If sir Arthur Wellesley had adopted the first line of operations,

his subsistence must have been drawn by convoys from the Mondego,

the enemy’s numerous cavalry would have cut his communications,

and in that state he would have had to retreat, or to force the

positions of Alhandra, Alverca, and finally the heights of Bellas,

a strong position the right flank of which was covered by the

creek of Saccavem, and the left flank by the impassable Sierra

dos Infiernos. On the other line Torres Vedras was to be carried,

and then Mafra or Montechique, following the direction of Junot’s

retreat. If Mafra was forced (and neither it nor Montechique could

be turned), a line of march, by Cassim and Quelus, upon Lisbon

would have been opened to the victors; but that route, besides

being longer than the road through Montechique and Loures, would,

while it led the English army equally away from the fleet, have

entangled it among the fortresses of Ereceira, Sant Antonio,

Cascaes, St. Julians, and Belem. Again, supposing the position of

Montechique to be stormed, the heights of Bellas offered a third

line of defence, and lastly, the citadel and forts of Lisbon itself

would have sufficed to cover the passage of the river, and a

retreat upon Elvas would have been secure.

Thus it is certain, that difficulties of the most serious nature

awaited the English army while acting on a single line of

operations; and the double line proposed by sir Arthur was strictly

scientific. For if sir John Moore, disembarking at the Mondego,

had marched first to Santarem and then to Saccavem, he would have

turned the positions of Torres Vedras and Montechique, and then sir

Arthur on the other side would have turned the heights of Bellas

by the road of Quelus. Junot’s central situation could not in this

case have availed him, because the distance between the British

corps would be more than a day’s march, and their near approach

to Lisbon would have caused an insurrection of the populace. The

duke of Abrantes must either have abandoned that capital and fallen

vigorously upon sir John Moore, with a view to overwhelm him and

gain Almeida or Elvas, or he must have concentrated his forces,

and been prepared to cross the Tagus if he lost a battle in front

of Lisbon. In the first case, the strength of the country afforded

Moore every facility for a successful resistance, and sir Arthur’s

corps would have quickly arrived upon the rear of the French. In

the second case, Junot would have had to fight superior numbers,

with an inveterate populace in his rear, and if, fearing the result

of such an encounter he had crossed the Tagus, and pushed for

Elvas, sir John Moore’s division could likewise have crossed the

river, and harassed the French in their retreat.

[Sidenote: Captain Poulteney Malcolm’s Evidence. Court of Inquiry.]

2º. The above reasoning being correct, it follows, that to

re-embark sir John Moore’s army after it had landed at the Mondego,

and to bring it down to Maceira bay, was an error which (no

convention intervening) might have proved fatal to the success

of the campaign. This error was rendered more important by the

danger incurred from the passage; for, as the transports were not

sea-worthy, the greatest part would have perished had a gale of

wind come on from the south-west.

[Illustration: _Explanatory Sketch_ of the CAMPAIGN IN PORTUGAL in

August 1808.

_London. Published March 1828, by John Murray, Albermarle Street._]

3º. Sir Arthur Wellesley’s project of seizing Mafra by a rapid

march on the morning of the 21st, was exceedingly bold; its

successful execution would have obliged Junot to make a hurried

retreat by Enxara dos Cavalleiros to Montechique, at the risk of

being attacked in flank during his march; or if he had moved by

the longer route of Ruña and Sobral, it is scarcely to be doubted

that the British army would have reached Lisbon before the French.

But was it possible so to deceive an enemy inured to warfare,

as to gain ten miles in a march of sixteen? was it possible to

evade the vigilance of an experienced general, who, being posted

only nine miles off, possessed a formidable cavalry, the efforts of

which could neither be checked nor interrupted by the small escort

of horse in the British camp? was it in fine possible, to avoid a

defeat during a flank march along a road crossed and interrupted

by a river and several deep gullies, which formed the beds of

mountain torrents? These are questions which naturally occur to

every military man. The sticklers for a rigid adherence to system

would probably decide in the negative. Sir Arthur Wellesley was

however, not only prepared to try at the time, but he afterwards

deliberately affirmed that, under certain circumstances of ground

an operation of that kind would succeed; and to investigate such

questions is the best study for an officer.

4º. A night march is the most obvious mode of effecting such

an enterprise, but not always the best in circumstances where

expedition is required; and great generals have usually preferred

the day-time, trusting to their own skill in deceiving the enemy

while their army made a forced march to gain the object in view.

Thus, Turenne at Landsberg was successful against the archduke

Leopold in broad daylight, and Cæsar in a more remarkable manner

overreached Afranius and Petrieus near Lerida. Nor were the

circumstances at Vimiero unfavourable to sir Arthur Wellesley. He

might have pushed a select corps of light troops, his cavalry, the

marines of the fleet, the Portuguese auxiliaries, and a few field

pieces, to the entrance of the defile of Torres Vedras before

daybreak, with orders to engage the French outposts briskly, and

to make demonstrations as for a general attack. There is no doubt

that such a movement if skilfully conducted, would have completely

occupied the enemy’s attention, while the main body of the army

marching in great coats, and hiding the glitter of their arms,

might have profited from the woods and hollows through which the

by-road to Mafra led, and gained such a start as would have insured

the success of the enterprise.

Let us, however, take a view of the other side; let us suppose

that Junot, instructed by his spies and patroles, or divining the

intention of the British general, held the masking division in

check with a small force, and carrying the remainder of his army

by the Puente de Roll, or some other cross road (and there were

several) against the flank of the English, had fallen upon the

latter while in march, hemmed in as they would be between the sea

and the mountains, and entangled among hollows and torrents. What

then would have been the result? History answers, by pointing to

Condé and the battle of Senef. It must however be confessed, that

it could be no ordinary general that conceived such a project, and,

notwithstanding the small numbers of the opposing armies, success

would have ranked sir Arthur high among the eminent commanders

of the world, if he had never performed any other exploit. “The

statue of Hercules, cast by Lysippus, although only a foot high,

expressed,” says Pliny, “the muscles and bones of the hero more

grandly than the colossal figures of other artists.”

5º. So many circumstances combine to sway the judgment of an

officer in the field which do not afterwards appear of weight, that

caution should always be the motto of those who censure the conduct

of an unfortunate commander; nevertheless, the duke of Abrantes’

faults, during this campaign, were too glaring to be mistaken.

He lingered too long at Lisbon; he was undecided in his plans;

he divided his army unnecessarily; and he discovered no skill on

the field of battle. The English army having landed affairs were

brought to a crisis, and Junot had only two points to consider.

Could the French forces under his command defend Portugal without

assistance? and if not, how were its operations to be made most

available for furthering Napoleon’s general plans against the

Peninsula? The first point could not be ascertained until a battle

with sir Arthur had been tried. The second evidently required that

Junot should keep his army concentrated, preserve the power of

retreating into Spain, and endeavour to engage the British troops

in the sieges of Elvas and Almeida. If the two plans had been

incompatible, the last was certainly preferable to the chance of

battle in a country universally hostile. But the two plans were not

incompatible.

6º. The pivot of Junot’s movements was Lisbon; he had therefore

to consider how he might best fall upon and overthrow the English

army, without resigning the capital to the Portuguese insurgents

during the operation. He could not hope to accomplish the first

effectually without using the great mass of his forces, nor to

avoid the last except by skilful management, and the utmost

rapidity. Now the citadel and forts about Lisbon were sufficiently

strong to enable a small part of the French army to control the

populace, and to resist the insurgents of the Alemtejo for a few

days. The Russian admiral, although not hostile to the Portuguese,

or favourable to the French, was forced by his fear of the

English, to preserve a guarded attitude, and in point of fact, did

materially contribute to awe the multitude, who could not but look

upon him as an enemy. The Portuguese ships of war which had been

fitted out by Junot, were floating fortresses requiring scarcely

any garrisons, and yet efficient instruments to control the city,

without ceasing to be receptacles for the Spanish prisoners, and

safe depôts for powder and arms which might otherwise have fallen

into the power of the populace. Wherefore, instead of delaying

so long in the capital, instead of troubling himself about the

assemblage of Alcacer do Sal, instead of detaching Laborde with a

weak division to cover the march of Loison; Junot should have taken

the most vigorous resolutions in respect to Lisbon the moment he

heard of the English descent. He should have abandoned the left

bank of the Tagus, with the exception of Palmela and the Bugio,

which were necessary to the safety of his shipping; he should have

seized upon the principal families of the capital as hostages for

the good behaviour of the rest; and he should have threatened and

been prepared to bombard the city if refractory; then leaving

nothing more than the mere garrisons of the citadel, forts, and

ships behind him, have proceeded, not to Leria, which was too near

the enemy to be a secure point of junction with Loison, but to

Santarem, where both corps might have been united without danger

and without fatigue. General Thomieres, in the mean time, putting

a small garrison in Peniché, could have watched the movement of

the British general, and thus from eighteen to twenty thousand men

would have been assembled at Santarem by the 13th at farthest, and

from thence one march would have brought the whole to Batalha,

near which place the lot of battle might have been drawn without

trembling.

7º. If it proved unfavourable to the French, the ulterior object of

renewing the campaign on the frontier was in no manner compromised.

The number of large boats that Lisbon can always furnish, would

have sufficed to transport the beaten army over the Tagus from

Santarem in a few hours, especially if the stores had been embarked

before Junot moved towards Batalha, and the French army, once in

the Alemtejo with a good garrison in Abrantes, could not have been

followed until the forts at the mouth of the Tagus were reduced,

and the fleet sheltered in the river. Thus, long before the British

could have appeared in force in the Alemtejo, the fortress of Elvas

would have been provisioned from the magazines collected by Loison

after the battle of Evora, and the campaign could have been easily

prolonged until the great French army, coming from Germany crushed

all opposition.

The above is not a theory broached after the event. That Junot

would attempt something of the kind, was the data upon which the

English general formed his plans; the intercepted memoir of colonel

Bory de St. Vincent, treated such an operation as a matter of

course, and Junot’s threats during the negotiation prove that he

was not ignorant of his own resources; but his mind was depressed,

and his desponding mood was palpable to those around him. It is a

curious fact, that Sattaro, the Portuguese agent, who, for some

purpose or other was in the British camp, told sir Arthur Wellesley

before the battle of Vimiero, that Junot would willingly evacuate

Portugal upon terms.

[Sidenote: Thiebault.]

8º. When the French, being fourteen thousand in number, occupied

Torres Vedras, that position was nearly impregnable. Seventeen

thousand British could scarcely have carried it by force; but they

might have turned it in a single march by the coast road; yet

Junot neither placed a detachment on that side nor kept a vigilant

watch by his patroles. Now, if sir Arthur Wellesley’s intended

movement had not been arrested by orders from Burrard, it must have

succeeded, because Junot was entangled in the defiles of Torres

Vedras from six o’clock in the evening of the 20th, until late in

the morning of the 21st. The two armies would thus have changed

camps in the space of a few hours without firing a shot: Junot

would have lost Lisbon, and have been placed in the most ridiculous

situation.

9º. In the battle, the duke of Abrantes showed great courage, but

no talent. His army was inferior in numbers, yet he formed two

separate attacks, an evident error that enabled sir Arthur to beat

him in detail without difficulty. And it was the less excusable,

because the comparatively easy nature of the ground over which the

road from Torres Vedras to Lourinham led, and the manner in which

the English army was heaped to the right when the position first

opened to the view of the French general, plainly indicated the

true line of attack. Junot should, with all his forces concentrated

for one effort, have fallen in upon the left of his opponent’s

position; if victorious, the sea would have swallowed those who

escaped his sword. If repulsed, his retreat was open, and his loss

could not have been so great in a well-conducted single effort, as

it was in the ill-digested, unconnected attacks that took place.

10º. The rapidity with which the French soldiers rallied, and

recovered their order after such a severe check, was admirable, but

their habitual method of attacking in column cannot be praised.

Against the Austrians, Russians, and Prussians, it may have been

successful, but against the British it must always fail, because

the English infantry is sufficiently firm, intelligent, and well

disciplined, to wait calmly in lines for the adverse masses, and

sufficiently bold to close upon them with the bayonet.

11º. The column is undoubtedly excellent for all movements short

of the actual charge, but as the Macedonian phalanx was unable to

resist the open formation of the Roman legion, so will the close

column be unequal to sustain the fire and charge of a good line

aided by artillery. The natural repugnance of men to trample on

their own dead and wounded, the cries and groans of the latter,

and the whistling of the cannon-shots as they tear open the

ranks, produce the greatest disorder, especially in the centre of

attacking columns, which, blinded by smoke, unstedfast of footing,

and bewildered by words of command coming from a multitude of

officers crowded together, can neither see what is taking place,

nor make any effort to advance or retreat without increasing the

confusion: no example of courage can be useful, no moral effect

can be produced by the spirit of individuals, except upon the

head, which is often firm, and even victorious at the moment when

the rear is flying in terror. Nevertheless, well managed columns

are the very soul of military operations; in them is the victory,

and in them also is safety to be found after a defeat. The secret

consists in knowing when and where to extend the front.

