CHAPTER X.

TRANSACTIONS OF THE BERLIN LABOUR CONFERENCE, DEALING WITH MATTERS

BEYOND THE RANGE OF LABOUR PROTECTION; DALE'S DEPOSITIONS ON COURTS OF

ARBITRATION, AND THE SLIDING SCALE OF WAGES IN MINING.

The demand for a legal minimum wage, for wage tariffs, and the sliding

scale of wages, form no part of Labour Protection. The State cannot, as

we have seen, regulate wages directly, but only indirectly, by favouring

an adjustment of wages that shall be fair to each side. But even in

measures of that kind it does not interfere for the purpose of

protecting the persons of the wage earners in their _relations of

dependence_ on the employer. Politico-social proposals for indirectly

influencing the movement of wages, do not for this very reason, belong

to Labour Protection, in the sense which I have assigned to the term in

this book. Therefore, I shall content myself, on the one hand, with

clearing up a misunderstanding concerning the minimum wage and the wage

tariff; and on the other hand, with supplementing my former contribution

to the subject (_Jahrg., 1889, Die Zeitschrift fuer die gesammte

Staatswissenschaft_) from the reports of the Berlin Conference, having

special reference to the regulation of wage in the English mining

industries.

These proposals, dealing with minimum wage and the wage tariff, which I

shall now introduce into my treatise on Labour Protection, do not aim at

enforcing a minimum rate of wage from above, regardless of the

individual value of the labour, they merely aim at providing as far as

possible a stable adjustment and classification of efforts and rewards

between the whole body of employers and the whole body of workers in any

branch of industry or industrial district, _i.e._ at substituting

_general_ for _individual_ control, for the protection not of the worker

alone, but also of the employer, _i.e._ against exploiting competitors.

In Germany the printers have led the way; the number of their followers

in other industries is increasing. But this is a matter that must be

settled by the two classes, not by the State.

Questions of wage policy, however, even when unconnected with protective

policy, are often drawn into discussions on protective policy; and even

the Berlin Conference, which was officially designated[14] "an

international conference on the regulation of labour in industrial

establishments, and in mining industries," frequently overstepped the

limits of questions of purely protective policy. I feel myself fully

justified, therefore, in touching upon a few of the further questions

dealt with by the Conference.

In an earlier treatise, written before the proclamation of the Imperial

Decree of February 4th, 1890, I pointed out the need for the special

cultivation of Labour Protection in mining industry, particularly in

coal mining, and I expressed an opinion as to the advisability of

establishing government mines as a kind of politico-social model to the

rest; while, on the other hand, I declared against the necessity for the

nationalisation of coal mines.

Pamphlets of an opposing tendency, which circulated freely in the wake

of the great coal strike of 1889, have, it is true, brought to light

more and more reliable evidence; but hitherto I have found in them

nothing to shake my confidence in the correctness of my fundamental

contention: as far as I am concerned, I await without anxiety the issue

of the latest Coal Trust.

As I pointed out in the same treatise, the special danger of the strike

agitation, attacking as it does the very centres of activity and

channels of healthy movement in the social body, has unfortunately been

only too fully exemplified. The coal strike, and the railway and dock

strikes, have become samples, and are triumphantly quoted as typical

instances of the success of the method.

In the same treatise I raised the question whether the branches of

industry under consideration should be constituted a department of the

public service, involving special obligations and special safeguards

against breach of contract, but also ensuring special security of work

and a good standard of pay. This question has also risen to a high level

of importance since that time; it does not, however, belong to the

sphere of Labour Protection, and in this treatise I must therefore leave

it on one side.

