ἴσης ὁρῶ τοῖς τ᾽ ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι καὶ ὑμῖν περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα
τὴν βουλὴν οὖσαν—ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνων μὲν πολλοῖς ἐνδέχεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ
τῶν ἰδίᾳ τι συμφερόντων διοικουμένοις τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ἀμελῆσαι,
ὑμῖν δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἀδικουμένοις παρὰ τῶν ἀδικούντων καλόν ἐστι λαβεῖν
ταύτην τὴν δίκην, ἐᾶσαί τινας αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τῷ βαρβάρῳ γενέσθαι.
In no one of the speeches of Demosthenes is the spirit of practical
wisdom more predominant than in this his earliest known discourse
to the public assembly—on the Symmories—delivered by a young man of
twenty-seven years of age, who could have had little other teaching
except from the decried classes of sophists, rhetors, and actors.
While proclaiming the king of Persia as the common and dangerous
enemy of the Grecian name, he contends that no evidence of impending
Persian attack had yet transpired, sufficiently obvious and glaring
to warrant Athens in sending round[607] to invoke a general league
of Greeks, as previous speakers had suggested. He deprecates on the
one hand any step calculated to provoke the Persian king or bring on
a war—and on the other hand, any premature appeal to the Greeks for
combination, before they themselves were impressed with a feeling of
common danger. Nothing but such common terror could bring about union
among the different Hellenic cities; nothing else could silence those
standing jealousies and antipathies, which rendered intestine war so
frequent, and would probably enable the Persian king to purchase
several Greeks for his own allies against the rest.
[607] Demosthen. De Symmor. p. 181. s. 14.
“Let us neither be immoderately afraid of the Great King, nor on
the other hand be ourselves the first to begin the war and wrong
him—as well on our own account as from the bad feeling and mistrust
prevalent among the Greeks around us. If indeed we, with the full
and unanimous force of Greece, could attack him unassisted, I should
have held that even wrong, done towards him, was no wrong at all. But
since this is impossible, I contend that we must take care not to
give the king a pretence for enforcing claims of right on behalf of
the other Greeks. While we remain quiet, he cannot do any such thing
without being mistrusted; but if we have been the first to begin war,
he will naturally seem to mean sincere friendship to the others, on
account of their aversion to us. Do not, therefore, expose to light
the sad distempers of the Hellenic world, by calling together its
members when you will not persuade them, and by going to war when
you will have no adequate force; but keep the peace, confiding in
yourselves, and making full preparation.”[608]
[608] Demosthen. De Symmor. p. 188. s. 42-46. ... Ὥστ᾽ οὔτε
φοβεῖσθαί φημι δεῖν πέρα τοῦ μετρίου, οὔθ᾽ ὑπαχθῆναι προτέρους
ἐκφέρειν τὸν πόλεμον....
... Τοῦτον ἡμεῖς φοβώμεθα; μηδαμῶς· ἀλλὰ μηδ᾽ ἀδικῶμεν, ~αὐτῶν
ἡμῶν ἕνεκα καὶ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ταραχῆς καὶ ἀπιστίας~· ἐπεὶ
εἴ γ᾽ ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἦν μετὰ πάντων ἐπιθέσθαι μόνῳ, οὐδ᾽ ἀδικεῖν
ἡμᾶς ἐκεῖνον ἀδίκημ᾽ ἂν ἔθηκα. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει,
φυλάττεσθαί φημι δεῖν μὴ πρόφασιν δῶμεν βασιλεῖ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια
ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ζητεῖν· ἡσυχίαν μὲν γὰρ ἐχόντων ὑμῶν,
ὕποπτος ἂν εἴη τοιοῦτό τι πράττων—πόλεμον δὲ ποιησαμένων προτέρων
~εἰκότως ἂν δοκοίη διὰ τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐχθρὰν τοῖς ἄλλοις φίλος~
εἶναι βούλεσθαι. ~Μὴ οὖν ἐξελέγξητε ὡς κακῶς ἔχει τὰ Ἑλληνικὰ,
συγκαλοῦντες ὅτ᾽ οὐ πείσετε, καὶ πολεμοῦντες ὅτ᾽ οὐ δυνήσεσθε·
ἀλλ᾽ ἔχετε ἡσυχίαν θαῤῥοῦντες καὶ παρασκευαζόμενοι~.
It is this necessity of making preparation, which constitutes the
special purpose of Demosthenes in his harangue. He produces an
elaborate plan, matured by careful reflection,[609] for improving
and extending the classification by Symmories; proposing a more
convenient and systematic distribution of the leading citizens as
well as of the total financial and nautical means—such as to ensure
both the ready equipment of armed force whenever required, and a fair
apportionment both of effort and of expense among the citizens. Into
the details of this plan of economical reform, which are explained
with the precision of an administrator and not with the vagueness
of a rhetor, I do not here enter; especially as we do not know that
it was actually adopted. But the spirit in which it was proposed
deserves all attention, as proclaiming, even at this early day,
the home-truth which the orator reiterates in so many subsequent
harangues. “In the preparation which I propose to you, Athenians
(he says), the first and most important point is, that your minds
shall be so set, as that each man individually will be willing and
forward in doing his duty. For you see plainly, that of all those
matters on which you have determined collectively, and on which each
man individually has looked upon the duty of execution as devolving
upon himself—not one has ever slipped through your hands; while,
on the contrary, whenever, after determination has been taken, you
have stood looking at one another, no man intending to do anything
himself, but every one throwing the burthen of action upon his
neighbor—nothing has ever succeeded. Assuming you, therefore, to be
thus disposed and wound up to the proper pitch, I recommend,”[610]
etc.
[609] Demosthen. De Symmor. p. 181. s. 17. Τὴν μὲν παρασκευὴν,
ὅπως ὡς ἄριστα καὶ τάχιστα γενήσεται, πάνυ πολλὰ πράγματα ἔσχον
σκοπῶν.
[610] Demosthenes, De Symmoriis, p. 182. s. 18. Ἔστι τοίνυν
πρῶτον μὲν τῆς παρασκευῆς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ μέγιστον, οὕτω
διακεῖσθαι τὰς γνώμας ὑμᾶς, ὡς ἕκαστον ἕκοντα προθύμως ὅ,τι
ἂν δέῃ ποιήσοντα. Ὁρᾶτε γὰρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ~ὅτι, ὅσα μὲν
πώποθ᾽ ἅπαντες ὑμεῖς ἠβουλήθητε, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τὸ πράττειν αὐτὸς
ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ προσήκειν ἡγήσατο, οὐδὲν πώποθ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἐξέφυγεν~·
ὅσα δ᾽ ἠβουλήθητε μὲν, μετὰ ~ταῦτα δ᾽ ἀπεβλέψατε πρὸς ἀλλήλους
ὡς αὐτὸς μὲν ἕκαστος οὐ ποιήσων, τὸν δὲ πλησίον πράξοντα~, οὐδὲν
πώποθ᾽ ὑμῖν ἐγένετο. Ἐχόντων δ᾽ ~ὑμῶν οὕτω καὶ αρωξυμμένων~, etc.
This is the true Demosthenic vein of exhortation, running with
unabated force through the Philippics and Olynthiacs, and striving
to revive that conjunction—of which Perikles had boasted as an
established fact in the Athenian character[611]—energetic individual
action following upon full public debate and collective resolution.
How often here, and elsewhere, does the orator denounce the
uselessness of voters in the public assembly, even after such
votes had been passed—if the citizens individually hung back, and
shrunk from the fatigue or the pecuniary burthen indispensable
for execution! Demus in the Pnyx (to use, in an altered sense,
an Aristophanic comparison)[612] still remained Pan-hellenic and
patriotic, when Demus at home had come to think that the city would
march safely by itself without any sacrifice on his part, and that
he was at liberty to become absorbed in his property, family,
religion, and recreations. And so Athens might really have proceeded,
in her enjoyment of liberty, wealth, refinement, and individual
security—could the Grecian world have been guaranteed against the
formidable Macedonian enemy from without.
[611] Thucyd. ii. 39, 40.
[612] Aristophanes, Equit. 750.
It was in the ensuing year, when the alarm respecting Persia had worn
off, that the Athenians were called on to discuss the conflicting
applications of Sparta and of Megalopolis. The success of the
Phokians appeared to be such as to prevent Thebes, especially while
her troops, under Pammenes, were absent in Asia, from interfering
in Peloponnesus for the protection of Megalopolis. There were even
at Athens politicians who confidently predicted the approaching
humiliation of Thebes,[613] together with the emancipation and
reconstitution of those Bœotian towns which she now held in
dependence—Orchomenus, Thespiæ, and Platæa; predictions cordially
welcomed by the Miso-Theban sentiment at Athens. To the Spartans, the
moment appeared favorable for breaking up Megalopolis and recovering
Messênê; in which scheme they hoped to interest not only Athens, but
also Elis, Phlius, and some other Peloponnesian states. To Athens
they offered aid for the recovery of Orôpus, now and for about
twelve years past in the hands of the Thebans; to Elis and Phlius
they also tendered assistance for regaining respectively Triphylia
and the Trikaranum, from the Arcadians and Argeians.[614] This
political combination was warmly espoused by a considerable party
at Athens; being recommended not less by aversion to Thebes than by
the anxious desire for repossessing the border town of Orôpus. But
it was combated by others, and by Demosthenes among the number, who
could not be tempted by any bait to acquiesce in the reconstitution
of Lacedæmonian power as it had stood before the battle of Leuktra.
In the Athenian assembly, the discussion was animated and even angry;
the envoys from Megalopolis, as well as those from Sparta on the
other side, finding strenuous partisans.[615]
[613] Demosthenes, Orat. pro Megalopolitanis, p. 203. s. 5. p.
210. s. 36. Ἔστι τοίνυν ἔν τινι τοιούτῳ καιρῷ τὰ πράγματα νῦν,
εἴ τι δεῖ τοῖς εἰρημένοις πολλάκις παρ᾽ ὑμῖν λόγοις τεκμήρασθαι,
ὥστε Θηβαίους μὲν Ὀρχομενοῦ καὶ Θεσπιῶν καὶ Πλαταιῶν οἰκισθεισῶν
ἀσθενεῖς γενέσθαι, etc. Ἂν μὲν τοίνυν καταπολεμηθῶσιν οἱ Θηβαῖοι,
ὥσπερ αὐτοὺς δεῖ, etc.
Compare Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 654. s. 120.
[614] Demosthenes pro Megalopol. p. 206. s. 18; compare Xenoph.
Hellen. vii. 2, 1-5.
[615] Demosthenes pro Megalopolit. p. 202. s. 1.
Demosthenes strikes a course professedly middle between the two, yet
really in favor of defending Megalopolis against Spartan reconquest.
We remark in this oration (as in the oration De Symmoriis, a year
before) that there is no allusion to Philip; a point to be noticed
as evidence of the gradual changes in the Demosthenic point of view.
All the arguments urged turn upon Hellenic and Athenian interests,
without reference to the likelihood of hostilities from without.
In fact, Demosthenes lays down as a position not to be disputed by
any one, that for the interest of Athens, both Sparta and Thebes
ought to be weak; neither of them in condition to disturb her
security;[616]—a position, unfortunately, but too well recognized
among all the leading Grecian states in their reciprocal dealings
with each other, rendering the Pan-hellenic aggregate comparatively
defenceless against Philip or any skilful aggressor from without.
While, however, affirming a general maxim, in itself questionable
and perilous, Demosthenes deduces from it nothing but judicious
consequences. In regard to Sparta, he insists only on keeping her _in
statu quo_, and maintaining inviolate against her the independence of
Megalopolis and Messênê. He will not be prevailed upon to surrender
to her these two cities, even by the seductive prospect of assistance
to Athens in recovering Orôpus, and in reviving the autonomy of the
Bœotian cities. At that moment the prevalent disposition among the
Athenian public was antipathy against Thebes, combined with a certain
sympathy in favor of Sparta, whom they had aided at the battle of
Mantineia against the Megalopolitans.[617] Though himself sharing
this sentiment,[618] Demosthenes will not suffer his countrymen to
be misled by it. He recommends that Athens shall herself take up
the Theban policy in regard to Megalopolis and Messênê, so as to
protect these two cities against Sparta; the rather, as by such a
proceeding the Thebans will be excluded from Peloponnesus, and their
general influence narrowed. He even goes so far as to say, that if
Sparta should succeed in reconquering Megalopolis and Messênê, Athens
must again become the ally of the Thebans to restrain her farther
aggrandizement.[619]
[616] Demosthen. pro Megalop. p. 203. s. 5, 6. Compare a similar
sentiment, Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 654. s. 120.
[617] Demosthen. pro Megalop. p. 203. s. 7, 9. p. 207. s. 22.
[618] See Demosthen. cont. Leptinem, p. 489. s. 172 (delivered
355 B. C.) and Olynthiac i. p. 16. s. 27.
[619] Demosthenes pro Megalopol. p. 207. s. 24.
As far as we make out from imperfect information, it seems that the
views of Demosthenes did not prevail, and that the Athenians declined
to undertake the protection of Megalopolis against Sparta; since we
presently find the Thebans continuing to afford that protection, as
they had done before. The aggressive schemes of Sparta appear to
have been broached at the moment when the Phokians under Onomarchus
were so decidedly superior to Thebes as to place that city in some
embarrassment. But the superiority of the Phokians was soon lessened
by their collision with a more formidable enemy—Philip of Macedon.
