OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA.
[Sidenote: Journal of Dupont’s Operations. MS.]
General Dupont received orders to march against Cadiz with a
column, composed of two Swiss regiments (Preux and Reding), taken
from the Spanish army, a French division of infantry under general
Barbou, a division of cavalry commanded by general Fresia, a marine
battalion of the imperial guards, and eighteen pieces of artillery.
Three thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and ten guns, drawn
from the army of Portugal, were to join him in Andalusia, and he
was to incorporate among his troops three other Swiss regiments,
quartered in that province.
The latter end of May he traversed La Mancha, entered the Sierra
Morena, by the pass of Despeñas Perros, and proceeded by Carolina
and Baylen to Andujar, where he arrived the 2d of June; there he
was informed that a supreme junta of government was established at
Seville, that minor juntas ruled in Granada, Jaen, and Cordoba,
that war was formally declared against the French, that the whole
of Andalusia was in arms, and the Swiss regiments ranged under the
Spanish banners, and finally, that general Avril, commanding the
detachment expected from Portugal, had halted in Tavora, and was
preparing to return to Lisbon.
Alarmed by this intelligence, Dupont wrote to Murat and Savary to
demand reinforcements, and in the mean time closed up the rear of
his columns, and established an hospital in Andujar. The 6th he
crossed the Guadalquivir, and continued his march towards Cordoba,
following the left bank of the river. Two leagues from that ancient
city the road recrossed the Guadalquivir by a long stone bridge,
at the furthest end of which stood the village of Alcolea. The
French general arrived there at day-break on the 7th, but his
further progress was opposed by the Spanish general Echevaria, who,
having fortified the head of the bridge, manned the works, placed
twelve guns in battery on the right bank, and drawn together three
thousand regular troops, and ten thousand new levies and smugglers,
occupied the village, and was prepared to dispute the passage of
the river. A small reserve remained in a camp close to Cordoba, and
a cloud of armed peasants from the side of Jaen were also gathered
on the hills behind the French army, ready to fall on its rear when
the bridge should be attacked.
Dupont having observed this disposition, placed the cavalry,
the Swiss regiments, and the marine battalion in reserve facing
to the hills, and with the division of Barbou stormed the head
of the bridge. The Spaniards, making a feeble resistance, were
driven across the river, and their whole line immediately fled to
the camp at Cordoba. The multitude on the hills descended during
the battle, but were beaten back by the cavalry with loss, and
the French general, leaving the marine battalion at Alcolea to
secure the bridge, marched with the rest of his forces to complete
the victory. At his approach the Spaniards abandoned their new
position, took refuge in the town, and being summoned to surrender,
opened a fire of musketry from the walls, whereupon the French
bursting the gates with their field-pieces, broke into the town,
and after a short and confused fight Echevaria’s men fled in
disorder along the Seville road, and were pursued by the cavalry.
As the inhabitants took no part in the contest, and received the
French without any signs of aversion, the town was protected from
pillage, and Dupont fixing his quarters there, sent his patroles as
far as Ecija without meeting with an enemy.
[Sidenote: Nellerto.]
In Seville the news of this disaster, and the arrival of fugitives,
struck such a terror, that the junta were only prevented from
retiring to Cadiz by their dread of the populace, and even
entertained thoughts of abandoning Spain altogether, and flying to
South America. Castaños, who a few days before had been declared
captain-general of the armies, was at this time in march with
seven thousand troops of the line from San Roque; being called to
Seville, he arrived there on the 9th, and after a short conference
with the junta proceeded to take the command of Echevaria’s forces,
the greater part of which were reassembled at Carmona, but in such
confusion and so moody that he returned immediately, and having
persuaded the president Saavedra to accompany him, fixed his
head-quarters at Utrera, where he gathered two or three thousand
regulars from the nearest garrisons, and directing the new levies
to repair to him, hastened the march of his own men from St.
Roche. He also pressed general Spencer to disembark, and take up a
position with the British forces at Xeres; but Spencer, for reasons
hereafter to be mentioned, sailed to Ayamonte, a circumstance that
augmented a general distrust of the English prevailing at the time,
and which was secretly fomented by Morla, and by several members of
the junta.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13.]
At this moment Andalusia was lost if Dupont had advanced; his
inactivity saved it: instead of pushing his victory, he wrote to
Savary for reinforcements, and to general Avril, desiring that he
would without delay come to his assistance, but he himself remained
in Cordoba, overwhelmed with imaginary dangers and difficulties;
for although Castaños had in a few days collected at Carmona and
Utrera seven or eight thousand regulars, and above fifty thousand
new levies, and that Dupont’s letters were intercepted and
brought to him, such was the condition of affairs that, resigning
all thoughts of making a stand, he had, under the pretence of
completing the defences of Cadiz, embarked the heavy artillery and
stores at Seville, and was prepared, if Dupont should advance, to
burn the timbers and harness of his field artillery, and to retreat
to Cadiz.
[Sidenote: Sir H. Dalrymple’s Papers.]
Meanwhile continuing the organization of his forces, he filled up
the old regiments with new levies, and formed fresh battalions, in
which he was assisted by two foreigners, the marquis de Coupigny,
a crafty French emigrant, of some experience in war, and Reding,
a Swiss, a bold, enterprising, honest man, but without judgment,
and of very moderate talents as an officer. Castaños wished to
adopt a defensive plan, to make Cadiz his place of arms, and to
form an entrenched camp, where he hoped to be joined by ten or
twelve thousand British troops, and, in security, to organize and
discipline a large army; but, in reality, he had merely the name
and the troubles of a commander-in-chief, without the power; for
Morla was his enemy, and the junta containing men determined to
use their authority for their own emolument and the gratification
of private enmity, were jealous lest Castaños should control their
proceedings, and thwarted him; humouring the caprice and insolence
of the populace, and meddling with affairs foreign to the matter in
hand.
As the numbers at Utrera increased, the general confidence
augmented, and a retreat was no longer contemplated: plans were
laid to surround Dupont in Cordoba; one detachment of peasants,
commanded by regular officers, was sent to occupy the passes of
the Sierra Morena, leading into Estremadura; another marched
from Grenada, accompanied by a regiment of the line, to seize
Carolina, and cut off the communication with La Mancha; a third,
under colonel Valdecanas, proposed to attack the French in Cordoba
without any assistance, and this eagerness for action was increased
by a knowledge of the situation of affairs in Portugal, and by
rumours exaggerating the strength of Filanghieri and Cuesta. It was
believed that the latter had advanced to Valladolid, and offered
Murat the option of abiding an attack, or retiring immediately to
France by stated marches, and that, alarmed at Cuesta’s power, the
grand duke was fortifying the Retiro.
These reports, so congenial to the wishes and vanity of the
Andalusians, caused the plan proposed by Castaños to be rejected;
and when Dupont’s despatches magnifying his own danger, and
pressing in the most urgent manner for reinforcements were again
intercepted and brought to head-quarters, it was resolved to
attack Cordoba immediately; but Dupont’s fears outstripped their
impatience.
[Sidenote: Journal of Dupont’s Operations.]
After ten days of inactivity, by which he lost the immediate fruit
of his victory at Alcolea,--the lead in an offensive campaign, and
all the imposing moral force of the French reputation in arms,
Dupont, finding that, instead of receiving direct reinforcements
from Savary, he must wait until Moncey, having first subdued
Valencia, could aid him by the circuitous route of Murcia, resolved
to fall back to Andujar.
[Sidenote: Napoleon’s notes, Appendix, No. 1.]
[Sidenote: Whittingham. Journal of Dupont.]
[Sidenote: Foy’s History.]
[Sidenote: Victoire et Conquêtes.]
He commenced his retreat the 17th of June, being followed as far
as Carpio by the advanced guard of the Andalusians, under general
Coupigny. Along the line of march, and in the town of Andujar,
where he arrived the evening of the 18th, he found terrible proofs
of Spanish ferocity; his stragglers had been assassinated, and his
hospital taken, the sick, the medical attendants, the couriers,
the staff officers, in fine, all who had the misfortune to be
weaker than the insurgents, were butchered, with circumstances of
extraordinary barbarity; upwards of four hundred men had perished
in this miserable manner since the fight of Alcolea. The fate
of colonel Renè was horrible; he had been sent on a mission to
Portugal previous to the breaking out of hostilities; and was on
his return, travelling in the ordinary mode, without arms, attached
to no army, engaged in no operations of war, but being recognised
as a Frenchman he was seized, mutilated, and then placed between
two planks and sawed alive.
Dupont now collected provisions, and prepared to maintain himself
in Andujar until he should be reinforced; but wishing to punish
the city of Jaen, from whence the bands had come that murdered his
sick, he sent captain Baste, a naval officer, with a battalion of
infantry and some cavalry, to accomplish that object. The French
soldiers, inflamed by the barbarity of their enemies, inflicted a
severe measure of retaliation, for it is the nature of cruelty to
reproduce itself in war; and for this reason, although the virtue
of clemency is to all persons becoming, it is peculiarly so to an
officer, the want of it leading to so many and such great evils.
The Andalusian army having remained quiet, Dupont, who knew that
Vedel’s division, escorting a large convoy for the army, was
marching through La Mancha, sent captain Baste with a second
detachment to clear the pass of Despeñas Perros which was occupied
by insurgents and smugglers from Grenada to the number of three
thousand: the pass itself was of incredible strength, and the
Spaniards had artillery, and were partially entrenched; but their
commander, a colonel of the line, deserted to the enemy, and before
Baste could arrive, Vedel forced the road without difficulty and
reached Carolina. He posted a detachment there to keep open the
communication with La Mancha, and then descended himself to Baylen,
a small town sixteen miles from Andujar.
[Sidenote: Dupont’s Journal.]
[Sidenote: Foy’s History.]
Meanwhile other insurgents from Grenada having arrived at Jaen were
preparing to move by the Linhares road to Carolina and Despeñas
Perros. General Cassagne, with a brigade of Vedel’s division,
marched against them the 29th of June, and after fighting on the
2nd and 3d of July, he took possession of Jaen, and drove the
Grenadans back with considerable slaughter, but lost two hundred
men himself, and returned on the 25th to Baylen. Notwithstanding
these successes, and that Vedel brought reinforcements for Barbou’s
division and the cavalry, Dupont’s fears increased. His position
at Andujar covered the main road from Seville to Carolina; but
eight miles lower down the river it could be turned by the bridge
of Marmolexo, and sixteen miles higher up by the roads leading
from Jaen to the ferry of Mengibar and Baylen; and beyond that
line by the roads from Jaen and Grenada to Uzeda, Linhares, and
the passes of El Rey and the Despeñas Perros. The dryness of
the season had also rendered the Guadalquivir fordable in many
places. The regular force under Castaños was daily increasing in
strength, the population around was actively hostile, and the
young French soldiers were drooping under privations and the heat
of the climate. Six hundred were in hospital, and the whole were
discouraged. It is in such situations that the worth of a veteran
is found: in battle the ardour of youth often appears to shame
the cool indifference of the old soldier, but when the strife
is between the malice of fortune and fortitude, between human
endurance and accumulating hardships, the veteran becomes truly
formidable, when the young soldier resigns himself to despair.
After the actions at Jaen, both sides remained quiet until the 14th
of July, on which day general Gobert, who should have been at Rio
Seco with Bessieres, arrived at Carolina with the greatest part of
a division, the next day he joined Vedel at Baylen, and the latter
general pushed on a brigade, under general Leger Bellair, to watch
the ferry of Mengibar, and it was full time, for the Spanish army
was already on the opposite bank of the river.
[Sidenote: Whittingham’s Correspondence.]
[Sidenote: Whittingham’s Correspondence.]
When Dupont’s retreat from Cordoba had frustrated the plan of the
Spaniards to surround him, Castaños returned to his old project
of a rigorous defensive system. The junta at first acquiesced,
but being unsettled in their policy, and getting intelligence of
Vedel’s march, they ordered Castaños to attack Dupont at Andujar
before the reinforcements could arrive. The regular troops were
about twenty-five thousand infantry, and two thousand cavalry. A
very heavy train of artillery, and large bodies of armed peasantry,
commanded by officers of the line, attended the army; the numbers,
of course, varied from day to day, but the whole multitude that
advanced towards the Guadalquivir could not have been less than
fifty thousand men, hence the intelligence that Vedel had actually
arrived did not much allay the general fierceness. Castaños,
however, was less sanguine than the rest, and learning that
Spencer had just returned to Cadiz with his division, he once more
requested him to land and advance to Xeres, to afford a point of
retreat in the event of a disaster; the English general consented
to disembark, but refused to advance further than Port St. Mary.
