OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.
[Sidenote: Cabanes, 1st Part.]
When Barcelona fell into the power of the French, the Spanish
garrison amounted to nearly four thousand men; but Duhesme daily
fearing a riot in the city, connived at their escape in parties,
and even sent the regiment of Estremadura (which was eight hundred
strong) entire to Lerida, where, strange to relate, the gates were
shut against it; and thus, discarded by both parties, it made its
way into Zaragoza during the siege of that place. Many thousand
citizens also fled from Barcelona, and joined the patriotic
standards in the neighbouring provinces.
[Sidenote: Napoleon’s Notes, Appendix, No. 2.]
[Sidenote: Cabanes, 1st Part.]
After the first ebullition at Manresa, the insurrection of
Catalonia lingered awhile; but the junta of Gerona continued to
excite the people to take arms, and it was manifest that a general
commotion approached; and this was a serious affair, for there
were in the beginning of June, including those who came out of
Barcelona, five thousand veteran troops in the province, and in the
Balearic islands above ten thousand. Sicily contained an English
army, and English fleets covered the Mediterranean. Moreover, by
the constitution of Catalonia, the whole of the male population fit
for war are obliged to assemble at certain points of each district
with arms and provisions, whenever the alarum bell, called the
_somaten_, is heard to ring; hence the name of _somatenes_; and
these warlike peasants, either from tradition or experience, are
well acquainted with the military value of their mountain holds.
[Sidenote: St. Cyr.]
[Sidenote: Victoire et Conquestes des Francois.]
[Sidenote: Foy.]
[Sidenote: Cabanes.]
Hostilities soon commenced; Duhesme, following his instructions
from Bayonne, detached general Chabran and five thousand two
hundred men, with orders to secure Tarragona and Tortosa, to
incorporate the Swiss regiment of Wimpfen with his own troops,
and to aid marshal Moncey in an attack on Valencia. At the same
time general Swartz having more than three thousand men, Swiss,
Germans, and Italians, under his command, was detached by the
way of Martorel and Montserrat to Manresa, with orders to raise
contributions, to put down the insurrection, and to destroy the
powder mills at the last town; then to get possession of Lerida,
and to incorporate all the Swiss troops found there in his own
brigade, placing five hundred men in the citadel; after which
he was to penetrate into Aragon, and to co-operate with Lefebre
against Zaragoza.
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
These two columns quitted Barcelona the 3d and the 4th of June.
A heavy rain induced Swartz to stop all the 5th at Martorel: the
6th he resumed his march, but without any military precautions,
although the object of his expedition was known, and the somaten
ringing out among the hills, the peasants of eight districts were
assembled in arms; these men took a resolution to defend the
pass of Bruch, and the most active of the Manresa and Igualada
districts, assisted by a few old soldiers, immediately repaired
there, and posted themselves on the rocks. Swartz coming on in a
careless manner, a heavy but distant fire opened from all parts
on his column, and created a little confusion, but order was soon
restored, and the Catalans being beaten from their strong holds,
were pursued for four or five miles along the main road. At Casa
Mansana, where a cross road leads to Manresa, one part broke away,
the others continued their flight to Igualada. Swartz, a man
evidently destitute of talent, halted at the very moment when his
success was complete, and the road to Manresa open; the Catalans
seeing his hesitation first rallied in the rear of Casa Mansana,
then returned to the attack, and drove the advanced guard back
upon the main body. The French general became alarmed, formed a
square, and retired hastily towards Esparraguéra, followed and
flanked by clouds of somatenes, whose courage and numbers increased
every moment; at Esparraguéra, which was a long single street,
the inhabitants had prepared an ambush; but Swartz, who arrived
at twilight, getting intelligence of their design, passed to the
right and left of the houses, and continuing his flight reached
Martorel the 7th, having lost a gun and many men by this inglorious
expedition, from which he returned in such disorder, and with his
soldiers so discouraged, that Duhesme thought it necessary to
recall Chabran from Tarragona.
The country westward of the Llobregat is rugged and difficult
for an army, yet Chabran reached Tarragona on the 8th without
encountering an enemy; but when he attempted to return, the line
of his march was intercepted by the insurgents, who took post at
Vendrill, Arbos, and Villa Franca, and spread themselves along the
banks of the Llobregat. As he approached Vendrill the somatenes
fell back to Arbos, but a skirmish commencing at this latter place,
the Catalans were defeated. Chabran set fire to the town, and
proceeded to Villa Franca. Here the excesses so common at this time
among the Spaniards were not spared; the governor, an old man,
and several of his friends, were murdered, and the perpetrators
of these crimes, as might be expected, made little or no defence
against the enemy.
Meanwhile general Lechi moved out of Barcelona, and acting in
concert with Swartz’s brigade, which marched from Martorel, cleared
the banks of the Llobregat, and formed a junction at San Felice
with Chabran on the 11th. The latter, after a day’s rest, having
his division completed by the brigade of Swartz, marched against
Manresa to repair the former disgrace; he arrived at Bruch the
14th, but the somatenes were also there, and assisted by some
regular troops with artillery. Finding that in a partial skirmish
he made no impression, Chabran, more timid even than Swartz, took
the extraordinary resolution of retreating, or rather flying from
those gallant peasants, who pursued him with scoffs and a galling
fire back to the very walls of Barcelona.
