[Sidenote: Nellerto.[3]]
[Sidenote: Vide Doblado’s Letters.]
For many years antecedent to the French invasion, the royal family
of Spain was distracted with domestic quarrels; the son’s hand was
against his mother, the father’s against his son, and the court was
a scene of continual broils, under cover of which artful men, as
is usual in such cases, pushed their own interest forward, while
they seemed to act only for the sake of the party whose cause they
espoused. Charles IV. attributed this unhappy state of his house to
the intrigues of his sister-in-law, the queen of the Two Sicilies.
He himself, a weak and inefficient old man, was governed by his
wife, and she again by don Manuel Godoy, of whose person she was
enamoured even to folly. From the rank of a simple gentleman of the
Royal Guards, this person had, through her influence, been raised
to the highest dignities; and the title of Prince of the Peace was
conferred upon a man whose name must be for ever connected with one
of the bloodiest wars that fill the page of history.
Ferdinand prince of the Asturias, naturally hated this favourite,
and the miserable death of his young wife, his own youth and
apparently forlorn condition created such an interest in his
favour, that the people partook of his feelings; and the disunion
of the royal family extending its effects beyond the precincts
of the court, involved the nation in ruin. Those who know how a
Spaniard hates, will readily comprehend why Godoy, who was really
a mild, good-natured man, although a sensual and corrupt one, has
been so overloaded with imprecations, as if he, and he alone, had
been the cause of the disasters of Spain.
[Sidenote: Napoleon in Las Casas.]
[Sidenote: Nellerto.]
The canon, Escoiquiz, a daring and subtile politician, appears to
have been the chief of Ferdinand’s party; finding the influence
of the Prince of the Peace too strong, he looked for support in a
powerful quarter; and under his tuition, Ferdinand wrote upon the
11th of October, 1807, to the emperor Napoleon; in this letter
he complained of the influence which bad men had obtained over
his father, prayed for the interference of the “hero destined
by Providence,” so run the text, “to save Europe and to support
thrones;” asked an alliance by marriage with the Buonaparte family,
and finally desired that his communication might be kept secret
from his father, lest it should be taken as a proof of disrespect.
To this letter he received no answer, and fresh matter of quarrel
being found by his enemies at home, he was placed in arrest, and
upon the 29th of October, Charles denounced him to the Emperor
as guilty of treason, and of having projected the assassination
of his own mother. Napoleon caught eagerly at this pretext for
interfering in the domestic policy of Spain, and thus the honour
and independence of a great people were placed in jeopardy by the
squabbles of two of the most worthless persons in the nation.
Some short time before this, Godoy, either instigated by an
ambition to found a dynasty, or fearing that the death of the king
would expose him to the vengeance of Ferdinand, had made proposals
to the French court to concert a plan for the conquest and division
of Portugal, promising the assistance of Spain, on condition that
a principality for himself should be set apart from the spoil.
At least such is the turn given by Napoleon to this affair; but
the article which provided an indemnification for the king of
Etruria a minor, who had just been obliged to surrender his Italian
dominions to France, renders it very doubtful if the first offer
came from Godoy. That, however, is a point of small interest,
for Napoleon eagerly adopted the project if he did not propose
it; and the advantages were all on his side. Under the pretext
of supporting his army in Portugal, he might fill Spain with his
troops; the dispute between the father and the son, now referred to
his arbitration, placed the golden apples within his reach, and he
resolved to gather the fruit if he had not planted the tree.
A secret treaty was immediately concluded at Fontainebleau, between
marshal Duroc on the part of France, and Eugenio Izquerdo on the
part of Spain. This treaty, together with a convention dependant
on it, was signed the 27th, and ratified by Napoleon on the 29th
of October; the contracting parties agreeing to the following
conditions.
The house of Braganza to be driven forth of Portugal, and that
kingdom divided into three portions, of which the province of Entre
Minho e Duero and the town of Oporto, forming one, was to be given
as an indemnification to the dispossessed king of Etruria, and to
be called the kingdom of North Lusitania.
The Alemtejo and the Algarves to be erected into a principality for
Godoy, who taking the title of prince of the Algarves, was still to
be in some respects dependant upon the Spanish crown.