ARMISTICE. CONVENTION.

1º. It is surprising, that Junot having regained Torres Vedras,

occupied Mafra, and obtained an armistice, did not profit by

the terms of the latter to prepare for crossing the Tagus and

establishing the war on the frontiers. Kellerman ascertained

during his negotiation, that sir John Moore was not arrived; and

it was clear, that until he did arrive the position of Montechique

could neither be attacked nor turned. There was nothing in the

armistice itself, nor the way in which it had been agreed to, which

rendered it dishonourable to take such an advantage. The opening

thus left for Junot to gain time, was sir Arthur Wellesley’s

principal objection to the preliminary treaty.

2º. With regard to the convention, although some of its provisions

were objectionable in point of form, and others imprudently worded,

yet taken as a whole, it was a transaction fraught with prudence

and wisdom. Let it be examined upon fair military and political

grounds; let it even be supposed for the sake of argument, that sir

Arthur unimpeded by sir Harry Burrard, had pursued his own plan,

and that Junot, cut off from Lisbon and the half of his forces

had been driven upon the Tagus, he was still master of flying to

Almeida or Elvas: the thousand men left in Santarem would have

joined him in the Alemtejo, or fallen down to the capital; and

what then would have been the advantages that could render the

convention undesirable?

[Sidenote: Proceedings of the Board of Inquiry.]

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 22.]

The British army, exclusive of sir John Moore’s division, had

only provisions, or transport for provisions, sufficient to last

for ten or twelve days, and the fleet was the only resource when

that supply should be exhausted. But a gale from any point between

the southward and north-west, would have driven the ships away or

have cast them on a lee-shore. Hence an indispensable preliminary

measure would have been to open the mouth of the Tagus as a

security for the fleet; but without occupying Cascaes, Bugio, and

St. Julians, that was impossible. To take the last-named fort would

have required ten days’ open trenches at the least, and the heavy

artillery must have been landed in some of the small creeks, and

dragged by force of men over the mountains, because the artillery

horses were scarcely able to draw the field guns, and the country

was incapable of supplying assistance of that kind. In the mean

time, the French troops in Lisbon, and those upon the heights of

Almada and in the men-of-war, retiring tranquilly through the

Alemtejo, would have united with Junot; or if he had fallen back

upon Almeida, they could have retired upon Elvas and La-Lyppe. In

this argument the Russians have not been considered, but whatever

his secret wishes might have been, Siniavin must have joined the

French or surrendered his squadron in a disgraceful manner. This

would have increased Junot’s force by six thousand men; and it may

here be observed, that even after the arrival of sir John Moore,

only twenty-five thousand British infantry were fit for duty.

Let it be supposed that the forts were taken, the English fleet in

the river, the resources of Lisbon organized, and the battering

guns and ammunition necessary for the siege of Elvas transported

to Abrantes by water. Seventy miles of land remained to traverse,

and then three months of arduous operations in the sickly season,

and in the most pestilent of situations, would have been the

certain consequences of any attempt to reduce that fortress. Did

the difficulty end there? No! Almeida remained, and in the then

state of the roads of Portugal, and taking into consideration only

the certain and foreseen obstacles, it is not too much to say,

that six months more would have been wasted before the country

could be entirely freed from the invaders. But long before that

period Napoleon’s eagles would have soared over Lisbon again. The

conclusion is inevitable; the convention was a great and solid

advantage for the allies, a blunder on the part of the French.

With the momentary exception of Junot’s threat to burn Lisbon if

his terms were not complied with, we look in vain for any traces of

that vigour which urged the march from Alcantara; we are astonished

to perceive the man, who, in the teeth of an English fleet, in

contempt of fourteen thousand Portuguese troops, and regardless of

a population of three hundred thousand souls, dared, with a few

hundred tired grenadiers, to seize upon Lisbon, so changed in half

a year, so sunk in energy, that, with twenty-five thousand good

soldiers, he declined a manly effort, and resorted to a convention

to save an army which was really in very little danger. But such

and so variable is the human mind, the momentary slave of every

attraction, yet ultimately true to self-interest. When Junot

entered Portugal, power, honours, fame, emolument, nay, even a

throne, was within his reach, and toil and danger were overlooked

in such gorgeous society; but when he proposed the convention he

was only with the latter companions; fame flitted at a distance,

and he easily persuaded himself that prudence and vigour could

not be yoked together. A saying attributed to Napoleon perfectly

describes the convention in a few words. “I was going to send Junot

before a council of war, but, fortunately, the English tried their

generals, and saved me the pain of punishing an old friend!”

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

The convention of Cintra being followed by the establishment of a

regency at Lisbon, the plans of the bishop and junta of Oporto were

disconcerted, and Portugal was restored to a state of comparative

tranquillity; for the Portuguese people being of a simple

character, when they found their country relieved from the presence

of a French army, readily acknowledged the benefit derived from the

convention, and refused to listen to the pernicious counsels of the

factious prelate and his mischievous coadjutors.

Thus terminated what may be called the convulsive struggle of

the Peninsular war. Up to that period a remarkable similarity

of feeling and mode of acting betrayed the common origin of the

Spanish and Portuguese people. A wild impatience of foreign

aggression, extravagant pride, vain boasting, and a passionate

reckless resentment, were common to both nations; but there the

likeness ceased, and the finer marks of national character which

had been impressed upon them by their different positions in the

political world, became distinctly visible.

Spain, holding from time immemorial a high rank among the great

powers, and more often an oppressor than oppressed, haughtily

rejected all advice. Unconscious of her actual weakness and

ignorance, and remembering only her former dignity, she

ridiculously assumed an attitude which would scarcely have suited

her in the days of Charles V.; while Portugal, always fearing the

ambition of a powerful neighbour, and relying for safety as much

upon her alliances as upon her own intrinsic strength, was from

habit inclined to prudent calculation, and readily submitted to the

direction of England. The turbulence of the first led to defeat and

disaster; the docility and patience of the second were productive

of the most beneficial results.

The difference between these nations was, however, not immediately

perceptible, and at the period of the convention the Portuguese

were despised, while a splendid triumph was anticipated for the

Spaniards. It was affirmed and believed, that from every quarter

enthusiastic multitudes of the latter were pressing forward to

complete the destruction of a baffled and dispirited enemy; the

vigour, the courage, the unmatched spring of Spanish patriotism,

was in every man’s mouth, and Napoleon’s power and energy seemed

weak in opposition. Few persons doubted the truth of such tales,

and yet nothing could be more unsound, more eminently fallacious,

than the generally-entertained opinion of French weakness and of

Spanish strength. The resources of the former were unbounded,

almost untouched; those of the latter were too slender even to

support the weight of victory. In Spain the whole structure of

society was shaken to pieces by the violence of an effort which

merely awakened the slumbering strength of France: foresight,

promptitude, arrangement, marked the proceedings of Napoleon;

but with the Spaniards the counsels of prudence were punished as

treason; and personal interests, every where springing up with

incredible force, wrestled against the public good. At a distance,

the insurrection appeared of towering proportions and mighty

strength; but in truth it was a fantastic object, stained with

blood, and tottering from weakness, and the helping hand of England

alone was stretched forth for its support; all other assistance

was denied, for the continental powers, although nourishing secret

hopes of profit from the struggle, with calculating policy, turned

coldly from the patriots’ cause. The English cabinet was indeed

sanguine, and resolute to act; but the ministers while anticipating

success in a preposterous manner, displayed little industry and

less judgment in their preparations for the struggle; nor does it

appear that the real freedom of the Peninsula was much considered

in their councils. They contemplated this astonishing insurrection,

as a mere military opening through which Napoleon might be

assailed, and they neglected, or rather feared, to look towards the

great moral consequences of such a stupendous event, consequences

which were in truth above their reach of policy. They were neither

able nor willing to seize such a singularly propitious occasion for

conferring a benefit upon mankind.

It is however certain, that this opportunity for restoring the

civil strength of a long degraded people, by a direct recurrence

to first principles, was such as had seldom been granted to a

sinking nation. Enthusiasm was aroused without the withering

curse of faction; and the multitude were ready to follow whoever

chose to lead. The weight of ancient authority was, by a violent

external shock, thrown off. The ruling power fell from the hands

of the few, and was caught by the many, without the latter having

thereby incurred the odium of rebellion, or excited the malice

of mortified grandeur. There was nothing to deter the cautious,

for there was nothing to pull down. The foundation of the social

structure was laid bare, and all the materials were at hand for

building a rare and noble monument of human genius and virtue. The

architect alone was wanting. No anxiety to ameliorate the moral

or physical condition of the people in the Peninsula was evinced

by the ruling men of England, and if any existed amongst those of

Spain, it evaporated in puerile abstract speculations. Napoleon

indeed offered the blessing of regeneration in exchange for

submission, but in that revolting form accompanied by the evils of

war, it was rejected; and amidst the clamorous pursuit of national

independence, the independence of man was trampled under foot. The

mass of the Spanish nation, blinded by personal hatred, thought

only of revenge. The leaders, arrogant and incapable, neither

sought nor wished for any higher motive of action: without unity of

design, devoid of arrangement, their policy was mean and personal,

their military efforts were abortive, and a rude unscientific

warfare disclosed at once the barbarous violence of Spanish

character, and the utter decay of Spanish institutions.

After Joseph’s retreat from Madrid, the insurrection of Spain may

be said to have ceased; from that period it became a war between

France and the Peninsula; the fate of the latter was intrusted to

organised bodies of men, and as the first excitement subsided,

and danger seemed to recede, all the meaner passions resumed

their empire; but the transactions of that memorable period

which intervened between the battles of Baylen and Coruña were

exceedingly confused, and the history of them must necessarily

partake somewhat of that confusion.

The establishment of a central supreme junta, the caprices of

the Spanish generals, and their interminable disputes, the

proceedings of the French army before the arrival of the emperor,

the operations of the grand army after his arrival, and the

campaign of the British auxiliary force, form so many distinct

actions, connected it is true by one great catastrophe, yet each

attended by a number of minor circumstances of no great historical

importance taken separately, but when combined, showing the extent

and complicated nature of the disease which destroyed the energy of

Spain.

For the advantage of clearness therefore, it will be necessary to

sacrifice chronological order; and as frequent reference must be

made to the proceedings of a class of men whose interference had

a decided, and in many cases a very disastrous influence upon the

affairs of that period, I shall first give a brief account of the

English agents, under which denomination both civil and military

men were employed, but the distinction was rather nominal than

real; for, generally speaking, each person assumed the right of

acting in both capacities.

The envoy, Mr. Charles Stuart, was the chief of the civil agents;

the persons subordinate to him were, Mr. Hunter, Mr. Duff, and

others, consuls and vice-consuls.

Mr. Stuart sailed with sir A. Wellesley, and was left at Coruña

when that officer touched there, previous to the operations in

Portugal.

Mr. Hunter was stationed at Gihon in the Asturias.

Mr. Duff proceeded to Cadiz, and the others in like manner were

employed at different ports. They were all empowered to distribute

money, arms, and succours of clothing and ammunition: but the want

of system and forethought in the cabinet was palpable from the

injudicious zeal of the inferior agents, each of whom conceived

himself competent to direct the whole of the political and

military transactions. Mr. Stuart was even put to some trouble in

establishing his right to control their proceedings.

The military agents were of two classes: those sent from England by

the government, and those employed by the generals abroad.

Sir Thomas Dyer, assisted by major Roche and captain Patrick,

proceeded to the Asturias. The last officer remained at Oviedo,

near the junta of that province. Major Roche was sent to the

head-quarters of Cuesta, and sir Thomas Dyer after collecting some

information, returned to England.

Colonel Charles Doyle having organized the Spanish prisoners at

Portsmouth, sailed with them to Coruña. He was accompanied by

captain Carrol and captain Kennedy. During the passage a singular

instance of turbulent impatience occurred: the prisoners, who had

been released, armed, and clothed by England, and who had been

as enthusiastic in their expressions of patriotism as the most

sanguine could desire, mutinied, seized the transports, carried

them into different ports in the Peninsula, disembarked, and

proceeded each to his own home.

Colonel Browne was despatched to Oporto, and a major Green to

Catalonia.

Those employed by the generals commanding armies were captain

Whittingham, who was placed by sir Hew Dalrymple, near general

Castaños, on the first appearance of the insurrection. He

accompanied the head-quarters of the Andalusian army until the

battle of Tudela put an end to his functions. Major Cox (appointed

also by sir Hew Dalrymple) remained near the junta of Seville. The

talents and prudent conduct of this officer were of great service.

It would have been fortunate if all the persons employed as agents

had acted with as much judgment and discretion. All the above named

gentlemen were in full activity previous to the commencement of the

campaign in Portugal.

