OPERATIONS OF BESSIERES AGAINST BLAKE AND CUESTA.
While the moveable columns of Bessieres’ corps ranged over the
Asturian and Biscayan mountains, and dispersed the insurgent
patriots of those provinces, Cuesta, undismayed by his defeat at
Cabezon, collected another army at Benevente, and, in concert with
the Gallician forces, prepared to advance again towards Burgos.
Filanghieri, the captain-general of Gallicia, had organised the
troops in that kingdom without difficulty, because the abundant
supplies poured in from England were beginning to be felt; and
patriotism is never more efficacious than when supported by large
sums of money. Taranco’s soldiers joined to the garrisons of Ferrol
and Coruña were increased, by new levies, to twenty-five thousand
men, organised in four divisions, and being well equipped, and
provided with a considerable train of artillery, were assembled
at Manzanal, a strong post in the mountains, twelve miles behind
Astorga.
The situation of that city offered great advantages to the
Spaniards; the old Moorish walls which surrounded it were complete,
and susceptible of being strengthened, so as to require a regular
siege; but a siege could not be undertaken by a small force, while
the army of Gallicia was entrenched at Manzanal, and while Cuesta
remained at Benevente; neither could Bessieres, with any prudence,
attack the Gallicians at Manzanal while Cuesta was at Benevente,
and while Astorga contained a strong garrison. Filanghieri appears
to have had some notion of its value, for he commenced forming an
entrenched camp in the mountains; but being slain by his soldiers,
don Joachim Blake succeeded to the command, and probably fearing a
similar fate if the army remained stationary, left one division at
Manzanal, and with the remainder marched towards Benevente to unite
with Cuesta.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Bessieres’ Operations. MSS.]
[Sidenote: Napoleon’s Notes, Appendix, No. 2.]
On the French side, marshal Bessieres collected his scattered
columns at Palencia; his plan, founded upon instructions from
Bayonne, was to make a rapid movement against Cuesta, in the hope
of beating him, while Blake was still behind Leon; then wheeling
to his right, to attack and drive the Gallicians back to the
mountains, to overrun the flat country with his numerous cavalry,
to open a communication with Portugal, and after receiving certain
reinforcements then preparing for him, to subdue Gallicia, or
assist Junot, as might seem most fitting at the time.
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
At this period the king was on his journey to Madrid, and the
military system of Napoleon was brought to its first great crisis;
for unless Bessieres was successful, there could be no sure footing
for the French in the capital, and as Madrid was the base of
Moncey’s and Dupont’s operations, the farther prosecution of their
plans depended upon the result of the approaching struggle in the
plains of Leon. Napoleon, foreseeing this crisis, had directed
Savary to occupy Segovia, to send general Gobert’s division
to Valladolid, and to hold Vedel’s and Frere’s, the one in La
Mancha, a few marches from the capital, and the other at San
Clemente, a central point connecting Moncey, Dupont, and Madrid.
But Savary, unable to estimate justly the relative importance of
the different operations, sent Vedel and Gobert into Andalusia to
reinforce Dupont, when he should rather have recalled the latter
to the northern side of the Sierra Morena; he caused Frere, as
we have seen, to quit San Clemente, and march by Requeña against
Valencia, at the moment when Moncey was retiring from that city
through Murcia to San Clemente, and thus dispersed and harassed his
reserves by long marches to the south without any definite object
when the essential interests were at stake in the north; and now,
struck with fear at the approach of Cuesta and Blake, whose armies
he had hitherto disregarded, he precipitately recalled Frere,
Vedel, Gobert, and even Dupont to Madrid, too late to take part
with Bessieres in the coming battle, but exactly timed to frustrate
Moncey’s projects, and, as we shall hereafter find, to ensure the
ruin of Dupont. In this manner steering his vessel before every
wind that blew, he could not fail of storms.