That prince had been already partially interfering in Thessalian
affairs,[620] at the instigation of Eudikus and Simus, chiefs of the
Aleuadæ of Larissa, against Lykophron the despot of Pheræ. But his
recent acquisition of Methônê left him more at liberty to extend
his conquests southward, and to bring a larger force to bear on the
dissensions of Thessaly. In that country, the great cities were,[621]
as usual, contending for supremacy, and holding in subjection the
smaller by means of garrisons; while Lykophron of Pheræ was exerting
himself to regain that ascendency over the whole, which had once
been possessed by Jason and Alexander. Philip now marched into
the country and attacked him so vigorously as to constrain him to
invoke aid from the Phokians. Onomarchus, at that time victorious
over the Thebans and master as far as Thermopylæ, was interested in
checking the farther progress of Philip southward and extending his
own ascendency. He sent into Thessaly a force of seven thousand men,
under his brother Phayllus, to sustain Lykophron. But Phayllus failed
altogether; being defeated and driven out of Thessaly by Philip, so
that Lykophron of Pheræ was in greater danger than ever. Upon this,
Onomarchus went himself thither with the full force of Phokians and
foreign mercenaries. An obstinate, and seemingly a protracted contest
now took place, in the course of which he was at first decidedly
victorious. He defeated Philip in two battles, with such severe loss
that the Macedonian army was withdrawn from Thessaly, while Lykophron
with his Phokian allies remained masters of the country.[622]
[620] Diodor. xvi. 14; Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 241. s. 60.
Harpokration v. Σίμος.
[621] Isokrates, Orat. viii. (De Pace) s. 143, 144.
[622] Diodor. xvi. 35.
This great success of the Phokian arms was followed up by farther
victory in Bœotia. Onomarchus renewed his invasion of that territory,
defeated the Thebans in battle, and made himself master of Koroneia,
in addition to Orchomenus, which he held before.[623] It would seem
that the Thebans were at this time deprived of much of their force,
which was serving in Asia under Artabazus, and which, perhaps from
these very reverses, they presently recalled. The Phokians, on the
other hand, were at the height of their power. At this juncture
falls, probably, the aggressive combination of the Spartans against
Megalopolis, and the debate, before noticed, in the Athenian assembly.
[623] Diodor. xvi. 35.
Philip was for some time in embarrassment from his defeats in
Thessaly. His soldiers, discouraged and even mutinous, would hardly
consent to remain under his standard. By great pains, and animated
exhortation, he at last succeeded in reanimating them. After a
certain interval for restoration and reinforcement, he advanced
with a fresh army into Thessaly, and resumed his operations against
Lykophron; who was obliged again to solicit aid from Onomarchus, and
to promise that all Thessaly should henceforward be held under his
dependence. Onomarchus accordingly joined him in Thessaly with a
large army, said to consist of twenty thousand foot and five hundred
cavalry. But he found on this occasion, within the country, more
obstinate resistance than before; for the cruel dynasty of Pheræ had
probably abused their previous victory by aggravated violence and
rapacity, so as to throw into the arms of their enemy a multitude
of exiles. On Philip’s coming into Thessaly with a new army, the
Thessalians embraced his cause so warmly, that he soon found himself
at the head of an army of twenty thousand foot and three thousand
horse. Onomarchus met him in the field, somewhere near the southern
coast of Thessaly; not diffident of success, as well from his
recent victories, as from the neighborhood of an Athenian fleet
under Chares, coöperating with him. Here a battle was joined, and
obstinately contested between the two armies, nearly equal in numbers
of infantry. Philip exalted the courage of his soldiers by decorating
them with laurel wreaths,[624] as crusaders in the service of the god
against the despoilers of the Delphian temple; while the Thessalians
also, forming the best cavalry in Greece and fighting with earnest
valor, gave decisive advantage to his cause. The defeat of the forces
of Onomarchus and Lykophron was complete. Six thousand of them are
said to have been slain, and three thousand to have been taken
prisoners; the remainder escaped either by flight, or by throwing
away their arms, and swimming off to the Athenian ships. Onomarchus
himself perished. According to one account, he was slain by his
own mercenaries, provoked by his cowardice: according to another
account, he was drowned—being carried into the sea by an unruly
horse, and trying to escape to the ships. Philip caused his dead
body to be crucified, and drowned all the prisoners as men guilty of
sacrilege.[625]
[624] This fact is mentioned by Justin (vii. 2), and seems
likely to be true, from the severity with which Philip, after
his victory, treated the Phokian prisoners. But the farther
statement of Justin is not likely to be true—that the Phokians,
on beholding the insignia of the god, threw away their arms and
fled without resistance.
[625] Diodor. xvi. 55; Pausan. x. 2, 3; Philo Judæus apud
Eusebium Præp. Evang. viii. p. 392. Diodorus states that Chares
with the Athenian fleet was sailing by, _accidentally_. But this
seems highly improbable. It cannot but be supposed that he was
destined to coöperate with the Phokians.
This victory procured for Philip great renown as the avenger of
the Delphian god—and became an important step in his career of
aggrandizement. It not only terminated the power of the Phokians
north of Thermopylæ, but also finally crushed the powerful dynasty
of Pheræ in Thessaly. Philip laid siege to that city, upon which
Lykophron and Peitholaus, surrounded by an adverse population and
unable to make any long defence, capitulated, and surrendered it to
him; retiring with their mercenaries, two thousand in number, into
Phokis.[626] Having obtained possession of Pheræ and proclaimed it
a free city, Philip proceeded to besiege the neighboring town of
Pagasæ, the most valuable maritime station in Thessaly. How long
Pagasæ resisted, we do not know; but long enough to send intimation
to Athens, with entreaties for succor. The Athenians, alarmed at
the successive conquests of Philip, were well-disposed to keep this
important post out of his hands, which their naval power fully
enabled them to do. But here again (as in the previous examples of
Pydna, Potidæa, and Methônê), the aversion to personal service among
the citizens individually—and the impediments as to apportionment of
duty or cost, whenever actual outgoing was called for—produced the
untoward result, that though an expedition was voted and despatched,
it did not arrive in time.[627] Pagasæ surrendered and came into the
power of Philip; who fortified and garrisoned it for himself, thus
becoming master of the Pagasæan gulf, the great maritime inlet of
Thessaly.
[626] Diodor. xvi. 37.
[627] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 50. s. 40. Καίτοι, τί δήποτε
νομίζετε ... τοὺς ἀποστόλους πάντας ὑμῖν ὑστερίζειν τῶν καιρῶν,
τὸν εἰς Μεθώνην, ~τὸν εἰς Παγασὰς~, τὸν εἰς Ποτίδαιαν, etc.
Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 11. s. 9. Καὶ πάλιν ἥνικα Πύδνα,
Ποτίδαια, Μεθώνη, ~Παγασαί—πολιορκούμενα ἀπηγγέλλετο~, εἰ τότε
τούτων ἑνὶ τῷ πρώτῳ προθύμως καὶ ὡς προσῆκεν ἐβοηθήσαμεν αὐτοὶ,
etc.
The first Philippic was delivered in 352-351 B. C., which proves
that Philip’s capture of Pagasæ cannot have been later than that
year. Nor can it have been earlier than his capture of Pheræ—as
I have before remarked in reference to the passage of Diodorus
(xvi. 31), where it seems to be placed in 354-353 B. C.; if Παγὰς
is to be taken for Παγασάς.
I apprehend that the first campaign of Philip in Thessaly against
the Phokians, wherein he was beaten and driven out by Onomarchus,
may be placed in the summer of 353 B. C. The second entrance
into Thessaly, with the defeat and death of Onomarchus, belongs
to the early spring of 352 B. C. The capture of Pheræ and Pagasæ
comes immediately afterwards; then the expedition of Philip to
Thermopylæ, where his progress was arrested by the Athenians
comes about Midsummer 352 B. C.
Philip was probably occupied for a certain time in making good his
dominion over Thessaly. But as soon as sufficient precautions had
been taken for this purpose, he sought to push his advantage over
the Phokians by invading them in their own territory. He marched
to Thermopylæ, still proclaiming as his aim the liberation of the
Delphian temple and the punishment of its sacrilegious robbers; while
he at the same time conciliated the favor of the Thessalians by
promising to restore to them the Pylæa, or half-yearly Amphiktyonic
festival at Thermopylæ, which the Phokians had discontinued.[628] The
Phokians, though masters of this almost inexpugnable pass, seemed
to have been so much disheartened by their recent defeat, and the
death of Onomarchus, that they felt unable to maintain it long. The
news of such a danger, transmitted to Athens, excited extraordinary
agitation. The importance of defending Thermopylæ—and of prohibiting
the victorious king of Macedon from coming to coöperate with the
Thebans on the southern side of it,[629] not merely against the
Phokians, but probably also against Attica—were so powerfully felt,
that the usual hesitations and delay of the Athenians in respect
to military expeditions were overcome. Chiefly from this cause—but
partly also, we may suppose, from the vexatious disappointment
recently incurred in the attempt to relieve Pagasæ—an Athenian
armament under Nausikles (not less than five thousand foot and four
hundred horse, according to Diodorus[630]) was fitted out with not
less vigor and celerity than had been displayed against the Thebans
in Eubœa, seven years before. Athenian citizens shook off their
lethargy, and promptly volunteered. They reached Thermopylæ in good
time, placing the pass in such a condition of defence that Philip
did not attack it at all. Often afterwards does Demosthenes,[631]
in combating the general remissness of his countrymen when military
exigencies arose, remind them of this unwonted act of energetic
movement, crowned with complete effect. With little or no loss, the
Athenians succeeded in guarding both themselves and their allies
against a very menacing contingency, simply by the promptitude of
their action. The cost of the armament altogether was more than two
hundred talents; and from the stress which Demosthenes lays on that
portion of the expense which was defrayed by the soldiers privately
and individually,[632] we may gather that these soldiers (as in
the Sicilian expedition under Nikias[633]) were in considerable
proportion opulent citizens. Among a portion of the Grecian public,
however, the Athenians incurred obloquy as accomplices in the Phokian
sacrilege, and enemies of the Delphian god.[634]
[628] Demosthenes, De Pace, p. 62. s. 23; Philippic ii. p. 71. s.
24; De Fals. Legat. p. 443. s. 365.
[629] Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. p. 367. s. 94. p. 446. s. 375.
Τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὑμῶν ὅτι τῷ Φωκέων πολέμῳ καὶ τῷ κυρίους
εἶναι Πυλῶν Φωκέας, ἥ τε ἀπὸ Θηβαίων ἄδεια ὑπῆρχεν ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ
μηδέποτ᾽ ἐλθεῖν ἂν εἰς Πελοπόννησον μηδ᾽ εἰς Εὔβοιαν Φίλιππον
μηδὲ Θηβαίους;
[630] Diodor. xvi. 37, 38.
[631] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 44. s. 20; De Coronâ, p. 236.
s. 40; De Fals. Leg. p. 444. s. 366.
[632] Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. p. 367. s. 95.
[633] Thucyd. vi. 31.
[634] Justin, vii. 2. His rhetorical exaggerations ought not to
make us reject the expression of this opinion against Athens, as
a real fact.
But though Philip was thus kept out of Southern Greece, and the
Phokians enabled to reorganize themselves against Thebes, yet in
Thessaly and without the straits of Thermopylæ, Macedonian ascendency
was henceforward an uncontested fact. Before we follow his subsequent
proceedings, however, it will be convenient to turn to events both in
Phokis and in Peloponnesus.
In the depressed condition of the Phokians after the defeat of
Onomarchus, they obtained reinforcement not only from Athens, but
also from Sparta (one thousand men), and from the Peloponnesian
Achæans (two thousand men[635]). Phayllus, the successor (by some
called brother) of Onomarchus, put himself again in a condition
of defence. He had recourse a third time to that yet unexhausted
store—the Delphian treasures and valuables. He despoiled the temple
to a greater extent than Philomelus, and not less than Onomarchus;
incurring aggravated odium from the fact, that he could not now
supply himself without laying hands on offerings of conspicuous
magnificence and antiquity, which his two predecessors had spared.
It was thus that the splendid golden donatives of the Lydian king
Krœsus were now melted down and turned into money; one hundred and
seventeen bricks or ingots of gold, most of them weighing two talents
each; three hundred and sixty golden goblets, together with a female
statue three cubits high, and a lion, of the same metal—said to have
weighed in the aggregate thirty talents.[636] The abstraction of
such ornaments, striking and venerable in the eyes of the numerous
visitors of the temple, was doubtless deeply felt among the Grecian
public. And the indignation was aggravated by the fact that beautiful
youths or women, favorites of Onomarchus or Phayllus, received some
of the most precious gifts, and wore the most noted ornaments, which
had decorated the temple—even the necklaces of Helen and Eriphylê.
One woman, a flute-player named Bromias, not only received from
Phayllus a silver cup and a golden wreath (the former dedicated in
the temple by the Phokæans, the latter by the Peparethians), but was
also introduced by him, in his capacity of superintendent of the
Pythian festival, to contend for the prize in playing the sacred
Hymn. As the competitors for such prize had always been men, the
assembled crowd so loudly resented the novelty, that Bromias was
obliged to withdraw.[637] Moreover profuse largesses, and flagrant
malversation, became more notorious than ever.[638] The Phokian
leaders displayed with ostentation their newly-acquired wealth, and
either imported for the first time bought slaves, or at least greatly
multiplied the pre-existing number. It had before been the practice
in Phokis, we are told, for the wealthy men to be served by the poor
youthful freemen of the country; and complaints arose among the
latter class that their daily bread was thus taken away.[639]
[635] Demosthenes (Fals. Leg. p. 443) affirms that no one else
except Athens assisted or rescued the Phokians in this emergency.