When the convention of Cintra opened a way for operations in Spain,

sir Hew Dalrymple sent lord William Bentinck to Madrid, that he

might arrange a plan of co-operation with the Spanish generals, and

transmit exact intelligence of the state of affairs. Such a mission

was become indispensable. Up to the period of lord William’s

arrival in Madrid, the military intelligence received was very

unsatisfactory. The letters from the armies contained abundance of

commonplace expressions relative to the enthusiasm and patriotism

visible in Spain. Vast plans were said to be under consideration,

some in progress of execution, and complete success was confidently

predicted; but, by some fatality, every project proved abortive or

disastrous, without lowering the confidence of the prognosticators,

or checking the mania for grand operations, which seemed to be the

disease of the moment.

[Sidenote: Sir H. Dalrymple’s Papers. MS.]

The English minister confirmed the appointment of lord William

Bentinck, and at the same time re-organized the system of the

military agents; by marking out certain districts and appointing a

general officer to superintend each. Thus, major-general Broderick

was sent to Gallicia. Major-general Leith, with a large staff,

proceeded to the Asturias. Major-general Sontag went to Portugal.

The scope of general Leith’s mission was wide; Biscay, Castille,

Leon, and even Catalonia were placed under his superintendence, and

he appears to have had instructions to prepare the way for the

disembarkation of an English army on the coast of Biscay. At the

same time sir Robert Wilson was furnished with arms, ammunition,

and clothing for organizing three or four thousand men levied by

the bishop of Oporto. He took with him a large regimental staff,

and a number of Portuguese refugees, and succeeded in forming a

partizan corps, afterwards known by the title of the Lusitanian

legion.

Brigadier-general Decken, a German, having been first destined for

Spain, was countermanded at sea, and directed to Oporto, where

he arrived on the 17th of August, and immediately commenced that

curious intrigue which has been already mentioned in the campaign

of Vimiero.

When sir John Moore assumed the command of the army, he sent

colonel Graham to reside at the Spanish head-quarters on the Ebro,

and directed lord William Bentinck to remain at Madrid to forward

the arrangements for commencing the campaign. Lord William found

in Mr. Stuart an able coadjutor, and in the letters of these two

gentlemen, and the correspondence of major Coxe, then at Seville,

is to be found the history of the evils which at this period

afflicted unhappy Spain, and ruined her noble cause.

The power of distributing supplies, and the independent nature

of their appointments, gave to those military agents immediately

employed by the minister an extraordinary influence, and it was

very injudiciously exercised. They forgot the real objects of their

mission, and in many cases took a leading part in affairs with

which it was not politic in them to have meddled at all.

[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Correspondence. MSS.]

[Sidenote: Whittingham’s Letters. MS.]

Colonel Doyle having left captain Kennedy at Coruña, and placed

captain Carrol at the head-quarters of Blake’s army, repaired in

person to Madrid, where he was received with marked attention,

and obtained the rank of a general officer in the Spanish service

for himself, and that of lieutenant-colonel for captains Carrol

and Kennedy. From colonel Doyle’s letters it appears that he had

a large share in conducting many important measures, such as the

arrangement of a general plan of operations, and the formation of a

central and supreme government. He seems to have attached himself

principally to the duke of Infantado, a young man of moderate

capacity, but with a strong predilection for those petty intrigues

which constituted the policy of the Spanish court. Captain

Whittingham gained the confidence of general Castaños to such a

degree that he was employed by him to inspect the different Spanish

corps on the Ebro early in September, and to report upon their

state of efficiency previous to entering upon the execution of the

plan laid down for the campaign. Notwithstanding the favourable

position in which these officers stood, it does not appear that

either of them obtained any clear idea of the relative strength

of the contending forces, and their opinions, invariably and even

extravagantly sanguine, were never borne out by the result.

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Letters. MS. Lord W. Bentinck’s Letters.

MS.]

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13. section 6.]

The Spaniards were not slow to perceive the advantages of

encouraging the vanity of inexperienced men who had the control

of enormous supplies; but while all outward demonstrations of

respect and confidence were by them lavished upon subordinate

functionaries, and especially upon those who had accepted of rank

in their service, the most strenuous exertions of lord William

Bentinck and Mr. Stuart were insufficient to procure the adoption

of a single beneficial measure, or even to establish the ordinary

intercourse of official business.

[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Correspondence. MS.]

The leading Spaniards wished to obtain a medium through which to

create a false impression of the state of affairs, and thus to

secure supplies and succours from England without being fettered

in the application of them. The subordinate agents answered this

purpose, and satisfied with their docility, the generals were far

from encouraging the residence of more than one British agent

at their head-quarters. Captain Birch, an intelligent engineer

officer, writing from Blake’s camp, says, “General Broderick is

expected here; but I have understood that the appearance of a

British general at these head-quarters to accompany the army might

give jealousy. General Blake is not communicative, but captain

Carrol appears to be on the best footing with him and his officers,

and captain Carrol tells me that he informs him of more than he

does any of his generals.”

The object was perfectly accomplished; nothing could be more

widely different than Spanish affairs, judged of by the tenor of

the military agent’s reports, and Spanish affairs when brought

to the test of battle. The fault did not attach so much to the

agents as to the ministers who selected them. It was difficult for

inexperienced men to avoid the snare. Living with the chiefs of

armies actually in the field, being in habits of daily intercourse

with them, holding rank in the same service, and dependent upon

their politeness for every convenience, the agent was in a manner

forced to see as the general saw, and to report as he wished. A

simple spy would have been far more efficacious!

[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Papers. MSS.]

Sir John Moore, perceiving the evil tendency of such a system,

recalled all those officers who were under his immediate control,

and strongly recommended to ministers that only one channel of

communication should exist between the Spanish authorities and the

British army. He was convinced of the necessity of this measure,

by observing, that each of the military agents considered the

events passing under his own peculiar cognizance as the only

occurrences of importance. Some of those officers even treated sir

Hew Dalrymple and himself as persons commanding auxiliary bodies of

men which might be moved, divided, and applied at the requisition

of every inferior agent, and the forces of the British empire, a

mere accessory aid, placed at their own disposal. Thus general

Leith says: “Whatever may be the plan of operations, and whatever

the result, I beg leave, in the strongest manner, to recommend

to your consideration the great advantage of ordering all the

disposable force of horse or car artillery, and light infantry,

mounted on horses or mules of the country, without a moment’s delay

to move on Palencia, where the column or columns will receive

such intelligence as may enable them to give the most effectual

co-operation.”

Captain Whittingham, at the same period, after mentioning the wish

of general Castaños that some British cavalry should join him,

says, “I cannot quit this subject without once more repeating, that

the efforts of the cavalry will decide the fate of the campaign.”

And again: “Should it be possible for your excellency to send one

thousand or fifteen hundred horse, the advantages that would result

are incalculable.” While one of these pressing recommendations came

from Oviedo, the other from Tudela, colonel Doyle, writing from

Madrid, thus expresses himself: “Certain it is, that if your army

were here, the French would evacuate Spain before you got within

a week’s march of them; indeed, even the light cavalry and two

thousand light troops sent on cars, to keep up with the cavalry, to

show our friends the nature of outpost duty, would, I think, decide

the question.”--“A respectable corps of British troops, landed

in Catalonia, would so impose, that I have no doubt of the good

effects.”

This last proposition relative to Catalonia was a favourite plan of

all the leading men at Madrid; so certain were they of success on

the Ebro, that finding no British force was likely to be granted

for that purpose, they withdrew eight or nine thousand men from the

army near Tudela, and directed them upon Lerida.

Thus much I have thought it necessary to relate about the agents,

and now quitting that subject, I shall narrate

THE OPERATIONS OF THE SPANISH ARMIES IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE BATTLE

OF BAYLEN.

When that victory caused Joseph to abandon Madrid, the patriotic

troops, guided by the caprice of the generals, moved in a variety

of directions, without any fixed object in view, and without the

slightest concert. Indeed all persons seemed to imagine that the

war was at an end, and that rejoicing and triumph alone ought to

occupy the minds of good Spaniards.

[Sidenote: Cavallero.]

The Murcian and Valencian army separated. General Llamas, with

twelve thousand infantry, and a few cavalry, took the road to

Madrid, and arrived there before any of the other generals. General

St. Marc, a Fleming by birth, with greater propriety, carried the

Valencians to the relief of Zaragoza. On the road he joined his

forces with those of the baron de Versage, and the united troops,

amounting to sixteen thousand, entered Zaragoza on the 15th, one

day after Verdier and Lefebre had broken up the siege and retired

to Tudela. The French left their heavy guns and many stores behind

them. The Valencians and Arragonese pursued, and on the 19th their

advanced guard overtook the retiring force, but were beaten by the

French cavalry. On the 20th Lefebre abandoned Tudela and took a

position at Milagro. On the 21st, St. Marc and Versage occupied

Tudela. The peasantry of the valleys, encouraged by the approach

of a regular army, and by the successful defence of Zaragoza,

assembled on the left flank of the French, and threatened their

communications. Meanwhile Palafox gave himself up to festivity

and rejoicing, and did not even begin to repair the defences of

Zaragoza until the end of the month. He assumed supreme authority,

and in various ways discovered the most inordinate and foolish

presumption; and among other acts he decreed that no Arragonese

should henceforward be liable to the punishment of death for any

crime.

[Sidenote: Cox’s Correspondence. MSS.]

[Sidenote: Whittingham’s Correspondence. MSS.]

The army of Andalusia was the most efficient body of men in arms

throughout Spain: it contained thirty thousand regular troops,

provided with a good train of artillery, and flushed with recent

victory; but they were constrained to remain idle by the junta of

Seville, who detained them to aid in asserting its own supremacy

over the other juntas of Andalusia, and even brought back a part to

Seville to assist in an ostentatious triumph. It was not until a

full month after the capitulation of Dupont, that Castaños made his

entry into the capital, at the head of a single division of seven

thousand men, another of the same force being left at Toledo, and

the rest of his army quartered at Puerto del Rey, St. Helena, and

Carolina, in the Sierra Morena.

The infantry of the Estremaduran army was at first composed of

new levies; but it was afterwards strengthened by the Walloon and

royal guards, and sir Hew Dalrymple supplied general Galluzzo

with every needful equipment. According to the stipulations of

a treaty between the juntas of Seville and Badajos, the cavalry

was to be placed under the command of Castaños; it was in number

about four thousand, and with the exception of Cuesta, no other

Spanish general possessed any efficient body of horsemen. Orders

and entreaties, and even the intervention of sir Hew Dalrymple,

were resorted to by the council of Castille, the generals and

the military agents, to induce Galluzzo to send this body of

cavalry forward to the capital; but he remained deaf to their

representations, and occupied himself, as we have seen, in

thwarting the execution of the convention of Cintra by a pretended

siege of fort La Lippe.

[Sidenote: Sir H. Dalrymple’s papers. MS.]

The Spanish captives, released by that treaty, were clothed, armed,

and sent to Catalonia in British transports; and sir Hew Dalrymple,

at the same time, forwarded ten thousand musquets, and ammunition

in proportion, for the service of the Catalans.

[Sidenote: Ibid.]

[Sidenote: Doyle’s letters.]

It has been before stated that one thousand five hundred

Spaniards, commanded by the marquis of Valladeras, co-operated

with the Portuguese during the campaign of Vimiero. But they never

penetrated beyond Guarda, and being destitute of money, were

reduced to great distress; they could not subsist where they were,

nor yet march away. From this dilemma, sir Hew, by a timely advance

of ten thousand dollars, relieved them, and Valladeras joined

Blake. That general, after the defeat of Rio Seco, separated the

Gallician army from the army commanded by Cuesta, and sheltered

himself from the pursuit of Bessieres in the mountains behind

Astorga. His reserve division had not been engaged in the battle,

and the resources of the province, aided by the succours from

England, were sufficient, to place him again at the head of thirty

thousand infantry.

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence.]

When Bessieres retreated after the defeat of Baylen, Blake occupied

Leon, Astorga, and the pass of Mansanal: farther into the plains

he durst not venture without cavalry. At this time Cuesta, with

one thousand five hundred dragoons, was at Arevalo, and the

junta of Castille and Leon, having taken refuge at Ponteferrada,

commanded him to transfer his horsemen to Blake’s army; but Cuesta,

an arbitrary old man, exasperated by his defeat, and his mind

rankling from his quarrel with Blake, instead of obeying retired to

Salamanca, collected eight or ten thousand peasants, armed them,

and then annulled the proceedings of the junta, and threatened

the members with punishment for resisting his authority as

captain-general. On the other hand Blake protected them, and while

the generals disputed, three thousand French cavalry descending the

Douero, scoured the plains, and raised contributions in the face of

both their armies.

[Sidenote: Capt. Carrol’s letters.]

