Sir John Moore had, indeed, much to execute, and with little

help. First, he was to organize an army of raw soldiers; then,

in a poor and unsettled country, just relieved from the pressure

of a harsh and griping enemy, he was to procure the transport

necessary for his stores, ammunition, and even for the conveyance

of the officers’ baggage. Assisted by an experienced staff, such

obstacles do not very much impede a good general; but here, few,

if any, of the officers, except the commander-in-chief, had served

a campaign; and every branch of the administration, civil and

military, was composed of new men, very zealous and willing, but

ignorant of a service, where no energy can prevent the effects of

inexperience from being severely felt. The roads through Portugal

were very bad; the rainy season, so baleful to an army, was upon

the point of setting in; time pressed sorely, it was essential to

be quick, but gold, that turns the wheels of war, was wanting; and

this, at all times a great evil, was the more grievously felt at

the moment, inasmuch as the Portuguese, accustomed to fraud on the

part of their own government, and to forced contributions by the

French, could not readily be persuaded that an army of foreigners,

paying with promises alone, might be trusted; nor was this natural

suspicion allayed by observing, that while the general and his

troops were thus kept without money, all the subordinate agents

dispersed throughout the country were amply supplied. Sir David

Baird, who, with his portion of troops, was to land at Coruña,

and to equip in a country already exhausted by Blake’s army, was

likewise encompassed with difficulties. From Coruña to the nearest

point where he could effect a junction with the forces marching

from Lisbon was two hundred miles, and he also was without money.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 4th.]

No general-in-chief was appointed to command the Spanish armies;

nor was sir John Moore referred by the English ministers to any

person with whom he could communicate at all, much less concert

a plan of operations for the allied forces. He was unacquainted

with the views of the Spanish government, he was uninformed of

the numbers, composition, or situation of the troops with which

he was to act, as well as those with whom he was to contend, and

25,000_l._ in his military chest, and his own genius, constituted

his resources for a campaign, which would probably lead the army

far from the coast, and from all its means of supply. He was first

to unite the scattered portions of his forces by a winter march of

three hundred miles; another three hundred were to be passed before

he reached the Ebro; then he was to concert a plan of operations

with generals acting each independent of the other; their corps

reaching from the northern sea-coast to Zaragoza; themselves

jealous and quarrelsome, their men insubordinate, differing in

customs, discipline, language, and religion from the English,

and despising all foreigners; and this was to be accomplished in

time to defeat an enemy who was already in the field, accustomed

to great movements, and conducted by the most rapid and decided

of men. It must be acknowledged that the ministers’ views were

equally vast and inconsiderate, and their miscalculations are the

more remarkable, as there was not wanting a man in the highest

military situation to condemn their plan at the time, and to

propose a better.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 24.]

The duke of York, in a formal minute drawn up for the information

of the government, observed, that the Spanish armies being

unconnected, and occupying a great extent of ground, were weak.

That the French being concentrated, and certain of reinforcements,

were strong. That there could be no question of the relative value

of Spanish and French troops, and that, consequently, the allies

might be beaten before the British could arrive at the scene of

action; the latter would then unaided have to meet the French army;

hence it was essential to provide a sufficient number of troops to

meet such an emergency; that number he judged should not be less

than sixty thousand men, and by a detailed statement, he proved

that such a number could have been furnished without detriment to

any other service.

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s letters. MS.]

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 6th.]

At this period, also, the effects of that incredible folly and

weakness which marked all the proceedings of the central junta,

were felt throughout Spain. In any other country the conduct of the

government would have been attributed to insanity. So apathetic

with respect to the enemy as to be contemptible; so active in

pursuit of self-interest as to become hateful. The junta was

occupied in devising how to render itself at once despotic and

popular; how to excite enthusiasm and check freedom of expression;

how to enjoy the luxury of power without its labour; how to acquire

great reputation without trouble; how to be indolent and victorious

at the same moment. Fear prevented it from removing to Madrid

after every preparation had been made for a public entrance into

that capital. The members passed decrees, repressing the liberty

of the press on the ground of the deceptions practised upon the

public; but themselves never hesitated to deceive the British

agents, the generals, the government, and their own countrymen,

by the most flagitious falsehoods upon every subject, whether

of greater or less importance. They hedged their own dignity

round, with ridiculous and misplaced forms opposed to the vital

principle of an insurrectional government; they devoted their

attention to abstract speculations, recalled the exiled Jesuits,

and inundated the country with long and laboured state papers,

but left the pressing business of the moment to shift for itself.

Every application on the part of lord William Bentinck and Mr.

Stuart, even for an order to expedite a common courier, was met by

difficulties and delays, and it was necessary to have recourse to

the most painful solicitations to obtain the slightest attention;

nor did that mode always succeed.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 3.]

Sir John Moore strenuously grappled with the difficulties besetting

him: well knowing the value of time in military transactions, he

urged forward the preparations with all possible activity. He

was very desirous, that troops who had a journey of six hundred

miles to make previous to meeting the enemy, should not, at the

commencement, be overwhelmed by the torrents of rain which in

Portugal descend at this period with such violence as to destroy

the shoes, ammunition, and accoutrements of a soldier, and render

him almost unfit for service. The Spanish generals recommended

that the line of march should be conducted by Almeida, Ciudad

Rodrigo, Salamanca, Valladolid, and Burgos, and that the magazines

for the campaign should be formed at one of the latter towns;

and as this coincided with the previous preparations, the army

was organized in three columns, two of which were directed upon

Almeida, by the routes of Coimbra and Guarda, and the third,

comprising the artillery, the cavalry, and the regiments quartered

in the Alemtejo, was destined to move by Alcantara, upon Ciudad

Rodrigo. Almeida itself was chosen for a place of arms, and all the

reserve-stores and provisions were forwarded there, as time and

circumstances would permit; but the want of money, the unsettled

state of the country, and the inexperience of the commissariat,

rendered it difficult to procure the means of transport even for

the light baggage of the regiments, although the quantity of the

latter was reduced so much as to create discontent. One Sattaro

(the same person who has been already mentioned as an agent of

Junot’s in the negotiation with sir Charles Cotton) engaged to

supply the army, but dishonestly failing in his contract, so

embarrassed the operations, that the general resigned all hope of

being able to move with more than the light baggage, the ammunition

necessary for immediate use, and a scanty supply of medicines.

The formation of the magazines at Almeida was also retarded, and

the future subsistence of the troops was thus thrown upon a raw

commissariat, unprovided with money. The general, however, relying

upon its increasing experience, and upon the activity of lord

William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart, did not delay his march, but

sent agents to Madrid and other places to make contracts, and to

endeavour to raise money, for such was the policy of the ministers,

that they supplied the Spaniards with gold, and left the English

army to get it back in loans.

Many of the regiments were actually in movement when an

unexpected difficulty forced the commander-in-chief to make a

fresh disposition of the troops. The state of the Portuguese roads

north of the Tagus was unknown; the native officers and the people

declared that they were impracticable for artillery. The opinion

of colonel Lopez, a military commissary, sent by the Spanish

government to facilitate the march of the British, coincided with

this information, and the reports of one of the most intelligent

and enterprising of the officers of the quarter-master-general’s

department, who were employed to examine the lines of route,

corroborated the general opinion[16]. Junot, indeed, with infinite

pains, had carried his guns along these roads, but his carriages

had been broken, and the batteries rendered unserviceable by the

operation. In this dilemma, sir John Moore reluctantly determined

to send his artillery and cavalry by the south bank of the Tagus,

to Talavera de la Reyna, from whence they might gain Naval

Carneiro, the Escurial, the pass of the Guadarama mountains,

Espiñar, Arevalo, and Salamanca. He would have marched the

whole army by the same route, if this disagreeable intelligence

respecting the northern roads had been obtained earlier; but when

the arrangements were all made for the supplies to go to Almeida,

and when most of the regiments were actually in movement towards

that town, it was too late to alter their destination.

This separation of the artillery violated a great military

principle, which prescribes that the point of concentration

for an army should be beyond the reach of the enemy. But it

was a matter of apparent necessity, and, moreover, no danger

was apprehended from the offensive operations of an adversary

represented to be incapable of maintaining his own line of defence.

Valladolid and Burgos were considered by the Spaniards as safe

places for the English magazines, and sir John Moore shared so

much of the universal confidence in the Spanish enthusiasm and

courage, as to suppose that Salamanca would not be an insecure

point of concentration for his columns, under the protection of

such numerous patriotic armies as were said to be on the Ebro.

One brigade of six-pounders he retained with the head-quarters,

the remainder of his artillery, twenty-four pieces; the cavalry,

amounting to a thousand troopers; the great parc of the army,

containing many hundred carriages, and escorted by three thousand

infantry, he sent by the road of Talavera, under the command of sir

John Hope, an officer qualified by his talents, firmness, and zeal,

to conduct the most important enterprises.

The rest of the army marched in three columns, the first by

Alcantara, the second by Abrantes, the third by Coimbra, in the

direction of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo; and with such energy did

the general overcome all obstacles, that the whole of the troops

were in movement, and head-quarters quitted Lisbon by the 26th

of October, just twenty days after the receipt of the despatch

which appointed him to the chief command; a surprising diligence,

but rendered necessary by the pressure of circumstances. “The

army,” to use his own words, “run the risk of finding itself in

front of the enemy with no more ammunition than the men carried in

their pouches:” “but had I waited,” he adds, “until every thing

was forwarded, the troops would not have been in Spain until the

spring, and I trust that the enemy will not find out our wants as

soon as they will feel the effects of what we have.”

The Spaniards, however, who expected “every body to fly except

themselves,” thought him slow, and were impatient, and from

every quarter indeed letters arrived, pressing him to advance.

Lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart, witnesses of the sluggish

incapacity of the Spanish government, judged that such a support

was absolutely necessary to sustain the reeling strength of Spain.

The supreme government were even awakened for a moment. Hitherto,

as a mask for its ignorance, it had treated the French power

with contempt, and the Spanish generals and the people echoed

the sentiments of the government: but now, a letter addressed by

the governor of Bayonne to general Jourdan, stating, that sixty

thousand infantry, and seven thousand cavalry, would reinforce the

French armies between the 16th of October and the 16th of November,

was intercepted, and made the junta feel that a crisis for which it

was unprepared was approaching. With the folly usually attendant on

improvidence, these men, who had been so slow themselves, required

that others should be supernaturally quick when danger pressed.

[Sidenote: Capt. Kennedy’s Letter. Par^y. Pap^s.]

In the mean time sir David Baird’s forces arrived at Coruña. Lord

William Bentinck had given intimation of their approach, and the

central junta had repeatedly assured him, that every necessary

order was given, and that every facility would be afforded, for

the disembarkation and supply of the troops. This was untrue;

no measures of any kind had been taken, no instructions issued,

and no preparations were made. The junta of Coruña disliked the

personal trouble of a disembarkation in that port, and in the hope

that Baird would be driven to another, refused him permission to

land, until a communication was had with Aranjuez; but fifteen

days elapsed before an answer could be obtained from a government,

who were daily pestering sir John Moore with complaints of the

tardiness of his march.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 1.

Sir J. Moore to lord Castlereagh, 27th Oct.]

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 5 and 6.]

Sir David Baird came without money, sir John could only give him

8000_l._, a sum which might have been mistaken for a private

loan, if the fact of its being public property were not expressly

mentioned. But at this time Mr. Frere, the plenipotentiary, arrived

at Coruña, with two millions of dollars, intended for the use of

the Spaniards; and while such large sums, contrary to the earnest

recommendations of Mr. Stuart and major Cox, were lavished in that

quarter, the penury of the English general obliged him to borrow

from the funds in Mr. Frere’s hands. Thus assisted, the troops were

put in motion; but, wanting all the equipments essential to an

army, they were forced to march by half battalions, conveying their

scanty stores on country cars, hired from day to day, nor was that

meagre assistance obtained but at great expense, and by compliance

with a vulgar mercenary spirit predominant among the authorities of

Gallicia. The junta frequently promised to procure the carriages,

but did not; the commissaries pushed to the wall by the delay,

offered an exorbitant remuneration: the cars were then forthcoming,

and the procrastination of the government proved to be a concerted

plan, to defraud the military chest. In fine, the local rulers were

unfriendly, crafty, fraudulent, the peasantry suspicious, fearful,

rude, disinclined towards strangers, and indifferent to public

affairs. A few shots only were required to render theirs a hostile

instead of a friendly greeting.

[Sidenote: Sir H. Dalrymple’s Correspondence.]

