CHAPTER XI.

THE "LABOUR BOARDS" AND "LABOUR CHAMBERS" OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY.

Of all the problems with which the science of government is confronted

in the present and the near future, there are few in the domain of

Social Policy of greater importance, or more fraught with serious

possibilities in their results, than the establishment on a democratic

basis, both in constitution and in administration, of the organs of

Labour Protection.

This tendency appears already in the demand for equal representation of

both classes in the organisation of Labour Protection. The establishment

by local governing authorities of industrial courts of arbitration has

been a step in this direction, a step which has not entirely been

retraced by recent legislation in Germany, dealing with such courts.

The form which Social Democracy has given to this idea by the proposal

of "Labour Boards" and "Labour Chambers," brought forward in the Auer

Motion, is a matter of the highest interest. So far as I know, this form

has received very little, or at any rate insufficient, attention in the

Reichstag or the Press. This is the more surprising for two reasons,

viz., the justice of its attempt at a better protective organisation,

and the serious import of its evident tendency to evolve out of the

Capitalist System a Social Democratic order of society.

I think, therefore, that just because of this extreme step in

organisation which the Auer Motion takes in proposing Labour Boards and

Labour Chambers, as instruments of Labour Protection, it behoves me not

to pass it by with indifference, but on the contrary to dwell upon it at

some length.

In the first place let us construct in our own minds a picture of the

new form of organisation proposed in the Auer Motion.

In the place of Art. IX. in the existing Imp. Ind. Code, a new Chap. IX.

would have to be inserted, dealing with "an Imperial Labour Board,

District Labour Boards, Labour Chambers, and Labour Courts of

Administration" (Sec.Sec. 131-143).

1. _The Imperial Labour Board and the Imperial Labour Parliament._

_The Imperial Labour Board._ Its organisation would be determined by

special Imperial legislation. Probably equal representation of classes

is intended in this Central Bureau, which would act together with the

hitherto essentially bureaucratic Imperial Insurance Board. Its duties

would consist: first, in supervising so far as possible, the whole

system of Labour Protection as demanded in the Auer Bill (Sec.Sec. 105-125);

further, in affording protection against the competition of penal

labour; finally, "in enforcing such measures and conducting such

enquiries as may be necessary to the well-being of the whole body of

wage-earners, including apprentices, in any kind of industry." Its

duties would therefore extend far beyond the limits of Labour Protection

in the strict sense, and it would be a general Central Bureau of aids to

Labour, in which the Imperial Insurance Board would soon become

incorporated.

_The Labour Parliament_ (Diet of Labour Chambers). I take leave thus to

designate the representative central organ proposed (although of course

it is not brought forward in these terms in the heading of the new Chap.

IX. of the Auer Bill) since it is clear that the Imperial Labour Board

is practically only intended to be the executive organ of this

democratic industrial Council of the nation. Sections 140-142 of the

Auer Motion require that: Sec. 140 "It shall be the duty of the Imperial

Labour Board to summon once a year representatives from the collective

Labour Chambers to a general deliberation on industrial interests. To

this General Council each Labour Chamber shall send one delegate to

represent the employers, and one the body of wage-earners. The choice of

the representatives shall be made by each class separately. The chair

shall be taken at the Council by a member of the Imperial Labour Board,

but he and his colleagues shall have no right to vote. The Council shall

determine its own standing orders and the orders of the day; the

sittings to be public. Sec. 141. The members of the Labour Chambers shall

receive daily pay and defrayment of travelling expenses. Sec. 142. The

Imperial Government shall pay the costs of the arrangements enumerated

in Sec.Sec. 131-140; they shall be entered yearly in the imperial accounts."

Thus we should have a national Labour Parliament--formed from the

district Labour Chambers--with equal representation of both classes,

receiving grants from the Imperial exchequer, undertaking the general

supervision of industrial interests and acting as a check on the

Imperial Labour Board. By the simple process of throwing overboard the

nominees of the employers, this Labour Parliament might at any time

become a pure parliament of labourers, or "People's Parliament," and the

Imperial Labour Board might resolve itself into the central ministry of

a purely "People's State."

Such a state of things would obviously be the realisation of the extreme

Social Democratic order of State.

It must be admitted that no secret is made of this fact, nor yet of the

_basis_ on which the whole edifice is raised.

(2) _Labour Boards and Labour Courts of Arbitration, Labour Chambers._

The basis of the edifice is formed by Labour Boards and Courts of

Arbitration, on the one hand (_i.e._ for executive purposes), and Labour

Chambers on the other (_i.e._, for purposes of regulation). We shall, as

far as possible, give the explanation of the matter in the words of the

motion.

_Labour Boards._ On this head the Auer Motion reads as follows: "Sec.

