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HISTORY
OF THE
WAR IN THE PENINSULA
AND IN THE
SOUTH OF FRANCE,
FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814.
BY
W. F. P. NAPIER, C. B.
LT. COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT.
VOL. I.
LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE-STREET.
MDCCCXXVIII.
TO
FIELD-MARSHAL
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.
This History I dedicate to your Grace, because I have served long
enough under your command to feel, why the Soldiers of the Tenth
Legion were attached to Cæsar.
W. F. P. NAPIER.
PREFACE.
For six years the Peninsula was devastated by the war of
independence. The blood of France, Germany, England, Portugal, and
Spain, was shed in the contest; and in each of those countries,
authors, desirous of recording the sufferings, or celebrating the
valour of their countrymen, have written largely touching that
fierce struggle. It may therefore happen that some will demand, why
I should again relate “a thrice-told tale?” I answer, that two men
observing the same object, will describe it diversely, following
the point of view from which either beholds it. That which in the
eyes of one is a fair prospect, to the other shall appear a barren
waste, and yet neither may see aright! Wherefore, truth being the
legitimate object of history, I hold it better that she should be
sought for by many than by few, lest, for want of seekers, amongst
the mists of prejudice and the false lights of interest, she be
lost altogether.
That much injustice has been done, and much justice left undone,
by those authors who have hitherto written concerning this war, I
can assert from personal knowledge of the facts. That I have been
able to remedy this without falling into similar errors, is more
than I will venture to assume; but I have endeavoured to render
as impartial an account of the campaigns in the Peninsula as the
feelings which must warp the judgment of a contemporary historian
will permit.
I was an eye-witness to many of the transactions that I relate; and
a wide acquaintance with military men has enabled me to consult
distinguished officers, both French and English, and to correct
my own recollections and opinions by their superior knowledge.
Thus assisted, I was encouraged to undertake the work, and I offer
it to the world with the less fear because it contains original
documents, which will suffice to give it interest, although it
should have no other merit. Many of those documents I owe to the
liberality of marshal Soult, who, disdaining national prejudices,
with the confidence of a great mind, placed them at my disposal,
without even a remark to check the freedom of my pen. I take this
opportunity to declare that respect which I believe every British
officer who has had the honour to serve against him feels for his
military talents. By those talents the French cause in Spain was
long upheld, and after the battle of Salamanca, if his counsel had
been followed by the intrusive monarch, the fate of the war might
have been changed.
Military operations are so dependent upon accidental circumstances,
that to justify censure it should always be shown that an
unsuccessful general has violated the received maxims and
established principles of war. By that rule I have been guided; but
to preserve the narratives unbroken, my own observations are placed
at the end of certain transactions of magnitude, where their real
source being known they will pass for as much as they are worth,
and no more: when they are not well supported by argument, I freely
surrender them to the judgment of abler men.
Of those transactions which, commencing with “the secret treaty of
Fontainebleau” ended with “the Assembly of Notables” at Bayonne,
little is known except through the exculpatory and contradictory
publications of men interested to conceal the truth; and to me it
appears that the passions of the present generation must subside,
and the ultimate fate of Spain be known, before that part of the
subject can be justly and usefully handled. I have, therefore,
related no more of those political affairs than would suffice to
introduce the military events that followed, neither have I treated
largely of the disjointed and ineffectual operations of the native
armies; for I cared not to swell my work with apocryphal matter,
and neglected the thousand narrow winding currents of Spanish
warfare; to follow that mighty stream of battle which, bearing the
glory of England in its course, burst the barriers of the Pyrenees,
and left deep traces of its fury in the soil of France.
The Spaniards have boldly asserted, and the world has believed,
that the deliverance of the Peninsula was the work of their hands:
this assertion so contrary to the truth I combat. It is unjust to
the fame of the British general, injurious to the glory of the
British arms. Military virtue is not the growth of a day, nor is
there any nation so rich and populous, that, despising it, can rest
secure. The imbecility of Charles IV., the vileness of Ferdinand,
and the corruption of Godoy, were undoubtedly the proximate causes
of the calamities that overwhelmed Spain; but the primary cause,
that which belongs to history, was the despotism arising from the
union of a superstitious court and a sanguinary priesthood, which,
repressing knowledge and contracting the public mind, sapped the
foundation of all military as well as civil virtues, and prepared
the way for invasion. No foreign potentate would have attempted to
steal into the fortresses of a great kingdom, if the prying eyes,
and the thousand clamorous tongues belonging to a free press, were
ready to expose his projects, and a well-disciplined army present
to avenge the insult; but Spain being destitute of both, was
first circumvented by the wiles, and then ravaged by the arms, of
Napoleon. She was deceived and fettered because the public voice
was stifled, but she was scourged and torn because her military
institutions were decayed.
From the moment that an English force took the field, the Spaniards
ceased to act as principals in a contest carried on in the heart
of their country, and involving their existence as an independent
nation; they were self-sufficient, and their pride was wounded
by insult; they were superstitious, and their religious feelings
were roused to fanatic fury by an all-powerful clergy, who feared
to lose their own rich endowments; but after the first burst of
indignation the cause of independence created little enthusiasm.
Horrible barbarities were exercised on those French soldiers
that sickness or the fortune of war exposed to the rage of the
invaded, and a dreadful spirit of personal hatred was kept alive
by the exactions and severe retaliations of the invaders, but no
great and general exertion to drive the latter from the soil was
made, or at least none was sustained with steadfast courage in the
field. Manifestoes, decrees, and lofty boasts, like a cloud of
canvas covering a rotten hull, made a gallant appearance, but real
strength and firmness were nowhere to be found.