The central provinces of Estremadura, Beira, and the Tras os
Montes, together with the town of Lisbon, to be held in deposit
until a general peace, and then to be exchanged under certain
conditions for English conquests.
The ultra-marine dominions of the exiled family to be equally
divided between the contracting parties, and in three years at
the longest, the king of Spain to be gratified with the title of
Emperor of the Two Americas. Thus much for the treaty. The terms of
the convention were:
That France should employ 25,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. Spain
24,000 infantry, 30 guns, and 3,000 cavalry.
The French contingent to be joined at Alcantara by the Spanish
cavalry, artillery, and one-third of the infantry, and from thence
to march at once to Lisbon. Of the remaining Spanish infantry
10,000 were to take possession of the Entre Minho e Duero and
Oporto, and 6,000 were to invade Estremadura and the Algarves.
In the mean time a reserve of 40,000 men was to be assembled at
Bayonne, ready to take the field by the 20th of November, if
England should interfere, or the Portuguese people resist.
If the king of Spain or any of his family joined the troops, the
chief command was to be vested in the person so joining, but with
that exception, the French general was to be obeyed whenever the
armies of the two nations came into contact, and during the march
through Spain the French soldiers were to be fed by that country,
but paid by their own government.
The revenues of the conquered provinces were to be administered
by the general actually in possession, and for the benefit of the
nation in whose name the province was held.
Although it is evident that this treaty and convention favoured
Napoleon’s ulterior operations in Spain, by enabling him to mask
his views, and introduce large bodies of men into that country
without creating much suspicion of his real intention; it does not
follow, as some authors have asserted, that they were contrived by
the emperor for the sole purpose of rendering the Spanish royal
family odious to the world, and by this far-fetched expedient to
prevent other nations from taking an interest in their fate when he
should find it convenient to apply the same measure of injustice to
his associates that they had accorded to the family of Braganza.
[Sidenote: Voice from St. Helena, vol. ii.]
To say nothing of the weakness of such a policy, founded as it
must be on the error that governments acknowledge the dictates of
justice at the expense of their supposed interests; it must be
observed that Portugal was intrinsically a great object. History
does not speak of the time when the inhabitants of that country
were deficient in spirit; the natural obstacles to an invasion had
more than once frustrated the efforts of large armies, and the long
line of communication between Bayonne and the Portuguese frontier
could only be supported by Spanish co-operation. Add to this, the
facility with which England could, and the probability that she
would, succour her ancient ally, and the reasonable conclusion
is, that Napoleon’s first intentions were in accordance with the
literal meaning of the treaty of Fontainebleau, and that his
subsequent proceedings were the result of new projects conceived as
the wondrous imbecility of the Spanish Bourbons became manifest.
Again, the convention provided for the organization of a large
Spanish force, to be stationed in the north and south of Portugal,
that is, in precisely the two places from whence they could most
readily march to the assistance of their country, if it was
invaded; and in fact the division of the marquis of Solano in the
south, and that of general Taranco in the north of Portugal, did
afterwards (when the Spanish insurrection broke out) form the
strength of the Andalusian and Gallician armies, the former of
which gained the victory at Baylen, while the latter contended for
it, although ineffectually, at Rio Seco.
The French force destined to invade Portugal was already assembled
at Bayonne, under the title of the first army of the Garonne. It
was commanded by general Junot, a young man of a bold ambitious
disposition, but of greater reputation for military talent than he
was able to support. The men were principally conscripts, and ill
fitted to endure the hardships which awaited them.
[Sidenote: Thiebault, Exp. du Portugal.]
At first, by easy marches and in small divisions, Junot led his
army through Spain; the inhabitants were by no means friendly
to their guests; but whether from any latent fear of what was
to follow, or from a dislike of foreign soldiers common to all
secluded people, does not clearly appear. When the head of the
columns reached Salamanca, Junot halted, intending to complete the
organization of his troops in that rich country, and there to await
the most favourable moment for penetrating the sterile frontier
which guarded his destined prey; but political events marched
faster than his calculations, and fresh instructions from the
emperor prescribed an immediate advance upon Lisbon. Junot obeyed,
and the family of Braganza, at his approach, fled to the Brazils.