This success spurred on the insurrection; Gerona, Rosas,
Hostalrich, and Tarragona prepared for defence. The somatenes
assembling in the Ampurdan obliged the French commandant to quit
the town of Figueras, and shut himself up with three hundred men in
the citadel, while others gathering between the Ter and the Besos,
intercepted all communication between France and Barcelona.
In this predicament Duhesme resolved to make a sudden attempt on
Gerona, and for this purpose drew out six thousand of his best
troops, and eight pieces of artillery; but as the fortress of
Hostalrich stood in the direct road, he followed the coast line,
and employed a French privateer, then in the harbour, to attend
his march. The somatenes got intelligence of his designs: one
multitude took possession of the heights of Moncada, which are six
miles from Barcelona, and overhang the road to Hostalrich; another
multitude was posted on the ridge of Mongat, which, at the same
distance from Barcelona, abuts on the sea; an intrenched castle,
with a battery of fifteen guns, protected their left, and their
right was slightly connected with the people at Moncada.
The 17th, Duhesme, after some false show to hide his real attack,
fell upon the castle of Mongat, where the greater mass of the
Catalans being posted, were defeated with slaughter; a detachment
from Barcelona dispersing those of Moncada at the same time.
The 18th, the town of Mattaro being taken was plundered, although a
few cannon-shot only had been fired in its defence. The somatenes
were also defeated at the pass of San Pol. The 19th, the French
halted at San Tione, but at nine o’clock on the morning of the
20th, they appeared before the walls of Gerona.
This town, built on the right bank of the Ter, is cut in two by
the Oña. To the eastward it is confined by strong rocky hills,
whose points filling the space between the right bank of the Oña
and the Ter, overlook the town at different distances. Fort Mont
Jouy, a regular fortification, crowned the nearest hill or table
land, at five hundred yards distance, and three forts (that of the
Constable, of queen Anne, and of the Capuchins), being connected by
a ditch and rampart, formed one irregular outwork, a thousand yards
in length, and commanding all the ridge to the south-east. The
summit of this ridge is five, eight, and twelve hundred yards from
Gerona, and sixteen hundred from Fort Mont Jouy, being separated
from the latter by the narrow valley and stream of the Gallegan.
South-west, between the left of the Oña and the Ter, the country,
comparatively flat, is, however, full of hollows and clefts close
to the town. The body of the place on that side was defended by a
ditch and five regular bastions connected by a wall with towers. To
the west the city was covered by the Ter, and on the east fortified
by a long wall with towers having an irregular bastion at each
extremity, and some small detached works placed at the opening of
the valley of Gallegan. Three hundred of the regiment of Ultonia
and some artillerymen composed the garrison of Gerona, but they
were assisted by volunteers and by the citizens; and the somatenes
also assembled on the left of the Ter to defend the passage of that
river.
[Sidenote: St. Cyr.]
Duhesme, after provoking some cannon-shot from the forts, occupied
the village of St. Eugenia in the plain, and making a feint as
if to pass the Ter by the bridge of Salt, engaged the somatenes
in a useless skirmish. Great part of the day was spent by him in
preparing ladders for an attack; but at five o’clock in the evening
the French artillery opened from the heights of Palau, and a column
crossing the Oña passed between the outworks and the town, threw
out a detachment to keep the garrison of the former in check, and
assaulted the gate of El Carmen. This attempt failed completely
and with great loss to the assailants. Two hours afterwards
another column, advancing by the plain on the left of the Oña,
made an assault on the bastion of Santa Clara, but with so little
arrangement, or discipline, that the storming party moved forward
without their ladders, and although the hollows favoured them so
much that they arrived under the walls without being perceived, and
that the Neapolitan colonel Ambrosio, with a few others, actually
gained the ramparts by means of the single ladder brought up, the
confusion was too great to be remedied. And a detachment of the
regiment of Ultonia coming from the other side of the town, charged
the assailants, bayoneted those who were upon the walls, and drove
the rest back. Another feeble effort made after dark likewise
failed.
Duhesme tried some useless negotiations on the following day; but
dreading a longer absence from Barcelona, broke up on the 22d, and
returned by forced marches. As he passed Mattaro he left Chabran
with some troops in that town. Meanwhile the victorious somatenes
of Bruch had descended the Llobregat, rallied those of the lower
country, and getting artillery from Taragona and other fortresses,
planted batteries at the different passages of the river, and
entrenched a line from San Boy to Martorel. Regular officers now
took the command of the peasants; colonel Milans assembled a body
at Granollers; don Juan Claros put himself at the head of the
peasants of the Ampurdan; and colonel Baget took the command of
those at Bruch.