The Spanish insurrection presented indeed a strange spectacle;
patriotism was seen supporting a vile system of government; a
popular assembly working for the restoration of a despotic monarch;
the higher classes seeking a foreign master; the lower armed in
the cause of bigotry and misrule. The upstart leaders secretly
abhorring freedom, yet governing in her name, trembled at the
democratic activity they had themselves excited. They called forth
all the bad passions of the multitude, but repressed the patriotism
that would regenerate as well as save. The country suffered the
evils, without enjoying the benefits, of a revolution! Tumults and
assassinations terrified and disgusted the sensible part of the
community; a corrupt administration of the resources extinguished
patriotism, and neglect ruined the armies: the peasant-soldier,
usually flying at the first onset, threw away his arms and returned
to his home, or, attracted by the license of the _partidas_, joined
the banners of men who, for the most part originally robbers,
were as oppressive to the people as the enemy. The _guerilla_
chiefs would, in their turn, have been quickly exterminated, but
that the French, pressed by lord Wellington’s battalions, were
obliged to keep in large masses. This was the secret of Spanish
constancy! Copious supplies from England, and the valour of the
Anglo-Portuguese troops, these were the supports of the war! and
it was the gigantic vigour with which the duke of Wellington
resisted the fierceness of France, and sustained the weakness of
three inefficient cabinets, that delivered the Peninsula. Faults
he committed, and who in war has not? but his reputation stands
upon a sure foundation, a simple majestic structure, that envy
cannot undermine, nor the meretricious ornaments of party panegyric
deform. The exploits of his army were great in themselves, and
great in their consequences: abounding with signal examples of
heroic courage and devoted zeal, they should neither be disfigured
nor forgotten, being worthy of more fame than the world has yet
accorded them--worthy also of a better historian.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
BOOK I.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION _Page_ 1
CHAPTER II.
Dissensions in the Spanish court--Secret treaty and convention
of Fontainebleau--Junot’s army enters Spain--Dupont’s
and Moncey’s corps enter Spain--Duhesme’s corps enters
Catalonia--Insurrections of Aranjuez and Madrid--Charles the
fourth abdicates--Ferdinand proclaimed king--Murat marches to
Madrid--Refuses to recognise Ferdinand as king--The sword of
Francis the first delivered to the French general--Savary arrives
at Madrid--Ferdinand goes to Bayonne--Charles the fourth goes to
Bayonne--The fortresses of St. Sebastian, Figueras, Pampeluna,
and Barcelona, treacherously seized by the French--Riot at
Toledo, 23d April--Tumult at Madrid, 2d of May--Charles the
fourth abdicates a second time in favour of Napoleon--Assembly
of notables at Bayonne--Joseph Buonaparte declared king of
Spain--Arrives at Madrid. 12
CHAPTER III.
Council of Castile refuses to take the oath of
allegiance--Supreme junta established at Seville--Marquis
of Solano murdered at Cadiz, and the Conde d’Aguilar
at Seville--Intercourse between Castaños and sir Hew
Dalrymple--General Spencer and admiral Purvis offer to co-operate
with the Spaniards--Admiral Rossily’s squadron surrenders to
Morla--General insurrection--Massacre at Valencia--Horrible
murder of Filanghieri. 32
CHAPTER IV.
New French corps formed in Navarre--Duhesme fixes himself at
Barcelona--Importance of that city--Napoleon’s military plan and
arrangements. 45
CHAPTER V.
First operations of marshal Bessieres--Spaniards defeated at
Cabeçon, at Segovia, at Logroño, at Torquemada--French take St.
Ander--Lefebre Desnouettes defeats the Spaniards on the Ebro, on
the Huecha, on the Xalon--First siege of Zaragoza--Observations. 62
CHAPTER VI.
Operations in Catalonia--General Swartz marches against the
town of Manresa, and general Chabran against Taragona--French
defeated at Bruch--Chabran recalled--Burns Arbos--Marches
against Bruch--Retreats--Duhesme assaults Gerona--Is repulsed
with loss--Action on the Llobregat--General insurrection
of Catalonia--Figueras blockaded--General Reille relieves
it--First siege of Gerona--The marquis of Palacios arrives in
Catalonia with the Spanish troops from the Balearic isles,
declared captain-general under St. Narcissus, re-establishes
the line of the Llobregat--The count of Caldagues forces the
French lines at Gerona--Duhesme raises the siege and returns
to Barcelona--Observations--Moncey marches against Valencia,
defeats the Spaniards at Pajaso, at the Siete Aguas, and at
Quarte--Attacks Valencia, is repulsed, marches into Murcia,
forces the passage of the Xucar, defeats Serbelloni at San
Felippe, arrives at San Clemente--Insurrection at Cuenca,
quelled by general Caulincourt--Observations 74
CHAPTER VII.
Second operations of Bessieres--Blake’s and Cuesta’s armies unite
at Benevente--Generals disagree--Battle of Rio Seco--Bessieres’
endeavours to corrupt the Spanish generals fail--Bessieres
marches to invade Gallicia, is recalled, and falls back to
Burgos--Observations 101
CHAPTER VIII.
Dupont marches against Andalusia, forces the bridge of Alcolea,
takes Cordoba--Alarm at Seville--Castaños arrives, forms a new
army--Dupont retreats to Andujar, attacks the town of Jaen--Vedel
forces the pass of Despeñas Perros, arrives at Baylen--Spanish
army arrives on the Guadalquivir--General Gobert defeated and
killed--Generals Vedel and Darfour retire to Carolina--General
Reding takes possession of Baylen--Dupont retires from
Andujar--Battle of Baylen--Dupont’s capitulation, eighteen
thousand French troops lay down their arms--Observations--Joseph
holds a council of war, resolves to abandon Madrid--Impolicy of
so doing 112
BOOK II.