Blake finding that the obstinacy of Cuesta was invincible, quitted

his cantonments early in September, and skirting the plains on the

north-east, carried his army by forced marches to the Montagna St.

Ander, a small rugged district, dividing Biscay from the Asturias.

The junta of the latter province had received enormous and very

timely succours from England, but made no exertions answerable

to the amount of the assistance granted, or to the strength and

importance of the district. Eighteen thousand men were said to be

in arms, but only ten thousand were promised to Blake, and but

eight thousand joined his army.

In Catalonia the war was conducted by both sides without much

connexion, or dependance on the movements of the main armies; and

at this period it had little influence on the general plan of

campaign.

Thus, it appears, that one month after the capitulation of Dupont,

only nineteen thousand infantry without cavalry, and those under

the command of more than one general, were collected at Madrid;

that only sixteen thousand men were in line upon the Ebro, and

that the remainder of the Spanish armies, (exclusive of that in

Catalonia computed at eleven thousand men,) were many days’ march

from the enemy, and from one another. The chiefs at discord with

their respective juntas, and at variance among themselves, were

inactive, or as in the case of Galluzzo, doing mischief.

The feeble and dilatory operations of the armies, were partly

owing to the ineptitude of the generals; but the principal causes

were the unbounded vanity, arrogance, and selfishness of the local

governments, among whom the juntas of Gallicia and Seville were

remarkable for their ambition. The time which should have been

passed in concerting measures for pushing the victory of Baylen was

spent by them in devising schemes to ensure the permanency of their

own power, and the money and resources, both of England and Spain,

were applied to further this pernicious object. In every part of

the country a spirit of interested violence prevailed; the ardour

of patriotism was chilled, and the exertions of sensible men were

rendered nugatory, or served as a signal for their own destruction.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6.]

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 4.]

The argument to be drawn from this state of affairs is conclusive

against the policy of Joseph’s retreat. Without drafting a man

from the garrisons of Pampeluna, Tortosa, and St. Sebastian;

without interfering with the moveable columns employed on

the communications of Biscay and Navarre; that monarch drew

together about fifty thousand good troops, in twenty days after

he had abandoned his capital. At the head of such a force, or

even of two-thirds of it, he might have bid defiance to the

inactive, half-organized, and scattered Spanish armies. It was

so necessary to have maintained himself in Madrid, that scarcely

any disproportion of numbers should have induced him to abandon

it without an effort; but the disaster of Dupont had created

in Joseph’s mind a respect for Spanish prowess, while from his

sagacious brother it drew the following observation: “_The whole of

the Spanish forces are not capable of beating twenty-five thousand

French in a reasonable position._” The error of abandoning the

capital would, if the Spaniards had been capable of pursuing any

general plan of action, been fatal; but as if the stone of Cadmus

had been cast among them, the juntas turned upon one another in

hate, and forgot the common enemy.

Ferdinand was again proclaimed king of Spain, and the pomp and

rejoicing attendant on this event put an end to all business,

except that of intrigue. Castaños assumed the title of

captain-general of Madrid. This step seems to have been taken

by him, partly to forward his being appointed generalissimo,

and partly with a view to emancipate himself from the injurious

control of the Seville junta; for, although the authority of the

captains-general had been superseded in most of the provinces by

the juntas, it was not universally the case. Castaños expected,

and with reason, to be appointed generalissimo of the Spanish

armies; but he was of an indolent disposition, and it soon

became manifest that until a central and supreme government was

established, such a salutary measure would not be adopted. In the

mean time the council of Castille, although not generally popular

with the people, and hated by the juntas, was accepted as the

provisional head of the state in the capital; but its authority

was merely nominal, and the necessity of showing some front to the

enemy seems to have been the only link of connexion between the

Spanish armies.

The evil consequences flowing from this want of unity were soon

felt. Scarcely had the French quitted Madrid, when the people of

Biscay prepared to rise. Such an event, if prudently conducted and

well supported, would have been of incalculable advantage; but the

nicest arrangement, and the utmost prudence, were necessary to

insure success, for the Biscayans had neither arms nor ammunition,

the French were close to them, and the nearest Spanish force was

the feeble Asturian levy. A previous junction of Blake’s army

with the latter was indispensable; that once effected, and due

preparation made, the insurrection of Biscay, protected by forty

thousand regular troops, and supplied from the sea-board with money

and stores, would have forced the French to abandon the Ebro or to

fight a battle, which Blake might have risked with little danger,

provided that the Andalusian, Murcian, Valencian, and Arragonese

troops assembling about Tudela, were prepared to move at the same

time against the left flank of the enemy. But in every point of

view it was an event pregnant with important consequences, and the

impatience of the Biscayans should have been restrained rather

than encouraged; yet the duke of Infantado, colonel Doyle, and

others, at Madrid, made strenuous efforts to hasten the explosion.

The crude manner in which they conducted this serious affair is

exposed in the following extracts from colonel Doyle’s despatches:

“I proposed to general Blake that he should send officers to Biscay

to stir up the people there, and into the Asturias to beg that of

their 15,000 men, 8,000 might be pushed into Biscay to Bilbao, to

assist the people, who were all ready, and only waited for arms

and ammunition, for both of which I wrote to Mr. Hunter at Gihon,

and learned from him that he had sent a large supply of both,

and some money to Bilbao, where already 14,000 men had enrolled

themselves. The remainder of the Asturians I begged might instantly

occupy the passes from Castille into the Asturias and Biscay, that

is to say, from Reynosa in the direction of Bilbao.” Some days

after he says,--“My measures in Biscay and Asturias have perfectly

succeeded; the reinforcements of arms, ammunition, and men (5,000

stand of arms, and ammunition in proportion) have reached Bilbao

in safety, and the Asturians have taken possession of the passes I

pointed out, so that we are all safe in that part of the world.”

In this fancied state of security affairs remained until the

16th of August; general Blake was still in the mountains of

Gallicia, the English succours arrived in the port of Bilbao, and

the explosion took place. General Merlin, with three thousand

grenadiers, immediately came down on the unfortunate Biscayans;

Bilbao was taken, and to use the emphatic expression of king

Joseph, “the fire of insurrection was quenched with the blood

of twelve hundred men.” Fortunately, the stores were not landed,

and the vessels escaped from the river. Thus, at a blow, one of

the principal resources which Blake had a right to calculate upon

in his future operations was destroyed; and although the number

admitted by the Spaniards to have fallen was less than the above

quotation implies, the spirit of resistance was severely checked,

and the evil was unmixed and deplorable.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6.]

[Sidenote: Whittingham’s Letters. MSS.]

This unfortunate event, however, created little or no sensation

beyond the immediate scene of the catastrophe. Triumphs and

rejoicings occupied the people of Madrid and Zaragoza, and it is

difficult to say how long the war would have been neglected, if

Palafox had not been roused by the re-appearance of a French corps,

which re-took Tudela, and pushed on to the vicinity of Zaragoza

itself. This movement took place immediately after the expedition

against Bilbao, and was intended to suppress the insurrection

of the valleys, and to clear the left flank of the French army.

Palafox thus roughly aroused, wrote intemperately to the council

of Castille, commanding that all the troops in the capital should

be forwarded to the Ebro, and menacing the members personally for

the delay which had already occurred. Being a young man without

any weight of character, and his remonstrances being founded only

upon his own danger, and not supported by any general plan or clear

view of affairs, the presumptuous tone of his letters gave general

offence; they were chiefly aimed at Castaños, who was not under his

command; and moreover, the junta of Seville refused to pay or to

subsist the Andalusian army if it moved beyond the capital before

a central government should be established; at the same time

resorting to every kind of intrigue, to retard, if not entirely to

prevent, the execution of the latter measure.

[Sidenote: Whittingham’s Letters. MSS.]

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Letters. Parliamentary Papers.]

It was, however, necessary to do something, and a council of all

the generals commanding armies was held at Madrid on the 5th of

September. Castaños, Llamas, Cuesta, the duke of Infantado, and

some others assembled; Blake gave his proxy to the duke, and

Palafox was represented by a colonel of his own staff. Cuesta

proposed that a commander-in-chief should be appointed: the others

were too jealous to adopt this proposal, but they agreed to pursue

the following plan of operations.

Llamas, with the Murcians, to occupy Tarascona, Agreda, and

Borja. La-Peña, with the two divisions of Andalusia already in

the capital, to march by Soria, and take possession of Logroña

and Najera. The other divisions of that army to follow in due

time. When La-Peña should be established in Logroña, Llamas was to

advance to Cascante, Corella, and Calahorra.

[Sidenote: Sir H. Dalrymple’s Corresp^{ce}. Doyle’s Letters. Cox’s

D^o.]

When this united force (to be called the army of the centre) was

once securely fixed in its positions, Palafox, under whose command

St. Marc’s division acted, was to push forward to Sanguessa by the

left bank of the Ebro, and to turn the enemy on the Aragon river.

In the mean time it was hoped that Blake would arrive at Palencia,

and form his junction with the Asturians. Cuesta promised to

march upon Burgo del Osma, and to fill up the space between Blake

and the army of the centre. The head of La-Peña’s column was to

be at Soria on the 17th of September, and the junta confidently

expected that this vicious plan, in which every sound military

principle was violated, and the enemy’s troops, considered with

regard to position, as a fixed immoveable mass, would cause the

total destruction of the French army. The only fear entertained

was, that a hasty flight into France would save it from Spanish

vengeance! Thus captain Whittingham, echoing the sentiments of the

Spanish generals with reference to this plan, writes, “As far as my

poor judgment leads me, I am satisfied that if the French persist

in maintaining their present position, we shall, in less than six

weeks, have a second edition of the battle of Baylen!” But to

enable La-Peña and Llamas to march, pecuniary aid was requisite.

There was a difficulty in raising money at Madrid, and the maritime

provinces intercepted all the English supplies. In this dilemma,

colonel Doyle drew bills upon the English treasury, and upon

the government at Seville, making the latter payable out of two

millions of dollars, just transmitted to the junta through Mr. Duff.

It is probable that such an unprincipled body would not have

hesitated to dishonour the bills, but major Coxe, before they

were received, made energetic remonstrances upon the subject

of the wants of the army; at first he received a haughty and

evasive answer, but his representations were strongly seconded by

a discovery made by the junta, that a plot against their lives,

supposed to have been concocted at Madrid, was on the eve of

execution. In fact, they had become hateful from their domineering

insolence and selfishness, and the public feeling was strongly

against them. Alarmed for the consequences, they sent off 200,000

dollars to Madrid, and published a manifesto, in which they

inserted a letter, purporting to be from themselves to Castaños,

dated on the 8th, and giving him full powers to act as he judged

fitting for the public good. Their objects were to pacify the

people, and to save their own dignity, by appearing to have acted

voluntarily; but Castaños published the letter in Madrid with its

true date of the 11th, and then it became manifest, that to major

Coxe’s remonstrance, and not to any sense of duty, this change of

conduct was due.

[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1810.]

Doyle’s bills having been negotiated, the troops were put in

motion, and 40,000 fresh levies were enrolled, but the foresight

and activity of Napoleon in disarming the country had been so

effectual, that only 3,200 firelocks could be procured. A curious

expedient then presented itself to the imagination of the duke of

Infantado, and other leading persons in Madrid: colonel Doyle, at

their desire, wrote to sir Hew Dalrymple in the name of the supreme

council, to request that _the firelocks of Junot’s army, and the

arms of the Portuguese people_, might be forwarded to the frontier,

and from thence carried by post to Madrid; a novel proposition,

and made at a time when England had already transmitted to Spain

160,000 muskets; a supply considerably exceeding the whole number

of men organized throughout the country; 50,000 of these arms had

been sent to Seville, but the junta shut them up in the arsenals,

and left the armies defenceless; for to neglect or misuse real

resources, and to fasten with avidity upon the most extravagant

projects, is peculiarly Spanish. No other people could have thought

of asking for a neighbouring nation’s arms at such a conjuncture;

no other than Spanish rulers could have imagined the absurdity of

supplying their levies (momentarily required to fight upon the

Ebro) with the arms of a French army still unconquered in Portugal.

But this project was only one among many proofs afforded at the

time, that Cervantes was as profound an observer as he was a witty

reprover of the extravagance of his countrymen.

CHAPTER II.

INTERNAL POLITICAL TRANSACTIONS.

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Letters. Parliamentary Papers.]

[Sidenote: Ibid.]

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Letters. MS.]

[Sidenote: Ibid.]

With the military affairs thus mismanaged, the civil and political

transactions proceeded step by step, and in the same crooked path.

Short as the period was between the first breaking forth of the

insurrection, and the arrival of Mr. Stuart at Coruña, it was

sufficient to create disunion of the worst kind. The juntas of

Leon, of the Asturias, and of Gallicia, were at open discord, and

those provinces were again split into parties, hating each other

with as much virulence as if they had been of a hundred years

growth. The money and other supplies sent by the English ministers

were considered, by the authorities into whose hands they fell, as

a peculiar donation to themselves, and appropriated accordingly.