But Diodorus (xvi. 37) mentions succors from the other allies
also; and there seems no ground for disbelieving him. The boast
of Demosthenes, however, that Athens single-handed saved the
Phokians, is not incorrect as to the main fact, though overstated
in the expression. For the Athenians, commanding a naval force,
and on this rare occasion rapid in their movements, reached
Thermopylæ in time to arrest the progress of Philip, and before
the Peloponnesian troops could arrive. The Athenian expedition to
Thermopylæ seems to have occurred about May 352 B. C.—as far as
we can make out the chronology of the time.
[636] Diodor. xvi. 56. The account of these donatives of Krœsus
may be read in Herodotus (i. 50, 51), who saw them at Delphi. As
to the exact weight and number, there is some discrepancy between
him and Diodorus; moreover the text of Herodotus himself is not
free from obscurity.
[637] Theopomp. Fragm. 182, 183; Phylarchus, Frag. 60, ed. Didot;
Anaximenes and Ephorus ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 231, 232. The Pythian
games here alluded to must have been those celebrated in August
or September 350 B. C. It would seem therefore that Phayllus
survived over that period.
[638] Diodor. xvi. 56, 57. The story annexed about Iphikrates
and the ships of Dionysius of Syracuse—a story which, at all
events, comes quite out of its chronological place—appears to me
not worthy of credit, in the manner in which Diodorus here gives
it. The squadron of Dionysius, which Iphikrates captured on the
coast of Korkyra, was coming to the aid and at the request of
the Lacedæmonians, then at war with Athens (Xenoph. Hellen. vi.
2, 33). It was therefore a fair capture for an Athenian general,
together with all on board. If, amidst the cargo, there happened
to be presents intended for Olympia and Delphi, these, as being
on board of ships of war, would follow the fate of the other
persons and things along with them. They would not be considered
as the property of the god until they had been actually dedicated
in his temple. Nor would the person sending them be entitled to
invoke the privilege of a consecrated cargo unless he divested
it of hostile accompaniment. The letter of complaint to the
Athenians, which Diodorus gives as having been sent by Dionysius,
seems to me neither genuine nor even plausible.
[639] Timæus, Fragm. 67, ed. Didot; ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 264-272.
Notwithstanding the indignation excited by these proceedings not
only throughout Greece, but even in Phokis itself,—Phayllus carried
his point of levying a fresh army of mercenaries, and of purchasing
new alliances among the smaller cities. Both Athens and Sparta
profited more or less by the distribution; though the cost of the
Athenian expedition to Thermopylæ, which rescued the Phokians from
destruction, seems clearly to have been paid by the Athenians
themselves.[640] Phayllus carried on war for some time against both
the Bœotians and Lokrians. He is represented by Diodorus to have lost
several battles. But it is certain that the general result was not
unfavorable to him; that he kept possession of Orchomenus in Bœotia;
and that his power remained without substantial diminution.[641]
[640] Diodor. xvi. 57: compare Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 367.
[641] Diodor. xvi. 37, 38.
The stress of war seems, for the time, to have been transferred
to Peloponnesus, whither a portion both of the Phokian and Theban
troops went to coöperate. The Lacedæmonians had at length opened
their campaign against Megalopolis, of which I have already spoken
as having been debated before the Athenian public assembly. Their
plan seems to have been formed some months before, when Onomarchus
was at the maximum of his power, and when Thebes was supposed to be
in danger; but it was not executed until after his defeat and death,
when the Phokians, depressed for the time, were rescued only by the
prompt interference of Athens,—and when the Thebans had their hands
comparatively free. Moreover, the Theban division which had been sent
into Asia under Pammenes a year or two before, to assist Artabazus,
may now be presumed to have returned; especially as we know that no
very long time afterwards, Artabazus appears as completely defeated
by the Persian troops,—expelled from Asia, and constrained to take
refuge, together with his brother-in-law Memnon, under the protection
of Philip.[642] The Megalopolitans had sent envoys to entreat aid
from Athens, under the apprehension that Thebes would not be in a
condition to assist them. It may be doubted whether Athens would have
granted their prayer, in spite of the advice of Demosthenes,—but the
Thebans had now again become strong enough to uphold with their own
force their natural allies in Peloponnesus.
[642] Diodor. xvi. 52.
Accordingly, when the Lacedæmonian army under king Archidamus invaded
the Megalopolitan territory, a competent force was soon brought
together to oppose them; furnished partly by the Argeians,—who had
been engaged during the preceding year in a border warfare with
Sparta, and had experienced a partial defeat at Orneæ,[643]—partly by
the Sikyonians and Messenians, who came in full muster. Besides this,
the forces on both sides from Bœotia and Phokis were transferred to
Peloponnesus. The Thebans sent four thousand foot, and five hundred
horse, under Kephision, to the aid of Megalopolis; while the Spartans
not only recalled their own troops from Phokis, but also procured
three thousand of the mercenaries in the service of Phayllus, and
one hundred and fifty Thessalian horse from Likophron, the expelled
despot of Pheræ. Archidamus received his reinforcements, and got
together his aggregate forces earlier than the enemy. He advanced
first into Arcadia, where he posted himself near Mantinea, thus
cutting off the Argeians from Megalopolis; he next invaded the
territory of Argos, attacked Orneæ, and defeated the Argeians in
a partial action. Presently the Thebans arrived, and effected a
junction with their Argeian and Arcadian allies. The united force was
greatly superior in number to the Lacedæmonians; but such superiority
was counterbalanced by the bad discipline of the Thebans, who had
sadly declined on this point during the interval of ten years since
the death of Epaminondas. A battle ensued, partially advantageous to
the Lacedæmonians; while the Argeians and Arcadians chose to go home
to their neighboring cities. The Lacedæmonians also, having ravaged
a portion of Arcadia, and stormed the Arcadian town of Helissus,
presently recrossed their own frontier and returned to Sparta. They
left, however, a division in Arcadia under Anaxander, who, engaging
with the Thebans near Telphusa, was worsted with great loss and made
prisoner. In two other battles, also, the Thebans were successively
victorious; in a third, they were vanquished by the Lacedæmonians.
With such balanced and undecided success was the war carried on
until, at length, the Lacedæmonians proposed and concluded peace
with Megalopolis. Either formally, or by implication, they were
forced to recognize the autonomy of that city; thus abandoning, for
the time at least, their aggressive purposes, which Demosthenes had
combated and sought to frustrate before the Athenian assembly. The
Thebans on their side returned home, having accomplished their object
of protecting Megalopolis and Messênê; and we may presume that the
Phokian allies of Sparta were sent home also.[644]
[643] Diodor. xvi. 34.
[644] Diodor. xvi. 39.
The war between the Bœotians and Phokians had doubtless slackened
during this episode in Peloponnesus; but it still went on in a series
of partial actions, on the river Kephissus, at Koroneia, at Abæ
in Phokis, and near the Lokrian town of Naryx. For the most part,
the Phokians are said to have been worsted; and their commander,
Phayllus, presently died of a painful disease,—the suitable
punishment (in the point of view of a Grecian historian[645]) for
his sacrilegious deeds. He left as his successor Phalækus, a young
man, son of Onomarchus, under the guardianship and advice of an
experienced friend named Mnaseas. But Mnaseas was soon surprised at
night, defeated, and slain, by the Thebans while Phalækus, left to
his own resources, was defeated in two battles near Chæroneia, and
was unable to hinder his enemies from ravaging a large part of the
Phokian territory.[646]
[645] Diodor. xvi. 38.
[646] Diodor. xvi. 38, 39.
We know the successive incidents of this ten years’ Sacred War
only from the meagre annals of Diodorus,—whose warm sympathy in
favor of the religious side of the question seems to betray him
into exaggeration of the victories of the Thebans, or at least
into some omission of counterbalancing reverses. For in spite of
these successive victories, the Phokians were noway put down, but
remained in possession of the Bœotian town of Orchomenus; moreover,
the Thebans became so tired out and impoverished by the war, that
they confined themselves presently to desultory incursions and
skirmishes.[647] Their losses fell wholly upon their own citizens and
their own funds; while the Phokians fought with foreign mercenaries
and with the treasures of the temple.[648] The increasing poverty of
the Thebans even induced them to send an embassy to the Persian king,
entreating pecuniary aid; which drew from him a present of three
hundred talents. As he was at this time organizing a fresh expedition
on an immense scale, for the reconquest of Phenicia and Egypt, after
more than one preceding failure, he required Grecian soldiers as much
as the Greeks required his money. Hence we shall see presently that
the Thebans were able to send him an equivalent.
[647] Diodor. xvi. 40. ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων, Θηβαῖοι κάμνοντες τῷ πρὸς
Φωκεῖς πολέμῳ, καὶ χρημάτων ἀπορούμενοι, πρέσβεις ἐξέπεμψαν πρὸς
τὸν τῶν Περσῶν βασιλέα.... Τοῖς δὲ Βοιωτοῖς καὶ τοῖς Φωκεῦσιν
ἀκροβολισμοὶ μὲν καὶ χώρας καταδρομαὶ συνέστησαν, πράξεις δὲ κατὰ
τοῦτον τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν (351-350 B. C.—according to the chronology of
Diodorus) οὐ συνετελέσθησαν.
[648] Isokrates, Orat. v. (ad Philipp.) s. 61.
In the war just recounted on the Laconian and Arcadian frontier,
the Athenians had taken no part. Their struggle with Philip had
been becoming from month to month more serious and embarrassing. By
occupying in time the defensible pass of Thermopylæ, they had indeed
prevented him both from crushing the Phokians and from meddling with
the Southern states of Greece. But the final battle wherein he had
defeated Onomarchus, had materially increased both his power and his
military reputation. The numbers on both sides were very great; the
result was decisive, and ruinous to the vanquished; moreover, we
cannot doubt that the Macedonian phalanx, with the other military
improvements and manœuvres which Philip had been gradually organizing
since his accession, was now exhibited in formidable efficiency.
The King of Macedon had become the ascendent soldier and potentate,
hanging on the skirts of the Grecian world, exciting fears or hopes,
or both at once, in every city throughout its limits. In the first
Philippic of Demosthenes, and in his oration against Aristokrates,
(delivered between midsummer 352 B. C. and midsummer 351 B. C.),
we discern evident marks of the terrors which Philip had come
to inspire, within a year after his repulse from Thermopylæ, to
reflecting Grecian politicians. “It is impossible for Athens (says
the orator[649]) to provide any land-force competent to contend in
the field against that of Philip.”
[649] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 46. s. 26. (352-351 B. C.)
Compare Philippic iii. p. 124. s. 63.
The reputation of his generalship and his indefatigable activity
was already everywhere felt; as well as that of the officers and
soldiers, partly native Macedonians, partly chosen Greeks, whom he
had assembled round him,[650]—especially the lochages or front-rank
men of the phalanx and the hypaspistæ. Moreover, the excellent
cavalry of Thessaly became embodied from henceforward as an element
in the Macedonian army; since Philip had acquired unbounded
ascendency in that country, from his expulsion of the Pheræan despots
and their auxiliaries the Phokians. The philo-Macedonian party in
the Thessalian cities had constituted him federal chief (or in some
sort Tagus) of the country, not only enrolling their cavalry in his
armies, but also placing at his disposal the customs and market-dues,
which formed a standing common fund for supporting the Thessalian
collective administration.[651] The financial means of Philip, for
payment of his foreign troops, and prosecution of his military
enterprises, were thus materially increased.
[650] Demosthenes, Olynth. ii. p. 23. s. 17. (delivered in 350 B.
C.) ... Οἱ δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὸν ὄντες ξένοι καὶ πεζέταιροι δόξαν μὲν
καὶ ἔχουσιν ὡς εἰσὶ θαυμαστοὶ καὶ συγκεκροτημένοι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου,
etc.
[651] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 657. s. 133 (352-351
B. C.); also Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 15. s. 23. (349 B. C.)
ἤκουον δ᾽ ἔγωγέ τινων ὡς ~οὐδὲ~ τοὺς λιμένας καὶ τὰς ἀγορὰς
~ἔτι δώσοιεν~ αὐτῷ καρποῦσθαι· τὰ γὰρ κοινὰ τὰ Θετταλῶν ἀπὸ
τούτων δέοι διοικεῖν, οὐ Φίλιππον λαμβάνειν· εἰ δὲ τούτων
ἀποστερηθήσεται τῶν χρημάτων, εἰς στενὸν κομιδῇ τὰ τῆς τροφῆς
τοῖς ξένοις αὐτῷ καταστήσεται.
But besides his irresistible land-force, Philip had now become master
of no inconsiderable naval power also. During the early years of
the war, though he had taken not only Amphipolis, but also all the
Athenian possessions on the Macedonian coast, yet the exports from
his territory had been interrupted by the naval force of Athens, so
as to lessen seriously the produce of his export duties.[652] But
he had now contrived to get together a sufficient number of armed
ships and privateers, if not to ward off such damage from himself,
at least to retaliate it upon Athens. Her navy, indeed, was still
incomparably superior, but the languor and remissness of her citizens
refused to bring it out with efficiency; while Philip had opened for
himself a new avenue to maritime power by his acquisition of Pheræ
and Pagasæ, and by establishing his ascendency over the Magnêtes
and their territory, round the eastern border of the Pagasæan Gulf.
