on the commissariat,
and to cover the flanks of the army. Fraser’s and Hope’s divisions
entered Villa Franca, Baird’s division was at Bembibre. The
reserve, with the head-quarters, halted at Cambarros, a village six
miles from Astorga, but the cavalry fell back in the night to the
same place, and then the reserve marched to Bembibre.
The marquis of Romana, after doing so much mischief by crossing the
line of march, left his infantry to wander as they pleased, and
retired with his cavalry and guns to the valley of the Mincio.