With Mr. Frere came a fleet, conveying a Spanish force, under the

marquis of Romana. When the insurrection first broke forth, that

nobleman commanded fourteen or fifteen thousand troops, who were

serving with the French armies. How to recover this disciplined

body of men from the enemy was a subject of early anxiety with

the junta of Seville; and Castaños, in his first intercourse with

sir Hew Dalrymple, signified his wish that the British government

should adopt some mode of apprising Romana, that Spain was in

arms, and should endeavour to extricate him and his army from the

toils of the enemy. A gentleman named M’Kenzie was employed by the

English ministers to conduct the enterprise; the Spanish troops

were quartered in Holstein, Sleswig, Jutland, and the islands of

Funen, Zealand, and Langeland; Mr. M’Kenzie, through the medium

of one Robertson, a catholic priest, opened a communication with

Romana. Neither the general, nor the soldiers he commanded,

hesitated, and a judicious plan being concerted, sir Richard

Keats, with a squadron detached from the Baltic fleet, suddenly

appeared off Nyborg, in the island of Funen. A majority of the

Spanish regiments quartered in Sleswig immediately seized all the

Danish craft in the different harbours of that coast, and pushed

across the channel to Funen, where Romana, with the assistance of

Keats, had already seized the port and castle of Nyborg without

opposition, save from a small ship of war that was moored across

the mouth of the harbour. From Nyborg Romana passed to Langeland,

and there awaited the arrival of sir James Saumarez with the

English fleet, on board of which he embarked with about nine

thousand five hundred men. Of the remainder, some were disarmed, or

overawed by the Danish troops in Zealand, and some did not escape

from Sleswig. This enterprise was conducted with prudent activity,

and the unhesitating patriotism of the Spanish soldiers was very

honourable, but the danger was trifling; Mr. Robertson incurred

the most. Romana, after touching at England, repaired to Coruña;

his troops did not, however, land at that port, but after a while

coasted to St. Andero, and being there disembarked, and equipped

from the English stores, proceeded by divisions to join Blake’s

army in Biscay.

Among the various subjects calling for sir John Moore’s attention,

there was none of greater interest than the appointment of a

generalissimo to the Spanish armies. Impressed with the imminent

danger of procrastination, or uncertainty in such a matter, he

desired lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart to urge the central

government with all their force upon that head; to lord Castlereagh

he represented the injury that must accrue to the cause, if the

measure was delayed, and he proposed to go himself to Madrid,

with a view of adding weight to his representations. Subsequent

events, which left him no time for the journey, frustrated this

intention, and there seems no reason to imagine, that his personal

remonstrances would have weighed with a government, described

by Mr. Stuart, after a thorough experience of their qualities,

as, “never having made a single exertion for the public good,

neither rewarding merit nor punishing guilt,” and being for all

useful purposes “absolutely null.” The junta’s dislike to a single

military chief was not an error of the head, and reason is of

little avail against the suggestions of self-interest.

The march of the British troops was as rapid as the previous

preparations had been. Head-quarters reached Almeida on the 8th of

November. The infantry were already assembled at that town. The

condition of the men was superb, and their discipline exemplary;

on that side all was well, but from the obstacles encountered by

sir David Baird, and the change of direction in the artillery,

it was evident, that no considerable force could be brought into

action before the end of the month. Meanwhile, the Spaniards were

hastening events. Despatches from lord William Bentinck announced

that the enemy remained stationary on the Ebro, although reinforced

by ten thousand men; that Castaños was about to cross that river

at Tudela; and that the army of Aragon was moving by Sor upon

Roncevalles, with a view to gain the rear of the French, while

Castaños assailed their left flank. The general, judging that such

movements would bring on a battle, the success of which must be

very doubtful, became uneasy for his own artillery: his concern

was increased by observing, that the guns might have kept with the

other columns; “and if any thing adverse happens, I have not,” he

wrote to general Hope, “necessity to plead; the road we are now

travelling, that by Villa Velha and Guarda, is practicable for

artillery. The brigade under Wilmot has already reached Guarda, and

as far as I have already seen, the road presents few obstacles, and

those easily surmounted; this knowledge was, however, only acquired

by our own officers; when the brigade was at Castello Branco,

it was not certain if it could proceed.” Wherefore, he desired

Hope no longer to trust any reports, but seek a shorter line, by

Placentia, across the mountains to Salamanca.

Up to this period, all reports from the agents, all information

from the government at home, all communications public and private,

coincided upon one subject. _The Spaniards were an enthusiastic,

a heroic people, a nation of unparalleled energy! their armies

were brave; they were numerous; they were confident! one hundred

and eighty thousand men were actually in line of battle, extending

from the sea-coast of Biscay to Zaragoza; the French, reduced to

a fourth of this number, cooped up in a corner, shrunk from an

encounter; they were deserted by the emperor; they were trembling;

they were spiritless!_ Nevertheless, the general was somewhat

distrustful; he perceived the elements of disaster in the divided

commands, and the lengthened lines of the Spaniards; and early in

October he had predicted the mischief that such a system would

produce. “As long as the French remain upon the defensive,” he

observed, “it will not be so much felt; but the moment an attack

is made, some great calamity must ensue.” However, he was not

without faith in the multitude and energy of the patriots, when he

considered the greatness of their cause.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 7.]

Castaños was at this time pointed out by the central junta as

the person with whom to concert a plan of campaign, and sir John

Moore, concluding that it was a preliminary step towards making

that officer generalissimo, wrote to him in a conciliatory style,

well calculated to ensure a cordial co-operation. This was an

encouraging event; the English general believed it to be the

commencement of a better system, and looked forward with more hope

to the opening of the war; but this favourable state soon changed.

Far from being created chief of all, Castaños was superseded in the

command he already held, the whole folly of the Spanish character

broke forth, and confusion and distress followed. But even at

that moment clouds were arising in a quarter, which had hitherto

been all sunshine. The military agents, as the crisis approached,

lowered their tone of confidence, they no longer dwelt upon the

enthusiasm of the armies; they admitted, that the confidence of the

troops was sinking, and that even in numbers they were inferior to

the French. In truth, it was full time to change their note, for

the real state of affairs could no longer be concealed, and a great

catastrophe was at hand; but what of wildness in their projects, or

of skill in the enemy’s; what of ignorance, vanity, and presumption

in their generals; what of fear among their soldiers; and what

of fortune in the events; combined to hasten the ruin of the

Spaniards, and how that ruin was effected, I, quitting the English

army for a time, will now relate.

CHAPTER IV.

In the preceding chapters I have exposed the weakness, the

folly, the improvidence of Spain, and shown how the bad passions

and sordid views of her leaders were encouraged by the unwise

prodigality of England. I have dissected the full boast and meagre

preparations of the governments in both countries; laying bare the

bones and sinews of the insurrection; and by comparing their loose

and feeble structure with the strongly knitted frame and large

proportions of the enemy, prepared the reader for the inevitable

issue of a conflict between such ill-matched champions. In the

present book, I shall recount the sudden and terrible manner in

which the Spanish armies were overthrown, and the tempestuous

progress of the French emperor.

But previous to relating these disasters I must revert to the

period immediately following the retreat of king Joseph, and trace

those early operations of the French and Spanish forces which, like

a jesting prologue to a deep tragedy, unworthily ushered in the

great catastrophe.

CAMPAIGN OF THE FRENCH AND SPANISH ARMIES BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF THE

EMPEROR.

After general Cuesta was removed from the command, and that the

junta of Seville was, by major Cox, forced to disgorge so much of

the English subsidy as sufficed for the immediate relief of the

troops in Madrid, all the Spanish armies closed upon the Ebro.

[Sidenote: General Broderick’s Correspondence.]

General Blake, reinforced by eight thousand Asturians, established

his base of operations at Reynosa, opened a communication with the

English vessels off the port of St. Andero, and directed his views

towards Biscay.

The Castillian army, conducted by general Pignatelli, resumed its

march upon Burgo del Osma and Logroña.

[Sidenote: Capt. Whittingham’s.]

The two divisions of the Andalusian troops under Lapeña, and the

Murcian division of general Llamas, advanced to Taranzona and

Tudela.

[Sidenote: Colonel Doyle’s.]

Palafox, with the Aragonese and Valencian divisions of St. Marc,

operated from the side of Zaragoza.

[Sidenote: Castaños’s Vindication.]

Fourteen or fifteen thousand of the Estremaduran troops were

drafted, and placed under the conduct of the conde de Belvedere, a

weak youth, not twenty years of age. They were at first directed

upon Logroña, as forming part of Castaños’s command, but finally,

as we shall find, received another destination.

[Sidenote: Whittingham’s Correspondence.]

Between these armies there was neither concert nor connexion;

their movements were regulated by some partial view of affairs, or

by the silly caprices of the generals, who were ignorant of each

other’s plans, and little solicitous to combine operations. The

weak characters of many of the chiefs, the inexperience of all,

and the total want of system, opened a field for intriguing men,

and invited unqualified persons to interfere in the direction of

affairs. Thus we find colonel Doyle making a journey to Zaragoza,

and priding himself upon having prevailed with Palafox to detach

seven thousand men to Sanguessa; and captain Whittingham, without

any knowledge of Doyle’s interference, earnestly dissuading the

Spaniards from such an enterprise. The first affirmed, that the

movement would “turn the enemy’s left flank, threaten his rear,

and have the appearance of cutting off his retreat.” The second

argued, that Sanguessa, being seventy miles from Zaragoza, and

only a few leagues from Pampeluna, the detachment would itself be

cut off. Doyle judged that it would draw the French from Caparosa

and Milagro, and expose those points to Llamas and La-Peña; that

it would force the enemy to recall the reinforcements said to be

marching against Blake, and enable that general to form a junction

with the Asturians, when he might, with forty thousand men, possess

himself of the Pyrenees; and if the French army, estimated at

thirty-five thousand men, did not fly, cut it off from France, or

by moving on Miranda, sweep clear Biscay and Castille. Palafox,

pleased with this plan, sent Whittingham to inform Llamas and

La-Peña, that O’Neil would, with six thousand men, march on the

15th of September to Sanguessa. Those generals disapproved of the

movement as dangerous, premature, and at variance with the plan

arranged in the council of war held at Madrid. Palafox, regardless

of their opinion, persisted. O’Neil occupied Sanguessa, drew the

attention of the enemy, and was immediately driven across the

Alagon river.

[Sidenote: Ld. W. Bentinck’s Correspond^{ce}. MS.]

[Sidenote: Doyle’s Correspondence. MS.]

In this manner all their projects, characterized by a profound

ignorance of war, were lightly adopted and as lightly abandoned, or

ended in disasters; yet victory was more confidently anticipated,

than if consummate skill had presided over the arrangements; and

this vain-glorious feeling, extending to the military agents, was

by them propagated in England, where the fore-boasting was nearly

as loud, and as absurd, as in the Peninsula. The delusion was

universal; even lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart, deceived by

the curious consistency of the Spanish falsehoods, doubted if

the French army was able to maintain its position, and believed

that the Spaniards had obtained a moral ascendancy in the field.

Drunk with vanity and folly, the leading Spaniards in the capital,

feeling certain that the “remnants,” as they were called, of the

French army on the Ebro, estimated at from thirty-five to forty

thousand men, would be immediately destroyed, proposed that the

British army should be directed upon Catalonia, and when they found

that this proposal was not acceded to, they withdrew ten thousand

men from the Murcian division, and sent them to the neighbourhood

of Lerida.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6.]

The natural pride and arrogance of the Spaniards were greatly aided

by the timid and false operations of king Joseph. Twenty days after

the evacuation of Madrid, that monarch was at the head of above

fifty thousand fighting men, exclusive of eight thousand employed

to maintain the communications, and to furnish the garrisons of

Pampeluna, Tolosa, Irun, St. Sebastian, and Bilbao.

The French army of Catalonia, seventeen thousand in number, was,

as we have seen, distinct from the king’s command; but a strong

reserve, assembled at Bayonne, under general Drouet, supplied him

with reinforcements, and was itself supported by drafts from the

depôts in the interior of France.

Six thousand men, divided into several moveable columns, watched

the openings of the Pyrenees, from St. Jean Pied de Port to

Rousillon, and guarded the frontier from Spanish incursions; and a

second reserve, composed of Neapolitans, Tuscans, and Piedmontese,

was commenced at Belgarde, with a view of supporting Duhesme in

Catalonia.

How the king quelled the nascent insurrection at Bilbao, and

how he dispersed the insurgents of the valleys in Aragon, I have

already related. After those operations the French army was

re-organized and divided into three grand divisions and a reserve.

Marshal Bessieres retained the command of the right wing; marshal

Moncey assumed that of the left; and marshal Ney arriving at this

period from Paris, took charge of the centre; while the reserve,

chiefly composed of detachments from the imperial guard, remained

near the person of the king. The old republican general, Jourdan,

a man whose day of glory belonged to another era, re-appeared upon

the military stage, and filled the office of major-general to the

army.

[Sidenote: Napoleon’s notes. Appendix, Nos. 4 and 5.]

[Sidenote: S. Journal of the king’s operations. MS.]

With such a force, and so assisted, there was nothing in Spain,

turn which way he would, capable of opposing king Joseph’s march;

but the incongruity of a camp with a court is always productive of

indecision and of error; the truncheon does not fit every hand, and

the French army soon felt the inconvenience of having at its head

a monarch who was not a warrior. Joseph remained on the defensive;

but he did not understand the force of the maxim, “_that offensive

movements are the foundation of a good defence_.” He held Bilbao,

but he abandoned Tudela contrary to the advice of the generals

who had conducted the operations on that side, and in its place

Milagro, a small town, situated upon the rivers Arga and Aragon,

just above their confluence with the Ebro, was by him chosen as

the position of battle for the left wing. As long as Bessieres

held Burgos in force, his cavalry commanded the valley of the

Douero, menaced Palencia and Valladolid, and scouring the plains,

kept Blake and Cuesta in check. Instead of reinforcing a post so

advantageous, the king relinquished Burgos as a point beyond his

line of defence, and Bessieres’ troops were posted in successive

divisions behind it, as far as Puente Lara on the Ebro. Ney’s force

lined that river down to Logroña; the reserve was quartered behind

Miranda; and Trevino, a small obscure place, was chosen as the

point of battle, for the right and centre. In this disadvantageous

situation the army, with some trifling changes, remained from the

middle of August until late in September. During that time the

artillery and carriages of transport were repaired, magazines were

collected, the cavalry remounted, and the preparations made for an

active campaign when the reinforcements should arrive from Germany.