The series of interesting transactions which attended this invasion
will be treated of hereafter; at present I must return to Spain
already bending to the first gusts of that hurricane, which was
soon to sweep over her with such destructive violence.
[Sidenote: Nellerto.]
[Sidenote: Historia de la Guerra contra Nap.]
The accusation of treason and intended parricide, preferred by
Charles IV. against his son Ferdinand, gave rise to some judicial
proceedings which ended in the submission of the latter; and
Ferdinand being absolved of the imputed crime, wrote a letter to
his father and mother, acknowledging his own faults, but accusing
the persons who surrounded him of being the instigators of deeds
which he abhorred. The intrigues of his advisers, however,
continued, and the plans of Napoleon advanced as a necessary
consequence of the divisions in the Spanish court.
[Sidenote: Return of the French army. Appendix.]
[Sidenote: Journal of Dupont’s Operations MSS.]
By the terms of the convention of Fontainebleau, forty thousand men
were to be held in reserve at Bayonne; but a greater number were
assembled on different points of the frontier; and in the course
of December, two corps had entered the Spanish territory, and were
quartered in Vittoria, Miranda, Briviesca, and the neighbourhood.
The one, commanded by general Dupont, was called the second army
of observation of the “Gironde.” The other, commanded by marshal
Moncey, took the title of the army of observation of the “Côte
d’Ocean.” In the gross they amounted to fifty-three thousand men,
of which above forty thousand were fit for duty; and in the course
of the month of December, Dupont advanced to Valladolid, while a
reinforcement for Junot, four thousand seven hundred in number,
took up their quarters at Salamanca.
[Sidenote: Notes of Napoleon. Appendix, No. 2.]
It thus appeared as if the French troops were quietly following the
natural line of communication between France and Portugal; but in
reality Dupont’s position cut off the capital from all intercourse
with the northern provinces, while Moncey secured the direct road
from Bayonne to Madrid. Small divisions under different pretexts
continually reinforced these two bodies, and through the Eastern
Pyrenees twelve thousand men, commanded by general Duhesme,
penetrated into Catalonia, and established themselves in Barcelona.
In the mean time the dispute between the king and his son, or
rather between the Prince of the Peace and the advisers of
Ferdinand, was brought to a crisis by insurrections at Aranjuez
and Madrid, which took place upon the 17th, 18th, and 19th of
March, 1808. The old king, deceived by intrigues, or frightened at
the difficulties which surrounded him, had determined, as it is
supposed by some, to quit Spain, and, in imitation of his brother
of Portugal, to retire from the turmoil of European politics, and
take refuge in his American dominions. Certain it is that every
thing was prepared for a flight to Seville, when the prince’s
grooms commenced a tumult, in which the populace of Aranjuez
joined, and were only pacified by the assurance that no journey was
in contemplation.
Upon the 18th the people of Madrid, following the example of
Aranjuez, sacked the house of the obnoxious favourite, Manuel
Godoy. Upon the 19th the riots recommenced in Aranjuez: the Prince
of the Peace secreted himself from the fury of the mob; but his
retreat being discovered, he was maltreated, and on the point of
being killed, when the soldiers of the royal guard rescued him.
Upon the 18th Charles IV., terrified by the violent proceedings of
his subjects, abdicated. This event was proclaimed at Madrid on
the 20th, and Ferdinand was declared king, to the great joy of the
nation at large: little did the people know what they rejoiced at,
time has since taught them that the fable of the frogs and their
monarch had its meaning.
During these transactions, Murat, grand duke of Berg, who had
taken the command of all the French troops in Spain, quitted his
quarters at Aranda de Duero, passed the Somosierra, and entered
Madrid the 23d, with Moncey’s corps and a fine body of cavalry,
Dupont at the same time deviating from the road to Portugal,
crossed the Duero and occupied Segovia, the Escurial, and Aranjuez.
[Sidenote: Napoleon in Las Casas.]
Ferdinand arrived at Madrid on the 24th, but was not recognised by
Murat as king; nevertheless, at the demand of that powerful guest,
he surrendered the sword of Francis I., which was delivered with
much ceremony to the French general. Charles, who had sent a paper
to Murat, declaring that his abdication had been the result of
force, wrote also to Napoleon in the same strain; and this state
of affairs being unexpected by the emperor, he employed general
Savary to conduct his plans, which appear to have been considerably
deranged by the vehemence of the people, and the precipitation of
Murat in taking possession of the capital.
