4. There was in the army a certain Xenophon, an Athenian, who

accompanied it neither in the character of general, nor captain, nor

common soldier, but it had happened that Proxenus, an old guest-friend

of his, had sent for him from home, giving him a promise that, if he

came, he would recommend him to the friendship of Cyrus, whom he

considered, he said, as a greater object of regard than his own country.

5. Xenophon, on reading the letter, consulted Socrates the Athenian, as

to the propriety of making the journey; and Socrates, fearing that if he

attached himself to Cyrus it might prove a ground for accusation against

him with his country, because Cyrus was thought to have zealously

assisted the Lacedæmonians in their war with Athens, advised Xenophon to

go to Delphi, and consult the god respecting the expedition. 6.

Xenophon, having gone thither accordingly, inquired of Apollo to which

of the gods he should sacrifice and pray, in order most honourably and

successfully to perform the journey which he contemplated, and, after

prosperously accomplishing it, to return in safety. Apollo answered him

that "he should sacrifice to the gods to whom it was proper for him to

sacrifice."[119] 7. When he returned, he repeated the oracle to

Socrates, who, on hearing it, blamed him for not asking Apollo in the

first place, whether it were better for him to go or stay at home;

whereas, having settled with himself that he would go, he only asked how

he might best go; "but since you have," said he, "put the question thus,

you must do what the god has directed." 8. Xenophon, therefore, having

sacrificed to the gods that Apollo commanded, set sail, and found

Proxenus and Cyrus at Sardis, just setting out on their march up the

country, and was presented to Cyrus. 9. Proxenus desiring that he should

remain with them, Cyrus joined in the same desire, and said that as soon

as the expedition was ended, he would send him home again. The

expedition was said to be intended against the Pisidians. 10. Xenophon

accordingly joined in the enterprise, being thus deceived, but not by

Proxenus; for he did not know that the movement was against the king,

nor did any other of the Greeks, except Clearchus. When they arrived in

Cilicia, however, it appeared manifest to every one that it was against

the king that their force was directed; but, though they were afraid of

the length of the journey, and unwilling to proceed, yet the greater

part of them, out of respect[120] both for one another and for Cyrus,

continued to follow him; of which number was Xenophon.

11. When this perplexity occurred, Xenophon was distressed as well as

the other Greeks, and unable to rest, but having at length got a little

sleep, he had a dream, in which, in the midst of a thunder-storm, a bolt

seemed to him to fall upon his father's house, and the house in

consequence became all in a blaze. 12. Being greatly frightened, he

immediately awoke, and considered his dream as in one respect

favourable, (inasmuch as, being in troubles and dangers, he seemed to

behold a great light from Jupiter,) but in another respect he was

alarmed, (because the dream appeared to him to be from Jupiter who was a

king, and the fire to blaze all around him,) lest he should be unable to

escape from the king's territories, but should be hemmed in on all sides

by inextricable difficulties.

13. What it betokens, however, to see such a dream, we may conjecture

from the occurrences that happened after the dream. What immediately

followed was this. As soon as he awoke, the thought that first occurred

to him was, "Why do I lie here? The night is passing away. With daylight

it is probable that the enemy will come upon us; and if we once fall

into the hands of the king, what is there to prevent us from being put

to death with ignominy, after witnessing the most grievous sufferings

among our comrades, and enduring every severity of torture ourselves?

14. Yet no one concerts measures, or takes thought, for our defence, but

we lie still, as if we were at liberty to enjoy repose. From what city,

then, do I expect a leader to undertake our defence? What age am I

waiting for to come to myself? Assuredly I shall never be older, if I

give myself up to the enemy to-day." 15. After these reflections he

arose, and called together, in the first place, the captains that were

under Proxenus.

When they were assembled, he said, "For my part, captains, I cannot

sleep, nor, I should think, can you, nor can I lie still any longer,

when I consider in what circumstances we are placed; 16. for it is plain

that the enemy did not openly manifest hostility towards us, until they

thought that they had judiciously arranged their plans; but on our side

no one takes any thought how we may best maintain a contest with them.

17. Yet if we prove remiss, and fall into the power of the king, what

may we not expect to suffer from a man who cut off the head and hand of

his own brother by the same mother and father, even after he was dead,

and fixed them upon a stake? What may not we, I say, expect to suffer,

who have no relative[121] to take our part, and who have marched against

him to make him a subject instead of a monarch, and to put him to death

if it should lie in our power? 18. Will he not proceed to every

extremity, that by reducing us to the last degree of ignominious

suffering, he may inspire all men with a dread of ever taking the field

against him? We must however try every expedient not to fall into his

hands. 19. For myself, I never ceased, while the truce lasted, to

consider ourselves as objects of pity, and to regard the king and his

people as objects of envy, as I contemplated how extensive and valuable

a country they possessed, how great an abundance of provisions, how many

slaves and cattle, and how vast a quantity of gold and raiment; 20.

while, on the other hand, when I reflected on the condition of our own

soldiers, that we had no share in any of all these blessings, unless we

bought it, and knew that few of us had any longer money to buy, and that

our oaths restrained us from getting provisions otherwise than by

buying, I sometimes, on taking all these circumstances into

consideration, feared the continuance of peace more than I now fear war.

21. But since they have put an end to peace, their own haughtiness, and

our mistrust, seem likewise to be brought to an end; for the advantages

which I have mentioned lie now as prizes between us, for whichsoever of

us shall prove the better men; and the gods are the judges of the

contest, who, as is just, will be on our side; 22. since the enemy have

offended them by perjury, while we, though seeing many good things to

tempt us, have resolutely abstained from all of them through regard to

our oaths; so that, as it seems to me, we may advance to the combat with

much greater confidence than they can feel. 23. We have bodies,

moreover, better able than theirs to endure cold and heat and toil; and

we have, with the help of the gods, more resolute minds; while the

enemy, if the gods, as before, grant us success, will be found more

obnoxious to wounds and death[122] than we are. 24. But possibly others

of you entertain the same thoughts; let us not, then, in the name of

heaven, wait for others to come and exhort us to noble deeds, but let us

be ourselves the first to excite others to exert their valour. Prove

yourselves the bravest of the captains, and more worthy to lead than

those who are now leaders. 25. As for me, if you wish to take the start

in the course, I am willing to follow you, or, if you appoint me to be a

leader, I shall not make my youth an excuse, but shall think myself

sufficiently mature to defend myself against harm."

26. Thus spoke Xenophon; and the captains, on hearing his observations,

all desired him to be their leader, except a certain Apollonides, who

resembled a Bœotian in his manner of speaking; this man said that

"whoever asserted they could gain safety by any other means than by

obtaining, if he could, the king's consent to it, talked absurdly;" and

at the same time began to enumerate the difficulties surrounding them.

27. But Xenophon, interrupting him, said, "O most wonderful of men! you

neither understand what you see, nor remember what you hear. Yet you

were on the same spot with those here present, when the king, after

Cyrus was dead, being in high spirits at the circumstance, sent to

demand that we should deliver up our arms; 28. and when we, refusing to

deliver them up, and appearing in full armour, went and encamped over

against him, what means did he not try, sending deputies, asking for a

truce, and supplying us with provisions until he obtained a truce? 29.

But when, on the other hand, our generals and captains went to confer

with the Barbarians, as you now advise us to do, without their arms, and

relying on the truce, were they not beaten, goaded, insulted, and are

they not unable, wretched men, to die, though, I should think, greatly

longing for death? And do you, knowing all these occurrences, say that

those who exhort us to defend ourselves talk absurdly, and advise us to

go again to try persuasion? 30. To me, O captains, it seems that we

should no longer admit this man into the same service with ourselves,

but take from him his captaincy, and laying baggage on his back, make

use of him in that capacity; for he disgraces both his own country and

all Greece, inasmuch as, being a Greek, he is of such a character." 31.

Here Agasias of Stymphalus, proceeding to speak, said, "But this man,

assuredly, has nothing to do either with Bœotia or with Greece at

all, for I have observed that he has both his ears bored, like a

Lydian." Such indeed was the case; and they accordingly expelled him.

32. The rest, proceeding to the different divisions of the troops,

called up the general wherever there was a general surviving, and the

lieutenant-general[123] where the general was dead, and the captain

wherever there was a captain surviving. 33. When they were all come

together, they sat down before the place where the arms were piled;[124]

and the generals and captains assembled were about a hundred in all. The

time when the meeting took place was about midnight.