CHAPTER I.
The Asturian deputies received with enthusiasm in
England---Ministers precipitate--Imprudent choice of
agents--Junot marches to Alcantara, joined by the Spanish
contingent, enters Portugal, arrives at Abrantes, pushes on to
Lisbon--Prince regent emigrates to the Brazils, reflections
on that transaction--Dangerous position of the French
army--Portuguese council of regency--Spanish contingent well
received--General Taranco dies at Oporto, is succeeded by the
French general Quesnel--Solano’s troops retire to Badajos--Junot
takes possession of the Alemtejo and the Algarves; exacts
a forced loan; is created duke of Abrantes; suppresses the
council of regency; sends the flower of the Portuguese army to
France--Napoleon demands a ransom from Portugal--People unable
to pay it--Police of Lisbon--Junot’s military position; his
character; political position--People discontented--Prophetic
eggs--Sebastianists---The capture of Rossily’s squadron known
at Lisbon--Pope’s nuncio takes refuge on board the English
fleet--Alarm of the French 136
CHAPTER II.
Spanish general Belesta seizes general Quesnel and retires to
Gallicia--Insurrection at Oporto--Junot disarms and confines the
Spanish soldiers near Lisbon--General Avril’s column returns to
Estremos--General Loison marches from Almeida against Oporto; is
attacked at Mezam Frias; crosses the Douero; attacked at Castro
d’Año; recalled to Lisbon--French driven out of the Algarves--The
fort of Figueras taken--Abrantes and Elvas threatened--Setuval
in commotion--General Spencer appears off the Tagus--Junot’s
plan--Insurrection at Villa Viciosa suppressed--Colonel
Maransin takes Beja with great slaughter of the patriots--The
insurgents advance from Leria, fall back--Action at Leria--Loison
arrives at Abrantes--Observations on his march--French army
concentrated--The Portuguese general Leite, aided by a Spanish
corps, takes post at Evora--Loison crosses the Tagus; defeats
Leite’s advanced guard at Montemor--Battle of Evora--Town taken
and pillaged--Unfriendly conduct of the Spaniards--Loison reaches
Elvas; collects provisions; is recalled by Junot--Observations 155
CHAPTER III.
Political and military retrospect--Mr. Fox’s conduct contrasted
with that of his successors--General Spencer sent to the
Mediterranean--Sir John Moore withdrawn from thence; arrives in
England; sent to Sweden--Spencer arrives at Gibraltar--Ceuta,
the object of his expedition--Spanish insurrection diverts
his attention to Cadiz; wishes to occupy that city--Spaniards
averse to it--Prudent conduct of sir Hew Dalrymple and lord
Collingwood--Spencer sails to Ayamonte; returns to Cadiz; sails
to the mouth of the Tagus; returns to Cadiz--Prince Leopold of
Sicily and the duke of Orleans arrive at Gibraltar--Curious
intrigue--Army assembled at Cork by the whig administration,
with a view to permanent conquest in South America, the
only disposable British force--Sir A. Wellesley takes the
command--Contradictory instructions of the ministers--Sir John
Moore returns from Sweden; ordered to Portugal--Sir Hew Dalrymple
appointed commander of the forces--Confused arrangements made by
the ministers 169
CHAPTER IV.
Sir A. Wellesley quits his troops and proceeds to Coruña--Junta
refuse assistance in men, but ask for and obtain money--Sir
Arthur goes to Oporto; arranges a plan with the bishop; proceeds
to the Tagus; rejoins his troops; joined by Spencer; disembarks
at the Mondego; has an interview with general Freire d’Andrada;
marches to Leria--Portuguese insurrection weak--Junot’s position
and dispositions--Laborde marches to Alcobaça, Loison to
Abrantes--General Freire separates from the British--Junot quits
Lisbon with the reserve--Laborde takes post at Roriça--Action of
Roriça--Laborde retreats to Montachique--Sir A. Wellesley marches
to Vimiero--Junot concentrates his army at Torres Vedras 187
CHAPTER V.
Portuguese take Abrantes--Generals Ackland and Anstruther
land and join the British army at Vimiero--Sir Harry
Burrard arrives--Battle of Vimiero--Junot defeated--Sir Hew
Dalrymple arrives--Armistice--Terms of it--Junot returns to
Lisbon--Negotiates for a convention--Sir John Moore’s troops
land--State of the public mind in Lisbon--The Russian admiral
negotiates separately--Convention concluded--the Russian fleet
surrenders upon terms--Conduct of the people at Lisbon--The
Monteiro Mor requires sir Charles Cotton to interrupt the
execution of the convention--Sir John Hope appointed commandant
of Lisbon; represses all disorders--Disputes between the French
and English commissioners--Reflections thereupon 207
CHAPTER VI.
The bishop and junta of Oporto aim at the supreme power;
wish to establish the seat of government at Oporto; their
intrigues; strange proceedings of general Decken; reflections
thereupon--Clamour raised against the convention in England
and in Portugal; soon ceases in Portugal--The Spanish general
Galluzzo refuses to acknowledge the convention; invests fort
Lalippe; his proceedings absurd and unjustifiable--Sir John
Hope marches against him; he alters his conduct--Garrison of
Lalippe--March to Lisbon--Embarked--Garrison of Almeida; march
to Oporto; attacked and plundered by the Portuguese--Sir Hew
Dalrymple and sir Harry Burrard recalled to England--Vile conduct
of the daily press--Violence of public feeling--Convention,
improperly called, of Cintra--Observations--On the action of
Roriça--On the battle of Vimiero--On the convention 236
BOOK III.