Before Savary’s arrival, don Carlos the brother of Ferdinand,
departed from Madrid hoping to meet the emperor Napoleon, whose
presence in that city was confidently expected; and upon the 10th
of April, Ferdinand, having first appointed a supreme junta, of
which his uncle, don Antonio, was president, and Murat a member,
commenced his own remarkable journey to Bayonne, the true causes of
which certainly have not yet been developed; and perhaps when they
shall be known, some petty personal intrigue may be found to have
had a greater share in producing it, than the grand machinations
attributed to Napoleon, who could not have anticipated, much less
have calculated, a great political measure upon such a surprising
example of weakness.
The people everywhere manifested their repugnance to this journey;
at Vittoria they cut the traces of Ferdinand’s carriage, and at
different times several gallant men offered, at the risk of their
lives, to carry him off, in defiance of the French troops quartered
along the road. But Ferdinand, unmoved by their entreaties and
zeal, and regardless of the warning contained in a letter that he
received at this period from Napoleon (who, withholding the title
of majesty, sharply reproved him for his past conduct, and scarcely
expressed a wish to meet him), continued his progress, and on the
20th of April, 1808, found himself a prisoner in Bayonne. In the
mean time Charles, who, under the protection of Murat, had resumed
his rights, and obtained the liberty of Godoy, quitted Spain, and
also threw himself, his cause, and kingdom, into the hands of the
emperor.
These events were in themselves quite enough to urge a more
cautious people than the Spaniards into action; but other measures
had been pursued, which proved beyond the possibility of doubt,
that the country was destined to be the spoil of the French.
The troops of that nation had been admitted without reserve or
precaution into the different fortresses upon the Spanish frontier,
and, taking advantage of this hospitality to forward the views of
their chief, they got possession, by various artifices, of the
citadels of St. Sebastian in Guipuscoa, of Pampeluna in Navarre,
and of that of Figueras, and the forts of Monjuik, and citadel of
Barcelona in Catalonia; and thus, under the pretence of mediating
between the father and the son, in a time of profound peace, a
foreign force was suddenly established in the capital--on the
communications--and in the principal frontier fortresses; its
chief was admitted to a share of the government, and a fiery,
proud, and jealous nation was laid prostrate at the feet of a
stranger, without a blow being struck, without one warning voice
being raised, without a suspicion being excited in sufficient time
to guard against those acts, upon which all were gazing in stupid
amazement.
It is idle to attribute this surprising event to the subtlety of
Napoleon’s policy, to the depth of his deceit, or to the treachery
of Godoy. Such a fatal calamity could only be the result of bad
government, and a consequent degradation of public feeling; and
it matters but little to those who wish to derive a lesson from
experience, whether it be a Godoy or a Savary that strikes the
last bargain of corruption, the silly father or the rebellious son
that signs the final act of degradation and infamy. Fortunately,
it is easier to oppress the people of all countries, than to
destroy their generous feelings; when all patriotism is lost among
the upper classes, it may still be found among the lower. In the
Peninsula it was not found, but started into life, and with a
fervour and energy that ennobled even the wild and savage form in
which it appeared; nor was it the less admirable that it burst
forth attended by many evils. The good feeling displayed was the
people’s own; their cruelty, folly, and perverseness, were the
effects of bad government.
There are many reasons why Napoleon should have meddled with the
interior affairs of Spain; there seems to be no good one for his
manner of doing it. It is true that the Spanish Bourbons could
never have been sincere friends to France while Buonaparte held
the sceptre, and the moment that the fear of his power ceased to
operate, it was quite certain that their apparent friendship would
change to active hostility; the proclamation issued by the Spanish
cabinet just before the battle of Jena, is evidence of this
feeling; but if the Bourbons were his enemies, it did not follow
that the people sympathised with their rulers. The resources of the
country were, it is said, already at his disposal; but that availed
him little, as the corruption and weakness of the administration
had reduced those resources to the lowest ebb. His great error
was, that he looked only to the court, and treated the nation with
contempt. Had Napoleon taken care to bring the people and their
government into hostile contact first,--and how many points of
contact would not such a government have afforded!--instead of
appearing as the treacherous arbitrator in a domestic quarrel, he
would have been hailed as the deliverer of a great people.