34. Hieronymus, a native of Elis, the oldest of all the captains that

had served under Proxenus, was the first to speak, as follows: "It has

seemed proper to us, O generals and captains, on contemplating the

present state of our affairs, to meet together ourselves, and to call

upon you to join us, that we may determine, if we can, on some plan for

our benefit. But do you, Xenophon, first represent to the assembly what

you have already observed to us." 35. Xenophon accordingly said, "We are

all aware that the king and Tissaphernes have made prisoners of as many

of us as they could; and it is evident that they are forming designs

against the rest of us, that they may put us to death if they can. But

on our parts I think that every means should be adopted in order that we

may not fall into the Barbarians' hands, but rather that they, if we can

accomplish it, may fall into ours. 36. Be well assured, then, that you,

who have now met together in such numbers, have upon you a most

important responsibility;[125] for all the soldiers look to you, and, if

they see you dispirited, they will themselves lose courage, but if both

you yourselves appear well prepared to meet the enemy, and exhort others

to be equally prepared, be certain that they will follow you, and strive

to imitate you. 37. Perhaps, too, it is right that you should show some

superiority over them; for you are their generals, their officers, and

their captains, and, when there was peace, you enjoyed advantages over

them in fortune and honour; and now, in consequence, when war arises,

you ought to prove yourselves pre-eminent over the multitude, and to

take the lead in forming plans for them, and, should it ever be

necessary, in toiling for them. 38. And, in the first place, I think

that you will greatly benefit the army, if you take care that generals

and captains be chosen as soon as possible in the room of those whom we

have lost; for without commanders nothing honourable or advantageous can

be achieved, I may say in one word, anywhere, but least of all in the

field of battle. Good order conduces to safety, but want of order has

already proved fatal to many. 39. Again, when you have appointed as many

commanders as are requisite, I consider that if you were to assemble

and encourage the rest of the soldiers, you would act very suitably to

the occasion; 40. for you perhaps observe, as well as myself, how

dejectedly they have now come to the place of arms,[126] and how

dejectedly they go upon guard, so that, while they are in such a

condition, I know not for what service any one could employ them,

whether required by night or by day. 41. But if any one could change the

direction of their thoughts, so that they may not merely contemplate

what they are likely to suffer, but what they may be able to do, they

will become much more eager for action; 42. for you are certain that it

is neither numbers nor strength which gives the victory in war, but that

whichsoever side advances on the enemy with the more resolute courage,

their opponents, in general, cannot withstand their onset. 43. I have

also remarked, fellow-soldiers, that such as are eager in the field to

preserve their lives at any rate, for the most part perish wretchedly

and ignominiously, while I see that such as reflect that death is to all

men common and inevitable, and seek in battle only to fall with honour,

more frequently, from whatever cause, arrive at old age, and live, while

they live, with greater happiness. 44. Being aware, then, of these

facts, it behoves us, such are the circumstances in which we are placed,

both to prove ourselves to be brave soldiers, and to exhort others to be

so likewise." 45. Having spoken thus, he stopped.

After him Cheirisophus said, "Till the present moment, O Xenophon, I

knew nothing of you, except having heard that you were an Athenian, but

now I have to praise you both for what you say and what you do and could

wish that there were very many like you; for it would be a general good.

46. And now," he added, "let us not delay, my fellow-soldiers, but

proceed at once, you who want them, to choose commanders, and when you

have elected them, come to the centre of the camp, and bring those that

are chosen; and we will then call the rest of the soldiers together

there. And let Tolmides the herald," said he, "come with us." 47. As he

said this, he rose up, that the necessary measures might not be delayed,

but carried at once into execution. There were accordingly chosen

commanders, Timasion a Dardanian in the room of Clearchus, Xanthicles an

Achæan in that of Socrates, Cleanor an Arcadian in that of Agias,

Philesius an Achæan in that of Menon, and Xenophon of Athens in that of

Proxenus.

[Footnote 116: Ἐπὶ ταῖς βασιλέως θύραις.] See ii. 4. 4.]

[Footnote 117: Εἰς τὴν ἑσπέραν.] _Vespertino tempore_. Kühner]

[Footnote 118: Ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ ὅπλα.] See note on ii. 2. 20.]

[Footnote 119: Θεοις, οἷς ἔδει, θύειν.] _Ut diis eis, quibus oporteret,

sacra faceret._ Those gods are to be understood, to whom it was

established, by law or by custom, that whoever was entering on an

expedition, such as that which Xenophon meditated, should offer

sacrifice. They were therefore certain or appointed gods: comp. sect. 8;

and vi. i. 22. Yet the absence of the article ought not to surprise us,

even when special gods are meant. _Kühner_.--What gods they were, does

not appear.]

[Footnote 120: Δι' αἰσχύνην.] They had regard for their character in the

eyes of one another, fearing that they might seem faint-hearted; and

regard for it in those of Cyrus, fearing that they might seem

ungrateful. _Kühner_.--Αἰσχύνη is self-respect, apprehension of what

others may think of us; and may be illustrated by Hom. Il. v.

Ἀλλήλους δ' αἰδεῖσθε κατὰ κρατερὰς ὑσμίνας·

Αἰδομένων ἀνδρῶν πλέονες σόοι ἠὲ πέφανται·

"Have self-respect before one another in the violence of battle; of men

who respect themselves, more are saved than killed." Hutchinson cites A.

Gellius, xix. 7: αἰσχύνη ἐστὶ φόβος δικαίον ψόγου, i. e. _a fear of just

blame_.]

[Footnote 121: Κηδεμών.] Cyrus, says Weiske, had his mother to take his

part, the Greeks had no one to take theirs.]

[Footnote 122: Καὶ τρωτοὶ καὶ θνητοὶ μᾶλλον.] "More vulnerable and

mortal." Alluding to the superiority of the Grecian armour over that of

the Persians.]

[Footnote 123: Τὸν ὑποστράτηγον.] Krüger, from v. 9. 36, and vi. 2. 11,

concludes that the ὑποστράτηγος was he who was appointed to discharge

the duties of the στράτηγος in his absence, or to take his place if he

should be killed.]

[Footnote 124: See ii. 2. 20.]

[Footnote 125: Καιρόν.] Leunclavius makes this equivalent to "in vobis

plurimum est situm." Sturz, in his Lexicon Xenoph., says, "rerum status

is est, ut vos in primis debeatis rebus consulere." Toup, in his _Emend.

ad Suid._, gives _maximum momentum habetis_.]

[Footnote 126: See ii. 2. 20.]

CHAPTER II.

The new generals hold a council of war. The speeches of

Cheirisophus, Cleanor, and Xenophon. The order of march is settled,

and the duties of each commander appointed.

1. When the officers were chosen, and day was just dawning, they met in

the centre of the camp, and it was resolved to station sentinels at the

out-posts, and to call together the soldiers. When the rest of the

troops came up, Cheirisophus the Lacedæmonian rose first, and spoke as

follows: 2. "Our present circumstances, fellow-soldiers, are fraught

with difficulty, since we are deprived of such able generals, and

captains, and soldiers, and since, also, the party of Ariæus, who were

formerly our supporters, have deserted us; 3. yet it behoves us to

extricate ourselves from these difficulties as brave men, and not to

lose courage, but to endeavour to save ourselves, if we can, by an

honourable victory; but if we cannot do so, let us at least die with

honour, and never, while we live, put ourselves into the power of the

enemy; for I think that, in that case, we should endure such sufferings

as I wish that the gods may inflict on our adversaries."

4. After him Cleanor the Orchomenian arose and spoke thus: "You see,

soldiers, the perjury and impiety of the king; and you see also the

faithlessness of Tissaphernes, who, after telling us that he was a

neighbour of the Greeks, and would esteem it the highest privilege to

save us, and after having given us his right hand as a pledge, has

himself deceived and made prisoners our generals, and has not respected

even Jupiter, the protector of the rights of hospitality, but,

entertaining Clearchus at his own table, has, by this very means,

inveigled and destroyed our officers. 5. Ariæus, too, whom we offered to

make king, to whom we gave and from whom we received pledges, that we

would not betray one another, even he, neither fearing the gods, nor

respecting the memory of Cyrus, though honoured by him in the highest

degree while he was alive, has now gone over to his bitterest enemies,

and endeavours to distress us who were his friends. 6. But on these men

may the gods take vengeance; for ourselves, it is incumbent upon us,

having this conduct before our eyes, not to be deceived again by them,

but, after fighting as bravely as we can, to bear with patience such

fortune as the gods may appoint us."

7. Next stood up Xenophon, who had accoutred himself for war as

splendidly as he could, thinking that if the gods should grant them

victory, the finest equipment would be suitable to success, or that, if

it were appointed for him to die, it would be well for him to adorn

himself with his best armour,[127] and in that dress to meet his end. He

proceeded to speak thus: 8. "Of the perjury and perfidy of the

Barbarians Cleanor has just spoken, and you, I am sure, are well aware

of it. If, then, we think of coming again to terms of friendship with

them, we must of necessity feel much distrust on that head, when we see

what our generals have suffered, who, in reliance on their faith, put

themselves into their hands; but if we propose to inflict on them

vengeance with our swords for what they have done, and, for the future,

to be at war with them at all points, we have, with the help of the

gods, many fair hopes of safety." 9. As he was uttering these words,

somebody sneezed, and the soldiers, hearing it, with one impulse paid

their adoration to the god;[128] and Xenophon continued, "Since,

soldiers, while we were speaking of safety, an omen from Jupiter the

Preserver has appeared, it seems to me that we should vow to that god to

offer sacrifices for our preservation on the spot where we first reach a

friendly country; and that we should vow, at the same time, to sacrifice

to the other gods according to our ability. And to whomsoever this seems

reasonable, let him hold up his hand." All held up their hands; and they

then made their vows, and sang the pæan. When the ceremonies to the gods

were duly performed, he recommenced thus: 10. "I was saying that we had

many fair hopes of safety. In the first place, we have observed our

oaths made to the gods; but the enemy have perjured themselves, and

broken the truce and their oaths. Such being the case, it is natural

that the gods should be unfavourable to our enemies, and should fight on

our side; the gods, who are able, whenever they will, to make the mighty

soon weak, and to save the weak with ease, although they be in grievous

perils. 11. In the next place, I will remind you of the dangers in which

our ancestors were, that you may feel conscious how much it becomes you

to be brave, and how the brave are preserved, even from the greatest

troubles, by the aid of the gods. For when the Persians, and those

united with them, came with a numerous host, as if to sweep Athens from

the face of the earth,[129] the Athenians, by daring to oppose them,

gave them a defeat; 12. and having made a vow to Diana, that whatever

number they should kill of the enemy, they would sacrifice to her

divinity the same number of goats, and not being able to find enough,

they resolved to sacrifice five hundred every year; and to this day they

still continue to sacrifice them. 13. Again, when Xerxes, having

collected that innumerable army of his, came down upon Greece a second

time, our ancestors on that occasion, too, defeated the ancestors of

these Barbarians, both by land and sea; of which exploits the trophies

are still to be seen as memorials; the greatest of all memorials,

however, is the liberty of the states in which you were born and bred,

for you worship no man as master, but the gods alone. Of such ancestors

are you sprung.