The line of resistance thus offered to the Spaniards, evinced

a degree of timidity which the relative strength of the armies

by no means justified; the left of the French evidently leaned

towards the great communication with France, and seemed to

refuse the support of Pampeluna. Tudela was abandoned, and

Burgos resigned to the enterprise of the Spaniards. All this

indicated fear, a disposition to retreat if the enemy advanced.

The king complained with what extreme difficulty he obtained

intelligence; yet he neglected by forward movements to feel for his

adversaries. Wandering as it were in the dark, he gave a loose to

his imagination, and conjuring up a phantom of Spanish strength,

which had no real existence, anxiously waited for the development

of their power, while they were exposing their weakness by a

succession of the most egregious blunders.

Joseph’s errors did not escape the animadversion of his brother,

whose sagacity enabled him, although at a distance, to detect,

through the glare of the insurrection, all the inefficiency of the

Spaniards; but, despising them as soldiers, he dreaded the moral

effect produced by their momentary success, and he was preparing

to crush the rising hopes of his enemies. Joseph’s retreat, and

subsequent position, therefore, displeased him; and he desired his

brother to check the exultation of the patriots, by acting upon a

bold and well-considered plan, of which he sent him the outline.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 5.]

His notes, dictated upon the occasion, are replete with genius,

and evince his absolute mastery of the art of war. “It was too

late,” he said, “to discuss the question, whether Madrid should

have been retained or abandoned? Idle to consider, if a position,

covering the siege of Zaragoza, might not have been formed; useless

to examine, if the line of the Douro was not better than that of

the Ebro for the French army. The line of the Ebro was actually

taken, and it must be kept; to advance from that river without a

fixed object would create indecision; this would bring the troops

back again, and produce an injurious moral effect; but why abandon

Tudela? Why relinquish Burgos? Those towns were of note, and of

reputation; the possession of them gave a moral influence, and

moral force constituted two-thirds of the strength of armies.

Tudela and Burgos had also a relative importance; the first

possessing a stone bridge, was on the communication of Pampeluna

and Madrid. It commanded the canal of Zaragoza. It was the capital

of a province. When the army resumed offensive operations, their

first enterprise would be the siege of Zaragoza; from that town to

Tudela, the land carriage was three days, but the water carriage

was only fourteen hours; wherefore to have the besieging artillery

and stores at Tudela was the same as to have them at Zaragoza. If

the Spaniards got possession of the former, all Navarre would be

in a state of insurrection, and Pampeluna exposed. Tudela then was

of vast importance; but Milagro was of none. It was an obscure

place, without a bridge, and commanding no communication; in

short, it was without interest, defended nothing! led to nothing!

A river,” said this great commander, “though it should be as

large as the Vistula, and as rapid as the Danube at its mouth,

is nothing, unless there are good points of passage, and a head

quick to take the offensive. The Ebro as a defence was less than

nothing, a mere line of demarcation! and Milagro was useless. The

enemy might neglect it, be at Estella, and from thence gain Tolosa,

before any preparation could be made to receive him; he might

come from Soria, from Logroña, or from Zaragoza. Again, Burgos

was the capital of a province, the centre of many communications,

a town of great fame, and of relative value to the French army.

To occupy it in force, and offensively, would threaten Palencia,

Valladolid, Aranda, and even Madrid. It is necessary,” observed

the emperor, “to have made war a long time to conceive this. It is

necessary to have made a number of offensive enterprises to know

how much the smallest event, or even indication, encourages or

discourages, and decides the adoption of one enterprise instead of

another.” “In short, if the enemy occupies Burgos, Logroña, and

Tudela, the French army will be in a pitiful position. It is not

known if he has left Madrid; you are ignorant of what has become

of the Gallician army, and we have reason to suspect that it may

have been directed upon Portugal; in such a state to take up,

instead of a bold, menacing, and honourable position like Burgos,

a confined shameful one like Trevino, is to say to the enemy, you

have nothing to fear, go elsewhere, we have made our dispositions

to go farther, or we have chosen our ground to fight; come there,

without fear of being disturbed. But what will the French general

do if the enemy marches the next day upon Burgos? Will he let the

citadel of that town be taken by six thousand insurgents? or if the

French have left a garrison in the castle, how can four or five

hundred men retire in such a vast plain? and, from that time, all

is gone; the enemy master of the citadel, it cannot be retaken; if,

on the contrary, we should guard the citadel, we must give battle

to the enemy, because it cannot hold out more than three days, and

if we wish to fight a battle, why should Bessieres abandon the

ground where we wish to fight? These dispositions appear badly

considered, and when the enemy shall march, our troops will meet

with such an insult as will demoralize them if there are only

insurgents or light troops advancing against them. If fifteen

thousand insurgents enter into Burgos, retrench themselves in the

town, and occupy the castle, it will be necessary to calculate a

march of several days to enable us to post ourselves there, and to

retake the town, which cannot be done without some inconvenience.

If, during the time, the real attack is upon Logroña or Pampeluna,

we shall have made countermarches without use, which will have

fatigued the army. If we hold it with cavalry only, is it not to

say we do not intend stopping, and to invite the enemy to come

there? It was the first time,” he said, “that an army had quitted

all its offensive positions to take up a bad defensive line, and

to affect to choose its field of battle, when the thousand and

one combinations which might take place, and the distance of the

enemy, did not leave a probability of being able to foresee if the

battle would take place at Tudela, between Tudela and Pampeluna,

between Soria and the Ebro, or between Burgos and Miranda;” and

then followed an observation which may be studied with advantage

by those authors who, unacquainted with the simplest rudiments

of military science, censure the conduct of a general, and are

pleased, from some obscure nook, to point out his errors to the

world; authors who, profoundly ignorant of the numbers, situation,

and resources of the opposing armies, pretend, nevertheless, to

detail with great accuracy the right method of executing the most

difficult and delicate operations of war. As the rebuke of Turenne,

who frankly acknowledged to Louvois that he could pass the Rhine at

a particular spot if the latter’s finger were a bridge, has been

lost upon such men, perhaps the more recent opinion of Napoleon may

be disregarded. “But it is not permitted,” says that consummate

general, “_it is not permitted, at the distance of three hundred

leagues, and without even a state of the situation of the army, to

direct what should be done_!”

After having thus protected himself from the charge of presumption,

the emperor proceeded to recommend certain dispositions for the

defence of the Ebro. The Spaniards, he said, were not to be feared

in the field; twenty-five thousand French in a good position would

suffice to beat all their armies united, and this opinion he

deduced from the events of Dupont’s campaign, of which he gave a

short analysis. Let Tudela, he said, be retrenched if possible, at

all events it should be occupied in force, and offensively towards

Zaragoza. Let the general commanding there collect provisions on

all sides; secure the boats, with a view to future operations when

the reinforcements should arrive, and maintain his communication

with Logroña by the right bank if he can, but certainly by the

left. Let his corps be considered as one of observation; if a

body of insurgents only approach, he may fight them, or keep them

constantly on the defensive by his movements against their line or

against Zaragoza. If regular troops attack him, and he is forced

across the Ebro, let him then manœuvre about Pampeluna until the

general-in-chief has made his dispositions for the main body. In

this manner no prompt movement upon Estella and Tolosa can take

place, and the corps of observation will have amply fulfilled

its task. Let marshal Bessieres, with all his corps united, and

reinforced by the light cavalry of the army, encamp in the wood

near Burgos; let the citadel be well occupied, the hospital, the

dépôts, and all encumbrances sent over the Ebro; let him keep in

a condition to manœuvre, be under arms every day at three o’clock

in the morning, and remain until the return of his patroles. He

should send parties to a great extent, as far as two days’ march.

Let the corps of the centre be placed at Miranda and Briviesca,

and all the encumbrances be likewise sent across the Ebro behind

Vittoria. This corps should be under arms every morning, and send

patroles by the road of Soria, and wherever the enemy may be

expected. It must not be lost sight of, that these two corps, being

to be united, they should be connected as little as possible with

Logroña, and consider the left wing as a corps detached, having

a line of operations upon Pampeluna, and a separate part to act.

Tudela is preserved as a post contiguous to the line. Be well on

the defensive, he continues, in short, make war, that is to say,

get information from the alcaldes, the curates, the posts, the

chiefs of convents, and the principal proprietors, you will then be

perfectly informed; the patroles should always be directed upon

the side of Soria, and of Burgos, upon Palencia, and upon the side

of Aranda. They could thus form three posts of interception, and

send three reports of men arrested; these men should be treated

well, and dismissed, after they had given the information desired

of them. Let the enemy then come, and we can unite all our forces;

hide our marches from him, and fall upon his flank at the moment he

is meditating an offensive movement.

With regard to the minor details, the emperor thus expressed

himself: “Soria is not, I believe, more than two short marches from

the actual position of the army; that town has constantly acted

against us; an expedition sent there to disarm it, to take thirty

of the principal people as hostages, and to obtain provisions,

would have a good effect. It would be useful to occupy St. Ander.

It will be of advantage to move by the direct road of Bilbao to

St. Ander. It will be necessary to occupy and disarm Biscay and

Navarre. Every Spaniard taken in arms there should be shot[17].

The manufactories of arms at Palencia should be watched, to hinder

them from working for the rebels. The port of Pancorbo should be

armed and fortified with great activity; ovens, and magazines of

provisions and ammunition, should be placed there. Situated nearly

half way between Madrid and Bayonne, it is an intermediate post

for the army, and a point of support for troops operating towards

Gallicia. The interest of the enemy,” he resumes, “is to mask his

forces. By hiding the true point of attack, he operates in such

a manner, that the blow he means to strike is never indicated in

a positive way, and the opposing general can only guess it by a

well-matured knowledge of his own position, and of the mode in

which he makes his offensive system act, to protect his defensive

system. We have no accounts of what the enemy is about; it is said

that no news can be obtained, as if this case was extraordinary in

an army, as if spies were common: they must do in Spain, as they do

in other places. Send parties out. Let them carry off, sometimes

the priest, sometimes the alcalde, the chief of a convent, the

master of the post or his deputy, and, above all, the letters. Put

them under arrest until they speak. Question them twice each day,

or keep them as hostages. Charge them to send foot messengers,

and to get news. When we know how to take measures of vigour and

force, it is easy to get news. All the posts, all the letters, must

be intercepted. The single motive of procuring intelligence will

be sufficient to authorise a detachment of four or five thousand

men, who will go into a great town, will take the letters from

the post, will seize the richest citizens, their letters, papers,

gazettes, &c. It is beyond doubt, that even in the French lines,

the inhabitants are all informed of what passes; of course, out

of that line, they know more; what, then, should prevent you from

seizing the principal men? Let them be sent back again without

being ill treated. It is a fact, that when we are not in a desert,

but in a peopled country, if the general is not well instructed,

it is because he is ignorant of his trade. The services which the

inhabitants render to an enemy’s general, are never given from

affection, nor even to get money. The truest method to obtain them

is by safeguards and protections to preserve their lives, their

goods, their towns, or their monasteries!”

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6.]

Joseph, although by no means a dull man, seems to have had no

portion of his brother’s martial genius, and the operations

recommended by the latter did not appear to the king to be

applicable to the state of affairs. He did not adopt them, but

proposed others; in discussing which, he thus defended the policy

of his retreat from Madrid.

“When the _defection_ of twenty-two thousand men (Dupont’s) caused

the king to quit the capital, the disposable troops remaining were

divided in three corps: that immediately about his person; that

of marshal Bessieres; and that of general Verdier, then besieging

Zaragoza: but these bodies were spread over a hundred leagues of

ground, and with the last the king had little or no connexion.

His first movement was to unite the two former at Burgos, and

afterwards to enter into communication with the third. The line of

defence on the Ebro was adopted.” This operation Joseph affirmed

to have been dictated by sound reason.--Because “when the events

of Andalusia foreboded a regular and serious war, prudence did

not permit three corps, the strongest of which was only eighteen

thousand men, to separate to a greater distance than six days’

march, in the midst of eleven millions of people in a state of

hostility. But fifty thousand French could defend with success a

line of sixty leagues, guarding the two grand communications of

Burgos and Tudela, against enemies who had not, up to that period,

been able to carry to either point above twenty-five thousand men;

because fifteen thousand French could be united upon either.”

Joseph was dissatisfied with Napoleon’s plans, and preferred his

own. The disposable troops at his command, exclusive of those in

Bilbao, were fifty thousand; these he distributed as follows.