But I consider myself bound to supplement the information given as to

the means of avoiding strikes in the mining industry by bringing forward

the communications made by the best informed English expert, who sat in

the Berlin Conference (session of March 4). The reports read as follows:

"Mr. Dale reminded the Conference that about twenty-five years ago

numerous and protracted strikes took place in the north of England (in

mining). In consequence of this, the employers met together to discuss

means of regulating the wage question. At first they refused to treat

with the workmen _in corpore_, but they finally decided on the advice of

a few of their number more far-seeing than the rest, to recognise the

union of miners belonging to one and the same mining district. This

principle once admitted formed the groundwork of the prevailing system

of the day for the settlement of all disputes. This method has obtained

for twenty years. At first the representatives of the employers and

workmen were only summoned to negotiate on special questions. The

principle of settlement by arbitration was admitted in all questions,

and was applied in the following manner: each party nominates an equal

number of arbitrators, usually two, and these elect an umpire; this last

office is willingly accepted by persons of the highest standing. Since

the questions laid before the board of arbitration mostly concern the

relation of wages to the market price of coal, this relation has to be

first ascertained from examination of the employers' books by a legally

qualified auditor, before a decision can be given. The most important

experimental method, which has so far been adopted for regulating the

relations between the rate of wage and the market price, has been the

sliding scale. The sliding scale aims at the establishment of a

numerical ratio between the rate of wage and the price of coal. At first

this was sometimes determined by the following method: five consecutive

years are taken, in the course of which considerable fluctuations have

taken place in the market prices and the price of coal (the latter

brought about by strikes, agreements, and arbitration). These five years

are divided into twenty quarters; the average price of coal and the

average rate of wage for each quarter is ascertained, and by this means

the numerical ratio of the two amounts to each other is determined. The

average of these numerical ratios is taken to express the normal

relation which must exist between the rate of wage and and the market

price of coal. Upon the scale thus determined the average market price

for all coal produced in the district for the last preceding quarter is

reckoned. The required numerical normal proportion between prices and

wages is now computed on this basis, and the rate of wage for the

current quarter thus determined. This calculation takes place for every

ensuing quarter. These calculations are made by two qualified auditors,

who are appointed by the labourers' union and the employers' union. The

books of all the works are submitted to these experts, who are bound to

the strictest secrecy as to the information thus obtained. They confine

themselves to the task of attesting: (1) that during the latest

preceding quarter, the average price of coal in the district is such and

such; (2) that such and such a rate of wage results therefrom. In this

way the workmen obtain, without the necessity of negotiation, of

strikes, or arbitration, the same wages which they could not otherwise

have obtained except by repeated efforts. The numerical ratio between

wages and market prices is generally fixed for two years. After that

time each party may give a half year's notice; but during six years, the

first sliding scale introduced has only been subjected to very slight

alterations. Notice will shortly be given by the employers in

Northumberland and the miners in Durham. Mr. Dale believes that this

double notice does not aim at the abolition of the system, but only at

revision of the existing scale. In the districts where for the moment

the sliding scale has been abolished, an attempt is being made to take

the nearest conjectural price of the current quarter as the basis,

instead of the price of the previous quarter. In this way the workmen

would receive official information as to the market prices, which would

be a great advantage, for strikes are most frequently caused by the

ignorance of the workmen as to the real position of the coal trade. As

to local questions which do not affect the whole district, they are

settled by so-called 'joint committees,' or mixed commissions formed by

an equal number of workmen and employers; either the President of the

county court, or some other person of high position, is chosen as

chairman. These commissions meet generally once a fortnight; their

decisions operate from the date of the complaint. Mr. Dale asserts that

the heads of the labour unions are, for the most part, intelligent men,

and when this is the case, the relations between workmen and employers

are easily arranged; in Durham, _e.g._, the miners union has four

secretaries, who devote their whole time to the affairs of the

association. In this district more than 500 disputes yearly are settled

by the joint committee."

At the request of the President, Mr. Dale gave some information as to

the strike of the past year; it did not affect the northern district

where good relations existed, although notice had previously been given

on the sliding scale. He further pointed out that former strikes had

often been caused by the fault of the foremen, who treated the workmen

with undue harshness. "The introduction of joint committees, on which

the workmen are equally represented, has had the effect of establishing

better relations between the foremen and the miners. Mr. Dale considers

this the best system for the avoidance of crises. The decisions

pronounced by the board of arbitration, and by the joint committees, are

generally accepted; thus the principle of decision by arbitration takes

the place of that of decision by strikes."

FOOTNOTE:

[14] Concluding speech of the Prussian Minister of Commerce.

The Theory and Policy of Labour Protection · 第 5 / 9 章