Greatly was Napoleon discontented with these errors; he relied,
and with reason, on the ability of Bessieres for a remedy; but to
Savary he sent the following instructions, dated the 13th of July:
“_The French affairs in Spain would be in an excellent state if
Gobert’s division had marched upon Valladolid, and Frere’s had
occupied San Clemente, with a moveable column, three or four
marches upon the route of general Dupont. Gobert having been
directed upon Dupont, Frere being with Moncey, harassed and
enfeebled by marches and countermarches, the position of the
French army is become less advantageous._
“_Marshal Bessieres is this day at Medina del Rio Seco with fifteen
thousand men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery; the 15th or 16th he
will attack Benevente, open a communication with Portugal, drive
the rebels into Gallicia, and seize upon Leon. If his operations
succeed thus, and in a brilliant manner, the position of the French
army will again be as good as it was._
“_If general Cuesta retires from Benevente without fighting, he
will move by Zamora and Salamanca to gain Avila and Segovia,
certain that then Bessieres cannot pursue him, as, in that case,
he would be menaced by the army of Gallicia, whose advanced guard
is at Leon. The general who commands at Madrid must then be able
to assemble six or seven thousand men and march upon Cuesta; the
citadel of Segovia must be occupied by three or four hundred
convalescents, with some guns and six weeks biscuit. It was a great
fault not to have occupied this citadel when the major-general
ordered it; of all the possible positions, Segovia is the most
dangerous for the army; the capital of a province, situated between
two routes, it deprives the army of all its communications, and the
enemy once posted in the citadel, the French army cannot dislodge
him. Three or four hundred convalescents, a good commandant, and a
squad of artillery, will render the castle of Segovia impregnable
for some time, and will insure to the army the important position
of Segovia._
“_If general Cuesta throws himself into Gallicia without fighting
or suffering a defeat, the position of the army will become
better; of course it will be still better if he does so after
having suffered a defeat._
“_If marshal Bessieres faces Cuesta at Benevente without attacking
him, or if he is repulsed by him, his object will always be to
cover Burgos, and to hold the enemy in check as long as possible;
he could, perhaps, be reinforced with the three hundred troops of
the line which accompany the king, but then there would be no room
for hesitation. If Bessieres retires without a battle, he must be
reinforced instantly with six thousand men. If he retreats after
a battle wherein he has suffered great loss, it will be necessary
to make great dispositions; to recall Frere, Gobert, Caulaincourt,
and Vedel by forced marches to Madrid; to withdraw Dupont into the
Sierra Morena, or even bring him nearer to Madrid (keeping him
always, however, seven or eight marches off), then crush Cuesta
and all the Gallician army, while Dupont will serve as an advanced
guard to hold the army of Andalusia in check._”
Before Bessieres could collect his troops, Blake effected a
junction with Cuesta at Benevente. Three plans were open to those
generals:
1º. To remove into the mountains, and take a position covering
Gallicia.
2º. To maintain the head of the Gallician army in advance of
Astorga, while Cuesta, with his Castilians, pushing by forced
marches through Salamanca and Avila, reached Segovia.
3º. To advance farther into the plains, and try the fate of a
battle.
This last plan was rash, seeing that Bessieres was well provided
with horsemen, and that the Spaniards had scarcely any; but
Cuesta, assuming the chief command, left a division at Benevente
to protect his stores, and advanced, much against Blake’s wishes,
with twenty-five thousand infantry (regular troops), a few hundred
cavalry, and from twenty to thirty pieces of artillery, in the
direction of Palencia. His march, as we have seen, dismayed Savary.
To use Napoleon’s expressions, he who had been “_hitherto acting
as if the army of Gallicia was not in existence_,” now acted “_as
if Bessieres was already beaten_;” but that marshal, firm and
experienced, rather than risk an action of such importance with
insufficient means, withdrew even the garrison from the important
post of St. Ander, and having quickly collected fifteen thousand
men and thirty pieces of artillery at Palencia, moved forward on
the 12th of July to the encounter. His line of battle consisted of
two divisions of infantry, one of light cavalry, and twenty-four
guns, his reserve was formed of four battalions and some horse
grenadiers of the imperial guards, with six pieces of artillery.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Bessieres’ Operations.]
