CHAPTER III.

[Sidenote: Memoir of O’Farril, and Azanza.]

Joseph being proclaimed king, required the council of Castile to

take the oath of allegiance prescribed by the constitution; but

with unexpected boldness, that body, hitherto obedient, met his

orders with a remonstrance. War, virtually declared on the 2d of

May, was at this time raging in all parts of the peninsula, and the

council was secretly apprized that a great misfortune had befallen

the French arms. It was no longer a question between Joseph and

some reluctant public bodies, but an awful struggle between

great nations; and how the spirit of insurrection breaking forth

simultaneously in every province was nourished in each, until it

acquired the consistence of regular warfare, I shall now relate.

Just before the tumult of Aranjuez, the marquis of Solano y Socoro,

commanding the Spanish auxiliary force in the Alentejo, received

orders from Godoy to withdraw from that country with his division,

and to post it on the frontier of Andalusia, to cover the projected

journey of Charles IV. Napoleon was aware of these orders, but

would not interrupt their execution. Solano quitted Portugal

without difficulty, and in the latter end of May, observing the

general agitation, repaired to his government of Cadiz, where a

French squadron[5], under admiral Rossily, had just before taken

refuge from the English fleet. As Solano passed through Seville

(that city being in a state of great ferment), he was required to

put himself at the head of an insurrection in favour of Ferdinand

VII. He refused, and passed on to his own government; but there

also the people were ripe for a declaration against the French;

and a local government having been in the mean time established

at Seville, the members at once assumed the title of the “Supreme

Junta of Spain and the Indies,” declared war in form against the

intrusive monarch, commanded all men between the ages of sixteen

and forty-five to take arms, called upon the troops of the camp

of St. Roch to acknowledge their authority, and ordered Solano

to attack the French squadron. That unfortunate man hesitated

to commit his country in a war with a power whose strength and

means he was better acquainted with than the temper of his own

countrymen, and was instantly murdered: he died with a courage

worthy of his amiable and unblemished character. There is too much

reason to believe that his death was coolly projected, and that the

junta at Seville sent an agent to Cadiz for the express purpose of

exciting the populace to commit this odious assassination.

This foul stain upon the cause was intensely deepened by the

perpetration of similar or worse deeds in every part of the

kingdom. At Seville the conde d’Aguilar was dragged from his

carriage, and, without even the imputation of guilt, inhumanly

butchered; and here again it is said that the mob were instigated

by a leading member of the junta, count Gusman de Tilly, a man

described as “capable of dishonouring a whole nation by his

crimes,” while his victim was universally admitted to be virtuous

and accomplished.

[Sidenote: Sir Hew Dalrymple’s correspondence.]

As early as April, general Castaños (then commanding the camp of

St. Roch) had entered into communication with sir Hew Dalrymple,

the governor of Gibraltar; he was resolved to seize any

opportunity that offered to resist the French, and he appears

to have been the first, if not the only Spaniard, who united

patriotism with prudent calculation, readily acknowledging the

authority of the junta of Seville, and stifling the workings of

self-interest with a virtue by no means common to his countrymen

at that period. When the insurrection first broke out, admiral

Purvis, commanded the British squadron off Cadiz, and in concert

with general Spencer (who happened to be in that part of the world

with five thousand men), offered to co-operate with Solano, if he

would assail the French ships of war in the harbour: upon the death

of that unfortunate man, this offer was renewed and pressed upon

don Thomas Morla, his successor; but he, for reasons hereafter

to be mentioned, refused all assistance, and reduced the hostile

ships himself. Castaños, on the contrary, united closely with all

the British commanders, and obtained from them supplies of arms,

ammunition, and money; and at the insistence of sir Hew Dalrymple,

the merchants of Gibraltar advanced a loan for the service of the

Spanish patriots[6].

[Sidenote: Moniteur. Azanza an O’Farril. Nellerto.]

Meanwhile the assassinations at Cadiz and Seville were imitated

in every part of Spain; hardly can a town be named in which

some innocent and worthy persons were not slain. Grenada had

its murders; Carthagena rivalled Cadiz in ruthless cruelty; and

Valencia was foul with slaughter. Don Miguel de Saavedra, the

governor of that city, was killed, not in the fury of the moment,

for he escaped the first danger and fled, but being pursued and

captured, was brought back and deliberately sacrificed. Balthazar

Calvo, a canon of the church of St. Isidro, then commenced a

massacre of the French residents. For twelve days unchecked he

traversed the streets of Valencia, followed by a band of fanatics,

brandishing their knives, and filling all places with blood: many

hundred helpless people fell the victims of his thirst for murder;

and at last, emboldened by the impunity he enjoyed, Calvo proceeded

to threaten the junta itself; but there his career was checked.

