Notwithstanding these changes in the command, the uncertainty

of the minister’s plans continued. The same day that sir Hew

Dalrymple was appointed to be commander-in-chief, a despatch,

containing the following project of campaign, was sent to sir

Arthur Wellesley: “The motives which have induced the sending so

large a force to that quarter[10] are, 1st. to provide effectually

for an attack upon the Tagus; and, 2dly, to have such an additional

force disposable beyond what may be indispensably requisite for

that operation, as may admit of a detachment being made to the

southward, either with a view to secure Cadiz, if it should

be threatened by the French force under general Dupont, or to

co-operate with the Spanish troops in reducing that corps, if

circumstances should favour such an operation, or any other that

may be concerted. His Majesty is pleased to direct that the _attack

upon the Tagus should be considered as the first object to be

attended to_. As the whole force, of which a statement is enclosed,

when assembled, will amount to not less than thirty thousand, _it

is considered that both services may be provided for amply_. The

precise distribution, as between Portugal and Andalusia, both as to

time and proportion of force, must depend upon circumstances, to be

judged of on the spot; and should it be deemed advisable to fulfil

the assurance which lieutenant-general sir Hew Dalrymple appears

to have given to the supreme junta of Seville[11], under the

authority of my despatch of (no date), that it was the intention of

his majesty to employ a corps of 10,000 men to co-operate with the

Spaniards in that quarter. A corps of this magnitude may, I should

hope, be detached without prejudice to the main operation against

the Tagus, and may be reinforced, according to circumstances,

after the Tagus has been secured. But if, previous to the arrival

of the force under orders from England, Cadiz should be seriously

threatened, it must rest with the senior officer of the Tagus, at

his discretion to detach, upon receiving a requisition to that

effect, such an amount of force as may place that important place

out of the reach of immediate danger, _even though it should for

the time suspend operations against the Tagus_[12].”

In England at this period, personal enmity to Napoleon, and violent

party prejudices, had so disturbed the judgments of men relative to

that monarch, that any information speaking of strength or success

for him, was regarded with suspicion even by the ministers, who,

as commonly happens in such cases, becoming the dupes of their own

practices, listened with complacency to all those tales of mutiny

among his troops, disaffection of his generals, and insurrections

in France, which the cunning or folly of their agents transmitted

to them. Hence sprung such projects as the one above, the false

calculations of which may be exposed by a short comparative

statement.

The whole English force was not much above thirty thousand men,

distributed off Cadiz, off the coast of Portugal, on the eastern

parts of England, and in the channel. The French force in Spain

and Portugal was about a hundred and twenty thousand men: they

possessed all the Portuguese, and most of the Spanish fortresses.

The English army had no reserve, no fixed plan, and it was to be

divided, and to act upon a double line of operations. The French

had a strong reserve at Bayonne, and the grand French army of four

hundred thousand veterans was untouched, and ready to succour the

troops in the Peninsula if they required it.

Happily, this visionary plan was in no particular followed by the

generals entrusted with the conduct of it. A variety of causes

combined to prevent the execution. The catastrophe of Baylen marred

all the great combinations of the French emperor; fortune drew the

scattered divisions of the English army together, and the decisive

vigour of sir Arthur Wellesley sweeping away these cobweb projects,

obtained all the success that the bad arrangements of the ministers

would permit.

In the next chapter, resuming the thread of the history, I shall

relate the proceedings of the first British campaign in the

Peninsula; but I judged it necessary first to make an exposition

of the previous preparations and plans of the cabinet, lest the

reader’s attention not being fully awakened to the difficulties

cast in the way of the English generals by the incapacity of the

government, should, with hasty censure, or niggard praise, do the

former injustice; for, as a noble forest hides many noisome swamps

and evil things, so the duke of Wellington’s laurels have covered

the innumerable errors of the ministers.

CHAPTER IV.

[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Narrative. Court of Inquiry.]

A few days after sailing from Cork, sir Arthur Wellesley quitting

the fleet, repaired in a frigate to Coruña, where he arrived the

20th of July, and immediately held a conference with the members of

the Gallician junta, by whom he was informed of the battle of Rio

Seco; but the account was glossed over in the Spanish manner, and

the issue of that contest had caused no change in their policy, if

policy that may be called, which was but a desire to obtain money

and to avoid personal inconvenience; they rejected all succour in

men, but earnestly pressed for arms and gold; and even while the

conference went on, the last was supplied, for an English frigate

entered the harbour with two hundred thousand pounds for their

use. Whereupon, the junta recommended that the British troops

should be employed in the north of Portugal, and promising to aid

them by sending a Spanish division to Oporto, supported their

recommendation by an incorrect statement of the number of men,

Spanish and Portuguese, who, they asserted, were in arms near that

city, and by a still more inaccurate estimate of the forces under

Junot; and in this manner persuaded sir Arthur not to land in their

province. Yet, at the moment they were rejecting the assistance of

the British troops, the whole kingdom of Gallicia was lying at the

mercy of marshal Bessieres, and there were neither men nor means to

impede the progress of his victorious army.

[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1809.]

[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Narrative. Court of Inquiry.]

Mr. Charles Stuart, appointed to reside as British envoy near the

junta, landed at Coruña, and sir Arthur Wellesley proceeded to

Oporto, where he found colonel Browne, an active and intelligent

officer, who had been sent there a short time before to collect

intelligence, and to distribute supplies. From his information it

appeared, that no Spanish troops were in the north of Portugal, and

that all the Portuguese force was upon the Mondego, to the south of

which river the insurrection had spread. A French division of eight

thousand men was supposed to be in their front, and some great

disaster was expected, for, to use colonel Browne’s words, “with

every good will in the people, their exertions were so short lived,

and with so little combination, that there was no hope of their

being able to resist the advance of the enemy;” in fact, only five

thousand regulars and militia, half armed, and associated with ten

or twelve thousand peasants without any arms, were in the field at

all. A large army was, however, made out upon paper by the bishop

of Oporto, who, having assembled his civil and military coadjutors

in council, proposed various plans of operation for the allied

forces, none of which sir Arthur was inclined to adopt; but after

some discussion it was finally arranged that the prelate and the

paper army should look to the defence of the Tras os Montes against

Bessieres, and that the five thousand soldiers on the Mondego

should co-operate with the British forces.

[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Narrative. Court of Inquiry.]

[Sidenote: Sir H. Dalrymple’s and lord Collingwood’s

Correspondence.]

This being settled, sir Arthur Wellesley hastened to consult with

sir Charles Cotton relative to the descent at the mouth of the

Tagus, which had so long haunted the imaginations of the ministers.

The strength of the French, the bar of the river, the disposition

of the forts, and the difficulty of landing in the immediate

neighbourhood, occasioned by the heavy surf playing upon all the

undefended creeks and bays, convinced him that such an enterprise

was unadvisable, if not impracticable. There remained the

alternative of landing to the north of Lisbon at such a distance as

to avoid the danger of a disputed disembarkation, or of proceeding

to the southward to join general Spencer, and commence operations

in that quarter against Dupont. Sir Arthur Wellesley decided

against the latter, which promised no good result while Junot held

Portugal, and Bessieres hung on the northern frontier. He foresaw

that the jealousy of the Spaniards, evinced by their frequent

refusal to admit English troops into Cadiz, would assuredly bring

on a tedious negotiation, and waste the season of action before the

army could obtain a place of arms, or that the campaign must be

commenced without any secure base of operations. Nothing was then

known of the Spanish troops, except that they were inexperienced;

but without good aid from them it would have been idle with

fourteen thousand men to take the field against twenty thousand

strongly posted in the Sierra Morena and communicating freely with

the main body of the French army. A momentary advance was useless;

and if the campaign was protracted, the line of operations running

nearly parallel to the frontier of Portugal, would have required a

covering army on the Guadiana to watch the movements of Junot.

The double line of operations, proposed by lord Castlereagh, was

contrary to all military principle, and as Spencer’s despatches

announced that his division was at St. Mary’s, near Cadiz, and

disengaged from any connexion with the Spaniards (a fortunate

circumstance scarcely to have been expected), sir Arthur sent him

orders to sail to the mouth of the Mondego, whither he himself

also repaired, and joined the fleet having his own army on board.

Off the Mondego he received the despatches announcing sir Hew

Dalrymple’s appointment and the sailing of sir John Moore’s troops.

[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Narrative. Court of Inquiry.]

This mortifying intelligence did not relax his activity; he

directed fast sailing vessels to look out for Anstruther’s

armament, and to conduct it to the Mondego, and having heard of

Dupont’s capitulation, resolved, without waiting for general

Spencer’s arrival, to disembark his own troops and commence the

campaign--a determination that marked the cool decisive vigour of

his character; for, although sure that (in consequence of Dupont’s

defeat) Bessieres would not enter Portugal, his information led

him to estimate Junot’s own force at sixteen to eighteen thousand

men, a number, indeed, below the truth, yet sufficient to make

the hardiest general pause before he disembarked with only nine

thousand men, and without any certainty that his fleet could remain

even for a day in that dangerous offing, at a moment also when

another man was coming to profit from any success that might be

obtained, and when a failure would have ruined his own reputation

in the estimation of the English public, always ready to deride the

skill of an Indian general.

It was difficult to find a good point of disembarkation, for the

coast of Portugal from the Minho to the Tagus, presents, with few

exceptions, a rugged and dangerous shore; all the harbours formed

by the rivers have bars, that render most of them difficult of

access even for boats, and with the slightest breeze from the

sea-board a terrible surf breaks along the whole line of coast

and forbids all approach, and when the south wind, which commonly

prevails from August to the winter months, blows, a more dangerous

shore is not to be found in any part of the world.

[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Narrative. Court of Inquiry.]

The small peninsula of Peniché, about seventy miles northward of

the Lisbon Rock, alone offered a safe and accessible bay, perfectly

adapted for a disembarkation, but the anchorage was completely

within range of the fort, which contained a hundred guns and a

garrison of a thousand men. The next best place was the Mondego

river, and as the little fort of Figueras, taken, as I have before

related, by the student Zagalo, and now occupied by English

marines, secured a free entrance, sir Arthur commenced landing his

troops there on the 1st of August. The weather was calm, but the

operation was so difficult that it was not completed before the

5th. At that moment, by a singular good fortune, general Spencer

arrived; he had not received sir Arthur’s orders, but with great

promptitude had sailed for the Tagus the moment Dupont surrendered,

and by sir Charles Cotton had been directed to the Mondego. The

united forces, however, only amounted to twelve thousand three

hundred men, because the fourth veteran battalion being destined

for Gibraltar was left on board the ships.

The army being on shore, the British general repaired to Montemor

Velho to confer with don Bernardim Freire de Andrada, the

Portuguese commander-in-chief. The latter proposed that the troops

of the two nations should relinquish all communication with the

coast, and throwing themselves into the heart of Beira, commence

an offensive campaign; he promised ample stores of provisions;

but sir Arthur having already discovered the weakness of the

insurrection, placed no reliance on those promises. He supplied

Freire with five thousand stand of arms and ammunition, but refused

to separate from his ships; and seeing clearly that the insurgents

were unable to give any real assistance, he resolved to act with

reference to the probability of their deserting him in danger.

The Portuguese general, disappointed at this refusal, reluctantly

consented to join the British army, but he pressed sir Arthur to

hasten to Leria, lest a large magazine filled, as he affirmed,

with provisions for the use of the British army, should fall into

the enemy’s hands. After this the two generals separated, and the

necessary preparations for a march being completed, the advanced

guard of the English army quitted the banks of the Mondego on

the 9th, taking the road to Leria. The 10th sir Arthur Wellesley

followed with the main body, and thus commenced the

FIRST CAMPAIGN IN PORTUGAL.

His plan embraced three principal objects:

1º. To hold on by the sea coast, as well for the sake of his

supplies as to avoid the drain upon his weak army, which the

protection of magazines on shore would occasion, and also to cover

the disembarkation of the reinforcements expected from England.

2º. To keep his troops in a mass, that he might strike an important

blow.

3º. To strike that blow as near Lisbon as possible, that the

affairs of Portugal might be quickly brought to a crisis.

[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Narrative. Court of Inquiry.]

He possessed very good military surveys of the ground in the

immediate neighbourhood of Lisbon, and he was anxious to carry

on his operations in a part of the country where he could avail

himself of this resource; but the utter inexperience of his

commissariat staff, and the want of cavalry, rendered his movements

slow, and obliged him to be extremely circumspect, especially as

the insurrection, although a generous, was but a feeble effort,

and its prolongation rather the result of terror than of hope. The

blow had been hastily struck in the moment of suffering, and the

patriots, conscious of weakness, trembled when they reflected on

their own temerity.

[Sidenote: Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.]