CHAPTER I.
Comparison between the Portuguese and Spanish people--The general
opinion of French weakness and Spanish strength and energy,
fallacious--Contracted policy of the English cabinet--Account
of the civil and military agents employed--Many of them act
without judgment--Mischievous effects thereof--Operations of
the Spanish armies after the battle of Baylen--Murcian army
arrives at Madrid--Valencian army marches to the relief of
Zaragoza--General Verdier raises the siege--Castaños enters
Madrid--Contumacious conduct of Galluzzo--Disputes between
Blake and Cuesta--Dilatory conduct of the Spaniards--Sagacious
observation of Napoleon--Insurrection at Bilbao; quelled by
general Merlin--French corps approaches Zaragoza--Palafox
alarmed, threatens the council of Castille--Council of war held
at Madrid--Plan of operations--Castaños unable to march from want
of money--Bad conduct of the junta of Seville--Vigorous conduct
of major Cox--Want of arms--Extravagant project to procure them 269
CHAPTER II.
Internal political transactions--Factions in Gallicia,
Asturias, Leon, and Castile--Flagitious conduct of the junta
of Seville--Mr. Stuart endeavours to establish a northern
cortes--Activity of the council of Castile, proposes a supreme
government agreeable to the public--Local juntas become generally
odious--Cortes meet at Lugo, declare for a central and supreme
government--Deputies appointed--Clamours of the Gallician junta
and bishop of Orense--Increasing influence of the council
of Castile--Underhand proceedings of the junta of Seville,
disconcerted by the quickness of the Baily Valdez--Character
of Cuesta, he denies the legality of the northern cortes,
abandons the line of military operations, returns to Segovia,
arrests the Baily Valdez and other deputies from Lugo--Central
and supreme government established at Aranjuez, Florida Blanca
president--Vile intrigues of the local juntas--Cuesta removed
from the command of his army, ordered to Aranjuez--Popular
feeling in favour of the central junta, vain and interested
proceedings of that body, its timidity, inactivity, and folly,
refuses to name a generalissimo--Foreign relations--Mr. Canning
leaves Mr. Stuart without any instructions for three months--Mr.
Frere appointed envoy extraordinary, &c. 292
CHAPTER III.
Political position of Napoleon; he resolves to crush the
Spaniards; his energy and activity; marches his armies
from every part of Europe towards Spain; his oration to
his soldiers--Conference at Erfurth--Negotiations for
peace--Petulant conduct of Mr. Canning--160,000 conscripts
enrolled in France--Power of that country--Napoleon’s speech to
the senate--He repairs to Bayonne--Remissness of the English
cabinet--Sir John Moore appointed to lead an army into Spain;
sends his artillery by the Madrid road, and marches himself by
Almeida--The central junta impatient for the arrival of the
English army--Sir David Baird arrives at Coruña; is refused
permission to disembark his troops--Mr. Frere and the marquis
of Romana arrive at Coruña; account of the latter’s escape
from the Danish Isles--Central junta resolved not to appoint a
generalissimo--Gloomy aspect of affairs 315
CHAPTER IV.
Movements of the Spanish generals on the Ebro, their absurd
confidence, their want of system and concert--General opinion
that the French are weak--Real strength of the king--Marshal Ney
and general Jourdan join the army--Military errors of the king
exposed by Napoleon, who instructs him how to make war--Joseph
proposes six plans of operation--Observations thereupon 342
CHAPTER V.
Position and strength of the French and Spanish armies--Blake
moves from Reynosa to the Upper Ebro; sends a division to
Bilbao; French retire from that town--Ney quits his position
near Logroña, and retakes Bilbao--The armies of the centre and
right approach the Ebro and the Aragon--Various evolutions--Blake
attacks and takes Bilbao--Head of the grand French army arrives
in Spain--The Castilians join the army of the centre--The
Asturians join Blake--Apathy of the central junta--Castaños
joins the army; holds a conference with Palafox; their dangerous
position; arrange a plan of operations--The Spaniards cross the
Ebro--The king orders a general attack--Skirmish at Sanguessa,
at Logroño, and Lerim--The Spaniards driven back over the
Ebro--Logroño taken--Colonel Cruz, with a Spanish battalion,
surrenders at Lerim--Francisco Palafox, the military deputy,
arrives at Alfaro; his exceeding folly and presumption; controls
and insults Castaños--Force of the French army increases
hourly; how composed and disposed--Blake ascends the valley of
Durango--Battle of Zornosa--French retake Bilbao--Combat at
Valmaceda--Observations 361
BOOK IV.
CHAPTER I.
Napoleon arrives at Bayonne--Blake advances towards Bilbao--The
count Belvedere arrives at Burgos--The first and fourth corps
advance--Combat of Guenes--Blake retreats--Napoleon at Vittoria;
his plan--Soult takes the command of the second corps--Battle
of Gamonal--Burgos taken--Battle of Espinosa--Flight from
Reynosa--Soult overruns the Montagna de St. Ander, and
scours Leon--Napoleon fixes his head-quarters at Burgos,
changes his front, lets 10,000 cavalry loose upon Castile and
Leon--Marshals Lasnes and Ney directed against Castaños--Folly
of the central junta--General St. Juan occupies the pass of the
Somosierra--Folly of the generals on the Ebro--Battle of Tudela 385
CHAPTER II.
Napoleon marches against the capital; forces the pass of
the Somosierra--St. Juan murdered by his men--Tumults in
Madrid--French army arrives there; the Retiro stormed--Town
capitulates--Remains of Castaños’s army driven across the Tagus;
retire to Cuenca--Napoleon explains his policy to the nobles,
clergy, and tribunals of Madrid--His vast plans, enormous
force--Defenceless state of Spain 407
CHAPTER III.