Those worthy personages, who (with the exception of Mr. Tupper, the

English consul, then a member), had calmly witnessed his previous

violence, at once found the means to crush his power when their own

safety was concerned. The canon, being in the act of braving their

authority, was seized by stratagem, imprisoned, and soon afterwards

strangled, together with two hundred of his band.

The conde de Serbelloni, captain-general of the province, placed

himself at the head of the insurrection, and proceeded to organise

an army; and at the same time the old count Florida Blanca assumed

the direction of the Murcian patriots, and those two kingdoms acted

cordially together.

In Catalonia the occupation of Barcelona impeded the development of

the popular effervescence, but the feeling was the same, and the

insurrection breaking out at the town of Manresa, soon spread to

all the unfettered parts of the province.

In Aragon the arrival of don Joseph Palafox kindled the fire of

patriotism; he had escaped from Bayonne, and his family were

greatly esteemed in a country where it was of the noblest among a

people absurdly vain of their ancient descent. The captain-general,

fearful of a tumult, ordered Palafox to quit the province. This

circumstance, joined to some appearance of mystery in his escape,

inflamed the passions of the multitude; they surrounded his abode,

and forced him to put himself at their head: the captain-general

was displaced and confined, some persons were murdered, and a junta

was formed. Palafox was considered by his companions as a man of

slender capacity and great vanity, and there is nothing in his

exploits to create a doubt of the justness of this opinion. It was

not Palafox that upheld the glory of Aragon, it was the spirit of

the people, which he had not excited, and could so little direct,

that for a long time after the commencement of the first siege, he

was kept a sort of prisoner in Zaragoza; and evident distrust of

his courage and fidelity was displayed by the population which he

is supposed to have ruled.

The example of Aragon aroused the Navarrese, and Logroño became the

focus of an insurrection which extended along most of the valleys

of that kingdom. In the northern and western provinces the spirit

of independence was equally fierce, and as decidedly pronounced,

accompanied also by the same brutal excesses. In Badajos the conde

de la Torre del Frenio was butchered by the populace, and his

mangled carcass dragged through the streets in triumph. At Talavera

de la Reyna, the corregidor with difficulty escaped a similar

fate by a hasty flight. Leon presented a wide, unbroken scene of

anarchy. In Valladolid, and all the great towns, the insurgent

patriots laid violent hands upon every person who did not instantly

concur in their wishes, and pillage was added to murder.

Gallicia seemed to hold back for a moment; but the example of

Leon, and the arrival of an agent from the Asturias, where the

insurrection was in full force, produced a general movement.

Filanghieri, the governor of Coruña, an Italian by birth, was

by a tumultuous crowd called upon to exercise the rights of

sovereignty, and to declare war in form against the French: like

every man of sense in Spain, he was unwilling to commence such an

important revolution upon such uncertain grounds; the impatient

populace instantly attempted his life, which was then saved by

the courage of an officer of his staff; but his horrible fate

was only deferred. He was a man of talent, sincerely attached to

Spain, and he exerted himself with success in establishing a force

in the province: no suspicion of guilt seems to have attached to

his conduct, and his death marks the temper of the times and the

inherent ferocity of the people. A part of the regiment of Navarre

seized him at Villa Franca del Bierzo, planted the ground with

their bayonets, and then tossing him in a blanket, let him fall on

the points thus disposed, and there leaving him to struggle, they

dispersed and retired to their own homes.

The Asturians were the first who proclaimed their indefeasible

right of choosing a new government when the old one ceased to

afford them protection. Having established a local junta, and

invested it with all the functions of royalty, they declared war

against the French, and despatched deputies to England to solicit

assistance.

In Biscay and the Castiles, fifty thousand bayonets overawed the

great towns; but the peasantry commenced a war in their own manner

against the stragglers and the sick, and thus a hostile chain

surrounding the French army was completed in every link.