The right wing occupied Burgos, Pancorbo, and Puente Lara. The

centre was posted between Haro and Logroña; the left extended from

Logroña to Tudela; the latter town was not occupied. He contended

that this arrangement, at once offensive and defensive, might be

advantageously continued, if the great army directed upon Spain

arrived in September, since it tended to refit the army already

there, and menaced the enemy; but that it could not be prolonged

until November, because in three months the Spaniards must make

a great progress, and would very soon be in a state to take the

offensive with grand organized corps, obedient to a central

administration, which would have time to form in Madrid. Every

thing announced, he said, that the month of October was one of

those decisive epochs which gave to the party who knew how to

profit from it, the priority of movements and success, the progress

of which it was difficult to calculate.

In this view of affairs, the merits of six projects were discussed

by the king.

First. To remain in the actual position. This was declared to

be unsustainable, because the enemy could attack the left with

forty thousand, the centre with forty thousand, the right with as

many. Tudela and Navarre, as far as Logroña, required twenty-five

thousand men to defend them. Burgos could not be defended but by an

army in a state to resist the united forces of Blake and Cuesta,

which would amount to eighty thousand men, and it was doubtful

if the twenty thousand bayonets which could be opposed, could

completely beat them; if they did not, the French would be harassed

by the insurgents of the three provinces (Biscay, Navarre, and

Guipuscoa), who would interpose between the left wing and France.

Second project. To carry the centre and reserve by Tudela, towards

Zaragoza or Almazan; united with the left, they would amount to

thirty thousand men, who might seek for, and, doubtless, would

defeat the enemy, if he was met with on that side. In the meantime,

the right wing, leaving garrisons in the citadel of Burgos and the

fort of Pancorbo, could occupy the enemy, and watch any movements

in the Montagna St. Ander, or disembarkations that might take place

at the ports; but this task was considered difficult, because

Pancorbo was not the only defile accessible to artillery. Three

leagues from thence, another road led upon Miranda, and there was a

third passage over the point of the chain which stretched between

Haro and Miranda.

Third project. To leave the defence of Navarre to the left wing.

To carry the centre, the reserve, and the right wing, to Burgos,

and to beat the enemy before he could unite; an easy task, as the

French would be thirty thousand strong. Meanwhile, Moncey could

keep the Spaniards in check on the side of Tudela, or if unable to

do that, he was to march up the Ebro, by Logroña and Briviesca,

and join the main body. The communication with France would be

thus lost, but the army might maintain itself until the arrival of

the emperor. A modification of this project proposed that Moncey,

retiring to the entrenched camp of Pampeluna, should there await

either the arrival of the emperor, or the result of the operations

towards Burgos.

Fourth project. To pass the Ebro in retreat, and to endeavour

to tempt the enemy to fight in the plain between that river and

Vittoria.

Fifth project. To retire, supporting the left upon Pampeluna, the

right upon Montdragon.

Sixth project. To leave garrisons, with the means of a six weeks’

defence, in Pampeluna, St. Sebastian, Pancorbo, and Burgos. To

unite the rest of the army march against the enemy, attack him

wherever he was found, and then wait either near Madrid or in that

country, into which the pursuit of the Spaniards, or the facility

of living, should draw the army. This plan relinquished the

communications with France entirely, but it was said that the grand

army could easily open them again, and the troops already in Spain

would be sufficiently strong to defy all the efforts of the enemy,

to disconcert all his projects, and to wait in a noble attitude the

general impulse which would be given by the arrival of the emperor.

Of all these projects the last was the favourite with the king, who

strongly recommended it, and asserted, that if it was followed,

affairs would be more prosperous when the emperor arrived than

could be expected from any other plan. Marshal Ney and general

Jourdan approved of it; but it would appear that Napoleon had

other views, and too little confidence in his brother’s military

judgment, to intrust so great a matter to his guidance.

OBSERVATIONS.

1º. It is undoubted, that there must always be some sympathy

of genius in the man who is to execute another’s conception in

military affairs. Without that species of harmony between their

minds, the thousand accidental occurrences and minor combinations

which must happen contrary to expectation, will inevitably

embarrass the executor to such a degree, that he will be unable

to see the most obvious advantages, and in striving to unite the

plan he has received with his own views, he will adopt neither, but

steer an unsteady reeling course between both, and fail of success.

The reason of this appears to be, that a strong, and, if the term

may be used, inveterate attention must be fixed upon certain great

principles of action in war, to enable a general to disregard the

minor events and inconveniences which cross his purpose; minor they

are to the great object, but in themselves sufficient to break down

the firmness and self-possession of any but extraordinary men.

2º. The original memoir from which Joseph’s projects have been

extracted is so blotted and interlined, that it would be unfair

to consider it as a matured production. The great error which

pervades it, is the conjectural data upon which he founds his

plans, and the little real information which he appears to have had

relative to the Spanish forces, views, or interior policy. Thus he

was prepared to act upon the idea, that the central junta would

be able and provident; the parties united, and the armies strong

and well administered; none of which things really took place.

Again, he estimated Cuesta and Blake’s armies at eighty thousand,

and considered them as one body; but they were never united at

all, and if they had, they would scarcely have amounted to sixty

thousand. The bold idea of throwing himself into the interior came

too late; he should have thought of that before he quitted Madrid,

or at least before the central government was established at that

capital. His operations might have been successful against the

miserable armies opposed to him; against good and moveable troops

they would not, as the emperor’s admirable notes prove.

The first project, wanting those offensive combinations discussed

by Napoleon, was open to all his objections, as being timid and

incomplete. The second was crude and ill-considered, for, according

to the king’s estimate of the Spanish force, thirty thousand men on

each wing might oppose the heads of his columns, sixty thousand

could still have been united at Logroña, pass the Ebro, excite an

insurrection in Navarre, Guipuscoa, and Biscay, seize Tolosa and

Miranda, and fall upon the rear of the French army, which thus

cut in two, and its communications intercepted, would have been

extremely embarrassed. The third was not better judged. Burgos

as an offensive post, protecting the line of defence, was very

valuable, and to unite a large force there was so far prudent; but

if the Spaniards retired, and refused battle with their left, while

the centre and right operated by Logroña and Sanguessa, what would

have been the result? the French right must without any definite

object either have continued to advance, or remained stationary

without communication, or returned to fight a battle for those

very positions which they had just quitted. The fourth depended

entirely upon accident, and is not worth argument. The fifth was

an undisguised retreat. The sixth was not applicable to the actual

situation of affairs. The king’s force was no longer an independent

body, it was become the advanced guard of the great army, marching

under Napoleon. It was absurd, therefore, to contemplate a decisive

movement, without having first matured a plan suitable to the whole

mass that was to be engaged in the execution. In short, to permit

an advanced guard to determine the operations of the main body, was

to reverse the order of military affairs, and to trust to accident

instead of design. It is curious, that while Joseph was proposing

this irruption into Spain, the Spaniards and the military agents of

Great Britain were trembling lest he should escape their power by a

precipitate flight. “_War is not a conjectural art!_”

CHAPTER V.

The emperor overruled the offensive projects of the king, and the

latter was forced to distribute the centre and right wing in a

manner more consonant to the spirit of Napoleon’s instructions; but

he still neglected to occupy Tudela, and covered his left wing by

the Aragon river.

[Sidenote: Journal of the king’s operations, MS.]

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 28.]

The 18th of September the French army was posted in the following

manner:

Right wing. Marshal } Three divisions of infantry in front of

Bessieres. 15,595 } Pancorbo, at Briviesca, Santa Maria,

under arms. } and Cuba; light cavalry behind Burgos.

Centre. Marshal Ney. }

13,756 under arms. } Logroña, Nalda, and Najera.

Left wing. Marshal } Milagro, Lodosa, Caparosa, and Alfaro.

Moncey. 16,636 } The garrison of Pampeluna was also

under arms. } under Moncey’s command.

Reserve of the king. }

Gen. Saligny. 5,413. }

}

Imperial guard. }

Gen. Dorsenne. 2,423. } Miranda, Haro, and Puente Lara.

------ }

Total 7,833.

Garrisons. 6,004. Pampeluna.

Gen. Monthion. 1,500. Bilbao.

{ Composed of small garrisons and moveable

Gen. La Grange. 6,979. { columns, guarding the communications

{ of Biscay, Alava, and Guipuscoa.

Grand reserve.

Moveable cols. 1,984. }

Stationary. 20,005. } Bayonne, and watching the valleys of

------ } the Pyrenees opening into Navarre.

Total, comm. by }

Gen. Drouet, 21,989. }

Total 90,289 present under arms, exclusive of the troops in

Catalonia. Hence the communication being secured, the fortresses

garrisoned, and the fort of Pancorbo armed, there remained above

fifty thousand sabres and bayonets disposable on a line of battle

extending from Bilbao to Alfaro.

To oppose this formidable force the Spanish troops were divided

into three principal masses, denominated the armies of the right,

centre, and left.

Infantry. Cavalry. Guns. 1st Line.

The first, composed of the

divisions of St. Marc and }

O’Neil, numbered about 17,500 500 24 }

The second, composed of the } Men. Guns.

divisions of La Pena, Llamas, }

and Caro 26,000 1,300 36 } 75,400 86

The third, consisting entirely }

of Gallicians, about 30,000 100 26 }

2d Line.

In the second line the Castillians were }

at Segovia 12,000 }

The Estremadurans at Talavera 13,000 }

Two Andalusian divisions were in } 57,000

La Mancha 14,000 }

And the Asturians (posted at Llanes) were }

called 18,000 }

This estimate, founded upon a number of contemporary returns and

other documents, proves the monstrous exaggerations put forth at

this time to deceive the Spanish people and the English government.

The Spaniards pretended that above one hundred and forty thousand

men in arms were threatening the French positions on the Ebro,

whereas less than seventy-six thousand were in line of battle, and

those exceedingly ill-armed and provided. The right, under Palafox,

held the country between Zaragoza and Sanguessa, on the Aragon

river; the centre, under Castaños, occupied Borja, Taranzona, and

Agreda; the left, under Blake, was posted at Reynosa, near the

sources of the Ebro.

The relative position of the French and Spanish armies was very

disadvantageous for the latter. From the right to the left of their

line, that is, from Reynosa to Zaragoza, was twice the distance

between Bayonne and Vittoria, and the roads more difficult;

the reserve under Drouet was consequently in closer military

communication with king Joseph’s army, than the Spanish wings were

with another. The patriots were acting without concert upon double

external lines of operation, and against an enemy far superior in

quickness, knowledge, and organization, and even in numbers. The

French were superior in cavalry, and the base of their operations

rested on three great fortresses, Bayonne, St. Sebastian, and

Pampeluna; and they could in three days carry the centre and the

reserve to either flank, and unite thirty thousand combatants

without drawing a man from their garrisons. The Spaniards held

but one fortress (Zaragoza), and being disseminated in corps

under different generals of equal authority, they could execute

no combined movement with rapidity or precision, nor under any

circumstances could they unite more than 40,000 men at any given

point.

[Sidenote: Corresp^{ce}. of Captain Carrol.]

[Sidenote: Ibid.]

[Sidenote: General Broderick.]

In this situation of affairs, general Blake, his army organized

in six divisions (each five thousand strong), of which four were

numbered, and the other two called the advanced guard, and the

reserve, broke up from Reynosa on the 17th of September. One

division advanced on the side of Burgos, to cover the march of the

main body, which, threading the valley of Villarcayo, turned the

right of marshal Bessieres, and reached the Ebro. Two divisions

occupied Traspaderna and Frias, and established a post at Oña, on

the right bank of that river; a third division took a position at

Medina, and a fourth held the town of Erran and the Sierra of that

name. A fifth halted in the town of Villarcayo, to preserve the

communication with Reynosa, and at the same time, 8,000 Asturians

under general Acevedo, quitted the camp at Llanes, and advanced

to St. Ander. General Broderick now arrived in the Spanish camp;

Blake importuned him for money, and obtained it, but treated

him otherwise with great coldness, and withheld all information

relative to the movements of the army.

[Sidenote: Corresp^{ce}. of general Leith.]

[Sidenote: Journal of the king’s operations, MS.]

English vessels hovering on the coast were prepared to supply the

Biscayans with arms and ammunition, and general Blake thought

himself in a situation to revive the insurrection in that province,

and to extend it to Guipuscoa. With this view he detached his

4th division, and five guns, under the command of the marquis of

Portazgo, to attack general Monthion at Bilbao. The king getting

knowledge of the march of this division, ordered a brigade from his

right wing to fall on its flank by the valley of Orduña, and caused

general Merlin to reinforce Monthion by the valley of Durango.

Bessieres aided these dispositions by a demonstration on the side

of Frias, but the combination was made too late. Portazgo was

already master of Bilbao. Monthion retired on the 20th to Durango,

and Bessieres fell back with his corps to Miranda, Haro, and Puente

Lara, having first injured the defences of Burgos.

[Sidenote: Correspondence of gen. Leith.]

The king took post with the reserve at Vittoria. Marshal Ney

immediately abandoned his position on the Ebro, and carried his

whole force by a rapid march to Bilbao, where he arrived on the

evening of the 26th. At the same time, general Merle’s division

executed a combined movement from Miranda upon Osma and Barbaceña.

Portazgo being overmatched, occupied the heights above Bilbao,

until nightfall, and then retreated to Valmaceda, where he found

the third division, for Blake had changed his position, and now

occupied Frias with his right, Quincoes with his centre, and

Valmaceda with his left. In this situation, holding the passes of

the mountain, he awaited the arrival of the Asturians, who were

marching by the valley of Villarcayo. All the Spanish artillery

remained in the town of that name, being guarded by a division of

infantry. Thus the second effort to raise Biscay failed of success.

