All the insurrections of the Spanish provinces took place nearly
at the same period; the operations of the French divisions were,
of course, nearly simultaneous; I shall, therefore, narrate their
proceedings separately, classing them by the effect each produced
upon the stability of the intrusive government in Madrid, and
commencing with the
FIRST OPERATIONS OF MARSHAL BESSIERES.
[Sidenote: Moniteur. Victoires et Conquêtes des Français.]
That officer had scarcely fixed his quarters at Burgos when a
general movement of revolt took place. On his right, the bishop of
St. Ander excited the inhabitants of the diocese to take arms. In
his rear, a mechanic assembled some thousand armed peasants at the
town of Logroño. In front, five thousand men took possession of the
Spanish artillery dépôt at Segovia; an equal number assembling at
Palencia armed themselves from the royal manufactory at that place,
and advanced to the town of Torquemada; while general Cuesta, with
some regular troops and a body of organized peasantry, posted
themselves on the Pisuerga at Cabeçon.
Bessieres immediately divided his disposable force, which was not
more than twelve thousand men, into several columns, and traversed
the country in all directions, disarming the towns and interrupting
the combinations of the insurgents; while a division of Dupont’s
corps, under general Frere, marched from the side of Madrid to aid
his operations. General Verdier attacked Logroño on the 6th of
June, dispersed the peasantry, and put the leaders to death after
the action. General Lasalle, departing from Burgos with a brigade
of light cavalry, passed the Pisuerga, fell upon the Spaniards at
Torquemada on the 7th, broke them, and pursuing with a merciless
sword, burnt that town, and entered Palencia on the 8th.
Meanwhile Frere defeated the Spanish force at Segovia taking
thirty pieces of artillery; and general Merle marching through the
country lying between the Pisuerga and the Douero with a division
of infantry, joined Lasalle at Dueñas on the 12th. From thence
they proceeded to Cabeçon, where Cuesta accepted battle, and was
overthrown, with much slaughter, the loss of his artillery, and
several thousand musquets. The flat country being thus subdued,
Lasalle’s cavalry remained to keep it under; but Merle, marching
northward, commenced operations, in concert with general Ducos,
against the province of St. Ander. On the 20th, the latter general
drove the Spaniards from the pass of Soncillo; the 21st, he forced
the pass of Venta de Escudo, and descending the valley of the
river Pas, approached St. Ander; on the 22d, Merle, after some
resistance, penetrated by Lantueño, and followed the course of
the Besaya to Torre La Vega, then turning to his right entered
St. Ander on the 23d; and Ducos arriving at the same time, the
town submitted, and the bishop fled with the greatest part of the
clergy. The authorities of Segovia, Valladolid, Palencia, and
St. Ander, were compelled to send deputies to take the oath of
allegiance to Joseph.
By these operations, the above-named provinces were completely
disarmed, and so awed by the activity of Bessieres, that no further
insurrections took place, and his cavalry raised contributions
and collected provisions without the least difficulty. Frere’s
division then returned to Toledo, and from thence marched to San
Clemente, on the borders of Murcia. The imprudence of Cuesta, and
the general deficiency of talent and judgment manifested by the
Spaniards throughout these proceedings, were very remarkable.
[Sidenote: Cavallero.]
While Bessieres thus broke the northern insurrections, the march
of general Lefebre Desnouettes against the province of Aragon
brought on the first siege of Zaragoza. Palafox being declared
captain-general, recalled the retired officers into service; a
number of volunteers repaired to him from distant parts, and the
soldiers and officers who could escape from Pampelona and Madrid
joined his standard, and among others the officers of engineers
employed in the school of Alcala. With their assistance his forces
were rapidly organized, and many battalions were formed and posted
at different points on the roads leading towards Navarre. The baron
de Versage, an officer of the Walloon guards, occupied Calatayud
with a regiment composed of students who were volunteers; he raised
more men in that quarter, kept up a communication with the juntas
of Soria and Siguenza, and covered the powder-mills in Villa
Felice. The arsenal of Zaragoza supplied the patriots with arms. At
Tudela the people broke down the bridge over the Ebro, and Palafox
detached five hundred fuzileers to assist them in defending the
passage of that river.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Lefebre’s Operations. MSS.]
[Sidenote: Moniteur. Victoire et Conquêtes des Français.]
[Sidenote: Cavallero.]
In this situation of affairs Lefebre commenced his march from
Pampelona the 7th of June, at the head of three or four thousand
infantry, some field batteries, and a regiment of Polish cavalry.