This universal and nearly simultaneous effort of the Spanish people

was beheld by the rest of Europe with astonishment and admiration:

astonishment at the energy thus suddenly put forth by a nation

hitherto deemed unnerved and debased; admiration at the devoted

courage of an act, which, seen at a distance, and its odious

parts unknown, appeared with all the ideal beauty of Numantian

patriotism. In England the enthusiasm was unbounded; dazzled

at first with the splendour of such an agreeable, unlooked-for

spectacle, men of all classes gave way to the impulse of a generous

sympathy, and forgot, or felt disinclined to analyse, the real

causes of this apparently magnanimous exertion. But without wishing

to detract from the merit of the Spanish people, and certainly that

merit was very great, it may be fairly doubted if the disinterested

vigour of their character was the true source of their resistance.

Constituted as modern states are, with little in their systems of

government or education which conduces to nourish intense feelings

of patriotism, it would be miraculous indeed if such a result was

obtained from the pure virtue of a nation, which for two centuries

had groaned under the pressure of civil and religious despotism.

It was, in fact, produced by several co-operating causes, many of

which were any thing but commendable.

The Spanish character, with relation to public affairs, is

distinguished by inordinate pride and arrogance. Dilatory and

improvident, the individual as well as the mass, all possess an

absurd confidence that every thing is practicable which their

heated imagination suggests; once excited, they can see no

difficulty in the execution of a project, and the obstacles they

encounter are attributed to treachery; hence the sudden murder

of so many virtuous men at the commencement of this commotion.

Kind and warm in his attachments, but bitter in his anger, the

Spaniard is patient under privations, firm in bodily suffering,

prone to sudden passion, vindictive, bloody, remembering insult

longer than injury, and cruel in his revenge. With a strong natural

perception of what is noble, his promise is lofty, but as he

invariably permits his passions to get the mastery of his reason,

his performance is mean.

In the progress of this war the tenacity of vengeance peculiar to

the nation supplied the want of cool, persevering intrepidity;

but it was a poor substitute for that essential quality, and

led rather to deeds of craft and cruelty than to daring acts of

patriotism. Now the abstraction of the royal family, and the

unexpected pretension to the crown, so insultingly put forth by

Napoleon, aroused all the Spanish pride. The tumults of Madrid

and Aranjuez had agitated the public mind, and prepared it for a

violent movement, and the protection afforded by the French to

the obnoxious Godoy increased the ferment of popular feeling:

a dearly cherished vengeance was thus frustrated at the moment

of its expected accomplishment, and the disappointment excited

all that fierceness of anger which with Spaniards is, for the

moment, uncontrollable. Just then the tumult of Madrid, swollen

and distorted, wrought the people to frenzy, and they arose with

one accord, not to meet a danger the extent of which they had

calculated, and were prepared, for the sake of independence, to

confront, but to gratify the fury of their hearts, and to slake

their thirst of blood.

[Sidenote: Napoleon’s Memoires, Campagne d’Italie, Venise.]

During Godoy’s administration the property of the church had been

trenched upon, and it was evident, from the example of France

and Italy, that, under the new system, that operation would be

repeated. This was a matter that involved the interests, and,

of course, stimulated the activity of a multitude of monks and

priests, who found no difficulty in persuading an ignorant and

bigoted people that the aggressive stranger was also the enemy

of religion and accursed of God; hence processions, miracles,

prophecies, distribution of reliques, and the appointment of saints

to the command of the armies, were freely employed to fanaticize

the mass of the patriots. In every part of the peninsula the

clergy were distinguished for their active zeal, and monks or

friars were leaders in the tumults, or at the side of those who

were instigating them to barbarous actions. Buonaparte found the

same cause produce similar effects during his early campaigns in

Italy; and if the shape of that country had been as favourable for

protracted resistance, and that a like support had been afforded to

them by Great Britain, the heroes of Spain would have been rivalled

by modern Romans!

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.]

The continental system of mercantile exclusion was another spring

of this complicated machinery. It threatened to lessen the already

decayed commerce of the maritime towns; but the contraband trade,

which has always been carried on in Spain to an incredible extent,

was certain of destruction; and with that trade the fate of one

hundred thousand excise and custom-house officers was involved.

It required but a small share of penetration to perceive, that

a system of armed revenue officers, organized after the French

manner, and stimulated by a vigorous administration, would

quickly put an end to the smuggling, which was, in truth, only a

consequence of the monopolies and internal restrictions upon the

trade of one province with another--vexations abolished by the

constitution of Bayonne: hence all the activity and intelligence

of the merchants engaged in foreign trade, and all the numbers and

lawless violence of the smugglers, were enlisted in the cause of

the country, and swelled the ranks of the insurgent patriots; and

hence also the readiness of the Gibraltar merchants to advance the

loan before spoken of.