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
The 1st of July the Spanish army occupied a position extending from
Carpio to Porcuñas; the 11th a council of war being held, it was
resolved that Reding’s division should cross the Guadalquivir at
the ferry of Mengibar, and gain Baylen; that Coupigny should cross
at Villa Nueva, and support Reding; and that Castaños, with the
other two divisions, advancing to the heights of Argonilla, should
attack Andujar in front, while Reding and Coupigny should descend
from Baylen and attack it in the rear. Some detachments of light
troops under colonel Cruz were ordered to pass the Guadalquivir by
Marmolexo, and to seize the passes leading through the Morena to
Estremadura.
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
[Sidenote: Dupont’s Journal.]
[Sidenote: Foy.]
The 13th, Reding, with the first division, and three or four
thousand peasantry, marched towards Mengibar; and Coupigny, with
the second division, took the road of Villa Nueva. The 15th,
Castaños crowned the heights of Argonilla, in front of Andujar,
with two divisions of infantry, and a multitude of irregular
troops. Coupigny skirmished with the French picquets at Villa
Nueva; and Reding crossing the river at Mengibar, attacked Leger
Bellair; but Vedel came to the assistance of the latter, and
Reding recrossed to the left bank. When Dupont saw the heights
of Argonilla covered with Spanish troops, he sent to Vedel for a
brigade of infantry, broke down the bridge of Marmolexo, occupied
some works that he had thrown up to cover the bridge of Andujar,
put a garrison in an old tower built over one of the arches, and
drew the remainder of his troops up in position on the bank of the
river; his cavalry being posted in the plain behind the town, with
posts watching the fords above and below the position.
[Sidenote: Dupont’s Journal.]
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
The 15th, Castaños merely cannonaded the bridge; the 16th, colonel
Cruz crossed with four thousand men near Marmolexo, and fell upon
Dupont’s rear, while Castaños attacked him in front. Cruz was
beaten, and chased into the mountains by a single battalion, and a
few discharges checked Castaños. Meanwhile, Vedel, either thinking
all safe at Baylen, or mistaking Dupont’s meaning, instead of
sending a brigade, marched during the night of the 15th with his
whole division. The next day Reding again passed the Guadalquivir,
and attacked Leger Bellair. General Gobert, who had just arrived
at Baylen, marched to the latter’s assistance; the combat became
hot, Gobert fell mortally wounded, and the French retired to
Baylen. General Darfour succeeded Gobert, and as Reding did not
follow up his success, Darfour gave credit to a report that the
Spanish general was moving by the Linhares road upon Carolina, and
imprudently fell back to the latter town.
While this was passing, Dupont, already offended by Vedel’s
over-zeal, heard of Gobert’s death, and obliged the former to
return during the nights of the 16th and 17th, to Baylen, with
orders to secure that important point; but Vedel also fell into the
same error as Darfour, and marched the 18th to Carolina. Reding,
who had never moved from Mengibar, being now joined by Coupigny,
profited of this occasion to seize Baylen, and throwing out a
detachment on the side of Carolina, drew up in position facing
Andujar; his numbers, including the armed peasants, being about
twenty thousand.
[Sidenote: Dupont’s Journal.]
The armies were thus interlaced in a singular manner: Dupont being
posted between Castaños and Reding; and Reding between Dupont and
Vedel’s division: the affair became one of time; Castaños rested
tranquilly in his camp, apparently ignorant of Reding’s situation;
Dupont, more alive to what was passing, silently quitted Andujar
on the evening of the 18th, marched all night, and at day-break
came to Rio de las Tiedras, a torrent with rugged banks, two miles
from the Spanish position, in front of Baylen. Reding’s ground
was strong, intersected with deep ravines, and planted with olive
trees. Dupont hoping that Vedel would return upon the Spanish rear,
and having no choice, passed the Tiedras, and leaving Barbou with
a few battalions on that stream to keep Castaños in check, if he
should arrive during the action, attacked Reding.
[Sidenote: Whittingham.]
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
For some time the French appeared to be gaining ground; but,
fatigued with a long night march, and unable to force the principal
points, they became discouraged; the Swiss brigade went over to
the enemy; and at two o’clock, after losing about two thousand,
killed and wounded, Dupont yielded to his destiny, and sent to
desire a suspension of hostilities, with a view to a convention.
Reding, who could hardly maintain his position, willingly acceded
to the proposal. At this moment Barbou was attacked by general La
Pena, who arrived on the Tiedras with a third Spanish division;
for Castaños, when he had discovered Dupont’s retreat eight hours
after the latter had quitted his position, sent half the troops in
pursuit, and remained with the rest at Andujar.
[Sidenote: Victoires et Conquêtes.]
[Sidenote: Foy.]
[Sidenote: Dupont’s Journal. MSS.]
Vedel having heard the cannonade as early as three o’clock in
the morning, quitted Carolina at five o’clock, and marched in
the direction of Baylen. The continued sound of artillery became
more distinct as he advanced, and left no doubt of the fact of
Dupont’s division being seriously engaged, notwithstanding which he
halted at Guarroman, two Spanish leagues from Baylen, and remained
inactive for seven hours. At three o’clock in the evening, when the
firing had long ceased, he put himself in motion again, and coming
upon the rear of Reding’s troops, enveloped and made prisoners a
battalion of the detached corps which was posted by that general
to watch the road leading from Carolina. These troops relying upon
the faith of the armistice just agreed upon with Dupont, made no
resistance; and Vedel being informed of what was passing, released
them, and awaited the result of this singular crisis.
[Sidenote: Whittingham’s Correspondence.]
[Sidenote: Victoires et Conquêtes.]
One Villontreys, an officer of the emperor’s staff, opened the
negotiation with Reding, by whom he was referred to Castaños then
at Andujar; thither generals Chabert and Marescot repaired on
the 20th. They demanded permission for the whole army to retire
peaceably upon Madrid; and Castaños was at first inclined to grant
this as the most certain and ready mode of freeing Andalusia
from the French, and gaining time for further preparations;
but Savary’s letter to Dupont, written just before the battle
of Rio Seco, to recall him to the defence of the capital,
being intercepted, was brought at this moment to the Spanish
head-quarters, and changed the aspect of affairs. A convention was
no longer in question; Dupont’s troops were required to lay down
their arms and to become prisoners of war, on condition of being
sent to France by sea. Vedel’s troops were likewise required to
surrender on condition of being sent to France with the others,
but not to be considered as prisoners of war: and these terms were
accepted.
Meanwhile Vedel, informed, in the night of the 20th, by Dupont, of
this unexpected change, had retreated to Carolina. Castaños hearing
of it, menaced Dupont with death if Vedel did not return; and the
latter understanding that he was included in the capitulation, came
back to Baylen and surrendered.
[Sidenote: Foy’s History.]
Thus, above eighteen thousand French soldiers laid down their arms
on the 22d, before a raw army incapable of resisting half that
number if the latter had been led by an able man. Nor did this end
the disgraceful affair; but, as if to show to what extent folly
and fear combined will carry men, captain Villontrey’s, with a
Spanish escort, passed the Sierra Morena, and traversing La Mancha
to within a short distance of Toledo, gathered up the escorts, the
hospital attendants, and the detachments left by Dupont in that
province, and constituting them prisoners under the capitulation,
sent them to Andujar; and this unheard of proceeding was quietly
submitted to by men who belonged to that army which for fifteen
years had been the terror of Europe--a proof how much the firmness
of soldiers depends upon the character of their immediate chief.
[Illustration: _Explanatory Sketch_ of the BATTLE OF BAYLEN.
_London. Published March 1828, by John Murray, Albermarle Street._]
The capitulation, shameful in itself, was shamefully broken. The
French troops, instead of being sent to France, were maltreated,
and numbers of them murdered in cold blood, especially at Lebrixa,
where above eighty officers were massacred in the most cowardly
manner. Although armed only with their swords, they kept the
assassins for some time at bay, and gathering in a company, upon an
open space in the town, endeavoured to save their lives, but a fire
from the neighbouring houses was kept up until the last of those
unfortunate gentlemen fell.
[Sidenote: Victoires et Conquêtes.]
No distinction was made between Dupont’s and Vedel’s troops;
all who survived the march to Cadiz, after being exposed to
every species of indignity, were cast into some hulks, where the
greatest number perished in lingering torments: a few hundreds,
rendered desperate by their situation, contrived to escape, some
years afterwards, by cutting the cables of their prison-ship,
and drifting, under a heavy fire, and in the midst of a storm,
upon a lee-shore, where two-thirds of them were picked up by
their countrymen at that time blockading Cadiz. Dupont himself
was permitted to return to France, and to take with him all
the generals; and it is curious that general Privé, who had
remonstrated strongly against the capitulation, and pressed Dupont
on the field to force a passage through Reding’s army, was the only
one left behind.
Don Thomas Morla, after a vain attempt to involve lord Collingwood
and sir Hew Dalrymple in the disgraceful transaction, formally
defended the conduct of the junta in breaking the capitulation; his
reasoning was worthy of the man who so soon afterwards betrayed his
own country with the same indifference to honour that he displayed
on this occasion.
OBSERVATIONS.
[Sidenote: Return of the French army. Appendix.]
1º. The gross amount of Dupont’s corps when it first entered
Spain was about twenty-four thousand men, with three thousand
five hundred horses; of these twenty-one thousand were fit for
duty. It was afterwards strengthened by a provisionary regiment of
cuirassiers, a marine battalion of the guard, and the two Swiss
regiments of Preux and Reding. It could not therefore have been
less than twenty-four thousand fighting men when Dupont arrived in
Andalusia, and as the whole of Vedel’s, and the greatest part of
Gobert’s division, had joined before the capitulation, and that
eighteen thousand men laid down their arms at Baylen, Dupont must
have lost by wounds, desertion, and deaths in hospital or the
field, above four thousand men.
2º. The order which directed this corps upon Cadiz was despatched
from Bayonne before the Spanish insurrection broke out; it was
therefore strange that Dupont should have persevered in his
march when he found affairs in such a different state from that
contemplated by Napoleon at the time the instructions for this
expedition were framed. If the emperor considered it necessary to
reinforce the division which marched under Dupont’s own command,
with a detachment from the army in Portugal before the insurrection
broke out, it was evident that he never could have intended that
that general should blindly follow the letter of his orders, when
a great and unexpected resistance was opposed to him, and that
the detachment of Portugal was unable to effect a junction. The
march to Cordoba was therefore an error, and it was a great error,
because Dupont confesses in his memoir that he advanced under the
conviction that his force was too weak to obtain success, and,
consequently, having no object, his operations could only lead to a
waste of lives.
3º. At Cordoba, Dupont remained in a state of torpor for ten days;
this was the second error of a series which led to his ruin: he
should either have followed up his victory and attacked Seville
in the first moment of consternation, or he should have retired
to Andujar while he might do so without the appearance of being
compelled to it. If he had followed the first plan, the city would
inevitably have fallen before him, and thus time would have been
gained for the arrival of the 2d and 3d division of his corps.
[Sidenote: Dupont’s Journal of Operations.]
4º. It may be objected that ten thousand men durst not penetrate so
far into a hostile country; but at Alcolea, Dupont boasts of having
defeated forty thousand men without any loss to himself; from such
armies then he had nothing to fear, and the very fact of his having
pushed his small force between the multitudes that he defeated upon
the 7th, proves that he despised them. “He retired from Cordoba,”
he says in his memoir, “because to fight a battle when victory can
be of no use is against all discretion;” but to make no use of a
victory when it is gained comes to the same thing; and he should
never have moved from Andujar unless with the determination of
taking Seville.
5º. Those errors were, however, redeemable; the position behind
the Guadalquivir, the checks given to the patriots at Jaen after
the arrival of Vedel at Carolina upon the 27th, and above all the
opportune junction of Gobert at the moment when Castaños and
Reding appeared in front of the French line, proved that it was not
fortune but common sense that deserted Dupont on this occasion,
for the Spanish forces being divided and extended from Andujar to
Mengibar were exposed to be beaten in detail; but their adversary
was indulgent to them, and amidst the mass of errors committed upon
both sides, this false disposition appeared like an act of wisdom,
and being successful was stamped accordingly.
6º. At Mengibar a variety of roads branch off leading to Jaen, to
Linhares, to Baylen and other places. From Andujar, a road nearly
parallel to the Guadalquivir runs to the ferry of Mengibar and
forms the base of a triangle, of which Baylen may be taken as the
apex. From this latter town to the ferry is about six miles, from
the ferry to Andujar is about eighteen, from the latter to Baylen
the distance may be sixteen miles. Fifteen miles above Baylen the
town of Carolina, situated in the gorge of the Sierra Morena, was
the point of communication with La Mancha, and the line of retreat
for the French in the event of a defeat, hence Baylen, not Andujar,
was the pivot of operations.
[Sidenote: Dupont’s Journal. MS.]