14. "Nor am I going to say that you dishonour them. It is not yet many

days since you arrayed yourselves in the field against the descendants

of those Barbarians, and defeated, with the help of the gods, a force

many times more numerous than yourselves. 15. On that occasion you

showed yourselves brave men to procure a throne for Cyrus; and now, when

the struggle is for your own lives, it becomes you to be more valiant

and resolute. 16. At present, too, you may justly feel greater

confidence against your adversaries; for even then, when you had made no

trial of them, and saw them in countless numbers before you, you yet

dared, with the spirit of your fathers, to advance upon them, and now,

when you have learned from experience of them, that, though many times

your number, they shrink from receiving your charge, what reason have

you any longer to fear them? 17. And do not consider it any

disadvantage, that the troops of Cyrus, who were formerly arrayed on our

side, have now left us; for they are far more cowardly than those who

were defeated by you; at least[130] they deserted us to flee to them,

and those who are so ready to commence flight it is better to see posted

on the side of the enemy than in our own ranks.

18. "If, again, any of you are disheartened because we have no cavalry,

and the enemy have a great number, consider that ten thousand cavalry

are nothing more than ten thousand men; for no one ever perished in

battle of being bitten or kicked by a horse; it is the men that do

whatever is done in the encounter. 19. Doubtless we, too, rest upon a

surer support than cavalry have, for they are raised upon horses, and

are afraid, not only of us, but also of falling, while we, taking our

steps upon the ground, shall strike such as approach us with far greater

force, and hit much more surely the mark at which we may aim. In one

point alone, indeed, have the cavalry the advantage, that it is safer

for them to flee than for us.

20. "But if, though you have courage for battle, you are disquieted at

the thought that Tissaphernes will no longer guide you, and that the

king will no longer supply you with provisions, consider whether it is

better to have Tissaphernes for our guide, who is manifestly plotting

our destruction, or such persons as we ourselves may seize and compel to

be our guides, who will be conscious that if they go wrong with regard

to us, they go wrong with regard to their own lives and persons. 21. And

as to provisions, whether is it better for us to purchase, in the

markets which they provide, small measures of food for large sums of

money, (no longer, indeed, having the money,) or, if we are successful

in the field, to take supplies for ourselves, adopting whatever measure

each of us may wish to use?

22. "Again, if you think, that this state of things will be better, but

imagine that the rivers will be impassable, and that you were greatly

misled when you came across them, reflect whether the Barbarians have

not acted most unwisely also in this respect.[131] For all rivers,

though they may be impassable at a distance from their sources, are easy

to be forded by those who go to their springs, wetting them not even to

the knees. 23. But even if the rivers shall not afford us a

passage,[132] and no guide shall appear to conduct us, we still need not

be in despair; for we know that the Mysians, whom we should not call

more valiant than ourselves, have settled themselves, against the king's

will, in many rich and large cities in the king's territory; we know

that the Pisidians have acted similarly; and we have ourselves seen[133]

that the Lycaonians, having seized on the strongholds in the plains,

enjoy the produce of the land of these Barbarians; 24. and I should

recommend that we, for the present, should not let it be seen that we

are eager to start homewards, but should apparently make arrangements as

if we thought of settling somewhere in these parts; for I am sure that

the king would grant the Mysians many guides, and give them many

hostages to send them out of the country safely, and even make roads for

them, though they should desire to depart in four-horse chariots; and

for ourselves, too, I am convinced that he would with thrice as much

pleasure do the same, if he saw us making dispositions to remain here.

25. But I am afraid that if we should once learn to live in idleness, to

revel in abundance, and to associate with the fair and stately wives and

daughters of the Medes and Persians, we should, like the

lotus-eaters,[134] think no more of the road homewards. 26. It seems to

me, therefore, both reasonable and just, that we should first of all

make an attempt to return to Greece, and to the members of our families,

and let our countrymen see that they live in voluntary poverty, since

they might see those, who are now living at home without due means of

subsistence, enriched on betaking themselves hither. But I need say no

more on this head, for it is plain, my fellow-soldiers, that all these

advantages fall to the conquerors.

27. "I must also suggest to you, however, in what manner we may proceed

on our way with the greatest safety, and how we may fight, if it should

be necessary to fight, to the greatest possible advantage. First of all,

then," he continued, "it seems to me that we ought to burn whatever

carriages we have, that our cattle may not influence our movements, but

that we may march whithersoever it may be convenient for the army; and

then that we should burn our tents with them, for tents are troublesome

to carry, and of no service either for fighting or in getting

provisions. 28. I think also that we ought to rid ourselves of whatever

is superfluous in the rest of our baggage, reserving only what we have

for war, or for meat and drink, that as many of us as possible may be

under arms, and as few as possible baggage-bearers; for you are aware

that whatever belongs to the conquered becomes the property of others;

and, if we are victorious, we ought to look upon the enemy as our

baggage-carriers.

29. "It only remains for me to mention a particular which I consider to

be of the greatest importance. You see that the enemy did not venture

openly to commence war against us, until they had seized our generals,

thinking that as long as we had commanders, and were obedient to them,

we should be in a condition to gain the advantage over them in the

field, but, on making prisoners of our generals, they expected that we

should perish from want of direction and order. 30. It is incumbent,

therefore, on our present commanders to be far more vigilant than our

former ones, and on those under command to be far more orderly, and

more obedient to their officers, at present than they were before. 31.

And if you were also to pass a resolution, that, should any one be

disobedient, whoever of you chances to light upon him is to join with

his officer in punishing him, the enemy would by that means be most

effectually disappointed in their expectations, for, on the very day

that such resolution is passed, they will see before them ten thousand

Clearchuses instead of one, who will not allow a single soldier to play

the coward. 32. But it is now time for me to conclude my speech;[135]

for in an instant perhaps the enemy will be upon us. Whosoever,

therefore, thinks these suggestions reasonable, let him give his

sanction to them at once, that they may be carried into execution. But

if any other course, in any one's opinion, be better than this,[136] let

him, even though he be a private soldier, boldly give us his sentiments;

for the safety, which we all seek, is a general concern."

33. Cheirisophus then said, "Should there be need of any other measure

in addition to what Xenophon proposes, it will be in our power to bring

it forward by and by; what he has now suggested we ought, I think, to

vote at once to be the best course that we can adopt; and to whomsoever

this seems proper, let him hold up his hand;" and they all held them up.

34. Xenophon then, rising again, said, "Hear, soldiers, what appears to

me to be necessary in addition to what I have laid before you. It is

plain that we must march to some place from which we may get provisions;

and I hear that there are some good-looking villages not more than

twenty stadia distant; 35. but I should not wonder if the enemy, (like

cowardly dogs that run after such as pass by them, and bite them if they

can, but flee from those who pursue them,) I should not wonder, I say,

if the enemy were to follow close upon us when we begin to march. 36. It

will, perhaps, be the safer way for us to march, therefore, forming a

hollow square of the heavy-armed troops, in order that the baggage and

the large number of camp-followers, may be in greater security within

it; and if it be now settled who is to lead the square, and regulate

the movements in front, who are to be on each flank, and who to have

charge of the rear, we shall not have to consider of these things when

the enemy approach, but may at once act according to what has been

arranged. 37. If, then, any one else sees anything better to recommend,

let it be settled otherwise; if not, let Cheirisophus lead, since he is

also a Lacedæmonian;[137] let two of the oldest generals take the

command on each of the flanks; and let Timasion and myself, the youngest

of the officers, take charge, at least for the present, of the rear. 38.

After a time, when we have tried this arrangement, we will consider, as

occasion may require, what may seem best to be done. If any one thinks

of any better plan than this, let him speak." As nobody made any

objection, he said, "Whosoever likes these proposals, let him hold up

his hand." The proposals were approved. 39. "And now," he added, "it

belongs to you to go and carry into execution what has been decided

upon; and whosoever of you wishes to see his friends and relations, let

him prove himself a man of valour, for by no other means can he succeed

in attaining that object; whoever of you desires to preserve his life,

let him strive to conquer, for it is the part of conquerors to kill, but

of the conquered to die; and if any one of you covets spoil, let him

endeavour to secure victory for us, for it is the privilege of victors

at once to save their own property and to seize on that of the

vanquished."

[Footnote 127: Τών καλλίστων ἐαυτὸν ἀξιώσαντα.] "Thinking himself worthy

of the most beautiful (equipments)."]

[Footnote 128: Τὸν θεόν.] Jupiter the Preserver. _Kühner_.]