From the English stores Bernardim Freire had received arms and

equipments complete for five thousand soldiers, yet his army at

Leria did not exceed six thousand men of all arms fit for action;

and besides this force, there were in all the provinces north

of the Tagus only three thousand infantry, under the command of

the marquis of Valladeres, half of whom were Spaniards. Hence

it appears, that nothing could be more insignificant than the

insurrection, nothing more absurd than the lofty style adopted

by the junta of Oporto in their communications with the British

ministers.

[Sidenote: Thiebault.]

Upon the other side, Junot, who received information of the

English descent in the Mondego as early as the 2d, was extremely

embarrassed by the distance of his principal force, and the hostile

disposition of the inhabitants of Lisbon. He also was acquainted

with the disaster of Dupont, and exaggerated notions of the

essential strength of the Portuguese insurgents were generated in

his own mind and in the minds of his principal officers.

The patriots of the Alemtejo and Algarves, assisted by some

Spaniards, and animated by the manifestos and promises assiduously

promulgated from the English fleet, had once more assembled at

Alcacer do Sal, from whence they threatened the garrisons of

St. Ubes and the French posts on the south bank of the Tagus,

immediately opposite to Lisbon. The capital itself was very

unquiet; the anticipation of coming freedom was apparent in

the wrathful looks and stubborn manners of the populace, and

superstition was at work to increase the hatred and the hopes

of the multitude. It was at this time that the prophetic eggs,

denouncing death to the French, and deliverance to the Portuguese,

appeared; but less equivocal indications of approaching danger were

to be drawn from the hesitations of Junot, who, wavering between

his fear of an insurrection in Lisbon, and his desire to check the

immediate progress of the British army, gave certain proof of an

intellect yielding to the pressure of events.

[Sidenote: Thiebault.]

At this period Loison, with between seven and eight thousand men,

was in the neighbourhood of Estremos, two thousand five hundred men

were in the fortresses of Elvas and Almeida, a few hundred were

at Abrantes, a thousand were in Santarem, and the same number in

Peniché. General Thomieres, with a brigade, was in the vicinity

of Alcobaca, and the remainder were quartered in Lisbon and on a

circuit round, including both sides of the river. The Tagus itself

was guarded on the north bank by the forts of Cascaes, St. Antonio,

St. Julians, Belem, and the citadel, between each of which smaller

works kept up a continued line of offence against ships entering

by the northern passage of the harbour. On the southern bank fort

Bugio, built upon a low sandy point, crossed its fire with St.

Julians in the defence of the entrance. Upon the heights of Almada

or Palmela, stood the fort of Palmela. St. Ubes and Traffaria

completed the posts occupied by the French on that side. The

communication between the north and south banks was kept up by the

refitted Portuguese ships of war, by the Russian squadron, and by

the innumerable boats, most of them very fine and large, with which

the Tagus is covered.

Such being the situation of the army on the 3d, Junot ordered

Loison to march by Portalegre and Abrantes, and from thence effect

a junction with general Laborde, who, with three thousand infantry,

five or six hundred cavalry, and five pieces of artillery, quitted

Lisbon upon the 6th, and proceeded by Villa Franca, Rio Mayor, and

Candeiros, charged to observe the movements of the British, and to

cover the march of Loison, with whom he expected to form a junction

at Leria.

[Sidenote: Thiebault.]

Junot himself remained in Lisbon with a view of controlling the

inhabitants by his presence. He embarked all the powder from

the magazines, took additional precautions to guard his Spanish

prisoners, and put the citadel and forts into a state of siege; but

disquieted by the patriots assembled at Alcacer do Sal, he sent

general Kellerman with a moveable column to disperse them, and to

scour the country between that place and Setuval, ordering him to

withdraw the garrison from the latter, to abandon all the French

posts on the south of the Tagus except Palmela, and to collect

the whole force in one mass on the heights of Almada, where an

entrenched camp had been already commenced; but general Kellerman

had scarcely departed when two English regiments, the one from

Madeira, the other from Gibraltar, arriving off the bar of Lisbon,

distracted anew the attention of the French, and increased the

turbulence of the populace, and in this state of perplexity the

duke of Abrantes lingered until the 15th, when the progress of sir

Arthur Wellesley forced him to assume the command of the army in

the field.

Loison entered Abrantes the 9th, and Laborde arrived at Candeiros

the same day; from that point he could with facility carry his

division upon Alcobaca and Leria, or form a junction with Loison

upon the side of Santarem.

The armies on both sides were now in that state of attraction

towards each other, which indicates an approaching shock. In the

French camps the news of Bessieres’ victory at Rio Seco became

known, and produced a short-lived exultation; and at the same

moment intelligence of Joseph’s flight from Madrid reached the

British army, and increased their confidence of victory. The 10th,

Loison halted at Abrantes, and Laborde moved to Alcobaca, where he

was joined by Thomieres and the garrison of Peniché.

[Sidenote: Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.]

Sir Arthur’s advanced guard also entered Leria, and was there

joined by Bernardim Freire and the Portuguese army, who immediately

seized the magazine without making any distribution to the British

troops. The main body of the latter arrived the 11th, and the whole

marched in advance upon the 12th.

[Sidenote: Thiebault.]

Laborde employed the 11th and 12th in looking for a position in the

neighbourhood of Battalha; but the ground was too extensive for

his numbers, and at the approach of the English, he fell back in

the night of the 12th to Obidos, a small town, with an old Moorish

castle situated on a gentle eminence in the middle of a valley.

Having occupied Obidos with his picquets, and placed a small

detachment at the windmill of Brilos, three miles in front, he

retired the 14th to Roriça, a village four miles to the southward,

situated at the intersection of the roads leading to Torres Vedras,

to Montachique, and to Alcoentre, and overlooking the whole valley

of Obidos.

This position enabled him to preserve his communication with Loison

open, but as it uncovered Peniché, the fourth Swiss regiment,

with the exception of the flank companies, was sent to regarrison

that important point, and at the same time three hundred men were

detached to the right by Bombarral, Cadaval, and Segura, to obtain

intelligence of Loison.

That general, having made a demonstration on the side of Thomar

the 11th, ascertained that Leria was in the hands of the British,

and fell back the same day upon Torres Novas, then following the

course of the Tagus he arrived at Santarem upon the 13th, but in

such an exhausted state, that he was unable to renew his march

until the 15th. Sir Arthur Wellesley’s first movement had thus cut

the line of communication between Loison and Laborde, caused a loss

of several forced marches to the former, and obliged the latter to

risk an action with more than twice his own numbers.

As the hostile troops approached each other, the Portuguese chiefs

became alarmed, notwithstanding the confident language of their

public manifestos and the bombastic style of their conversation, an

internal conviction that a French army was invincible pervaded all

ranks of the patriots. The leaders, aware of their own deficiency,

and incredulous of the courage of the English soldiers, dreaded

the being committed in a decisive contest, because a defeat (which

they expected) would deprive them of all hope to make terms with

the victors, whereas by keeping five or six thousand men together,

they could at any time secure themselves by a capitulation. The

junta of Oporto also, who were already aiming at supreme authority,

foresaw that in the event of a successful battle, it would be more

advantageous for their particular views, to be provided with an

army untouched and entirely disconnected with a foreign general,

and Freire being well instructed in the secret designs of his

party, resolved not to advance a step beyond Leria; but, to cover

his real motives, he required the British commander to supply him

with provisions, choosing to forget the magazine which he had just

appropriated to himself, and as readily forgetting the formal

promises of the bishop of Oporto, who had undertaken to feed the

English army.

This extraordinary demand, that an auxiliary force just disembarked

should nourish the native soldiers, instead of being itself fed

by the people, was met by sir Arthur Wellesley with a strong

remonstrance. He easily penetrated the secret motive which caused

it, but feeling that it was important to have a respectable

Portuguese force acting in conjunction with his own, he first

appealed to the honour and patriotism of Freire, and warmly

admonished him, that he was going to forfeit all pretension to

either, by permitting the British army to fight without his

assistance; but this argument had no effect upon don Bernardim. He

parried the imputations against his spirit and zeal by pretending

that his intention was to operate independently on the line of the

Tagus; and after some further discussion, sir Arthur, as a last

effort, changed his tone of rebuke to one of conciliation, and

recommended to him not to risk his troops by an isolated march, but

to keep in the rear of the British, and wait for the result of the

first battle. This advice was so agreeable to Freire, that at the

solicitation of captain Trant, a military agent, he consented to

leave fourteen hundred infantry, and two hundred and fifty cavalry,

under the immediate command of the English general.

[Sidenote: Thiebault.]

The defection of the native force was a serious evil. It shed

an injurious moral influence, and deprived sir Arthur of the

aid of troops whose means of gaining intelligence, and whose

local knowledge, might have compensated for his want of cavalry.

Nevertheless, continuing his own march, his advanced guard entered

Caldas the 15th, and that day also Junot reluctantly quitted

Lisbon, with a reserve composed of two thousand infantry, six

hundred cavalry, and ten pieces of artillery, carrying with him his

grand parc of ammunition, and a military chest, containing forty

thousand pounds. General Travot was left at Lisbon, with above

seven thousand men, of which number two battalions were formed of

stragglers and convalescents. He occupied both sides of the Tagus,

distributing two thousand men in Palmela, the Bugio fort, and on

the heights of Almada, in order to protect the shipping from the

insurgents of the Alemtejo, who, under the orders of the Monteiro

Mor, were again gathering at Setuval. A thousand French he kept

on board the vessels of war, to guard the Spanish prisoners and

the spare powder; with two thousand four hundred he garrisoned the

citadel and supported the police. A thousand were distributed in

the forts of Belem, St. Julians, Cascaes, and Ericeia (the last

named place is situated to the northward of the rock of Lisbon, and

commands a small harbour a few miles west of Mafra), and a thousand

were at Santarem, protecting a large depôt of stores; thus, if the

garrisons of Elvas, Peniché, and Almeida be included, nearly one

half of the French army was, by Junot’s combinations, rendered

inactive, and those in the field were divided into three parts,

without any certain point of junction in advance, yet each too weak

singly to sustain an action. The duke of Abrantes seems to have

reigned long enough in Portugal to forget that he was merely the

chief of an advanced corps, whose safety depended upon activity and

concentration.

The French reserve was transported to Villa Franca by water, from

whence it was to march to Otta; but the rope ferry-boat of Saccavem

being removed by the natives, it cost twenty-four hours to throw

a bridge across the creek at that place. On the 17th the troops

were on their march, when Junot hastily recalled them to Villa

Franca. This retrograde movement was occasioned by a report that

the English had landed near the capital. When the falsehood of this

rumour became known, the reserve resumed the road to Otta, under

the command of general Thiebault, Junot himself pushing forward

to Alcoentre, where he found Loison, and assumed the personal

direction of that general’s division.

[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Despatch.]

During this time, sir Arthur Wellesley was pressing La Borde. The

15th he caused the post at Brilos to be attacked, and the piquets

to be driven out of Obidos. Two companies of the 95th, and two of

the 5th battalion, 60th, were employed in the former operation;

they carried the windmill without loss, but pursued the retiring

enemy with such inconsiderate eagerness, that at the distance

of three miles from their support, they were outflanked by two

superior bodies of French, and were only saved by the opportune

advance of general Spencer. Two officers and twenty-seven men were

killed and wounded in this slight affair, which gave a salutary

check to the rashness, without lowering the confidence of the

troops.

The 16th Laborde’s position was examined. The road from Caldas to

Obidos runs through a valley, formed by the ramifications of the

Monte Junto. The high table land upon which Roriça is situated

closed this valley to the southward, and Laborde’s division being

posted on a small plain immediately in front of that village,

completely overlooked the country as far as Obidos. All the

favourable points of defence in the valley, and on the nearest

hills on each side, were occupied by small detachments. One mile in

the rear, a steep ridge extending about three quarters of a mile

from east to west, and parallel to the French position, offered a

second line of great strength. The main road led by a deep defile

over this ridge, which was called the height of Zambugeira, or

Columbeira, and beyond it, very lofty mountains rose abruptly,

stretching from the sea-coast to the Tagus like a wall, and filling

all the space between that river and the ocean down to the rock of

Lisbon.

The valley leading from Obidos to Roriça was bounded on the left

by a succession of ridges that rose the one above the other like

steps, until they were lost in the great mass of the Sierra de

Baragueda, itself a shoot from the Monte-junto.

Laborde’s situation was becoming truly embarrassing. Loison was

at Alcoentre, and the reserve was at Villa Franca; that is one

and two marches distant from Roriça. If he retired upon Torres

Vedras, his communication with Loison would be lost. To fall back

on Montachique was to expose the line of Torres Vedras and Mafra.

To march upon Alcoentre, and unite with Loison, was to open the

shortest road to Lisbon (that of Montachique) for the British army;

and to remain at Roriça, it was necessary to fight three times his

own force.