General Chabran, after a few days’ rest at Mattaro, made a foraging
excursion through the district of El Vallés. Milans, who held the
valley of the Congosta, encountered him near Granollers; both sides
claimed the victory, but Chabran retired to Barcelona, and Milans
remained on the banks of the Besos. The 30th Duhesme caused the
somatenes on the Llobregat to be attacked; general Lechi menaced
those at the bridge of Molinos del Rey, while the brigades of
Bessieres and Goullus, crossing at San Boy, surprised a battery
at that point and turned the whole line. Lechi then crossed the
river by the bridge of Molinos, ascended the left bank, took
all the artillery, burnt several villages, killed a number of
the somatenes, and put the rest to flight. They rallied again,
however, at Bruch and Igualada, and returning the 6th of July,
infested the immediate vicinity of Barcelona, taking possession of
all the hills between San Boy and Moncada, and connecting their
operations with colonel Milans. Other parties collected between the
Besos and the Ter, and extended the line of insurrection to the
Ampurdan; Juan Claros occupied the flat country about Rosas, and
the French garrison of Figueras having burnt the town, were blocked
up in the fort of San Fernando by two thousand somatenes of the
Pyrenees. A nest of Spanish privateers was formed in Palamos Bay,
and two English frigates, the Imperieuse and the Cambrian, watched
the coast from Rosas to Barcelona.
A supreme junta being now established at Lerida, opened an
intercourse with Aragon, Valencia, Seville, Gibraltar, and the
Balearic islands, and decreed that forty tercios or regiments of
one thousand men, to be selected from the somatenes, should be paid
and organized as regular troops, and that forty others should be
kept in reserve, but without pay.
[Sidenote: Foy’s History.]
[Sidenote: Lord Collingwood’s despatch, Aug. 27.]
[Sidenote: Foy’s History.]
This state of affairs being made known to Napoleon through the
medium of the moveable columns watching the valleys of the eastern
Pyrenees, he ordered general Reille, commanding the reserve at
Perpignan, to take the first soldiers at hand and march to the
relief of Figueras, after which, his force being increased by
drafts from the interior of France, to nine thousand men, he was
to assault Rosas and to besiege Gerona. The emperor imagined, that
the fall of the latter place would induce the surrender of Lerida,
and would so tranquillize Catalonia, that five thousand men might
again be detached towards Valencia. On receiving this order, Reille
with two battalions of Tuscan recruits, conducted a convoy safely
to Figueras and raised the blockade, but not without difficulty,
for his troops were greatly terrified and could scarcely be kept
to their colours. He relieved the place the 10th of July, and the
same day Duhesme, who had been preparing for a second attack on
Gerona, quitted Barcelona with six thousand infantry, some cavalry,
a battering train of twenty-two pieces, and a great number of
country carriages to transport his ammunition and stores, general
Lechi remaining in the city with five thousand men. Meanwhile
Reille having victualled Figueras and received a part of his
reinforcements, proceeded to invest Rosas; but he had scarcely
appeared before it when Juan Claros raised the country in his rear;
and Captain Otway, of the Montague, landing with some marines,
joined the migueletes: the French were forced to retire, and lost
two hundred men in their retreat.
[Sidenote: St. Cyr. Campaign in Catalonia.]
Duhesme pursued his march by the coast, whereupon the somatenes
of that part broke up the road in his front; Milans hung upon his
left, and lord Cochrane, with the Imperieuse frigate and some
Spanish vessels, cannonaded his right flank. In this dilemma he
remained five days in front of Arenas de Mar; and then dividing
his forces, sent one part across the mountains by Villagorguin,
and another by St. Iscle; the first made an attempt on Hostalrich,
but failed; the second beat away colonel Milans and dispersed
the somatenes of the Tordera; finally, Duhesme united his people
before Gerona on the 22d, but he had lost many carriages during the
march. The 23d he passed the Ter and dispersed the migueletes that
guarded the left bank. The 24th general Reille coming from Figueras
with six thousand men, took post at Puente Mayor, and the town was
invested with a line extending from that point by the heights of
San Miguel to the Monte Livio; from Monte Livio by the plain to the
bridge of Salt, and from thence along the left bank of the Ter to
Sarria. The garrison consisting of five hundred migueletes and four
hundred of the regiment of Ultonia, was reinforced on the 25th by
thirteen hundred of the regiment of Barcelona, who entered the town
with two guns. All the defences were in bad repair, but the people
were resolute. The night of the 27th, a French column passing the
valley of Galligan, gained the table land of Fort Mont Jouy, and
made lodgements in three towers of masonry which the Spaniards
had abandoned in the first moment of surprise. This advantage
elated Duhesme so much, that he resolved, without consulting his
engineers, to break ground on that side.
[Sidenote: Cabanes’ History.]
[Sidenote: Cabanes’ History, 2d Part.]
At this period a great change in the affairs of Catalonia took
place; the insurrection had hitherto been confined to the exertions
of the unorganised somatenes and was without system; but now
a treaty between lord Collingwood, who commanded the British
navy in the Mediterranean, and the marquis of Palacios, who was
captain-general of the Balearic isles, having been concluded, the
Spanish fleet and the troops in Minorca, Majorca, and Ivica, became
disposable for the service of the patriots. Palacios immediately
sent thirteen hundred to the port of San Felice di Quixols to
reinforce the garrison of Gerona. These men entered that city, as
we have seen, on the 25th, and Palacios himself disembarked four
thousand others at Tarragona on the 22d, together with thirty-seven
pieces of artillery; an event that excited universal joy, and
produced a surprising eagerness to fight the French.