[Footnote 129: Αὔθις ἀφανιούντων.] Weiske, Schneider, and others omit

the αὔθις. Bornemann, Dindorf, and Kühner preserve it, as it is found in

six manuscripts, giving it, with Spohn, Lect. Theocr. i. p. 33, the

sense of _back again_, as if the Persians had intended to make Athens

disappear again as if it had never been. I think the word better left

out. An American editor has conjectured αὐτὰς.]

[Footnote 130: Γοῦν.] Some copies have οὖν. "The sense of γοῦν is this;

_ceteris rebus prætermissis, hoc quidem certissimum est, eos fugisse_."

Kühner.]

[Footnote 131: Εἰ ἄρα, κ. τ. λ.] Krüger admonishes the reader that these

words must be taken negatively: _whether--not_.]

[Footnote 132: Διήσουσιν.] Eight manuscripts have διοίσουσιν, which

Bornemann has preferred. Dindorf also gave the preference to it in his

first edition, but has subsequently adopted the other reading. Μήτε

διοίσουσιν is interpreted by Bornemann, "if the rivers shall present no

difference in any part of their course; if they be as broad at their

sources as at their mouths."]

[Footnote 133: Αὐτοὶ εἴδομεν.] The Greeks had passed through a part of

Lycaonia in their march up the country, i. 2. 19; when, however, it is

not indicated that they saw much.]

[Footnote 134: The allusion is to Odyss. ix. 83, where the lotus-eaters

are mentioned:

The trees around them all their food produce,

Lotus the name, divine nectareous juice,

(Thence called Lotophagi,) which whoso tastes,

Insatiate riots in the sweet repasts,

Nor other home, nor other care intends,

But quits his house, his country, and his friends. _Pope._

]

[Footnote 135: Περαίνειν.] Sc. τὸν λόγον. This is the sense in which

this word has been taken, I believe, by most readers; as in Æsch. Pers.

699, and elsewhere. Sturz, in his Lexicon, seems to take it in the sense

of _to execute, to proceed to action_.]

[Footnote 136: Εἰ δὲ τι ἄλλο βέλτιον ἤ ταύτῃ.] Understand δοκεῖ ἔχειν.

_Kühner_. "But if anything else (seems) better (to any one) than in this

way."]

[Footnote 137: Ἐπειδὴ καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιός ἐστι.] The καὶ, _also_, refers

to something understood: "since he is not only a brave man, but also a

Lacedæmonian." _Kühner_. The Lacedæmonians were then at the head of

Greece: comp. v. 9. 26; vi. 6. 12. _Zeune_.]

CHAPTER III.

The Greeks are visited by Mithridates as a friend, but he soon

shows that he is an enemy, and they resolve to enter into no

further negotiations with the Persian king. They pass the Zabatus,

are harassed by Mithridates, and suffer from the want of slingers

and cavalry. Volunteers are enrolled for these services.

1. When this speech was concluded, they rose up, and went off to burn

their carriages and tents; of their superfluous baggage they divided

among themselves such portions as any needed, and threw the rest into

the fire. Having done this, they went to breakfast. While they were at

their meal, Mithridates rode up to them with about thirty horsemen and

requesting the generals to come within hearing, spoke as follows: 2. "I

was faithful to Cyrus, O men of Greece, as you yourselves know; I am now

well disposed towards you; and I am living here under great

apprehensions; if therefore I should find that you are concerting any

safe scheme for your deliverance, I would come and join you, bringing

with me all my followers. Let me know, therefore, what you have in

contemplation, as one who is your friend and well-wisher, and who is

willing to march along with you." 3. The generals, after consulting

together, resolved on returning the following answer; and Cheirisophus

delivered it: "It is our determination, if no one hinders us from

returning home, to proceed through the country with as little injury to

it as possible; but if any one opposes us on our march, to fight our way

against him as vigorously as we can." 4. Mithridates then endeavoured to

convince them how impracticable it was to escape without the king's

consent. But it was now concluded that he was insidiously sent; for one

of the followers of Tissaphernes was in attendance on him to insure his

fidelity.[138] 5. In consequence, it was thought right by the generals

to pass a resolution that the war should be such as to admit of no

intercourse by heralds;[139] for those that came tried to corrupt the

soldiers, and succeeded in seducing one of the captains, Nicarchus an

Arcadian, and he deserted in the night with about twenty men.

6. Having then dined, and crossed the river Zabatus, they marched on in

regular order, keeping the baggage-cattle and camp-followers in the

centre. But before they had gone far, Mithridates made his appearance

again with about two hundred cavalry and about four hundred archers and

slingers, very light and active troops. 7. He advanced towards the

Greeks as a friend, but, when he came near, some of his men, both horse

and foot, suddenly discharged their arrows, and others used their

slings, and wounded some of our men. The rear of the Greeks indeed was

much harassed, and could do nothing in return; for the Cretan bowmen

shot to a less distance than the Persians, and had also, as being

lightly armed, sheltered themselves within the heavy troops; and the

javelin-men did not hurl far enough to reach the slingers. 8. Upon this

it seemed to Xenophon that it would be well to pursue them; and such of

the heavy-armed and peltasts as happened to be with him in the rear,

began to pursue, but could overtake in the pursuit not a single man of

the enemy; 9. for the Greeks had no cavalry,[140] nor could their

infantry, in a short distance, overtake the infantry of the enemy, who

took to flight when they were a long way off, since it was impossible

for the Greeks to follow them to a great distance from the rest of the

army. 10. The Barbarian cavalry, too, inflicted wounds in their retreat,

shooting backwards as they rode, and however far the Greeks advanced in

pursuit, so far were they obliged to retreat fighting. 11. Thus during

the whole day they did not advance more than five-and-twenty stadia;

however, they arrived at the villages in the evening.

Here again there was much dejection; and Cheirisophus and the oldest of

the generals blamed Xenophon for pursuing the enemy apart from the main

body, endangering himself, and yet being unable to hurt the assailants.

12. Xenophon, hearing this charge, acknowledged that they blamed him

justly, and that the result bore testimony in their favour. "But," said

he, "I was under the necessity of pursuing, as I saw that we suffered

great damage while remaining at our posts, and were unable to retaliate.

13. But when we began to pursue," continued he, "the truth was as you

say; for we were none the better able to injure the enemy, and we could

not retreat without great difficulty. 14. Thanks are due to the gods,

therefore, that the Barbarians did not come upon us in great force, but

only with a few troops, so that, whilst they did us no great harm, they

showed us of what we stand in need: 15. for at present the enemy shoot

their arrows and sling their stones such a distance, that neither can

the Cretans return their shots, nor can those who throw with the hand

reach them; and when we pursue them, we cannot go after them any great

distance from the main body, and in a short space a foot-soldier, even

if ever so swift, cannot overtake another foot-soldier, starting at

bow-shot distance. 16. If therefore we would keep off the enemy, so that

they may be unable to hurt us on our march, we must at once provide

ourselves with slingers and cavalry. There are, I hear, some Rhodians in

our army, the greater number of whom, they say, understand the use of

the sling, while their weapon carries even double the distance of the

Persian sling, 17. which, as they sling with large stones, reach only a

short distance, while the Rhodians know how to use leaden bullets. 18.

If then, we ascertain which of them have slings, and give money to each

of them[141] for them; and pay money also to any one who is willing to

plait more, and find some other privilege[142] for him who consents to

serve in the troop of slingers,[143] possibly some will offer themselves

who may be able to be of service to us. 19. I see also that there are

horses in the army, some in my possession, and some left by Clearchus,

besides many others taken from the enemy which are employed in carrying

the baggage. If, then, we collect all these, and put ordinary

baggage-cattle in their place, and equip the horses for riders, they

will perhaps annoy the enemy in their flight." 20. These suggestions

were approved; and that very night there came forward slingers to the

number of two hundred. The next day, as many as fifty horsemen and

horses were pronounced fit for service; leathern jackets[144] and

breastplates were furnished to them; and Lycius the son of Polystratus

an Athenian, was appointed their captain.

[Footnote 138: Πίστεως ἕνεκα.] To watch him, lest he should act

treacherously. _Kühner_.]

[Footnote 139: Πόλεμον ἀκήρυκτον.] Properly _war in which there is no

use for heralds_, but in which all is violent and desperate; so that

ἀκήρυκτος will be equivalent, according to Hesychius, to ἀδιάλλακτος,

_implacable_, _irreconcilable_. See Erasm. Adag. iii. 3. 84. _Sturz

Lex_. Others rather think it a deadly war, not commenced by sending

heralds, and not to be terminated by sending them. _Kühner_. See Herod.

v. 81.]

[Footnote 140: Cyrus's Greek auxiliaries for the expedition had

consisted only of infantry; all his cavalry was either Asiatic or

Thracian. The Thracian horse had deserted, and the Asiatic cavalry had

gone over to Tissaphernes soon after the battle.]

[Footnote 141: Τούτῳ μὲν.] As τίνες πέπανται immediately precedes, the

singular τούτῳ rather startles the reader; but there are not wanting

examples of similar irregularity.]

[Footnote 142: Ἀτέλειαν.] Exemption, for instance, from keeping guard

and keeping watch. _Krüger_.]