The state of civilisation in Spain was likewise exactly suited to

an insurrection: if the people had been a little more enlightened,

they would have joined the French; if very enlightened, the

invasion could not have happened at all; but, in a country where

the comforts of civilized society are less needed, and therefore

less attended to than in any other part of Europe, where the warmth

and dryness of the climate render it no sort of privation or even

inconvenience to sleep for the greatest part of the year in the

open air, and where the universal custom is to go armed, it was not

difficult for any energetic man to assemble and keep together large

masses of the credulous peasantry. No story could be too gross

for their belief, if it agreed with their wishes. “Es verdad, los

dicen,” “It is true, they say it,” is the invariable answer of a

Spaniard if a doubt is expressed of the truth of an absurd report.

Of temperate habits, possessing little furniture, and generally

hoarding all the gold he can get, the Spanish peasant is less

concerned for the loss of his house than the inhabitant of another

country would be: the effort that he makes in relinquishing his

abode must not be measured by the scale of an Englishman’s exertion

in a like case; and once engaged in an adventure, the lightness of

his spirits, and the brilliancy of his sky, make it a matter of

indifference to the angry Spanish peasant whither he wanders.

[Sidenote: Historia de la Guerra contra Napoleon.]

The evils which had afflicted the country previous to the period of

the French interference was another cause which tended to prepare

the Spaniards for violence, and aided in turning that violence

against the intruders. Famine, oppression, poverty, and disease,

the loss of commerce, and unequal taxation, had pressed sorely

upon them; for such a system the people could not be enthusiastic;

but they were taught to believe, that Godoy was the sole author of

the misery they suffered, and that Ferdinand would redress their

grievances; and as the French were the strenuous protectors of the

former, and the oppressors of the latter, it was easy to add this

bitterness to their natural hatred of the domination of a stranger;

and it was so done.

Such were the principal causes which combined to produce this

surprising revolution, from which so many great events flowed,

without one man of eminent talent being cast up to control or

direct the spirit which was thus accidentally excited. Nothing

proves more directly the heterogeneous nature of the feelings and

interests which were united together than this last fact, which

cannot be attributed to a deficiency of natural talent, for the

genius of the Spanish people is notoriously ardent, subtle, and

vigorous; but there was no common bond of feeling which a great man

could lay hold of to influence large masses. Persons of sagacity

perceived very early that the Spanish revolution, like a leafy

shrub in a violent gale of wind, greatly agitated but disclosing

only slight unconnected stems, afforded no sure hold for the

ambition of a master-spirit, if such there were. It was clear that

the cause would fail unless supported by England, and then England

would direct all, and not suffer her resources to be wielded for

the glory of an individual, whose views and policy might hereafter

thwart her own; nor was it difficult to perceive that the downfall

of Napoleon, not the regeneration of Spain, was the object of her

cabinet.

The explosion of public feeling was fierce in its expression,

because political passions will always be vehement at the first

moment of their appearance among a people new to civil commotion,

and unused to permit their heat to evaporate in public discussions.

The result was certainly a wonderful change in the affairs of

Europe; it seems yet undecided whether that change has been for the

better or for the worse. In the progress of their struggle, the

Spaniards developed more cruelty than courage, more violence than

intrepidity, more personal hatred of the French than enthusiasm for

their own cause. They opened indeed a wide field for the exertions

of others; they presented a fulcrum upon which a lever was rested

that moved the civilised world; but assuredly the presiding genius,

the impelling power, came from another quarter. Useful accessories

they were, but as principals they displayed neither wisdom, spirit,

nor skill sufficient to resist the prodigious force by which they

were assailed. If they appeared at first heedless of danger, it was

not because they were prepared to perish rather than submit, but

that they were reckless of provoking a power whose terrors they

could not estimate, and in their ignorance despised.

It is, however, not surprising that great expectations were

at first formed of the heroism of the Spaniards, and those

expectations were greatly augmented by their agreeable qualities.

There is not upon the face of the earth a people so attractive in

the friendly intercourse of society: their majestic language, fine

persons, imposing dress and lively imaginations, the inexpressible

beauty of the women, and the air of romance which they throw

over every action, and infuse into every feeling, all combine to

delude the senses and to impose upon the judgment. As companions

they are incomparably the most agreeable of mankind; but danger

and disappointment attend the man who, confiding in their promises

and energy, ventures upon a difficult enterprise. “Never do to-day

what you can put off until to-morrow,” is the favourite proverb in

Spain, and, unlike most proverbs, it is rigidly attended to.

History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 1 · 第 3 / 15 章