[Sidenote: St Cyr.]
[Sidenote: Cabanes’ History, 2d Part.]
The supreme junta immediately repaired to Tarragona, declared
Palacios their president, and created him commander-in-chief,
subject, however, to the tutelar saint Narcissus, who was appointed
generalissimo of the forces by sea and land, and the ensigns of
authority, with due solemnity, placed on his coffin. The first
object with Palacios was to re-establish the line of the Llobregat.
To effect this, the count of Caldagues, with eighteen hundred men
and four guns, marched from Tarragona in two columns, the one
moving by the coast way to San Boy, and the other by the royal
road, through Villafranca and Ordal. Caldagues, in passing by
the bridge of Molino del Rey, established a post there, and then
ascending the left bank, fixed his quarters at Martorel, where
colonel Baget joined him with three thousand migueletes of the new
levy.
[Sidenote: Lord Collingwood’s despatches.]
[Sidenote: St. Cyr.]
The Llobregat runs within a few miles of Barcelona, but the right
bank being much the steepest, the lateral communications easier,
and the heights commanding a distinct view of every thing passing
on the opposite side; the line taken by Caldagues was strong, and
the country in his rear rough, full of defiles, and very fitting
for a retreat after the loss of a battle. General Lechi, thus
hemmed in on the west, was also hampered on the north, for the
mountains filling all the space between the Llobregat and the
Besos, approach in tongues as near as two and three miles from
Barcelona; and the somatenes of the Manresa and Valls districts
occupied them, and skirmished daily with the French outposts.
Beyond the Besos, which bounds Barcelona on the eastward, a lofty
continuous ridge extending to Hostalrich, runs parallel to, and at
the distance of two or three miles from the sea coast, separating
the main and the marine roads, and sending its shoots down to the
water’s edge. This ridge also swarmed with somatenes, who cut off
all communication with Duhesme, and lay in leaguer round the castle
of Mongat, in which were eighty or ninety French. The Cambrian and
the Imperieuse frigates blockaded the harbour of Barcelona; and, on
the 31st of July, lord Cochrane having brought his vessel alongside
of Mongat, landed his marines, and, in concert with the somatenes,
took it, blew up the works, and rolled the rocks and ruins down
in such a manner as to destroy the road. Thus, at the very moment
that Duhesme commenced the siege of Gerona, he was cut off from his
own base of operations, and the communication between Figueras and
general Reille’s division, was equally insecure, for the latter’s
convoys were attacked the 28th of July, the 3d of August, and so
fiercely on the 6th, that a Neapolitan battalion was surrounded,
and lost one hundred and fifty men.
Palacios, whose forces increased daily, wished to make an effort in
favour of Gerona, and with this view sent the count of Caldagues,
at the head of three or four thousand men (part migueletes, part
regulars), to interrupt the progress of the siege, intending to
follow himself with greater forces. Caldagues left Martorel the
evening of the 6th, marched by Tarrasa, Sabadell, Granollers, and
San Celoni, and reached Hostalrich the morning of the 10th; there
his force was increased to five thousand men and four guns. The
13th, he entered Llagostera; the 14th Castellar, a small place
situated behind the ridges that overlook Gerona, and only five
miles from the French camps. Don Juan Claros, with two thousand
five hundred migueletes, mixed with some Walloon and Spanish guards
from Rosas, met him at Castellar, as did also colonel Milans with
eight hundred somatenes.
Caldagues having opened a communication with the junta of Gerona,
found that Fort Mont Jouy was upon the point of surrendering, and
that the French, who were ignorant of his approach, had, contrary
to good discipline, heaped their forces in the plain between the
left of the Oña and the Ter, but only kept a slender guard on the
hills, while a single battalion protected the batteries raised
against Mont Jouy. Being an enterprising man, Caldagues resolved to
make an immediate effort for the relief of the place, and, after a
careful observation on the 15th, divided his forces, and the 16th
fell, with several columns, on the weakest part of the besiegers’
line. The garrison sallied forth at the same time from Mont Jouy,
and the French guards being taken between two fires, were quickly
overpowered, and driven first to the Puente Mayor and finally over
the Ter. The Spaniards re-formed on the hills, expecting to be
attacked; but Duhesme and Reille remained quiet until dark, then
breaking up the siege, they fled away, the one to Figueras, the
other to Barcelona, leaving both artillery and stores behind.
Duhesme endeavoured to pass along the coast, but, on his arrival
at Callella, he discovered that the road was cut by ditches, that
an English frigate was prepared to rake his columns on the march,
and that all the heights were occupied by the somatenes; whereupon,
destroying his ammunition, throwing his remaining artillery over
the rocks, and taking to by-ways in the mountains, he forced a
passage through the midst of the somatenes to Mongat, where general
Lechi met him the 20th, and covered his retreat into Barcelona.
Thus ended Duhesme’s second attempt against Gerona.
OBSERVATION 1.--Three great communications pierce the Pyrenean
frontier of Catalonia, leading directly upon Barcelona.
