FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF PROTECTIVE ORGANISATION.
In spite of all that can be urged against them, however, we may gather
much, not merely negative, but also positive, knowledge from the
proposals of Social Democracy. An organisation which shall be equipped
with full authority, which shall be independent, complete in all its
parts, which shall prevail uniformly and equally over the whole nation;
an organisation which shall avoid the disintegration of collective aids
to labour, which shall encourage industrial representation and prevent
the division of authority amongst many different courts: such is the
root idea of the proposal, and this idea is just, however unacceptable
may appear to us the form in which it is clothed in the Auer Motion.
Nothing is omitted in the Auer Motion except the assignment of their
various duties to the various branches of the territorial representative
bodies, and the working out of an elementary local organisation. I shall
therefore try to work out the idea into a legitimate and possible form
of development. In order to do this I must distinguish between the
organisation required for executive and for representative bodies.
As regards the executive organs, neither in Germany nor elsewhere is
the industrial inspectorate at present furnished with a sufficient
number of paid head-inspectors and sub-inspectors. Scarcely any of the
sub-inspectors are drawn from the labouring class except in the case of
England. Industrial inspection in Germany has not yet attained uniform
extension over the whole Empire. The inspectors of the different
provinces, and the chief provincial inspectors of the whole Empire
require to be brought into regular communication with each other and
with a Central Bureau adapted for all forms of aid to labour, including
Labour Protection--an organ which of course must not interfere with the
imperial, constitutional, and administrative independence of the States
of the _Bund_. If the individual inspectors were everywhere carefully
chosen, the assembling of all inspectors for deliberation with the
Provincial and Imperial Central Bureaux of Labour Protection would in
nowise retard, but on the contrary would serve to promote the complete
and equitable administration of Labour Protection and all forms of aid
to labour. This is the really fruitful germ contained in the idea of an
"Imperial Labour Board."
A Provincial Labour Board might effect much in the same direction. We
are not without the beginnings of a uniform constitution of this kind:
England has an Inspector-General, Austria a Central Inspector; in
Switzerland the inspectors hold regular conferences; in France a
comprehensive scheme of inspectoral combination is projected.
The choice of persons as head and sub-inspectors, which is a matter of
such great importance, might be subject to nomination by the united
provincial inspectorate, coupled with instructions to direct particular
attention to the selection of persons of practical experience, without
social bias, well versed in knowledge of technical and hygienic matters,
and suited to the special needs of the several posts.
But the mere development of the inspectorate would not be the only step
in the progress of the organisation of Labour Protection. We must go
much further than this. The combined interests of economy, simplicity,
efficiency, and permanence of service, point to the necessity of
relieving as far as possible the regular governmental courts of the
Empire, of the province, and of the municipality, of the extra burden of
judicial and police administration involved in special branches of
Labour Protection, and in all other special forms of aid to labour. The
same considerations involve the necessity of gradually developing a
better organisation of associated labour boards, an imperial board, and
provincial, district, and municipal boards. We should thus get rid of
the present confusion of divided authority without entirely depriving
Labour Protection, both individual and general, of the assistance of the
ordinary administrative courts. This is the task that I have repeatedly
insisted upon as imperatively requiring to be taken in hand in connexion
with Labour Insurance. The Auer Motion attempts to meet this necessity.
Much also that is very just and very practical is contained in the idea
of extending the sphere of operations of the Imperial Labour Board and
of the District Boards so as to embrace not only Labour Protection but
every form of aid to labour. Complaint is made that the organisation of
Labour Insurance, in spite of all caution, has frequently proved a
unpractical and costly piece of patchwork administration. Would it not
then be more to the point, and would it not more easily fulfil the
object of Labour Insurance and Labour Protection, and later on also of
dwelling reform, inspection of work, etc., to create municipal district
and provincial boards, with a great Imperial Central Bureau at the head?
In order that each special branch of protection might receive proper
attention, care would have to be taken in appointing to the offices of
the collective organ, to insure the inclusion of the technical,
juristic, police, hygienic, and statistic elements, and it would be
necessary to group these elements into sections without destroying the
unity of the service. There would be no lack of material, and it would
not be difficult to secure a good, efficient, and economical working
staff.
No less reasonable is the idea of a "guild" of the eldest in the trade,
or of a factory committee for the several large works with
representation of both classes to appoint the district, provincial, and
imperial labour councils. So far from being extreme in this respect, the
Auer Motion is rather to be reproached with incompleteness, and a lack
of provision for local Labour Councils and Labour Chambers, a point
which we have already mentioned. But the representative bodies would
have a significance extending far beyond the limits of Labour
Protection--following the example of Switzerland the _von Berlepsch_
Bill admits factory labour-committees for dealing with matters
concerning the factory working rules--they would be agencies for the
care of labour, for the insurance of social peace, the protection of
morality, the settlement of disputes and the maintenance of order in the
factory, for the instruction and discipline of apprentices, for the
control of the administration of protective legislation, for dealing
with the wage question, in a word for softening the severe autocracy of
the employers and their managers by the co-operation and advice of the
workers. And in this case I have nothing further to add to what I have
already said on the matter in a former article.