On the 9th he forced the passage of the Ebro, put the leaders of
the insurrection to death after the action, and then continued his
movement by the right bank to Mallen. Palafox, with ten thousand
infantry, two hundred dragoons, and eight pieces of artillery,
awaited him there in a position behind the Huecha. The 13th,
Palafox was overthrown; the 14th, the French reached the Xalon;
another combat and another victory carried Lefebre across that
river; and the 15th, he was on the Huerba, in front of the heroic
city.
FIRST SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA.
[Sidenote: Cavallero.]
[Sidenote: Siege of Zaragoza.]
Zaragoza contained at that period fifty thousand inhabitants;
situated on the right bank of the Ebro, it was connected with
a suburb on the opposite side by a handsome stone bridge. The
immediate vicinity is flat, and on the side of the suburb low and
marshy. The small river Huerba, running through a deep cleft, cuts
the plain on the right bank, and taking its course close to the
walls, falls into the Ebro nearly opposite to the mouth of the
Gallego, which, descending from the mountains on the opposite side,
cuts the plain on the left bank. The convent of St. Joseph, built
on the right of the Huerba, covered a bridge over that torrent;
and, at the distance of cannon-shot, a step of land commenced,
which, gradually rising, terminated at eighteen hundred yards from
the convent, in a hill called the Monte Torrero. On this hill,
which commanded all the plain and overlooked the town, several
storehouses and workshops, built for the use of the canal, were
entrenched, and occupied by twelve hundred men. The canal itself,
a noble work, formed a water carriage without a single lock from
Tudela to Zaragoza. The city, surrounded by a low brick wall,
presented no regular defences, and possessed very few guns in a
state fit for service, but the houses were strongly constructed,
some of stone, others of brick; they were mostly of two stories
high, each story being vaulted so as to be nearly proof against
fire; and the massive walls of the convents, rising like castles
all round the circuit as well as inside the place, were to be seen
crowded with armed men.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Lefebre’s Operations. MSS.]
[Sidenote: Cavallero.]
Such was Zaragoza when Lefebre Desnouettes first appeared before
it: his previous movements had cut the direct communication with
Calatayud, and obliged the baron Versage to retire to Belchite
with the volunteers and several thousand fresh levies. Palafox
occupied the olive groves and houses on the step of land between
the convent of St. Joseph and Monte Torrero; but his men, cowed by
their previous defeats, were easily driven from thence on the 16th,
and the town was closely invested on the right bank of the Ebro.
Indeed so great was the terror and confusion of the Spaniards, that
some of the French penetrated without difficulty into the street
of St. Engracia, and the city was on the point of being taken
that day, for Palafox, accompanied by his brother Francisco, an
aide-de-camp, and one hundred dragoons, under pretence of seeking
succour, endeavoured to go forth on the side of the suburb at the
moment when the French were entering on the side of Engracia; but
the plebeian leaders being suspicious of his intentions, would not
suffer him to depart without a guard of infantry, and Tio Jorge[7]
accompanied him to watch his conduct and to ensure his return. It
was a strange proceeding, and ill-timed, that the chief should thus
fly out at one gate while the enemy was pressing in at another,
when the streets were filled with clamour, the dismayed garrison
making little or no resistance, and all things in confusion.
Zaragoza was that day on the very verge of destruction, when
the French, either fearful of an ambuscade, or ignorant of their
advantages, retired, and the people, as if inspired, changing from
the extreme of terror to that of courage, suddenly fell to casting
up defences, piercing loop-holes in the walls of the houses,
constructing ramparts with sand-bags, and working with such vigour,
that, under the direction of their engineers, in twenty-four
hours they put the place in a condition to withstand an assault.
Whereupon Lefebre confining his operations to the right bank of
the Ebro, established posts close to the gates, and waited for
reinforcements.
[Sidenote: Cavallero.]