Sir John Moore arrives at Salamanca; hears of the battle of
Espinosa--His dangerous position; discovers the real state of
affairs; contemplates a hardy enterprise; hears of the defeat
at Tudela; resolves to retreat; waits for general Hope’s
division--Danger of that general; his able conduct--Central junta
fly to Badajos--Mr. Frere, incapable of judging rightly, opposes
the retreat; his weakness and levity; insults the general; sends
colonel Charmilly to Salamanca--Manly conduct of sir John Moore;
his able and bold plan of operations 425
CHAPTER IV.
British army advances towards Burgos--French outposts surprised
at Rueda--Letter from Berthier to Soult intercepted--Direction
of the march changed--Mr. Stuart and a member of the junta
arrive at head-quarters--Arrogant and insulting letter of Mr.
Frere--Noble answer of sir John Moore--British army united at
Majorga; their force and composition--Inconsistent conduct of
Romana; his character--Soult’s position and forces; concentrates
his army at Carrion--Combat of cavalry at Sahagun--The British
army retires to Benevente--The emperor moves from Madrid, passes
the Guadarama, arrives at Tordesillas, expects to interrupt
the British line of retreat, fails--Bridge of Castro Gonzalo
destroyed--Combat of cavalry at Benevente--General Lefebre
taken--Soult forces the bridge of Mansilla, takes Leon--The
emperor unites his army at Astorga; hears of the Austrian war;
orders marshal Soult to pursue the English army, and returns to
France 450
CHAPTER V.
Sir John Moore retreats towards Vigo; is closely
pursued--Miserable scene at Bembibre--Excesses at Villa
Franca--Combat at Calcabellos--Death of general Colbert--March
to Nogales--Line of retreat changed from Vigo to Coruña--Skilful
passage of the bridge of Constantino; skirmish there--The army
halts at Lugo--Sir John Moore offers battle; it is not accepted;
he makes a forced march to Betanzos; loses many stragglers;
rallies the army; reaches Coruña--The army takes a position; two
large stores of powder exploded--Fleet arrives in the harbour;
army commences embarking--Battle of Coruña--Death of sir John
Moore--His character 473
CHAPTER VI.
Observations--The conduct of Napoleon and that of the English
cabinet compared--The emperor’s military dispositions
examined--Propriety of sir John Moore’s operations
discussed--Diagram, exposing the relative positions of Spanish,
French, and English armies--Propriety of sir John Moore’s retreat
discussed, and the question whether he should have fallen back
on Portugal or Gallicia investigated--Sir John Moore’s judgment
defended; his conduct calumniated by interested men for party
purposes--Eulogised by marshal Soult, by Napoleon, by the duke of
Wellington 502
APPENDIX.
No.
1. Observations on Spanish affairs by Napoleon _Page_ i
2. Notes on Spanish affairs ditto v
3. Ditto ditto ditto xiii
4. Ditto ditto ditto xvii
5. Ditto ditto ditto xxiii
6. Plan of campaign by king Joseph xxvi
7. Five Sections, containing four letters from Berthier to
general Savary--One from marshal Berthier to king Joseph xxx
8. Four letters.--Mr. Drummond to sir A. Ball--Ditto to sir
Hew Dalrymple--Sir Hew Dalrymple to lord Castlereagh--Lord
Castlereagh to sir Hew Dalrymple xxxv
9. Two letters from sir Arthur Wellesley to sir Harry Burrard xxxvii
10. Articles of the convention for the evacuation of Portugal xlii
11. Three letters from brigadier-general Von Decken to sir Hew
Dalrymple xlvi
12. Two letters.--General Leite to sir Hew Dalrymple--Sir Hew
Dalrymple to lieutenant-general Hope li
13. Nine Sections, containing justificatory extracts from sir
John Moore’s correspondence.--Section 1st. Want of money--2d.
Relating to roads--3d. Relating to equipments and supplies--4th.
Relating to the want of information--5th. Relating to the conduct
of the local juntas--6th. Central junta--7th. Relating to the
passive state of the people--8th. Miscellaneous liii
14. Justificatory extracts from sir John Moore’s
correspondence lxviii
15. Despatch from the conde de Belvedere relative to the battle
of Gamonal lxxi
16. Extract of a letter from the duke of Dalmatia to the author ib.
17. Letters from Mr. Canning to Mr. Frere lxxii
18. Return of British troops embarked for Portugal and Spain lxxviii
19. Return of killed, &c. sir Arthur Wellesley’s army lxxix
20. British order of battle--Roriça ib.
21. British order of battle--Vimiero lxxx
22. Return of sir Hew Dalrymple’s army ib.
23. Embarkation return of the French under Junot lxxxi
24. Detail of troops--Extracted from a minute made by the duke
of York ib.
25. Order of battle--Sir John Moore’s army--Return of ditto
December 19th, 1808 lxxxii
26. Especial return of loss during sir John Moore’s campaign lxxxiii
27. States of the Spanish armies lxxxiv
28. Five sections, containing returns of the French armies in
Spain and Portugal lxxxvi
29. Three letters from lord Collingwood to sir Hew Dalrymple xc
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
_Explanatory Sketch_ of the BATTLE OF BAYLEN. 124
_SKETCH OF THE_ COMBAT OF RORIÇA. 203
_SKETCH OF THE_ BATTLE OF VIMIERO. 216
_Explanatory Sketch_ of the CAMPAIGN IN PORTUGAL 258
_Explanatory Sketch_ of the FRENCH & SPANISH POSITIONS 372
_Explanatory Sketch_ of BLAKE’S POSITION 382
_SKETCH OF THE_ BATTLE OF CORUÑA 498
_Plate VIII_ 516
NOTICE.