Animated, however, by the danger, encouraged by the local

advantages of his position, and justly confident in his own

talents, Laborde resolved to abide his enemy’s assault, in the

feeble hope that Loison might arrive during the action.

COMBAT OF RORIÇA.

Sir Arthur Wellesley attacked upon the 17th.

Early in the morning of that day, a dense mass, consisting of

thirteen thousand four hundred and eighty infantry, four hundred

and seventy cavalry, and eighteen guns, issued from Obidos, and

soon afterwards broke into three distinct columns of battle.

The left, commanded by lieutenant-general Ferguson, was composed of

his own and major-general Bowe’s brigades of infantry, reinforced

by two hundred and fifty riflemen, forty cavalry, and six guns,

forming a total of four thousand nine hundred combatants. They

marched by the crests of the hills adjoining the Sierra de

Baragueda, being destined to turn the right flank of Laborde’s

position, and to oppose the efforts of Loison, if that general (who

was supposed to be at Rio Mayor) should appear during the action.

The column of the right, under captain Trant, composed of a

thousand Portuguese infantry, and fifty horse of the same nation,

moved by the village of St. Amias, with the intention of turning

the left flank of the French.

The centre column, nine thousand in number, with twelve guns, was

commanded by sir Arthur in person, and marched straight against the

enemy by the village of Mahmed. It was composed of generals Hill’s,

Nightingale’s, Catlin Craufurd’s, and Fane’s brigades of British

infantry, four hundred cavalry, two hundred and fifty of which were

Portuguese, and four hundred light troops of the same nation.

As this column advanced, general Fane’s brigade, extending to its

left, drove back the French skirmishers, and connected the march

of Ferguson’s division with the centre. When the latter approached

the elevated plain upon which Laborde was posted, general Hill,

who moved upon the right of the main road, being supported by

the cavalry, and covered by the fire of his light troops, pushed

forward rapidly to the attack. On his left general Nightingale

displayed a line of infantry, preceded by the fire of nine guns.

Craufurd’s brigade, and the remaining pieces of artillery, formed a

reserve.

At this moment, Fane’s riflemen crowned the nearest hills on the

right flank of the French; the Portuguese troops showed the head

of a column beyond St. Amias upon the enemy’s left, and general

Ferguson was seen descending from the higher grounds in the rear of

Fane. Laborde’s position appeared desperate; but with the coolness

and dexterity of a practised warrior, he evaded the danger,

and covered by his excellent cavalry, fell back rapidly to the

heights of Zambugeira. A fresh disposition of the English became

indispensable to dislodge him from that formidable and well chosen

post.

Colonel Trant continued his march, and turned the left of the new

field of battle.

Ferguson and Fane being united, were directed to penetrate by the

mountains, and outflank the French right.

[Illustration: _SKETCH OF THE_ COMBAT OF RORIÇA. 17^{th} August

1808.]

Generals Hill and Nightingale advanced against the front, which was

of singular strength, and only to be approached by narrow paths

winding through deep ravines. A swarm of skirmishers starting

forward, plunged into the passes, and spreading to the right and

left, won their way with extreme difficulty among the rocks and

tangled evergreens that overspread the steep ascent; with still

greater difficulty the supporting columns followed, and their

formation was soon disordered in the confined and rugged passes.

The hollows echoed with a continued roll of musketry; the shouts

of the advancing troops were loudly answered by the enemy, and the

curling smoke that broke out from the sides of the mountain marking

the progress of the assailants, showed how stoutly the defence was

maintained. Laborde, watching anxiously for the arrival of Loison,

gradually slackened his hold on the left, but clung tenaciously

to the right, in the hope of yet effecting a junction with that

general. The ardour of the 9th and 29th regiments, who led the

attack, favoured this skilful conduct. They pressed forward with

such vigour, as to force the two strongest passes and reach the

plain above, long before the flank movements of Ferguson and Trant

had shaken the credit of the position, the 29th first arrived

in disorder at the top; ere they could form, a French battalion

came forward at a rapid pace, poured in their fire, and breaking

gallantly through the midst of the English regiment, slew the

colonel and many others, and made the major and fifty or sixty men

prisoners; but the 29th were not to be overthrown. They rallied,

and being joined by the 9th, the colonel of which also fell in this

bitter fight, maintained their dangerous footing. Laborde, who

brought every arm into action at the proper time and place, made

repeated efforts to destroy these regiments before they could be

supported; failing in that, he yet gained time to withdraw his left

wing and to rally it upon the centre and right; but the English

troops were gathering thickly on the upper ground, and general

Ferguson, who had at first taken an erroneous direction towards the

centre, now regained the true line, and was rapidly passing the

right flank of the position. The French general, seeing that the

day was lost, commenced a retreat by alternate masses, protecting

his movements by vigorous charges of cavalry. At the village of

Zambugeira he made another desperate stand, but the English troops

bore on him too heavily to be resisted, and thus disputing the

ground, he fell back to the Quinta de Bugagliera, there he halted

until his detachments on the side of Segura had rejoined him, and

then taking to the narrow pass of Ruña he marched all night to gain

the position of Montechique, leaving three guns on the field of

battle, and the road to Torres Vedras open for the victors.

[Sidenote: Thiebault.]

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 19.]

The loss of the French was six hundred killed and wounded;

among the latter was Laborde himself. The British also suffered

considerably; two lieutenant-colonels and nearly five hundred men

being killed, taken, or wounded, and as not more than four thousand

men were actually engaged, this hard fought action was very

honourable to both sides.

[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s evidence. Court of Inquiry.]

The firing ceased a little after four o’clock, and sir Arthur

getting intelligence that Loison’s division was at Bombaral,

only five miles distant, took up a position for the night in an

oblique line to that which he had just forced, his left resting

upon a height near the field of battle, and his right covering the

road to Lourinham. Believing that Loison and Laborde had effected

their junction at the Quintade Bugagliera, and that both were

retiring to Montechique, he resolved to march the next morning to

Torres Vedras; but before night-fall he was informed that general

Anstruther’s and general Acland’s[13] divisions, accompanied by

a large fleet of store ships, were off the coast, the dangerous

nature of which rendered it necessary to provide for their safety

by a quick disembarkation. He therefore changed his plans, and

resolved to seek for some convenient post, that, being in advance

of his present position, would likewise enable him to cover the

landing of these reinforcements. The vigour of Laborde’s defence

had also an influence upon this occasion; before an enemy so bold

and skilful no precaution could be neglected with impunity.

The 18th sir Arthur marched to Lourinham, and Junot at the same

time quitting Cereal with Loison’s division, crossed the line of

Laborde’s retreat, and pushed for Torres Vedras, which he reached

in the evening of the same day. The 19th being joined by Laborde,

and the 20th by his reserve, he re-organized his army, and prepared

for a decisive battle.

CHAPTER V.

The day on which the combat of Roriça was fought the insurgents

attacked Abrantes, and the feeble garrison being ill commanded,

gave way, and was destroyed.

The 19th sir Arthur Wellesley took up a position at Vimiero, a

village near the sea-coast, and from thence sent a detachment to

cover the march of general Anstruther’s brigade, which had, with

great difficulty and some loss, been that morning landed on an open

sandy beach called the bay of Maceira.

The French cavalry scoured the neighbouring country, carried off

some of the women from the rear of the camp, and hemmed the army

round so closely that no information of Junot’s position could be

obtained.

In the night of the 20th, general Acland’s brigade was also

disembarked, and this reinforcement increased the army to sixteen

thousand fighting men, with eighteen pieces of artillery, exclusive

of Trant’s Portuguese and of two British regiments, under general

Beresford, which were with the fleet at the mouth of the Tagus.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.]

Estimating Junot’s whole force at eighteen thousand men, sir Arthur

Wellesley judged, that after providing for the security of Lisbon,

the French general could not bring more than fourteen thousand

into the field; he designed, therefore, not only to strike the

first blow, but to follow it up, so as to prevent the enemy from

rallying and renewing the campaign upon the frontier. In this view

he had, before quitting the Mondego, written to sir Harry Burrard,

giving an exact statement of his own proceedings and intentions,

and recommending that sir John Moore, with his division, should

disembark at the Mondego, and march without delay to Santarem, by

which he would protect the left of the army, block the line of

the Tagus, and at the same time threaten the French communication

between Lisbon and Elvas, and that without danger, because Junot

would be forced to defend Lisbon against the coast army, or if,

relinquishing the capital, he endeavoured to make way to Almeida

by Santarem, the ground there was so strong that sir John Moore

might easily maintain it against any efforts. Moreover, the

marquis of Valladeres commanded three thousand men at Guarda, and

general Freire, with five thousand men, was at Leria, and might be

persuaded to support the British at Santarem.

[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s evidence. Court of Inquiry.]

The distance from Vimiero to Torres Vedras was about nine miles;

but although the number and activity of the French cavalry

completely shrouded Junot’s position, it was known to be strong,

and very difficult of approach, by reason of a long defile through

which the army must penetrate in order to reach the crest of the

mountain. There was, however, a road leading between the sea-coast

and Torres Vedras, which, turning Junot’s position, opened a way

to Mafra. Sir Arthur possessed very exact military surveys of the

country through which that road led, and he projected, by a forced

march, on the 21st to turn the position of Torres Vedras, and to

gain Mafra with a strong advanced guard, while the main body,

seizing some advantageous heights a few miles short of that town,

would be in a position to intercept the French line of march to

Montachique. The army was reorganized during the 20th in eight

brigades of infantry, and four weak squadrons of cavalry, and every

preparation was made for the next day’s enterprise; but at that

critical period of the campaign the ministerial arrangements, which

provided three commanders-in-chief, began to work.

Sir Harry Burrard arrived in a frigate off the bay of Maceira, and

sir Arthur was checked in the midst of his operations on the eve of

a decisive battle. Having repaired on board the frigate, he made

his report of the situation of affairs, and renewed his former

recommendation relative to the disposal of sir John Moore’s troops;

but Burrard, who had previously resolved to bring the latter down

to Maceira, condemned this project, and forbid any offensive

movement until the whole army should be concentrated; whereupon sir

Arthur returned to his camp.

The ground occupied by the army, although very extensive, and not

very clearly defined as a position, was by no means weak. The

village of Vimiero, situated in a valley through which the little

river of Maceira flows, contained the parc and commissariat stores.

The cavalry and the Portuguese were on a small plain close behind

the village, and immediately in its front a rugged isolated height,

with a flat top, commanded all the ground to the southward and

eastward for a considerable distance.

Upon this height Fane’s and Anstruther’s brigades of infantry with

six guns were posted, the left of Anstruther’s occupied a church

and churchyard which blocked a road leading over the extremity of

the height to the village, the right of Fane’s rested on the edge

of the other extremity of the hill, the base of which was washed by

the Maceira.

A mountain that commenced at the coast swept in a half circle

close behind the right of the hill upon which these brigades were

posted, and commanded, at rather long artillery range, all its

upper surface. Eight guns, and the first, second, third, fourth,

and eighth brigades of infantry, occupied this mountain, which

was terminated on the left by a deep ravine that divided it from

another strong and narrow range of heights over which the road

from Vimiero to Lourinham passed. The right of these last heights

also overtopped the hill in front of the village, but the left,

bending suddenly backward, after the form of a crook, returned to

the coast, and ended in a lofty cliff. There was no water upon this

range, and some piquets only were placed there.

The troops being thus posted, on the night of the 20th, about

twelve o’clock, sir Arthur was aroused by a German officer of

dragoons, who galloped into the camp, and with some consternation

reported, that Junot, at the head of twenty thousand men, was

coming on to the attack, and distant but one hour’s march. The

general, doubting the accuracy of this gentleman’s information,

merely sent out some patrolles, and warned the piquets and guards

to be upon the alert. Before daybreak, according to the British

custom, the troops were under arms; the sun rose, and no enemy was

perceived; but at seven o’clock a cloud of dust was observed beyond

the nearest hills, and at eight o’clock an advanced guard of horse

was seen to crown the heights to the southward, and to send forward

scouts on every side. Scarcely had this body been discovered, when

a force of infantry, preceded by other cavalry, was descried moving

along the road from Torres Vedras to Lourinham, and threatening

the left of the British position; column after column followed in

order of battle, and it soon became evident that the French were

coming down to fight, but that the right wing of the English was

not their object. The second, third, fourth, and eighth brigades

were immediately directed to cross the valley behind the village,

and to take post on the heights before-mentioned as being occupied

by the piquets only. As those brigades reached the ground, the

second and third were disposed in two lines facing to the left,

and consequently forming a right angle with the prolongation of

Fane and Anstruther’s front. The fourth and eighth brigades were to

have furnished a third line; but before the latter could reach the

summit the battle commenced. From the flank of all these troops,

a line of skirmishers was thrown out upon the face of the descent

towards the enemy; the cavalry was drawn up in the plain a little

to the right of the village of Vimiero; and the fifth brigade and

the Portuguese were detached to the returning part of the crook to

cover the extreme left, and to protect the rear of the army. The

first brigade under general Hill remained on the mountain which the

others had just quitted, and formed a support for the centre and a

reserve for the whole.