The first, or Puycerda road, penetrates between the sources of the
Segre and the Ter.
The second, or Campredon road, between the sources of the Ter and
the Fluvia.
The third, or Figueras road, between the sources of the Muga and
the sea-coast.
The first and second unite at Vicque; the second and third are
connected by a transverse road running from Olot, by Castle Follit,
to Gerona; the third also dividing near the latter town, leads with
one branch through Hostalrich, and with the other follows the line
of the coast. After the union of the first and second at Vicque,
a single route pursues the stream of the Besos to Barcelona, thus
turning the Muga, the Fluvia, the Ter, the Tordera, Besos, and an
infinity of minor streams, that, descending from the mountains, in
their rapid course to the Mediterranean, furrow all the country
between the eastern Pyrenees and Barcelona. The third, which is the
direct and best communication between Perpignan and the capital of
Catalonia, crosses all the above-named rivers, whose deep channels
and sudden floods offer serious obstacles to the march of an army.
All these roads, with the exception of that from Olot to Gerona,
are separated by craggy ridges of mountains scarcely to be
passed by troops; and the two first leading through wild and
savage districts, are incommoded by defiles, and protected by a
number of old castles and walled places, more or less capable of
resistance. The third, passing through many rich and flourishing
places, is however completely blocked to an invader by the strong
fortresses of Figueras and Rosas on the Muga, of Gerona on the
Ter, and Hostalrich on the Tordera. Palamos and several castles
likewise impede the coast road, which is moreover skirted by rocky
mountains, and exposed for many leagues to the fire of a fleet.
Such is Catalonia, eastward and northward of Barcelona.
On the west, at five or six miles distance, the Llobregat cuts it
off from a rough and lofty tract, through which the Cardena, the
Noga, the Foix, Gaya, Anguera, and Francoli rivers, break in deep
channels, descending in nearly parallel lines to the coast, and
the spaces between being gorged with mountains, and studded with
fortified places which command all the main roads. The plains and
fertile valleys are so few and contracted, that Catalonia may,
with the exception of the rich parts about Lerida and the Urgel,
be described as a huge mass of rocks and torrents, incapable of
supplying subsistence even for the inhabitants, whose prosperity
depends entirely upon manufactures and commerce.
Barcelona, the richest and most populous city in Spain, is the
heart of the province, and whoso masters it, if he can hold it,
may suck the strength of Catalonia away. A French army, without a
commanding fleet to assist, can scarcely take or keep Barcelona;
the troops must be supplied by regular convoys from France;
the fortresses on the line of communication must be taken and
provisioned, and the active intelligent population of the country
must be beaten from the rivers, pursued into their fortresses, and
warred down by exertions which none but the best troops are capable
of: for the Catalans are robust, numerous, and brave enough after
their own manner.
OBSERVATION 2d.--It follows from this exposition, that Duhesme
evinced a surprising want of forethought and military sagacity,
in neglecting to secure Gerona, Hostalrich, and Tarragona, with
garrisons, when his troops were received into those places. It was
this negligence that rendered the timid operations of Swartz and
Chabran capital errors; it was this that enabled some poor injured
and indignant peasants to kindle a mighty war, and in a very few
weeks obliged Napoleon to send thirty thousand men to the relief of
Barcelona.
[Sidenote: St Cyr.]
OBSERVATION 3d.--Duhesme was experienced in battles, and his energy
and resources of mind have been praised by a great authority; but
undoubtedly an absence of prudent calculation and arrangement, a
total neglect of military discipline, marked all his operations in
Catalonia; witness his mode of attack on Gerona, the deficiency
of ladders, and the confusion of the assaults. Witness also his
raising of the second siege, and absolute flight from Caldagues,
whose rash enterprise, although crowned with success, should have
caused his own destruction.
[Sidenote: Napoleon’s Notes, Appendix, No. 2.]
[Sidenote: St. Cyr.]
[Sidenote: Cabanes.]
In those affairs it is certain Duhesme displayed neither talent
nor vigour; but in the severities he exercised at the sacking of
Mattaro, in the burning of villages, which he executed to the
extreme verge of, if not beyond what the harshest laws of war will
justify, an odious energy was apparent, and as the ardour of the
somatenes was rather increased than repressed by these vigorous
proceedings, his conduct may be deemed as impolitic as it was
barbarous.
OBSERVATION 4th.--In Catalonia all the inherent cruelty of the
Spaniards was as grossly displayed as in any other province of
Spain. The Catalans were likewise vain and superstitious; but their
courage was higher, their patriotism purer, and their efforts
more sustained; the somatenes were bold and active in battle,
the population of the towns firm, and the juntas apparently
disinterested. The praise merited and bestowed upon the people of
Zaragoza is great; but Gerona more justly claims the admiration of
mankind; for the Aragonese troops were by Lefebre driven from the
open country in crowds to their capital, and little was wanted to
induce them to surrender at once; it was not until the last hour
that, gathering courage from despair, the people of Zaragoza put
forth all their energy: whereas those of Gerona, although attacked
by a greater force, and possessing fewer means of defence, without
any internal system of terror to counterbalance their fear of the
enemy, manfully and successfully resisted from the first. The
people of Zaragoza rallied at their hearthstone; those of Gerona
stood firm at the porch. But quitting these matters, I must now,
following the order I have marked out, proceed to relate the
occurrences in Valencia.