That gulf (now known by the name of Volo), is still the great inlet
and outlet for Thessalian trade; the eastern coast of Thessaly,
along the line of Mount Pelion, being craggy and harborless.[653]
The naval force belonging to Pheræ and its seaport Pagasæ, was very
considerable, and had been so even from the times of the despots,
Jason and Alexander;[654] at one moment painfully felt even by
Athens. All these ships now passed into the service of Philip,
together with the dues on export and import levied round the Pagasæan
Gulf; the command of which he farther secured by erecting suitable
fortifications on the Magnesian shore, and by placing a garrison in
Pagasæ.[655] Such additional naval means, combined with what he
already possessed at Amphipolis and elsewhere, made him speedily
annoying, if not formidable, to Athens, even at sea. His triremes
showed themselves everywhere, probably in small and rapidly moving
squadrons. He levied large contributions on the insular allies of
Athens, and paid the costs of war greatly out of the capture of
merchant vessels in the Ægean. His squadrons made incursions on the
Athenian islands of Lemnos and Imbros, carrying off several Athenian
citizens as prisoners. They even stretched southward as far as
Geræstus, the southern promontory of Eubœa, where they not only fell
in with and captured a lucrative squadron of corn-ships, but also
insulted the coast of Attica itself in the opposite bay of Marathon,
towing off as a prize one of the sacred triremes.[656] Such was the
mischief successfully inflicted by the flying squadrons of Philip,
though Athens had probably a considerable number of cruisers at sea,
and certainly a far superior number of ships at home in Peiræus. Her
commerce, and even her coasts, were disturbed and endangered; her
insular allies suffered yet more. Eubœa especially, the nearest and
most important of all her allies, separated only by a narrow strait
from the Pagasæan Gulf and the southern coast of Phthiotis, was now
within the immediate reach not only of Philip’s marauding vessels,
but also of his political intrigues.
[652] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 657. s. 131-133 (352-351
B. C.); compare Isokrates, Orat. v. (ad Philipp. s. 5.)
[653] Xenoph. Hellen. v. 4, 56; Hermippus ap. Athenæum, i. p.
27. About the lucrative commerce in the Gulf, in reference to
Demetrias and Thebæ Phthiotides, see Livy, xxxix. 25.
[654] Demosthenes cont. Polykl. p. 1207; De Coronâ Trierarchicâ,
p. 1230; Diodor. xv. 95; Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1, 11.
[655] Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 15. s. 23. Καὶ γὰρ Παγασὰς
ἀπαιτεῖν αὐτόν εἰσιν ἐψηφισμένοι (the Thessalians re-demand
the place from Philip), καὶ Μαγνησίαν κεκωλύκασι τειχίζειν. In
Olynth. ii. p. 21. s. 11. it stands—καὶ γὰρ νῦν εἰσὶν ἐψηφισμένοι
Παγασὰς ἀπαιτεῖν, καὶ περὶ Μαγνησίας λόγους ποιεῖσθαι. I take the
latter expression to state the fact with more strict precision;
the Thessalians passed a vote to _remonstrate_ with Philip; it
is not probable that they _actually hindered him_. And if he
afterwards “gave to them Magnesia,” as we are told in a later
oration delivered 344 B. C. (Philippic ii. p. 71. s. 24), he
probably gave it with reserve of the fortified posts to himself;
since we know that his ascendency over Thessaly was not only not
relaxed, but became more violent and compressive.
The value which the Macedonian kings always continued to
set, from this time forward, upon Magnesia and the recess of
the Pagasæan Gulf, is shown in the foundation of the city of
Demetrias in that important position, by Demetrius Poliorketes,
about sixty years afterwards. Demetrias, Chalkis, and Corinth
came to be considered the most commanding positions in Greece.
This fine bay, with the fertile territory lying on its shores
under Mount Pelion, are well described by colonel Leake, Travels
in Northern Greece, vol. iv. ch. 41. p. 373 _seqq._ I doubt
whether either Ulpian (ad Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 24) or colonel
Leake (p. 381) are borne out in supposing that there was any
_town_ called _Magnesia_ on the shores of the Gulf. None such is
mentioned either by Strabo or by Skylax; and I apprehend that the
passages above cited from Demosthenes mean _Magnesia the region_
inhabited by the Magnetes; as in Demosthenes cont. Neæram. p.
1382. s. 141.
[656] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 46. s. 25. δεῖ γὰρ, ἔχοντος
ἐκείνου ναυτικὸν, καὶ ταχειῶν τριηρῶν ἡμῖν, ὅπως ἀσφαλῶς ἡ
δύναμις πλέῃ.—p. 49. s. 38. Πρῶτον μὲν, τὸν μέγιστον τῶν ἐκείνου
πόρων ἀφαιρήσεσθε· ἔστι δ᾽ οὗτος τίς; ἀπὸ τῶν ὑμετέρων ὑμῖν
πολεμεῖ συμμάχων, ἄγων καὶ φέρων τοὺς πλέοντας τὴν θάλασσαν.
Ἔπειτα, τί πρὸς τούτῳ; τοῦ πάσχειν αὐτοὶ κακῶς ἔξω γενήσεσθε,
οὐχ ὥσπερ τὸν παρελθόντα χρόνον εἰς Λῆμνον καὶ Ἴμβρον ἐμβαλὼν
αἰχμαλώτους πολίτας ὑμετέρους ᾤχετ᾽ ἄγων, πρὸς τῷ Γεραιστῷ τὰ
πλοῖα συλλαβὼν ἀμύθητα χρήματ᾽ ἐξέλεξε, τὰ τελευταῖα εἰς Μαραθῶνα
ἀπέβη, καὶ τὴν ἱερὰν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας ᾤχετ᾽ ἔχων τριήρη, etc.
We can hardly be certain that the Sacred Trireme thus taken was
either the Paralus or the Salaminia; there may have been other
sacred triremes besides these two.
It was thus that the war against Philip turned more and more to the
disgrace and disadvantage of the Athenians. Though they had begun
it in the hope of punishing him for his duplicity in appropriating
Amphipolis, they had been themselves the losers by the capture
of Pydna, Potidæa, Methônê, etc.; and they were now thrown upon
the defensive, without security for their maritime allies, their
commerce, or their coasts.[657] The intelligence of these various
losses and insults endured at sea, in spite of indisputable maritime
preponderance, called forth at Athens acrimonious complaints
against the generals of the state, and exaggerated outbursts of
enmity against Philip.[658] That prince, having spent a few months,
after his repulse from Thermopylæ, in Thessaly, and having so
far established his ascendency over that country that he could
leave the completion of the task to his officers, pushed with his
characteristic activity into Thrace. He there took part in the
disputes between various native princes, expelling some, confirming
or installing others, and extending his own dominion at the cost
of all.[659] Among these princes were probably Kersobleptes, and
Amadokus; for Philip carried his aggressions to the immediate
neighborhood of the Thracian Chersonese.
[657] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 52. s. 49. ὁρῶν τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν
τοῦ πολέμου γεγενημένην ὑπὲρ τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι Φίλιππον, τὴν
δὲ τελευτὴν οὖσαν ἤδη ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ παθεῖν κακῶς ὑπὸ Φιλίππου.
(Between Midsummer 352 and Midsummer 351 B. C.)
[658] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 660. s. 144. p. 656. s.
130. Ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μάλιστα δοκῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ἐχθρὸς εἶναι Φίλιππος οὑτοσί,
etc. (this harangue also between Midsummer 352 and Midsummer 351
B. C.)
[659] Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 13. s. 13.
In November, 352 B. C., intelligence reached Athens, that he
was in Thrace besieging Heræon Teichos; a place so near to the
Chersonese,[660] that the Athenian possessions and colonists in
that peninsula were threatened with considerable danger. So great
was the alarm and excitement caused by this news, that a vote was
immediately passed in the public assembly to equip a fleet of forty
triremes,—to man it with Athenian citizens, all persons up to the age
of forty-five being made liable to serve on the expedition,—and to
raise sixty talents by a direct property tax. At first active steps
were taken to accelerate the armament. But before the difficulties
of detail could be surmounted,—before it could be determined,
amidst the general aversion to personal service, what citizens
should go abroad, and how the burthen of trierarchy should be
distributed,—fresh messengers arrived from the Chersonese, reporting
first that Philip had fallen sick, next that he was actually
dead.[661] The last-mentioned report proved false; but the sickness
of Philip was an actual fact, and seems to have been severe enough
to cause a temporary suspension of his military operations. Though
the opportunity became thus only the more favorable for attacking
Philip, yet the Athenians, no longer spurred on by the fear of
farther immediate danger, relapsed into their former languor, and
renounced or postponed their intended armament. After passing the
whole ensuing summer in inaction, they could only be prevailed upon,
in the month of September 351, to despatch to Thrace a feeble force
under the mercenary chief Charidemus; ten triremes, without any
soldiers aboard, and with no more than five talents in money.[662]
[660] Demosthenes, Olynth. iii. p. 29. s. 5 (delivered in the
latter half of 350 B. C.)
... ἀπηγγέλθη Φίλιππος ὑμῖν ἐν Θρᾴκῃ, τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον
ἔτος τουτὶ, Ἡραῖον τεῖχος πολιορκῶν, τότε τοίνυν μὴν μὲν ἦν
Μαιμακτηριὼν, etc.
This Thracian expedition of Philip (alluded to also in
Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 13. s. 13) stands fixed to the date of
November 352 B. C., on reasonably good grounds.
That the town or fortress called Ἡραῖον Τεῖχος was near to the
Chersonese, cannot be doubted. The commentators identify it with
Ἡραῖον, mentioned by Herodotus (iv. 90) as being near Perinthus.
But this hypothesis is open to much doubt. Ἡραῖον Τεῖχος is not
quite the same as Ἡραῖον; nor was the latter place very near to
the Chersonese; nor would Philip be yet in a condition to provoke
or menace so powerful a city as Perinthus—though he did so ten
years afterwards. (Diodor. xvi. 74).
I cannot think that we know where Ἡραῖον Τεῖχος was situated;
except that it was in Thrace, and near the Chersonese.
[661] Demosthenes, Olynth. iii. p. 29, 30. ὡς γὰρ ἠγγέλθη
Φίλιππος ἀσθενῶν ἢ τεθνεὼς (ἦλθε γὰρ ἀμφότερα), etc. These
reports of the sickness and death of Philip in Thrace are alluded
to in the first Philippic, p. 43. s. 14. The expedition of Philip
threatening the Chersonese, and the vote passed by the Athenians
when they first heard of this expedition, are also alluded to in
the first Philippic, p. 44. s. 20. p. 51. s. 46. καὶ ὑμεῖς, ἂν
ἐν Χεῤῥονήσῳ πύθησθε Φίλιππον, ἐκεῖσε βοηθεῖν ψηφίζεσθε, etc.
When Philip was besieging Ἡραῖον Τεῖχος, he was said to be ἐν
Χεῤῥονήσῳ.
[662] Demosthenes, Olynth. iii. p. 30. s. 6.
At this time Charidemus was at the height of his popularity. It was
supposed that he could raise and maintain a mercenary band by his
own ingenuity and valor. His friends confidently averred, before
the Athenian assembly, that he was the only man capable of putting
down Philip, and conquering Amphipolis.[663] One of these partisans,
Aristokrates, even went so far as to propose that a vote should be
passed ensuring inviolability to his person, and enacting that any
one who killed him should be seized wherever found in the territory
of Athens or her allies. This proposition was attacked judicially by
an accuser named Euthykles, who borrowed a memorable discourse from
the pen of Demosthenes.
[663] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 625. s. 14. p. 682, 683.
This oration, delivered between Midsummer 352 and Midsummer 351
B. C., seems to have been prior to November 352 B. C., when the
news reached Athens that Philip was besieging Ἡραῖον Τεῖχος.
It was thus that the real sickness, and reported death, of Philip
which ought to have operated as a stimulus to the Athenians by
exposing to them their enemy during a moment of peculiar weakness,
proved rather an opiate exaggerating their chronic lethargy, and
cheating them into a belief that no farther efforts were needed. That
belief appears to have been proclaimed by the leading, best-known,
and senior speakers, those who gave the tone to the public assembly,
and who were principally relied upon for advice. These men,—probably
Eubulus at their head, and Phokion, so constantly named as general,
along with him,—either did not feel, or could not bring themselves
to proclaim, the painful necessity of personal military service and
increased taxation. Though repeated debates took place on the insults
offered to Athens in her maritime dignity, and on the sufferings of
those allies to whom she owed protection,—combined with accusations
against the generals, and complaints of the inefficiency of such
mercenary foreigners as Athens took into commission but never
paid,—still, the recognized public advisers shrank from appeal
to the dormant patriotism or personal endurance of the citizens.
The serious, but indispensable, duty which they thus omitted, was
performed for them by a younger competitor, far beneath them in
established footing and influence,—Demosthenes, now about thirty
years old,—in an harangue, known as the first Philippic.