[Sidenote: Journal of the king’s operations. MS.]

[Sidenote: Ibid.]

In the mean time, O’Neil, following colonel Doyle’s plan before

mentioned, entered Sanguessa, and was beaten out of it again, with

the loss of two guns. However, the Castillian army approached

the Ebro by the road of Soria. General La-Peña occupied Logroña,

Nalda, and Najera. Llamas and Caro occupied Corella, Cascante,

and Calahorra, and O’Neil took post in the mountains, on the left

bank of the Aragon facing Sanguessa. The peasantry of the valleys

assembled in considerable numbers, and the country between Zaragoza

and the Aragon river appeared to be filled with troops. Marshal

Moncey withdrew from the Ebro, and took a position, with his left

flank at the pass of Sanguessa, his centre at Falces, and his right

at Estella. Ney, leaving Merlin with three thousand men at Bilbao,

returned to the Ebro; but finding that Logroña was occupied in

force by the Spaniards, halted at Guardia on the 5th of October,

and remained in observation.

[Sidenote: Journal of the king’s operations. MS.]

On the 4th the king and Bessieres, at the head of Mouton’s and

Merle’s divisions, quitted Miranda, and advanced along the road

of Osma, with the intention of feeling for Blake on the side of

Frias and Medina, but the Spaniards were in force at Valmaceda.

Joseph, deceived by false information, imagined that they were

again in march towards Bilbao, and pushed on to Lodio, with

the intention of attacking Blake during his movement. At Lodio

the king ascertained the truth and halted. He was uneasy about

Moncey, and therefore returned to Murquia on the 7th. In that

town he left Merle to protect the rear of the troops at Bilbao,

and proceeded to Miranda with the division of Mouton. On the

12th, Blake, still intent upon the insurrection of Biscay, placed

a division at Orduña, and attacked Bilbao with fifteen thousand

men. Merlin retired fighting up the valley of Durango as far as

Zornosa, but being joined there by general Verdier, at the head

of six battalions, he turned and checked the pursuit. At this

time the leading columns of the great French army were passing

the Spanish frontier, and Laval’s division advanced to Durango.

Sebastiani, with six thousand men, relieved Merle at Murquia; the

latter repaired to Miranda, and Verdier returned to Vittoria.

Marshal Lefebre, duke of Dantzic, assumed the command of the three

divisions posted at Durango.

[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers.]

[Sidenote: Vindication of Castaños.]

On the Spanish side, the marquis of Romana’s division disembarked

on the 9th at St. Ander, and being completely equipped and provided

from the English stores, the infantry, eight thousand in number,

proceeded by slow marches to join Blake. The Asturians halted

at Villarcayo; but the Estremaduran army, under the conde de

Belvedere, was put in motion, and the Castillian forces arrived

upon the Ebro. The first and third divisions of the Andalusian army

were on the march from La Mancha, and Castaños, quitting Madrid,

proceeded towards Tudela. All things announced the approach of a

great crisis. Yet such was the apathy of the supreme junta, that

the best friends of Spain hoped for a defeat, as the only mode of

exciting sufficient energy in the government to save the state,

and by some it was thought, that even that sharp remedy would be

insufficient. A momentary excitement was, however, caused by the

intercepted letter to Jourdan before spoken of. The troops in the

second line were ordered to proceed to the Ebro by forced marches,

letters were written pressing for the advance of the British army,

and Castaños was enjoined to drive the enemy, without delay, beyond

the frontier; but this sudden fury of action ended with those

orders. Sir David Baird’s corps was detained in the transports at

Coruña, waiting for permission to land; no assistance was afforded

to sir John Moore, and although the subsidies already paid by

England amounted to ten millions of dollars, and that Madrid was

rich, and willing to contribute to the exigencies of the moment,

the central junta, although complaining of the want of money, would

not be at the trouble of collecting patriotic gifts, and left the

armies “to all the horrors of famine, nakedness, and misery.” The

natural consequence of such folly and wickedness ensued; the people

ceased to be enthusiastic, and the soldiers deserted in crowds.

[Sidenote: General Broderick’s Letter. Par^y. Pap^s.]

[Sidenote: Birch’s Letters to Leith. MS.]

The conduct of the generals was scarcely less extraordinary.

Blake had voluntarily commenced the campaign without magazines,

and without any plan, except that of raising the provinces of

Biscay and Guipuscoa. With the usual blind confidence of a

Spaniard, he pressed forward, ignorant of the force or situation

of his adversaries, never dreaming of a defeat, and so little

experienced in the detail of command, that he calculated upon the

ordinary quantity of provision contained in an English frigate,

which cruised off the coast, as a resource for his army, if the

country should fail to supply him with subsistence. His artillery

had only seventy rounds for each gun, his men were without great

coats, many without shoes, and the snow was beginning to fall

in the mountains. That he was able to make any impression is a

proof that king Joseph possessed little military talent: the

French marshals, from the habitude of war, were able to baffle

Blake without difficulty, but the stratagetical importance of the

valley of Orduña they did not appreciate, or he would have been

destroyed. The lesson given by Napoleon, when he defeated Wurmser

in the valley of the Brenta, might have been repeated, under more

favourable circumstances, at Orduña and Durango; but if genius was

asleep with the French, it was dead with the Spaniards.

As long as Blake remained between Frias and Valmaceda his position

was tolerably secure from an attack, because the Montagna St.

Ander is exceedingly rugged, and the line of retreat by Villacayo

was open; but he was cooped up in a corner, and ill-placed for

offensive movements, which were the only operations he thought

of. Instead of occupying Burgos, and repairing the citadel, he

descended on Bilbao with the bulk of his army, thereby discovering

his total ignorance of war; for several great valleys, the upper

parts of which were possessed by the French, met near that town,

and it was untenable. The flank of his army was exposed to an

attack from the side of Orduña, and his line of retreat was always

in the power of Bessieres. To protect his flank and rear, Blake

detached largely, but that weakened the main body without obviating

the danger, nor did he make amends for his bad dispositions by

diligence, for his movements were slow, his attacks without vigour,

and his whole conduct displayed temerity without decision, and

rashness without enterprise.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 27.]

The armies of the centre and right were not better conducted.

Castaños, having quitted Madrid on the 8th of October, arrived at

Tudela on the 17th, and on the 20th held a conference with Palafox

at Zaragoza. The aggregate of their forces did not much exceed

forty-five thousand men, of which from two to three thousand were

cavalry. Sixty pieces of artillery followed the divisions, and the

whole was posted in the following manner:

ARMY OF THE CENTRE, 27,000.

General Pignatelli, with ten thousand Castillian infantry, one

thousand five hundred cavalry, and fourteen guns, at Logroña.

General Grimarest, with the second division of Andalusia, five

thousand men, at Lodosa.

General La-Peña, with the fourth division, five thousand infantry,

at Calahorra.

The parc of artillery, and a division of infantry, four thousand,

at Centruenigo.

The remainder at Tudela and the neighbouring villages.

ARMY OF ARAGON, 18,000.

O’Neil, with seven thousand five hundred men, held Sos, Lumbar, and

Sanguessa.

Thirty miles in the rear, St. Marc occupied Exca, with five

thousand five hundred men.

Palafox, with five thousand men, remained in Zaragoza.

The Ebro rolled between these two corps. Taken as one army, their

front lines occupied two sides of an irregular triangle, of which

Tudela was the apex, and Sanguessa and Logroña the extremities of

the base. Those points being taken as the chord, the rivers Ebro

and Aragon meeting at Milagro, describe, in their double course, an

arc, the convex of which was opposed to the Spaniards. The streams

of the Ega, the Arga, and the Zidasco rivers, descending from the

Pyrenees in parallel courses, cut the chord of this arc at nearly

equal distances, and fall, the two first into the Ebro, and the

last into the Aragon. All the roads leading from Pampeluna to the

Ebro follow the course of those torrents.

Marshal Moncey’s right was at Estella on the Ega, his centre held

Falces and Tafalla on the Arga and the Zidasco, his left was in

front of Sanguessa on the Aragon. The bridges of Olite and Peralta

were secured by advanced parties, and Caparosa, where there was

another bridge, he occupied in force. In this situation he could

operate freely between the torrents, which intersected his line;

he commanded all the roads leading to the Ebro, and he could, from

Caparosa, at any moment, issue forth against the centre of the

Spanish armies. Now from Tudela to Sanguessa is fifty miles, from

Tudela to Logroña is sixty miles, but from Tudela to Caparosa is

only twelve miles of good road; wherefore, the extremities of the

Spanish line were above one hundred miles, or six days’ march from

each other, while a single day would have sufficed to unite the

French within two hours’ march of the centre.

[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Papers.]

[Sidenote: Colonel Graham’s Correspondence.]

[Sidenote: Ibid.]

[Sidenote: Col. Doyle’s Correspondence.]

The weakness of the Spaniards’ position is apparent. If Palafox,

crossing the Aragon at Sanguessa, advanced towards Pampeluna,

Moncey would be on his left flank and rear; if he turned against

Moncey, the garrison of Pampeluna would fall upon his right. If

Castaños, to favour the attack of Palafox, crossed the Ebro at

Logroña, Ney, being posted at Guardia, was ready to take him in

flank; if the two wings endeavoured to unite, their line of march

was liable to be intercepted at Tudela by Moncey, and the rear of

Castaños attacked by Ney, who could pass the Ebro at Logroña or

Lodosa. If they remained stationary, they might easily be beaten

in detail. Any other than Spanish generals would have been filled

with apprehension on such an occasion. But Palafox and Castaños,

heedless of their own danger, tranquilly proceeded to arrange a

plan of offensive operations singularly absurd. They agreed that

the army of the centre, leaving a division at Lodosa and another

at Calahorra, should make a flank march to the right, and take a

position along the Aragon, the left to be at Tudela, the right at

Sanguessa; that is, with less than twenty thousand men to occupy

fifty miles of country close to a powerful enemy. In the meantime,

Palafox, with the Aragonese, crossing the river at Sanguessa, was

to extend in an oblique line to Roncesvalles, covering the valleys

of Talay, Escay, and Roncal, with his centre, and reinforcing his

army by the armed inhabitants, who were ready to flock to his

standard. Blake was invited to operate, in combination with them,

by Guipuscoa, and to pass in the rear of the whole French army, so

as to unite with Palafox, and thus cut off the enemy’s retreat into

France, and intercept his reinforcements at the same time.

[Sidenote: S. Journal of the king’s operations, MS.]

Castaños returned to Tudela on the 23d, and proceeded to Logroña

on the 25th; the grand movement being to commence on the 27th.

But on the 21st, Grimarest had pushed forward strong detachments

across the Ebro to Mendavia, Andosilla, Sesma, and Carcur, and

one over the Ega to Lerim. The Castillian outposts also occupied

Viana on the left bank of the Ebro. The Aragonese divisions were

already closing upon Sanguessa, and a multitude of peasants crowded

to the same place in the hope of obtaining arms and ammunition.

Moncey, deceived by this concourse of persons, estimated the force

in Sanguessa at twenty thousand, when, in fact, it was only eight

thousand regular troops. His report, and the simultaneous movements

of the Spaniards on both extremities, made the king to apprehend a

triple attack from Logroña, Lodosa, and Sanguessa. He immediately

reinforced Ney with a division (Merlin’s) of Bessieres’ corps, and

directed him to clear the left bank of the Ebro, while a second

division (Bonnet’s) of Bessieres descended the right bank from Haro

to Briones. A division of Moncey’s corps, stationed at Estella,

received orders to follow the course of the Ega, and second Ney’s

operations; and a part of the garrison of Pampeluna, posted at

Montreal and Salinas, was commanded to advance upon Nardues, and

make a demonstration against Sanguessa.

[Illustration: _Explanatory Sketch_ of the FRENCH & SPANISH

POSITIONS _the 26^{th} Oct^r. 1808_.

_London. Published March 1828, by John Murray, Albermarle Street._]

[Sidenote: Whittingham’s Correspondence. MS.]

[Sidenote: Colonel Graham’s Correspondence. MS.]

[Sidenote: Ibid.]

When Castaños arrived at Logroña these operations were in full

activity. Ney had advanced on the 24th, driven back the Castillian

outposts, crowned the height opposite that town on the 25th, and

was cannonading the Spaniards’ position. On the 26th, he renewed

his fire briskly until twelve o’clock, at which time Castaños,

after giving Pignatelli strict orders to defend his post unless

he was turned by a force descending the right bank of the Ebro,

proceeded himself to Lodosa and Calahorra. As the road winded by

the river, the Spanish general was exposed to the fire of light

troops posted in a wood on the opposite side, but escaped without

injury. Meanwhile the French from Estella falling down the Ega,

drove the Spanish parties out of Mendavia, Andosilla, Carcur, and

Sesma; and Grimarest retired from Lodosa to La Torre with such

precipitation, that he left colonel Cruz, a valuable officer,

with a light battalion, and some volunteers, at Lerim. A

squadron of cavalry escaped, but Cruz, with the infantry, being

surrounded in a convent, was, after a creditable resistance, taken.