The 13th he halted at Ampudia and Torre de Mormojon, from thence
advancing on the 14th in two columns, he drove in an advanced guard
of one hundred and fifty Spanish cavalry, and arrived about nine
o’clock in front of Rio Seco, where Cuesta’s army was drawn up like
a heavy domestic animal awaiting the spring of some active wild
beast.
BATTLE OF RIO SECO.
The first line of the Spaniards was posted along the edge of a step
of land, with an abrupt fall towards the French; the heaviest guns
were distributed along the front. The second line, composed of
the best troops, strengthened, or rather weakened, by seventeen
or eighteen thousand peasants, was displayed at a great distance
behind the first; the town of Rio Seco was in rear of the centre.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Bessieres’ Operations.]
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
Bessieres was at first startled at their numbers, and doubted
if he should attack; but soon perceiving the vice of Cuesta’s
disposition, he ordered general Lasalle to make a feint against the
front with the light cavalry, while he himself marching obliquely
to the right, outstretched the left of the Spaniards, and suddenly
thrust Merle’s and Mouton’s divisions and the imperial guards,
horse and foot, between their lines, and threw the first into
confusion; at that moment Lasalle charging furiously, the Spanish
front went down at once, and fifteen hundred dead bodies strewed
the field; but the victor’s ranks were disordered, and Cuesta made
a gallant effort to retrieve the day, for, supported by the fire of
all his remaining artillery, he fell with his second line upon the
French, and with his right wing broke in boldly and took six guns;
but his left hanging back, the flank of the right was exposed.
Bessieres, with great readiness, immediately charged on this naked
flank with Merle’s division and the horse grenadiers, while the
fourteenth provisionary regiment made head against the front; a
fierce short struggle ensued; and the Spaniards were overborne,
were broken and dispersed; meanwhile the first line rallied in
the town of Rio Seco, but were a second time defeated by Mouton’s
division, and fled over the plains, pursued by the light cavalry,
and suffering severely in their flight.
[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers.]
From five to six thousand Spaniards were killed and wounded on the
field, and twelve hundred prisoners, eighteen guns, and a great
store of ammunition, remained in the hands of the French. The
vanquished sought safety in all directions, but chiefly on the side
of Benevente. Blake and Cuesta separated in wrath with each other,
the former making for the mountains of Gallicia, the latter towards
Leon, and the division left at Benevente dispersed.
The French, who had lost fifty killed and three hundred wounded,
remained at Rio Seco all the 15th; the 16th they advanced to
Benevente, where they found many thousand English muskets and vast
quantities of ammunition, clothing, and provisions.
The communication with Portugal was now open, and Bessieres at
first resolved to give his hand to Junot; but hearing that the
fugitives were likely to rally on the side of Leon, he pursued
them by the road of Villa-fere. On his march, learning that Cuesta
was gone to Mayorga, he turned aside to that place, and on the 22d
captured there another great collection of stores; for, the Spanish
general, with the usual improvidence of his nation, had established
all his magazines in the open towns of the flat country.
After this Bessieres entered the city of Leon and remained there
until the 29th, during which time he received the submission of
the municipality, and prepared to carry the war into Gallicia. The
junta of Castile and Leon, whose power had hitherto been restrained
by Cuesta, now retired to Puente-Ferrada and assumed supreme
authority, and the quarrel between the generals becoming rancorous,
they sided with Blake. This appearing to Bessieres a favourable
occasion to tamper with the fidelity of those chiefs; he sent his
prisoners back, and endeavoured, by offering the vice-royalty of
Mexico to the one, and by reasoning on the hopeless state of the
insurrection, and the promise of rank and honours to the other, to
shake the loyalty of both; but neither would listen to him.
This failing, he marched to Puente Orvigo the 31st, intending to
break into Gallicia, but he was suddenly recalled from thence to
protect the retreat of the king from Madrid. Dupont had surrendered
with a whole army in Andalusia, the court was in consternation, the
victory of Rio Seco was rendered fruitless; and Bessieres retracing
his steps to Mayorga, took a defensive position near that town.
OBSERVATIONS.