We have already had before us this aspiring man, as a public adviser
in the assembly. In his first parliamentary harangue two years
before,[664] he had begun to inculcate on his countrymen the general
lesson of energy and self-reliance, and to remind them of that
which the comfort, activity, and peaceful refinement of Athenian
life, had a constant tendency to put out of sight:—That the City,
as a whole, could not maintain her security and dignity against
enemies, unless each citizen individually, besides his home-duties,
were prepared to take his fair share, readily and without evasion,
of the hardship and cost of personal service abroad.[665] But he
had then been called upon to deal (in his discourse De Symmoriis)
only with the contingency of Persian hostilities—possible indeed,
yet neither near nor declared; he now renews the same exhortation
under more pressing exigencies. He has to protect interests already
suffering, and to repel dishonorable insults, becoming from month
to month more frequent, from an indefatigable enemy. Successive
assemblies have been occupied with complaints from sufferers, amidst
a sentiment of unwonted chagrin and helplessness among the public—yet
with no material comfort from the leading and established speakers;
who content themselves with inveighing against the negligence of
the mercenaries—taken into service by Athens but never paid—and
with threatening to impeach the generals. The assembly, wearied by
repetition of topics promising no improvement for the future, is
convoked, probably to hear some farther instance of damage committed
by the Macedonian cruisers, when Demosthenes, breaking through the
common formalities of precedence, rises first to address them.
[664] I adopt the date accepted by most critics, on the authority
of Dionysius of Halikarnassus, to the first Philippic; the
archonship of Aristodemus 352-351 B. C. It belongs, I think, to
the latter half of that year.
The statements of Dionysius bearing on this oration have been
much called in question; to a certain extent, with good reason,
in what he states about the _sixth Philippic_ (ad Ammæum, p.
736). What he calls the _sixth_, is in reality the _fifth_ in his
own enumeration, coming next after the first Philippic and the
three Olynthiacs. To the Oratio De Pace, which is properly the
sixth in his enumeration, he assigns no ordinal number whatever.
What is still more perplexing—he gives as the initial words of
what he calls the _sixth_ Philippic, certain words which occur
in the middle of the first Philippic, immediately after the
financial scheme read by Demosthenes to the people, the words,
Ἃ μὲν ἡμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δεδυνήμεθα εὑρεῖν ταῦτ᾽ ἐστίν
(Philipp. i. p. 48). If this were correct, we should have to
divide the first Philippic into two parts, and recognize the
latter part (after the words ἃ μὲν ἡμεῖς) as a separate and later
oration. Some critics, among them Dr. Thirlwall, agree so far
with Dionysius as to separate the latter part from the former,
and to view it as a portion of some later oration. I follow the
more common opinion, accepting the oration as one. There is a
confusion, either in the text or the affirmations, of Dionysius,
which has never yet been, perhaps cannot be, satisfactorily
cleared up.
Böhnecke (in his Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Attischen
Redner, p. 222 seq.) has gone into a full and elaborate
examination of the first Philippic and all the controversy
respecting it. He rejects the statement of Dionysius altogether.
He considers that the oration as it stands now is one whole,
but delivered three years later than Dionysius asserts: not
in 351 B. C., but in the Spring of 348 B. C., after the three
Olynthiacs, and a little before the fall of Olynthus. He notices
various chronological points (in my judgment none of them proving
his point) tending to show that the harangue cannot have been
delivered so early as 351 B. C. But I think the difficulty of
supposing that the oration was spoken at so late a period of the
Olynthian war, and yet that nothing is said in it about that war,
and next to nothing about Olynthus itself—is greater than any of
those difficulties which Böhnecke tries to make good against the
earlier date.
[665] Demosthenes, De Symmor. p. 182. s. 18.
It had once been the practice at Athens, that the herald formally
proclaimed, when a public assembly was opened—“Who among the citizens
above fifty years old wishes to speak? and after them, which of
the other citizens in his turn?”[666] Though this old proclamation
had fallen into disuse, the habit still remained, that speakers of
advanced age and experience rose first after the debate had been
opened by the presiding magistrates. But the relations of Athens with
Philip had been so often discussed, that all these men had already
delivered their sentiments and exhausted their recommendations. “Had
their recommendations been good, you need not have been now debating
the same topic over again”[667]—says Demosthenes, as an apology for
standing forward out of his turn to produce his own views.
[666] Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. p. 366.
[667] Demosthen. Philipp. i. init. ... Εἰ μὲν περὶ καινοῦ τινὸς
πράγματος προὐτίθετο λέγειν, ἐπισχὼν ἂν ἕως ~οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν
εἰωθότων~ γνώμην ἀπεφῄναντο ... ἐπειδὴ δὲ περὶ ὧν πολλάκις
εἰρήκασιν οὗτοι πρότερον συμβαίνει καὶ νυνὶ σκοπεῖν, ~ἡγοῦμαι καὶ
πρῶτος ἀναστὰς~ εἰκότως ἂν συγγνώμης τυγχάνειν· εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ
παρεληλυθότος χρόνου τὰ δέοντα οὗτοι συνεβούλευσαν, οὐδὲν ἂν ὑμᾶς
νῦν ἔδει βουλεύεσθαι.
His views indeed were so new, so independent of party-sympathies
or antipathies, and so plain-spoken in comments on the past as
well as in demands for the future—that they would hardly have been
proposed except by a speaker instinct with the ideal of the Periklean
foretime, familiar to him from his study of Thucydides. In explicit
language, Demosthenes throws the blame of the public misfortunes,
not simply on the past advisers and generals of the people, but
also on the people themselves.[668] It is from this proclaimed fact
that he starts, as his main ground of hope for future improvement.
Athens contended formerly with honor against the Lacedæmonians; and
now also, she will exchange disgrace for victory in her war against
Philip, if her citizens individually will shake off their past
inertness and negligence, each of them henceforward becoming ready
to undertake his full share of personal duty in the common cause.
Athens had undergone enough humiliation, and more than enough, to
teach her this lesson. She might learn it farther from her enemy
Philip himself, who had raised himself from small beginnings, and
heaped losses as well as shame upon her, mainly by his own personal
energy, perseverance, and ability; while the Athenian citizens had
been hitherto so backward as individuals, and so unprepared as a
public, that even if a lucky turn of fortune were to hand over to
them Amphipolis, they would be in no condition to seize it.[669]
Should the rumor prove true, that this Philip were dead, they would
soon make for themselves another Philip equally troublesome.
[668] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 40, 41. Ὅτι ~οὐδὲν τῶν δεόντων
ποιούντων~ ὑμῶν κακῶς τὰ πράγματα ἔχει· ἐπεί τοι, εἰ πάνθ᾽ ἃ
προσῆκε πραττόντων οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἐλπὶς ἦν αὐτὰ βελτίω
γενέσθαι, etc. Again, p. 42. Ἂν τοίνυν καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐπὶ τῆς τοιαύτης
ἐθελήσητε γενέσθαι γνώμης νῦν, ~ἐπειδήπερ οὐ πρότερον~, ... καὶ
παύσησθε αὐτὸς μὲν οὐδὲν ἕκαστος ποιήσειν ἐλπίζων, τὸν δὲ πλησίον
πάνθ᾽ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ πράξειν, etc.
Compare the previous harangue, De Symmoriis, p. 182. s. 18.
[669] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 43. s. 15. ὡς δὲ νῦν ἔχετε,
οὐδὲ διδόντων τῶν καιρῶν Ἀμφίπολιν δέξασθαι δύναισθ᾽ ἄν,
ἀπηρτημένοι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς καὶ ταῖς γνώμαις.
After thus severely commenting on the past apathy of the citizens,
and insisting upon a change of disposition as indispensable,
Demosthenes proceeds to specify the particular acts whereby such
change ought to be manifested. He entreats them not to be startled by
the novelty of his plan, but to hear him patiently to the end. It is
the result of his own meditations; other citizens may have better to
propose; if they have, he shall not be found to stand in their way.
What is past, cannot be helped; nor is extemporaneous speech the best
way of providing remedies for a difficult future.[670]
[670] Demosthenes, Philip. i. p. 44. ... ἐπειδὰν ἅπαντα ἀκούσητε,
κρίνατε—μὴ πρότερον προλαμβάνετε· μηδ᾽ ἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ~δοκῶ τινὶ
καινὴν παρασκευὴν~ λέγειν, ἀναβάλλειν με τὰ πράγματα ἡγείσθω· οὐ
γὰρ οἱ ταχὺ καὶ τήμερον εἰπόντες μάλιστα εἰς δέον λέγουσιν, etc.
... Οἶμαι τοίνυν ἐγὼ ταῦτα λέγειν ἔχειν, μὴ κωλύων εἴ τις ἄλλος
ἐπαγγέλλεταί τι.
This deprecatory tone deserves notice, and the difficulty which
the speaker anticipates in obtaining a hearing.
He advises first, that a fleet of fifty triremes shall be immediately
put in readiness; that the citizens shall firmly resolve to serve in
person on board, whenever the occasion may require, and that triremes
and other vessels shall be specially fitted out for half of the
horsemen of the city, who shall serve personally also. This force is
to be kept ready to sail at a moment’s notice, and to meet Philip
in any of his sudden out-marches—to Chersonesus, to Thermopylæ, to
Olynthus, etc.[671]
[671] Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 44, 45.
Secondly, that a farther permanent force shall be set on foot
immediately, to take the aggressive, and carry on active continuous
warfare against Philip, by harassing him in various points of his
own country. Two thousand infantry, and two hundred horse, will be
sufficient; but it is essential that one-fourth part—five hundred
of the former and fifty of the latter—shall be citizens of Athens.
The remainder are to be foreign mercenaries; ten swift sailing war
triremes are also to be provided to protect the transports against
the naval force of Philip. The citizens are to serve by relays,
relieving each other; every one for a time fixed beforehand, yet none
for a very long time.[672] The orator then proceeds to calculate
the cost of such a standing force for one year. He assigns to each
seaman, and to each foot soldier, ten drachmæ per month, or two
oboli per day; to each horseman, thirty drachmæ per month, or one
drachma (six oboli) per day. No difference is made between the
Athenian citizen and the foreigner. The sum here assigned is not
full pay, but simply the cost of each man’s maintenance. At the same
time, Demosthenes pledges himself, that if thus much be furnished
by the state, the remainder of a full pay (or as much again) will
be made up by what the soldiers will themselves acquire in the war;
and that too, without wrong done to allies or neutral Greeks. The
total annual cost thus incurred will be ninety-two talents (= about
£22,000.) He does not give any estimate of the probable cost of his
other armament, of fifty triremes; which are to be equipped and ready
at a moment’s notice for emergencies, but not sent out on permanent
service.
[672] Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 45, 46.
His next task is, to provide ways and means for meeting such
additional cost of ninety-two talents. Here he produces and reads
to the assembly, a special financial scheme, drawn up in writing.
Not being actually embodied in the speech, the scheme has been
unfortunately lost; though its contents would help us materially to
appreciate the views of Demosthenes.[673] It must have been more or
less complicated in its details; not a simple proposition for an
_eisphora_ or property-tax, which would have been announced in a
sentence of the orator’s speech.
[673] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 48, 49. Ἃ δ᾽ ὑπάρξαι δεῖ παρ᾽
ὑμῶν, ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἁγὼ γέγραφα.
Assuming the money, the ships, and the armament for permanent
service, to be provided, Demosthenes proposes that a formal law be
passed, making such permanent service peremptory; the general in
command being held responsible for the efficient employment of the
force.[674] The islands, the maritime allies, and the commerce of the
Ægean would then become secure; while the profits of Philip from his
captures at sea would be arrested.[675] The quarters of the armament
might be established, during winter or bad weather, in Skiathos,
Thasos, Lemnos, or other adjoining islands, from whence they could
act at all times against Philip on his own coast; while from Athens
it was difficult to arrive thither either during the prevalence of
the Etesian winds or during winter—the seasons usually selected by
Philip for his aggressions.[676]
[674] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 49. s. 37.
[675] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 49. s. 38, 39.
[676] Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 48, 49. “The obstinacy and
violence of the Etesian winds, in July and August, are well known
to those who have had to struggle with them in the Ægean during
that season” (Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iv.
ch. 42. p. 426).
The Etesian winds, blowing from the north, made it difficult to
reach Macedonia from Athens.
Compare Demosthenes, De Rebus Chersonesi, p. 93. s. 14.
The aggregate means of Athens (Demosthenes affirmed) in men,
money, ships, hoplites, horsemen, were greater than could be found
anywhere else. But hitherto they had never been properly employed.
The Athenians, like awkward pugilists, waited for Philip to strike,
and then put up their hand to follow his blow. They never sought to
look him in the face—nor to be ready with a good defensive system
beforehand—nor to anticipate him in offensive operations.[677] While
their religious festivals, the Panathenaic, Dionysiac, and others,
were not only celebrated with costly splendor, but prearranged with
the most careful pains, so that nothing was ever wanting in detail
at the moment of execution—their military force was left without
organization or predetermined system. Whenever any new encroachment
of Philip was made known, nothing was found ready to meet it; fresh
decrees were to be voted, modified, and put in execution, for each
special occasion; the time for action was wasted in preparation,
and before a force could be placed on shipboard, the moment for
execution had passed.[678] This practice of waiting for Philip to
act offensively, and then sending aid to the point attacked, was
ruinous; the war must be carried on by a standing force put in motion
beforehand.[679]
[677] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 51. s. 46. ... ὑμεῖς δὲ, πλείστην
δύναμιν ἁπάντων ἔχοντες, τριηρεῖς, ὁπλίτας, ἱππέας, χρημάτων
πρόσοδον, τούτων μὲν μέχρι τῆς τήμερον ἡμέρας οὐδενὶ πώποτε εἰς
δέον τι κέχρησθε.
[678] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 50. ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ τοῦ πολέμου
ἄτακτα, ἀδιόρθωτα, ἀόριστα, ἅπαντα. Τοιγαροῦν ἅμα ἀκηκόαμέν τι
καὶ τριηράρχους καθίσταμεν, καὶ τούτοις ἀντιδόσεις ποιούμεθα καὶ
περὶ χρημάτων πόρου σκοποῦμεν, etc.