OPERATIONS OF MARSHAL MONCEY.
The execution of Calvo and his followers changed the horrid aspect
of the Valencian insurrection; the spirit of murder was checked,
and the patriotic energy assumed a nobler appearance. Murcia and
Valencia were united as one province; and towards the end of June,
nearly thirty thousand men, armed and provided with artillery,
attested the resources of these rich provinces, and the activity of
their chiefs. The Valencians then conceived the plan of marching
to the assistance of the Aragonese; but Napoleon had already
prescribed the measures which were to render such a movement
abortive.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Moncey’s Operations. MSS.]
An order, dated the 30th of May, directed Moncey to move, with a
column of ten thousand men, upon Cuenca; from that point he was to
watch the country comprised between the lower Ebro and Carthagena,
and he was empowered to act against the city of Valencia if
he judged it fitting to do so. The position of Cuenca was
advantageous; a short movement from thence to the left would place
Moncey’s troops upon the direct line between Valencia and Zaragoza,
and enable him to intercept all communication between those towns;
and a few marches to the right placed him upon the junction of the
roads leading from Carthagena and Valencia to Madrid. If Moncey
thought it essential to attack Valencia, the division of general
Chabran was to co-operate from the side of Catalonia. By this
combination the operations of Lefebre Desnouettes at Zaragoza, and
those of Duhesme in Catalonia, were covered from the Valencians;
and at the same time the flank of the French army at Madrid was
protected on the side of Murcia.
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
The 6th of June Moncey marched from Aranjuez by Santa Cruz,
Tarancon, Carascoso, and Villa del Orma, and reached Cuenca the
11th. There he received information of the rapid progress of the
insurrection, of the state of the Valencian army, and of the
projected movement to relieve Zaragoza; he immediately resolved to
make an attempt against the city of Valencia, and wrote to general
Chabran, whom he supposed to be at Tortosa, directing him to march
upon Castellon de la Plana, a town situated at some distance
eastward of the river Guadalaviar. Moncey himself proposed, by a
march through Requeña, to clear the country westward of that river,
and fixed upon the 25th of June as the latest period at which
the two columns were to communicate in the immediate vicinity of
Valencia.
Halting from the 11th to the 16th at Cuenca, he marched the 17th to
Tortola, the 18th to Buenaches, the 19th to Matilla, the 20th to
Minglanilla, and the 21st to Pesquiera. From Buenaches to Pesquiera
no inhabitants were to be seen; the villages were deserted, and
either from fear or hatred, every living person fled before his
footsteps. At length, a Swiss regiment, some of the Spanish guards,
and a body of armed peasantry, made a stand at the bridge of
Pajaso, upon the river Cabriel; the manner in which the country
had been forsaken, the gloomy and desolate marches, and the sudden
appearance of an armed force ready to dispute this important pass,
prognosticated a desperate conflict; but the event belied the
omens; and scarcely any resistance was made; the French easily
forced the passage of the bridge; the peasants fled, and the Swiss
and Spanish guards came over to the side of the victors.
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
Moncey informed general Chabran of this success, and appointed the
27th and 28th for a junction under the walls of Valencia. The next
day he took a position at Otiel; but hearing that the defeated
patriots had rallied and being reinforced, were, to the number
of ten or twelve thousand, intrenching themselves upon his left,
he quitted the direct line of march to attack them in their post
of Cabreras, which was somewhat in advance of the Siete Aguas.
The Spanish position was of extraordinary strength, the flanks
rested upon steep rocky mountains, and the only approach to the
front was through a long narrow defile, formed by high scarped
rocks, whose tops, inaccessible from the French side, were covered
with the armed peasantry of the neighbourhood. A direct assault
upon such a position could not succeed, and general Harispe was
directed to turn it by the right, while the cavalry and artillery
occupied the attention of the Spaniards in front; after overcoming
many obstacles offered by the impracticable nature of the ground,
Harispe reached the main body of the Spaniards, and then easily
defeated them, taking all their cannon, ammunition, and baggage.
This action, which took place upon the 24th, freed the left flank
of Moncey’s army, and he resumed his march upon the direct road
to Valencia. The 25th he was at the Venta de Buñol, the 26th in
advance of Chieva, and the 27th he arrived in front of Valencia.
A complete circuit of the ancient walls was in existence, and all
the approaches were commanded by works which had been hastily
repaired or newly raised by the inhabitants; the citadel was in a
tolerable state of defence, and the population were preparing for
a vigorous resistance. A city containing eighty thousand people,
actuated by the most violent passions, cannot be easily overcome,
and the Valencians derived additional strength from the situation
of their town, built as it was upon low ground, and encircled with
numerous canals and cuts, made for the purposes of irrigation;
the deep ditches of the place were filled with water, so that no
approach could be made by the small force under Moncey except
against the gates. It is said that the marshal had corrupted a
smuggler, who promised to betray the city during the heat of the
assault, and it is probable that some secret understanding of that
kind induced the French commander to make an attempt which would
otherwise have been rash and unmilitary.