1º. As Blake was overruled by Cuesta he is not responsible for the
errors of this short campaign; but the faults were gross on both
sides, and it seems difficult to decide whether Savary or Cuesta
made the greatest number.
2º. If the former had sent Gobert’s division to Valladolid,
Bessieres would have had twenty-two thousand men and forty pieces
of artillery in the field, a force not at all too great, when it
is considered that the fate of three French armies depended upon
the success of a battle to which Cuesta might have brought at least
double that number. The latter having determined upon an offensive
movement, disregarded the powerful cavalry of his enemy, chose
a field of battle precisely in the country where that arm would
have the greatest advantage, and when he should have brought every
man to bear upon the quarter which he did attack, he displayed
his ignorance of the art of war by fighting the battle of Rio
Seco with twenty-five thousand men only, and leaving ten thousand
disciplined troops guarding positions in his rear, which could not
be approached until he himself was first beaten. Neither was the
time well chosen for his advance; had he waited a few days the port
of St. Ander would have been attacked by eight English frigates
and a detachment of Spanish troops under the command of general
da Ponte, an enterprise that would have distracted and weakened
Bessieres, but which was relinquished in consequence of the battle
of Rio Seco.
3º. Once united to Blake, Cuesta’s real base of operations was
Gallicia, and he should have kept all his stores within the
mountains, and not have heaped them up in the open towns of the
flat country, exposed to the marauding parties of the enemy, or
covered, as in the case of Benevente, by strong detachments which
weakened his troops in the field and confined him to a particular
line of operations in the plain.
4º. The activity and good sense of marshal Bessieres overbalanced
the errors of Savary; and the victory of Rio Seco was of infinite
importance, because as we have seen a defeat in that quarter
would have shaken the French military system to its centre and
have obliged the king, then on his journey to Madrid, to halt at
Vittoria, until the distant divisions of the army were recalled to
the capital, and a powerful effort made to crush the victorious
enemy. Napoleon’s observations are full of strong expressions of
discontent at the imprudence of his lieutenant. “_A check given
to Dupont_,” he says, “_would have a slight effect, but a wound
received by Bessieres would give a locked jaw to the whole army.
Not an inhabitant of Madrid, not a peasant of the valleys that does
not feel that the affairs of Spain are involved in the affair of
Bessieres; how unfortunate, then, that in such a great event you
have wilfully given the enemy twenty chances against yourself._”
When he heard of the victory he exclaimed that it was the battle of
Almanza, and that Bessieres had saved Spain.
[Sidenote: Napoleon’s Notes, Appendix, No. 3.]
The prospect was indeed very promising; the king had arrived in
Madrid, bringing with him the veteran brigade of general Rey and
some of the guards, and all fears upon the side of Leon being
allayed, the affairs of Andalusia alone were of doubtful issue; for
Zaragoza, hard pushed by Verdier, was upon the point of destruction
in despite of the noble courage of the besieged; nor did the
subjugation of Andalusia appear in reason a hard task, seeing that
Moncey was then at San Clemente, and from that point threatened
Valencia without losing the power of succouring Dupont, and Frere’s
and Caulincourt’s troops were disposable for any operation. The
French army possessed the centre, and the Spaniards were dispersed
upon a variety of points on the circumference without any connexion
with each other, and in force only upon the side of Andalusia.
5º. The great combinations of the French emperor were upon the
point of being crowned with success, when a sudden catastrophe
overturned his able calculations and raised the sinking hopes of
the Spaniards. It was the campaign in Andalusia which produced
such important effects, and it offers one of the most interesting
and curious examples recorded by history of the vicissitudes of
war; for there disorder unaccompanied by superior valour triumphed
over discipline; inexperienced officers were successful against
practised generals; and a fortuitous combination of circumstances
enabled the Spaniards, without any skill, to defeat in one day an
immense plan wisely arranged, embracing a variety of interests, and
until that moment happily conducted in all its parts. This blow,
which felled Joseph from his throne, marked the French army with a
dishonourable scar, the more conspicuous, because it was the only
one of its numerous wounds that misbecame it.