[Sidenote: Journal of Dupont’s Operations. MSS.]
The journey of Ferdinand, the liberation of Godoy, and the flight
of Charles, the appointing Murat to be a member of the governing
Junta, and the movements of the French troops, who were advancing
from all parts towards Madrid, roused the indignation of the
Spanish people; tumults and assassinations had taken place in
various parts; and at Toledo a serious riot occurred on the 23d
of April; the peasants joined the inhabitants of the town, and it
was only by the advance of a division of infantry and some cavalry
of Dupont’s corps (then quartered at Aranjuez) that order was
restored. The agitation of the public mind, however, increased, the
French troops were all young men, or rather boys, taken from the
last conscription, and disciplined after they had entered Spain,
their youth and apparent feebleness excited the contempt of the
Spaniards, who pride themselves much upon individual prowess; and
the swelling indignation at last broke out.
[Sidenote: Memoir of Azanza and O’Farril.]
Upon the 2d of May, a carriage being prepared (as the people
supposed) to convey don Antonio, the uncle of Ferdinand, to
France, a crowd collected about it, and their language indicated
a determination not to permit the last of the royal family to
be spirited away: the traces of the carriage were cut, and loud
imprecations against the French burst forth on every side. At that
moment, colonel La Grange, an aide-de-camp of Murat’s, appearing
amongst them, was assailed and maltreated; in an instant the
whole city was in commotion, and the French soldiers expecting no
violence, were taken unawares and killed in every quarter: above
seven hundred fell. The hospital was attacked by the populace; but
the attendants and the sick beat them off; and the alarm having
spread to the camp outside the town, the French cavalry came to the
assistance of their countrymen by the gate of Alcala; while general
Lanfranc, with a column of three thousand infantry, descending from
the heights on the north-west quarter, entered the Calle Ancha de
Bernardo. As this column crossed the street of Maravelles, in which
the arsenal was situated, two Spanish officers, named Daois and
Velarde, who were in a state of great excitement, discharged some
guns upon the passing troops, and were immediately put to death
by the voltigeurs; meanwhile, the column, continuing its march,
released, as it advanced, several superior French officers, who
were in a manner besieged in the houses by the mob. The cavalry at
the other end of the town, treating the affair as a tumult, and not
as an action, made some hundred prisoners; and by the exertions
of marshal Moncey, general Harispe, Gonzalvo O’Farril, and some
others, order was soon restored.
After night-fall, the peasantry of the neighbourhood came armed and
in considerable numbers towards the city, and the French guards at
the different gates firing upon them, killed twenty or thirty, and
wounded others, some few were also crushed to death or lamed by the
cavalry in the morning.
In the first moment of irritation, Murat ordered all the prisoners
to be tried by a military commission, which condemned them to
death; but the municipality interfered, and represented to that
prince the extreme cruelty of visiting this angry ebullition of
an injured and insulted people with such severity. Murat admitted
the weight of their arguments, and forbade any executions on the
sentence; but it is said that general Grouchy, in whose immediate
power the prisoners remained, exclaiming that his own life had been
attempted! that the blood of the French soldiers was not to be
spilt with impunity! and that the prisoners having been condemned
by a council of war, ought and should be executed! proceeded to
shoot them in the Prado; and forty were thus slain before Murat
could cause his orders to be effectually obeyed. The next day
some of the Spanish authorities having discovered that a colonel
commanding the imperial guards still retained a number of prisoners
in the barracks, applied to the duke of Berg to have them released.
Murat consented to have those prisoners also enlarged: but the
colonel getting intelligence of what was passing, and being enraged
at the loss of so many choice soldiers, put forty-five of the
captives to death before the order could arrive to stay his bloody
proceedings[4].
Such were nearly the circumstances that attended this celebrated
tumult, in which the wild cry of Spanish warfare was first heard;
but as many authors, adopting without hesitation all the reports of
the day, have represented it sometimes as a wanton and extensive
massacre on the part of the French, at another as a barbarous
political stroke to impress a dread of their power, I think it
necessary to make the following observations.