The ground between the two armies was so wooded and broken, that

after the French had passed the ridge where they had been first

descried, no correct view of their movements could be obtained; and

the British being so weak in cavalry were forced to wait patiently

until the columns of attack were close upon them. Junot had quitted

Torres Vedras the evening of the 20th, intending to fall on the

English army at day-break; but the difficulty of the defile in his

front retarded his march for many hours and fatigued his troops.

When he first came in sight of the position of Vimiero, the British

order of battle appeared to him as being on two sides of an

irregular triangle, the apex of which formed by the hill in front

of the village, was well furnished with men, while the left face

appeared naked, for he could only see the piquets on that side, and

the passage of the four brigades across the valley was hidden from

him. Concluding, then, that the principal force was in the centre,

he resolved to form two connected attacks, the one against the

apex, the other against the left face; for he thought that the left

of the position was an accessible ridge, whereas a deep ravine,

trenched as it were along the base, rendered it utterly impervious

to an attack, except at the extremity, over which the road from

Torres Vedras to Lourinham passed. Junot had nearly fourteen

thousand fighting men organized in four divisions, of which three

were of infantry and one of cavalry, with twenty-three pieces of

artillery, but of small calibre. Each division was composed of two

brigades, and at ten o’clock, all being prepared, he commenced the

BATTLE OF VIMIERO.

[Sidenote: Thiebault.]

[Sidenote: Foy.]

Laborde marched with one brigade against the centre; general

Brennier led another against the left; Loison’s division followed

in the same order at a short distance. Kellerman, whose division

(called the reserve) was composed of grenadiers, moved in one body

behind Loison, and the cavalry under Margaron, about thirteen

hundred in number, was divided, a part being on the right of

Brennier, and the remainder in rear of the reserve. The artillery

was distributed among the columns, and opened their fire whenever

the ground was favourable for their practice.

[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s despatch.]

Junot designed that Laborde’s and Brennier’s attacks should be

simultaneous, but the latter coming unexpectedly upon the ravine

before mentioned as protecting the left, got entangled among the

rocks and water courses, and Laborde alone engaged Anstruther’s

brigade under a heavy and destructive fire of artillery that played

on his front and flank, for the eighth brigade being then in the

act of mounting the heights where the left was posted, observing

the advance of the columns against the centre, halted, and opened a

battery on their right flank. Junot, perceiving this failure in his

combinations, ordered Loison to support Laborde’s attack with one

brigade of his division, and directed general Solignac, with the

other, to turn the ravine in which Brennier was entangled, and to

fall upon the extremity of the English line.

Loison and Laborde formed one grand and two secondary columns

of attack; of the latter, the one advanced against Fane’s

brigade, while the other endeavoured to penetrate by a road which

passed between the ravine and the church on the extreme left of

Anstruther; but the principal column, headed by Laborde in person,

and preceded by a multitude of light troops, mounted the face of

the hill with great fury and loud cries; the English skirmishers

were forced in upon the lines in a moment, and the French masses

arrived at the summit; but, shattered by a terrible fire of the

artillery, and breathless from their exertions, and in this state,

first receiving a discharge of musketry from the fiftieth regiment

at the distance of half pistol shot, they were vigorously charged

in front and flank, and overthrown. At the same time Fane’s brigade

repulsed the attack on their side, and colonel Taylor, with the

very few horsemen he commanded, passing out by the right, rode

fiercely among the confused and retreating troops, and scattered

them with great execution. Margaron’s cavalry seeing this, came

suddenly down upon Taylor, who was there slain, and the half of

his feeble squadron cut to pieces, and Kellerman taking advantage

of this check, threw one half of the reserve into a pine wood, that

flanked the line of retreat followed by the beaten troops, and with

the other endeavoured to renew the attack by the road leading to

the church, where the forty-third regiment were engaged in a hot

skirmish among some vineyards.

The grenadiers coming on at a brisk pace, beat back the advanced

companies of the forty-third; but to avoid the artillery that swept

their left, they dipped a little into the ravine, and were taken

on the other flank by the guns of the eighth and fourth brigades,

and at the same time the forty-third rallying in a mass, broke down

upon the head of the column at a moment when the narrowness of the

way and the discharges of the artillery had somewhat disordered its

formation, a short yet desperate fight took place; the enemy were

repulsed in disorder, but the regiment suffered very severely.

The French being now wholly discomfited in the centre, and the

woods and hollows filled with their wounded and straggling men,

retired up the edge of the ravine in a direction almost parallel

to the British line, and left the road from Vimiero to Torres

Vedras open to their opponents; but sir Arthur Wellesley strictly

forbade any pursuit at that moment, partly because the grenadiers

in the pine wood flanked the line of the French retreat, and partly

because Margaron’s horsemen, riding stiffly between the two armies,

were not to be lightly meddled with. Meanwhile, (Brennier being

still hampered in the ravine), general Solignac passed along the

crest of the ridge above, and came upon general Ferguson’s brigade,

which was posted at the left of the English position. But where the

French expected to find a weak flank, they encountered a front of

battle on a depth of three lines protected by steep declivities

on either side; a powerful artillery swept away their foremost

ranks, and on their right the fifth brigade and the Portuguese

were seen marching by a distant ridge towards the Lourinham road

and threatening the rear. Ferguson instantly taking the lead, bore

down upon the enemy, the ridge widened as the English advanced,

and the regiments of the second line running up in succession,

increased the front, and constantly filled the ground. The French

falling fast under the fire drew back fighting, until they reached

the declivity of the ridge, and their cavalry made several efforts

to check the advancing troops, but the latter were too compact to

be disturbed by these attempts. Solignac himself was carried from

the field severely wounded, and his retiring column, continually

outflanked on the left, was cut off from the line of retreat, and

thrown into the low ground about the village of Perenza. There six

guns were captured, and general Ferguson leaving the eighty-second

and seventy-first regiments to guard them, was continuing to press

the disordered columns, when Brennier having at last cleared the

ravine, came suddenly in upon those two regiments, and re-took

the artillery. His success was but momentary; the surprised

troops rallied upon the higher ground, poured in a heavy fire of

musquetry, and with a shout returning to the charge, overthrew

him and recovered the guns. Brennier himself was wounded and made

prisoner, and Ferguson having completely separated the French

brigades from each other, would have forced the greatest part of

Solignac’s to surrender, if an unexpected order had not obliged

him to halt, and then the discomfited troops re-forming under

the protection of their cavalry with admirable quickness and

steadiness, made an orderly retreat, and were soon united to the

broken brigades which were falling back from the attack on the

centre.

Brennier, who, the moment he was taken, was brought to sir Arthur

Wellesley, eagerly demanded if the reserve under Kellerman had

yet charged, and sir Arthur, ascertaining from other prisoners

that it had, was then satisfied that all the enemy’s attacks were

exhausted, and that no considerable body of fresh troops could be

hidden among the woods and hollows in his front. It was only twelve

o’clock, the battle was already won; thirteen guns were in his

possession, for seven had been taken in the centre; the fourth and

eighth brigades had suffered very little; the Portuguese, the fifth

and the first brigades had not fired a shot, and the latter was two

miles nearer to Torres Vedras than any part of the French army,

which was moreover in great confusion. The relative numbers before

the action were considerably in favour of the English; and the

result of the action had increased that disparity. A portion of sir

Arthur’s army had defeated the enemy when entire; a portion then

could effectually follow up his victory, and he resolved with the

five brigades on the left to press Junot closely, and driving him

over the Sierra da Baragueda, force him upon the Tagus, while Hill,

Anstruther, and Fane, seizing the defile of Torres Vedras, should

push on to Montachique and cut him off from Lisbon.

[Illustration: _SKETCH OF THE_ BATTLE OF VIMIERO. 21^{st} August

1808.]

If this able and decisive operation had been executed, Junot

would probably have lost all his artillery, and several thousand

stragglers, and being buffeted and turned at every point, would

have been glad to seek safety under the guns of Almeida or Elvas,

and even that he could only have accomplished because sir John

Moore’s troops were not landed at the Mondego. But sir Harry

Burrard, who was present during the action, although partly from

delicacy, and partly from approving of sir Arthur’s arrangements,

he had not hitherto interfered, now assumed the chief command. From

him, the order which arrested Ferguson in his victorious career had

emanated, by him further offensive operations were forbidden, and

he resolved to wait in the position of Vimiero until the arrival of

sir John Moore. The adjutant-general Clinton and colonel Murray,

the quarter-master-general, supported sir Harry Burrard’s views,

and sir Arthur’s earnest representations could not alter his

determination.

[Sidenote: Proceedings of the Board of Inquiry.]

Sir Harry’s decision was certainly erroneous, but error is common

in an art which at best is but a choice of difficulties. The

circumstances of the moment were imposing enough to sway most

generals; for although the French were beaten in the attacks,

they rallied with surprising quickness under the protection of a

strong and gallant cavalry; sir Harry knew that his own artillery

carriages were so shaken as to be scarcely fit for service; that

the draft horses were few and bad, and that the commissariat parc

on the plain was in the greatest confusion. The hired Portuguese

carmen were making off with their carriages in all directions; the

English cavalry was totally destroyed, and finally, general Spencer

had discovered a line of fresh troops on the ridge behind that

occupied by the French army. Weighing all these things in his mind

with the caution natural to age, Burrard was reluctant to hazard

the fortune of the day upon what he deemed a perilous throw.

The duke of Abrantes, who had displayed all that reckless courage

to which he originally owed his elevation, profited by this

unexpected cessation of the battle, and re-formed his broken

infantry. Twelve hundred fresh men joined him at the close of the

contest, and, covered by his cavalry, he retreated with order

and celerity until he regained the command of the pass of Torres

Vedras, so that when the day closed, the relative position of the

two armies was the same as on the evening before.

[Sidenote: Thiebault.]

One general, thirteen guns, and several hundred prisoners fell into

the hands of the victors, and the total loss of the French was

estimated at three thousand men, an exaggeration, no doubt, but it

was certainly above two thousand, for their closed columns had been

exposed for more than half an hour to sweeping discharges of grape

and musquetry, and the dead lay thickly together. General Thiebault

indeed reduces the number to eighteen hundred, and asserts that the

whole amount of the French army did not much exceed twelve thousand

men, from which number he deducts nearly three thousand for the

sick, the stragglers, and all those other petty drains which form

the torment of a general-in-chief. But when it is considered

that this army was composed of men selected and organized into

provisionary battalions expressly for the occasion; that one half

had only been in the field for a fortnight, and that the whole had

enjoyed three days rest at Torres Vedras, it is evident that the

number of absentees bears too great a proportion to the combatants.

A French order of battle found upon the field gave a total of

fourteen thousand men present under arms, of which thirteen hundred

were cavalry, and this amount agrees too closely with other

estimates, and also with the observations made at the time, to

leave any reasonable doubt of its authenticity or correctness.

[Sidenote: Proceedings of the Board of Inquiry.]

The arrangements made by sir Harry Burrard did not remain in force

a long time. Early on the morning of the 22d, sir Hew Dalrymple

disembarked and assumed the chief command. Thus, in the short space

of twenty-four hours, during which a battle was fought, the army

fell successively into the hands of three men, who, coming from

different quarters, with different views, habits, and information,

had not any previous opportunity of communing even by letter, so as

to arrange a common plan of operations; and they were now brought

together at a critical moment, when it was more than probable they

must all disagree, and that the public service must suffer from

that want of vigour which is inherent to divided councils; for

when sir Hew Dalrymple was appointed to the command, sir Arthur

Wellesley was privately recommended to him by the minister as a

person who should be employed with more than usual confidence;

and this unequivocal hint was backed up with too much force by

the previous reputation and recent exploits of the latter, not

to produce some want of cordiality; for sir Arthur could not do

otherwise than take the lead in discussing affairs of which he had

more than laid the foundation, and sir Hew would have forfeited all

claims to independence in his command, if he had not exercised the

right of judging for himself between the conflicting opinions of

his predecessors.

[Sidenote: Sir H. Dalrymple’s Narrative. Court of Inquiry.]

[Sidenote: Proceedings of the Board of Inquiry.]