132_a_. Below the Imperial Labour Board come the Labour Boards which

shall be appointed throughout the German Empire, in districts of not

less than 200,000, nor more than 400,000 inhabitants, at the latest by

Oct. 1, 1891. Sec. 133. The Labour Board shall consist of a Labour

Councillor and at least two paid officers; it must pass its rulings and

decisions in full sitting. The Imperial Labour Board shall select the

labour councillor from two candidates nominated by the Labour Chamber.

The permanent paid officers, whose duty it is to assist the labour

councillor in his task of supervision, shall be elected by the Labour

Chamber, half from the employers, and half from the employed. In

districts in which there are a considerable number of works employing

chiefly female labour, some of the officials appointed shall be women.

The same rules with regard to invalid and superannuation pensions shall

apply to the officers of the Labour Boards, as apply to all other

imperial officials. Sec. 133_a_. The officers of the Imperial Labour Board,

and the labour councillors or their paid assistants, shall have the

right at any time to inspect all places of business (whether of State,

municipal, or private enterprise) and to make such regulations as may

appear necessary for the life and health of the workers employed. In the

exercise of such supervision they shall be empowered with all the

official authority of the local police magistrates. In so far as the

rules laid down are within the official authority of the supervising

officers, the employers and their staff shall be bound to render

unhesitating obedience. The employer or his representatives shall have a

right of appeal to the District Labour Board, to be lodged within a

week, against the orders and rulings of individual officials, and a

right of appeal against the District Labour Board's decision, also

within a week, to the Imperial Labour Board. The Labour Board shall be

bound to inspect all the works within a district at least once a year.

The employers shall permit the official inspection to take place at any

time when the work is being carried on, especially also at night. The

inspecting officers shall be bound, except in cases of infringement of

the law, to observe secrecy as to all information on the concerns of a

business obtained by them in pursuit of their official duties. Sec. 133_b_.

The local police magistrates shall uphold the Labour Board in the

exercise of its authority, and shall enforce obedience to its

directions. Sec. 133_c_. The Labour Board shall organize all free labour

intelligence within its district, and serve in fact as a central bureau

for this purpose. It shall also be empowered to appoint branch bureaux

with this object, in such places as may seem suitable, and if there is

no industrial union to undertake the duties the local police magistrates

shall undertake them. Sec. 133_d_. Every Labour Board shall publish a

yearly report of its proceedings, copies of which shall be distributed

gratuitously to the members of the Labour Chambers by the Imperial

Labour Board and the Central District Courts. The report shall be

submitted to the approval of the Labour Chamber before publication. The

Imperial Labour Board shall draw up yearly, from the annual reports of

the Labour Boards, a general report to be submitted to the _Bundesrath_

and the Reichstag. The reports of the District Labour Boards and the

Imperial Labour Board shall be accessible to the public at cost price."

The Labour Board of a district of from 200,000 to 400,000 inhabitants

would be in the first place a modern kind of industrial inspectorate

with offices filled from both classes--employers and employed--with a

democratic system of election, and to which women would also be

eligible. Even the presidency of this inspectorate would not be freely

appointed by the government, which would have only the power of electing

one out of two nominees of the Labour Chambers. The primary task of the

board would take the form of Labour Protection, of centralization of

labour intelligence, and of drawing up reports on matters concerning

labour. The Labour Board is intended as the executive organ of the

Labour Chambers, the parliamentary administration would therefore be

general; even in reporting on industry the Labour Board would be subject

to the approval of the Labour Chamber. It is evident that this

Democratic organisation of courts, which would be powerless to act so

long as both classes obstructed each other, might easily at one stroke,

by turning out the nominees of the employers, be changed and developed

into purely democratic district courts for the general protection of

labour and the control of production.

_Courts of Arbitration._ The Court of Arbitration as proposed by the

Auer Motion, is, so to speak, the judicial twin brother of the Labour

Board. According to Sec. 137-137_e_, the Court of Arbitration would be a

court of the first instance, for the settlement of disputes between

employers and workmen. It would be formed by each Labour Chamber out of

its numbers, and would consist of equal numbers of employers and of

workmen. The chair would be taken by the labour councillor or one of his

paid assistants. Equal representation of both classes would be required

when pronouncing decisions. None but relations, employes, and partners

in the business, would be permitted to be present during the

deliberations in support of the disagreeing parties. There would be

right of appeal to the Labour Chamber. The members of this Court of

Arbitration would (like those of the Labour Chamber) (Sec. 130_a_) receive

daily pay and defrayment of travelling expenses. Such would evidently be

the working out of this system of combined class representation, of

which, indeed, we already have an instance in the industrial courts of

arbitration.