Of the manuscript authorities consulted for this history, those
marked with the letter S. the author owes to the kindness of
marshal Soult.
For the notes dictated by Napoleon, and the plans of campaign
sketched out by king Joseph, he is indebted to his grace the duke
of Wellington.
The returns of the French army were extracted from the original
half monthly statements presented by marshal Berthier to the
emperor Napoleon.
Of the other authorities it is unnecessary to say more than that
the author had access to the original papers, with the exception of
Dupont’s memoir, of which a copy only was obtained.
CORRIGENDA.
Page 92, line 27, _for_ Agnas, _read_ Aguas.
202, __ 30, __ Catlin’s, Craufurd’s, _read_ Catlin Craufurd’s.
214, __ 32, __ above ridge, _read_ ridge above.
215, __ 2, __ deep, _read_ steep.
256, __ 17, __ Alhambra, _read_ Alhandra.
274, __ 9, __ of the first class _to be erased:
it is an error_.
289, __ 27, __ tlme, _read_ time.
343, __ 7, __ Orma, _read_ Osma.
365, __ 16, __ Carella, _read_ Corella.
374, __ 1, __ Montejo, _read_ Montijo.
381, __ 9, __ were, _read_ was.
394, __ 11, __ Sahugan, _read_ Sahagun.
424, __ 30, __ wnose, _read_ whose.
425, __ 3, __ communications, _read_ communication.
428, __ 6, __ transports, _read_ transport.
426, __ 1, __ {one hundred thousand, _read_ one hundred and
{ seventy thousand.
464, __ 20, __ fine plain, _read_ plain.
468, __ 26, __ six guns, _read_ two guns.
481, __ 2, __ {who, having turned Villa Franca and scoured
{ the valley of the Syl, _read_ who, after
{ turning Villa Franca and scouring the valley
{ of the Syl.
483, __ 21, __ three or four hundred, _read_ three and four
hundred.
HISTORY
OF THE
PENINSULAR WAR.
BOOK I.
CHAPTER I.
[Sidenote: Introduction.]
The hostility of the European aristocracy caused the enthusiasm of
republican France to take a military direction, and forced that
powerful nation into a course of policy which, however outrageous
it might appear, was in reality one of necessity. Up to the treaty
of Tilsit, the wars of France were essentially defensive; for the
bloody contest that wasted the continent so many years was not a
struggle for pre-eminence between ambitious powers, not a dispute
for some accession of territory, nor for the political ascendancy
of one or other nation, but a deadly conflict to determine whether
aristocracy or democracy should predominate; whether equality
or privilege should henceforth be the principle of European
governments.
The French revolution was pushed into existence before the hour
of its natural birth. The power of the aristocratic principle was
too vigorous and too much identified with that of the monarchical
principle, to be successfully resisted by a virtuous democratic
effort, much less could it be overthrown by a democracy rioting in
innocent blood, and menacing destruction to political and religious
establishments, the growth of centuries, somewhat decayed indeed,
yet scarcely showing their grey hairs. The first military events
of the revolution, the disaffection of Toulon and Lyons, the civil
war of La Vendee, the feeble, although successful resistance made
to the duke of Brunswick’s invasion, and the frequent and violent
change of rulers whose fall none regretted, were all proofs
that the French revolution, intrinsically too feeble to sustain
the physical and moral force pressing it down, was fast sinking
when the wonderful genius of Buonaparte, baffling all reasonable
calculation, raised and fixed it on the basis of victory, the only
one capable of supporting the crude production.
Sensible, however, that the cause he upheld was not sufficiently
in unison with the feelings of the age, Napoleon’s first care
was to disarm or neutralize monarchical and sacerdotal enmity,
by restoring a church establishment, and by becoming a monarch
himself. Once a sovereign, his vigorous character, his pursuits,
his talents, and the critical nature of the times, inevitably
rendered him a despotic one; yet while he sacrificed political
liberty, which to the great bulk of mankind has never been more
than a pleasing sound, he cherished with the utmost care political
equality, a sensible good, that produces increasing satisfaction as
it descends in the scale of society; but this, the real principle
of his government, the secret of his popularity, made him the
people’s monarch, not the sovereign of the aristocracy; hence, Mr.
Pitt called him, “the child and the champion of democracy,” a truth
as evident as that Mr. Pitt and his successors were the children
and the champions of aristocracy; hence also the privileged
classes of Europe consistently transferred their natural and
implacable hatred of the French revolution to his person, for they
saw that in him innovation had found a protector; that he alone
had given pre-eminence to a system so hateful to them, and that he
really was what he called himself, “the State.”
The treaty of Tilsit, therefore, although it placed Napoleon in
a commanding situation with regard to the potentates of Europe,
unmasked the real nature of the war, and brought him and England,
the respective champions of equality and privilege, into more
direct contact; peace could not be between them while both were
strong, and all that the French emperor had hitherto gained only
enabled him to choose his future field of battle.
When the catastrophe of Trafalgar forbade him to think of invading
England, his fertile genius conceived the plan of sapping her naval
and commercial strength, by depriving her of the continental market
for her manufactured goods; he prohibited the reception of English
wares in any part of the continent, and he exacted from allies and
dependants the most rigid compliance with his orders; but this
“continental system,” as it was called, became inoperative when
French troops were not present to enforce his commands. It was thus
in Portugal, where British influence was really paramount, although
the terror inspired by the French arms seemed at times to render
this doubtful; fear however is momentary, self-interest lasting,
and Portugal was but an unguarded province of England.
[Sidenote: Monsieur de Champagny’s Report, 21st Oct. 1807.]