The junta of one province would not assist another with arms when

there was a surplus, nor permit their troops to march against the

enemy beyond the precincts of the particular province in which they

were first organized. The ruling power was in the hands of the

provincial nobility and gentry, men of narrow contracted views,

unused to business, proud, arrogant--as extreme ignorance suddenly

clothed with authority will always be--and generally disposed to

employ their newly-acquired power in providing for their relations

and dependants at the expense of the common cause, which with

them was quite subordinate to the local interests of their own

particular province. Hence a jealousy of their neighbours regulated

the proceedings of all the juntas, and the means they resorted

to for increasing their own, or depressing a rival government’s

influence, were equally characterised by absurdity and want of

principle. The junta of Gallicia did their utmost to isolate that

province, as if with a view to a final separation from Spain and

a connexion with Portugal. They complained, as of an injury, that

the army of Estremadura had obeyed the orders of the junta of

Seville; they at once struck up an independent alliance with the

junta and bishop of Oporto, and sent troops, as we have seen,

under Valladeras, to aid the war in Portugal, but, at the same

time, refused to unite in any common measure of defence with the

provinces of Castille, until a formal treaty of alliance between

them was negotiated, signed, and ratified. In the mean time their

selfishness and incapacity created so much disgust in their own

district, that plots were formed to overthrow their authority. The

bishops of Orense and St. Jago became their decided enemies; and

the last-named prelate, an intriguing man, secretly endeavoured to

draw Blake, with the army, into his views, and even wrote to him,

to desire that he would lead the forces against the government of

Coruña; but the junta having intercepted the letters, arrested the

bishop. Their own stability and personal safety were however still

so insecure, that many persons applied to Mr. Stuart to aid in

changing the form of government by force. The Asturians were even

worse, they refused to assist Blake when his army was suffering,

although the stores required by him, and supplied by England, were

rotting in the harbours where they were first landed. Money also

that was sent out in the Pluto frigate for the use of Leon was

detained at Gihon, and Leon itself never raised a single soldier

for the cause: and thus, only two months after the first burst of

the insurrection, corruption, intrigue, and faction even to the

verge of civil war, were raging in the northern parts of Spain.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 5.]

[Sidenote: Ibid.]

[Sidenote: Sir Hew Dalrymple’s Pap^{rs}. Coxe’s Correspond^{ce}.]

[Sidenote: Sir H. Dalrymple’s Papers. Coxe’s Correspondence.

Appendix, No. 13, section 5.]

[Sidenote: Ibid.]

The same passions were at work in the south, and the same

consequences followed. The junta of Seville, still less scrupulous

than that of Gallicia, made no secret of their ambitious views;

they stifled all local publications, and even suppressed the public

address of Florida Blanca, who, as president of the Murcian junta,

had recommended the formation of a supreme central government. They

wasted their time in vain and frivolous disputes, and neglecting

every concern of real importance, sacrificed the general welfare to

views of private advantage and interest. They made promotions in

the army without regard to public opinion or merit; they overlaid

all real patriotism; bestowed on their own creatures places of

emolument, to the patronage of which they had not a legal right;

and even usurped the royal prerogative of appointing canons in

the church, for their cupidity equalled their ambition. They

intercepted, as I have already related, the pecuniary supplies

necessary to enable the army to act; they complained that La

Mancha and Madrid, in whose defence they said “_their_ troops

were sacrificing themselves,” did not subsist and supply the

force under Castaños; under the pretence of forming a nucleus for

disciplining thirty thousand levies as a reserve, they retained

five battalions at Seville, and, having by this draft weakened the

army in the field, they neglected the rest, and never raised a

man. The canonries filled up by them had been vacant for several

years, and the salaries attached to those offices were appropriated

to the public service. The junta now applied the money to their

own and their creatures’ emolument; and at one period they appear

to have contemplated an open partition of the funds received

from England among themselves. Against this flagitious junta also

the public indignation was rife; a plot was formed to assassinate

the members; the municipal authorities remonstrated with them,

the archbishop of Toledo protested against their conduct, and the

junta of Grenada refused to acknowledge their supremacy; but so

great was their arrogance, so unprincipled their ambition, that the

decided and resolute opposition of Castaños alone prevented them

from commencing a civil war, and marching the victorious army of

Baylen against the refractory Granadans. Such was the real state of

Spain, and such the patriotism of the juntas, who were at this time

filling Europe with the sound of their own praise.

[Sidenote: Stuart’s Correspondence. Parliamentary Papers.]

In the northern parts Mr. Stuart endeavoured to reduce this chaos

of folly and wickedness to some degree of order, and to produce

that unity of design and action without which it was impossible to

resist the mighty adversary that threatened the independence of

the Peninsula. He judged that to reduce the conflicting passions

of the moment, a supreme authority, upon which the influence

of Great Britain could be brought to bear with full force, was

indispensable. To convoke the ancient cortez of the realm appeared

to him the most certain and natural method of drawing the strength

and energy of the nation into one compact mass; but there the

foresight of Napoleon interfered; by an able distribution of the

French forces, all direct communication between the northern and

southern provinces was intercepted. Bessieres, Dupont and Moncey at

that time occupied a circle round Madrid, and would have prevented

the local governments of the north from uniting with those of

the southern, if they had been inclined to do so. An union of the

nearest provinces, to be called the northern cortez, then suggested

itself to Mr. Stuart as a preliminary step, which would ensure the

convocation of a general assembly when such a measure should become

practicable. Accordingly he strenuously urged its adoption, but his

efforts, at first, produced no good results. It was in vain that

he represented the danger of remaining in a state of anarchy when

so many violent passions were excited, and such an enemy was in

the heart of the country. It was in vain that he pointed out the

difficulties, that the want of a supreme authority fastened on the

intercourse with the British cabinet, which could not enter into

separate relations with every provincial junta. The Spaniards,

finding that the supplies were not withheld, that their reputation

for patriotism was not lowered in England by actions which little

merited praise, finding, in short, that the English cabinet was

weak enough to gorge their cupidity, flatter their vanity, and

respect their folly, they assented to all Mr. Stuart’s reasoning,

but forwarded none of his propositions, and continued to nourish

the disorders that, cancer-like, were destroying the common cause.

The jarring interests which agitated the northern provinces were

not even subdued by the near approach of danger. The result of

the battle of Rio Seco rather inflamed than allayed the violence

of party feeling. If Bessieres had not been checked in his

operations by the disaster of Dupont, he would have encountered

few obstacles in establishing Joseph’s authority in Gallicia and

Old Castile. The enthusiasm of those provinces never rose to a

great pitch; Bessieres was prepared to use address as well as

force, and among the factions he must doubtless have found support.

The reinforcements continually arriving from France would have

enabled him to maintain his acquisition, and then the ability of

the emperor’s dispositions would have become apparent; for while

Bessieres held Gallicia, and Dupont hung on the southern frontier

of Portugal with twenty-five thousand men, Junot could have

securely concentrated his army in the neighbourhood of Lisbon,

and have rendered an English disembarkation on the coast nearly

impracticable.

[Sidenote: Azanza and O’Farril, Mem.]

The whole of the French monarch’s combinations were overturned by

the disgraceful capitulation of Baylen, and when Joseph evacuated

Madrid a fresh impulse was given to the spirit of the people;

but, unfortunately for Spain, as a wider scope for ambition was

obtained, the workings of self-interest increased, fresh parties

sprung up, and new follies and greater absurdities stifled the

virtue of the country, and produced irremediable confusion, ending

in ruin. The fact of Dupont’s capitulation was made known to the

council of Castile before king Joseph was informed of it, and

the council, foreseeing all the consequences of such an event,

immediately refused, as I have already related, to promulgate

officially his accession to the throne. Joseph permitted this act

of obedience to pass without much notice. He was naturally averse

to violence, and neither he, nor his brother Napoleon, did at any

period of the contest for Spain constrain a Spaniard to accept or

retain office under the intrusive government. Joseph went further;

before he abandoned Madrid, he released his ministers from their

voluntary oath of allegiance to himself, and left them free to

choose their party once more. Don Pedro Cevallos and the marquis

of Pinuelo changed with, what appeared to them, changing fortune;

but five others remained steadfast, preferring an ameliorated

government under a foreign prince to what they believed to be

a hopeless struggle, but which, if successful, they knew must

end in a degrading native despotism; perhaps, also, a little

swayed by their dislike to England, and by the impossibility of

obtaining that influence among their countrymen which, under other

circumstances, their talents and character would have ensured.

[Sidenote: Sir H. Dalrymple’s Papers. Coxe’s Correspondence.]

The boldness of the council of Castille was not publicly chastised

by the intruding monarch, but secretly he punished the members by

a dexterous stroke of policy. General Grouchy wrote to Castaños,

saying, that circumstances had arisen which required the presence

of the French troops in another quarter, and he invited the Spanish

general to take immediate possession of Madrid for the preservation

of public tranquillity. This communication gave rise to an opinion

that the French were going to evacuate Spain; a report so congenial

to the vanity and indolence of the Spaniards was greedily received,

and contributed among other causes to the subsequent supineness

of the nation in preparing for its defence; thus by appealing to

Castaños, and affecting to treat the council of Castille as a

body who had lost their influence with the nation, Joseph gave a

handle to their enemies which the latter failed not to lay hold

of. The juntas dreaded that the influence of such a body would

destroy their own; that of Gallicia would not communicate with

them, affirming that, individually, the members were attached to

the French, and that, collectively, they had been the most active

instrument of the usurper’s government. The junta of Seville

endeavoured not only to destroy the authority of the existing

members, but to annul that of the council, as an acknowledged

tribunal of the state. The council, however, was not wanting to

itself, the individuals composing it did not hesitate to seize the

reins of government the moment the French had departed; and the

prudence with which they preserved tranquillity in the capital, and

prevented all re-action, proves that they were not without merit;

and forms a striking contrast to the conduct of the provincial

juntas, under whose savage sway every kind of excess was committed,

and even encouraged.

Aware of the hostility they had to encounter, the members of the

council lost no time in forming a party to support themselves. Don

Arias Mon y Velarde, dean or president for the time being, wrote

a circular letter to the local juntas, pointing out the necessity

of establishing a central and supreme power, and proposing that

deputies from each province, or nation, as they were sometimes

called, should repair to Madrid, and there concert with the council

the best mode of carrying such a measure into effect. If this

proposal had been adopted, all power would inevitably have fallen

into the hands of the proposers. Confessedly the first public body

in the state, and well acquainted with the forms of business; the

council must necessarily have had a preponderating influence in

the assembly of delegates, and it appeared so reasonable that it

should take the lead, when an efficient authority was required to

direct the violence of the people in a useful channel, before the

moment of safety was passed; that all the juntas trembled at the

prospect of losing their misused power. The minor ones submitted,

and agreed to send deputies. The stronger and more ambitious felt

that subtlety would avail more than open opposition to the project.

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence.]

[Sidenote: Cox’s Correspon^{ce}. Appendix, No. 13, section 5.]

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence.]

The council followed up this blow by the publication of a

manifesto, containing an accurate detail of the events of the

revolution, defending the part taken by its members, and claiming a

renewal of the confidence formerly reposed in them by the nation.

This important state paper was so ably written, that a large

party, especially at Valladolid, was immediately formed in favour

of its authors; and the junta of Seville were so sensible of the

increasing influence of the council, that they intercepted a copy

of this manifesto, addressed to sir Hew Dalrymple, and strictly

suppressed all writings favourable to the formation of a supreme

central authority. Nothing they dreaded more; but it was no longer

possible to resist the current, which had set strongly in favour of

such a measure. The juntas, however they might oppose its progress,

could not openly deny the propriety of it, and in every province,

individuals of talent and consideration called for a change in the

Hydra polity, which oppressed the country, and was inefficient

against the enemy. Every British functionary, civil or military,

in communication with the Spaniards, also urged the necessity of

concentrating the executive power.

[Sidenote: Ibid.]

The provincial juntas were become universally odious. Some of the

generals alone, who had suddenly risen to command under their

rule, were favourable to them; but Palafox was independent,

as a captain-general, whose power was confirmed by success;

Castaños openly declared that he would no longer serve under

their control, and Cuesta was prepared to put them down by

force, and to re-establish the royal audienzas and the authority

of the captains-general according to the old practice. In this

state of affairs, the retreat of Bessieres’ army freed the

communication with the southern parts, and removed all excuse for

procrastination. The juntas of Gallicia, Castille, Leon, and the

Asturias, gave way to the unceasing remonstrances of Mr. Stuart,

and at his instance agreed to meet in cortez, at Lugo; Gallicia,

however, first insisted upon a formal ratification of the treaty

with Castille already mentioned.