Meanwhile Palafox crossing the Ebro at Pina, joined Versage at
Belchite, and having collected seven or eight thousand men, and
four pieces of artillery, gained the Xalon in rear of the French;
from thence he proposed to advance through Epila and endeavour
to relieve Zaragoza by a battle. His officers, struck with the
imprudence of this measure, resisted his authority, and prepared to
retire to Valencia. Palafox, ignorant of war, and probably awed by
Tio Jorge, expressed his determination to fight, saying, with an
imposing air, “that those who feared danger might retire.” Touched
with shame, all agreed to follow him to Epila; and he advanced: but
two French regiments, detached by Lefebre, met him on the march,
and a combat commencing at nine in the evening, the Spaniards were
unable to form any order of battle, and, notwithstanding their
superior numbers, were defeated with the loss of three thousand
men. Palafox, who did not display that firmness in danger which
his speech promised, must have fled early, as he reached Calatayud
in the night, although many of his troops arrived there unbroken
the next morning. After this disaster, Palafox, leaving Versage at
Calatayud to make fresh levies, returned himself, with all the
beaten troops that he could collect, to Belchite, and from thence
regained Zaragoza on the 2d of July. Meanwhile Lefebre had taken
the Monte Torrero by assault on the 27th of June.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Lefebre’s Operations. MSS.]
The 29th or 30th, general Verdier arrived on the Huerba with a
division of infantry, and a large train of battering artillery; and
the besiegers being now nearly twelve thousand strong, attacked
the convents of St. Joseph and the Capuchins on the same day that
Palafox returned; the first assault on St. Joseph’s failed, the
second succeeded; but the Capuchins, after some fighting, was set
fire to by the Spaniards and abandoned. All this time the suburb
was left open and free for the besieged. But Napoleon blamed this
mode of attack, and sent orders to throw a bridge across the
Ebro,--to press the siege on the left bank,--and to profit of the
previous success by raising a breaching battery in the convent of
St. Joseph. A bridge was accordingly constructed at St. Lambert,
two hundred yards above the town, and two attacks were carried on
at the same time.
[Sidenote: Napoleon’s Notes, Appendix, No. 2.]
Hitherto the French troops employed in Aragon formed a part of
marshal Bessieres’ corps, but the emperor now directed Lefebre to
repair with his brigade to reinforce that marshal, and constituting
the ten thousand men who remained with Verdier a separate corps,
gave this last general the command of it, and promised him
reinforcements. Verdier continued to press the siege as closely as
his numbers would permit, but, all around him, the insurgents were
rapidly organising small armies, and threatened to enclose him in
his camp. This obliged him to send detachments against them: and
it is singular, that with so few men, while daily fighting with
the besieged, he should have been able to scour the country, and
put down the insurrection, as far as Lerida, Barbastro, Tudela,
Jacca, and Calatayud; the garrison of Pampelona only assisting
him from the side of Navarre. In one of these expeditions the
powder-mills of Villa Felice, thirty miles distant, were destroyed,
and the baron Versage being defeated, was forced to retire with his
division towards Valencia.
[Sidenote: Cavallero.]
During the course of July, Verdier made several assaults on the
gate of El Carmen, and others on the Portillo, but he was repulsed
in all. The besieged having been reinforced by the regiment of
Estremadura, composed of eight hundred old soldiers, in return
made a sally with two thousand men to retake the Monte Torrero,
but they were beaten, with the loss of their commander; regular
approaches were then commenced by the French against the quarter
of St. Engracia and the castle of Aljaferia. The 2d of August, the
besieged were again reinforced by two hundred men of the Spanish
guard and volunteers of Aragon, who brought some artillery with
them; the French likewise were strengthened by two old regiments of
the line, which increased their numbers to fifteen thousand men.
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
[Sidenote: Cavallero.]
On the 3d of August, the breaching batteries opened against St.
Engracia and Aljaferia; the mortar batteries threw shells at the
same time, and a Spanish magazine of powder blowing up in the
Cosso (a public walk formed on the line of the ancient Moorish
ramparts), destroyed several houses, and killed many of the
defenders. The place was then summoned to surrender on terms, but
Palafox having rejected all offers, on the 4th of August the town
was stormed through a breach in the convent of St. Engracia; the
French penetrated to the Cosso, and a confused and terrible scene
ensued. Some defended the houses, some drew up in the streets,
some fled by the suburb to the country, where the French cavalry
fell upon them; cries of treason were every where heard, and became
the signal for assassinations; all seemed lost, when a column of
the assailants seeking the way to the bridge over the Ebro, got
entangled in the Arco de Cineja, a long crooked street, and being
attacked in that situation, were driven back to the Cosso; others
began to plunder, and the Zaragozans recovering courage, fought
with desperation, and set fire to the convent of Francisco. At
the close of day the French were in possession of one side of the
Cosso, and the Spaniards of the other. A hideous and revolting
spectacle was exhibited during the action; the public hospital
being taken and fired, the madmen confined there issued forth among
the combatants, muttering, shouting, singing, and moping, according
to the character of their disorder, while drivelling idiots mixed
their unmeaning cries with the shouts of contending soldiers.