[679] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 48, 49. δεῖ—μὴ βοηθείαις πολεμεῖν
(ὑστεριοῦμεν γὰρ ἁπάντων) ἀλλὰ παρασκευῇ συνεχεῖ καὶ δυνάμει.
Compare his Oration De Rebus Chersonesi, p. 92. s. 11.
To provide and pay such a standing force, is one of the main points
in the project of Demosthenes. The absolute necessity that it shall
consist, in large proportion at least, of citizens, is another. To
this latter point he reverts again and again, insisting that the
foreign mercenaries—sent out to make their pay where or how they
could, and unaccompanied by Athenian citizens—were at best useless
and untrustworthy. They did more mischief to friends and allies,
who were terrified at the very tidings of their approach—than to
the enemy.[680] The general, unprovided with funds to pay them, was
compelled to follow them wheresoever they chose to go, disregarding
his orders received from the city. To try him afterwards for that
which he could not help, was unprofitable disgrace. But if the
troops were regularly paid; if, besides, a considerable proportion
of them were Athenian citizens, themselves interested in success,
and inspectors of all that was done; then the general would be
found willing and able to attack the enemy with vigor—and might be
held to a rigorous accountability, if he did not. Such was the only
way in which the formidable and ever-growing force of their enemy
Philip could be successfully combated. As matters now stood, the
inefficiency of Athenian operations was so ridiculous, that men might
be tempted to doubt whether Athens was really in earnest. Her chief
military officers—her ten generals, ten taxiarchs, ten phylarchs,
and two hipparchs, annually chosen—were busied only in the affairs
of the city and in the showy religious processions. They left the
real business of war to a foreign general named Menelaus.[681] Such a
system was disgraceful. The honor of Athens ought to be maintained by
her own citizens, both as generals and as soldiers.
[680] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 46. s. 28. ἐξ οὗ δ᾽ αὐτὰ
καθ᾽ αὑτὰ τὰ ξενικὰ ὑμῖν στρατεύεται, τοὺς φίλους νικᾷ καὶ
τοὺς συμμάχους, οἱ δ᾽ ἐχθροὶ μείζους τοῦ δέοντος γεγόνασι· καὶ
παρακύψαντα ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς πόλεως πόλεμον, πρὸς Ἀρτάβαζον καὶ
πανταχοῖ μᾶλλον οἴχεται πλέοντα, ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς ἀκολουθεῖ,
εἰκότως· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄρχειν μὴ διδόντα μισθόν. Τί οὖν κελεύω;
τὰς προφάσεις ἀφελεῖν καὶ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν,
μισθὸν πορίσαντας καὶ στρατιώτας οἰκείους ὥσπερ ἐπόπτας τῶν
στρατηγουμένων παρακαταστήσαντας, etc.
... p 53. s. 51. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐχθροὶ καταγελῶσιν, οἱ δὲ σύμμαχοι
τεθνᾶσι τῷ δέει τοὺς τοιούτους ἀποστόλους, etc.
[681] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 47. ἐπεὶ νῦν γε γέλως ἔσθ᾽ ὡς
χρώμεθα τοῖς πράγμασι.
Such are the principal features in the discourse called the First
Philippic; the earliest public harangue delivered by Demosthenes
to the Athenian assembly, in reference to the war with Philip. It
is not merely a splendid piece of oratory, emphatic and forcible
in its appeal to the emotions; bringing the audience by many
different roads, to the main conviction which the orator seeks to
impress; profoundly animated with genuine Pan-hellenic patriotism,
and with the dignity of that free Grecian world now threatened
by a monarch from without. It has other merits besides, not less
important in themselves, and lying more immediately within the
scope of the historian. We find Demosthenes, yet only thirty years
old—young in political life—and thirteen years before the battle
of Chæroneia—taking accurate measure of the political relations
between Athens and Philip; examining those relations during the
past, pointing out how they had become every year more unfavorable,
and foretelling the dangerous contingencies of the future, unless
better precautions were taken; exposing with courageous frankness
not only the past mismanagement of public men, but also those
defective dispositions of the people themselves wherein such
management had its root; lastly, after fault found, adventuring on
his own responsibility to propose specific measures of correction,
and urging upon reluctant citizens a painful imposition of personal
hardship as well as of taxation. We shall find him insisting on the
same obligation, irksome alike to the leading politicians and to
the people,[682] throughout all the Olynthiacs and Philippics. We
note his warnings given at this early day, when timely prevention
would have been easily practicable; and his superiority to elder
politicians like Eubulus and Phokion, in prudent appreciation,
in foresight, and in courage of speaking out unpalatable truths.
More than twenty years after this period, when Athens had lost
the game and was in her phase of humiliation, Demosthenes (in
repelling the charges of those who imputed her misfortune to his
bad advice) measures the real extent to which a political statesman
is properly responsible. The first of all things is—“To see events
in their beginnings—to discern tendencies beforehand, and proclaim
them beforehand to others—to abridge as much as possible the
rubs, impediments, jealousies, and tardy movements, inseparable
from the march of a free city—and to infuse among the citizens
harmony, friendly feelings, and zeal for the performance of their
duties.”[683] The first Philippic is alone sufficient to prove, how
justly Demosthenes lays claim to the merit of having “seen events
in their beginnings” and given timely warning to his countrymen. It
will also go to show, along with other proofs hereafter to be seen,
that he was not less honest and judicious in his attempts to fulfil
the remaining portion of the statesman’s duty—that of working up
his countrymen to unanimous and resolute enterprise; to the pitch
requisite not merely for speaking and voting, but for acting and
suffering, against the public enemy.
[682] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 54 s. 58. Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν
οὔτ᾽ ἄλλοτε πώποτε πρὸς χάριν εἱλόμην λέγειν, ὅ,τι ἂν μὴ καὶ
συνοίσειν πεπεισμένος ὦ, νῦν τε ἃ γιγνώσκω πάνθ᾽ ἁπλῶς, οὐδὲν
ὑποστειλάμενος, πεπαῤῥησίασμαι. Ἐβουλόμην δ᾽ ἄν, ὥσπερ ὅτι ὑμῖν
συμφέρει τὰ βέλτιστα ἀκούειν οἶδα, οὕτως εἰδέναι συνοῖσον καὶ τῷ
τὰ βέλτιστα εἰπόντι· πολλῷ γὰρ ἂν ἥδιον εἶπον. Νῦν δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀδήλοις
οὖσι τοῖς ἀπὸ τούτων ἐμαυτῷ γενησομένοις, ὅμως ἐπὶ τῷ συνοίσειν
ὑμῖν, ἂν πράξητε, ταῦτα πεπεῖσθαι λέγειν αἱροῦμαι.
[683] Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 308. s. 306. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὧν γ᾽ ἂν ὁ
ῥήτωρ ὑπεύθυνος εἴη, πᾶσαν ἐξέτασιν λάμβανε· οὐ παραιτοῦμαι. Τίνα
οὖν ἐστὶ ταῦτα; Ἰδεῖν τὰ πράγματα ἀρχόμενα, καὶ προαισθέσθαι καὶ
προειπεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις. Ταῦτα πέπρακταί μοι. Καὶ ἔτι τὰς ἑκασταχοῦ
βραδυτῆτας, ὄκνους, ἀγνοίας, φιλονεικίας, ἃ πολιτικὰ ταῖς πόλεσι
πρόσεστιν ἁπάσαις καὶ ἀναγκαῖα ἁμαρτήματα, ταῦθ᾽ ὡς εἰς ἐλάχιστα
συστεῖλαι, καὶ τοὐνάντιον εἰς ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ τοῦ τὰ δέοντα
ποιεῖν ὁρμὴν προτρέψαι.
We know neither the actual course, nor the concluding vote, of this
debate, wherein Demosthenes took a part so unexpectedly prominent.
But we know that neither of the two positive measures which he
recommends was carried into effect. The working armament was not
sent out, nor was the home-force, destined to be held in reserve for
instant movement in case of emergency, ever got ready. It was not
until the following month of September (the oration being delivered
some time in the first half of 351 B. C.), that any actual force
was sent against Philip; and even then nothing more was done than
to send the mercenary chief Charidemus to the Chersonese, with ten
triremes, and five talents in money, but no soldiers.[684] Nor is
there any probability that Demosthenes even obtained a favorable vote
of the assembly; though strong votes against Philip were often passed
without being ever put in execution afterwards.[685]
[684] Demosthenes, Olynth. iii. p. 29. s. 5.
[685] Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 48. s. 34; Olynth. ii. p. 21.
s. 12; Olynth. iii. p. 29. s. 5. p. 32. s. 16; De Rhodiorum
Libertate, p. 190. s. 1. And not merely votes against Philip, but
against others also, remained either unexecuted or inadequately
executed (Demosthenes, De Republicâ Ordinandâ, p. 175, 176).
Demosthenes was doubtless opposed by those senior statesmen whose
duty it would have been to come forward themselves with the same
propositions assuming the necessity to be undeniable. But what
ground was taken in opposing him, we do not know. There existed
at that time in Athens a certain party or section who undervalued
Philip as an enemy not really formidable—far less formidable than
the Persian king.[686] The reports of Persian force and preparation,
prevalent two years before when Demosthenes delivered his harangue
on the Symmories, seem still to have continued, and may partly
explain the inaction again Philip. Such reports would be magnified,
or fabricated, by another Athenian party much more dangerous;
in communication with, and probably paid by, Philip himself. To
this party Demosthenes makes his earliest allusion in the first
Philippic,[687] and reverts to them on many occasions afterwards.
We may be very certain that there were Athenian citizens serving
as Philip’s secret agents, though we cannot assign their names. It
would be not less his interest to purchase such auxiliaries, than to
employ paid spies in his operations of war:[688] while the prevalent
political antipathies at Athens, coupled with the laxity of public
morality in individuals, would render it perfectly practicable to
obtain suitable instruments. That not only at Athens, but also at
Amphipolis, Potidæa, Olynthus and elsewhere, Philip achieved his
successes, partly by purchasing corrupt partisans among the leaders
of his enemies—is an assertion so intrinsically probable, that we may
readily believe it, though advanced chiefly by unfriendly witnesses.
Such corruption alone, indeed, would not have availed him, but it was
eminently useful when combined with well-employed force and military
genius.
[686] Demosthen. De Rhodior. Libertat. p. 197. s. 31. ὁρῶ
δ᾽ ~ὑμῶν ἐνίους~ Φιλίππου μὲν ὡς ἄρ᾽ οὐδενὸς ἀξίου πολλάκις
ὀλιγωροῦντας, βασιλέα δ᾽ ὡς ἰσχυρὸν ἐχθρὸν οἷς ἂν προέληται
φοβουμένους. Εἰ δὲ ~τὸν μὲν ὡς φαῦλον οὐκ ἀμυνούμεθα~, τῷ δὲ ὡς
φοβερῷ πάνθ᾽ ὑπείξομεν, πρὸς τίνας παραταξόμεθα;
This oration was delivered in 351-350 B. C.; a few months after
the first Philippic.
[687] Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 45. s. 21; Olynthiac ii. p. 19.
s. 4.
[688] Compare the advice of the Thebans to Mardonius in 479 B.
C.—during the Persian invasion of Greece (Herodot. ix. 2).
CHAPTER LXXXVIII.
EUBOIC AND OLYNTHIAN WARS.
If even in Athens, at the date of the first Philippic of Demosthenes,
the uneasiness about Philip was considerable, much more serious had
it become among his neighbors the Olynthians. He had gained them
over, four years before, by transferring to them the territory of
Anthemus—and the still more important town of Potidæa, captured by
his own arms from Athens. Grateful for these cessions, they had
become his allies in his war with Athens, whom they hated on every
ground. But a material change had since taken place. Since the loss
of Methônê, Athens, expelled from the coast of Thrace and Macedonia,
had ceased to be a hostile neighbor, or to inspire alarm to the
Olynthians; while the immense increase in the power of Philip,
combined with his ability and ambition alike manifest, had overlaid
their gratitude for the past by a sentiment of fear for the future.
It was but too clear that a prince who stretched his encroaching
arms in all directions—to Thermopylæ, to Illyria, and to Thrace—would
not long suffer the fertile peninsula between the Thermaic and
Strymonic gulfs to remain occupied by free Grecian communities.
Accordingly, it seems that after the great victory of Philip in
Thessaly over the Phokians (in the first half of 352 B. C.), the
Olynthians manifested their uneasiness by seceding from alliance
with him against Athens. They concluded peace with that city, and
manifested such friendly sentiments that an alliance began to be
thought possible. This peace seems to have been concluded before
November 352 B. C.[689]
[689] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 656. s. 129. ἐκεῖνοι
(Olynthians) ἕως μὲν ἑώρων αὐτὸν (Philip) τηλικοῦτον ἡλίκος ὢν
πιστὸς ὑπῆρχε, σύμμαχοί τε ἦσαν, καὶ δι᾽ ἐκεῖνον ἡμῖν ἐπολέμουν·
ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἶδον μείζω τῆς πρὸς αὑτοὺς πίστεως γιγνόμενον ...
ὑμᾶς, οὓς ἴσασιν ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων ἥδιστ᾽ ἂν καὶ τοὺς ἐκείνου
φίλους καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Φίλιππον ἀποκτείναντας, φίλους πεποίηνται,
φασὶ δὲ καὶ συμμάχους ποιήσεσθαι.