From Portugal and Gibraltar, English goods freely passed into
Spain; and to check this traffic by force was not easy, and
otherwise impossible. Spain stood nearly in the same position with
regard to France that Portugal did to England; a warm feeling
of friendship for the enemy of Great Britain was the natural
consequence of the unjust seizure of the Spanish frigates in a time
of peace; but although this rendered the French cause popular in
Spain, and that the court of Madrid was from weakness subservient
to the French Emperor, nothing could induce the people to refrain
from a profitable contraband trade; they would not pay that respect
to the wishes of a foreign power, which they refused to the
regulations of their own government; neither was the aristocratical
enmity to Napoleon asleep in Spain. A proclamation issued by the
Prince of Peace previous to the battle of Jena, although hastily
recalled when the result of that conflict was known, sufficiently
indicated the tenure upon which the friendship of the Spanish court
was to be held.
[Sidenote: Napoleon, in Las Casas, vol. ii. 4th part.]
This state of affairs drew the French Emperor’s attention towards
the Peninsula; a chain of remarkable circumstances fixed it there,
and induced him to remove the reigning family, and to place his
brother Joseph on the throne of Spain. He thought that the people
of that country, sick of an effete government, would be quiescent
under such a change; and although it should prove otherwise, the
confidence he reposed in his own fortune, unrivalled talents,
and vast power, made him disregard the consequences, while the
cravings of his military and political system, the danger to be
apprehended from the vicinity of a Bourbon dynasty, and above all
the temptations offered by a miraculous folly which outrun even his
desires, urged him to a deed, that well accepted by the people of
the Peninsula, would have proved beneficial; but being enforced
contrary to their wishes, was unhallowed either by justice or
benevolence.
In an evil hour, for his own greatness and the happiness of
others, he commenced this fatal project; founded in violence,
executed with fraud and cruelty, it spread desolation through the
fairest portions of the Peninsula; it was calamitous to France and
destructive to himself. The conflict between his hardy veterans
and the bloody vindictive race he insulted, assumed a character of
unmitigated ferocity disgraceful to human nature; for the Spaniards
did not fail to defend their just cause with hereditary cruelty,
and the French army struck a terrible balance of barbarous actions.
Napoleon observed with surprise the unexpected energy of the
people, and bent his whole force to the attainment of his object;
while England coming to the assistance of the Peninsula employed
all her resources to frustrate his efforts. Thus the two leading
nations of the world were brought into contact at a moment when
both were disturbed by angry passions, eager for great events, and
possessed of surprising power.
The extent and population of the French empire, including the
kingdom of Italy, the confederation of the Rhine, the Swiss
Cantons, the Duchy of Warsaw, and the dependent states of
Holland and Naples, enabled Buonaparte through the medium of the
conscription to array an army, in number nearly equal to the great
host that followed the Persian of old against Greece; like that
multitude also his troops were gathered from many nations, but they
were trained in a Roman discipline, and ruled by a Carthaginian
genius. The organization[1] of Napoleon’s army was simple, the
administration vigorous, the manipulations well contrived. The
French officers, accustomed to success, were bold, enterprising,
of great reputation, and feared accordingly. By a combination of
discipline and moral excitement, admirably adapted to the mixed
nature of his troops, the Emperor had created a power that appeared
to be resistless, and, in truth, it would have been so, if applied
to one great object at a time; but this the ambition of the man, or
rather the force of circumstances, would not permit.
[Sidenote: Exposé de l’Empire, 1807-8-9-13.]
[Sidenote: Napoleon’s Memoirs, Las Casas, 7th part.]
[Sidenote: Lord Collingwood’s letters, vide Appendix.]
The ships of France were chained up in her harbours, and her naval
strength was rebuked, but not destroyed; inexhaustible resources
for building vessels, vast marine establishments, a coast line
of many thousand miles, and the creative genius of Napoleon were
nursing up a navy, formidable as a secondary arm; and the war then
pending between the United States and Great Britain promised to
nurture its growth, and to increase its efficacy.
[Sidenote: Exposé, 1808-9. Napoleon, in Las Casas, vol. ii. 4th
part.]
[Sidenote: Ibid. 6th part.]
Maritime commerce was indeed fainting in France, but her internal
and continental traffic was robust; her manufactures were rapidly
improving; her debt was small; her financial operations conducted
on a prudent plan, and with exact economy. The supplies were all
raised within the year without any very great pressure of taxation,
and from a sound metallic currency; thus there seemed to be no
reasonable doubt, that any war undertaken by Napoleon might be by
him brought to a favourable termination.
On the other hand, England, omnipotent at sea, was little regarded
as a military power. Her enormous debt was yearly increasing in an
accelerated ratio; and this necessary consequence of anticipating
the resources of the country, and dealing in a factitious currency,
was fast eating into the vital strength of the state; for although
the merchants and great manufacturers were thriving from the
accidental circumstances of the times, the labourers were suffering
and degenerating in character; pauperism and its sure attendant
crime were spreading over the land, and the population was fast
splitting into distinct classes,--the one rich and arbitrary, the
other poor and discontented: the former composed of those who
profited, the latter of those who suffered by the war. Of Ireland
it is unnecessary to speak; her wrongs and her misery, peculiar and
unparalleled, are too well known, and too little regarded, to call
for remark.
This general comparative statement, so favourable to France,
would however be a false criterion of the relative strength of
the belligerents, with regard to the approaching struggle in
the Peninsula. A cause manifestly unjust is a heavy weight upon
the operations of a general: it reconciles men to desertion--it
sanctifies want of zeal--is a pretext for cowardice--renders
hardships more irksome, dangers more obnoxious, and glory less
satisfactory to the mind of the soldier. Now the invasion of the
Peninsula, whatever might have been its real original, was an act
of violence on the part of Napoleon repugnant to the feelings of
mankind. The French armies were burthened with a sense of its
iniquity, the British troops exhilarated by a contrary sentiment.