Pignatelli, regardless of Castaños’ orders, retired from Logroña,

and abandoned all his guns at the foot of the Sierra de Nalda, only

a few miles from the enemy, then crossing the mountains gained

Centruenigo in such disorder, that his men continued to arrive for

twenty-four hours consecutively. On the right, O’Neil skirmished

with the garrison of Pampeluna, and lost six men killed, and eight

wounded; but, in the Spanish fashion, announced, that, after a

hard action of many hours, the enemy was completely overthrown.

On the 27th, Merlin’s division rejoined Bessieres at Miranda, and

Bonnet, retiring from Briones, took post in front of Pancorbo.

Castaños, incensed at the ill conduct of the Castillians, dismissed

Pignatelli, and incorporated his troops with the Andalusian

divisions. Fifteen hundred men of the latter, commanded by the

Conde de Cartoajal, being sent back to Nalda, recovered the lost

guns, and brought them safe to Centruenigo.

[Sidenote: Castaños’ Vindication.]

[Sidenote: Colonel Graham’s Correspondence. MS.]

[Sidenote: Whittingham’s Correspondence. MS.]

Internal dissensions succeeded to external troubles. Palafox

arrogantly censured Castaños, and a cabal, of which general

Coupigny appears to have been the principal mover, was formed

against the latter. The junta, exasperated that Castaños had not

already driven the enemy beyond the frontier, encouraged his

traducers, and circulated slanderous accusations themselves, as

if his inaction alone enabled the French to remain in Spain. Don

Francisco Palafox, brother of the captain-general, and a member

of the supreme junta, was sent to head-quarters avowedly to

facilitate, but really to interfere with, and control the military

operations. He arrived at Alfaro on the 29th, accompanied by

Coupigny and the conde de Montijo, a turbulent, factious man,

shallow and vain, but designing and unprincipled. Castaños waited

upon the representative of the government, and laid before him the

denuded state of the army, and the captain-general, Palafox, coming

up from Zaragoza, a council of war was held at Tudela on the 5th of

November. The rough manner in which the troops were driven from the

left bank of the Ebro was not sufficient to divert the attention

of the Spanish generals from the grand project of gaining the rear

of the French army. The council agreed to persevere, although

certain advice was received that the enemy were strengthened by

thirty thousand fresh men. Deeming it, however, fitting, that Blake

should act the first, it was resolved to await his time, but, as an

intermediate operation, it was agreed that the army of the centre,

leaving six thousand men at Calahorra, and a garrison at Tudela,

should cross the Ebro and attack Caparosa. French parties were,

however, pushed as far as Voltierra, and in the skirmishes which

ensued, the conduct of the Castillian battalions was discreditable.

[Sidenote: Ibid.]

Joseph Palafox returned to Zaragoza, and the deputy separated

himself from Castaños. The loss sustained by desertion and the

previous combats was considerable, but some Murcian levies, and a

part of the first and third Andalusian divisions joined the army

of the centre, which now mustered twenty-six thousand infantry,

and nearly three thousand cavalry under arms, with fifty or sixty

pieces of artillery. The positions of the army extended from

Calahorra, by Haro, to Tudela. La-Peña held the first town with

five thousand men; Grimarest and Caro commanded eight thousand

at the second; and head-quarters, with thirteen thousand five

hundred men, were fixed in the last. Cartoajal remained with eleven

hundred in the Sierra de Nalda, and eight hundred were posted at

Ansejo.

[Sidenote: Graham’s Correspondence. MS.]

[Sidenote: Castaños’ Vindication].

[Sidenote: Graham’s Correspondence. MS.]

In pursuance of the plan arranged, the troops were in movement to

cross the Ebro, when despatches from Blake announced that he had

met with some disaster on the 31st, the extent of which he did not

communicate. This news arrested the attack; and the preposterous

transactions that ensued, resembled the freaks of Caligula rather

than the operations of real war. First, it was arranged that the

army should abandon Tudela, and take a position in two lines,

the extremities of the one to rest on Calahorra and Amedo, the

second to extend from Alfaro to Fitero. The deputy ordered O’Neil,

with the army of Aragon, to occupy the latter of these lines

forthwith, but O’Neil refused to stir without instructions from

the captain-general. This was on the 9th, on the 10th the plan was

changed. Castaños fixed his head-quarters at Centruenigo, and the

deputy proposed that O’Neil should descend the right bank of the

Aragon river, and attack Caparosa in the rear; that the troops in

Tudela should attack it in front; and that a division should make

a demonstration of passing the Ebro in boats, opposite to Milagro,

in order to favour this attack. Castaños assented. On the 12th a

division assembled opposite Milagro, and La-Peña with two divisions

marched against Caparosa. Suddenly, the whimsical deputy sent

them orders to repair to Lodosa, forty miles higher up the Ebro,

and attack the bridge at that place, while Grimarest crossing in

the boats at Calahorra, should ascend the left bank of the Ebro,

and take it in rear. La-Peña and Villarcayo, confounded by this

change, wrote to Castaños for an explanation. This was the first

intimation that the latter, who was lying sick at Centruenigo,

received of the altered dispositions. He directed his lieutenants

to obey; but being provoked beyond endurance, wrote sharply to the

junta, demanding to know who was to command the army; and after

all this insolence and vapouring on the part of Francisco Palafox,

no operation took place at all. He declared, that his intention

was merely to make a demonstration, ordered the troops to their

quarters, and then, without assigning any reason, deprived La-Peña

of his command, and appointed Cartoajal in his place.

[Sidenote: Vindication of Castaños.]

It was at this time that sir John Moore’s letter arrived; but

Castaños, no longer master of his own operations, could ill concert

a plan of campaign with the general of another army. He could not

even tell what troops were to be at his nominal disposal; for the

Estremaduran force, originally destined for his command, was now

directed by the junta upon Burgos, and the remainder of his own

first and third division was detained in Madrid. His enemies,

especially Montijo, were active in spreading reports to his

disadvantage; the deserters scattered over the country declared

that all the generals were traitors, and the people of the towns

and villages, deceived by the central junta, and excited by false

rumours, respected neither justice nor government, and committed

the most scandalous excesses.

Blake’s situation was not more prosperous.

The road from Bayonne to Vittoria was encumbered with the advancing

columns of the great French army. An imperial decree, issued early

in September, commanded that the troops already in Spain should

be incorporated with the grand army then marching from Germany.

The united forces were to compose eight divisions, called “Corps

d’Armée,” an institution analogous to the Roman legion, because

each “Corps d’Armée,” although adapted to act with facility as

a component part of a large army, was also provided with light

cavalry, a parc, and train of artillery, engineers, sappers, and

miners, and a complete civil administration, to enable it to take

the field as an independent force. The imperial guards and the

heavy cavalry of the army were not included in this arrangement;

the first had a constitution of their own, and at this time all the

heavy cavalry, and all the artillery, not attached to the “Corps

d’Armée,” were formed into a large reserve. As the columns arrived

in Spain, they were united to the troops already there, and the

whole was disposed conformably to the new organization.

Marshal Victor, duke of Belluno, commanded the first corps.

Marshal Bessieres, duke of Istria second corps.

Marshal Moncey, duke of Cornegliano third corps.

Marshal Lefebre, duke of Dantzic fourth corps.

Marshal Mortier, duke of Treviso fifth corps.

Marshal Ney, duke of Elchingen sixth corps.

General St. Cyr seventh corps.

General Junot, duke of Abrantes eighth corps.

[Sidenote: S. Journal of the king’s operations, MS.]

The seventh corps was appropriated to Catalonia; the remainder were

in the latter end of October assembled or assembling in Navarre and

Biscay. General Merlin, with a division, held Zornosa, and observed

Blake, who remained tranquilly at Bilbao. Two divisions of the

fourth corps occupied Durango and the neighbouring villages. One

division and the light cavalry of the first corps was at Vittoria,

a second division of the same corps guarded the bridge of Murguia

on the river Bayas, and commanded the entrance to the valley of

Orduña. Haro, Puente Lara, Miranda, and Pancorbo were maintained

by the infantry of the king’s body guard and the second corps, and

the light cavalry of the latter covered the plains close up to

Briviesca.

The reinforcements were daily crowding up to Vittoria, and the

king, restrained by the emperor’s orders to a rigorous system

of defence, occupied himself with the arrangements attendant on

such an immense accumulation of force, and left Blake in quiet

possession of Bilbao. The latter mistook this apparent inactivity

for timidity; he was aware that reinforcements, in number equal

to his whole army, had joined the enemy; but, with wonderful

rashness, he resolved to press forward, and readily agreed to

attempt a junction with Palafox, in the rear of the French

position. At this time Romana’s infantry were approaching Bilbao,

and the Estremadurans were in march for Burgos; but the country

was nearly exhausted of provisions; both armies felt the scarcity,

and desertion prevailed among the Spaniards. The Biscayans, twice

abandoned, were fearful of a third insurrection. Prudence dictated

a retreat towards Burgos. Blake resolved to advance.

[Sidenote: Carrol’s Correspondence.]

[Sidenote: Brodrick’s Correspondence.]

Having posted general Acevedo with the Asturians and the second

division at Orduña, he left a battalion at Miravelles, to preserve

the communication with Bilbao, and the 24th of October marched

himself at the head of seventeen thousand fighting men, divided in

three columns, to attack Zornosa. The right ascended the valley

of Durango by Galdacano, the centre by Larabezua, the left by

Rigoytia; at the same time general Acevedo penetrated through the

mountains of Gorbea by Ozoco and Villaro, with a view to seize

Manares and St. Antonia d’Urquitiola. It was intended by this

operation to cut the communication between Miranda on the Ebro,

and the town of Durango, and thus to intercept the retreat of

marshal Ney, and oblige him to surrender with sixteen thousand men;

for Blake was utterly ignorant of his adversary’s position, and

imagined that he had only two corps to deal with. He believed that

the king, with one, was in his front at Durango and Mont Dragon,

and that Ney, with the other, was at Miranda, when in fact, the

latter was at that moment attacking Pignatelli at Logroña. As the

Spanish army approached Zornosa, Merlin abandoned the town, and

drew up on some heights in the rear. Bad weather, and the want

of provisions, checked further operations until the 25th. On the

evening of that day, the Spanish division at Rigoytia attempted to

turn the right flank of the French. At the same time Blake marched

against the centre and left, and Merlin fell back to Durango.

[Sidenote: S. Journal of the king’s operations, MS.]

The duke of Dantzic, alarmed by these movements, concentrated his

whole force, consisting of two divisions of infantry (Sebastiani’s

and Laval’s), and a Dutch brigade at Durango; his third division

(Valence’s) being yet in France. The king reinforced him with a

division of the first corps (Villatte’s), and ordered Merlin’s

troops, which were composed of detachments, to join their

respective regiments. From the 25th to the 30th the armies

remained quiet; but at day-break on the 31st, the Spaniards were

formed in order of battle, five miles beyond Zornosa, and close

to the enemy’s position. The vanguard drew up across the road to

Durango; the reserve at some distance in the rear. The third and

fourth divisions occupied the intermediate space, so disposed as

to outflank the others, in a chequer shape. The first division

occupied a height on the left of the road, and behind the reserve.

[Sidenote: Ibid.]

[Sidenote: Carrol’s Correspondence.]

The duke of Dantzic, apprised by the previous movements, that

he was going to be attacked, became impatient; the state of the

atmosphere prevented him from discovering the order of march, or

the real force of the Spaniards; he knew that Blake had the power

of uniting nearly fifty thousand men, and concluding that such a

force was in his front, he resolved to anticipate his adversaries

by a sudden and vigorous assault. In fact, the Spanish generals

were so little guided by the rules of war, that before their

incapacity was understood, their very errors being too gross for

belief contributed to their safety. Blake had commenced a great

offensive movement, intending to beat the troops in his front, and

to cut off and capture Ney’s corps of sixteen thousand men. In six

days, although unopposed, he advanced less than fifteen miles, and

so disposed his forces, that out of thirty-six thousand men, he

concentrated only seventeen thousand infantry, without artillery,

upon the field of battle!

[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.]

[Sidenote: Leith’s Correspondence. MS.]

The duke of Dantzic, at the head of twenty-five thousand men,

formed in three columns of attack, descended the heights of

Durango. A thick fog covering the mountain sides, filled all the

valleys; and a few random shots alone indicated the presence of the

hostile armies. Suddenly Villatte’s division appeared close to the

Spanish vanguard; and with a brisk onset forced it back upon the

third division. Sebastiani’s and Leval’s followed in succession; a

fire of artillery, to which Blake could make no reply, opened along

the road: the day cleared, and the Spanish army, heaped in confused

masses, was, notwithstanding the example of personal courage given

by Blake, and the natural strength of the country, driven from one

position to another. At mid-day it was beyond Zornosa, and at three

o’clock in full flight for Bilbao, which place it gained in a state

of great confusion during the night. The next day Blake crossed

the Salcedon, and took a position at Nava. The duke of Dantzic

pursued as far as Guenes, and then leaving general Villatte, with

seven thousand men, to observe the enemy, returned to Bilboa.

Twelve vessels, laden with English stores, were in the river, but

contrived to escape.

[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.]