We know from Dionysius that this oration was delivered between
Midsummer 352 B. C. and Midsummer 351 B. C. I have already
remarked that it must have been delivered, in my judgment, before
the month Mæmakterion (November) 352 B. C.
Here was an important change of policy on the part of the Olynthians.
Though they probably intended it, not as a measure of hostility
against Philip, but simply as a precaution to ensure to themselves
recourse elsewhere in case of becoming exposed to his attack, it
was not likely that he would either draw or recognize any such
distinction. He would probably consider that by the cession of
Potidæa, he had purchased their coöperation against Athens, and would
treat their secession as at least making an end to all amicable
relations.
A few months afterwards (at the date of the first Philippic[690])
we find that he, or his soldiers, had attacked, and made sudden
excursions into their territory, close adjoining to his own.
[690] Demosthenes, Philippic i. p. 44. s. 20. ... ἐπὶ τὰς
ἐξαίφνης ταύτας ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας χώρας αὐτοῦ στρατείας, εἰς Πύλας
καὶ Χεῤῥόνησον καὶ Ὄλυνθον καὶ ὅποι βούλεται.
In this state of partial hostility, yet without proclaimed or
vigorous war, matters seem to have remained throughout the year 351
B. C. Philip was engaged during that year in his Thracian expedition,
where he fell sick, so that aggressive enterprise was for the time
suspended. Meanwhile the Athenians seem to have proposed to Olynthus
a scheme of decided alliance against Philip.[691] But the Olynthians
had too much to fear from him, to become themselves the aggressors.
They still probably hoped that he might find sufficient enemies
and occupation elsewhere, among Thracians, Illyrians, Pæonians,
Arymbas and the Epirots, and Athenians;[692] at any rate, they would
not be the first to provoke a contest. This state of reciprocal
mistrust[693] continued for several months, until at length Philip
began serious operations against them; not very long after his
recovery from the sickness in Thrace, and seemingly towards the
middle of 350 B. C.;[694] a little before the beginning of Olympiad
107, 3.
[691] Demosthenes, Olynthiac i. p. 11. s. 7. ... νυνὶ γὰρ, ~ὃ
πάντες ἐθρύλλουν τέως, Ὀλυνθίους ἐκπολεμῆσαι δεῖν~ Φιλίππῳ,
γέγονεν αὐτόματον, καὶ ταῦθ᾽ ὡς ἂν ὑμῖν μάλιστα συμφέροι. Εἰ μὲν
γὰρ ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν πεισθέντες ἀνείλοντο τὸν πόλεμον, σφαλεροὶ σύμμαχοι
καὶ μέχρι του ταῦτ᾽ ἂν ἐγνωκότες ἦσαν ἴσως, etc.
Compare Olynth. iii. p. 30. s. 9. and p. 32. s. 18. οὐχ οὓς, εἰ
πολεμήσαιεν, ἑτοίμως σώσειν ὑπισχνούμεθα, οὗτοι νῦν πολεμοῦνται;
[692] Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 13. s. 13.
[693] Demosthen. Olynth. iii. p. 30. s. 8. οὔτε Φίλιππος ἐθάῤῥει
τούτους, οὔθ᾽ οὗτοι Φίλιππον, etc.
[694] Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 13. s. 13. ... ἠσθένησε· πάλιν
ῥαΐσας οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ ῥᾳθυμεῖν ἀπέκλινεν, ἀλλ᾽ ~εὐθὺς Ὀλυνθίοις
ἐπεχείρησεν~.
What length of time is denoted by the adverb εὐθὺς, must of
course be matter of conjecture. If the expression had been found
in the Oration De Coronâ, delivered twenty years afterwards, we
might have construed εὐθὺς very loosely. But it occurs here in an
oration delivered probably in the latter half of 350 B. C., but
certainly not later than the first half of 348 B. C. Accordingly,
it is hardly reasonable to assign to the interval here designated
by εὐθὺς (that between Philip’s recovery and his serious attack
upon the Olynthians) a longer time than six months. We should
then suppose this attack to have been commenced about the
last quartet of Olymp. 107, 2; or in the first half of 350 B.
C. This is the view of Böhnecke, and, I think, very probable
(Forschungen, p. 211).
It was probably during the continuance of such semi-hostile relations
that two half-brothers of Philip, sons of his father Amyntas by
another mother, sought and obtained shelter at Olynthus. They came as
his enemies; for he had put to death already one of their brothers,
and they themselves only escaped the same fate by flight. Whether
they had committed any positive act to provoke his wrath, we are not
informed; but such tragedies were not unfrequent in the Macedonian
regal family. While Olynthus was friendly and grateful to Philip,
these exiles would not have resorted thither; but they were now
favorably received, and may perhaps have held out hopes that in case
of war they could raise a Macedonian party against Philip. To that
prince, the reception of his fugitive enemies served as a plausible
pretence for war—which he doubtless would under all circumstances
have prosecuted—against Olynthus; and it seems to have been so put
forward in his public declarations.[695]
[695] Justin, viii. 3; Orosius, iii. 12. Justin states this as
the _cause_ of the attack made by Philip on Olynthus—which I do
not believe. But I see no ground for doubting the fact itself—or
for doubting that Philip laid hold of it as a _pretext_. He found
the half-brothers in Olynthus when the city was taken, and put
both of them to death.
But Philip, in accomplishing his conquests, knew well how to blend
the influences of deceit and seduction with those of arms, and to
divide or corrupt those whom he intended to subdue. To such insidious
approaches Olynthus was in many ways open. The power of that city
consisted, in great part, in her position as chief of a numerous
confederacy, including a large proportion, though probably not all,
of the Grecian cities in the peninsula of Chalkidikê. Among the
different members of such a confederacy, there was more or less of
dissentient interest or sentiment, which accidental circumstances
might inflame so as to induce a wish for separation. In each city
moreover, and in Olynthus itself, there were ambitious citizens
competing for power, and not scrupulous as to the means whereby it
was to be acquired or retained. In each of them, Philip could open
intrigues, and enlist partisans; in some, he would probably receive
invitations to do so; for the greatness of his exploits, while it
inspired alarm in some quarters, raised hopes among disappointed and
jealous minorities. If, through such predisposing circumstances, he
either made or found partisans and traitors in the distant cities
of Peloponnesus, much more was this practicable for him in the
neighboring peninsula of Chalkidikê. Olynthus and the other cities
were nearly all conterminous with the Macedonian territory, some
probably with boundaries not clearly settled. Perdikkas II. had
given to the Olynthians (at the beginning of the Peloponnesian
war[696]) a portion of his territory near the Lake Bolbê: Philip
himself had given to them the district of Anthemus. Possessed of so
much neighboring land, he had the means, with little loss to himself,
of materially favoring or enriching such individual citizens, of
Olynthus or other cities, as chose to promote his designs. Besides
direct bribes, where that mode of proceeding was most effective, he
could grant the right of gratuitous pasture to the flocks and herds
of one, and furnish abundant supplies of timber to another. Master as
he now was of Amphipolis and Philippi, he could at pleasure open or
close to them the speculations of the gold mines of Mount Pangæus,
for which they had always hankered.[697] If his privateers harassed
even the powerful Athens, and the islands under her protection,
much more vexatious would they be to his neighbors in the Chalkidic
peninsula, which they as it were encircled, from the Thermaic Gulf on
one side to the Strymonic Gulf on the other. Lastly, we cannot doubt
that some individuals in these cities had found it profitable to take
service, civil or military, under Philip, which would supply him with
correspondents and adherents among their friends and relatives.
[696] Thucyd. i. 58.
[697] Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 425, 426; Xenophon, Hellen. v.
2. 17.
It will thus be easily seen, that with reference to Olynthus and
her confederate cities, Philip had at his command means of private
benefit and annoyance to such an extent, as would ensure to him the
coöperation of a venal and traitorous minority in each; such minority
of course blending its proceedings, and concealing its purposes,
among the standing political feuds of the place. These means however
were only preliminary to the direct use of the sword. His seductions
and presents commenced the work, but his excellent generalship
and soldiers—the phalanx, the hypaspistæ, and the cavalry, all
now brought into admirable training during the ten years of his
reign—completed it.
Though Demosthenes in one passage goes so far as to say that Philip
rated his established influence so high as to expect to incorporate
the Chalkidic confederacy in his empire without serious difficulty
and without even real war[698]—there is ground for believing that he
encountered strenuous resistance, avenged by unmeasured rigors after
the victory. The two years and a half between Midsummer 350 B. C.,
and the commencement of 347 B. C. (the two last years of Olympiad
107 and the nine first months of Olympiad 108), were productive of
phænomena more terror-striking than anything in the recent annals of
Greece. No less than thirty-two free Grecian cities in Chalkidikê
were taken and destroyed, the inhabitants being reduced to slavery,
by Philip. Among them was Olynthus, one of the most powerful,
flourishing, and energetic members of the Hellenic brotherhood;
Apollonia, whose inhabitants would now repent the untoward obstinacy
of their fathers (thirty-two years before) in repudiating a generous
and equal confederacy with Olynthus, and invoking Spartan aid to
revive the falling power of Philip’s father, Amyntas; and Stageira,
the birth-place of Aristotle. The destruction of thirty-two free
Hellenic communities in two years by a foreign prince, was a calamity
the like of which had never occurred since the suppression of the
Ionic revolt and the invasion of Xerxes. I have already recounted in
a previous chapter[699] the manifestation of wrath at the festival
of the ninety-ninth Olympiad (394 B. C.) against the envoys of the
elder Dionysius of Syracuse, who had captured and subverted five or
six free Hellenic communities in Italy and Sicily. Far more vehement
would be the sentiment of awe and terror, after the Olynthian war,
against the Macedonian destroyer of thirty-two Chalkidic cities.
We shall find this plainly indicated in the phænomena immediately
succeeding. We shall see Athens terrified into a peace alike
dishonorable and improvident, which even Demosthenes does not venture
to oppose; we shall see Æschines passing out of a free spoken
Athenian citizen into a servile worshipper, if not a paid agent, of
Philip: we shall observe Isokrates, once the champion of Pan-hellenic
freedom and integrity, ostentatiously proclaiming Philip as the
master and arbiter of Greece, while persuading him at the same time
to use his power well for the purpose of conquering Persia. These
were terrible times; suitably illustrated in their cruel details by
the gangs of enslaved Chalkidic Greeks of both sexes, seen passing
even into Peloponnesus[700] as the property of new grantees who
extolled the munificence of the donor Philip; and suitably ushered in
by awful celestial signs, showers of fire and blood falling from the
heavens to the earth, in testimony of the wrath of the gods.[701]
[698] Demosthenes, Olynth. i. p. 15. s. 22. οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἐξήνεγκε τὸν
πόλεμόν ποτε τοῦτον ἐκεῖνος, εἰ πολεμεῖν ᾠήθη δεήσειν αὐτὸν,
ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐπιὼν ἅπαντα τότε ἤλπιζε τὰ πράγματα ἀναιρήσεσθαι, κᾆτα
διέψευσται. Τοῦτο δὴ πρῶτον αὐτὸν ταράττει παρὰ γνώμην γεγονὸς,
etc.
[699] See ch. lxxxiii. p. 35 of this Volume.
[700] Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 439. Æschines himself met a
person named Atrestidas followed by one of these sorrowful
troops. We may be sure that this case was only one among many.
[701] Pliny, H. N. ii. 27. “Fit et cœli ipsius hiatus, quod
vocant chasma. Fit et sanguineâ specie (quo nihil terribilius
mortalium timori est) incendium ad terras cadens inde; _sicut
Olympiadis centesimæ septimæ anno tertio, cum rex Philippus
Græciam quateret_. Atque ego hæc statis temporibus naturæ, ut
cetera, arbitror existere; non (ut plerique) variis de causis,
quas ingeniorum acumen excogitat. _Quippe ingentium malorum fuere
prænuntia_; sed ea accidisse non quia hæc facta sunt arbitror,
verum hæc ideo facta, quia incasura erant illa: raritate autem
occultam eorum esse rationem, ideoque non sicut exortus supra
dictos defectusque et multa alia nosci.”
The precision of this chronological note makes it valuable.
Olymp. 107, 3—corresponds to the year between Midsummer 350 and
Midsummer 349 B. C.
Taylor, who cites this passage in his Prolegomena ad Demosthenem
(ap. Reiske Oratt. Gr. vol. viii. p. 756), takes the liberty,
without any manuscript authority, of altering _tertio_ into
_quarto_; which Böhnecke justly pronounces to be unreasonable
(Forschungen, p. 212). The passage as it stands is an evidence,
not merely to authenticate the terrific character of the time,
but also to prove, among other evidences, that the attack of
Philip on the Olynthians and Chalkidians began in 350-349 B.
C.—not in the following Olympic year, or in the time after
Midsummer 349 B. C.
Böhnecke (Forschungen, p. 201-221) has gone into an examination
of the dates and events of this Olynthian war, and has arranged
them in a manner different from any preceding critic. His
examination is acute and instructive, including however some
reasonings of little force or pertinence. I follow him generally,
in placing the beginning of the Olynthian war, and the Olynthiacs
of Demosthenes, before Olymp. 107, 4. This is the best opinion
which I can form, on matters lamentably unattested and uncertain.