[Footnote 143: Τῷ σφενδονᾶν ἐντεταγμένω ἐθέλοντι.] "To him willing to be

a slinger, being enrolled in the company (of slingers)." This is the

reading of Schneider, and Dindorf, and Bornemann. Kühner and some others

prefer ἐν τῷ τεταγμένῳ, "in the place appointed him."]

[Footnote 144: Σπολάδες.] This form of the word is preferred by Dindorf,

Schneider, Bornemann, and Kühner prefer στολάδες, both in this passage

and in iv. 1. 18. Both forms seem to have been in use, and to have had

the same signification; but σπολάς to have been the more common. See

Pollux, 1. 135. Hesychius has σπολὰς, χιτωνίσκος βαθὺς, σκύτινος, ὁ

βύρσινος θώραξ. See Pollux, 7. 70; 10. 143. Suidas, Phavorinus, and

Photius give similar interpretations.]

CHAPTER IV

Mithridates again pursues the Greeks, but is repulsed. They reach

the Tigris, encamp at Mespila, and are attacked by Tissaphernes

with a numerous force. They repel him, and alter their order of

march. Traversing a mountainous part of the country, they are

harassed by the enemy, till, on getting possession of a height,

they are enabled to reach the plain beyond it in safety.

1. Having halted for that day, they went forward on the next, rising

earlier in the morning than usual; for they had a ravine formed by a

torrent to pass, at which they were afraid that the enemy would attack

them while they were crossing. 2. It was not till they had got over,

however, that Mithridates again made his appearance, having now with him

a thousand horse, and archers and slingers to the number of four

thousand; for he had solicited and obtained that number from

Tissaphernes, promising that, if he received them, he would deliver the

Greeks into his hands; for he had conceived a contempt for them,

because, in his previous attack on them, though he had but a small force

with him, he had suffered no loss, and thought that he had caused them

great annoyance. 3. When the Greeks, having crossed, were distant about

eight stadia from the ravine, Mithridates also passed over it with his

force. Instructions had been issued to such of the peltasts and

heavy-armed troops as were to pursue, and a charge had been given to the

horsemen to pursue with boldness, as a sufficient force would follow to

support them. 4. When therefore Mithridates overtook them, and the

slings and arrows began to take effect, a signal was given to the Greeks

with the trumpet, and those who had been ordered immediately hastened to

charge the enemy, the cavalry riding forward at the same time. The enemy

however did not wait to receive their charge, but fled back to the

ravine. 5. In the pursuit several of the Barbarian foot were killed,

and about eighteen of the horse were made prisoners in the defile. The

Greeks, of their own impulse, mutilated the dead bodies, in order that

the sight of them might be as horrible as possible to the enemy.

6. The enemy, after faring thus, went off, and the Greeks, advancing the

rest of the day without molestation, arrived at the river Tigris. 7.

Here was a large deserted city, the name of which was Larissa, and which

the Medes had formerly inhabited. The breadth of its wall was five and

twenty feet, and the height of it a hundred; its circuit was two

parasangs. It was built of bricks made of clay, but there was under it a

stone foundation,[145] the height of twenty feet. 8. This city the king

of the Persians,[146] at the time when the Persians wrested[147] the

empire from the Medes, was unable by any means to take; a cloud,

however, having covered the sun, hid it from view,[148] till the people

deserted it,[149] and so it was taken. 9. Near the city was a stone

pyramid of the breadth[150] of one plethrum, and the height of two

plethra. Upon it[151] were many of the Barbarians who had fled from the

neighbouring villages.

10. Hence they proceeded one day's journey, six parasangs, to a large

unoccupied fortress,[152] situated near a city, the name of which was

Mespila; the Medes had formerly inhabited it. The foundation of the wall

was of polished stone, full of shells,[153] the breadth fifty feet, and

the height fifty; 11. and on it was constructed a wall of bricks, fifty

feet broad, and a hundred high; the circumference of it was six

parasangs. Here Medea, the king's wife, is said to have taken refuge,

when the Medes were deprived of their empire by the Persians. 12. The

king of the Persians, on besieging this city, was unable to reduce it

either by length of time or by assault, but Jupiter, as with a

thunder-stroke,[154] deprived the inhabitants of their senses, and thus

it was taken.

13. Hence they proceeded one day's journey, a distance of four

parasangs. In the course of this day's march Tissaphernes made his

appearance, having with him the cavalry which he himself commanded, the

force of Orontes, who had married the king's daughter, the Barbarian

troops with which Cyrus went up, the troops with which the king's

brother came to assist him, and, besides these, all that the king

himself had given him; so that his army appeared extremely numerous. 14.

When he came near, he stationed some of his companies in the rear, and

brought others round upon our flanks, but did not venture to make a

charge, or show any disposition to endanger himself, but ordered his men

to use their slings and bows. 15. But when the Rhodians, who were

dispersed among the ranks, began to use their slings, and the Scythian

archers[155] discharged their arrows, no one failing to hit a man, (for

it would not have been easy to do so, even if they had been ever so

desirous,) Tissaphernes hastily retreated beyond reach of the missiles,

and the other divisions drew off at the same time. 16. During the rest

of the day the Greeks continued their march, and the enemy followed; but

the Barbarians no longer harassed them with their usual skirmishing; for

the Rhodians sent their missiles to a greater distance than the

Persians, and than most of the bowmen. 17. The bows of the Persians,

too, were large, so that such of their arrows as were taken up, were of

service to the Cretans, who continued to use the enemy's arrows, and

practised shooting by sending them far up into the air.[156] A great

number of bowstrings were also found in the villages, and some lead, so

that they could use it for their slings.

18. For that day, therefore, as soon as the Greeks reached the villages

and encamped, the Barbarians went off, having had the worst in the

skirmish; and during the next the Greeks remained where they were, and

collected provisions, for there was plenty of corn in the villages. The

day after, they proceeded through the open country, and Tissaphernes

followed, hurling missiles at them from a distance. 19. Here the Greeks

found that a square was a bad disposition for an army when the enemy

was behind them: for it must necessarily happen, that if the flanks of

the square close together from the road being narrow, or from hills or a

bridge making it necessary, that the heavy-armed men must be pushed out

of their places, and march with difficulty,[157] being at the same time

crowded together and thrown into confusion; so that when in such

disorder they must be nearly useless. 20. And when, again, the flanks

divide, those who were previously forced out of their places, must now

of necessity separate, and the space between the flanks be left empty;

and men who are thrown into such a condition must doubtless lose heart,

if the enemy are behind them. Whenever, too, they had to pass a bridge,

or any other crossing-place, each hastened on to get first, and the

enemy had then a fine opportunity of attacking them.[158] 21. The

generals, seeing that such was the case, formed six companies of a

hundred men each, and appointed captains of these companies, as well as

captains of fifty and captains of twenty-five.[159] These captains and

their companies, on the march, whenever the flanks of the square closed

together, fell behind, so as to cause no disorder in the flanks, and

then led on outside the flanks; 22. and whenever the sides of the square

opened, they filled up the centre, if the opening was narrow, by

companies; if rather wide, by fifties; if very wide, by

twenty-fives;[160] so that the centre was always full. 23. If, then, it

was necessary to pass any defile or bridge, they were not thrown into

confusion, but the captains and companies went over in succession;[161]

and if anything was needed in any part of the main body, these were at

hand. In this order they advanced four days' journey.

24. As they were pursuing the fifth day's march, they observed a kind of

palace, and several villages round it. The way to this place, they

perceived, lay among high hills, which reached down from a mountain, at

the foot of which the village was.[162] These hills the Greeks were glad

to see, as was natural, when the enemy's force consisted of cavalry. 25.

But when, after leaving the plain, they had ascended the first hill, and

were descending in order to mount the second, the Barbarians came upon

them, and from the eminence began, under the lash,[163] to hurl darts,

use their slings, and shoot arrows, on the ground below; 26. they

wounded many, and had the advantage over the light-armed Greeks, and

shut them up within the heavy-armed; so that both the slingers and

archers were that day entirely useless, being mixed with the crowd that

had charge of the baggage. 27. When the Greeks, on being hard pressed,

attempted pursuit, they mounted the height but slowly, as being heavily

armed, while the enemy sprang up speedily. 28. When, again, they

retreated back to the rest of the force, they fared equally ill. The

same occurrences took place on the second hill; so that they thought it

proper not to move the soldiers from the third hill, until they led up a

body of peltasts to the mountain from the right wing of the square. 29.

When these had got above the pursuing enemy, they no longer attacked

them in their descent, fearing that they might be cut off from their own

body, and that enemies might assail them on both sides. 30. Marching in

this manner for the rest of the day, some by the route among the hills,

and others advancing abreast of them along the mountain, they arrived

at the villages, and appointed eight surgeons,[164] for there were many

wounded.

31. Here they remained three days, both for the sake of the wounded, and

because they found, at the same time, abundance of provisions,

wheat-flour, wine, and a great quantity of barley laid up for horses;

supplies which had been collected for the satrap of the country. On the

fourth day they went down into the plain. 32. But as Tissaphernes

overtook them with his forces, necessity taught them to encamp where

they first saw a village, and not to march on still fighting; for there

were many unfitted for action, some wounded, some carrying the wounded,

and some bearing the arms of those that carried them. 33. When however

they were encamped, and the Barbarians, coming up to the village,

attempted to skirmish with them, the Greeks had greatly the advantage;

for they found a great difference[165] between sallying from their own

ground to repulse the enemy, and fighting with a pursuing enemy on their

march.