After receiving information upon the most important points, and

taking a hasty view of the situation of the army; although the

wounded were still upon the ground, and that the wains of the

commissariat were employed in removing them, sir Hew decided

to advance upon the 23d, and gave orders to that effect; but,

at the same time, he entirely agreed in opinion with sir Harry

Burrard, that the operation was a perilous one, which required

the concentration of all the troops, and the application of all

his means, to bring to a good conclusion; and for this reason he

did not rescind the order directing sir John Moore to fall down to

Maceira. This last measure was disapproved of by sir Arthur, who

observed that the provisions on shore would not supply more than

eight or nine days consumption for the troops already at Vimiero;

that the country would be unable to furnish any assistance, and

that the fleet could not be calculated upon as a resource because

the first of the gales common at that season of the year would

certainly send it away from the coast, if it did not destroy a

great portion of it. Sir Hew thought the evil of having the army

separated, would be greater than the chance of distress from such

events. His position was certainly difficult; the bishop of Oporto

had failed in his promise of assisting the troops with draft

cattle, as indeed he did in all his promises. Both the artillery

and commissariat were badly supplied with mules and horses; the

cavalry was a nullity; and the enemy was, with the exception of

his immediate loss in killed and wounded, suffering nothing from

his defeat, which, we have seen, did not deprive him of a single

position necessary to his defence.

[Sidenote: Thiebault.]

Sir Hew, while weighing this state of affairs, was informed that

general Kellerman, escorted by a strong body of cavalry, was at

the outposts, and demanded an interview. It appears, that Junot

having regained Torres Vedras and occupied Mafra with half his

army, received news from Lisbon that gave him great uneasiness:

the symptoms of an immediate explosion in that city threatened him

with destruction, and he hastened to extricate himself while there

was yet time. Sending forward a false account of a victory, he

followed it up by a reinforcement for the garrison, and immediately

afterwards called a council of war to advise with upon the measures

fittest to pursue towards the English. It is an old and a sound

remark, that “a council of war never fights,” and Kellerman’s

mission was the result of the above consultation.

[Sidenote: Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.]

That general being conducted to the quarters of the

commander-in-chief, demanded a cessation of arms, and proposed

the ground-work of a convention under which Junot offered to

evacuate Portugal without further resistance. Nothing could be

more opportune than this proposition, and sir Hew Dalrymple

readily accepted of it as an advantage which would accrue, without

any drawback to the general cause of the Peninsula. He knew,

from a plan of operations sketched by the chief of the French

engineers, colonel Bory de St Vincent, and taken by the Portuguese,

that Junot possessed several very strong positions in front of

Lisbon, and that a retreat either upon Almeida, or across the

river upon Elvas, was not only within the contemplation of that

general, but considered in this report as a matter of course, and

perfectly easy of execution. Hence the proposed convention was

an unexpected advantage offered in a moment of difficulty, and

the only subject for consideration was the nature of the articles

proposed by Kellerman as a basis for the treaty. Sir Hew was of

necessity ignorant of many important details which bore upon the

question, and he naturally had recourse to sir Arthur Wellesley for

information. The latter, taking an enlarged view of the question

in all its bearings, coincided with the opinion of the former as

to the sound policy of agreeing to a convention by which a strong

French army would be quietly got out of a country that it had

complete military possession of, and by which not only a great

moral effect in favour of the general cause would be produced, but

likewise an actual gain made both of men and time, for the farther

prosecution of the war in Spain. By the convention, he observed,

1º. That a kingdom would be liberated, with all its fortresses,

arsenals, &c., and that the excited population of the Peninsula

might then be pushed forward in the career of opposition to France,

under the most favourable circumstances.

[Sidenote: Ibid.]

2º. That the Spanish army of Estremadura, which contained the most

efficient body of cavalry in the Peninsula, (being first reinforced

with the four or five thousand Spanish soldiers who were prisoners

on board the vessels in the Tagus), would be enabled to unite with

the other patriot armies at a critical period, when every addition

of force must tend to increase the confidence, and forward the

impulse, which the victory of Baylen, and the flight of Joseph,

had given to the Spaniards; and, finally, that the sacrifice of

lives to be expected in carrying the French positions in Portugal,

all the difficulties of reducing the fortresses, and the danger

of losing a communication with the fleet, would be avoided by

this measure; the result of which would be as complete as the

most sanguine could expect from the long course of uncertain and

unhealthy operations which must follow a rejection of the proposal.

But, completely coinciding, as he did, with the commander-in-chief,

as to the utility of the measure itself, he differed with him as

to the mode of proceeding, and a long discussion (in which sir H.

Burrard took a part) followed the opening of Kellerman’s mission.

Sir Arthur’s first objection was, that, in point of form, Kellerman

was merely entitled to negotiate a cessation of hostilities. But

sir Hew Dalrymple judged, that as the good policy and the utility

of the convention were recognised, it would be unwise to drive the

French to the wall for the sake of a trivial ceremony. Wherefore

the proposition was accepted, and the basis of a definitive treaty

was arranged, subject, however, to the final approbation of sir

Charles Cotton, without whose concurrence it was not to be binding.

Articles 1st and 2d declared the fact of the armistice, and

provided for the mode of future proceedings.

Article 3d indicated the river Sizandre as the line of demarcation

between the two armies. The position of Torres Vedras to be

occupied by neither.

Article 4th. Sir Hew Dalrymple engaged to have the Portuguese

included in the armistice, and their boundary line was to extend

from Leria to Thomar.

Article 5th declared, that the French were not to be considered as

prisoners of war, and that themselves and their property, public

and private, were, without any detainder, to be transported to

France. To this article sir Arthur objected, as affording a cover

for the abstraction of Portuguese property. General Kellerman

replied, that it was to be taken in its fair sense of property

justly obtained; and upon this assurance it was admitted.

Article 6th provided for the protection of individuals. It

guaranteed from political persecution all French residents, all

subjects of powers in alliance with France, and all Portuguese who

had served the invaders, or become obnoxious for their attachment

to them.

Article 7th stipulated for the neutrality of the port of Lisbon as

far as the Russian fleet was concerned. At first Kellerman proposed

to have the Russian fleet guaranteed from capture, with leave to

return to the Baltic; but this was peremptorily refused; and

indeed the whole proceeding was designed to entangle the Russians

in the French negotiation, that in case the armistice should be

broken, the former might be forced into a co-operation with the

latter.

Sir Arthur strenuously opposed this article: he argued, 1º, that

the interests of the two nations were not blended, and that they

stood in different relations towards the British army. 2º. That it

was an important object to keep them separate, and that the French

general, if pressed, would leave the Russians to their fate. 3º.

That as the British operations had not been so rapid and decisive

as to enable them to capture the fleet before the question of

neutrality could be agitated, the right of the Russians to such

protection was undoubted, and in the present circumstances it was

desirable to grant it, because, independent of the chances of

their final capture, they would be prevented from returning to the

Baltic, which in fact constituted their only point of interest when

disengaged from the French negotiation; but, that viewed as allies

of the latter, they became of great weight. Lastly, that it was an

affair which concerned the Portuguese, Russians, and British, but

with which the French could have no right to interfere.

Sir Hew finding that the discussion of this question became

lengthened, and considering that sir Charles Cotton alone could

finally decide, admitted the article merely as a form, without

acquiescing in the propriety of it.

Article 8th provided, that all guns of French calibre, and the

horses of the cavalry, were to be likewise transported to France.

Article 9th stipulated, that forty-eight hours notice should be

given of the rupture of the armistice.

To this article also sir Arthur objected; he considered it

unnecessary for the interests of the British army, and favourable

to the French, because if hostilities recommenced, the latter would

have forty-eight hours to make arrangements for their defence, for

the passage of the Tagus, and for the co-operation of the Russian

fleet. Upon the other hand, sir Hew thought it was an absolute

advantage to gain time for the preparations of the British army,

and for the arrival of sir John Moore’s reinforcements.

By an additional article it was provided, that all the fortresses

held by the French, which had not capitulated before the 25th of

August, should be given up to the British, and the basis of a

convention being thus arranged, general Kellerman returned to his

chief, and colonel George Murray was ordered to carry the proposed

articles to the English admiral.

Previous to his landing, sir Hew had received none of the letters

addressed to him by sir Arthur Wellesley, he had met with no person

during his voyage from whom he could obtain authentic information

of the state of affairs, and his time had been completely occupied

since his arrival by the negotiations with Kellerman; he was

consequently ignorant of many details of importance. The day after

Kellerman’s departure, don Bernardim Freire Andrada the Portuguese

commander-in-chief, came to remonstrate against the armistice

just concluded. Now, from the circumstances before-mentioned, it

so happened that sir Hew was utterly ignorant of the existence of

don Bernardim or his army at the time the armistice was discussed,

and it was therefore difficult for him to manage this interview

with propriety, because Andrada had some plausible, although no

real ground of complaint. His remonstrances were, however, merely

intended for the commencement of an intrigue, to which I shall

hereafter revert.

[Sidenote: Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.]

Colonel Murray soon reached the fleet, and presented the articles

of convention to sir Charles Cotton, but the latter refused to

concur therein, and declared that he would himself conduct a

separate treaty for the Russian ships. With this answer colonel

Murray returned on the 24th, having first, in reply to a question

put by the French officer who accompanied him on board the

Hibernia, declared that nothing had passed between him and sir

Charles Cotton which ought to preclude further negotiation. Sir Hew

Dalrymple was now urged by sir Arthur Wellesley to give notice,

without further explanation, that hostilities would recommence,

and to leave it to general Junot to renew propositions, if he

chose to do so, separately from the Russians. But sir Hew felt

himself in honour bound, by colonel Murray’s observation to the

French officer, not to take advantage of the occasion; and he

likewise felt disinclined to relinquish a negotiation which, from

certain circumstances, he deemed upon the point of being crowned

with success. He therefore despatched colonel Murray to Lisbon,

with directions, to inform Junot of the admiral’s objection, and

to give notice of the consequent rupture of the armistice, Murray

himself being provided, however, with full powers to enter into and

conclude a definitive treaty upon a fresh basis.

[Sidenote: Ibid.]

[Sidenote: Proc^{gs}. C^t. of Inquiry.]

The army was, at the same time, pushed forward to Ramalhal, and

sir John Moore’s troops commenced landing at Maceira Bay. When

the order to repair to that place first reached them, a part had

been already disembarked in the Mondego, and had to be re-shipped.

This and contrary winds detained them for four days, and when they

arrived at Maceira great difficulty was encountered, and some loss

was sustained, in the getting of them ashore, an operation effected

only by five days of incessant exertion on the part of the navy,

for the boats were constantly swamped by the surf, and such was

its fury that not more than thirty remained fit for service at the

conclusion.

On the 27th, information was received from colonel Murray that a

fresh treaty was in agitation upon an admissible basis. On the

28th, the army took a new position, a part occupying Torres Vedras,

and the remainder being placed in the rear of that town.

Meanwhile in Lisbon the agitation of the public mind was

excessively great, hope and fear were magnified by the obscurity of

affairs, and the contradictory news which was spread by the French,

and by those who held communication with the country, increased

the anxious feelings of joy or grief almost to phrensy. Junot made

every effort to engage admiral Siniavin in the negotiation, and

the necessity by which the latter was forced to put his ships in a

hostile and guarded attitude, contributed powerfully to control the

populace, and to give strength to an opinion, industriously spread,

that he would make common cause with the French. Siniavin had,

however, no intention of this kind, and very early gave notice that

he would treat separately.

The French, thus left to themselves, rested their hopes upon

their own dexterity, and brought all the ordinary machinery of

diplomatic subtlety into play. Among other schemes, Junot opened a

separate communication with sir Hew Dalrymple at the moment when

colonel Murray, invested with full powers, was engaged in daily

conferences with general Kellerman, and the difficulty of coming to

a conclusion was much increased by the natural sources of suspicion

and jealousy incident to such a singular transaction, where two

foreign nations were seen bargaining, and one of them honestly

bargaining, for the goods and interests of a third, yet scarcely

hinting even at the existence of the latter. The French were the

weakest party, and having of course the most to dread, put forward

claims which they knew could not be complied with, in order to

preserve the vital questions untouched. On the other hand, the

Portuguese leaders being relieved from all fear of a signal defeat,

were loudly remonstrating against the terms of the convention,

and taking advantage of the opportunity to attack some patroles

of the French, passed the bounds of demarcation, and threatened

the line of the Tagus by Santarem. This movement, and the breach

of faith in attacking the patroles, were promptly and distinctly

disavowed by sir Hew; but they kept suspicion awake, and the mutual

misunderstandings arose at last to such a height, that Junot,

seeming for a moment to recover all his natural energy, threatened

to burn the public establishments, and to make his retreat good

at the expense of the city; a menace which nothing could have

prevented him from executing. Finally, however, a definitive treaty

was concluded at Lisbon on the 30th, and soon afterwards ratified

in form.

[Sidenote: Vide Appendix, No. 10.]

This celebrated convention, improperly called “of Cintra,”

consisted of twenty-two original, and three supplementary articles,

upon the expediency of many of which, sir Arthur Wellesley and

the commander-in-chief disagreed; but as their disagreement had

reference to the details and not to the general principle, the

historical importance is not sufficient to call for remark.

An informality on the part of Junot caused some delay in the

ratification of the instrument; but the British army marched

notwithstanding to take up the position near Lisbon, assigned to

it by the 11th article of the treaty.