7º. The French force was inferior in number to that under Castaños,
yet Dupont disseminated his divisions upon several points. The
natural results followed. The Spaniards, although the most
unwieldy body, took the lead and became the assailants; the French
divisions were worn out by useless marches; the orders of their
chief were mistaken or disobeyed; one position being forced,
another was of necessity abandoned; confusion ensued, and finally
Dupont says he surrendered with _eighteen thousand_ men, because
his fighting force was reduced to _two thousand_: such an avowal
saves the honour of his soldiers, but destroys his own reputation
as a general. The first question to ask is, what became of the
remainder? Why had he so few when ten thousand of his army never
fired a shot? It must be confessed that Dupont, unless a worse
explanation can be given of his conduct, was incapable to the last
degree.
8º. There were two plans, either of which promised a reasonable
chance of success, under the circumstances in which the French
army was placed on the 14th. 1st. To abandon Andujar, send all
the incumbrances into La Mancha, secure the passes, unite the
fighting men at Carolina, and fall in one mass upon the first corps
of Spaniards that advanced; the result of such an attack could
hardly have been doubtful; but if, contrary to all probability, the
Spaniards had been successful, the retreat of the French was open
and safe. 2dly. To secure Carolina by a detachment, and placing
small bodies in observation at Andujar and the ferry of Mengibar,
to unite the army on the 15th at Baylen, and in that central
position await the enemy. If the two corps of the Spanish army had
presented themselves simultaneously upon both roads, the position
was strong for battle and the retreat open; if one approached
before the other, each might have been encountered and crushed
separately. Dupont had a force more than sufficient for this
object, and fortune was not against him.
9º. The direction in which Reding marched was good, but it should
have been followed by the whole army. The heights of Argonilla
would have screened the march of Castaños, and a few troops with
some heavy guns left in front of the bridge of Andujar, would
have sufficed to occupy Dupont’s attention. If the latter general
had attacked Castaños upon the morning of the 16th, when Vedel’s
division arrived from Baylen, the fourteen thousand men thus
united by accident would easily have overthrown the two Spanish
divisions in front of Andujar; and Reding, if he had lost an
hour in retreating to Jaen, might have been taken in flank by
the victorious troops, and in front by Gobert, and so destroyed.
Instead of availing himself of this opening, the French general
sent Vedel back to Baylen, and followed himself the day after;
being encountered by Reding, he vainly hoped that the divisions
(which with so much pains he had dispersed) would reunite to
relieve him from his desperate situation; it is difficult to say
why those divisions did not arrive during the battle, and more
difficult to assign to each person a just portion of censure where
all were to blame.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6.]
10º. In the action Dupont clung tenaciously to the miserable
system of dividing his forces; his only chance of safety was to
force Reding before Castaños could arrive upon the Tiedras; it was
therefore a wretched misapplication of rules to have a reserve
watching that torrent, and to fight a formal battle with a first
and second line and half a dozen puny columns of attack. An
energetic officer would have formed his troops in a dense mass and
broken at once through the opposing force upon the weakest point;
there are few armies so good, that such an assault would not open
a passage through them; seven thousand infantry with cavalry and
artillery is a powerful column of attack, and the Spanish line
could not have withstood it for a moment. The battle should have
been one of half an hour; Dupont, by his ridiculous evolutions,
made it one of ten hours, and yet so badly did the patriots fight,
that in all that time not a single prisoner or gun fell into their
hands, and the fact of Reding’s entering at all into a convention,
proves his fears for the final result. It is truly astonishing that
Dupont, who, from his rank, must have been well acquainted with
Napoleon’s Italian campaigns, should have caught so little of the
spirit of his master. And then the inexplicable capitulation of
Vedel after his retreat was actually effected! Vedel, who might
have given battle and disputed the victory by himself without
any great imprudence! Joseph called Dupont’s capitulation a
“_defection_;” perhaps he was right.
11º. Castaños, although active in preparation, discovered but
little talent in the field, his movements were slow, uncertain,
and generally false: the attempt to turn the French position at
Andujar by detaching four thousand men across the river was ill
conceived and badly supported; it was of that class of combinations
to which the separate march of Reding’s corps belonged. To the
latter general the chief honour of the victory is due; yet, if
Vedel had returned from Carolina upon the 19th, with the rapidity
which the occasion required, Reding would have repented taking post
at Baylen. It was undoubtedly a bold energetic step; but instead of
remaining at that place, he should have descended instantly upon
the rear of Dupont, leaving a corps of observation to delay the
march of Vedel. Time not being taken into his calculation, Reding
acted like a bold but rash and unskilful officer. Fortune, however,
favoured his temerity, and with her assistance war is but a child’s
play.
[Sidenote: Foy’s History.]
Intelligence of the capitulation of Baylen was secretly spread
among the Spaniards in Madrid as early as the 23d or 24th of
July, but the French, although alarmed by rumours of some great
disaster, were unable to acquire any distinct information,
until the king sent two divisions into La Mancha to open the
communication; these troops arriving at Madrilejos, one hundred and
twenty miles from Baylen, met captain Villontreys with his Spanish
escort collecting prisoners, and apparently intending to proceed in
his task to the very gates of Madrid. The extent of the disaster
thus became known, and the divisions retraced their steps. Joseph
called a council of war on the 29th, and Savary, enlightened by
the instructions of Napoleon, proposed to unite all the French
forces, to place a small garrison in the Retiro, and to fall upon
the Spanish armies in succession as they advanced towards the
capital; but a dislike to the war was prevalent amongst the higher
ranks of the French army. The injustice of it was too glaring; and
the reasons for a retreat, which might perchance induce Napoleon
to desist, being listened to with more complacency than Savary’s
proposal, it was resolved to abandon Madrid and retire behind the
Ebro.
The king commenced this operation on the 1st of August, marching
by the Somosierra; while Bessieres posted at Mayorga, covered
the movement until the court reached Burgos, and then fell back
himself. In a short time the French invaders were all behind the
Ebro, the siege of Zaragoza was raised, and the triumphant cry of
the Spaniards was heard throughout Europe.
The retreat of the king was undoubtedly hasty and ill-considered;
whether as a military or political measure it was unwise.
Bessieres, with seventeen thousand victorious troops and forty
pieces of artillery, paralized the northern provinces, the Spanish
army of Andalusia was too distant from that of Valencia to concert
a combined movement, and if they had formed a junction their united
force could not have exceeded forty thousand fighting men, ill
provided, and commanded by jealous independent chiefs. Now the
king, without weakening Bessieres’s corps too much, could have
collected twenty thousand infantry, five thousand cavalry, and
eighty pieces of artillery, and the battle of Rio Seco shows what
such an army could have effected. Every motive of prudence and of
honour called for some daring action to wipe off the ignominy of
Baylen.
Let it be conceded that Joseph could not have maintained himself
in Madrid; the line of the Duero was the true position for
the French army. Taking Aranda as a centre, and occupying the
Somosierra, Segovia, Valladolid, Palencia, Burgos, and Soria on
the circumference; two ordinary marches would have carried the
king to the succour of any part of his position, and the northern
provinces would thus have been separated from the southern; for
Blake durst not have made a flank march to the Guadarama, Castaños
durst not have remained in the basin of Madrid, and the siege of
Zaragoza might have been continued, because from Aranda to Zaragoza
the distance is not greater than from Valencia or from Madrid, and
from Soria it is only three marches; hence the king could have
succoured Verdier in time if the Valencians attacked him, and it
was impossible for Castaños to have arrived at Zaragoza under a
month; now by taking up the line of the Ebro, Napoleon’s plan of
separating the provinces, and confining each to its own exertions,
was frustrated, and Joseph virtually resigned the throne; for
however doubtful the prudence of opposing the French might have
been considered before the retreat, it became imperative upon all
Spaniards to aid the energy of the multitude, when that energy was
proved to be efficient.
In this manner Napoleon’s first effort against Spain was
frustrated; not that he had miscalculated either the difficulties
of his task, or the means to overcome them; for although Bessieres
was the only general who perfectly succeeded in his operations,
the plan of the emperor was so well combined, that it required
the destruction of a whole army to shake it at all, and even when
the king, by committing the great faults of abandoning Madrid
and raising the siege of Zaragoza, had given the utmost force to
Dupont’s catastrophe; the political position only of the French was
weakened, their military hold of the country was scarcely loosened,
and the Spaniards were unable to follow up their victory.
The moral effect of the battle of Baylen was surprising: it was
one of those minor events which, insignificant in themselves, are
the cause of great changes in the affairs of nations. The defeat
of Rio Seco, the preparations of Moncey for a second attack on
Valencia, the miserable plight of Zaragoza, the desponding view
taken of affairs by the ablest men of Spain, and, above all, the
disgust and terror excited among the patriots by the excesses of
the populace, weighed heavy against the Spanish cause. One victory
more, and probably the moral as well as the physical force of
Spain would have been crushed; but the battle of Baylen, opening
as it were a new crater for the Spanish fire, all their pride,
and vanity, and arrogance burst forth, the glory of past ages
seemed to be renewed, every man conceived himself a second Cid,
and perceived in the surrender of Dupont, not the deliverance of
Spain, but the immediate conquest of France. “We are much obliged
to our good friends the English,” was a common phrase among them
when conversing with the officers of Sir John Moore’s army; “we
thank them for their good-will, and we shall have the pleasure
of escorting them through France to Calais: the journey will be
pleasanter than a long voyage, and we shall not give them the
trouble of fighting the French; we shall, however, be pleased at
having them as spectators of our victories.” This absurd confidence
might have led to great things if it had been supported by wisdom,
activity, or valour; but it was “a voice, and nothing more.”
BOOK II.
CHAPTER I.
The uninterrupted success that for so many years attended the arms
of Napoleon, gave him a moral influence doubling his actual force.
Exciting at once terror, admiration, and hatred, he absorbed the
whole attention of an astonished world, and openly or secretly all
men acknowledged the power of his wonderful genius. The continent
bowed before him, and even in England an increasing number of
absurd and virulent libels on his person and character indicated
the growth of secret fear. His proceedings against the Peninsula
were, in truth, viewed at first with anxiety rather than with the
hope of arresting their progress; yet when the full extent of the
injustice became manifest, the public mind was vehemently excited,
and a sentiment of some extraordinary change being about to take
place in the affairs of the world prevailed among all classes of
society; suddenly the Spanish people rose against the man that all
feared; and the admiration which energy and courage exact, even
from the base and timid, became enthusiastic in a nation conscious
of the same virtues.
No factious feelings interfered to check this enthusiasm: the party
in power, anxious to pursue a warlike system necessary to their
own political existence, saw with joy that the stamp of justice
and high feeling would, for the first time, be affixed to their
policy. The party out of power having always derided the impotence
of the ancient dynasties, and asserted that regular armies alone
were insufficient means of defence, could not consistently refuse
their approbation to a struggle originating with, and carried on
entirely by the Spanish multitude. The people at large exulted that
the manifest superiority of plebeian virtue and patriotism was
acknowledged.
The arrival of the Asturian deputies was, therefore, universally
hailed as an auspicious event. Their wishes were forestalled, their
suggestions were attended to with eagerness; their demands were so
readily complied with, and the riches of England were so profusely
tendered to them by the ministers, that it can scarcely be doubted
that the after arrogance and extravagance of the Spaniards arose
from the manner in which their first applications were met; for
there is a way of conferring a favour that appears like accepting
one: and this secret being discovered by the English cabinet, the
Spaniards soon demanded as a right what they had at first solicited
as a boon. In politics it is a grievous fault to be too generous;
gratitude, in state affairs, is unknown; and as the appearance of
disinterested kindness never deceives, it should never be assumed.
The capture of the Spanish frigates had placed Great Britain and
Spain in a state of hostility without a declaration of war. The
invasion of Napoleon produced a friendly alliance between those
countries without a declaration of peace, for the cessation of
hostilities was not proclaimed until long after succours had been
sent to the juntas.
The ministers seemed, by their precipitate measures, to be more
afraid of losing the assistance of the Spaniards than prepared
to take the lead in a contest which could only be supported by
the power and riches of Great Britain. Instead of adopting a
simple and decisive policy towards Spain, instead of sending a
statesman of high rank and acknowledged capacity to sustain the
insurrection, and to establish the influence of England by a
judicious application of money and other supplies, the ministers
employed a number of obscure men in various parts of the Peninsula
who, without any experience of public affairs, were empowered to
distribute succours of all kinds at their own discretion. Instead
of sifting carefully the information obtained from such agents,
and consulting distinguished military and naval officers in the
arrangement of some comprehensive plan of operations which, being
well understood by those who were to execute it, might be supported
vigorously, the ministers formed crude projects, and parcelled out
the forces in small expeditions, without any definite object in
view, altering their plans with every idle report, and changing the
commanders as lightly as the plans.
[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Letters.]
[Sidenote: Lord W. Bentinck’s ditto.]