All the continental nations had smarted under the sword of
Napoleon, but, with the exception of Prussia, none were crushed; a
common feeling of humiliation, the hope of revenge, and the ready
subsidies of England, were bonds of union among their governments
stronger than the most solemn treaties. France could only calculate
on their fears, England was secure in their self-love.
The hatred to what were called French principles was at this
period in full activity. The privileged classes of every country
hated Napoleon, because his genius had given stability to the
institutions that grew out of the revolution, because his victories
had baffled their calculations, and shaken their hold of power. As
the chief of revolutionary France he was constrained to continue
his career until the final accomplishment of her destiny, and
this necessity, overlooked by the great bulk of mankind, afforded
plausible ground for imputing insatiable ambition to the French
government and to the French nation, of which ample use was made.
Rapacity, insolence, injustice, cruelty, even cowardice, were
said to be inseparable from the character of a Frenchman; and,
as if such vices were nowhere else to be found, it was more than
insinuated that all the enemies of France were inherently virtuous
and disinterested. Unhappily history is but a record of crimes,
and it is not wonderful that the arrogance of men, buoyed up by
a spring-tide of military glory, should, as well among allies,
as among vanquished enemies, have produced sufficient disgust to
ensure a ready belief in any accusation, however false and absurd.
Napoleon was the contriver and the sole support of a political
system that required time and victory to consolidate; he was the
connecting link between the new interests of mankind and what of
the old were left in a state of vigour; he held them together
strongly, but he was no favourite with either, and consequently
in danger from both. His power, unsanctified by time, depended
not less upon delicate management than upon vigorous exercise; he
had to fix the foundations of, as well as to defend, an empire,
and he may be said to have been rather peremptory than despotic.
There were points of administration with which he durst not
meddle even wisely, much less arbitrarily; customs, prejudices,
and the dregs of the revolutionary licence interfered with his
policy, and rendered it complicated and difficult. It was not so
with his inveterate adversaries; the delusion of parliamentary
representation enabled the English government safely to exercise an
unlimited power over the persons and the property of the nation,
and through the influence of an active and corrupt press they
exercised nearly the same power over the public mind.
The vast commerce of England, penetrating by a thousand channels
(open or secret) as it were into every house on the face of the
globe, supplied unequalled sources of intelligence. The spirit
of traffic, which seldom acknowledges the ties of country, was
universally on the side of Great Britain, and those twin curses,
paper-money and public credit, so truly described as “strength in
the beginning but weakness in the end,” were recklessly used by
statesmen whose policy regarded not the interests of posterity.
Such were the adventitious causes of England’s power; and her
natural, legitimate resources were many and great.
If any credit is to be given to the census, the increasing
population of the United Kingdom, amounted at this period to nearly
twenty millions: France reckoned but twenty-seven millions when
Frederick the Great declared that if he were her king, “not a gun
should be fired in Europe without his leave.”
The French army was undoubtedly very formidable from numbers,
discipline, skill, and bravery; but contrary to the general
opinion, the British army was inferior to it in none of these
points save the first, and in discipline it was superior, because
a national army will always bear a sterner code than a mixed force
will suffer. With the latter, the military not the moral crimes
can be punished; men will submit to death for a breach of great
regulations which they know by experience to be useful, but the
constant restraint of petty though wholesome rules they will escape
from by desertion, or resist by mutiny, when the ties of custom
and country are removed; for the disgrace of bad conduct attaches
not to them, but to the nation under whose colours they serve;
great indeed is that genius that can keep men of different nations
firm to their colours, and preserve a rigid discipline at the same
time. Napoleon’s military system was, from this cause, inferior
to the British, which, if it be purely administered, combines the
solidity of the Germans with the rapidity of the French, excluding
the mechanical dulness of the one, and the dangerous vivacity of
the other; yet, before the campaign in the Peninsula had proved its
excellence in every branch of war, the English army was absurdly
under-rated in foreign countries, and absolutely despised in its
own. It was reasonable to suppose that it did not possess that
facility of moving in large bodies which long practice had given
to the French; but the individual soldier was (and is still) most
falsely stigmatized as deficient in intelligence and activity, the
officers ridiculed, and the idea that a British could cope with a
French army, even for a single campaign, considered chimerical.
The English are a people very subject to receive and to cherish
false impressions; proud of their credulity as if it were a
virtue, the majority will adopt any fallacy, and cling to it with a
tenacity proportioned to its grossness. Thus an ignorant contempt
for the British soldiery had been long entertained, before the ill
success of the expeditions in 1794 and 1799 appeared to justify the
general prejudice. The true cause of those failures was not traced,
and the excellent discipline afterwards introduced and perfected by
the duke of York was despised. England, both at home and abroad,
was, in 1808, scorned as a military power, when she possessed,
without a frontier to swallow up large armies in expensive
fortresses, at least two hundred thousand[2] of the best equipped
and best disciplined soldiers in the universe, together with an
immense recruiting establishment, and through the medium of the
militia, the power of drawing upon the population without limit.
It is true that of this number many were necessarily employed in
the defence of the colonies, but enough remained to compose a
disposable force greater than that with which Napoleon won the
battle of Austerlitz, and double that with which he conquered
Italy. In all the materials of war, the superior ingenuity and
skill of the English mechanics were visible, and that intellectual
power that distinguishes Great Britain amongst the nations, in
science, arts, and literature, was not wanting to her generals in
the hour of danger.