Don Joseph Caro, a brother of the marquis of Romana, was with
four thousand men entrenched behind the canal of the Guadalaviar,
which was five miles in advance of the city gates. The village of
Quarte, and some thickly planted mulberry trees, helped to render
this post very strong; and when Moncey attacked it upon the 27th,
he met with a vigorous resistance. Caro was, however, beaten, and
chased into the city, with the loss of some cannon, and on the 28th
the French drove in the outposts, and occupied all the principal
avenues of the town.
However enthusiastic the patriots were while their enemy was at
a distance, his near approach filled them with terror, and it
is possible that a vigorous assault might have succeeded at the
first moment of consternation. But the favourable opportunity,
if it really existed, quickly passed away; Padre Rico, a friar
distinguished by his resolution, traversing the streets, with a
cross in one hand and a sword in the other, aroused the sinking
spirit and excited the fanaticism of the multitude; the fear of
retaliation for the massacre of the French residents, and the
certainty that Moncey’s troops were few, powerfully seconded his
efforts; and as it is usual for undisciplined masses of people to
pass suddenly from one extreme to another, fear was soon succeeded
by enthusiasm.
After disposing his field-pieces on the most favourable points, and
while the impression of the first defeat was still fresh, Moncey
summoned the governor to surrender. But the latter answered, “That
he would defend the city.” The French guns then opened upon the
place; the heavy guns of the Spaniards, however, soon overpowered
them, and a warm skirmish ensuing about the houses of the suburbs
and the vicinity of the gates, the Valencians so obstinately
resisted, that when the night fell, not only no serious impression
had been made upon the defences, but the assailants were repulsed
with loss at every point. The situation of the French marshal
became delicate; the persons sent to seek Chabran could gain no
intelligence of that general’s movements; the secret connexions in
the town, if any there were, had failed; the ammunition was nearly
expended, and the army was encumbered with seven or eight hundred
wounded men, and among them the general of engineers. Moncey,
swayed by these embarrassments, relinquished his attack, and fell
back to Quarte on the 29th, being harassed by Caro and the populace
in his retreat.
When it is considered that in a great city only a small number
of persons can estimate justly the immense advantages of their
situation, and the comparative weakness of the enemy, it must be
confessed that the spirit displayed by the Valencians upon this
occasion was very great; unfortunately it ended there, nothing
worthy of such an energetic commencement was afterwards performed,
although very considerable armies were either raised or maintained
in the province.
[Sidenote: Journal of Moncey.]
At Quarte Moncey, hearing that the captain-general, Serbelloni,
was marching upon Almanza to intercept the communication with
Chieva and Buñol, resolved to relinquish the line of Cuenca, and
to attack Serbelloni before he could quit the kingdom of Murcia.
This vigorous resolution he executed with great celerity; for,
directing the head of his column towards Torrente, he continued his
march until night, halting a short distance from that town. And a
forced march the next day brought him near Alcira, only one league
from the river Xucar; from his bivouac at that place he despatched
advice to general Chabran of this change of affairs.
In the mean time the conde de Serbelloni, surprised in the midst of
his movement, and disconcerted in his calculations by the decision
and rapidity of Moncey, took up a position to defend the passage
of the Xucar; the line of that river is strong, and offers many
advantageous points of resistance; but the Spaniards imprudently
occupied both banks, and in this exposed situation were attacked
upon the morning of the 1st of July; the division on the French
side was overthrown, and the passage forced without loss of time.
Serbelloni then retired to the heights of San Felice, which covered
the main road leading from Alcira to Almanza, hoping to secure the
defiles in front of the latter town before the enemy could arrive
there; but Moncey was again too quick for him; for leaving San
Felice to his left, he continued his march on another route, and
by a strenuous exertion seized upon the gorge of the defiles near
Almanza late in the night of the 2d; the Spanish troops in the mean
time approached his position, but were dispersed at day-break on
the 3d, and some of their guns captured; the road being now open,
Moncey entered the town of Almanza the same day. The 4th he took
post at Bonete. The 5th near Chinchilla, and the 6th at Albacete,
where he got intelligence that general Frere, who should have been
at St. Clemente with a division, was gone towards Mequeña.
To explain this movement it is necessary to observe that when
Dupont marched towards Andalusia, and Moncey against Valencia, the
remaining divisions of their corps were employed by Savary to scour
the country in the neighbourhood of Madrid, and to protect the rear
and connect the operations of those generals; thus general Gobert,
who, following Napoleon’s orders, should have been at Valladolid,
was sent with the third division of Dupont towards Andalusia; and
general Frere (commanding the second division of Moncey’s), who
should have been at San Clemente, a central point, from whence
he could gain the road leading from Seville to La Mancha, and
intercept the communication between Valencia and Cuenca, or seize
upon the point of junction where the route from Carthagena and
Murcia falls into the road of Valencia, was sent by Requeña to
reinforce Moncey.