Entering into formal relations with every knot of Spanish
politicians that assumed the title of a supreme junta, the
government dealt with unsparing hands enormous supplies at the
demand of those self-elected authorities, yet took no assurance
that the succours should be justly applied, but, with affected
earnestness, disclaimed all intention of interfering with the
internal arrangements of the Spaniards, when the ablest men of
Spain expected and wished for such an interference to repress
the folly and violence of their countrymen, and when England was
entitled, both in policy and justice, not only to interfere,
but to direct the councils of the insurgents. The latter had
solicited and obtained her assistance; the cause was become common
to both nations, and their welfare demanded, that a prudent, just,
and vigorous interference on the part of the most powerful and
enlightened, should prevent that cause from being ruined by a few
ignorant and conceited men, accidentally invested with authority.
[Sidenote: Vide Instructions for sir Thos. Dyer, &c. &c.]
[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1809.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, Section 5th.]
The numbers and injudicious choice of military agents were also
the source of infinite mischief; selected, as it would appear,
principally because of their acquaintance with the Spanish
language; few of those agents had any knowledge of war beyond the
ordinary duties of a regiment; there was no concert among them, for
there was no controlling power vested in any, but each did that
which seemed good to him. Readily affecting to consult men whose
inexperience rendered them amenable, and whose friendship could
supply the means of advancing their own interests in a disorganised
state of society, the Spanish generals received the agents with a
flattering and confidential politeness, that diverted the attention
of the latter from the true objects of their mission. Instead of
ascertaining the real numbers and efficiency of the armies, they
adopted the inflated language and extravagant opinions of the
chiefs, with whom they lived; and their reports gave birth to most
erroneous notions of the relative strength and situation of the
contending forces in the Peninsula. Some exceptions there were; but
the ministers seemed to be better pleased with the sanguine than
with the cautious, and made their own wishes the measure of their
judgments. Accordingly, enthusiasm, numbers, courage, and talent,
were gratuitously found for every occasion; but money, arms, and
clothing, were demanded incessantly, and supplied with profusion;
the arms were, however, generally left in their cases to rot, or to
fall into the hands of the enemy; the clothing seldom reached the
soldier’s back, and the money, in all instances misapplied, was in
some, embezzled by the authorities, into whose hands it fell, and
in others employed to create disunion, and to forward the private
views of the juntas, at the expense of the public welfare. It is
a curious fact, that from the beginning to the end of the war, an
English musket was rarely to be seen in the hands of a Spanish
soldier. But it is time to quit this subject, and to trace the
progress of Junot’s invasion of Portugal, that the whole circle of
operations in the Peninsula being completed, the reader may take a
general view of the situation of all parties, at the moment when
sir Arthur Wellesley, disembarking at the Mondego, commenced those
campaigns which form the proper subject of this history.
INVASION OF PORTUGAL BY JUNOT.
[Sidenote: Thiebault.]
Peremptory orders obliged Junot to commence operations at an
unfavourable time of year, and before his preparations were
completed. In his front the roads were nearly impracticable, and a
part of his troops were still in the rear of Salamanca. Hence, his
march from that town to Alcantara (where he effected his junction
in the latter end of November, with the part of the Spanish force
that was to act under his immediate orders) was very disastrous,
and nearly disorganized his inexperienced army.
The succours he expected to receive at Alcantara were not
furnished, and the repugnance of the Spanish authorities to aid
him, was the cause of so much embarrassment, that his chief
officers doubted the propriety of continuing operations under
the accumulating difficulties of his situation; but Junot’s
firmness was unabated. He knew that no English force had landed at
Lisbon, and the cowardice of the Portuguese court was notorious.
Encouraged by these considerations, he undertook one of those hardy
enterprises which astound the mind by their success, and leave
the historian in doubt if he should praise the happy daring, or
stigmatise the rashness of the deed.
[Sidenote: Thiebault.]
Without money, without transport, without ammunition sufficient
for a general action, with an auxiliary force of Spaniards by
no means well disposed to aid him, Junot, at the head of a raw
army, penetrated the mountains of Portugal on the most dangerous
and difficult line by which that country can be invaded. He was
ignorant of what was passing in the interior; he knew not if he
was to be opposed, nor what means were prepared to resist him; but
trusting to the inertness of the Portuguese government, to the
rapidity of his own movements, and to the renown of the French
arms, he made his way through Lower Beira, and suddenly appeared
in the town of Abrantes, a fearful and unexpected guest. There he
obtained the first information of the true state of affairs. Lisbon
was tranquil, and the Portuguese fleet was ready to sail, but the
court still remained on shore. On hearing this, Junot, animated by
the prospect of seizing the prince regent, pressed forward, and
reached Lisbon in time to see the fleet, having the royal family
on board, clearing the mouth of the Tagus. One vessel dragged
astern within reach of a battery, the French general himself fired
a gun at her; and on his return to Lisbon, meeting some Portuguese
troops, he resolutely commanded them to form an escort for his
person, and thus attended, passed through the streets of the
capital. Nature alone had opposed his progress; yet such were the
hardships his army had endured, that of a column which had numbered
twenty-five thousand in its ranks, two thousand tired grenadiers
only entered Lisbon with their general; fatigue, and want, and
tempests, had scattered the remainder along two hundred miles of
rugged mountains, inhabited by a warlike and ferocious peasantry,
well acquainted with the strength of their fastnesses, and proud
of many successful defences made by their fore-fathers against
former invaders. Lisbon itself contained three hundred thousand
inhabitants, and fourteen thousand regular troops were collected
there. A powerful British fleet was at the mouth of the harbour;
the commander, sir Sydney Smith, had urged the court to resist, and
offered to land his seamen and marines to aid in the defence of
the town; but his offers were declined; and the people, disgusted
with the pusillanimous conduct of their rulers, and confounded
by the strangeness of the scene, evinced no desire to impede the
march of events. Thus three weak battalions sufficed to impose a
foreign yoke upon this great capital, and illustrated the truth of
Napoleon’s maxim:--_that in war the moral is to the physical force
as three parts to one_.
The prince regent, after having at the desire of the French
government, expelled the British factory, ordered the British
minister plenipotentiary away from his court, sequestered British
property, and shut the ports of Portugal against British merchants;
after having degraded himself and his nation by performing every
submissive act which France could devise to insult his weakness,
was still reluctant to forego the base tenure by which he hoped
to hold his crown. Alternately swayed by fear and indolence,
a miserable example of helpless folly, he lingered until the
reception of a Moniteur, announcing that “_the house of Braganza
had ceased to reign_,” awoke all the energy he was capable of. At
that time lord Strangford, the British minister plenipotentiary,
had resigned all hope of persuading the royal family to emigrate;
but sir Sydney Smith, seizing the favourable moment, threatened to
commence hostilities if the emigration should be longer delayed;
and thus urged, the prince regent of Portugal, the old queen his
mother, and the rest of the royal family, had embarked on the 27th;
and quitting the Tagus on the 29th of November[9], sailed for the
Brazils, a few hours only before Junot arrived with his slight
escort of grenadiers.
This celebrated emigration was beneficial to the Brazils in the
highest degree, and of vast importance to England in two ways,
for it ensured great commercial advantages, and it threw Portugal
completely into her power in the approaching conflict; but it
was disgraceful to the prince, insulting to the brave people he
abandoned, and impolitic, inasmuch as it obliged men to inquire how
far subjects were bound to a monarch who deserted them in their
need? how far the nation could belong to a man who did not belong
to the nation?
It has been observed by political economists, that where a gold
and paper currency circulate together, if the paper be depreciated
it will drag down the gold with it, and deteriorate the whole
mass; but that after a time, the metal revolts from this unnatural
state, and asserts its own intrinsic superiority. So a privileged
class, corrupted by power and luxury, drags down the national
character; but there is a point when the people, like the gold, no
longer suffering such a degradation, will separate themselves with
violence from the vices of their effeminate rulers. Before that
time arrives a nation may appear to be sunk in hopeless lethargy,
when it is really capable of great and noble exertions. Thus it was
with the Portuguese, who were at this time unjustly despised by
enemies, and mistrusted by friends.
[Sidenote: Thiebault.]
[Sidenote: Foy.]
The invading army, in pursuance of the convention of Fontainebleau,
was divided into three corps; the central one, composed of the
French troops, and a Spanish division, under general Caraffa, had
penetrated by the two roads, which from Alcantara lead, the one by
Pedragoa, the other by Sobreira Formosa; but at Abrantes, Caraffa’s
division separated from the French, and took possession of Thomar.
Meanwhile the right, under general Taranco, marching from Gallicia
established themselves at Oporto, and the marquis of Solano, with
the left, entered the Alemtejo, and fixed his quarters at Setuval.
The Spanish troops did not suffer on their route; but such had been
the distress of the French army, that three weeks afterwards it
could only muster ten thousand men under arms, and the privations
encountered on the march led to excesses which first produced that
rancorous spirit of mutual hatred, so remarkable between the French
and Portuguese. Young soldiers always attribute their sufferings
to the ill-will of the inhabitants; it is difficult to make them
understand that a poor peasantry have nothing to spare; old
soldiers, on the contrary, blame nobody, but know how to extract
subsistence in most cases without exciting enmity.
Junot passed the month of December in collecting his army, securing
the great military points about Lisbon, and in preparations to
supplant the power of a council of regency, to whom the prince at
his departure had delegated the sovereign authority. As long as the
French troops were scattered on the line of march, and that the
fortresses were held by Portuguese garrisons, it would have been
dangerous to provoke the enmity, or to excite the activity of this
council, and the members were treated with studious respect; but
they were of the same leaven as the court they emanated from, and
the quick resolute proceedings of Junot soon deprived them of any
importance conferred by the critical situation of affairs during
the first three weeks.
[Sidenote: Return of the French army. Appendix, No. 28.]
The Spanish auxiliary forces were well received in the north and
in the Alemtejo; but general Taranco dying soon after his arrival
at Oporto, the French general Quesnel was sent to command that
province. Junot had early taken possession of Elvas, and detached
general Maurin to the Algarves, with sixteen hundred men; and, when
Solano was ordered by his court to withdraw from Portugal, nine
French battalions and the cavalry, under the command of Kellerman,
took possession of the Alemtejo also, and occupied the fortress
of Setuval. At the same time Junot replaced Caraffa’s division
at Thomar by a French force, and distributed the former in small
bodies, at a considerable distance from each other, on both sides
of the Tagus, immediately round Lisbon.
[Sidenote: Foy.]
The provisions of the treaty of Fontainebleau were unknown to
the Portuguese, a circumstance that procured the Spanish troops
a better reception than the French; but that treaty was now no
longer regarded by Junot, whose conduct plainly discovered that he
considered Portugal to be a possession entirely belonging to France.
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
[Sidenote: Thiebault.]
When all his stragglers were come up, his army recovered from its
fatigues, and that he knew that a reinforcement of five thousand
men had arrived at Salamanca on its march to Lisbon, Junot
proceeded more openly to assume the chief authority; he commenced
by exacting a forced loan of two hundred thousand pounds, and not
only interfered with the different departments of state, but put
Frenchmen into all the lucrative offices; and his promises and
protestations of amity became loud and frequent in proportion to
his encroachments and the increase of his power. At last being
created by Napoleon duke of Abrantes, he threw off all disguise,
suppressed the council of regency, seized the reins of government
himself, and while he established many useful regulations, made the
nation sensibly alive to the fact that he was a despotic conqueror.
The flag and the arms of Portugal were replaced by those of France;
and of the Portuguese army, eight thousand men were selected and
sent from the kingdom, under the command of the marquis d’Alorna
and Gomez Frere, two noblemen of the greatest reputation for
military talent among the native officers. Five thousand more
were attached to the divisions of Junot’s army, and the rest were
disbanded.
[Sidenote: Thiebault.]
[Sidenote: Foy.]
An extraordinary contribution of four millions sterling, decreed by
Napoleon, was then demanded, under the curious title of a ransom
for the state; this sum was exorbitant, and Junot prevailed on the
emperor to reduce it one half. He likewise on his own authority
accepted the forced loan, the confiscated English merchandise, the
church plate, and the royal property, in part payment; but the
people were still unable to raise the whole amount, for the court
had before taken the greatest part of the church plate and bullion
of the kingdom, and had also drawn large sums from the people,
under the pretext of defending the country, with which treasure
they departed, leaving the public functionaries, the army, private
creditors, and even domestic servants, unpaid.
But although great discontent and misery prevailed, the
tranquillity of Lisbon, during the first month after the arrival of
the French, was remarkable; no disturbance took place, the populace
were completely controlled by the activity of a police, established
under the prince regent’s government by the count de Novion, a
French emigrant, and continued by Junot on an extended scale.