The king was displeased with the precipitancy of marshal Lefebre,

but endeavoured to profit from the result. The division of the

first corps, stationed at Murguia, was ordered to descend the

valley of Orduña, as far as Amurio, to aid the operations of the

fourth corps. At the same time, Mouton’s division was detached from

the second corps towards Barbareña, from whence it was, according

to circumstances, either to join the troops in the valley of

Orduña, or to watch Medina and Quincoes, and press Blake in his

retreat, if he retired by Villarcayo. The French were ignorant

of the situation of general Acevedo. On the day of the action at

Zornosa, that general was at Villaro, from whence he endeavoured

to rejoin Blake, by marching to Valmaceda. He reached Miravalles,

in the valley of Orduña, on the 3d, at the moment when the head

of the French troops coming from Murguia appeared in sight. After

a slight skirmish, the latter thinking they had to deal with the

whole of Blake’s army, retired to Orduña, and Acevedo immediately

pushed for the Salcedon river. Villatte first got notice of his

march, and dividing his own troops, posted one half at Orantia, on

the road leading from Miravalles to Nava, the other on the road to

Valmaceda, thus intercepting the line of retreat.

[Sidenote: Captain Carrol.]

Blake, who was informed of Acevedo’s danger, in the night of the

4th, with great decision and promptitude, instantly passed the

bridge of Nava, and at daybreak crowned the heights of Orantia

with three divisions, meaning to fall suddenly upon the French;

but they were aware of his intention, and sending a detachment

to occupy Gordujuela, a pass in the mountains, leading to Bilbao,

rejoined Villatte on the Valmaceda road. Five Spanish divisions and

some of Romania’s troops were now assembled at Orantia: Blake left

two in reserve, detached one against Gordujuela, and marched with

the other two against the French position. Villatte was overpowered

and driven across the Salcedon; but rallied on the left bank and

renewed the action. At this moment Acevedo appeared in sight; he

sent two battalions by a circuit to gain the rear of the French,

and with the remainder joined in the combat. Villatte retired

fighting, and encountering the two battalions in his retreat, broke

through them, and reached Guenes, but not without considerable

loss of men, and he also left one gun and part of his baggage in

the hands of the Spaniards. Thus ended a series of operations and

combats, which had lasted for eleven days.

[Illustration: _Explanatory Sketch_ of BLAKE’S POSITION _at the

Battle of Zornoza_.

_London. Published March 1828, by John Murray, Albermarle Street._]

OBSERVATIONS.

1º. The duke of Dantzic’s attack at Zornosa was founded upon

false data; it was inconsistent with the general plan of the

campaign, hasty, ill-combined, and feebly followed up. It was an

unpardonable fault to leave Villatte without support, close to an

army that had met with no signal defeat, and that was five times

his strength. The march of Victor’s division was too easily checked

at Miravalles. For five days, general Acevedo, with at least eight

thousand men, was wandering unmolested in the midst of the French

columns, and finally escaped without any extraordinary effort.

2º. General Blake’s dispositions, with the exception of his

night-march from Nava to Orantia, will, if studied, afford

useful lessons in an inverse sense. From the 24th of October to

the 4th of November, he omitted no error that the circumstances

rendered it possible to commit; and then, as if ashamed of the

single judicious movement that occurred, he would not profit by

it. Romana’s infantry being partly arrived, and the remainder in

the vicinity of Nava, the whole Spanish army was, contrary to all

reasonable expectation, concentrated; Blake had then above thirty

thousand fighting men united in one mass, harassed, but not much

discouraged, and the conde de Belvedere, with twelve thousand

infantry, twelve hundred cavalry, and thirty pieces of artillery,

was close to Burgos.

If Blake had been at all acquainted with the principles of his

art, he would have taken advantage of Villatte’s retreat, to

march by Espinosa, and Villarcayo, to the upper Ebro; from thence

have gained Burgos; brought up the artillery from Reynosa; united

Belvedere’s troops to his own; opened a communication with the

English army; and in that position, with a plentiful country behind

him, his retreat open, and his army provided with cavalry, he might

have commenced a regular system of operations; but with incredible

obstinacy and want of judgment, he determined to attack Bilbao

again, and to renew the ridiculous attempt to surround the French

army and unite with Palafox at the foot of the Pyrenees.

[Sidenote: Lord W. Bentinck’s Correspondence.]

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, Sect. 8.]

Such were the commanders, the armies, the rulers, upon whose

exertions the British cabinet relied for the security of sir John

Moore’s troops, during their double march from Lisbon and Coruña.

It was in such a state of affairs that the English ministers,

anticipating the speedy and complete destruction of the French

forces in Spain, were sounding the trumpet for an immediate

invasion of France! Of France, defended by a million of veteran

soldiers, and governed by the mightiest genius of two thousand

years! As if the vast military power of that warlike nation had

suddenly become extinct; as if Baylen were a second Zama, and

Hannibal flying to Adrumetum instead of passing the Iberus! But

Napoleon, with an execution more rapid than other men’s thoughts,

was already at Vittoria, and his hovering eagles cast a gloomy

shadow over Spain.

BOOK IV.

CHAPTER I.

[Sidenote: S. Journal of the king’s operations, MS.]

After the opening of the legislative sessions, the emperor

quitted Paris, and repaired to Bayonne. He arrived there on the

3d of November. It was his intention that the presumption of the

Spanish generals should be encouraged by a strict defensive system

until the moment, when the blow he was prepared to strike, could

fall with the greatest effect. The precipitate attack at Zornosa

displeased him, and he was also dissatisfied with the subsequent

measures of the king. He thought that the safety of Mouton’s

division would be compromised between the armies of Blake and the

conde de Belvedere. To prevent any accident, he judged it necessary

that Bessieres should advance with the whole of the second corps to

Burgos; that marshal Victor should march by Amurio to Valmaceda;

and that marshal Le-Febre should immediately renew his attack on

that position, from the side of Bilbao. These dispositions were

executed, and thus at the very moment when Blake was leading his

harassed and starving troops back to Bilbao, two corps, amounting

to fifty thousand men, were in full march to meet him, and a third

had already turned his right flank, and was on his rear.

[Sidenote: Captain Carrol’s Corresp^{ce}.]

[Sidenote: General Leith’s Corresp^{ce}.]

The Spanish general advanced from Valmaceda on the 7th, and

thinking that only fifteen hundred men were in Guenes, prepared to

surround them. Two divisions making a circuit to the left, passed

through Abellana and Sopoerte, with a view to gain the bridge of

Sodupe, in the rear of Guenes, while two other divisions attacked

that position in front; the remainder of the army followed at

some distance. The advanced guard of the 4th corps was in Guenes,

and after an action of two hours, the Spaniards were thrown into

confusion; but the night saved them from a total rout. The same

day, one of their flanking divisions was encountered and beaten

near Sopoerte, and the retreat of the other being intercepted on

the side of Abellana, it was forced to make for Portagalete on

the sea-coast, and from thence to St. Andero. Blake’s eyes being

now opened a little to the peril of his situation, he resolved to

retreat to Espinosa de los Monteros, a strong mountain position,

two days’ march in the rear; intending to rest his troops there,

and to draw supplies from the magazines at Reynosa. Retreating

during the night to Valmaceda, he gained Nava on the 8th, and

finally reached Espinosa on the 9th. The remainder of Romana’s

infantry came up during this retreat, and the whole army was, with

the exception of the division cut off at Abellana, concentrated in

a strong position, which covered the intersection of the roads from

St. Andero, Villarcayo, and Reynosa.

Napoleon, accompanied by the dukes of Dalmatia and Montebello,

quitted Bayonne the morning of the 8th, and reached Vittoria in

the evening. He was met by the civil and military chiefs at the

gates of the town; but refusing to go to the house prepared for his

reception, he jumped off his horse, entered the first small inn

that he observed, and calling for his maps, and a report of the

situation of the armies on both sides, proceeded to study the plan

of his campaign.

The first and fourth corps, after uniting at Valmaceda, had

separated again at Nava on the 9th, Victor pursuing the track of

Blake, and Lefebre marching upon Villarcayo by Medina. The second

corps was concentrating at Briviesca, the third corps occupied

Tafalla, Peraltes, Caparosa, and Estrella. The sixth corps, the

guards, and the reserve, were distributed from Vittoria to Miranda,

and a division, under the command of general La Grange, was at

Guardia, connecting the positions of the third and sixth corps. The

fifth corps was still behind the frontier, and the eighth composed

of the troops, removed from Portugal by the convention of Cintra,

was marching from the French sea-ports, where it had disembarked.

On the Spanish side, the conde de Belvedere was at Burgos, Castaños

and Palafox, unknowing of their danger, were planning to cut off

the French army, and Blake was flying to Espinosa. The English army

were scattered from Coruña to Talavera de la Reyna.

[Sidenote: S. Marshal Soult’s Operations, MSS.]

In two hours the emperor had arranged his plans. Moncey was

directed to leave a division in front of Pampeluna, to observe

the Spaniards on the Aragon, to concentrate the remainder of the

third corps at Lodosa, and to remain on the defensive until further

orders. Lagrange was reinforced by Colbert’s brigade of light

cavalry from the sixth corps, and directed upon Logroña. The first

and fourth corps were to press Blake without intermission. The

sixth to march towards Aranda de Douero. The duke of Dalmatia was

appointed to command the 2d corps, and ordered to fall headlong

upon the conde de Belvedere. The emperor, with the imperial guards

and the reserve, followed the movement of the second corps.

These instructions being issued, the enormous mass of the French

army was put in motion with a celerity that marked the vigour of

Napoleon’s command. Marshal Soult having departed on the instant

for Briviesca, arrived there at day-break on the 9th, received

the second corps from the hands of Bessieres, and in a few hours,

the divisions composing it were in full march for the terrace of

Monasterio, which overlooks the plains of Burgos. Head-quarters

were established there, and, during the night, general Franceschi’s

brigade of light cavalry took the road of Zaldueño to Arlanzon,

having orders to cross the river of that name, and descending the

left bank, to cut the communication of the Spaniards with Madrid,

and to prevent them from rallying at the convent of the Chartreuse,

if defeated near Burgos.

[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.]

At four o’clock on the morning of the 10th, the French were in

march from Monasterio, and at six o’clock general Lassalle’s

cavalry reached Villa Fria. The conde de Belvedere, being informed

of their approach, posted the Spanish army at Gamonal, and taking

four thousand infantry, eight guns, and the whole of his cavalry,

fell upon Lassalle. The latter skirmished for a while, and then

following his orders, retired slowly to Rio Bena. At eight

o’clock, the French infantry, which had advanced by two roads, was

reunited at this town, and immediately pushed forward on Villa

Fria. Belvedere was soon driven back upon Gamonal, and the Spanish

army was discovered in line of battle. The right occupied a wood,

leaving a clear space of some extent between it and the river

Arlazon. The left was posted in the walled park of Vellimer. Thirty

pieces of artillery covered the front, and seven or eight thousand

armed peasants were arrayed on the heights, immediately behind

the regular troops. These latter amounted to eleven thousand one

hundred and fifty infantry, and eleven hundred and fifty cavalry,

following a field state of their numbers, found after the action.

This was the best army at that time in Spain; it was composed of

the Walloon and Spanish guards, the regiments of Mayorca, Zafra,

and Valencia de Alcantara; the hussars of Valencia, the royal

carbineers, and some volunteers of good families. It was completely

equipped, and armed principally from the English stores; but its

resistance was even more feeble than that made by the half-famished

peasants of Blake’s force.

BATTLE OF GAMONAL.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 15.]

General Lassalle, with the light cavalry, led down upon the Spanish

right, and filled the plain between the river and the wood. At

the same moment the Spanish artillery opened along the whole of

their line, and the French infantry formed in columns of regiments

arrived. Mouton’s division, composed of old soldiers, broke at once

into the wood at a charging pace. General Bonnet followed closely,

but so rapid and effectual was the assault of Mouton’s veterans,

that Bonnet’s troops never fired a shot. The Spaniards fled in

disorder, the left wing, although not attacked, followed the

example of the right, and the whole mass, victors and vanquished,

rushed into the town of Burgos with extraordinary violence and

uproar. At the same moment, Bessieres, who retained the command

of all the heavy cavalry, passed at full gallop toward the Madrid

road, where it crosses the Arlazon, sabring the fugitives, and

taking all the guns which had escaped Mouton’s vehement attack;

and on the other side of the river, Franceschi was seen to cut in

pieces some Catalonian light troops stationed there, and to bar

all hopes of flight. Never was a defeat more instantaneous, or

more complete. Two thousand five hundred Spaniards were killed;

twenty guns, thirty ammunition waggons, six pair of colours, and

nine hundred men, were taken on the field. Four thousand musquets

were found unbroken, and the fugitives were dispersed far and

wide. Belvedere himself escaped to Lerma, where he arrived in the

evening of the day on which the battle was fought. Meeting some

battalions, principally composed of volunteers, on their march to

join his army, he retired with them to Aranda de Douero during

the night; but first, with true Spanish exaggeration, wrote a

despatch, in which he asserted, that the French were repulsed in

two desperate attacks; but that after thirteen hours hard fighting,

they succeeded in a third.