On the march, sir Hew Dalrymple met two Russian officers, who were

charged to open a separate negotiation for the Russian squadron.

The British general refused to receive their credentials, and

referred them to sir Charles Cotton. Baffled in this attempt to

carry on a double treaty (for a naval one was already commenced),

Siniavin, whose conduct appears to have been weak, was forced to

come to a conclusion with the English admiral. At first he claimed

the protection of a neutral port; but singly he possessed none of

that weight which circumstances had given him before the convention

with Junot, and his claim was answered by an intimation, that a

British flag was flying on the forts at the mouth of the Tagus; and

this was true, for the third and forty-second regiments, under the

command of major-general Beresford, had landed and taken possession

of them, in virtue of the convention, and the British colours were

hoisted instead of the Portuguese. Foiled by this proceeding, the

justice of which is somewhat doubtful, Siniavin finally agreed to

surrender, upon the following terms:

1º. The Russian ships, with their sails, stores, &c. to be held by

England, as a deposit, until six months after the conclusion of a

peace between the two governments of the contracting parties.

2º. The admiral, officers, and seamen, without any restriction

as to their future services, to be transported to Russia, at the

expense of the British government.

[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1809.]

Two additional articles were, subsequently to the ratification of

the original treaty, proposed by the Russians, and assented to by

the English admiral. The first stipulated that the imperial flag

should be displayed, even in the British harbours, as long as

the Russian admiral remained on board. The second provided that

the ships themselves and their stores should be delivered again

at the appointed time, in the same state as when surrendered. The

rights of the Portuguese were not referred to; but sir Charles

Cotton individually was justified by his instructions in this

breach of neutrality, for by them he was authorised to make prize

of the Russian fleet, which thus suffered all the inconvenience of

hostilities, and its commander the shame of striking his colours

without having violated in any manner the relations of amity in

which his nation stood with regard to the Portuguese. On the

other hand, for the sake of a few old and decaying ships, the

British government made an injudicious display of contempt for

the independence of their ally, as, with singular inconsistency,

they permitted the officers and crews, the real strength of the

squadron, to return to the Baltic, although scarcely a year had

elapsed since the national character was defiled to extinguish in

that quarter the existence of a navy inimical to Great Britain.

[Sidenote: Par^y. Pap^s. 1809. Admiralty Instructions to sir C.

Cotton, 16th April, 1808.]

[Sidenote: Ibid. Mr. Well^y. Pole to sir C. Cotton, 17th Sept.

1808.]

This inconsistency belonged wholly to the ministers; for the two

original articles of the treaty only were confirmed by them, and

they were copied verbatim from the Admiralty instructions delivered

to sir Charles Cotton four months previous to the transaction. Yet

that officer, by the very men who had framed those instructions,

was, with matchless inconsistency, rebuked, for having adopted a

new principle of maritime surrender!

The 2d of September head-quarters were established at Oyeras. The

right of the army occupied the forts at the mouth of the river, the

left rested upon the heights of Bellas.

[Sidenote: Thiebault.]

[Sidenote: Ibid.]

The French army being concentrated in Lisbon, posted their piquets

and guards as if in front of an enemy, and at night the sentries

fired upon whoever approached their posts; the police disbanded

of their own accord, and the city became a scene of turbulence,

anarchy, and crime. Notwithstanding the presence of their enemies,

the inhabitants of the capital testified their joy, and evinced

their vengeful feelings in a remarkable manner; they refused to

sell any provisions, or to deal in any manner with the French,

they sung songs of triumph in their hearing, and in their sight

fabricated thousands of small lamps for the avowed purpose of

illuminating the streets at their departure. The doors of many

of the houses occupied by the troops were marked in one night;

men were observed bearing in their hats lists of Portuguese or

Frenchmen designed for slaughter, and the quarters of Loison were

threatened with a serious attack. Yet amidst all this disorder

and violence, general Travot, and some others of the French army,

fearlessly and safely traversed the streets, unguarded save by

the reputation of their just and liberal conduct when in power; a

fact extremely honourable to the Portuguese, and conclusive of the

misconduct of Loison. Junot himself was menaced by an assassin, but

he treated the affair with magnanimity, and, in general, he was

respected, although in a far less degree than Travot. The dread of

an explosion, which would have compromised at once the safety of

the French army and of the city, induced Junot to hasten the period

when an English division was to occupy the citadel and take charge

of the public tranquillity.

Emissaries from the junta of Oporto fomented the disposition of

the populace to commit themselves by an attack upon the French;

the convention was reprobated, and endeavours were fruitlessly

made to turn the tide of indignation even against the English, as

abettors of the invaders. The judge of the people, an energetic,

but turbulent fellow, issued an inflammatory address calling for

a suspension of the treaty, and designating the French as robbers

and as insulters of religion. The Monteiro Mor, who commanded a

rabble of peasantry which he dignified with the title of an army,

had taken possession of the south bank of the Tagus, and from his

quarters issued a protest against the convention, the execution

of which he had the audacity to call upon sir Charles Cotton to

interrupt. The latter sent his communications to sir Hew Dalrymple,

who treated them with the contemptuous indignation they merited.

Sir John Hope being appointed the English commandant of Lisbon,

took possession of the castle of Belem on the 10th, and of the

citadel on the 12th, and, by his firm and vigorous conduct, soon

reduced the effervescence of the public mind, and repressed the

disorders which had arisen to a height that gave opportunity for

the commission of any villany. The duke of Abrantes, with his

staff, embarked the 13th. The first division of his army sailed the

15th, it was followed by the second and third divisions, and on the

30th all the French, except the garrisons of Elvas and Almeida,

were out of Portugal.

[Sidenote: Sir H. Dalrymple’s Narrative. Court of Inquiry.]

The execution of the convention had not been carried on thus far

without much trouble and contestation. Lord Proby, the English

commissioner appointed to carry the articles of the treaty into

effect, was joined by major-general Beresford on the 5th, and their

united labours were scarcely sufficient to meet the exigencies

of a task in the prosecution of which disputes hourly arose.

Anger, the cupidity of individuals, and opportunity, combined

to push the French beyond the bounds of honour and decency, and

several gross attempts were made to appropriate property which

no interpretation of the stipulations could give a colour to;

amongst the most odious were the abstraction of manuscripts and

rare specimens of natural history from the national museum, and the

invasion of the deposito publico, or funds of money awaiting legal

decision for their final appropriation. Those dishonest attempts

were met and checked with a strong hand, and at last a committee,

consisting of an individual of each of the three nations, was

appointed by the commissioners on both sides. Their office was to

receive reclamations, to investigate them, and to do justice by

seizing upon all contraband baggage embarked by the French. This

measure was attended with excellent effect. It must, however, be

observed, that the loud complaints and violence of the Portuguese,

and the machinations of the bishop of Oporto, seem to have excited

the suspicions of the British, and influenced their actions more

than the real facts warranted; for the national character of the

Portuguese was not then understood, nor the extent to which they

supplied the place of true reports, by the fabrication of false

ones, generally known. Writers have not been wanting to exaggerate

the grounds of complaint. The English have imputed fraud, and

evasions of the most dishonourable kind to the French, and the

latter have retorted by accusations of gratuitous insult and breach

of faith, asserting that their soldiers when on board the British

ships were treated with cruelty in order to induce them to desert.

It would be too much to affirm that all the error was on one side,

but it does appear reasonable and consonant to justice to decide,

that as the French were originally aggressors and acting for

their own interest, and that the British were interfering for the

protection of the Portuguese, any indecorous zeal upon the part

of the latter, if not commendable, was certainly more excusable

than in their opponents. Upon the ground of its being evidently

impossible for him to know what was doing in his name, the British

commissioners acquitted Junot of any personal impropriety of

conduct, and his public orders, which denounced severe punishments

for such malpractices, corroborated this testimony; yet Kellerman,

in his communications with sir Hew Dalrymple, did not scruple to

insinuate matter to the duke’s disadvantage. But, amidst all these

conflicting accusations, the British commander’s personal good

faith and scrupulous adherence to justice has never been called in

question.

To define the exact extent to which each party should have pushed

their claims is not an easy task; but an impartial investigator

would begin by carefully separating the original rights of the

French from those rights which they acquired by the convention.

Much of the subsequent clamour in England against the authors

of that treaty sprung from the error of confounding these

essentially distinct grounds of argument. Conquest being the sole

foundation of the first, defeat, if complete, extinguished them,

if incomplete, nullified a part only. Now the issue of the appeal

to arms not having been answerable to the justice of the cause,

an agreement ensued, by which a part was sacrificed for the sake

of the remainder, and upon the terms of that agreement the whole

question of right hinges. If the French were not prisoners of war,

it follows that they had not forfeited their claims founded on the

right of conquest, but they were willing to exchange an insecure

tenure of the whole for a secure tenure of a part. The difficulty

consisted in defining exactly what was conceded, and what should be

recovered from them. With respect to the latter, the restitution

of plunder acquired anterior to the convention was clearly out

of the question: if officially made, it was part of the rights

bargained for, and if individually, to what tribunal could the

innumerable claims which would follow such an article be referred?

Abstract notions of right in such matters are misplaced. If an army

surrenders at discretion, the victors may say with Brennus, “Woe to

the vanquished;” but a convention implies some weakness, and must

be weighed in the scales of prudence, not in those of justice.

CHAPTER VI.

The interview that took place at Vimiero between don Bernardim

Freire d’Andrada and sir Hew Dalrymple has been already noticed as

the commencement of an intrigue of some consequence. The Portuguese

general objected at the time to the armistice just concluded

with Kellerman, ostensibly upon general grounds, but really, as

it appeared, to sir Hew, because the bishop and junta of Oporto

were not named in the instrument. At the desire of Freire, one

Ayres Pinto de Souza was received at the English head-quarters

as the protector of Portuguese interests during the subsequent

negotiation. He was soon apprised that a treaty for a definitive

convention was on foot, and both himself and his general were

invited to state their views and wishes before any further steps

were taken. Neither of them took any notice of this invitation, but

when the treaty was concluded clamoured loudly against it.

The British army was, they said, an auxiliary force, and should

only act as such; nevertheless it had assumed the right of treating

with the French for Portuguese interests. A convention had been

concluded which protected the enemy from the punishment due to

his rapine and cruelty. It was more favourable than the strength

of the relative parties warranted; no notice had been taken of

the Portuguese government, or of the native army in the Alemtejo.

Men who were obnoxious to their countrymen for having aided the

invaders were protected from a just vengeance, and finally the

fortresses were bargained for, as acquisitions appertaining to

the British army; a circumstance which must inevitably excite

great jealousy both in Portugal and Spain, and injure the general

cause, by affording an opportunity for the French emissaries to

create disunion among the allied nations. They dwelt upon the

importance of the native forces, the strength of the insurrection,

and insinuated that separate operations were likely to be carried

on notwithstanding the treaty. Noble words often cover pitiful

deeds: this remonstrance, apparently springing from the feelings of

a patriot whose heart was ulcerated by the wrongs his country had

sustained, was but a cloak for a miserable interested intrigue.

The bishop of Oporto, a meddling ambitious priest, had early

conceived the project of placing himself at the head of the

insurrectional authorities, and transferring the seat of government

from Lisbon to Oporto. He was aware that he should encounter great

opposition, and he hoped that by inveigling the English general to

countenance these pretensions, he might, with the aid of Freire’s

force and his own influence, succeed in the object of his wishes.

With this view he wrote a letter to sir Charles Cotton, dated the

4th of August, in which was enclosed (as the letter describes it)

“The form of government with which they (the junta of Oporto)

meant to govern Portugal when the city of Lisbon should be free

from the French.” This letter, together with its enclosure, being

transmitted to sir Arthur Wellesley, he placed them among other

public documents in the hands of sir Hew Dalrymple when the latter

first landed at Maceira. In the document itself it was declared

that “The body of government had taken the glorious resolution

of restoring the Portuguese monarchy in all its extent, and of

restoring the crown of Portugal to its lawful sovereign, don

Juan VI., their prince, who was actually living in his estates

of Brazil;” but this “glorious resolution” was burthened with

many forms and restrictions; and although the junta professed the

intention of restoring a regency, they provided, “that if this new

regency should be interrupted by a new invasion of the French,

(which God forbid!) or by _any other thing_, this government

will immediately take the government on themselves, and exercise

the authority and jurisdiction which it has done ever since its

institution.”