No capital city in Europe suffers so much as Lisbon from the want
of good police regulations, and the French general conferred
an unmixed benefit on the inhabitants by giving more effect to
Novion’s plans; yet so deeply rooted is the prejudice in favour
of ancient customs, that no act of the duke of Abrantes gave the
Portuguese more offence than his having the streets cleansed, and
the wild dogs (that infested them by thousands) killed. A French
serjeant, distinguished by his zeal in destroying those disgusting
and dangerous animals, was in revenge assassinated.
[Sidenote: Thiebault.]
In the course of March and April, Junot’s military system was
completed; the arsenal of Lisbon, one of the finest establishments
of the kind in Europe, contained all kinds of naval and military
stores in abundance, and ten thousand excellent workmen in every
branch of business appertaining to war; hence the artillery, the
carriages, the ammunition, and all the minor equipments of the
army, were soon renewed and put in the best possible condition,
and the hulks of two line-of-battle ships, three frigates, and
seven lighter vessels of war, were refitted, armed, and moored
across the river to defend the entrance, and to awe the town. The
army itself, perfectly recovered from its fatigues, reinforced,
and better disciplined, was grown confident in its chief from the
success of the invasion, and being well fed and clothed, was become
a fine body of robust men, capable of any exertion. In March it was
re-organized in three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry.
General La Borde commanded the first, general Loison the second,
general Travot the third, general Margaron the fourth, and general
Taviel directed the artillery. General Kellerman commanded in
the Alemtejo, general Quesnel at Oporto, general Maurin in the
Algarves, and Junot himself in Lisbon.
The fortresses of Faro in Algarve, of Almeida, of Elvas, La Lippe,
St. Lucie, Setuval, Palmela, and those between Lisbon and the mouth
of the Tagus, of Ericia and Peniché, were furnished with French
garrisons; and Estremos, Aldea-Gallegos, Santarem, and Abrantes
were occupied, and put in such a state of defence as their decayed
ramparts would permit.
[Sidenote: Return of the French army. Appendix, No. 28.]
The whole army, including the French workmen and marines attached
to it, amounted to above fifty thousand men, of which above
forty-four thousand were fit for duty; that is to say, fifteen
thousand five hundred Spaniards, five thousand Portuguese, and
twenty-four thousand four hundred French.
Of the latter 1000 were in Elvas and La Lippe,
1000 in Almeida,
1000 in Peniché,
1600 in the Algarves,
2892 in Setuval,
750 in Abrantes,
450 cavalry were kept in Valencia
d’Alcantara, in Spanish Estremadura,
and 350 distributed in the proportion of
fifteen men to a post, guarded the lines of communication which
were established from Lisbon to Elvas, and from Almeida to Coimbra.
Above fifteen thousand men remained disposable.
Thus Lisbon, the capital, containing all the civil, military, and
naval, and the greatest part of the commercial establishments, the
only fine harbour, two-eighths of the population, and two-thirds
of the riches of the whole kingdom, was secured by the main body,
which formed the centre, while on the circumference a number
of strong posts gave support to the operations of the moveable
column. By this disposition, the garrison of Peniché commanded the
only harbour between the Tagus and the Mondego, in which a large
disembarkation of English troops could take place; and the little
port of Figueras, which was held by a small garrison, blocked the
mouth of the latter river; while the division at Thomar secured
all the great lines of communication to the north-east, and in
conjunction with the garrison of Abrantes, commanded both sides of
the Zezere.
From Abrantes to Estremos and Elvas, and from the former to
Setuval, the lines of communication were short, and through an open
country, suitable for the operations of the cavalry, which was all
quartered on the south bank of the Tagus. Thus, without breaking up
the mass of the army, the harbours were sealed against the English,
and a great and rich tract was enclosed by posts, and rendered so
pervious to the troops, that any insurrection could be reached
by a few marches, and immediately crushed. The connexion between
the right and left banks of the Tagus at Lisbon was secured, and
the entrance to the port defended by the vessels of war which had
been refitted and armed. A light squadron was also prepared to
communicate with South America, and nine Russian line of battle
ships, and a frigate under the command of admiral Siniavin, which
had taken refuge some time before from the English fleet, were of
necessity engaged in the defence of the harbour, and formed an
unwilling, but not an unimportant auxiliary force.
These military arrangements were Junot’s own, and suitable enough
if his army had been unconnected with any other; but they clashed
with the general views of Napoleon, who regarded the force in
Portugal only as a division of troops, to be rendered subservient
to the general scheme of subjecting the Peninsula; wherefore,
in the month of May, he ordered that general Avril, with three
thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and ten guns, should
co-operate with Dupont in Andalusia, and that general Loison, with
four thousand infantry, should proceed to Almeida, and from thence
co-operate with Bessieres in the event of an insurrection taking
place in Spain.
General Thiebault complains of this order as injurious to Junot,
ill combined, and the result of a foolish vanity that prompted the
emperor to direct all the armies himself; yet it would be difficult
to show that the arrangement was faulty. Avril’s division, if he
had not halted at Tavora, for which there was no reason, would
have ensured the capture of Seville, and if Dupont’s defeat had
not rendered the victory of Rio Seco useless, Loison’s division
would have been eminently useful in controlling the country behind
Bessieres, in case the latter invaded Gallicia; and it was well
placed to intercept the communication between the Castilian and the
Estremaduran armies. Thus the emperor’s combinations, if they had
been fully executed, would have brought seventy thousand men to
bear on the defence of Portugal.
[Sidenote: Napoleon in Las Casas.]
[Sidenote: Foy.]
Such was the military attitude of the French in May; their
political situation was far from being so favourable. Junot’s
natural capacity was very considerable; but it was neither enlarged
by study, nor strengthened by mental discipline. Of intemperate
habits, indolent in business, yet prompt and brave in action,
quick to give offence, ready to forget an injury; at one moment
a great man, the next below mediocrity, Junot was at all times
unsuited to the task of conciliating and governing a people like
the Portuguese, who, with passions as sudden and vehement as his
own, retain a sense of injury or insult with incredible tenacity;
otherwise, although he had many difficulties to encounter, and
his duty towards France was in some instances incompatible with
good policy towards Portugal, he was not without resources for
establishing a strong French interest. But he possessed neither the
ability nor disposition to soothe a nation that, without having
suffered a defeat, was suddenly bowed to a foreign yoke.
[Sidenote: Foy.]
The pride and the poverty of the Portuguese, and the influence
of ancient usages, interfered with Junot’s policy. The monks and
friars, and most of the nobility, were inimical to his sway; and
all the activity of the expelled British factory, and the secret
warfare of spies and writers in the pay of England, were directed
to undermine his plans, and to render him and his nation odious;
but on the other hand, he was in possession of the government and
of the capital, he had a fine army, and he could offer novelty so
dear to the multitude, and he had the name and the fame of Napoleon
to assist him. The promises of power are always believed by the
many; and there were abundance of grievances to remedy, and wrongs
to redress in Portugal. And such a strong feeling existed among the
best educated men (and especially at the universities) of dislike
to the Braganza family, and in favour of a reformed system, that
steps were actually taken to have prince Eugene declared king of
Portugal; and we shall find hereafter, that this spirit was not
extinguished at a much later date.
With these materials, and the military vanity of the Portuguese
to work upon, Junot might have established a powerful French
interest; and under an active government, the people would not long
have regretted the loss of an independence that had no wholesome
breathing amidst the corrupt stagnation of the old system. But the
arrogance of a conqueror, and the necessities of an army, which
was to be subsisted and paid by an impoverished people, soon gave
rise to all kinds of oppression; private abuses followed close
upon the heels of public rapacity, and insolence left its sting to
rankle in the wounds of the injured. The malignant humours broke
out in quarrels and assassinations, and the severe punishments that
ensued, many of them unjust and barbarous in the highest degree,
created rage, not terror; for the nation had not tried its strength
in battle, and would not believe that it was weak.
[Sidenote: Thiebault.]
The ports were rigorously blockaded by the English fleet, the
troubles in Spain interrupted the commerce in grain, by which
Portugal had been usually supplied from that country, and the
unhappy people suffered under the triple pressure of famine,
war-contributions, and a foreign yoke. With all external aliment
thus cut off, and a hungry army gnawing at its vitals, the nation
could not remain tranquil; and although the first five months of
Junot’s government was, with the exception of a slight tumult at
Lisbon (when the arms of Portugal were taken down), undisturbed
by commotion, the whole country was soon ripe for a general
insurrection. The harvest, however, proved remarkably fine, and
Junot hailed the prospect of returning plenty, as a relief from
his principal difficulty; but as one danger disappeared, another
presented itself. The Spanish insurrection excited the hopes of
the Portuguese; agents from the neighbouring juntas communicated
secretly with the Spanish generals in Portugal. The capture of the
French fleet in Cadiz became known, assassinations multiplied;
the pope’s nuncio fled on board the English fleet, and all things
tended to a general explosion. The English agents were of course
actively engaged in promoting this spirit; and the appearance of
two English fleets at different points of the coast, having troops
on board, produced great alarm among the French, and augmented the
impatient fierceness of the Portuguese.
Among the various ways in which the people discovered their
hatred of the invaders, one was very characteristic: an egg was
marked with certain letters by a chemical process, and then
placed in a nest; being taken from thence, it was exhibited,
and created a great sensation; the letters were interpreted to
indicate the speedy coming of don Sebastian, king of Portugal,
who, like Arthur of romantic memory, was supposed to be hidden
in a secret island, waiting for the destined period when he was
to re-appear and restore his country to her ancient glory. The
trick was turned against the contrivers; other eggs prophesied in
the most impatriotic manner, but the belief of the Sebastianists
lost nothing of its zeal; many people, and those not of the most
uneducated classes, were often observed upon the highest points of
the hills, casting earnest looks towards the ocean, in the hopes of
descrying the island in which their long lost hero was detained.
CHAPTER II.
The first serious blow was struck at Oporto; the news of what
had taken place all over Spain was known there in June. General
Bellesta, the chief Spanish officer, immediately took an honourable
and resolute part. He made the French general Quesnel, with his
staff, prisoners; after which, calling together the Portuguese
authorities, he declared that they were free to act as they judged
most fitting for their own interests, and then marched to Gallicia
with his army and captives.
The opinions of the leading men at Oporto were divided upon the
great question of resistance; but, after some vicissitudes, the
boldest side was successful, and the insurrection, although at
one moment quelled by the French party, was finally established
in Oporto, and soon extended along the banks of the Duero and the
Minho, and to those parts of Beira which lie between the Mondego
and the sea-coast.
[Sidenote: Thiebault.]
Junot being informed of this event, perceived that no time was
to be lost in disarming the Spanish regiments quartered in the
neighbourhood of Lisbon; but this was not an easy operation.
Carraffa’s division was above six thousand men, and without
employing the garrisons of the citadel and forts of Lisbon, it
was difficult to collect an equal force of French. The suspicions
of the Spanish regiments had been already excited, they were
reluctant to obey the French generals, and one quartered at Alcacer
de Sal had actually resisted the orders of the general-in-chief
himself. To avoid a tumult was the great object, because in Lisbon
fifteen thousand Gallicians were ordinarily engaged as porters and
water-carriers, and if a popular movement had been excited, these
men would naturally have assisted their countrymen. Notwithstanding
these difficulties, Junot, in the night of that day upon which he
received the information of Bellesta’s defection, arranged all his
measures; and the next day the Spanish troops being, under various
pretexts, assembled in such numbers, and in such places, that
resistance became impossible, they yielded to necessity, and were
disarmed, and placed on board the hulks in the Tagus: eight hundred
of the regiment of Murcia and three hundred of that of Valencia
only escaping. Thus Junot in the course of twenty-four hours,
and with very little bloodshed, succeeded, by his promptness and
dexterity, in averting a very serious danger.
The decision and success of this stroke against the Spanish
division produced considerable effect, but not sufficient to
prevent the insurrection from becoming general; all couriers,
and officers carrying orders or commanding small posts of
communications, were suddenly cut off, and Junot, reduced by a
single blow from fifty to twenty-eight thousand men, found himself
isolated, and dependent upon his individual resources, and the
courage of his soldiers, for the maintenance of his conquest, and
even for the preservation of his army.
The Russian squadron indeed contained six thousand seamen and
marines, but, while they consumed a great quantity of provisions,
it was evident, from certain symptoms, that they could not be
depended upon as useful allies, except in the case of an English
fleet attempting to force the entrance of the river. In this
situation the duke of Abrantes at first thought of seizing
Badajos, with a view to secure still more effectually the best
line of retreat into Spain, but the Spanish army of Estremadura
had assembled there, under the command of general Galuzzo, and
frustrated that scheme.
[Sidenote: Thiebault.]
General Avril’s column having failed to effect its junction with
Dupont, returned to Estremos, and it is probable that Junot never
intended that it should be otherwise; for no great efforts appear
to have been made by Avril to attain the object of the march.