When the moment of assembling arrived, the Asturians, without

assigning any reason, refused to fulfil the engagement they had

entered into, and the three remaining juntas held the session

without them. The bishop of Orense, and the junta of Gallicia, were

prepared to assert the supremacy of that province over the others,

but the Baily Valdez of Castille, an able and disinterested man,

being chosen president of the convocation, proposed, on the first

day of assembly, that deputies should be appointed to represent

the three provinces in a supreme junta, to be assembled in some

central place, for the purpose of convoking the ancient cortez of

the whole kingdom according to the old forms, and of settling the

administration of the interior, and the future succession to the

throne. This proposition was immediately carried by the superior

number of the Castillians and Leonese; but the bishop of Orense

protested against it, and the Gallician members strongly opposed

an arrangement, by which their province was placed on the same

footing as others, a glaring injustice (in their opinion) when the

numbers of the Gallician army were taken into consideration; for

the local feeling of ambition was uppermost, and the general cause

disregarded. The other party answered, with great force, that the

Gallician army was paid, armed, and clothed, by England, and fed by

Castille and Leon.

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence.]

Meanwhile the influence of the council of Castille greatly

increased, and the junta of Seville, quickened by fear, took the

lead in directing what they could not prevent. The convocation

of the cortez they knew would be fatal to their own existence;

wherefore, in a public letter, addressed to the junta of Gallicia,

dated one day previous to the circular of don Arias Mon, but

evidently written after the receipt of the latter, they opposed the

assembling of the cortez on the ground that it was “the prerogative

of the king to convoke that body, and if it was called together by

any other authority, the provinces would not obey.” “There would

be no unanimity.” The futility of this argument is apparent. The

question was not one of form, but of expediency. If the nation was

in favour of such a step, (and after facts proved that the people

were not opposed to it) the same necessity which constituted the

right of the junta to declare war against the French, (another

prerogative of the monarch) would have sufficed to legalize the

convocation of the national assembly. But their sole object was

to preserve their own power. They maintained that the juntas,

being chosen by the nation, were the only legitimate depositaries

of authority, and that to members of their own bodies only could

any of that authority be delegated; and adopting thereupon the

suggestion contained in the letter of Arias Mon, they proposed that

two deputies from each supreme junta should repair, not to Madrid,

but to Ciudad Real, or Almagro, and at the moment of meeting should

be in fact constituted governors-general of the kingdom, and as

such obeyed. Nevertheless, the local governments were, with due

subordination to the central junta, to retain and exercise in

their own provinces all the authority with which they had already

invested themselves. Thus they had only to choose subservient

deputies, and their power would be more firmly fixed than before.

This arrangement would, doubtless, have been readily adopted by

the junta of Gallicia; but the rapidity with which Valdez carried

his proposition, prevented that cause of discord from being added

to the numerous disputes which already distracted the northern

provinces. Mr. Stuart, impelled by the political tide, proceeded

onward to Madrid, observing, wherever he passed, the same violence

of local party feeling, and the general disgust occasioned by the

conduct of the oligarchical provincial governments. Pride, vanity,

corruption, and improvidence, were every where obtrusively visible.

[Sidenote: Stuart’s Correspondence.]

The dispute between Blake and Cuesta, which was raging at the

period of the battle of Rio Seco, a period when division was

most hurtful to the military operations, was now allayed between

the generals; but their political partizans waged war with more

bitterness than ever, as if with the intent to do the greatest

possible mischief, by continuing the feud among the civil branches

of the government, when union was most desirable in that quarter.

The seeds of division had taken deep root. The Baily Valdez chosen,

as I have said, a deputy to the supreme junta, was obnoxious to

general Cuesta, a man not to be offended with impunity when he had

power to punish.

Don Gregorio Cuesta was haughty and incredibly obstinate. He

had been president of the council of Castille, and he was

captain-general of Castille and Leon when the insurrection first

broke out. Disliking all revolutionary movements, although as

inimical to a foreign domination as any of his countrymen, he

endeavoured to repress the public effervescence, and to maintain

the tranquillity of the country at the risk of losing his life

as a traitor. He was an honest man, insomuch as the Spanish and

French interests being put in competition, he would aid the former,

but, between his country’s cause and his own passions, he was

not honest. He disliked, and with reason, the sway of the local

juntas, and with consistency of opinion, he wished to preserve the

authority of the captains-general and the royal audienzas, both

of which had been overturned by the establishment of those petty

governments; but, sullen and ferocious in his temper, he supported

his opinion with an authority and severity which had no guide but

his own will, and he was prepared, if an opportunity offered, to

exercise military influence over the supreme, as well as over the

subordinate juntas. He had himself appointed one for Leon and

Castille as a sort of council, subordinate to the authority of

captain-general; but, after the battle of Rio Seco, the members

fled to Ponteferrada, assumed the supreme authority, and putting

themselves under the protection of his enemy Blake, disregarded

Cuesta’s orders, and presumed to command him, their superior, to

deliver up his cavalry to the former general; wherefore he annulled

all their proceedings at Ponteferrada, and now asserting that the

election of Valdez and his colleagues was void, as being contrary

to the existing laws, he directed new juntas to be assembled in a

manner more conformable to existing usages, and a fresh election to

be made.

His mandates were disregarded; Valdez and the other deputies

proceeded in defiance of them towards the place appointed for

the assembly of the central and supreme government, and Cuesta,

in return, without hesitation, abandoned the operations of the

campaign, which, in the council of war held at Madrid, he had

promised to aid, and falling back to Segovia with twelve thousand

men, seized the deputies, and shut up Valdez a close prisoner in

the tower of that place, declaring his intention to try him by

a military tribunal for disobedience; and such was the disorder

of the times, that Cuesta was not without plausible arguments to

justify this act of stubborn violence; for the original election of

members to form the junta of Castille and Leon had been any thing

but legal; several districts had been omitted altogether in the

representation of those kingdoms, many deputies had been chosen by

the city of Leon alone, and Valdez was named president, although

neither a native nor a proprietor, and for those reasons ineligible

to be a deputy at all. The kingdom of Leon also had appointed

representatives for those districts in Castille which were under

the domination of the French, and when the enemy retired, the

Castillians in vain demanded a more equitable arrangement.

However, amidst all this confusion and violence, the plan of

uniting to form a central government gained ground all over the

kingdom. Seville, Catalonia, Arragon, Murcia, Valencia, and

Asturias, appointed their deputies. Fresh disputes relative to the

place of assembly now arose, but after some time it was agreed to

meet at Aranjuez. This royal residence was chosen contrary to the

wishes of many, and notably against the opinion of Jovellanos,

an eloquent person, and of great reputation for integrity, but

of a pertinacious temper, unsuitable to the times. He urged that

the capital was the meetest spot; but he was answered, that the

turbulent disposition of the inhabitants of Madrid would impede the

formation of a government, and that the same objection would exist

against the choice of any other large town. It is extraordinary

that such an argument should be held in Spain at a moment when the

people were, in all the official and public papers, represented as

perfectly enthusiastic, and united in one common sacred pursuit,

and in the British parliament were denominated the “universal

Spanish nation!”

[Sidenote: Cox’s Correspondence.]

To seek thus for protection in a corner, instead of manfully and

confidently identifying themselves with the people, and courting

publicity, augured ill for the intentions of the deputies, nor

was the augury belied by the event. The junta of Seville, who had

so bitterly reviled the council of Castille, for having partially

submitted to the usurper, had, notwithstanding, chosen for their

own deputies, don Vincente Hore, a known creature of the prince of

peace, and the count de Tilly Gusman, who was under the stigma of

a judicial sentence for robbery. Hore declined the appointment;

but Tilly, braving the public disgust, repaired to Aranjuez, and

his place as resident with the head-quarters of the Andalusian

army was filled up by Miñiano, another member of the junta, who

received an enormous salary for performing the mischievous duties

of that office. The instructions given by the different provinces

to the deputies were to confine their deliberations and votes to

such subjects as they should, from time to time, receive directions

from their constituents to treat of. Seville again took the lead

in this fraudulent policy, and when public indignation and the

remonstrances of some right-minded persons, obliged the juntas

of that town and of Valencia to rescind these instructions, both

substituted secret orders of the same tenor; in short the greater

part of the deputies were the mere tools of the juntas; agents,

watching over the interests of their employers, and (conscious of

demerit) anxious to hide themselves from the just indignation of

the public until they had consolidated their power; hence the

dislike to large towns and the intrigues for fixing the government

at Aranjuez.

Count Florida Blanca, a man in the last stage of decrepitude, was

chosen first president in rotation for three months, and all idea

of choosing an independent executive was abandoned; Jovellanos

proposed to establish a regency selected from their own body; but

his plan was rejected on the ground that the members were not

authorised to delegate their powers even to one another. It was

palpable that the juntas had merely appeared to comply with the

public wish for a central government, but were determined not to

part with one iota of their own real power.

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence. Col. Graham’s ditto.]

The first act of authority executed by the assembly was, however,

a necessary assertion of its own dignity, which had been violated

in the case of Valdez. Cuesta, who was personally unpopular,

and feared by the central, as well as by the provincial juntas,

was summoned to release his captive, and to repair to Aranjuez,

that cognizance might be taken of his proceedings; he was at

the same time denounced by the juntas of Castille and Leon as a

traitor, and exposed to great danger of popular commotion. At

first Cuesta haughtily repelled the interference of Castaños and

Florida Blanca, but finally he was forced to bend, and after a

sharp correspondence with Mr. Stuart, whose influence was usefully

employed to strengthen the central government, he released his

prisoner, and quitting the command of the army, appeared at

Aranjuez. No formal proceedings were had upon the case; but after

much mutual recrimination, Valdez was admitted to the exercise

of his functions, and the old general was detained at the seat

of government, a kind of state prisoner at large, until, for the

misfortune of his country, he was, by subsequent events, once more

placed at the head of an army.

About this time lord William Bentinck joined Mr. Stuart at Madrid.

Perfectly coinciding in opinions, they laboured earnestly to give

a favourable turn to affairs, by directing the attention of the

central junta, to the necessity of military preparations, and

active exertion for defence; but the picture of discord, folly,

and improvidence exhibited in the provinces, was here displayed

in more glaring colours. The lesser tribunals being called upon

to acknowledge the authority of the assembled deputies, readily

obeyed; but the council of Castille, reluctant to submit, and

too weak to resist, endeavoured to make terms; they were forced,

however, to an unconditional submission.

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence.]

[Sidenote: Ibid.]

A good management of the revenue, a single chief for the army, and,

above all, the total suppression of the provincial juntas, were

the three objects of public anxiety. With respect to the army, no

doubt was at first entertained that Castaños would be appointed

commander-in-chief; his services entitled him to the office, and

his general moderation and conciliating manners fitted him for

it at a time when so much jealousy was to be soothed and so many

interests to be reconciled. The past expenditure of the money

received from England was also a subject of great importance, and

it was loudly required that an account of its disbursement should

be demanded of the local juntas, and a surrender of the residue

instantly enforced. These just expectations lasted but a short

time; scarcely were the deputies assembled, when every prospect of

a vigorous administration was blasted. Dividing themselves into

sections, answering in number to the departments of state under the

old king, they appointed a secretary not chosen from their own

body, to each, and declared all and every one of these sections,

supreme and independent, having equal authority.

[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers.]

Florida Blanca informed Mr. Stuart and lord William Bentinck that

Castaños would be named generalissimo, and the latter was even

appointed to confer with him upon the plan of campaign for the

British troops, then marching from Portugal to the assistance of

the Spaniards. The necessity of having a single chief at the head

of the armies was imperious, and acknowledged by every individual,

military or civil; yet such was the force of jealousy, and so

stubborn were the tools of the different juntas, that all the

exertions of Mr. Stuart and lord William Bentinck, and all the

influence of the British cabinet, failed to get one appointed.

The generals were all confirmed in their separate and independent

commands, the old and miserable system of the Dutch deputies in

Marlborough’s time, and of the commissaries of the convention,

during the French revolution, was partially revived, and the

expressed wishes of the English government were totally disregarded

at a time when it had supplied Spain with two hundred thousand

musquets, clothing, ammunition of all kinds in proportion, and

ten millions of dollars. Such ample succours, if rightly managed,

ought to have secured to the English cabinet unlimited influence;

but as the benefits came through one set of persons, and the

demands through another, the first were taken as of right, the

last unheeded, and the resources of Great Britain were wasted

without materially improving the condition of Spain; the armies

were destitute, the central government was without credit, and

notwithstanding the ample subsidies, contracted a large debt.

[Sidenote: Stuart’s Corresp^{ce}. Lord W. Bentinck’s Ditto.]

[Sidenote: Lord W. Bentinck’s Corresp^{ce}. Appendix, No. 13,

section 6.]