_Labour Chambers._ These would form the foundation stone of the edifice,

and they deserve the special attention of all who wish to know how

Social Democracy means to attain her ends. I give verbatim the clauses

dealing with this: "Sec. 134. For the representation of the interests of

employers and their workmen, as well as for the support of the Labour

Boards in the exercise of their authority, there shall be appointed from

Oct. 1, 1891, in every Labour Board district, a Labour Chamber, to

consist of not less than 24, and not more than 36 members, according to

the number of different firms established in the district. The number of

members for the separate districts shall be determined by the Imperial

Labour Board. The members of the Labour Chambers shall be elected, the

one half by employers of full age from amongst their numbers, the other

half by workers of full age from amongst their numbers. The election

shall be made on the principle of direct, individual, ballot voting by

both sexes, a simple majority only to decide. Each class shall elect its

own representatives. The mandate of the members of the Labour Chamber

shall last for two years, opening and closing in each case with the

calendar year. Simultaneously with the election of the members of the

Labour Chamber proxies to the number of one-half shall be appointed. The

proxies shall be those candidates who receive the greatest number of

votes next after the elected members. In the case of equal votes lots

shall be drawn. The selection of the polling day, which must be either a

Sunday or festival, shall rest with the Imperial Labour Board, which

shall also lay down the rules of procedure for the election. Employers

and workmen shall be equally represented on the election committees. The

time appointed for taking the votes shall be fixed in such a manner that

both day and night shifts may be able to go to the poll. Sec. 135. Besides

fulfilling the functions assigned to them in Sec.Sec. 106_a_, 110 and 121, the

Labour Chambers shall support the Labour Boards by advice and active

help in all questions touching the industrial life of their district. It

shall be their special duty to make enquiry into the carrying out of

commercial and shipping contracts; into customs, taxes, duties, and into

the rate of wage, price of provisions, rent, competitive relations,

educational and industrial establishments, collections of models and

patterns, condition of dwellings, and into the health and mortality of

the working population. They shall bring before the courts all

complaints as to the conditions of industrial life, and they shall give

opinion on all measures and legal proposals affecting industrial life in

their district. Finally, they shall be courts of appeal against the

decisions of the Courts of Arbitration. Sec. 136. The president of the

Labour Chamber shall be the labour councillor, or failing him, one of

his paid officials. The president shall have no vote, except in cases in

which the Labour Chamber is giving decision as a court of appeal against

the decision of the Court of Arbitration. Equality of voting shall be

counted as a negative. The president shall be bound to summon the Labour

Chamber at least once a month, and also when required on the motion of

at least one-third of the members of the Chamber. The Labour Chambers

shall lay down their own working rules; their sittings shall be public."

According to Sec. 139 of the motion, the members of the Labour Chambers

shall also be entitled to claim daily pay and defrayment of travelling

expenses.

Such are the Labour Chambers according to the proposals of the Social

Democrats in 1885 and 1890.

It is not without some astonishment that I note the tactical ingenuity

displayed by the party even here. Everything that has anywhere appeared

in literature, in popular representation, in judicial and administrative

organisation, in the way of proposals for the centralisation and

extension of labour intelligence, or of proposals for the representation

of labour in Labour Protection, and in all agencies for the care of

labour,--every scheme that has ever been put forward under different

forms, either purely theoretic or practical, as, _e.g._, "Popular

Industrial Councils," and "Industrial Courts of Arbitration"--is here

used to make a part of a broad bridge, leading across to a "People's

State." Nothing is lacking but the lowest planks, which could not,

however, be dispensed with, a Local Labour Board and a Local Labour

Chamber, as the sub-structure of the District Labour Boards and District

Labour Chambers.

The leaders of Social Democracy in the German Reichstag maintain that

they are willing to join hands with the representatives of the existing

order in their schemes of organisation. We have, therefore, no right to

treat their scheme as consciously revolutionary. But this hardly affects

the question. The question is whether--setting aside altogether the

originators of the plan--such an organisation as that described above

might not in fact readily lend itself as a battering-ram to overthrow

the existing order and realise the aim of Socialism, whether, in fact,

it would not of necessity be so used. This question may well be answered

in the affirmative without casting the slightest reproach at the present

leaders of the party.

The regulating representative organs would have full and comprehensive

authority in all questions of industry, social policy, and health, and

in inspection of dwellings; and the executive organs, even up to the

Imperial Labour Board, might be empowered by the mere alteration of a

few sections of the Bill to exercise the same authority, subject to the

consent of the majority in the National and District Chambers, and

eventually in the Local Chambers.

If these representative and administrative bodies ever came into

existence, they would slowly but surely oust, not only the whole

existing organisation of Chambers of Commerce and Industrial Councils,

but also the Reichstag itself, and the Imperial Government, as well as

the local corporate bodies; they would tear down every part of the

existing social edifice. By the combined action of the Social Democrats

in the Reichstag with the increasingly democratic tendencies of the

local bodies, all this might come to pass in a very short space of time.