[Sidenote: Manifesto of the council of Castile. Page 28.]
[Sidenote: Surgical Campaigns of Baron Larrey.]
That it was commenced by the Spaniards is undoubted: their fiery
tempers, the irritation produced by passing events, and the habits
of violence which they had acquired by their late successful
insurrection against Godoy, rendered an explosion inevitable. But
if the French had secretly stimulated this disposition, and had
prepared in cold blood to make a terrible example, undoubtedly
they would have prepared some check on the Spanish soldiers of
the garrison, and they would scarcely have left their hospital
unguarded; still less have arranged the plan so that their own
loss should far exceed that of the Spaniards; and surely nothing
would have induced them to relinquish the profit of such policy
after having suffered all the injury. Yet marshal Moncey and
general Harispe were actively engaged in restoring order; and it is
certain that, including the peasants shot outside the gates, the
executions on the Prado and in the barracks of the imperial guards,
the whole number of Spaniards slain did not amount to one hundred
and twenty persons, while more than seven hundred French fell. Of
the imperial guards seventy men were wounded, and this fact alone
would suffice to prove that there was no premeditation on the part
of Murat; for if he was base enough to sacrifice his own men with
such unconcern, he would not have exposed the select soldiers of
the French empire in preference to the conscripts who abounded in
his army. The affair itself was certainly accidental, and not very
bloody for the patriots, but policy induced both sides to attribute
secret motives, and to exaggerate the slaughter. The Spaniards
in the provinces, impressed with an opinion of French atrocity,
were thereby excited to insurrection on the one hand; and, on the
other, the French, well aware that such an impression could not
be effaced by an accurate relation of what did happen, seized the
occasion to convey a terrible idea of their power and severity;
but, while it is the part of history to reduce such amplifications,
it is impossible to remain unmoved in recording the gallantry and
devotion of a populace that could thus dare to assail the force
commanded by Murat, rather than abandon one of their princes; such,
however, was the character of the lower classes of Spain throughout
this war; fierce, confident, and prone to sudden and rash actions,
they had an intuitive perception of all that was great and noble,
but were miserably weak in execution.
The commotion of the 2d of May was the forerunner of insurrections
in every part of Spain, few of which were so honourable to the
actors as that of Madrid. Unprincipled villains hailed this
opportunity of directing the passions of the multitude, and, under
the mask of patriotism, turned the unthinking fury of the people
against whoever it pleased them to rob or to destroy: pillage,
massacres, assassinations, cruelties of the most revolting kind
were everywhere perpetrated; and the intrinsic goodness of the
cause was disfigured by the enormities committed at Cadiz, Seville,
Badajos, and other places, but chiefly at Valencia, pre-eminent in
barbarity at a moment when all were barbarous! The first burst
of popular feeling being thus misdirected, and the energy of the
people wasted in assassinations; lassitude and fear succeeded to
the insolence of tumult at the approach of real danger; for it
is one thing to shine in the work of butchery, and another to
establish that discipline which can alone sustain the courage of
the multitude in the hour of trial.
To cover the suspicious measure of introducing more troops than
the terms of the convention warranted, a variety of reports
relative to the ultimate intentions of the French emperor had been
propagated: at one time Gibraltar was to be besieged, and officers
were despatched to examine the Mediterranean coasts of Spain
and Barbary; at another, Portugal was to become the theatre of
great events, and a mysterious importance was attached to all the
movements of the French armies, with a view to deceive a court that
fear and sloth disposed to the belief of any thing but the truth,
and to impose upon a people whose unsuspicious ignorance was at
first mistaken for tameness.
In the mean time, active agents were employed to form a French
party at the capital; but as the insurrections of Aranjuez and
Madrid discovered the fierceness of the Spanish character, Napoleon
enjoined more caution and prudence upon his lieutenants than the
latter were disposed to practise. In fact, Murat’s precipitation
was the cause of hastening the discovery of his master’s real views
before they were ripe for execution; for Dupont’s first division
and cavalry crossed the Duero as early as the 14th of March, and
upon the 10th of April occupied Aranjuez, while his second and
third divisions took post at the Escurial and at Segovia; thus
encircling the capital while Moncey’s corps occupied it. Hence an
intention to control the provincial government left by Ferdinand
became manifest, and the riot at Toledo, although promptly quelled
by the interference of the French troops, indicated the state of
the public mind before the explosion at Madrid had placed the
parties in a state of direct hostility.