34. When evening approached, it became time for the enemy to retire; for

the Barbarians never encamped at a less distance from the Greeks than

sixty stadia, fearing lest the Greeks should attack them in the night.

35. For in the night a Persian army is difficult to manage; as their

horses are tied, and for the most part fastened by the feet, that they

may not run away if they should be untied; and if any sudden attack

takes place, the Persian has[166] to put the housings [167] on his

horse, and to bridle him, and then, when he has put on his armour, to

mount; but all these things are troublesome by night and in the midst of

an alarm. On this account they encamped at a distance from the Greeks.

36. As soon as the Greeks saw that they intended to retire, and were

passing the order for doing so, proclamation was made among the Greeks,

in the hearing of the enemy, that they were to collect their baggage;

when the Barbarians, for some time, delayed their march; but, when it

grew late, they went off; for they did not think it expedient to march

and arrive at their camp[168] in the night. 37. When the Greeks observed

them evidently moving away, they themselves also decamped[169] and began

to march, and accomplished as much as sixty stadia. There was thus so

great a distance between the armies, that the enemy did not appear on

the following day or on the third; but on the fourth, the Barbarians,

having gone forward in the night, occupied an elevated position on the

right, on the route by which the Greeks were to pass; the brow of a

mountain, beneath which was the descent into the plain. 38. As soon as

Cheirisophus saw that this eminence was pre-occupied, he sent for

Xenophon from the rear, and ordered him to bring his peltasts and come

to the front. 39. Xenophon however did not bring the peltasts, (for he

saw Tissaphernes, and all his force, in full view,) but, riding up

alone, asked, "Why do you call me?" Cheirisophus replied, "You may see;

for the eminence above the descent has been pre-occupied against us, and

it is impossible to pass, unless we cut off those who are on it. But why

did you not bring the peltasts?" 40. Xenophon replied that he did not

think it right to leave the rear unguarded when the enemy were in sight.

"But it is high time," he continued, "to consider how some of us may

dislodge those men from the hill." 41. Xenophon now noticed that the

summit of the mountain[170] was above their own army, and that there

was a way from it to the hill where the enemy were, and exclaimed, "It

is best for us, Cheirisophus, to hasten as quickly as possible to the

summit, for if we gain this, those who are above our road will be unable

to maintain their ground. But do you, if you please, remain with the

army; I have a desire to go forward; or, if you prefer it, proceed on to

the mountain, and I will stay here." 42. "I leave you," replied

Cheirisophus, "to choose which of the two you please." Xenophon,

observing that he was the younger, decided on advancing, but requested

Cheirisophus to send with him a detachment from the front, as it was too

great a distance to bring one from the rear. 43. Cheirisophus then sent

with him the peltasts from the front; and he took those that were in the

middle of the square. Cheirisophus also ordered the three hundred that

he had with him at the head of the square, consisting of picked men, to

follow Xenophon.

44. The party then marched forward with all possible speed. But the

enemy on the heights, when they perceived that the Greeks were directing

their course towards the summit, hurried forward also themselves to

contend for the possession of the summit. 45. There was then great

shouting from the Grecian army, cheering their men, and great shouting

also from the troops of Tissaphernes, cheering on theirs. 46. Xenophon,

riding along on horseback, encouraged his party, saying, "Consider,

soldiers, that you are now contending for Greece; that after a brief

struggle now, we shall march the rest of the way without fighting, to

join our children and our wives." 47. Soterides, a Sicyonian, cried out,

"We are not upon an equality, Xenophon; for you are carried on a horse,

while I have hard work to carry my shield." 48. Xenophon, on hearing

this remark, leaped from his horse, pushed Soterides from the ranks,

took from him his shield, and marched on with it as fast as he was able.

He happened however to have on his horseman's corslet, so that he was

distressed. Yet he continued to exhort the men in front to lead on

gently, and those behind, who followed with difficulty, to come up. 49.

But the rest of the soldiers beat and threw stones at Soterides, and

reviled him, till they obliged him to resume his shield and march in his

place. Xenophon, remounting, led the way, as long as it was passable for

his horse, on horseback, but when it became impassable, he left his

horse behind, and hastened forward on foot. Thus they got the start of

the enemy, and arrived first at the summit.

[Footnote 145: Κρηπὶς δ' ὑπῆν λιθίνη, κ. τ. λ.] The foundation appears

to have risen twenty feet above the ground; so that the whole height of

the wall would be a hundred and twenty feet. Mr. Ainsworth says that he

found the ruins of the brick wall at Resen, which he considers to be the

same with Larissa, "based on a rude and hard conglomerate rock, giving

to them all the solidity and characteristics of being built of stone."

_Travels in the Track_, p. 139.]

[Footnote 146: Cyrus the Great.]

[Footnote 147: Ἐλάμβανον.] That the Medes did not willingly submit, but

were overcome by force, is testified by Herodotus, and is apparent from

what is said here; whence it follows that λαμβάνειν τὴν ἀρχὴν παρά τινος

may be applied even when those who lose the government are forcibly

deprived of it. Xenophon however is at variance with himself in the

Cyropædia, where Cyrus is said to have succeeded to the throne by a

marriage with the daughter of Cyaxares. _Kühner_.]

[Footnote 148: Ἥλιον δὲ νεφέλη προκαλύψασα ἠφάνισε.] This reading has

been adopted by Dindorf and others, from a conjecture of Brodæus or

Muretus; the manuscripts have all ἥλιος δὲ νεφέλην προκάλυψας, except

two, one of which has the ν erased in νεφέλην, and the other νεφέλῃ.

Those who read with Dindorf refer to Plutarch de Placit. Philosoph. ii.

24, where the cause of an eclipse of the sun is said by some

philosophers to be _a condensation of clouds imperceptibly advancing

over the disc_. Bornemann and Kühner restore the reading of the

manuscripts, which Langius thus interprets: _sol nubem sibi prætendens

se obscuravit_; than which no better explanation has been offered. That

we are not to suppose an eclipse of the sun to be signified in the text,

is well observed by Bornemann; as Thales had previously ascertained the

causes of such eclipses, and had foretold one, according to Herodotus i.

74; hence it is impossible to believe that Xenophon would have spoken of

a solar eclipse himself, or have made the inhabitants speak of one, so

irrationally. Hutchinson and Zeune absurdly understand τὴν πόλιν with

ἠφάνισε.]

[Footnote 149: Ἐξέλιπον.] Hutchinson and Weiske interpret this word

_animis defecerunt_. Abreschius (Dilucid. Thucyd. p. 274) makes it

_reliquerunt_ sc. _urbem_; an interpretation adopted by Porson,

Schneider, Kühner, and all the modern editors.]

[Footnote 150: Εὖρος.] We must understand the length of each side.]

[Footnote 151: Ἐπὶ ταύτης.] There might be steps on the outside on which

they might climb.]

[Footnote 152: Τεῖχος.] Now called _Yarumjah_, according to Ainsw.

Travels, p. 139.]

[Footnote 153: Κογχυλιάτον.] "It is a curious fact, that the common

building-stone of Mosul (near Mespila) is highly fossiliferous, and

indeed replete with shells, characteristic of a tertiary or

supra-cretaceous deposit; and the same lime-stone does not occur far to

the north or south of Mosul, being succeeded by wastes of gypsum."'

_Ainsw. Travels_, p. 140.]

[Footnote 154: Ἐμβροντήτους ποιεῖ.] "Jupiter makes the inhabitants

thunderstruck." "He rendered them," says Sturz, "either stupid or mad."]

[Footnote 155: Σκύθαι τοξόται.] As there is no mention of Scythians in

the whole Anabasis, Krüger, in his larger edition, suggested that the

word Σκύθαι might have been written in the margin by some sciolist, who

was thinking of the Athenian τοξόται; but in his smaller edition he has

shown that he has learned something better from Arrian, Tact. ii. 13:

"Those of the cavalry who use bows are called ἱπποτοξόται, and by some

Σκύθαι." _Kühner_.]

[Footnote 156: In order that they might fall with the greater weight.

_Bornemann_. Or perhaps, as Bishop Thirlwall thinks, that they might

reach a greater distance.]

[Footnote 157: Πονήρως.] From πόνηρος, _difficult_, not from πονηρός,

_bad_. See Thucyd. viii. 24, ed. Popp. part iii. vol. iv. p. 658,

_seqq._ _Kühner_.]

[Footnote 158: Καὶ εὐεπίθετον ἧν ἐνταῦθα τοῖς πολεμίοις. I have rendered

this phrase agreeably to the notion of Krüger, who thinks εὐεπίθετον

used absolutely, or as a substantive. Some, however, understand τὸ

πλαίσιον, or τὸ στράτευμα, which is perhaps better.]

[Footnote 159: Ἐνωμοτάρχας.] The ἐνωμοτία being the fourth part of a

λόχος, or twenty-five men. See Xen. De Rep. Lac. ii. 4; Arnold's Thucyd.

v. 68.]

[Footnote 160: As there were six companies of a hundred men each, they

moved into the vacant space, if it was but narrow, by centuries, that

is, six men in front, and a hundred deep; if it was somewhat broader, by

fifties, that is, twelve men in front, and fifty deep; if very broad, by

twenty-fives, that is, twenty-four men in front, and twenty-five deep.

_Kühner_.]

[Footnote 161: Ἐν τῷ μέρει.] Each in his place; one after another in the

order which had been previously appointed.]