I do not forget that the organisation is to be based in the first

instance on equal representation of classes. On the first two, and

eventually on the third, step of the judicial and representative

edifice, as many representatives are given to capital as to labour. In

so far the organisation is a hybrid of Capitalism and Social Democracy.

For the moment, and in the present stage, it is, for this very reason,

of special value to the Social Democrats, as it supplies a method of

completely crippling the forces opposed to them in the existing order.

For it will be sufficient in the day of fulfilment, _i.e._ when all is

ripe for the intended change, to give one shake, so to speak, in order

to burst open the half capitalistic chrysalis, and let the butterfly of

a Social Democratic "People's State" fly out.

The half capitalistic organisation would, I repeat, be of the greatest

value at present, in the early preparatory work of the Social Democrats.

First, because the working class would become practically and thoroughly

accustomed to co-operation instead of to subordination as hitherto;

this is the transition step which cannot be avoided, to the supremacy of

the working class over the employers' class. Then, too, the proposed

organisation would offer an excellent opportunity for passing through

the transition step by step, by the continued weakening of the

capitalist order of society in all its joints. The struggle with capital

would have the sanction and the organised force of legislation. It would

receive legal organisation, and would even be legally enjoined. This

legalised battle would proceed over the whole circuit of industrial

activity, including trade and transport, and including also the state

regulated portion of it.

In addition to this the organisation would be peculiarly fitted to

cripple even the least objectionable bulwarks of capital, even the

altogether unbiassed and nonpartisan operation of the local and

district, and probably even ultimately of the imperial courts.

The apparently equal coupling of the influence of both classes would

lead to the result that the class which had the more energetic

representatives and the slighter interest in the maintenance of the

"working rules" would be able at any moment and at any point in the

national industrial life, to bring everything to a deadlock. The labour

councillor would be dependent on the Labour Chambers, and they in turn

would be entirely dependent on the leaders of labour. By the provision

that the president shall have no vote, and a tie in voting shall

therefore count as a defeat, the workmen's electorate hold in their

hands the power to obstruct at will any resolution, and especially to

obstruct the issue of the working rules in any business, since the

rules must be submitted to the approval of the Labour Chambers.

The function of "supporting the Labour Boards by advice and active help

in all questions touching the industrial life of their district," might

very easily, by virtue of the above provision, be so abused by the

Labour Chambers as to deprive individual industrial inspectors of all

possibility of just and independent action, and hence by degrees to

entirely cripple and destroy the value of the inspectorate as a whole;

there can, I think be no doubt that before very long these powers would

intentionally be used for this purpose.

The action of a positive Social policy would be hopelessly crippled by

an equally balanced class representation, while at the same time the

existing order of industrial life would be disturbed and shaken down to

the very last and smallest branches of industry.

Nor would this be all, for such an organisation would secure fixed

salaries for the staff of agitators in the Labour party, since the

representatives would receive daily pay and defrayment of travelling

expenses from the Imperial exchequer. Debates and discussions might be

carried on without intermission, the pay continuing all the time, for

each Labour Chamber would be convened, not only once a month, but also

at any time at the request of one-third of the members of the Labour

Chamber, therefore of two-thirds of the labour representatives in the

chamber. By virtue of the provision which gives them unlimited right of

intervention, pretexts for convening frequent meetings would never be

wanting.

Hence it is evident that no more effectual machinery could be devised

for the legal preparation for leading up the existing social order

directly to the threshold of the "People's State." The attempt to

convert the hybrid Capitalist-Socialist state to a pure Socialist state

would be a perfectly simple matter, both in the Empire, the provinces,

and the local districts, as soon as we had allowed Social Democracy one

or two decades in which to turn the two-fold class representation to

their own ends. By a single successful revolutionary "_coup_" in the

chief city of the Empire, or in the chief cities of several countries

simultaneously, representation of capital in the Labour Courts might be

thrown overboard, and the "People's State" would be ready; the

parliament of a purely popular government would hold the field, and the

present representation of the nation which includes all classes and

watches over the spiritual and material interests of the whole nation,

might without difficulty be swept away from Empire, province, district

and municipality.

The construction of a complete system of "collective" production would

be easy, for it would find the framework ready to its hand, complete

from base to summit, fully mapped out on the plan.

Perhaps the leaders themselves are not fully conscious of the lengths to

which their proposed organisation may carry them. One can quite

understand how from their standpoint they fail to see the end. They have

pursued the path that seemed the most likely to lead to their goal of a

radical change of the existing social order. The whole responsibility

will rest with the parties in power, if they do more than hold out their

little finger, which they have already done, to help Social Democracy

along this path of organisation.

The Theory and Policy of Labour Protection · 第 6 / 9 章