But the supporter of even the most comprehensive scheme of labour
representation does not stand committed to any such system of
parliamentary management of industry by democratic majority as is
proposed in the Auer Motion. The appointment and the working of the
Labour Councils and Labour Chambers seems to me to introduce quite
another element into the scheme.
The regular, not merely the accidental and occasional, meeting of the
inspectors with the body of employers and workers is a recognised
practical necessity; a less bureaucratic system of industrial management
is demanded on all sides. Regularly appointed ordinary and special
meetings with the Labour Chambers would no doubt accomplish much. The
inspector ought to be accessible to the expression of all wishes,
advice, and complaints; but, on the other hand, he should not yield
blind obedience to the rulings and representations of such organs. The
industrial inspector must be, and must remain, an officer of the State,
capable of acting independently of either class, appointed by
government; only under these circumstances can he perform the duties of
his office with firmness and impartial justice; in his appointment, in
his salary, and in the exercise of his official duties he should be
furnished with every guarantee to insure the independence of his
judgment. It is nowise incompatible with this that he should be open to
receive representations, whether in the way of advice, information, or
complaint. The more he lays himself open to such in the natural course
of work, the more important will his duties and position become, both on
his circuits and in his office. The right of appeal to higher courts can
always be secured to the Labour Chambers in cases of complaint. But how
should representative bodies of this kind be formed?
In answering this question care must be taken above all not to confound
such public Labour Chambers as are suggested in the Auer proposals with
voluntary joint committees of both classes. Each of these representative
organs requires its own special constitution.
The voluntary unions appoint committees for the security of class
interests, and especially for the purpose of making agreements as to
conditions of work. The election of these representative bodies ought to
be made by both classes with unrestricted equal eligibility of all,
including the female, members of any union, and without predominance of
one class over the other, or of any section of one class.
I have already in a former article (see also above, Chap. V.) laid
great stress upon the development of this voluntary or conciliatory
representation of both classes as a means of union which can never be
replaced by the other or legal form of representation.
The need for a representative system in the organs of the different
forms of state-aid to labour is quite another matter.
Their tasks require special, public, legalised representation, with
essentially only the right of deliberation; but they may also decide by
a majority of votes questions which lie within the sphere of their
competence.
As regards this public representation, it seems to me that joint
appointment by direct choice of all the individuals in both classes, and
out of either class, tends to the preservation of class enmity rather
than to the mutual conciliation of the two classes and to the promotion
of their wholesome joint influence on the boards. This kind of
appointment might be dispensed with by limiting direct election as far
as possible to the appointment of the elementary organs of
representation; but for the rest by drawing the already existing
authorities of a corporate kind into the formation of the system of
general representation. Herein I refer to such already existing organs
as those of labour insurance, Chambers of Commerce and Industrial
guilds, railway boards, local and parliamentary representatives; and
other elementary forms of corporate action might also be pressed into
the service. A thoroughly serviceable, fully accredited _personnel_
would thus be secured for all Labour Boards.
This system might even be applied to the election or appointment by lot
of the Industrial Court of Arbitration. If the Labour Chambers were
corporate bodies really representative of the trade, then the Industrial
Courts of Arbitration, both provincial and local, might be constituted
as thoroughly trustworthy public organs--without great expense, free
from judicial interference, competent as courts of the first and second
instance, and not in any way dependent on the communal
authorities--either freely elected by the managers of the workmen's
clubs and the employers' boards or companies, or chosen by lot from the
_personnel_ of the already existing corporate institutions above
referred to. The system of direct election by the votes of all the
individual workers and employers would thus be avoided, and, more
important still, this method would meet the difficulty which proved the
crux of the whole question when the organisation of Industrial Courts of
Arbitration was discussed in the last Reichstag: the distinction between
young persons and adults would not enter into consideration, either in
the case of Labour Chambers or of the Courts of Arbitration proceeding
therefrom.
There would be no need, under this system, that electors of either class
should be required to limit their choice of representatives to members
of their own class. Each body of electors would be free to fix their
choice on the men who possessed their confidence, wherever such might be
found. This would further help to stamp out the antagonisms which are
excited by the separate corporate representation of both classes. Men
would be appointed who would need no special protection against
dismissal. But the representatives of the workers when chosen out of the
midst of the working electorate might still receive daily pay and
defrayment of travelling expenses. If this were entered to the account
of the unions which direct the election through members of the managing
committee, and if charged _pro rata_ of the electors appointed, a
sufficient safeguard would be provided against the temptation to
protract the sessions or to bribe professional electors.
The foregoing sketch of the executive and representative development of
the organisation of Labour Protection in the direction of united,
simple, uniform, specialized organisation of the whole aggregate of aids
to labour, ought at least to deserve some attention.
Provided that the upward progress of our civilisation continues
generally, this quite modern, hitherto unheard of, development of boards
and representative bodies, even if only brought about piecemeal, will
eventually be brought to completion, and will effect appreciable results
in the State and in society. Some of the best forms of special boards,
_i.e._ special representative bodies are already making their
appearance, _e.g._ the "Labour Secretariats" in Switzerland, the
American "Boards of Labour," and the Russian "Factory Courts" under the
governments of St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Vladimir (Act of June 23,
1868).