[Sidenote: S. Journal of Lefebre’s Operations. MSS.]
The Spaniards now perceived, that with courage the town might still
be defended; and from that day the fighting was murderous and
constant, one party endeavouring to take, the other to defend the
houses. In this warfare, where skill was nearly useless, Verdier’s
force was too weak to make a rapid progress; and events disastrous
to the French arms taking place in other parts of Spain, he
received, about the 10th of August, orders from the king to raise
the siege, and retire to Logroña. Of this operation I shall speak
in due time.
OBSERVATIONS.
1º. Mere professional skill and enterprise do not constitute a
great general. Lefebre Desnouettes, by his activity and boldness,
with a tithe of their numbers, defeated the insurgents of
Aragon in several actions, and scoured the open country; but the
same Lefebre, wanting the higher qualities of a general, failed
miserably where that intuitive sagacity that reads passing events
aright was required. There were thousands in the French army who
could have done as well as him; probably not three who could
have reduced Zaragoza, and yet it is manifest that Zaragoza owed
her safety to accident, and that the desperate resistance of the
inhabitants was more the result of chance than of any peculiar
virtue.
2º. The feeble defence made at Mallen, at the Xalon; at the Monte
Torrero, at Epila; the terror of the besieged on the 16th, when
the French penetrated into the town; the flight of Palafox under
the pretence of seeking succour, nay, the very assault which in
such a wonderful manner called forth the energy of the Zaragozans,
and failed only because the French troops plundered, and missing
the road to the bridge, missed that to victory at the same time,
proves, that the fate of the city was determined by accident in
more than one of those nice conjunctures which men of genius know
how to seize, but others leave to the decision of fortune.
3º. However, it must be acknowledged that Lefebre and Verdier,
especially the latter, displayed both vigour and talent; for it was
no mean exploit to quell the insurrections to a distance of fifty
miles on every side, at the same time investing double their own
numbers, and pushing the attack with such ardour as to reduce to
extremity a city so defended.
4º. The current romantic tales of women rallying the troops, and
leading them forward at the most dangerous periods of this siege,
I have not touched upon, and may perhaps be allowed to doubt,
although it is not unlikely that when suddenly environed with
horrors, the delicate sensitiveness of women driving them to a kind
of phrensy, might produce actions above the heroism of men; and in
patient suffering their superior fortitude is manifest; wherefore I
neither wholly believe, nor will deny, their exploits at Zaragoza;
merely remarking that for a long time afterwards Spain swarmed with
heroines, clothed in half uniforms, and loaded with weapons.
[Sidenote: Cavallero.]
5º. The two circumstances that principally contributed to the
success of the defence were, first, the bad discipline of the
French soldiers; and secondly, the system of terror which was
established by the Spanish leaders, whoever those leaders were.
Few soldiers can be restrained from plunder when a town is taken
by assault; yet there is no period when the chances of war are
so sudden and so decisive, none where the moral responsibility
of a general is so great. Will military regulations alone secure
the necessary discipline at such a moment? The French army are
not deficient in a stern code, and the English army, taken
altogether, is probably the best regulated of modern times; but
here it is seen that Lefebre failed to take Zaragoza in default
of discipline; and in the course of this work it will appear that
no wild horde of Tartars ever fell with more licence upon their
rich effeminate neighbours than did the English troops upon the
Spanish towns taken by storm. The inference to be drawn is, that
national institutions alone will produce that moral discipline
necessary to make a soldier capable of fulfilling his whole duty;
yet a British statesman[8] was not ashamed to declare in parliament
that the worst men make the best soldiers; and this odious,
narrow-minded, unworthy maxim, had its admirers. That a system
of terror was at Zaragoza successfully employed to protract the
defence is undoubted. The commandant of Monte Torrero, ostensibly
for suffering himself to be defeated, but according to some, for
the gratification of private malice, was tried and put to death;
and a general of artillery was in a more summary manner killed
without any trial; the chief engineer, a man of skill and undaunted
courage, was arbitrarily imprisoned; and the slightest word or even
gesture of discontent, was punished with instant death. A stern
band of priests and plebeian leaders, in whose hands Palafox was a
tool, ruled with such furious energy, that resistance to the enemy
was less dangerous than disobedience to their orders. Suspicion was
the warrant of death, and this system once begun, ceased not until
the town was taken in the second siege.