The provincial juntas were still permitted to retain their power

within their own districts, and the greatest timidity marked all

the proceedings of the central government in relation to those

obnoxious bodies. Attentive, however, to their own interests, the

members of the supreme junta decreed, 1st. that their persons

should be inviolable; 2d. that the president should have the title

of highness, with a salary of 25,000 crowns a year; 3d. that each

of the deputies, taking the title of excellency, should have a

yearly salary of 5,000 crowns; and lastly, that the collective

body should be addressed by the title of majesty. Thinking that

they were now sufficiently confirmed in power to venture upon a

public entry into Madrid, the junta made preparations to ensure a

favourable reception from the populace. They resolved to declare a

general amnesty, to lower the duties on tobacco, and to fling large

sums among the people during the procession; but, in the midst of

all this pomp and vanity, the presence of the enemy on the soil

was scarcely remembered, and the details of business were totally

neglected, a prominent evil that extended to the lowest branches

of administration. Self-interest, indeed, produced abundance of

activity, but every department, almost every man, seemed struck

with torpor when the public welfare was at stake; and withal, an

astonishing presumption was common to the highest and the lowest.

[Sidenote: Lord W. Bentinck’s Corresp^{ce}.]

To supply the place of a generalissimo, a council or board of

general officers was projected, on whose reports the junta proposed

to regulate the military operations. Castaños was destined to be

president; but some difficulty arising relative to the appointment

of the other members, the execution of the plan was deferred, with

the characteristic remark “that when the enemy was driven across

the frontier, Castaños would have leisure to take his seat.” The

idea of a defeat, the possibility of failure, never entered their

minds; the government evincing neither apprehension, nor activity,

nor foresight, were contented if the people believed the daily

falsehoods they promulgated relative to the enemy; and the people,

equally presumptuous, were content to be so deceived; in fine, all

the symptoms of a ruined cause were already visible to discerning

eyes. The armies neglected even to nakedness, and the soldier’s

constancy under privations cruelly abused; disunion, cupidity,

incapacity, in the higher orders; the patriotic ardour visibly

abating among the lower classes; the rulers grasping, improvident,

and boasting; the enemy powerful; the people insubordinate, and

the fighting men without arms or bread; as a whole, and in all

its parts, the government unfitted for its task; cumbrous and

ostentatious, its system, to use the comprehensive words of Mr.

Stuart, “was neither calculated to inspire courage nor to increase

enthusiasm.”

The truth of this picture will be recognized by men who are yet

living, and whose exertions were as incessant as unavailing to

remedy those evils at the time. It will be recognized by the

friends of a great man, who fell a victim to the folly and base

intrigues of the day; and finally, it will be recognized by that

general and army, who, afterwards winning their own unaided way

through Spain, found that to trust Spaniards in war was to lean

against a broken reed. To others it may appear exaggerated; for

without having seen it is difficult to believe the extent of a

disorder that paralized the enthusiasm of a whole people.

EXTERNAL POLITICAL RELATIONS OF SPAIN.

At first these were of necessity confined to a few foreign courts;

England, Sicily, and Portugal; the rest of the Old World was either

subject to Buonaparte or directly under his influence; but in the

New World it was different: the Brazils, after the emigration of

the royal family of Braganza, became important under every point

of view, and relations were established between the junta and

that court, that afterwards under the cortez created considerable

interest, and threatened serious embarrassments to the operations

of the duke of Wellington.

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Corresp^{ce}. MS. Sir Hew Dalrymple.]

The ultra-marine possessions of Spain were, of course, a matter

of great anxiety to both sides; Napoleon’s activity balanced the

natural preponderance of the mother country. The slowness of the

local juntas, or rather their want of capacity to conduct such an

affair, gave the enemy a great advantage. It was only owing to the

exertions of Mr. Stuart in the north, and of sir Hew Dalrymple

and lord Collingwood in the south, that, after the insurrection

broke out, vessels were despatched to South America to confirm

the colonists in their adherence to Spain, and to arrange the

mode of securing the resources of those great possessions for the

parent state. The hold which Spain retained over her colonies was,

however, very slight; her harsh restrictive system had long before

weakened the attachment of the South Americans; the expedition of

Miranda, although unsuccessful, had kindled a fire which could

not be extinguished; and it was apparent to all able statesmen,

that Spain must relinquish her arbitrary mode of governing, or

relinquish the colonies altogether; the insurrection at home only

rendered this more certain; every argument, every public manifesto

put forth in Europe, to animate the Spaniards against foreign

aggression, told against them in America. Yet for a time the latter

transmitted the produce of the mines, and many of the natives

served in the Spanish armies.

Napoleon, notwithstanding his activity, and the offers which he

made of the vice-royalty of Mexico to Cuesta, Castaños, Blake,

and probably to others residing in that country, failed to

create a French party of any consequence. The Americans were

unwilling to plunge into civil strife for a less object than

their own independence: the arrogance and injustice of Old Spain,

however, increased, rather than diminished, under the sway of the

insurrectional government, and at last, as it is well known, a

general rebellion of the South American states established the

independence of the fairest portion of the globe, and proved, how

little the abstract love of freedom influenced the resistance of

the old country to Napoleon.

The intercourse with the English court, which had been hitherto

carried on through the medium of the deputies, who first arrived in

London to claim assistance, was now placed upon a regular footing.

The deputies, at the desire of Mr. Canning, were recalled, and

admiral Apodaca was appointed envoy extraordinary and minister

plenipotentiary at St. James’s, and Mr. John Hookham Frere was

accredited, with the same diplomatic rank, near the central junta.

Mr. Stuart, whose knowledge of the state of the country, whose

acquaintance with the character of the leading persons, and

whose able and energetic exertions had so much contributed to

the formation of a central government, was superseded by this

injudicious appointment, and thus a great political machine,

with every wheel in violent action, was, at the critical moment,

left without any controlling power or guiding influence; for Mr.

Stuart, who, on his own responsibility, had quitted Coruña, and

repaired to Madrid, and had remitted the most exact and important

information of what was passing, remained for three months without

receiving a single line from Mr. Canning, approving or disapproving

of his proceedings, or giving him instructions how to act at this

important crisis: a strange remissness, indicating the bewildered

state of the ministers, who slowly and with difficulty followed,

when they should have been prepared to lead. Their tardy abortive

measures demonstrated, how wide the space between a sophist and a

statesman, and how dangerous to a nation is that public feeling

which, insatiable of words, disregards the actions of men,

esteeming more the interested eloquence and wit of an orator like

Demades, than the simple integrity, sound judgment, and great

exploits, of a general like Phocion.

Such were the preparations made by Spain in September and October,

to meet the exigencies of a period replete with danger and

difficulty. It would be instructive to contrast the exertions of

the “enthusiastic Spaniards” during these three months of their

insurrection, with the efforts of “discontented France,” in the

hundred days of Napoleon’s second reign. The junta were, however,

not devoid of ambition, for even before the battle of Baylen, that

of Seville was occupied with a project of annexing the Algarves

to Spain, and the treaty of Fontainebleau was far from being

considered as a dead letter.

CHAPTER III.

[Sidenote: Letter to Murat. Las Casas.]

The French emperor, although surprised and chagrined at the

disgrace which, for the first time, his armies had sustained, was

nothing dismayed by a resistance which he had early contemplated

as not improbable. With a piercing glance he had observed the

efforts of Spain, and calculated the power of foreign influence

in keeping alive the spirit of resistance. Assigning a just value

to the succours which England could afford, he foresaw the danger

which might accrue, if he suffered an insurrection of peasants,

that had already dishonoured the glory of his arms, to attain the

consistency of regular government, to league with powerful nations,

and to become disciplined troops.

To defeat the raw levies which the Spaniards had hitherto opposed

to his soldiers, was an easy matter, but it was necessary to crush

them to atoms, that a dread of his invincible power might still

pervade the world, and the secret influence of his genius remain

unabated. The constitution of Bayonne would, he was aware, weigh

heavy in the scale against those chaotic governments, neither

monarchical, nor popular, nor aristocratic, nor federal, which the

Spanish revolution was throwing up; but before the benefit of that

could be felt by the many, before he could draw any advantages from

his moral resources, it was necessary to develop all his military

strength. The moment was critical and dangerous. He was surrounded

by enemies whose pride he had wounded, but whose means of offence

he had not destroyed. If he bent his forces against the Peninsula,

England might again excite the continent to arms, and Russia and

Austria once more banding together, might raise Prussia and renew

the eternal coalitions. The designs of Austria, although covered by

the usual artifices of that cunning rapacious court, were not so

hidden but that, earlier or later, a war from that quarter was to

be expected as a certain event.

[Sidenote: Baron Fain’s Campaign. 1813.]

The inhabitants of Prussia, subdued and oppressed, could not be

supposed tranquil: the secret societies, that, under the name of

Tugenbunde, Gymnasiasts, and other denominations, have since been

persecuted by those who were then glad to avail themselves of

such assistance, were just beginning to disclose their force and

plans. A baron de Nostiz, Stein, the Prussian counsellor of state,

generals Sharnhost and Gneizenau, and colonel Schill, appear to

have been the principal contrivers and patrons of these societies,

so characteristic of Germans, who, regular and plodding, even to a

proverb in their actions, possess the most extravagant imaginations

of any people on the face of the earth. Whatever the ulterior

views of these associations may have been, at this period they

were universally inimical to the French, their intent was to drive

the latter over the Rhine, and they were a source of peril to the

emperor, the more to be feared, as the extent of their influence

could not be immediately ascertained.

Russia also, little injured by her losses, was more powerful

perhaps from her defeats, because more enlightened as to the cause

of them: Napoleon felt, that the hostility of such a great empire

would require all his means to repel, and that, consequently, his

Spanish operations must be confined in a manner unsuitable to

the fame of his arms. Of a long-sighted policy he had, however,

prepared the means of obviating this danger, by drawing the emperor

of Russia into a conference at Erfurth, whither the French monarch

repaired, confident in the resources of his genius for securing the

friendship of the czar.

At this period, it may be truly said, that Napoleon supported the

weight of the world; every movement of his produced a political

convulsion; yet so sure, so confident was he, of his intellectual

superiority, that he sought but to gain one step, and doubted not

to overcome all resistance, and preserve his ascendancy. Time was

to him victory; if he gained the one, the other followed. Sudden

and prompt in execution, he prepared for one of those gigantic

efforts which have stamped this age with the greatness of antiquity.

His armies were scattered over Europe. In Italy, in Dalmatia, on

the Rhine, the Danube, the Elbe; in Prussia, Denmark, Poland, his

legions were to be found. Over that vast extent, above five hundred

thousand disciplined men maintained the supremacy of France. From

those bands he drew the imperial guards, the select soldiers of the

warlike nation he governed, and the terror of the other continental

troops. The veterans of Jena, of Austerlitz, of Friedland, reduced

in number, but of confirmed hardihood, were collected into one

corps, and marched towards Spain. A host of cavalry, unequalled for

enterprise and knowledge of war, were also directed against that

devoted land, and a long train of gallant soldiers followed, until

two hundred thousand men, accustomed to battle, had penetrated

the gloomy fastnesses of the western Pyrenees. Forty thousand

men of inferior reputation, drawn from the interior of France,

from Naples, from Tuscany, and from Piedmont, were assembled at

Perpignan.

The march of this multitude was incessant, and as they passed the

capital, Napoleon, neglectful of nothing which could excite their

courage and swell their military pride, addressed to them one of

those nervous orations that shoot like fire to the heart of a real

soldier. In the tranquillity of peace it may seem inflated, but on

the eve of battle it is thus a general should speak.

“Soldiers! after triumphing on the banks of the Vistula and the

Danube, with rapid steps you have passed through Germany. This

day, without a moment of repose, I command you to traverse France.

Soldiers! I have need of you! The hideous presence of the leopard

contaminates the peninsula of Spain and Portugal. In terror he must

fly before you. Let us bear our triumphal eagles to the pillars of

Hercules, there also we have injuries to avenge! Soldiers! you have

surpassed the renown of modern armies, but have you yet equalled

the glory of those Romans who, in one and the same campaign, were

victorious upon the Rhine and the Euphrates, in Illyria and upon

the Tagus! A long peace, a lasting prosperity, shall be the reward

of your labours. A real Frenchman could not, ought not, to rest

until the seas are free and open to all. Soldiers! all that you

have done, all that you will do, for the happiness of the French

people and for my glory, shall be eternal in my heart!”

Thus saying, he caused his troops to proceed towards the frontiers

of Spain, and himself hastened to meet the emperor Alexander at

Erfurth. Their conference, conducted upon the footing of intimate

friendship, produced a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive,

and the fate of Spain was, by the one, with calm indifference,

abandoned to the injustice of the other.