Loison was in the north, but orders were sent to him, to repair
with his column to Oporto and assume the command of that city. Upon
the 5th of June, one day previous to Bellesta’s defection, Loison
had arrived at Almeida, and upon the 12th had made himself master
of Fort Conception, a strong, but ill-placed Spanish fortification
on the frontier. The commandant being partly persuaded, and partly
frightened into a surrender of his charge, retired, with his
garrison, to Ciudad Rodrigo.
Upon receipt of the despatch which directed him to march to Oporto,
Loison quitted Almeida, and endeavoured to penetrate into the
province of Entre Minho e Duero by the route of Amarante, but
his division was too weak to force his way through such a strong
country (where the population was in full insurrection), and to
take a great city, and it was possible that general Bellesta
might have returned and fallen upon his flank. Swayed by these
reasons, Loison advanced cautiously, and without vigour. Being
slightly opposed at the position of Mezam Frias, and hearing that
his baggage had been attacked at the same time by insurgents in
his rear, he fell back at once upon Villa Real, there he engaged
in another trifling skirmish, and then quitting his first route,
crossed the Douero at Lamego, and marched to Castro d’Airo, being
harassed on the road by the armed peasantry of the mountains
skirting his line of march. At Castro d’Airo he faced about, and
dispersed the assailants with some slaughter, and then continued
his movement to Celerico without further molestation; at Celerico a
body of insurgents fled without firing a shot; and Loison dividing
his troops, sent one half to Trancoso, and with the other marched
to Guarda, intending to scour that part of the country, and to
put down the insurrection; but at this time he received one of
twenty-five despatches sent by Junot for the purpose of recalling
him to Lisbon; all the rest had been intercepted. Loison, upon the
receipt of this despatch, returned to Almeida the 1st of July.
Leaving his sick, his wounded, and weak men there, and making up
the garrison to the number of twelve hundred and fifty, he removed
all the palisades, guns, and materials from Fort Conception,
completely ruined the defences of that place, and then prosecuted
his march to Lisbon by the route of Guarda.
While these events were passing in the north, another insurrection
took place in the south: general Maurin commanded in the Algarves;
and some Portuguese artillerymen and other native troops were
attached to the French brigade under his orders. A rising of the
people commenced in the neighbourhood of Faro, and soon extended
to that town, and along the coast. Maurin was confined to his bed
by illness, and fell into the hands of the insurgents; colonel
Maransin supplied his place, but the country was too extensive
to be controlled by sixteen hundred men. The Portuguese soldiers
went over to their countrymen: the Spaniards from Andalusia
threatened to move across the Guadiana, and general Spencer, with
five thousand British soldiers, appeared off Ayamonte. Maransin
immediately fell back in haste upon Mertola, leaving part of his
baggage, his military chest, his accounts, and above a hundred
prisoners, besides killed and wounded, in the hands of the
patriots. At Mertola he was safe; and general Spencer merely landed
a few officers, and ordered rations for five thousand men; while
the Portuguese wisely remained within the range of the mountains
which protect the northern frontier of Algarve.
The circle was now closing fast round Junot; emissaries from Oporto
excited the people to rise as far as Coimbra. At that town a small
French post was easily overpowered, and a junta formed; from thence
new efforts spread the flame to Condexa, Pombal, and Leria; and a
student of the Coimbra university, named Zagalo, with considerable
address and boldness, got possession of the small, but important
fort of Figueras, at the mouth of the Mondego; the commandant (a
Portuguese officer), with a hundred men, capitulated; the terms
were broken, but no violence seems to have been committed upon the
prisoners.
On the other side, Abrantes was threatened by the insurgents
of the valley of the Zezere; and the Spaniards, under Galuzzo,
crossed the Guadiana at Juramenha, and occupied that place and
Campo Mayor. Kellerman’s head-quarters were at Elvas; a great,
although confused body of men menaced his position, but, supported
by the strength of the town and Fort La-Lyppe, he easily maintained
himself. Avril remained unmolested at Estremos, and Evora, held by
a small garrison, was tranquil; but the neighbourhood of Setuval
was in commotion; the populace of Lisbon was unquiet; and at this
critical moment general Spencer, whose force report magnified to
ten thousand men, appeared at the mouth of the Tagus.
[Sidenote: Thiebault.]
Junot held a council of war. After hearing the opinions of the
principal general officers, he decided on the following plan: 1º.
To collect the sick in such hospitals as could be protected by
the ships of war. 2º. To secure the Spanish prisoners by moving
the hulks in which they were confined as far as possible from the
city. 3º. To arm and provision the fortresses of Lisbon, and to
remove the powder from the magazines to the ships. 4º. To abandon
all the other fortresses in Portugal with the exception of Setuval,
Almeida, Elvas, and Peniché, and, finally, to concentrate the
army in Lisbon. In the event of bad fortune, the duke of Abrantes
determined to defend the capital as long as he was able, and then
to cross the Tagus, make way by the left bank upon Elvas, and from
thence retreat to Madrid, Valladolid, or Segovia, as he might find
expedient. This well-conceived plan was not executed, the first
alarm soon died away, Spencer returned to Cadiz, and when the
insurrection was grappled with, it proved to be more noisy than
dangerous.
Kellerman recalled Maransin from Mertola and prepared himself to
march to Lisbon, but the inhabitants of the town of Villa Viciosa
having risen against a company of French troops quartered there,
the latter took refuge in an old castle, and defended themselves
until Kellerman sent general Avril from Estremos to succour them;
this the latter effected without difficulty; the Portuguese fled
the moment he appeared, and a very few were killed in the pursuit.
But the town of Beja followed the example of Villa Viciosa, and
colonel Maransin, who was preparing to retire from Mertola, being
informed of it, marched in that direction with such rapidity, that
he passed over forty miles in eighteen hours, and falling suddenly
upon the patriots, defeated them with considerable slaughter,
himself losing thirty killed and fifty wounded: the town was
pillaged, and some houses were burned.
General Thiebault writes, that an obstinate combat took place
in the streets, but the Portuguese never made head for a
moment against a strong body, during the whole course of the
insurrection. How, indeed, was it possible for a collection of
miserable peasants, armed with scythes, pitchforks, a few old
fowling pieces, and a little bad powder, under the command of
some ignorant countryman or fanatic friar, to maintain a battle
against an efficient and active corps of French soldiers? For there
is this essential difference to be observed in judging between
the Spanish and Portuguese insurrections; the Spaniards had many
great and strong towns free from the presence of the French, and
large provinces in which to collect and train forces at a distance
from the invaders; but in Portugal the naked peasants were forced
to go to battle the instant even of assembling. The loss which
Maransin sustained must have arisen from the stragglers (who in a
consecutive march of forty miles would have been numerous) having
been cut off and killed by the peasantry. This blow, however,
quieted the Alentejo for the moment, and Kellerman having cleared
the neighbourhood of Elvas from the Spanish parties, placed a
commandant in La-Lyppe, and concentrated the detachments under
Maransin and Avril, proceeded towards Lisbon.
[Sidenote: Thiebault.]
[Sidenote: Accursio de Neves.]
The duke of Abrantes was in great perplexity; the intercepting
of his couriers and isolated officers had been followed by the
detection of all his spies, and he was exposed, without assistance,
to every report which the fears of his army, or the ingenuity of
the people, could give birth to. Now there are few nations that can
pretend to vie with the Portuguese and Spaniards in the fabrication
of plausible reports: among those current, the captivity of
Loison was one; but nothing was certainly known except that the
insurgents from the valley of the Mondego were marching towards
Lisbon. General Margaron was therefore ordered to disperse them,
and, if possible, to open a communication with general Loison: he
advanced, with three thousand men and six pieces of artillery, to
Leria, whither the patriots had retired in disorder when they heard
of his approach. The greater part dispersed at once, but those who
remained were attacked on the 5th of July, and a scene similar to
that of Beja ensued; the French boasted of victory, the insurgents
called it massacre and pillage.
In a combat with armed peasantry, it is difficult to know where the
fighting ceases and the massacre begins: men dressed in peasants’
clothes are observed firing, and moving about, without order, from
place to place; when do they cease to be enemies? They are more
dangerous when single than together; they can hide their muskets
in an instant and appear peaceable; the soldier passes and is
immediately shot from behind.
The example at Leria did not however deter the people of Thomar
from declaring against the French; and the neighbourhood of
Alcobaça rose at the same time. Thus Margaron was placed between
two new insurrections at the moment he had quelled one. English
fleets, with troops on board, were said to be hovering off the
coast, and the most alarming reports relative to Loison were
corroborated, his safety was despaired of, when suddenly authentic
intelligence of his arrival at Abrantes revived the spirits of the
general-in-chief and the army.
After arranging all things necessary for the security of Almeida,
Loison had quitted that town the 2d of July, at the head of three
thousand four hundred and fifty men, and arrived at Abrantes upon
the 8th, having in seven days passed through Guarda, Atalaya,
Sarsedas, Corteja, and Sardoval. During this rapid march he
dispersed several bodies of insurgents that were assembled on the
line of his route, especially at Guarda and Atalaya. It has been
said that twelve hundred bodies were stretched upon the field of
battle near the first town; this is absurd beyond all measure.
Twelve hundred slain would give, at a low average, five thousand
wounded: six thousand two hundred killed and wounded by a corps
of three thousand four hundred and fifty men, in half an hour!
and this without cavalry or artillery, and among fastnesses that
vie in ruggedness with any in the world! The truth is, that the
peasants, terrified by the reports that Loison himself spread to
favour his march, fled on all sides, and if two hundred and fifty
Portuguese were killed and wounded during the whole passage, it was
the utmost. The distance from Almeida to Abrantes is more than a
hundred and eighty miles, the greatest part is a mountain pathway
rather than a road, and the French were obliged to gather their
provisions from the country as they passed; now, to forage, to
fight several actions, to pursue active peasants well acquainted
with the country so closely as to destroy them by thousands, and to
march a hundred and eighty miles over bad roads, and all in seven
days, is impossible.
[Sidenote: Thiebault.]
[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1809.]
The whole French army was now concentrated; the insurrection at
Alcobaça had been quelled by Kellerman, and that of Thomar was also
quieted, but the insurgents from Oporto were gathering strength
at Coimbra; the last of the native soldiers deserted the French
colours; the Spanish troops at Badajos, strengthened by a body of
Portuguese fugitives, and commanded by one Moretti, were preparing
to enter the Alentejo, which was again in commotion: the English
admiral had opened a communication with the insurgents on the side
of Setuval, and the patriots were also assembled in considerable
numbers at Alcacer do Sal.
In this dilemma Junot resolved to leave the northern people quiet
for a while, and to bend his force against the Alentejo, because
that was his line of retreat upon Spain; from thence only he could
provision the capital, and there also his cavalry could act with
the most effect. Accordingly, Loison, with seven thousand infantry,
twelve hundred cavalry, and eight pieces of artillery, crossed the
Tagus the 25th of July, and marched by Os Pegoens, Vendanovas, and
Montemor. At the latter place he defeated an advanced guard, which
fled to Evora, where the Portuguese general Leite had assembled
the mass of the insurgents; and assisted by three or four thousand
Spanish troops under Moretti, had taken a position to cover the
town.
[Sidenote: Thiebault.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 12.]
When Loison came up he directed Margaron and Solignac to turn the
flanks of the patriots, and fell upon their centre himself. The
Spanish auxiliaries performed no service, and the Portuguese soon
took to flight, but there was a great and confused concourse; a
strong cavalry was let loose upon them, and many being cut off
from the main body, were driven into the town, which had been
deserted by the principal inhabitants. There, urged by despair,
they endeavoured to defend the walls and the streets for a few
moments, but were soon overpowered, the greater part slain, and
the houses pillaged. The French lost about two or three hundred
men, but the number of the Portuguese and Spaniards that fell was
very considerable; and disputes having arisen between the troops of
those nations, the latter ravaged the country in their retreat with
more violence than the French.
Loison, after resting two days at Evora, proceeded to Elvas, and
drove away the numerous Spanish parties which had long infested the
neighbourhood of that fortress, and were become extremely obnoxious
to friends and enemies. His detachments scoured the country round,
and were accumulating provisions to form great magazines at Elvas,
when their labours were suddenly interrupted by a despatch from the
duke of Abrantes, directing Loison to return to the right bank of
the Tagus. The British army, so long expected, had descended upon
the coast, and manly warfare reared its honest front amidst the
desolating scenes of insurrection.
OBSERVATIONS.
[Sidenote: Thiebault.]