All the ammunition and stores of the Spanish army were captured in

Burgos; and the indefatigable marshal Soult, who was still upon

the post-horse, which he mounted at Briviesca; not content with

travelling from Bayonne to Burgos, taking the latter town, and

gaining a decisive victory within the space of fifty hours; now

rallied his corps, and detaching one column in pursuit on the side

of Lerma, and another towards Valencia and Valladolid, marched

himself with a third, on the very day of the battle, towards

Reynosa, where he hoped to intercept Blake’s line of retreat to the

plains of Leon.

[Sidenote: Carrol’s Corresp^{ce}.]

[Sidenote: Ibid.]

This last-mentioned general reached Espinosa, as we have seen, on

the evening of the 9th, with six divisions, including Romana’s

infantry, who also dragged with them six guns of a small calibre.

The separation of the fourth division at Abellana, the deserters,

and the losses sustained in battle, had reduced the army below

twenty-five thousand fighting men. The parc of ammunition and the

artillery, guarded by two thousand infantry, were behind Reynosa,

at Aquilar del Campo, on the road to Leon. Blake’s position was

strong, and he hoped to remain in it for some days unmolested.

His left wing, composed of the Asturians, and the first division,

occupied some heights which covered the road of St. Andero. The

centre, consisting of the third division and the reserve, formed

a line across the road of Reynosa, which led through Espinosa

directly to the rear. The second division was established on a

commanding height, a little on the right hand of the town; Romana’s

infantry were posted in a wood, two miles in advance of the right;

and the vanguard, with six guns, formed a reserve behind the centre

of the position.

BATTLE OF ESPINOSA.

At two o’clock in the afternoon of the 10th, the head of marshal

Victor’s columns drove back Romana’s infantry[18], and seized

the wood; but the Spaniards, reinforced by the third division,

renewed the combat. A second French column, however, opened its

fire upon the Spanish centre, thus weakened by the advance of the

third division; and at the same time some light troops ascending

the heights on the left, menaced that wing of Blake’s army. The

contest on the right was maintained with vigour, and the Spaniards,

supported by the fire of the six guns in their centre, appeared

to be gaining ground, when the night closed and put an end to

the action, leaving the French in possession of the wood, and of

a ridge of hills, which, at the distance of a cannon-shot, run

parallel to the centre of the position. Generals St. Roman and

Riquielmé were mortally wounded this day on the Spanish side.

At daylight the next morning, Victor, who had relieved his left

with fresh troops during the night, renewed the attack. General

Maison throwing out a cloud of skirmishers along the front of the

Spanish centre and left wing, under cover of their fire, passed

rapidly to his own right, and fell upon the Asturians and the first

division. Blake, observing this movement, detached a column of

grenadiers to reinforce the latter, and advanced in person with

three regiments from the centre to take Maison in flank during

his march. It was too late. Three Asturian generals fell at the

first fire, and the troops of that kingdom fled without waiting

for the enemy. They were soon followed by the first division, and

Maison, continuing his course without a check, intercepted the line

of retreat by St. Andero, and also that by the town of Espinosa.

In the mean time, the French troops posted on the parallel ridge

before spoken of, attacked the centre, and the division in the wood

advancing against the right of the Spaniards, their whole army gave

way in terrible confusion and distress, and crowded towards the

river Trueba, which encircled the rear of the position. Some tried

the fords, some rushed to the town, others fled to the right and

left; but the weather was bad, the roads deep, the country rugged

and difficult, and the overthrow was fatal. Those who escaped went

to their own provinces, carrying dismay into the remotest parts

of Gallicia, Asturias, Leon, and Castille. The guns, the baggage,

and ammunition, fell into the hands of the French. Blake himself

reached Reynosa on the 12th, and there rallied about seven thousand

fugitives, but without arms, without spirit, and without hope.

[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.]

The line of retreat by Aguilar del Campo, where his artillery

remained, was still open to him; and he proposed to remain at

Reynosa as long as the enemy would permit him; to restore order,

and then to retire through Leon upon sir David Baird’s division,

the head of which was now near Astorga. But his total ignorance

of the French operations and strength again misled him. He looked

only to the side of Espinosa, and already Soult’s cavalry was upon

his line of retreat, and the duke of Dantzic was hastening by

the valley of Villarcayo towards Reynosa. Upon the 13th, he was

attacked by the advanced guard of the second corps, and being now

utterly confounded, he fled with four or five thousand men through

the valley of Cabuerniga, and took refuge at Arnedo, in the heart

of the Asturian mountains. There the marquis of Romana joined him,

and assumed the command of all that remained of the unfortunate

army of the left.

[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.]

Blake being thus disposed of, the fourth French corps, after a

halt of a few days to refresh the troops, took the road of Carrion

and Valladolid; but Soult recalling his detachments, concentrated

the second corps at Reynosa, seized St. Ander, and captured a

quantity of English stores; leaving a division there under general

Bonnet, he then spread his columns over the whole of the Montagna,

pursuing, attacking, and dispersing every body of Spaniards that

yet held together, capturing their baggage, and filling all places

with alarm. After some partial actions with unconnected parties,

every thing military belonging to the patriots was driven over

the snowy barrier of the Asturian hills; and Soult having left a

detachment at St. Vincent de Barqueira, scoured the banks of the

Deba, took the town of Potes, and overrun Leon with his cavalry as

far as Sahagun and Saldaña. Meanwhile the duke of Belluno quitting

Espinosa, joined the emperor, whose head-quarters were fixed at

Burgos, after the defeat of Belvedere.

The battles of Espinosa and Gamonal, and the subsequent operations

of marshal Soult, laid the north of Spain prostrate, and secured

the whole coast from St. Sebastian to the frontier of the Asturias.

By a judicious arrangement of small garrisons, and moveable

columns, the provinces of Guipuscoa, Navarre, Biscay, and the

Baston de Laredo were fettered; the communication of the army

with France could no longer be endangered by insurrections in the

rear; and the wide and fertile plains of Old Castille and Leon

were thrown open to the French, and forbidden to the separated

divisions of the British army. These great advantages, the result

of Napoleon’s admirable combinations, the fruits of ten days of

active exertion, obtained so easily, and yet so decisive of the

fate of the campaign, prove the weakness of the system upon which

the Spanish and British governments were at this time acting; if

that can be called a system where no one general knew what another

had done--was doing--or intended to do.

[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Papers.]

Burgos, instead of Vittoria, was now become the pivot of

operations, and the right of his army being secured, the emperor

prepared to change his front, and bear down against the armies

of Castaños and Palafox, with a similar impetuosity; but it was

first necessary to ascertain the exact situation of the British

force. Napoleon believed that it was concentrated at Valladolid,

and he detached three divisions of cavalry and twenty-four

pieces of artillery, by Lerma and Palencia, with orders to cross

the Douero, to turn the flank of the English, threaten their

communications with Portugal, and thus force them to retire. It was

soon discovered that the heads of their columns had not penetrated

beyond Salamanca and Astorga, and that many days must elapse before

they could be concentrated, and in a condition to act offensively.

Certain of this fact, the emperor let loose his three divisions

of cavalry, and eight thousand horsemen sweeping over the plains,

vexed all Leon and Castille. The authorities showed no firmness;

the captain-general, Pignatelli, fled in consternation; the people

submissive and fearful, displayed no enthusiasm, and disconcerted

by the rapid movements of the French, spread a thousand confused

and contradictory reports. The incursions of the cavalry extended

to the neighbourhood of Astorga, to Benevente, Zamora, Toro,

Tordesillas, and even to the vicinity of Salamanca. Such was the

fear, or the apathy of the inhabitants, that thirty dragoons were

sufficient to raise contributions at the gates of the largest

towns; and after the overthrow of Espinosa was known, ten troopers

could safely traverse the country in any direction.

The front of the French army being now changed, the second

corps, hitherto the leading column of attack, became a corps of

observation, covering the right flank, and protecting the important

point of Burgos, where large magazines were establishing, and upon

which the reinforcements continually arriving from France were

directed. The exact situation of the other corps was as follows:

The first corps, the guards, and a part of the reserve, were

at Burgos; and Ney, with the sixth, occupied Aranda de Douero;

the march of his force from the Ebro had been made with a view

to intercept the army of Estremadura on the side of Madrid; but

the sudden destruction of that body of troops having rendered

this precaution useless, Ney was equally well placed to cut the

communication of Castaños with the capital. General Lagrange

occupied Logroña, and Moncey, with three divisions of infantry

and his light cavalry, was at Lodosa. The Spanish army of the

centre was consequently turned and cut off from Madrid even before

Castaños was aware that the campaign had commenced.

[Sidenote: Baron Larrey’s Surgical Campaigns.]

In passing the mountains near Tolosa, marshal Lasnes, duke of

Montebello, fell from his horse, and was left at Vittoria; his

hurts were dangerous, but a rapid and interesting cure being

effected by wrapping him in the skin of a sheep newly slain, the

emperor directed him to assume the command of Lagrange’s division

and Colbert’s light cavalry, to unite them with the third corps

at Lodosa, and to fall upon Castaños in front. At the same time

he ordered Ney to ascend the course of the Douero with the light

cavalry and two divisions of the sixth corps, to connect his left

with the right of Lasnes, and to gain Agreda by the road of Osma

and Soria, from whence he could intercept the retreat of Castaños,

and place himself on the rear of the Spanish army. To support this

operation, the first corps, and Latour Maubourg’s division of

heavy cavalry being drawn from the reserve, proceeded by Lerma and

Aranda, and from thence slowly followed the direction of Ney’s

march. The emperor, with the guards, and the remainder of the

reserve, continued at Burgos, the citadel was repaired and armed,

magazines were formed, and arrangements made to render it the great

dépôt of the army. All the reinforcements coming from France were

directed upon this town, and proclamations were issued assuring the

country people of protection if they would be tranquil and remain

in their houses.

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart. Lord W. Bentinck. MSS.]

[Sidenote: Ibid.]

Ten days had now elapsed since Napoleon, breaking forth from

Vittoria, had deluged the country with his troops, and each day

was marked by some advantage gained over the Spaniards; but these

misfortunes were still unknown at Tudela and disregarded at the

capital. The remnants of Belvedere’s army having rallied in the

pass of the Somosierra and on the side of Segovia, the troops

belonging to the army of the centre, which had been detained in

Madrid, were forwarded to the former place, and those left behind

from Cuesta’s levies were ordered to the latter. General St. Juan,

an officer of high reputation, took the command at the Somosierra,

general Heredia repaired to Segovia, and an intermediate camp of

detachments being formed at Sepulveda, the men thus collected were,

by the junta, magnified into a great army sufficient to protect

Madrid.

[Sidenote: Ibid.]

That the left wing of the French army was still upon the Ebro,

the central junta attributed, not to the enemy’s strength, but to

the dilatory proceedings of Castaños, and depriving him of the

command, they gave it to Romana, precisely at the moment when it

was impossible for the latter to reach the army he was to lead. The

junta wanted a battle, and, uncorrected by Blake’s destruction,

doubted not of victory.

[Sidenote: Castaños’ Vindication.]

[Sidenote: Ibid.]

[Sidenote: Colonel Graham’s Corresp^{ce}. MSS.]

The proceedings at Tudela were also worthy of the times; there the

madness of the generals, and the folly of the deputy, increased

rather than abated. The freaks of Francisco Palafox, and their

ridiculous termination on the 12th of November, I have already

related. A few days sufficed to give birth to new plans equally

absurd, but more dangerous, as the crisis approached nearer.

This time Castaños took the lead. He knew upon the 10th that the

Estremaduran army was at Burgos, and that the French were marching

on that town; from that moment, despairing of the junction of the

British army, and likewise of his own first and third divisions,

which were in Madrid, he sent orders to Belvedere to unite himself

with Blake; but his letters never reached that officer, who was

defeated before they were written, and Castaños, feeling that

he himself was in a dangerous position, and that some decided

measure was required, conceived so extraordinary a plan, that it

would be difficult to credit it upon any authority but his own.

He proposed to carry the army of the centre, reduced in numbers

and ill-disciplined as it was, by the Concha de Haro and Soria,

towards Burgos, and to fall upon the emperor’s rear guard; and,

as a preliminary step, he determined to beat the army in his

front; but Palafox had also a plan, of attacking Moncey on the

side of Sanguessa, and the first measure necessary was to combine

these double operations. It was agreed that Caparosa should be

garrisoned by four thousand infantry, that the bridge head at that

place should be fortified, and that O’Neil should be reinforced at

Sanguessa by detachments from the centre until his force amounted

to nineteen thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry. He was

then to break down the bridge, place guards at all the passages

on the Aragon, and by a flank march gain Caparosa, cross the

river, and threaten Peraltes and Olite on the 17th; but on the

18th turning suddenly to the left to get in rear of Lodosa, while

general La-Peña and Coupigny, marching from Centruenigo, should

attack Moncey in front.

[Sidenote: Ibid.]

This great movement was openly talked of at the head-quarters

of the Spanish generals for several days before its execution,

and these extraordinary commanders, who were ignorant of Blake’s

disasters, announced their intention of afterwards marching towards

Vittoria to lighten the pressure on that officer if he should be in

difficulty, or if (as his despatches of the 5th had assured them)

he was successful, then to join in a general pursuit. Castaños,

however, concealed his real project, which was to move by the

Concha de Haro towards Burgos.

[Sidenote: Ibid.]