[Footnote 162: Ην ἡ κώμη.] Schneider, Bornemann, and most editors before

Dindorf, read κώμη, _a village_, without the article. Dindorf has added

the article from two manuscripts, and Kühner has followed him, supposing

that _the particular village_ of which the Greeks had now caught sight

is meant. Bornemann, if the article be added, thinks that _the village

in which the palace stood_ is intended. The passage seems to me

decidedly better without the article; for, if it be inserted, the reader

is puzzled to know why Xenophon changes the number, when he had just

before said that the palace stood in the midst of villages.]

[Footnote 163: According to the discipline of the Persians; see Herod,

vii. 21, 56, 223.]

[Footnote 164: This is the first mention of surgeons in the Greek army,

as Mr. Stanford observes, since the time of Homer. But whether the

persons here mentioned were professed surgeons, or merely some of the

soldiers, who, in long service, had gained experience in the treatment

of wounds, is uncertain. The latter supposition is more in consonance

with the word _appointed_.]

[Footnote 165: Πολὺ γὰρ διέφερον ---- ὁρμῶντες ----πορευόμενοι.] The

manuscripts present some variations here. Bornemann's text is the same

as Dindorf's. Kühner prefers διέφερεν ----ὁρμῶντας ---- πορευομένους,

expressing a doubt whether the other method be really Greek.]

[Footnote 166: Δεῖ ---- Πέρσῃ ἀνδρὶ.] Most commentators concur in taking

this as an example of the rarer construction of δεῖ with the dative;

though it has been suggested whether Πέρσῃ ἀνδρὶ may be the dative after

ἐπισάξαι, as if a Persian horse-soldier had an attendant to equip his

horse for him.]

[Footnote 167: Ἐπισάξαι.] Spelman quarrels with D'Ablancourt for

translating this word by "saddle," and adopts in his own version

"housings," which I have borrowed from him, from inability to find a

better word.]

[Footnote 168: Τὸ στρατόπεδον.] Apparently for the place where they

intended to encamp. It seems needless to understand, with Krüger,

"castra interea à lixis et calonibus posita."]

[Footnote 169: Ἀναζεύξαντες.] Ἀναζεύξαι, _castra movere_. Zeune.]

[Footnote 170: The enemy had not occupied the highest part of the

mountain, but a lower position upon it. Comp. sect. 37. _Kühner_.]

CHAPTER V.

The Greeks arrive at a point where the Carduchian mountains

overhang the river, and, as they are still harassed by the enemy,

the generals hold a consultation, and determine to march across the

mountains.

1. The Barbarians, in consequence, turned their backs and fled every one

as he could, and the Greeks took possession of the top of the hill.

Tissaphernes and Ariæus turned aside, and went off in another direction.

Cheirisophus and his forces, going down into the plain, encamped in a

village abounding with acceptable supplies; and there were also in this

plain many other villages stored with excellent provisions, lying along

the river Tigris. 2. When it was evening, the enemy suddenly showed

themselves in the plain, and cut off some of the Greeks who were

dispersed over the ground foraging; for several herds of cattle had been

intercepted as they were being transported to the other side of the

river. 3. Here Tissaphernes and his party attempted to set fire to the

villages, and some of the Greeks were much disheartened, being

apprehensive that, if they should burn them, they would have no place

whence to procure supplies.

4. Cheirisophus and his men now returned from giving succour;[171] and

Xenophon, when he came down, riding past the ranks, as the Greeks,

coming in from affording aid, met him, said, 5. "You see, Greeks, that

the enemy admit that the country is now ours, for whereas they

stipulated, when they made the truce, that we should not burn the king's

country, they now burn it themselves, as being no longer theirs. But

wherever they leave supplies for themselves, thither also they shall see

us direct our march. 6. I think, however, Cheirisophus," continued he,

"that we ought to resist these burners, as if in defence of our own

territory." "I," replied Cheirisophus, "am of a different opinion;

rather let us burn also," said he, "and thus they will the sooner

cease."

7. When they returned to their quarters,[172] the soldiers busied

themselves about their provisions, but the generals and captains held a

council. There was now much perplexity; for on one side of them were

exceeding high mountains, and on the other a river of such depth, that,

when they sounded it, their spears did not rise above the water. 8.

While they were in doubt how to act, a Rhodian came to them, and said,

"I am willing to convey you across, O Greeks, by four thousand

heavy-armed men at a time, if you will furnish me with what I require

for the purpose, and give me a talent as a remuneration." 9. Being asked

what he should require, he replied, "I shall want two thousand hides

made into bags; and I see here many sheep, goats, oxen, and asses, the

hides of which, being blown out,[173] would easily furnish the means of

crossing. 10. I shall want also the ropes which you use for the

baggage-cattle; joining, with these, the bags to one another, steadying

each bag by attaching stones to it, letting the stones down like anchors

into the water, extending the bags across the stream, and securing them

to both banks, I will then lay wood upon them, and strew earth over the

wood. 11. That you will not sink, you will at once see; for each skin

will prevent two men from sinking, and the wood and earth will keep them

from slipping off." 12. The generals, on hearing this proposal, thought

the invention ingenious, but the execution of it impossible, for there

were numerous cavalry on the other side to hinder their passage, who, at

the commencement, would not have allowed the first that made the attempt

to effect their purposes.

13. The next day they retreated back towards Babylon, to some unburnt

villages, having first set fire to those which they abandoned; so that

the enemy did not come up to them, but watched them, and seemed to be

wondering which way the Greeks would turn themselves, and what they had

in their mind. 14. The rest of the soldiers then turned their thoughts

to getting supplies; but the generals and captains held another council,

and, bringing together the prisoners, questioned them as to the whole

country around, what each part was. 15. They said that the parts toward

the south were on the road towards Babylon and Media, through which the

Greeks had come; that the road towards the east led to Susa and

Ecbatana, where the king was said to pass the summer and spring; that

the one across[174] the river, towards the west, led to Lydia and Ionia;

and that the other over the mountains, towards the north, led to the

Carduchi. 16. This people, they said, lived among the mountains, were

very warlike, and did not obey the king; that on one occasion, a royal

army of a hundred and twenty thousand men had penetrated into their

country, whence, from the impracticability of the ground, not one of

them returned; but that, whenever they made a treaty with the satrap of

the plain, some of them had intercourse with the Carduchi, and some of

the Carduchi with them. 17. The generals, having heard these statements,

kept apart by themselves those who said that they knew the road in each

direction, not letting it be known which way they intended to go. It

appeared necessary to the generals, however, to make their way over the

mountains into the country of the Carduchi; for the prisoners said that

after passing through this they would come to Armenia, a large and rich

country, of which Orontes was governor, whence it would be easy for them

to go whichever way they pleased.

18. With reference to this proceeding, they made a sacrifice, in order

that, when it should seem time, they might commence their march; for

they were afraid that the passage over the mountains might be

pre-occupied by the enemy; and they gave orders, that when the soldiers

had supped, they should all pack up their baggage and go to rest, and

follow their leaders whenever the signal should be given.

[Footnote 171: Ἐκ τῆς βοηθείας.] Xenophon is here somewhat obscure; for

he made no mention of this βοηθεία before. Cheirisophus and his men seem

to have gone to aid the party of Greeks that were dispersed for plunder,

when some of them were cut off by the Persians, and when Tissaphernes

attempted to burn the villages. * * * Afterwards he is rather

tautological; for the words ἡνίκα ----οἱ Ἕλληνες express no more than is

said in οἱ μὲν ἀμφὶ Χειρίσοφον ---- βοηθείας, except that they serve to

mark the exact time when Xenophon addressed the men. _Kühner_.]

[Footnote 172: Ἐπὶ τὰς σκηνάς.] The tents were burned, iii. 3. 1; and

Krüger therefore observes that we must consider τὰς σκηνάς as equivalent

to τὸ στρατόπεδον, or the place of encampment. This explanation is

better than that of Weiske and Zeune, who think that the _shelter of the

villages_ is meant.]

[Footnote 173: Ἅ ἀποδαρέντα καὶ φυσηθέντα.] "Which being skinned and

blown out." From brevity, Xenophon has said that of the animals which he

ought to have said of their skins. _Krüger_.]

[Footnote 174: Διαβάντι.] The road "for one crossing" the river.]

BOOK IV.

CHAPTER I.

The Greeks enter the territory of the Carduchi, where they suffer

greatly from the wind and cold, as well as from the Barbarians, who

harass them with frequent attacks on their march.

1. What occurred in the expedition up the country to the time of the

battle, and what took place after the battle during the truce which the

king and the Greeks that went up with Cyrus concluded, and what

hostilities were committed against the Greeks after the king and

Tissaphernes had violated the truce, and while the Persian army was

pursuing them, have been related in the preceding part of the narrative.

2. When they had arrived at a spot where the Tigris was quite impassable

from its depth and width, and where there was no passage along, its

banks, as the Carduchian mountains hung steep over the stream, it

appeared to the generals that they must march over those mountains, 3.

for they had heard from the prisoners that "if they could but cross the

Carduchian mountains, they would be able to ford, if they wished, the

sources of the Tigris in Armenia, or, if they declined doing so, to make

a circuit round them." The sources of the Euphrates, too, they said were

not far from those of the Tigris; and such is the truth.[175]

4. Their entrance upon the territory of the Carduchi they made in the

following manner, endeavouring at once to escape observation, and to

anticipate the enemy in getting possession of the heights. 5. When it

was about the last watch, and enough of the night was left to allow them

to cross the plain under cover of the darkness, they arose at a given

signal, and, marching onwards, reached the hills by break of day. 6.