1º. This expedition to the Alentejo was an operation of military
police, rather than a campaign. Junot wished to repress the spirit
of insurrection by sudden and severe examples. The actions of
general Loison were therefore of necessity harsh, but they have
been represented as a series of massacres and cruelties of the most
revolting nature, because he himself disseminated such stories
in order to increase the terror which it was the object of his
expedition to create; and the credulity of the nation that produced
the Sebastianists was not easily shocked. The Portuguese eagerly
listened to tales so derogatory to their enemies and congenial
to their own revengeful disposition. The anecdotes of French
barbarity current for two years after the convention of Cintra,
were notoriously false. The same story being related by persons
remote from each other, is no argument of their truth. The reports
that Loison was captured on his march from Almeida, reached Junot
through fifty different channels; there were men to declare that
they had beheld him bound with cords, others to tell how he had
been entrapped, some named the places he had been carried through
in triumph, and his habitual and characteristic expressions were
quoted. The story was complete and the parts were consistent; yet
the whole was not only false, but the rumour had not even the
slightest foundation of truth.
2º. The Portuguese accounts of the events of this period are but
angry amplifications of every real or pretended act of French
barbarity and injustice, and the crimes of individuals are made
matter of accusation against the whole army. The French accounts
are more plausible, but scarcely more safe as authorities, seeing
that they are written by men, who being for the most part actors in
the scenes they describe, are naturally concerned to defend their
own characters: their military vanity also has had its share in
disguising the simple facts of the insurrection; for willing to
enhance the merit of the troops, they have exaggerated the number
of the insurgents, the obstinacy of the combats, and the loss of
the patriots. English party writers, greedily fixing upon such
relations, have changed the name of battle into massacre; and thus
prejudice, conceit, and clamour, have combined, to violate the
decorum of history, and to perpetuate error.
[Sidenote: Napoleon in Las Casas.]
3º. It would, however, be an egregious mistake to suppose, that
because the French were not monsters, there existed no cause for
the acrimony with which their conduct has been assailed. The duke
of Abrantes, although not cruel, nor personally obnoxious to the
Portuguese, was a sensual and violent person, and his habits were
expensive; such a man is always rapacious, and as the character
of the chief influences the manners of those under his command,
it may be safely assumed that his vices were aped by many of his
followers. Now the virtuous general Travot was esteemed, and his
person respected, even in the midst of tumult, by the Portuguese,
while Loison was scarcely safe from their vengeance when surrounded
by his troops. The execrations poured forth at the mere mention of
“the bloody Maneta,” as, from the loss of his hand, he was called,
proves that he must have committed many heinous acts; and Kellerman
appears to have been as justly stigmatised for rapacity, as Loison
was for violence.
4º. It has been made a charge against the French generals, that
they repressed the hostility of the Portuguese and Spanish peasants
by military executions; but in doing so they only followed the
custom of war, and they are not justly liable to reproof, save
where they may have carried their punishments to excess, and
displayed a wanton spirit of cruelty. All armies have an undoubted
right to protect themselves when engaged in hostilities. An
insurrection of armed peasants is a military anarchy. Men in such
circumstances cannot be restrained within the bounds of civilised
warfare; they will murder stragglers, torture prisoners, destroy
hospitals, poison wells, and break down all the usages that soften
the enmities of modern nations. They wear no badge of an enemy,
and their devices cannot, therefore, be guarded against in the
ordinary mode. Their war is one of extermination, and it must
be repressed by terrible examples, or the civilized customs of
modern warfare must be discarded, and the devastating system of
the ancients revived. Hence, the usage of refusing quarter to an
armed peasantry, and burning their villages, however unjust and
barbarous it may appear at first view, is founded upon a principle
of necessity, and is in reality a vigorous infliction of a partial
evil, to prevent universal calamity. But however justifiable it may
be in theory, no wise man will hastily resort to it, and no good
man will carry it to any extent.
CHAPTER III.
[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1809.]
The subjugation of Portugal was neither a recent nor a secret
project of Napoleon’s. His intentions with respect to the house of
Braganza were known in 1806 to Mr. Fox, who sent lord Roslyn, lord
St. Vincent, and general Simcoe on a politico-military mission to
Lisbon, instructing them not only to warn the court that a French
force destined to invade Portugal was assembling at Bayonne, but to
offer the assistance of an English army to repel the danger. The
cabinet of Lisbon affected to disbelieve the information, Mr. Fox
died during the negotiation, and the war with Prussia diverting
Napoleon’s attention to more important objects, he withdrew his
troops from Bayonne. The tory administration, which soon after
overturned the Grenville party, thought no further of the affair,
or at least did not evince as much foresight and ready zeal as
their predecessors. They kept, indeed, a naval force off Lisbon,
under the command of sir Sydney Smith; but their views seem to
have been confined to the emigration of the royal family, and they
intrusted the conduct of the negotiations to lord Strangford,
a young man of no solid influence or experience. Suddenly, the
Russian squadron, under admiral Siniavin, took refuge in the Tagus,
and this unexpected event produced in the British cabinet an
activity which the danger of Portugal had not been able to excite.
[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1809.]
[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Journal, MS.]
It was supposed, that as Russia and England were in a state of
hostility, the presence of the Russian ships would intimidate
the prince regent, and prevent him from passing to the Brazils,
wherefore sir Charles Cotton, an admiral of higher rank than sir
Sydney Smith, was sent out with instructions to force the entrance
of the Tagus, and to attack admiral Siniavin. To ensure success,
general Spencer, then upon the point of sailing with five thousand
men upon a secret expedition, was ordered to touch at Lisbon, and
sir John Moore, with ten thousand men, was withdrawn from Sicily,
and directed to aid the enterprise; but before the instructions
for the commanders were even written, the prince regent was on his
voyage to the Brazils, and Junot ruled in Lisbon.
Sir John Moore, however, arrived at Gibraltar, but hearing nothing
of sir Sydney Smith, nor of general Spencer, proceeded to England,
and reached Spithead the 31st of December, from whence, after a
detention of four months, he was despatched upon that well-known
and eminently foolish expedition to Sweden, which ended in such
an extraordinary manner, and which seems from the first to have
had no other object than to keep an excellent general and a superb
division of troops at a distance from the only country where their
services were really required.
Meanwhile, general Spencer’s armament, long baffled by contrary
winds, and once forced back to port, was finally dispersed in a
storm, and a part arrived at Gibraltar by single ships the latter
end of January. Sir Hew Dalrymple, the governor of that fortress,
being informed, on the 5th of February, that a French fleet had
just passed the strait, and run up the Mediterranean, became
alarmed for Sicily, then scantily furnished with troops, and caused
the first comers to proceed to that island the 11th. General
Spencer, whose instructions were to attack Ceuta, arrived on the
10th of March, and the deficiency in his armament being supplied
by a draft from the garrison of Gibraltar, a council was held
for the purpose of arranging the plan of attack: the operation
was, however, thought to be impracticable, and consequently
relinquished. General Spencer would then have carried the remainder
of his troops to Sicily, but the insurrection in Spain broke out
at the moment and altered his determination. In the relation
of Dupont’s campaign, I have already touched upon Spencer’s
proceedings at Cadiz; but in this place it is necessary to give
a more detailed sketch of those occurrences, which, fortunately,
brought him back to the coast of Portugal at the moment when sir
Arthur Wellesley was commencing the campaign of Vimiero.
[Sidenote: Sir Hew Dalrymple’s Correspondence. MS.]
When the French first entered Spain, general Castaños commanded the
Spanish troops at St. Roque; in that situation he was an object
of interest to Napoleon, who sent two French officers privately
to sound his disposition. Castaños secretly resolving to oppose
the designs of the emperor, thought those officers were coming
to arrest him, and at first determined to kill them, and fly to
Gibraltar; but soon discovering his mistake, he treated them
civilly, and prosecuted his original plans. Through the medium
of one Viale, a merchant of Gibraltar, he opened a communication
with sir Hew Dalrymple, and the latter, who had been closely
watching the progress of events, encouraged him in his views, and
not only promised assistance, but recommended several important
measures, such as the immediate seizure of the French squadron in
Cadiz, the security of the Spanish fleet at Minorca, and a speedy
communication with South America. But before Castaños could
mature his plans, the insurrection took place at Seville, and he
acknowledged the authority of the junta.
Meanwhile Solano arrived at Cadiz, and general Spencer, in
conjunction with admiral Purvis, pressed him to attack the French
squadron, and offered to assist if he would admit the English
troops into the town. Solano’s mind was, however, not made up
to resist the invaders, and expressing great displeasure at the
proposal to occupy Cadiz, he refused to treat at all with the
British. This was not unexpected by sir Hew; he knew that most
of the Spaniards were mistrustful of the object of Spencer’s
expedition, and the offer was made without his concurrence; thus a
double intercourse was carried on between the British and Spanish
authorities; the one friendly and confidential between sir Hew
and Castaños, the other of a character proper to increase the
suspicions of the Spaniards; and when it is considered that Spain
and England were nominally at war, that the English commanders were
acting without the authority of their government, that the troops
which it was proposed to introduce into Cadiz were in that part
of the world for the express purpose of attacking Ceuta, and had
already taken the island of Perexil, close to that fortress, little
surprise can be excited by Solano’s conduct.
[Sidenote: Sir Hew Dalrymple’s Correspondence.]
His death intervening, general Morla succeeded to the command,
and Spencer and Purvis renewed their offers; but Morla likewise
declined their assistance, and having himself forced the French
squadron to surrender, by a succession of such ill-directed
attacks, that some doubt was entertained of his wish to succeed, he
commenced a series of low intrigues calculated to secure his own
personal safety, while he held himself ready to betray his country
if the French should prove the strongest. After the reduction of
the enemy’s ships, the people were inclined to admit the English
troops, but the local junta, swayed by Morla’s representations,
were averse to it, and he, while confirming this disposition,
secretly urged Spencer to persevere in his offer, saying that he
looked entirely to the English troops for the future defence of
Cadiz; and thus dealing, he passed with the people for an active
patriot, yet made no preparations for resistance, and by his double
falsehoods preserved a fair appearance both with the junta and the
English general.
With these affairs sir Hew Dalrymple did not meddle, he early
discovered that Morla was an enemy of Castaños, and having more
confidence in the latter, carried on the intercourse at first
established between them without reference to the transactions
at Cadiz. He also supplied the Spanish general with arms and two
thousand barrels of powder, and placing an English officer near
him as a military correspondent, sent another in the capacity of a
political agent to the supreme junta at Seville.
Castaños being appointed commander-in-chief of the Andalusian army,
as I have before related, rallied Echevaria’s troops, and asked
for the co-operation of the British force; he had no objection
to their entering Cadiz, but he preferred having them landed at
Almeria to march to Xeres. General Spencer, however, confined his
offers to the occupation of Cadiz; and when Morla pretended that to
fit out the Spanish fleet was an object of immediate importance,
colonel sir George Smith, an officer employed by general Spencer to
conduct the negotiations, promised on his own authority, money to
pay the Spanish seamen, who were then in a state of mutiny. Lord
Collingwood and sir Hew Dalrymple refused to fulfil this promise,
and the approach of Dupont causing Morla to wish Spencer’s troops
away, he persuaded that general to sail to Ayamonte, under the
pretence of preventing Avril’s division from crossing the Guadiana,
although he knew well that the latter had no intention of doing so.
The effect produced upon colonel Maransin by the appearance of
the British force off Ayamonte has been already noticed. General
Thiebault says, that Spencer might have struck an important blow
at that period against the French; but the British troops were
unprovided with any equipment for a campaign, and to have thrown
five thousand infantry, without cavalry and without a single
place of arms, into the midst of an enemy who occupied all the
fortresses, and who could bring twenty thousand men into the field,
would have been imprudent to the greatest degree. General Spencer,
who had by this time been rejoined by his detachment from Sicily,
only made a demonstration of landing, and having thus materially
aided the insurrection, returned to Cadiz, from whence he was
almost immediately summoned to Lisbon, to execute a new project,
which proved to be both ill-considered and fruitless.
[Sidenote: Mr. Canning to lord Castlereagh, 28th Dec. 1807.]
[Sidenote: Sir Hew Dalrymple’s Correspondence.]
[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1809.]
[Sidenote: Sir Hew Dalrymple’s Correspondence.]
Sir Charles Cotton, after superseding sir Sydney Smith, had
blockaded the mouth of the Tagus with the utmost rigour, expecting
to force the Russian squadron to capitulate for want of provisions.
This scheme, which originated with lord Strangford, never had
the least chance of success; but the privations and misery of
the wretched inhabitants was so greatly aggravated thereby, that
Junot had recourse to various expedients to abate the rigour of
the blockade with regard to them, and among others, employed a
Portuguese, named Sataro, to make proposals to the English admiral.