Murat seems to have been intrusted with only a half confidence,
and as his natural impetuosity urged him to play a rash rather
than a timid part, he appeared with the air of a conqueror before
a ground of quarrel was laid; not that he acted entirely without
grounds, for a letter addressed to him about this time by Napoleon,
contained the following instructions: “_The duke of Infantado has
a party in Madrid; they will attack you; dissipate them, and seize
the government._” But Murat’s policy, as his after life proved, was
too coarse and open for such difficult affairs.
At Bayonne the political events kept pace with those of Madrid.
Charles IV. having reclaimed his rights in presence of Napoleon,
sent orders to the infant, don Antonio, to resign his office, the
presidency of the governing junta, to Murat, who, at the same time,
received the title of lieutenant-general of the kingdom: this
appointment, and the restoration of Charles to the regal dignity,
were proclaimed in Madrid, with the acquiescence of the council of
Castile, on the 10th of May; but five days previous to that period,
the old monarch had again resigned his sceptre into the hands of
Napoleon, and Ferdinand and himself were consigned, with large
pensions, to the tranquillity of private life.
The throne of Spain being now vacant, the right to fill it was
assumed by the French emperor, in virtue of the cession made by
Charles IV. He desired that a king might be chosen from his own
family, and after some hesitation upon the part of the council of
Castile, that body, in concert with the municipality of Madrid, and
the governing junta, declared that their choice had fallen upon
Joseph Buonaparte, at that time king of Naples. Cardinal Bourbon,
primate of Spain, first cousin of Charles IV., and archbishop of
Toledo, not only acceded to this arrangement, but actually wrote
to Napoleon a letter testifying his adhesion to the new order of
things.
As it was easy to foretel the result of the election, the king of
Naples was already journeying towards Bayonne, and arrived there
on the 7th of June. The principal men of Spain were also invited
to meet in that town upon the 15th, with a view to obtain their
assent to a constitution prepared by Napoleon. At this meeting,
called “the Assembly of Notables,” ninety-one Spaniards of eminence
appeared, and, first accepting Joseph as their king, proceeded to
discuss the constitution in detail, and after several sittings
adopted it, and swore to maintain its provisions. Thus finished the
first part of this eventful drama.
The new constitution was calculated to draw forth the resources
of Spain: compared to the old system it was a blessing, and it
would have been received as such under different circumstances;
but now arms were to decide its fate, for in every province of
Spain the cry of war had been raised. In Catalonia, in Valencia, in
Andalusia, Estremadura, Gallicia, and the Asturias, the people were
gathering, and fiercely declaring their determination to resist
French intrusion.
But Joseph, apparently contented with the acquiescence of the
ninety-one notables, and trusting to the powerful support of
his brother, crossed the frontier on the 9th of July; and on
the 12th arrived at Vittoria. The inhabitants still nourishing
the discontent caused by Ferdinand’s journey to Bayonne, seemed
disposed to hinder Joseph’s entrance; but their opposition did not
break out into actual violence, and the next morning he continued
his progress by Miranda del Ebro, Breviesca, Burgos, and Buitrago.
The 20th of July he entered Madrid, and upon the 24th he was
proclaimed king of Spain and the Indies, with all the solemnities
usual upon such occasions; not hesitating to declare himself
the enemy of eleven millions of people, the object of a whole
nation’s hatred; calling, with a strange accent, from the midst
of foreign bands, upon that fierce and haughty race, to accept of
a constitution which they did not understand, and which few of
them had ever heard of; his only hope of success resting on the
strength of his brother’s arms; his claims upon the consent of an
imbecile monarch, and the weakness of a few pusillanimous nobles,
in contempt of the rights of millions now arming to oppose him.
This was the unhallowed part of the enterprise; this it was that
rendered his offered constitution odious, covered it with a leprous
skin, and drove the noble-minded far from the pollution of its
touch!