Thus prepared for some cabal, sir Hew Dalrymple was at no loss

for an answer to Freire’s remonstrance. He observed, that if the

government of Portugal had not been mentioned in the treaty,

neither had that of England nor that of France. The convention was

purely military, and for the present concerned only the commanders

in the field. With regard to the occupation of the fortresses, and

the fact of the British army being an auxiliary force, the first

was merely a measure of military precaution absolutely necessary,

and the latter was in no way rendered doubtful by any act which

had been committed; he sir Hew was instructed by his government to

assist in restoring the prince regent of Portugal to his lawful

rights, without any secret or interested motives; finally, the

Portuguese general had been invited to assist in the negotiations,

and if he had not done so, the blame rested with himself. And to

this sir Hew might have justly added, that the conduct of Freire in

withdrawing his troops at the most critical moment of the campaign,

by no means entitled him to assume a high tone towards those whom

he had so disgracefully deserted in the hour of danger.

The Portuguese general was silenced by this plain and decided

answer; but the English general was quickly convinced that the

bishop and his coadjutors, however incapable of conducting great

affairs, were experienced plotters. In his first interview with

Andrada, sir Hew Dalrymple had taken occasion to observe, that

“no government lawfully representing the prince regent actually

existed in Portugal.” In fact, a junta, calling itself independent,

was likewise established in Algarvé, and the members of the

regency legally invested by the prince with supreme authority

were dispersed, and part of them in the power of the French. This

observation, so adverse to the prelate’s views, was transmitted to

him by Freire, together with a copy of the armistice. The junta

were well aware that a definite convention, differing materially

from the armistice, was upon the point of being concluded, and that

the refusal of sir Charles Cotton to concur in the latter, had

rendered it null and void; but preserving silence on that point,

the bishop forwarded the copy of the armistice to the chevalier

Da Souza, Portuguese minister in London, accompanied by a letter

filled with invectives and misrepresentations of its provisions.

The chevalier placed this letter with its inclosures, in the hands

of Mr. Canning the English secretary of state for foreign affairs,

and at the same time delivered to him an official note in which,

adopting the style of the prelate and junta, he spoke of them as

the representatives of his sovereign, and the possessors of the

supreme power in Portugal.

But the efforts of the party were not confined to formal

communications with the ministers; the daily press teemed with

invectives against the English general’s conduct, and ex-parte

statements, founded on the provisions of an armistice that was

never concluded, being thus palmed upon the public, (always hasty

in judging of such matters), a prejudice against the convention

was raised before either the terms of, or the events which led to

it, were known. For, sir Hew, forgetting the ordinary forms of

official intercourse, neglected to transmit information to his

government until fifteen days after the commencement of the treaty,

and the ministers, unable to contradict or explain any of Souza’s

assertions, were placed in a mortifying situation, by which their

minds were irritated and disposed to take a prejudiced view of the

real treaty. Meanwhile the bishop pretended to know nothing of the

convention, hence the silence of Freire during the negotiations;

but those once concluded, a clamour was, by the party, raised

in Portugal, similar to that which they had already excited in

England; and thus both nations appeared to be equally indignant at

the conduct of the general, when, in fact, his proceedings were

unknown to either.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 11.]

It would appear that the bishop had other than Portuguese

coadjutors. The baron Von Decken, a Hanoverian officer, was

appointed one of the military agents at Oporto: he was subject to

sir Hew Dalrymple’s orders, but as his mission was of a detached

nature, he was also to communicate directly with the secretary

of state in England. Von Decken arrived at Oporto upon the 17th

August, and the same evening, in concert with the bishop, concocted

a project admirably adapted to forward the views of the latter;

they agreed that the prelate was the fittest person to be at the

head of the government, and that as he could not, or pretended

that he could not, quit Oporto, the seat of government ought to be

transferred to that city. But two obstacles to this arrangement

were foreseen; first, the prince regent at his departure had

nominated a regency, and left full instructions for the filling

up of vacancies arising from death or other causes; secondly, the

people of Lisbon and of the southern provinces would certainly

resist any plan for changing the seat of government. To obviate

these difficulties, Von Decken wrote largely in commendation of

the proposed arrangement, vilifying the conduct of the regency,

and urging sir Hew not only to give his sanction to the ambitious

project, but to employ the British troops in controlling the

people of Lisbon should they attempt to frustrate the bishop’s

plans. To conciliate the members of the regency, it was proposed

to admit a portion of them into the new government, and Francisco

Noronha, Francisco da Cunha, the Monteiro Mor, and the principal

Castro, were named as being the only men who were faithful to

their sovereign. Now the last had accepted the office of ministre

des cultes under the French, and was consequently unfaithful; but

he was the brother of the bishop, Castro being legitimately born.

Under the pretext of sparing the feelings of the people of Lisbon,

it was further proposed to appoint a Portuguese commandant, subject

to the British governor, but with a native force under his orders,

to conduct all matters of police; and the bishop took the occasion

to recommend a particular general for that office. Finally, civil

dissension and all its attendant evils were foretold as the

consequences of rejecting this plan.

Sir Hew Dalrymple’s answer was peremptory and decisive. He

reprimanded general Von Decken, and at once put an end to the

bishop’s hopes of support from the English army.

This second offence, for sir Hew’s answer did not reach Oporto

until after Freire’s report had arrived there, completed the

mortification of the bishop and the junta; they set no bounds to

their violence. Efforts were made to stimulate the populace of

Lisbon to attack not only the French but the English, in the hope

that the terrible scene which must have ensued would effectually

prevent the re-establishment of the old regency, and at the same

time render the transfer of the seat of government to Oporto an

easy task. Hence the outrageous conduct of the Monteiro Mor and

of the judge of the people, and the former’s insolent letter

calling upon sir Charles Cotton to interrupt the execution of the

convention.

The 3d of September, sir Hew Dalrymple received instructions

from home relative to the formation of a new regency, which were

completely at variance with the plan arranged between the bishop

and general Von Decken, yet no difficulty attended the execution.

Here, as in the case of prince Leopold, we are arrested by the

singularity of the transaction. Is it likely that general Von

Decken should plunge into such a delicate and important affair in

one hour after his arrival at Oporto, if he had not been secretly

authorised by some member of the English cabinet; and are we to

seek for a clue to these mysteries in that shameful Machiavelian

policy that soon afterwards forced lord Castlereagh to defend his

public measures by a duel?

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 23.]

The usual fate of plans laid by men more cunning than wise,

attended the bishop of Oporto’s projects; he was successful for

a moment in rendering the convention of Cintra odious to the

Portuguese, but the great mass of the people soon acknowledged

with gratitude the services rendered them by the English, and

rejoiced at the fulfilment of a treaty that freed their country

at once from the invaders; and well might they rejoice when they

beheld above twenty-five thousand bold and skilful soldiers

reluctantly quitting the strong holds of the kingdom, and to the

last maintaining the haughty air of an army unsubdued, and capable

on the slightest provocation of resorting once more to the decision

of battle.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 12.]

The Portuguese people were contented; but the Spanish general

Galluzzo appears to have favoured the views of the Oporto faction.

Detachments of his troops, and Portuguese refugees (principally

from the northern provinces), commanded by a Spaniard, were acting

in conjunction with the insurgents of the Alemtejo. Many disputes

arose between the two nations, as I have already related, and the

Spaniards treated Portugal as a conquered country, they denied

the authority of the Portuguese general Leite, who was not of the

bishop’s party; they insulted him personally, seized his military

chest at Campo Mayor, and in all things acted with the utmost

violence and rapacity. Galluzzo himself was required by his own

government to join the Spanish armies concentrating on the Ebro;

but instead of obeying, he collected his forces near Elvas, and

when he heard of the convention concluded at Lisbon, invested Fort

Lalippe, and refused to permit the execution of the treaty relative

to that impregnable fortress. Colonel Girod de Novillard commanded

the French garrison, and profiting from its situation, had

compelled the inhabitants of Elvas to shut their gates against the

Spaniards, and to supply the fort daily with provisions. Galluzzo’s

proceedings were also manifestly absurd in a military point of

view; his attacks were confined to a trifling bombardment of

Lalippe from an immense distance, and the utmost damage sustained,

or likely to be sustained by that fortress, was the knocking away

the cornices and chimneys of the governor’s house, every other part

being protected by bomb proofs of the finest masonry.

Through lord Burghersh, who had been appointed to communicate with

the Spanish troops in Portugal, Galluzzo was early in September

officially informed of the articles of the convention, and also

that the troops of his nation confined on board the hulks at

Lisbon, were by that treaty released, and would be clothed and

armed and sent to Catalonia. Upon the 5th of September, sir Hew

Dalrymple wrote to the Spaniard, repeating the substance of the

first communication, and requesting that his detachments might be

withdrawn from the Alemtejo where they were living at the expense

of the people. Galluzzo took no notice of either communication;

he pretended that he had opened his fire against Lalippe before

the date of the convention; that no third party had a right to

interfere, and that he would grant no terms to the garrison, nor

permit any but Portuguese to enter the fort. At this very moment

the Spanish armies on the Ebro were languishing for cavalry, which

he alone possessed; and his efforts were so despised by Girod that

the latter made no secret of his intention, (if the fate of the

French army at Lisbon should render such a step advisable), to blow

up the works, and march openly through the midst of Galluzzo’s

troops.

Colonel Ross, with the 20th regiment, being appointed by sir Hew to

receive the fort from colonel Girod, and to escort the garrison to

Lisbon under the terms of the convention, sent a flag of truce to

the French. Major Colborne, who carried it, was furnished with an

autograph letter from Kellerman, and was received by Girod with

civility; but the latter refused to surrender his post without more

complete proof of the authenticity of the treaty; and with the

view of acquiring that, he proposed that a French officer should

proceed to Lisbon to verify the information; not that he affected

to doubt the truth of Colborne’s information, but that he would not

surrender his charge while the slightest doubt, capable of being

removed, was attached to the transaction; and so acting he did

well, and like a good soldier.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 12.]

General Dearey, who commanded the investing force, was persuaded

to grant a truce for six days, to give time for the journey of the

officers appointed to go to Lisbon; but on their return it was

not without great difficulty and delay that they were permitted

to communicate with colonel Girod, and no argument could prevail

upon the obstinate Galluzzo to relinquish the siege. After a warm

intercourse of letters, sir Hew Dalrymple was forced to order

sir John Hope to advance to Estremos with a considerable body of

troops, for the purpose of giving weight to his remonstrances, or,

if pushed to extremity, of forcing the Spaniard to desist from

his unwarrantable pretensions. It must be observed that Galluzzo

was not only putting aside the convention by which he profited

himself, but also violating the independence of the Portuguese

who desired his absence from their territory; and he was likewise

setting at naught the authority of his own government, for the

army of Estremadura pretended to act under the orders of the junta

of Seville: and Laguna, an accredited agent of that junta, was at

this moment receiving from sir Hew Dalrymple the Spanish prisoners

liberated by the effect of the convention, together with money,

arms, &c., to prepare them for immediate service in Catalonia,

whither they were also to be transported in British vessels. One

more effort was however made to persuade this intractable man to

submit to reason, before recourse was had to violent measures which

must have produced infinite evil. Colonel Graham repaired upon

the 25th of September to Badajos, and his arguments being backed

up by the near approach of the powerful division under Hope, were

successful, and this troublesome affair ended in an amicable manner.

[Sidenote: Appendix to col. De Bosset’s Parga, p. 134.]

[Sidenote: Thiebault.]

Colonel Girod evacuated the forts, and his garrison proceeded to

Lisbon, attended by the 52d regiment as an escort. The rival troops

agreed very well together, striving to out-do each other by the

vigour and the military order of their marches; but the Swiss and

French soldiers did not accord, and many of the latter wished to

desert. At Lisbon the whole were immediately embarked; but the

transports being detained for some time in the river, major de

Bosset, an officer of the Chasseurs Britanniques, contrived to

persuade near a thousand of the men to desert, who were afterwards

received into the British service. Girod de Novillard complained of

this as a breach of the convention, and it must be confessed that

it was an equivocal act, yet one common to all armies, and if done

simply by persuasion, very excusable.

The garrison of Almeida surrendered that fortress without any

delay, and being marched to Oporto, were proceeding to embark, when

the populace rose and would have slain them if great exertions had

not been made by the British officers to prevent such a disgraceful

breach of faith. The escort was weak, but resolute to sustain

the honour of their nation, by firing upon the multitude if the

circumstances became desperate. Nevertheless several of the French

soldiers were assassinated, and in spite of every effort the

baggage was landed, and the whole plundered; the excuse being that

church plate was to be found amongst it, an accusation easily made,

difficult to be disproved to the satisfaction of a violent mob, and

likely enough to be true.

This tumult gives scope for reflection upon the facility with which

men adapt themselves to circumstances, and regulate their most

furious passions, by the scale of self-interest. In Oporto, the

suffering, in consequence of the invasion, was trifling compared

to the misery endured in Lisbon; yet the inhabitants of the former

were much more outrageous in their anger. In Lisbon, the very

persons who had inflicted the worst evils upon the people were

daily exposed, more or less, to violence, yet suffered none; while

in Oporto it was with extreme difficulty that men, until that

moment unseen of the multitude, were rescued from their frantic

revenge. In both cases fear regulated the degree of hatred shown,

and we may conclude from hence, that national insurrections however

spontaneous and vehement, if the result of hatred only, will never

successfully resist an organized force, unless the mechanical

courage of discipline be grafted upon the first enthusiasm.