Here Cheirisophus took the lead of the army, having with him both his

own men and all the light-armed; while Xenophon brought up the rear with

the heavy-armed troops, having not a single light-armed soldier; for

there seemed to be no danger that any of the enemy would attack them in

the rear as they were marching up the mountains. Cheirisophus indeed

mounted the summit before any of the enemy perceived him; he then led

slowly forward; 7. and each portion of the army, as it passed the summit

in succession, followed him to the villages which lay in the windings

and recesses of the mountains.[176] 8. The Carduchi, in consequence,

quitting their dwellings, and taking with them their wives and children,

fled to the hills. There was plenty of provisions left for the Greeks to

take; and the houses were furnished with great numbers of brazen

utensils, none of which the Greeks took away. Nor did they pursue the

people, being inclined to spare them, if perchance the Carduchi, since

they were enemies to the king, might consent to allow them to pass

through their country as that of friends; 9, the provisions, however, as

many as fell in their way, they carried off; for it was a matter of

necessity to do so. But as for the Carduchi themselves, they would

neither listen when they called, nor did they give any other sign of

friendly feeling.

10. But when the rear of the Greeks was descending from the hills into

the villages, being now overtaken by darkness, (for, as the way was

narrow, their ascent of the heights, and descent to the villages, had

lasted the entire day,) some of the Carduchi, collecting together,

attacked the hindmost, and killed and wounded some of them with stones

and arrows. They were but few; for the Greek troops had come on them

unawares; 11. but had they assembled in greater numbers, a great part of

the army would have been in danger of being destroyed. For this night,

accordingly, they took up their abode in the villages; and the Carduchi

lighted a number of fires around them on the hills, and observed the

positions of one another.[177] 12. As soon as it was day, the generals

and captains of the Greeks, meeting together, resolved, when they

should march, to reserve only such of the baggage-cattle as were most

necessary and most able, abandoning the rest, and to dismiss all the

slaves in the army that had been recently captured; 13. for the cattle

and the slaves, being numerous, rendered their progress slow, and the

number of men in charge of them were unable to take part in any

encounter; and besides, when the men were so numerous, it was necessary

to procure and carry with them a double quantity of provisions. This

resolution being passed, they made proclamation that the troops should

act accordingly.

14. When they had breakfasted, and were on the march, the generals,

taking their stand in a narrow part of the way, took from the soldiers

whatever of the things mentioned they found had not been left behind;

and the men submitted to this, unless any of them, smitten with desire

of a handsome boy or woman, conveyed them past secretly.[178] Thus they

proceeded during this day, sometimes having to fight a little, and

sometimes resting themselves. 15. On the next day a great storm arose;

but they were obliged to pursue their march, for they had not a

sufficient supply of provisions. Cheirisophus continued to lead, and

Xenophon had charge of the rear. 16. The enemy pressed steadily upon

them, and, where the passes were narrow, came close up, and used their

bows and their slings; so that the Greeks, sometimes pursuing and

sometimes retreating, were compelled to march but slowly; and Xenophon,

when the enemy attacked them violently, had frequently to pass the word

for a halt. 17. Cheirisophus, at other times, when the order was passed,

halted, but on one occasion he did not halt, but hurried on rapidly, and

passed the word to follow; so that it was manifest that there was

something extraordinary; but there was no time to go forward and

ascertain the cause of the haste; and the march of the rear-guard became

like a flight. 18. On this occasion a brave soldier, Cleonymus a

Lacedæmonian, met his death, being shot with an arrow in the side

through his shield and corslet;[179] and also Basias, an Arcadian, shot

right through the head.

19. When they arrived at the place of encampment, Xenophon immediately

proceeded, just as he was, to Cheirisophus, and blamed him for not

having halted, as the men had been compelled to flee and fight at the

same time. "Two honourable and brave soldiers," said he, "have now been

killed, and we have been unable either to carry off their bodies or bury

them." 20. To this remark Cheirisophus answered, "Cast your eyes upon

those mountains, and observe how impassable they all are. The only road

which you see is steep; and close upon it you may perceive a great

multitude of men, who, having occupied the pass, keep guard at it. 21.

For these reasons I hastened on, and therefore did not wait for you, to

try if I could get the start of the enemy before the pass was seized;

and the guides whom we have say that there is no other road." 22.

Xenophon rejoined, "I have two prisoners; for when the enemy molested

us, we placed an ambush, which enabled us to recover breath, and killed

some of them; and we were also anxious to take some alive for this very

purpose, that we might use them, as being well acquainted with the

country, for guides."

23. Immediately after, bringing forward the two men, they inquired of

them separately whether they knew of any other road than that which was

open to their view. The one denied that he knew of any other, though

many threats were held out to him; and as he would give no useful

information, he was put to death in sight of the other. 24. The survivor

said that the other had denied any knowledge of a road, because he had a

daughter there married to somebody, but stated that he himself would

lead them by a road that might be passed even by beasts of burden. 25.

Being then asked if there was any spot in it difficult to be passed, he

replied that there was one height, and that unless a party secured it

before-hand, it would be impossible for them to pass. 26. Upon this it

was thought proper to call together the captains, both of the peltasts

and of the heavy-armed men,[180] and to acquaint them with the prospect

of affairs, and ask whether any of them was willing to prove himself a

man of valour, and engage to go on this service as a volunteer. 27. Of

the heavy-armed, Aristonymus of Methydrium, and Agasias of Stymphalus,

both Arcadians, offered themselves; and Callimachus of Parrhasia, also

an Arcadian, disputed the honour with them, and said that he himself was

eager to go, taking with him volunteers from the whole army; "for I am

sure," said he, "that, many of the young men will follow if I take the

lead." 28. They then asked if any of the officers of the light-armed

troops were willing to join in the attempt; and Aristeas of Chios

presented himself, a man who had often proved himself of great value to

the army for similar services.

[Footnote 175: Καὶ ἔστιν ὅυτως ἔχον.] A most happy emendation of

Abreschius, Dilucid. Thucyd. p. 640, for καὶ ἔστιν ὅυτω στενόν.]

[Footnote 176: "Thus they accomplished their entrance into Kurdistan

without opposition, and crossed one of the most defensible passes that

they were almost destined to meet. * * * The recesses--left between the

hills are in the present day the seat of villages, as they were in the

time of Xenophon, and the crags in front, and in the rear, bristle with

the small and rude rock-forts of the Kurds." _Ainsworth, Travels in the

Track_, p. 153, 154.]

[Footnote 177: Συνεώρων ἀλλήλους.] The lighted fires served as signals,

by means of which the Carduchi could keep an eye on one another.

_Kühner_.]

[Footnote 178: Πλὴν εἴ τίς τι ἔκλεψεν, κ. τ. λ.] "Except if any one

concealed anything, either coveting a youth or woman of the handsome

ones"]

[Footnote 179: Τῆς σπολάδος.] See note on iii. 3. 20.]

[Footnote 180: Λοχαγοὺς καὶ πελταστὰς καὶ τῶν ὁπλιτῶν.] H. e.

_Centuriones et ex peltastis et ex militibus gravis armaturæ_. Kühner.

Πελταστὰς is to be taken as an epithet; compare γυμνητῶν ταξιαρχῶν,

sect. 28.]

CHAPTER II.

One of the prisoners is forced to guide them to an eminence, from

which they dislodge the Carduchi. But they are still harassed, and

the rear suffers severely.

1. It was now afternoon, and the generals[181] desired the party to take

some refreshment and set forward. Having bound the guide, they put him

into their hands, and arranged with them, that, if they should gain the

summit, they should keep guard at that post during the night, and give a

signal by trumpet at break of day, and that those on the height should

then charge the enemy in possession of the apparent egress,[182] and

those below should issue forth and come in a body to their assistance as

soon as they were able.

2. When they had made this arrangement, the party set out, being in

number about two thousand; and there was heavy rain at the time.

Xenophon, taking the rear-guard, led them towards the apparent egress,

in order that the enemy might turn their attention in that direction,

and that those who were going round might as much as possible escape

notice. 3. But when the rear-guard came to a ravine, which they had to

pass to gain the ascent, the Barbarians then rolled down masses of

rock,[183] each big enough to load a waggon, with other stones greater

and smaller, which, striking in their descent against the rocks, were

hurled abroad in all directions;[184] and it was utterly impossible even

to approach the pass. 4. Some of the captains, when they could not

succeed in this part, made attempts in another, and continued their

efforts till darkness came on. When they thought that they might retire

unobserved, they went to get their supper; for the rear-guard had been

dinnerless that day. The enemy, however, being evidently in fear,

continued to roll down stones through the whole of the night, as it was

easy to conjecture from the noise. 5. Those, meanwhile, who had the

guide, taking a circuitous route, surprised a guard of the enemy sitting

round a fire, and, having killed some of them, and put the rest to

flight, remained on the spot, with the notion that they were in

possession of the summit. 6. But in possession of it they were not; for

there was a small hill above them, round which lay the narrow pass, at

which the guard had been posted. However, there was a way from thence to

that party of the enemy who were stationed at the open egress. 7. Here

they remained during the night.