The accession of strength which this treaty, and the manifest

personal partiality of Alexander, gave to the French emperor,

inspired him perhaps with the idea, that the English cabinet would,

if a fair occasion offered, gladly enter into negotiations for a

general peace. The two emperors wrote a joint letter to the king

of England. “The circumstances of Europe had,” they said, “brought

them together; their first thought was to yield to the wish and

the wants of every people, and to seek, in a speedy pacification,

the most efficacious remedy for the miseries which oppressed all

nations. The long and bloody war which had torn the continent was

at an end, without the possibility of being renewed. Many changes

had taken place in Europe, many states had been overthrown; the

cause was to be found in the state of agitation and misery in

which the stagnation of maritime commerce had placed the greatest

nations: still greater changes might yet take place, and all of

them contrary to the policy of the English nation. Peace, then,

was, at once, the interest of the people of the continent, as it

was the interest of the people of Great Britain. We entreat your

majesty,” they concluded, “we unite to entreat your majesty to

listen to the voice of humanity, to silence that of the passions;

to seek, with the intention of arriving at that object, to

conciliate all interests, and thus preserve all powers which exist,

ensure the happiness of Europe and of this generation, at the head

of which Providence has placed us.”

To this joint letter Mr. Canning replied by two letters to the

French and Russian ministers, accompanied by an official note.

In that addressed to the Russian, he observed, that “however

desirous the king might be to reply personally to the emperor,

he was prevented, by the unusual mode of communication adopted,

which had deprived it of a private and personal character. It was

impossible to pay that mark of respect to the emperor, without at

the same time acknowledging titles which he had never acknowledged.

The proposition for peace would be communicated to Sweden, and to

the existing government of Spain. It was necessary that his majesty

should receive an immediate assurance, that France acknowledged

the government of Spain as a party to the negotiation. That such

was the intention of the emperor could not be doubted, when the

lively interest manifested by his imperial majesty for the welfare

and dignity of the Spanish monarchy was recollected. No other

assurance was wanted, that the emperor could not have been induced

to sanction by his concurrence or approbation, usurpations, the

principles of which were not less unjust than their example was

dangerous to all legitimate sovereigns.”

The letter addressed to Mons. de Champagny, duke of Cadore, merely

reiterated the claim for Sweden and Spain being admitted as parties

to the negotiation. The official note commenced by stating the

king’s desire for peace, on terms consistent with his honour, his

fidelity to his engagements, and the permanent repose of Europe.

The miserable condition of the continent, the convulsions it had

experienced, and those with which it was threatened, were not

imputable to his majesty. If the cause of so much misery was to be

found in the stagnation of commercial intercourse, although his

majesty could _not be expected to hear with unqualified regret_,

that the system devised for the destruction of the commerce of

his subjects had recoiled upon its authors or its instruments;

yet, as it was neither the disposition of his majesty, nor in the

character of the people over whom he reigned to rejoice in the

privations and unhappiness even of the nations which were combined

against him, he anxiously desired the termination of the sufferings

of the continent. The note, after stating that the progress of the

war had imposed new obligations upon Great Britain, claimed for

Sicily, for Portugal, for Sweden, and for Spain, a participation

in the negotiations. Treaties, it stated, existed with the three

first, which bound them and England in peace and war. With Spain

indeed no formal instrument had yet been executed, but the ties

of honour were, to the king of England, as strong as the most

solemn treaties; wherefore it was assumed, that the central junta,

or government of Spain, was understood to be a party to any

negotiation, in which his majesty was invited to engage.

The reply of Russia was peremptory. The claims of the sovereigns,

allies of Great Britain, she would readily admit. But the

insurgents of Spain, Russia would not acknowledge as an independent

power. The Russians (and England, it was said, could recollect

one particular instance) had always been true to this principle;

moreover, the emperor had acknowledged Joseph Buonaparte as king

of Spain, and was united to the French emperor for peace and for

war; he was resolved not to separate his interests from those of

Napoleon. After some further arguments touching the question, the

reply concluded by offering to treat upon the basis of the “uti

possidetis,” and the respective power of the belligerent parties,

or upon _any basis_; for the conclusion of an honourable, just, and

equal peace.

The insulting tone of Mr. Canning’s communication produced an

insulting reply from monsieur de Champagny, which also finished

by proposing the “uti possidetis” as a basis for a treaty, and

expressing a hope, that without losing sight of the inevitable

results of the force of states, it would be remembered, that

between great powers there could be no solid peace but that which

was equal and honourable for both parties. Upon the receipt of

these replies, the English minister broke off the negotiations, and

all chance of peace vanished; but previous to the conclusion of

this remarkable correspondence, Napoleon had returned to Paris.

[Sidenote: O’Meara. Voice from St. Helena. Vol. 2.]

What his real views in proposing to treat were, it is difficult

to determine; he could not have expected that Great Britain

would relinquish the cause of Spain, he must therefore have been

prepared to make some arrangement upon that head, unless the whole

proceeding was an artifice to sow distrust among his enemies.

The English ministers asserted that it was so; but what enemies

were they among whom he could create this uneasy feeling? Sweden,

Sicily, Portugal! the notion as applied to them was absurd; it is

more probable that he was sincere. He said so at Saint Helena, and

the peculiar circumstances of the period at which the conferences

of Erfurth took place, warrant a belief in that assertion. The

menacing aspect of Austria, the recent loss of Portugal, the

hitherto successful insurrection of Spain, the secret societies

of Germany, the desire of consolidating the Polish dominions, and

placing, while he might, a barrier to the power of Russia on that

side, the breach which the events of the Peninsula made in his

continental system of excluding British goods, and the commercial

distresses of Europe, were cogent reasons for a peace, they

might well cause him to be suspicious of the future, and render

him anxious for an excuse to abandon an unjust contest, in which

he could not fail to suffer much, and to risk more than he could

gain. In securing the alliance of Russia, he only disentangled a

part of the Gordian knot of politics; to cut the remainder with his

sword was at this conjuncture a task which even he might have been

doubtful of. The fact that his armies were marching upon Spain,

proves nothing to the contrary of this supposition. Time was to him

of the utmost consequence. His negotiations proving abortive, it

would have been too late to have reinforced his troops on the Ebro;

and the event evinced the prudence of his measures in that respect.

The refusal to admit the Spaniards as a party to the conferences

for peace is scarcely more conclusive; to have done that would have

been to resign the weapon in his hands before he entered the lists.

That England could not abandon the Spaniards is unquestionable;

but that was not a necessary consequence of continuing the

negotiations. There was a bar put to the admission of a Spanish

diplomatist, but no bar was thereby put to the discussion of

Spanish interests; the correspondence of the English minister would

not of necessity have compromised Spanish independence, it need not

have relaxed in the slightest degree the measures of hostility,

nor retarded the succours preparing for the patriots; and when

we consider the great power of Napoleon’s arms, the subtlety and

force of his genius, the good fortune which had hitherto attended

his progress in war, and the vast additional strength which the

alliance of Russia conferred at the moment, and when, to oppose

all this, we contrast the scanty means of Spain, and the confusion

into which she was plunged, it does appear as if her welfare would

have been better consulted by an appeal to negotiation rather

than to battle. It is true that Austria was arming; but Austria

had been so often conquered, was so sure to abandon the cause of

the patriots, and every other cause when pressed, so certain to

sacrifice every consideration of honour or faith to the suggestions

of self-interest, that the independence of Spain through the medium

of war could only be regarded as the object of uncertain hope, a

prize to be gained, if gained at all, by wading through torrents

of blood, and sustaining every misery that famine, and the fury

of devastating armies could inflict. To avoid, if possible, such

dreadful evils by negotiating was surely worth trial, and the

force of justice, when urged by the minister of a great nation,

would have been difficult to withstand; no power, no ambition can

resist it and be safe. But such an enlarged mode of proceeding was

not in accord with the shifts and subterfuges that characterized

the policy of the day[15], when it was thought wise to degrade

the dignity of such a correspondence by a ridiculous denial of

Napoleon’s titles; and praiseworthy to render a state paper, in

which such serious interests were discussed, offensive and mean

by miserable sarcasms, evincing the pride of an author more than

the gravity of a statesman. Mr. Whitbread declared in the House of

Commons that he saw no reason for refusing to treat with France at

that period; and although public clamour afterwards induced him to

explain away this expression, he had no reason to be ashamed of it;

for if the opinion of Cicero, that an unfair peace is preferable to

the justest war, was ever worthy of attention, it was so at this

period, when the success of Spain was doubtful, her misery certain,

her salvation only to be obtained through the baptism of blood!

[Sidenote: Imperial Decree, 11th Sept. 1808.]

Upon the 18th of October Napoleon returned to Paris, secure of the

present friendship and alliance of Russia, but uncertain of the

moment when the stimulus of English subsidies would quicken the

hostility of Austria into life; but if his peril was great, his

preparations to meet it were likewise enormous. First he called out

two conscriptions, of which the one taken from the classes of 1806,

7, 8, and 9, afforded eighty thousand men arrived at maturity;

these were destined to replace the veterans directed against Spain.

The second conscription, taken from the class of 1810, also

produced eighty thousand, which were disposed of as reserves in the

dépôts of France.

The force in Germany was concentrated on the side of Austria.

Denmark was evacuated, and one hundred thousand soldiers were

withdrawn from the Prussian states.

The army of Italy was powerfully reinforced, and placed under the

command of prince Eugene, who was assisted by marshal Massena.

Murat also, who had succeeded Joseph in the kingdom of Naples, was

directed to assemble a Neapolitan army on the shores of Calabria,

and to threaten Sicily. In short, no measures that prudence could

suggest were neglected by this wonderful man, to whom the time

required by Austria for the mere preparation of a campaign seemed

sufficient for the subjection of the whole Peninsula.

[Sidenote: Exposé de l’Empire, 1808.]

The session of the legislative body was opened on the 24th of

October; the emperor, in his speech from the throne, after giving a

concise sketch of the political situation of Europe, touched upon

Spain. “In a few days I go,” said he, “to put myself at the head of

my armies, and, with the aid of God, to crown the king of Spain in

Madrid, and to plant my eagles on the towers of Lisbon,” and then

departing from Paris he repaired to Bayonne; but the labours of his

ministers continued; their speeches and reports, more elaborately

explicit than usual, exposed the vast resources of France, and

were well calculated to impress upon the minds of men the danger

of provoking the enmity of such a powerful nation. From those

documents it appeared that the expenses of the year, (including

the interest of the national debt), being between twenty-nine and

thirty millions sterling, were completely covered by the existing

taxes, drawn from a metallic currency, and that no fresh burthens

would be laid upon the nation. Numerous public works were in

progress, internal trade, and that commerce which was carried on by

land, were flourishing, and nearly one million of men were in arms!

The readiness with which Mr. Canning broke off the negotiation

of Erfurth, and defied this stupendous power, would lead to the

supposition that on the side of Spain at least he was prepared to

encounter it with some chance of success; but no trace of a matured

plan is to be found in the instructions to the generals commanding

in Portugal previous to the 25th of September, nor was the project

then adopted one which discovered any adequate knowledge of the

force of the enemy, or of the state of affairs. Indeed the conduct

of the cabinet relative to the Peninsula was scarcely superior to

that of the central junta itself. Several vague projects, or rather

speculations, were communicated to the generals in Portugal, but

in none of them was the strength of the enemy alluded to, in none

was there a settled plan of operations visible. It was evident

that the prodigious activity of the emperor was not taken into

consideration, and that a strange delusion relative to his power,

or to his intentions existed among the English ministers.

[Sidenote: L^d. Castle^s. Despatch. Par^y. Pap^s.]

It was the 6th of October before a despatch, containing the first

determinate plan of campaign, arrived at Lisbon. Thirty thousand

infantry and five thousand cavalry were to be employed in the north

of Spain; of these numbers ten thousand were to be embarked at the

English ports, and the remainder were to be composed of regiments,

drafted from the army then in Portugal. Lieutenant-general sir John

Moore was appointed to command the whole, and he was authorised

(at his own discretion) to effect a junction by a voyage round the

coast, or by a march through the interior. He chose the latter, 1º.

because a voyage at that season of the year would have been tedious

and precarious; 2º. because the intention of sir Hew Dalrymple had

been to enter Spain by Almeida, and the few arrangements which that

general had power to make were made with a view to such a march;

and 3º. because he was informed that the province of Gallicia was

scarcely able to equip the force coming from England, under the

command of lieutenant-general sir David Baird. Sir John Moore was

directed to take the field with the troops under his own immediate

command without delay; and he was to fix upon some place either

in Gallicia or on the borders of Leon for concentrating the

whole army. The specific plan of operations was to be concerted

afterwards with the Spanish generals.

This was a light and idle proceeding, promising no good result,

for the Ebro was to be the theatre of war. The head of the great

French host coming from Germany was already in the passes of the

Pyrenees, and the local difficulties impeding the English general’s

progress were abundant, and of a nature to render that which was

ill begun, end worse, and that which was well arranged, fail. To be

first in the field is a great and decided advantage; but here the

plan of operations was not even arranged, when the enemy’s first

blows were descending.

[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Papers.]

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, sections 1st and 3d.]

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 1st.]