While the vexatious correspondence with Galluzzo was going on, sir

Hew Dalrymple renewed his intercourse with Castaños, and prepared

to prosecute the war in Spain. The Spanish prisoners, about four

thousand in number, were sent to Catalonia; and the British

army was cantoned principally in the Alemtejo along the road to

Badajos, but some officers were despatched to examine the roads

through Beira with a view to a movement on that line; and general

Anstruther was directed to repair to the fortress of Almeida, for

the purpose of regulating every thing which might concern the

passage of the army, if it should be found necessary to enter Spain

by that route. Lord William Bentinck was also despatched to Madrid,

having instructions to communicate with the Spanish generals and

with the central junta, and to arrange with them the best line of

march, the mode of providing magazines, and the plan of campaign.

But in the midst of these affairs, and before the garrison of Elvas

arrived at Lisbon, sir Hew Dalrymple was called home to answer for

his conduct relative to the convention. The command then devolved

upon sir Harry Burrard, but after holding it for a few days he

also returned to England, there to abide the fury of the most

outrageous and disgraceful public clamour that was ever excited by

the falsehoods of base and venal political writers.

The editors of the daily press adopting all the misrepresentations

of the Portuguese minister, and concluding that the silence of

government was the consequence of its dissatisfaction at the

convention, broke forth with such a torrent of rabid malevolence,

that all feelings of right and justice were overborne, and the

voice of truth stifled by their obstreperous cry. Many of the

public papers were printed with mourning lines around the text

which related to Portuguese affairs; all called for punishment, and

some even talked of death to the guilty, before it was possible to

know if any crime had been committed; the infamy of the convention

was the universal subject of conversation, a general madness seemed

to have seized all classes, and, like the Athenians after the sea

fight of Arginusæ, the English people if their laws would have

permitted the exploit, were ready to condemn their generals to

death for having gained a victory!

A court of inquiry was assembled at Chelsea to inquire into the

transactions relating to the armistice and the definite convention.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, sir Harry Burrard, sir Hew Dalrymple, and

the principal generals engaged at Vimiero, were called before it.

A minute investigation of all the circumstances took place, and

a detailed report was made by the board; at the end of which, it

was stated that no further judicial measures seemed to be called

for. This report was not satisfactory to the government, and the

members of the court were required to state individually whether

they approved or disapproved of the armistice and convention.

It then appeared that four approved, and three disapproved, of

the convention. Among the latter the earl of Moira distinguished

himself by a laboured criticism, which, however, left the pith of

the question entirely untouched. The proceedings of the board were

dispassionate and impartial but the report was not luminous; a

circumstance to be regretted, because the rank and reputation of

the members were sufficiently great to secure them from the revenge

of party, and no set of men were ever more favourably placed for

giving a severe and just rebuke to popular injustice.

Thus ended the last act of the celebrated convention of Cintra, the

very name of which will always be a signal record of the ignorant

and ridiculous vehemence of the public feeling; for the armistice,

the negotiations, the convention itself, and the execution of its

provisions, were all commenced, conducted, and concluded, at the

distance of thirty miles from Cintra, with which place they had

not the slightest connexion, political, military, or local[14]!

OBSERVATIONS.

RORIÇA.

1º. General Thiebault says, that the scattered state of the French

army, in the beginning of August, rendered its situation desperate;

but that the slowness of sir Arthur Wellesley saved it. Others

again have accused the latter of rashness and temerity. Neither of

these censures appear to be well founded. It is true that Junot’s

army was disseminated; but to beat an army in detail, a general

must be perfectly acquainted with the country he is to act in, well

informed of his adversary’s movements, and rapid in his own. Now

rapidity in war depends as much upon the experience of the troops

as upon the energy of the chief; and the English army was raw, the

staff and commissariat mere novices, the artillery scantily and

badly horsed, few baggage or draft animals were to be obtained

in the country, and there were only a hundred and eighty cavalry

mounted. Such impediments are not to be removed in a moment, and

therein lies the difference betwixt theory and practice, between

criticism and execution.

2º. To disembark the army without waiting for the reinforcements

was a bold but not a rash measure. Sir Arthur Wellesley knew that

the French troops were very much scattered, although he was not

aware of the exact situation of each division, and from the bishop

of Oporto’s promises, he had reason to expect good assistance from

the Portuguese, who would have been discouraged if he had not

landed at once. Weighing these circumstances he was justified

in disembarking his troops, and the event proved that he was

right, for he had full time to prepare his army, his marches were

methodical, and he was superior in numbers to his enemy in each

battle. His plans were characterized by a due mixture of enterprise

and caution well adapted to his own force, and yet capable of being

enlarged without inconvenience when the reinforcement should arrive.

3º. In the action of Roriça there was a great deal to admire, and

some grounds for animadversion. The movement against Laborde’s

first position was well conceived and executed; but the subsequent

attack against the heights of Zambugeira was undoubtedly faulty.

The march of Ferguson’s and Trant’s divisions would have dislodged

Laborde from that strong ridge without any attack on the front. It

is said that such was sir Arthur’s project; but that some mistake

in the orders caused general Ferguson to alter the direction of

his march from the flank to the centre; this if true, does not

excuse the error; because the commander-in-chief being present at

the attack in front, might have restrained it until Ferguson had

recovered the right direction. It is more probable that sir Arthur

did not expect any very vigorous resistance, and wishing to press

the French in their retreat pushed on the action too fast, and

Laborde, who was unquestionably no ordinary general, made the most

of both time and circumstances.

4º. Towards the close of the day when the French had decidedly

taken to the mountains, the line of Loison’s march was in the power

of the English general. If he had sent two thousand men in pursuit

of Laborde, left one thousand to protect the field of battle, and

with the remaining ten thousand marched against Loison, whose

advanced guard could not have been far off; it is probable that the

latter would have been surprised and totally defeated, and at all

events he could only have saved himself by a hasty retreat, which

would have broken Junot’s combinations and scattered his army in

all directions.

5º. Sir Arthur Wellesley marched to Lourinham to cover the

immediate disembarkation of his reinforcements and stores, and

this was prudent, because a south-west wind would in one night

have sent half the fleet on shore in a surf unequalled for fury;

and such was the difficulty of a disembarkation, that a detachment

from the garrison of Peniché would have sufficed to frustrate it.

The existence of a French reserve estimated by report at four

thousand men, was known; but its situation was unknown, and it

might have been on the coast line; hence great danger to Anstruther

if he attempted a landing without being covered, greater still if

he remained at sea. The reasons then for the march to Lourinham

were cogent, and perhaps outweighed the advantages of attacking

Loison; but it seems to have been an error not to have occupied

Torres Vedras on the 18th; as the disembarkation of Anstruther’s

force would have been equally secured, while the junction of the

French army, and the consequent battle of Vimiero would have been

prevented.

6º. It is an agreeable task to render a just tribute of applause to

the conduct of a gallant although unsuccessful enemy; and there is

no danger of incurring the imputation of ostentatious liberality in

asserting that Laborde’s operations were exquisite specimens of the

art of war. The free and confident manner in which he felt for his

enemy, the occupation of Brilos, Obidos, and Roriça in succession,

by which he delayed the final moment of battle, and gained time

for Loison; the judgment and nice calculation with which he

maintained the position of Roriça, and the obstinacy with which he

defended the heights of Zambugeira, were all proofs of a consummate

knowledge of war and a facility of command rarely attained.

[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s evidence. Court of Inquiry.]

7º. Sir Arthur Wellesley estimated Laborde’s numbers at six

thousand men, and his estimation was corroborated by the

information gained from a wounded French officer during the action.

It is possible that at Alcobaça they might have been so many, but

I have thought it safer to rate them at five thousand, for the

following reasons: first, it is at all times very difficult to

judge of an enemy’s force by the eye, and it is nearly impossible

to do so correctly when he is skilfully posted, and as in the

present case, desirous of appearing stronger than he really was;

secondly, the six hundred men sent on the 14th to Peniché, and

three companies employed on the 16th and 17th to keep open the

communication with Loison by Bombaral, Cadaval, and Segura must

be deducted; thirdly, Laborde himself after the convention,

positively denied that he had so many as six thousand. General

Thiebault indeed says, that only one thousand nine hundred were

present under arms; but this assertion is certainly inaccurate, and

very injurious to the credit of general Laborde, because it casts

ridicule upon a really glorious deed of arms. It is surprising that

a well-informed and able writer should disfigure an excellent work

by such trifling.

VIMIERO.

1º. The battle of Vimiero was merely a short combat, but it led

to important results because Junot was unable to comprehend the

advantages of his situation. Profitable lessons may however be

drawn from every occurrence in war, and Vimiero is not deficient in

good subjects for military speculation.

2º. To many officers the position of the British appeared weak from

its extent, and dangerous from its proximity to the sea, into which

the army must have been driven if defeated. The last objection is

well founded, and suggests the reflection that it is unsafe to

neglect the principles of the art even for a moment. The ground

having been occupied merely as a temporary post, without any view

to fighting a battle, the line of retreat by Lourinham was for

the sake of a trifling convenience left uncovered a few hours.

The accidental arrival of sir Harry Burrard arrested the advanced

movement projected by sir Arthur Wellesley for the 21st, and in the

mean time Junot took the lead, and had he been successful upon the

left, there would have been no retreat for the British army.

3º. The extent of the position at Vimiero, although considerable

to a small army, was no cause of weakness, because the line of

communication from the right to the left was much shorter and much

easier for the British defence than it was for the French attack,

and the centre was very strong and perfectly covered the movement

of the right wing. Sir Arthur, when he placed the bulk of the

combatants in that quarter, did all that was possible to remedy the

only real defect in his position, that of having no line of retreat.

4º. The project of seizing Torres Vedras and Mafra at the close

of the battle, was one of those prompt daring conceptions that

distinguish great generals, and it is absurd to blame sir Harry

Burrard for not adopting it. Men are not gifted alike, and even

if the latter had not been confirmed in his view of the matter

by the advice of his staff, there was in the actual situation

of affairs ample scope for doubt; the facility of executing sir

Arthur’s plan was not so apparent on the field of battle as it

may be in the closet. The French cavalry was numerous, unharmed,

and full of spirit. Upon the distant heights behind Junot’s army,

a fresh body of infantry had been discovered by general Spencer,

and the nature of the country prevented any accurate judgment of

its strength being formed. The gun carriages of the British army

were very much shaken, and they were so badly and so scantily

horsed, that doubts were entertained if they could keep up with the

infantry in a long march. The commissariat was in great confusion,

and the natives, as we have seen, were flying with the country

transport. The Portuguese troops gave no promise of utility, and

the English cavalry was destroyed. To overcome obstacles in the

pursuit of a great object is the proof of a lofty genius; but

the single fact that a man of sir George Murray’s acknowledged

abilities was opposed to the attempt, at once exonerates sir Harry

Burrard’s conduct from censure, and places the vigour of sir Arthur

Wellesley’s in the strongest light. It was doubtless ill-judged

of the former (aware as he was of the ephemeral nature of his

command) to interfere at all with the dispositions of a general who

was in the full career of victory, and whose superior talents and

experience were well known; but it excites indignation to find a

brave and honourable veteran borne to the earth as a criminal, and

assailed by the most puerile shallow writers, merely because his

mind was not of the highest class. Sir Arthur Wellesley himself was

the first to declare before the court of inquiry that sir Harry

Burrard had decided upon fair military reasons.

GENERAL PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN.

1º. Although double lines of operation are generally

disadvantageous and opposed to sound principles, the expediency

of landing sir John Moore’s troops at the mouth of the Mondego,

and pushing them forward to Santarem, was unquestionable, and

unless the probable consequences of such a movement are taken into

consideration, sir Arthur Wellesley’s foresight cannot be justly

appreciated.

Lisbon, situated near the end of the tongue of land lying between

the sea-coast and the Tagus, is defended to the northward by vast

mountains, that rising in successive and nearly parallel ranges,

end abruptly in a line extending from Torres Vedras to Alhandra on

the Tagus. As these ridges can only be passed at certain points

by an army, the intersections of the different roads form so many

strong positions.

The great mass of the Monte Junto appears to lead perpendicularly

on to the centre of the first ridge; but stopping short at a

few miles distance, sends a rugged shoot called the Sierra de

Barragueda in a slanting direction towards Torres Vedras, from

which it is only divided by a deep defile.

From this conformation it results, that an army marching from the

Mondego to Lisbon, must either pass behind the Monte Junto, and

follow the line of the Tagus, or keeping the western side of that

mountain, come upon the position of Torres Vedras.