Meanwhile, the inhabitants of Cuenca rose in arms, and being
joined by a force of seven or eight thousand peasants, overpowered
and destroyed a French detachment left in that town. The duke of
Rovigo, fearing that Moncey’s column would be compromised by this
insurrection, ordered general Caulaincourt, then at Taracon, to
quell it with a force composed of cavalry and some provisional
battalions. Caulaincourt arrived in front of Cuenca on the evening
of the 3d of July; finding the insurgents in position, he attacked
and dispersed them with great slaughter, and the town being
deserted by the inhabitants, was given up to pillage.
[Sidenote: Foy’s History.]
In the mean time, Frere, who had quitted San Clemente upon the
26th, made his way to Requeña; there he received intelligence of
Caulaincourt’s success, and that Moncey had passed the Xucar;
whereupon, retracing his steps, he returned to San Clemente, his
troops being wearied, sickly, and exhausted by these long and
useless marches in the heats of summer. Moncey now re-organized his
forces, and prepared artillery and other means for a second attempt
against Valencia; but he was interrupted by Savary, who, alarmed
at the advance of Cuesta and Blake, recalled Frere towards Madrid,
and Moncey, justly offended that Savary, inflated with momentary
power, should treat him with so little ceremony, broke up from San
Clemente, and likewise returned by the way of Ocaña to the capital.
OBSERVATIONS.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 7.]
1º. The result of marshal Moncey’s campaign being published by the
Spaniards as a great and decisive failure, produced extravagant
hopes of final success; a happy illusion if the chiefs had not
partaken of it, and pursued their wild course of mutual flattery
and exaggeration, without reflecting that in truth there was
nothing very satisfactory in the prospect of affairs. Moncey’s
operation was in the nature of a moveable column; the object of
which was to prevent the junction of the Valencian army with the
Aragonese. The attempt upon the town of Valencia was a simple
experiment, which, if successful, would have produced great
effects, but having failed, the evil resulting was but trifling in
a military point of view. Valencia was not the essential object of
the expedition, and the fate of the general campaign depended upon
the armies in Old Castile.
2º. It was consoling that a rich and flourishing town had not
fallen into the power of the enemy; but at the same time a want of
real nerve in the Spanish insurrection was visible. The kingdoms
of Murcia and Valencia acted in concert, and contained two of
the richest sea-port towns in the Peninsula; their united force
amounted to thirty thousand organised troops, exclusive of the
armed peasants in various districts; and the populace of Valencia
were deeply committed by the massacre of the French residents. Here
then, if in any place, a strenuous resistance was to be expected;
nevertheless, marshal Moncey, whose whole force was at first only
eight thousand French, and never exceeded ten thousand men,
continued marching and fighting without cessation for a month,
during which period he forced two of the strongest mountain passes
in the world, crossed several large and difficult rivers, carried
the war into the very streets of Valencia; and being disappointed
of assistance from Catalonia, extricated his division from a
difficult situation, after having defeated his opponents in five
actions, killed and wounded a number of them, equal in amount to
the whole of his own force, and made a circuit of above three
hundred miles through a hostile and populous country, without
having sustained any serious loss, without any desertion from the
Spanish battalions incorporated with his own, and what was of more
importance, having those battalions much increased by desertions
from the enemy. In short, the great object of the expedition
had been attained, the plan of relieving Zaragoza was entirely
frustrated, and the organization of an efficient Spanish force
retarded.
3º. Moncey could hardly have expected to succeed against the town
of Valencia; for to use Napoleon’s words, “_a city, with eighty
thousand inhabitants, barricadoed streets, and artillery placed at
the gates, cannot be_ TAKEN BY THE COLLAR.”
4º. General Frere’s useless march to Requeña was very hurtful to
the French; and the duke of Rovigo was rated by the emperor for his
want of judgment upon the occasion; “it was a folly,” the latter
writes, “to dream of reinforcing Moncey; because if that marshal
failed in taking the city by a sudden assault, it became an affair
of artillery; and twenty thousand men, more or less, would not
enable him to succeed.” “Frere could do nothing at Valencia, but he
could do a great deal at San Clemente; because from that post he
could support either Madrid or general Dupont.”
5º. Moncey was slightly blamed by the emperor for not halting
within a day’s march of Valencia, in order to break the spirit of
the people, and make them feel the weight of the war; but this
opinion was probably formed upon an imperfect knowledge of the
local details. The marshal’s line of operations from Cuenca was
infested by insurgent bands, his ammunition was nearly exhausted,
he could hear nothing of Chabran’s division, and the whole force
of Murcia was collecting upon his flank and rear. The country
behind him was favourable for his adversaries, and his army was
encumbered by a number of wounded men; it was surely prudent under
such circumstances, to open his communication again with Madrid as
quickly as possible.
By some authors, the repulse at Valencia has been classed with
the inglorious defeat of Dupont at Baylen; but there was a wide
difference between those events, the generals, and the results.
Moncey, although an old man, was vigorous, active, and decided;
and the check he received produced little effect. Dupont was
irresolute, slow, and incapable, if not worse, as I shall hereafter
show; but before describing his campaign, I must narrate the
operations of the Gallician army.