This man at first pretended that he came without the privity of the
French, and in the course of the communications that followed, sir
Charles was led to believe that only four thousand French troops
remained in Lisbon. Under this erroneous impression, he requested
that general Spencer might be sent to him, for the purpose of
attacking the enemy while they were so weak. Spencer, by the advice
of sir Hew Dalrymple and lord Collingwood, obeyed the summons, but
on his arrival was led to doubt the correctness of the admiral’s
information. Instead of four thousand, it appeared that there could
not be much less than fifteen thousand French in or near Lisbon;
and the attack was of course relinquished. When Spencer returned to
Cadiz, Castaños again pressing him to co-operate with the Spanish
forces, he so far consented, as to disembark them at the port St.
Mary, and even agreed to send a detachment to Xeres; but being
deceived by Morla, who still gave him hopes of finally occupying
Cadiz, he resolved to keep the greater part close to that city.
At this period the insurrection of Andalusia attracted all the
intriguing adventurers in the Mediterranean towards Gibraltar and
Seville, and the confusion of Agramant’s camp would have been
rivalled, if the prudent firmness of sir Hew Dalrymple had not
checked the first efforts of those political pests; but among the
perplexing follies of the moment, one deserves particular notice,
on account of some curious circumstances that attended it, the full
explanation of which I must, however, leave to other historians,
who may perhaps find in that and the like affairs, a key to that
absurd policy, which in Sicily so long sacrificed the welfare of
two nations to the whims and follies of a profligate court.
[Sidenote: Sir Hew Dalrymple’s Correspondence.]
The introduction of the salique law had long been a favourite
object with the Bourbons of Spain; but the nation at large
would never agree to change the ancient rule of succession,
which admitted females to the throne. The project was, however,
secretly revived by some of the junta at this moment, and the
party favouring the salique law wished to offer the regency to the
prince of Sicily, who (Ferdinand and his brothers dying without
sons) would, under that law, have succeeded, to the prejudice of
the princess of the Brazils. The chevalier Robertoni, a Sicilian
agent, appeared early at Gibraltar, and from thence (as if under
the auspices of England), attempted to forward the views of his
court; but sir Hew Dalrymple, being accidentally informed that the
British cabinet disapproved of the object of his mission, sent
him away. Meanwhile Castaños, deceived by some person engaged
in the intrigue, was inclined to support the pretensions of the
Sicilian prince to the regency, and proposed to make use of sir Hew
Dalrymple’s name to give weight to his opinions; a circumstance
which must have created great jealousy in Spain, if sir Hew had not
promptly refused his sanction.
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
After that, the affair seemed to droop for a moment; but in
the middle of July an English man of war suddenly appeared at
Gibraltar, having on board prince Leopold of Sicily, and a complete
court establishment of chamberlains with their keys, and ushers
with their white wands. The duke of Orleans, who attended his
brother-in-law the prince, made no secret of his intention to
negotiate for the regency of Spain, and openly demanded that he
should be received into Gibraltar. Sir Hew, foreseeing all the
mischief of this proceeding, promptly refused to permit the prince,
or any of his attendants, to land; and the captain of the ship,
whose orders were merely to carry him to Gibraltar, refused to take
him back to Sicily. To relieve his royal highness from this awkward
situation, sir Hew consented to receive him as a guest, provided
that he divested himself of his public character, and that the duke
of Orleans departed instantly from the fortress.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 8.]
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
Sir William Drummond, the British envoy at Palermo; Mr. Viale;
and the duke of Orleans were the ostensible contrivers of this
notable scheme, by which, if it had succeeded, a small party in
a local junta would have appointed a regency for Spain, paved
the way for altering the laws of succession in that country,
established their own sway over the other juntas, and created
interminable jealousy between England, Portugal, and Spain; but
with whom the plan originated does not very clearly appear. Sir
William Drummond’s representations induced sir Alexander Ball to
provide the ship of war, nominally for the conveyance of the duke
of Orleans, but in reality for prince Leopold, with whose intended
voyage sir Alexander does not appear to have been made acquainted.
That the prince should have desired to be regent of Spain was
natural, but that he should have been conveyed to Gibraltar in a
British ship of the line, when the English government disapproved
of his pretensions, was really curious. Sir William Drummond
could scarcely have proceeded such lengths in an affair of so
great consequence, without secret instructions from some member
of his own government, yet lord Castlereagh expressed unqualified
approbation of sir Hew’s decisive conduct upon the occasion!
Did the ministers act at this period without any confidential
communication with each other? or was lord Castlereagh’s policy
secretly and designedly thwarted by one of his colleagues? But it
is time to quit this digression and turn to
THE PROCEEDINGS IN PORTUGAL.
The bishop of Oporto being placed at the head of the insurrectional
junta of that town, claimed the assistance of England. “We hope,”
said he, “for an aid of three hundred thousand cruzado novas; of
arms and accoutrements complete, and of cloth for forty thousand
infantry and for eight thousand cavalry; three thousand barrels of
cannon powder, some cargoes of salt fish, and other provisions,
and an auxiliary body of six thousand men at least, including some
cavalry.” This extravagant demand would lead to the supposition
than an immense force had been assembled by the prelate, yet he
could never at any time have put five thousand organized men in
motion against the French, and had probably not even thought of any
feasible or rational mode of employing the succours he demanded;
but the times were favourable for extravagant demands, and his were
not rejected by the English ministers, who sent agents to Oporto
and other parts, with power to grant supplies. The improvident
system adopted for Spain being thus extended to Portugal, produced
precisely the same effects, that is, cavils, intrigues, waste,
insubordination, and inordinate vanity and ambition among the
ignorant upstart men of the day.
[Sidenote: Par^y. Pap^s. L^d. Castle^h. to S. A. Well^y. 21st June,
1808.]
More than half a year had now elapsed since Napoleon first poured
his forces into the Peninsula; every moment of that time was marked
by some extraordinary event, and one month had passed since a
general and terrible explosion, shaking the unsteady structure
of diplomacy to pieces, had left a clear space for the shock of
arms; yet the British cabinet was still unacquainted with the real
state of public feeling in the Peninsula and with the Spanish
character; and although possessing a disposable army, of at least
eighty thousand excellent troops, was totally unsettled in its
plans, and unprepared for any vigorous effort. Agents were indeed
despatched to every accessible province; the public treasure was
scattered with heedless profusion, and the din of preparation
was heard in every department; but the bustle of confusion is
easily mistaken for the activity of business; time removing the
veil of official mystery covering those transactions, has exposed
all their dull and meagre features; and it is now clear that the
treasure was squandered without judgment, and the troops dispersed
without meaning. Ten thousand exiled to Sweden proved the truth of
Oxenstern’s address to his son; as many more idly kept in Sicily
were degraded into the guards of a vicious court; Gibraltar was
unnecessarily filled with fighting men; and general Spencer, with
five thousand excellent soldiers, being doomed to wander between
Ceuta, Lisbon, and Cadiz, was seeking, like the knight of La
Mancha, for a foe to combat.
A considerable force remained in England; but it was not ready
for service, when the minister resolved to send an expedition to
the Peninsula, and nine thousand men collected at Cork by other
hands and for other purposes, formed the only disposable army for
immediate operations. The Grey and Grenville administration, so
remarkable for unfortunate military enterprises, had assembled
this handful of men with a view to permanent conquests in South
America, upon what principle of policy it is not necessary
to inquire, but such undoubtedly was the intention of that
administration; perhaps in imitation of the Roman senate, who
sent troops to Spain when Hannibal was at the gates of the city.
The tory administration relinquished this scheme of conquest,
and directed sir Arthur Wellesley to inform general Miranda, the
military adventurer of the day, not only that he must cease to
expect assistance, but that all attempts to separate the colonies
of Spain from the parent state would be discouraged by the English
government. Thus the troops assembled at Cork became available,
and sir Arthur Wellesley being appointed to command them, sailed
on the 12th of July, to commence that long and bloody contest in
the Peninsula which he was destined to terminate in such a glorious
manner.
[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1808.]
[Sidenote: Ibid. L^d. Castle^h. to S. A. Well^y. 30th June.]
[Sidenote: Ibid. L^d. Castle^h. to g^l. Spenc^r. 28th and 30th
June.]
[Sidenote: D^o. to ad^l. Purvis, 28th June.]
Two small divisions were soon after ordered to assemble for
embarkation at Ramsgate and Harwich, under the command of generals
Anstruther and Acland, but a considerable time elapsed before they
were ready to sail; and a singular uncertainty in the views of the
ministers at this period subjected all the military operations to
perpetual and mischievous changes. General Spencer, supposed to
be at Gibraltar, was directed to repair to Cadiz, and wait for
sir Arthur’s orders; and the latter was permitted to sail under
the impression that Spencer was actually subject to his command;
but other instructions empowered Spencer at his own discretion to
commence operations in the south, without reference to sir Arthur
Wellesley’s proceedings; and admiral Purvis, who, after lord
Collingwood’s arrival, had no separate command, was also authorised
to undertake any enterprise in that quarter, and even to control
the operations of sir Arthur Wellesley by calling for the aid of
his troops, that general being enjoined to “pay all due obedience
to any such requisition!” Yet sir Arthur himself was informed, that
“the accounts from Cadiz were bad;” that “no disposition to move
either there or in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar was visible,” and
that “the cabinet were unwilling he should go far to the southward,
whilst the spirit of exertion appeared to reside more to the
northward.” Again the admiral, sir Charles Cotton, was informed
that sir Arthur Wellesley was to co-operate with him in a descent
at the mouth of the Tagus; but sir Arthur himself had no definite
object given for his own operations, although his instructions
pointed to Portugal, and thus in fact no one officer, naval or
military, knew exactly what his powers were, with the exception
of admiral Purvis, who, being only second in command for his own
service, was really authorised to control all the operations of the
land forces, provided he directed them to that quarter which had
been declared unfavourable for any operations at all.
[Sidenote: Par^y. Pap^s. L^d. Castle^h. to S. A. Well^y. 30th June,
1808.]
In recommending Portugal as the fittest field of action, the
ministers were chiefly guided by the advice of the Asturian
deputies; although having received sir Hew Dalrymple’s despatches
to a late date, their own information must have been more
recent and more extensive than any that they could obtain from
the deputies, who had left Spain at the commencement of the
insurrection, and were ill informed of what was passing in their
own province, utterly ignorant of the state of any other part
of the Peninsula, and under any circumstances were incapable of
judging rightly in such momentous affairs.
[Sidenote: Par^y. Pap^s. L^d. Castle^h. to S. A. Well^y. 30th June,
1808.]
The inconsistent orders of the ministers were well calculated to
introduce all manner of confusion, and to prevent all vigour
of action, but more egregious conduct followed. In sir Arthur
Wellesley’s instructions, although they were vague and undefined,
as to immediate military operations, it was expressly stated that
the intention of the government was to enable Portugal and Spain
to throw off the French yoke, and ample directions were given to
him as to his future political conduct in the Peninsula. He was
informed how to demean himself in any disputes that might arise
between the two insurrectional nations, how to act with relation
to the settlement of the supreme authority during the interregnum;
and directed to facilitate communications between the colonies
and the mother country, and to offer his good offices to arrange
any differences between them. The terms upon which Great Britain
would acquiesce in any negotiation between Spain and France were
stated, and finally he was empowered to recommend the establishment
of a paper system in the Peninsula, as a good mode of raising
money, and attaching the holders of it to the national cause. The
Spaniards were not, however, sufficiently civilized to adopt this
recommendation, and barbarously preferred gold to credit at a time
when no man’s life, or faith, or wealth, or power, was worth a
week’s purchase. Sir Hew Dalrymple was at this time also commanded
to furnish sir Arthur with every information that might be of use
to the latter in his operations.
[Sidenote: Ibid. L^d. Castle^h. to S. H. Dalrymple, 28th June,
1808.]
When the tenor of these instructions, and the great Indian
reputation enjoyed by sir Arthur Wellesley are considered, it is
not possible to doubt that he was first chosen as the fittest man
to conduct the armies of England at this important conjuncture; yet
scarcely had he sailed when he was superseded, not to make room
for a man whose fame and experience might have justified such a
change, but by an extraordinary arrangement, which can hardly be
attributed to mere vacillation of purpose, he was reduced to the
fourth rank in that army, for the future governance of which, he
had fifteen days before received the most extended instructions.
Sir Hew Dalrymple was appointed to the chief command, and sir
John Moore, who had suddenly and unexpectedly returned from the
Baltic, (having by his firmness and address saved himself and his
troops from the madness of the Swedish monarch), was, with marked
disrespect, directed, to place himself under the orders of sir
Harry Burrard and proceed to Portugal. Thus two men, comparatively
unknown and unused to the command of armies, superseded the only
generals in the British service whose talents and experience were
indisputable. The secret springs of this proceeding are not so deep
as to baffle investigation; but that task scarcely belongs to the
general historian, who does enough when he exposes the effects of
envy, treachery, and base cunning, without tracing those vices home
to their possessors.
[Sidenote: Ibid. L^d. Castle^h. to S. A. Well^y. 15th July, 1808.]