While, however, we make out with tolerable clearness the general
result of Philip’s Olynthian war, and the terror which it struck into
the Grecian mind—we are not only left without information as to its
details, but are even perplexed by its chronology. I have already
remarked, that though the Olynthians had contracted such suspicions
of Philip, even before the beginning of 351 B. C., as to induce them
to make peace with his enemy Athens—they had nevertheless, declined
the overtures of Athens for a closer alliance, not wishing to bring
upon themselves decided hostility from so powerful a neighbor, until
his aggressions should become such as to leave them no choice. We
have no precise information as to Philip’s movements after his
operations in Thrace and his sickness in 351 B. C. But we know that
it was not in his nature to remain inactive; that he was incessantly
pushing his conquests; and that no conquest could be so important to
him as that of Olynthus and the Chalkidic peninsula. Accordingly,
we are not surprised to find, that the Olynthian and Chalkidian
confederates became the object of his direct hostility in 350 B.
C. He raised pretences for attack against one or other of these
cities separately; avoiding to deal with the confederacy as a whole,
and disclaiming, by special envoys,[702] all purposes injurious to
Olynthus.
[702] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 113. That Philip not only
attacked, but even subdued, the thirty-two Chalkidic cities,
before he marched directly and finally to assail Olynthus—is
stated in the Fragment of Kallisthenes ap. Stobæum, Eclog. Tit.
vii. p. 92.
Kallisthenes, whose history is lost, was a native of Olynthus,
born a few years before the capture of the city.
Probably the philippizing party in that city may have dwelt upon
this disclaimer as satisfactory, and given as many false assurances
about the purposes of Philip, as we shall find Æschines hereafter
uttering at Athens. But the general body of citizens were not so
deceived. Feeling that the time had come when it was prudent to close
with the previous Athenian overtures, they sent envoys to Athens to
propose alliance and invite coöperation against Philip. Their first
propositions were doubtless not couched in the language of urgency
and distress. They were not as yet in any actual danger; their
power was great in reality, and estimated at its full value abroad;
moreover, as prudent diplomatists, they would naturally overstate
their own dignity and the magnitude of what they were offering. Of
course they would ask for Athenian aid to be sent to Chalkidikê—since
it was there that the war was being carried on; but they would ask
for aid in order to act energetically against the common enemy,
and repress the growth of his power—not to avert immediate danger
menacing Olynthus.
There needed no discussion to induce the Athenians to accept this
alliance. It was what they had long been seeking, and they willingly
closed with the proposition. Of course they also promised—what indeed
was almost involved in the acceptance—to send a force to coöperate
against Philip in Chalkidikê. On this first recognition of Olynthus
as an ally—or perhaps shortly afterwards, but before circumstances
had at all changed—Demosthenes delivered his earliest Olynthiac
harangue. Of the three memorable compositions so denominated, the
earliest is, in my judgment, that which stands _second_ in the edited
order. Their true chronological order has long been, and still is,
matter of controversy; the best conclusion which I can form, is that
the first and the second are erroneously placed, but that the third
is really the latest;[703] all of them being delivered during the six
or seven last months of 350 B. C.
[703] Some remarks will be found on the order of the Olynthiacs,
in an Appendix to the present chapter.
It must be understood that I always speak of the Olynthiacs as
_first_, _second_, and _third_, according to the common and
edited order; though I cannot adopt that order as correct.
In this his earliest advocacy (the speech which stands printed as
the second Olynthiac), Demosthenes insists upon the advantageous
contingency which has just turned up for Athens, through the blessing
of the gods, in the spontaneous tender of so valuable an ally. He
recommends that aid be despatched to the new ally; the most prompt
and effective aid will please him the best. But this recommendation
is contained in a single sentence, in the middle of the speech; it
is neither repeated a second time, nor emphatically insisted upon,
nor enlarged by specification of quantity or quality of aid to be
sent. No allusion is made to necessities or danger of Olynthus, nor
to the chance that Philip might conquer the town; still less to
ulterior contingencies, that Philip, if he did conquer it, might
carry the seat of war from his own coasts to those of Attica. On
the contrary, Demosthenes adverts to the power of the Olynthians—to
the situation of their territory, close on Philip’s flanks—to their
fixed resolution that they will never again enter into amity or
compromise with him—as evidences how valuable their alliance will
prove to Athens; enabling her to prosecute with improved success the
war against Philip, and to retrieve the disgraceful losses brought
upon her by previous remissness. The main purpose of the orator is
to inflame his countrymen into more hearty and vigorous efforts for
the prosecution of this general war; while to furnish aid to the
Olynthians, is only a secondary purpose, and a part of the larger
scheme. “I shall not (says the orator) expatiate on the formidable
power of Philip as an argument to urge you to the performance of
your public duty. That would be too much both of compliment to him
and of disparagement to you. I should, indeed, myself have thought
him truly formidable, if he had achieved his present eminence by
means consistent with justice. But he has aggrandized himself, partly
through your negligence and improvidence, partly by treacherous
means—by taking into pay corrupt partisans at Athens, and by cheating
successively Olynthians, Thessalians, and all his other allies.
These allies, having now detected his treachery, are deserting him;
without them, his power will crumble away. Moreover, the Macedonians
themselves have no sympathy with his personal ambition; they are
fatigued with the labor imposed upon them by his endless military
movements, and impoverished by the closing of their ports through
the war. His vaunted officers are men of worthless and dissolute
habits; his personal companions are thieves, vile ministers of
amusement, outcasts from our cities. His past good fortune imparts to
all this real weakness a fallacious air of strength; and doubtless
his good fortune has been very great. But the fortune of Athens,
and her title to the benevolent aid of the gods is still greater—if
only you, Athenians, will do your duty. Yet here you are, sitting
still, doing nothing. The sluggard cannot even command his friends
to work for him—much less the gods. I do not wonder, that Philip,
always in the field, always in movement, doing everything for
himself, never letting slip an opportunity—prevails over you who
merely talk, inquire, and vote, without action. Nay—the contrary
would be wonderful—if under such circumstances, he had _not_ been
the conqueror. But what I do wonder at is, that you Athenians—who
in former days contended for Pan-hellenic freedom against the
Lacedæmonians—who, scorning unjust aggrandizement for yourselves,
fought in person and lavished your substance to protect the rights
of other Greeks—that _you_ now shrink from personal service and
payment of money for the defence of your own possessions. You, who
have so often rescued others, can now sit still after having lost so
much of your own! I wonder you do not look back to that conduct of
yours which has brought your affairs into this state of ruin, and
ask yourselves how they can ever mend, while such conduct remains
unchanged. It was much easier at first to preserve what we once had,
than to recover it now that it is lost; we have nothing now left to
lose—we have everything to recover. This must be done by ourselves,
and at once; we must furnish money, we must serve in person by turns;
we must give our generals means to do their work well, and then exact
from them a severe account afterwards—which we cannot do so long
as we ourselves will neither pay nor serve. We must correct that
abuse which has grown up, whereby particular symmories in the state
combine to exempt themselves from burdensome duties, and to cast them
all unjustly upon others. We must not only come forward vigorously
and heartily, with person and with money, but each man must embrace
faithfully his fair share of patriotic obligation.”
Such are the main points of the earliest discourse delivered by
Demosthenes on the subject of Olynthus. In the mind of modern
readers, as in that of the rhetor Dionysius,[704] there is an
unconscious tendency to imagine that these memorable pleadings must
have worked persuasion, and to magnify the efficiency of their author
as an historical and directing person. But there are no facts to
bear out such an impression. Demosthenes was still comparatively a
young man—thirty-one years of age; admired indeed for his speeches
and his compositions written to be spoken by others;[705] but as yet
not enjoying much practical influence. It is moreover certain—to
his honor—that he described and measured foreign dangers before they
were recognized by ordinary politicians; that he advised a course,
energetic and salutary indeed, but painful for the people to act
upon, and disagreeable for recognized leaders to propose; that these
leaders, such as Eubulus and others, were accordingly adverse to him.
The tone of Demosthenes in these speeches is that of one who feels
that he is contending against heavy odds—combating an habitual and
deep-seated reluctance. He is an earnest remonstrant—an opposition
speaker—contributing to raise up gradually a body of public sentiment
and conviction which ultimately may pass into act. His rival Eubulus
is the ministerial spokesman, whom the majority, both rich and
poor, followed; a man not at all corrupt (so far as we know), but
of simple conservative routine, evading all painful necessities and
extraordinary precautions; conciliating the rich by resisting a
property-tax, and the general body of citizens by refusing to meddle
with the Theôric expenditure.
[704] Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæ. p. 736. μετὰ γὰρ ἄρχοντα Καλλίμαχον,
ἐφ᾽ οὗ τὰς εἰς Ὄλυνθον βοηθείας ἀπέστειλαν Ἀθηναῖοι, ~πεισθέντες
ὑπὸ Δημοσθένους~, etc.
He connects the three Olynthiacs of Demosthenes, with the three
Athenian armaments sent to Olynthus in the year following
Midsummer 349 B. C.; for which armaments he had just before cited
Philochorus.
[705] This is evident from the sneers of Meidias: see the oration
of Demosthenes cont. Meidiam, p. 575, 576. (spoken in the year
following—349-348 B. C.)
I observe, not without regret, that Demosthenes himself is
not ashamed to put the like sneers into the mouth of a client
speaking before the Dikastery—against Lakritus—“this very clever
man, who has paid ten minæ to Isokrates for a course of rhetoric,
and thinks himself able to talk you over as he pleases,” etc.
(Demosth. adv. Lakrit. p. 938).
The Athenians did not follow the counsel of Demosthenes. They
accepted the Olynthian alliance, but took no active step to coöperate
with Olynthus in the war against Philip.[706] Such unhappily was
their usual habit. The habit of Philip was the opposite. We need no
witness to satisfy us, that he would not slacken in his attack—and
that in the course of a month or two, he would master more than one
of the Chalkidic cities, perhaps defeating the Olynthian forces
also. The Olynthians would discover that they had gained nothing by
their new allies; while the philippizing party among themselves
would take advantage of the remissness of Athens to depreciate her
promises as worthless or insincere, and to press for accommodation
with the enemy.[707] Complaints would presently reach Athens, brought
by fresh envoys from the Olynthians, and probably also from the
Chalkidians, who were the greatest sufferers by Philip’s arms. They
would naturally justify this renewed application by expatiating
on the victorious progress of Philip; they would now call for aid
more urgently, and might even glance at the possibility of Philip’s
conquest of Chalkidikê. It was in this advanced stage of the
proceedings that Demosthenes again exerted himself in the cause,
delivering that speech which stands first in the printed order of the
Olynthiacs.
[706] An orator of the next generation (Deinarchus cont.
Demosthen. p. 102, s. 99) taunts Demosthenes as a mere
opposition-talker, in contrast with the excellent administration
of the finances and marine under Eubulus—ποῖαι γὰρ τριήρεις εἰσὶ
κατεσκευασμέναι διὰ τοῦτον (Demosthenes) ὥσπερ επὶ Εὐβούλου,
τῇ πόλει; ἢ ποῖοι νεώσοικοι τούτου πολιτευομένου γεγόνασι;
The administration of Eubulus must have left a creditable
remembrance, to be thus cited afterwards.
See Theopompus ap. Harpokr. v. Εὔβουλος; Plutarch, Reipubl.
Gerend. Præcept. p. 812. Compare also Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 435;
and Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 57. c. 11.
[707] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 9. ὡς ἔστι μάλιστα τοῦτο δέος, μὴ
πανοῦργος ὢν καὶ δεινὸς ἅνθρωπος (Philip) πράγμασι χρῆσθαι τὰ
μὲν εἴκων ἡνίκ᾽ ἂν τύχῃ, τὰ δ᾽ ἀπειλῶν, τὰ δ᾽ ἡμᾶς διαβάλλων καὶ
~τὴν ἀπουσίαν τὴν ἡμετέραν~ τρέψῃ τε καὶ παρασπάσηταί τι τῶν ὅλων
πραγμάτων.
This occurs in the next subsequent speech of Demosthenes,
intimating what Philip and his partisans had already deduced as
inference from the past neglect of the Athenians to send any aid
to Olynthus. Of course, no such inference could be started until
some time had been allowed for expectation and disappointment;
which is one among many reasons for believing the first Olynthiac
to be posterior in time to the second.
Here we have, not a Philippic, but a true Olynthiac. Olynthus is no
longer part and parcel of a larger theme, upon the whole of which
Demosthenes intends to discourse; but stands out as the prominent
feature and specialty of his pleading. It is now pronounced to be in
danger and in pressing need of succor; moreover its preservation is
strenuously pressed upon the Athenians, as essential to their own
safety. While it stands with its confederacy around it, the Athenians
can fight Philip on his own coast; if it falls, there is nothing to
prevent him from transferring the war into Attica, and assailing them
on their own soil.[708] Demosthenes is wound up to a higher pitch
of emphasis, complaining of the lukewarmness of his countrymen on
a crisis which calls aloud for instant action.[709] He again urges
that a vote be at once passed to assist Olynthus, and two armaments
despatched as quickly as possible; one to preserve to Olynthus her
confederate cities—the other, to make a diversion by simultaneous
attack on Philip at home. Without such two-fold aid (he says) the
cities cannot be preserved.[710] Advice of aid generally he had
already given, though less emphatically, in his previous harangue;
but he now superadds a new suggestion—that Athenian envoys shall
be sent thither, not merely to announce the coming of the force,
but also to remain at Olynthus and watch over the course of events.
For he is afraid, that unless such immediate encouragement be sent,
Philip may, even without the tedious process of a siege, frighten or
cajole the Olynthian confederacy into submission; partly by reminding
them that Athens had done nothing for them, and by denouncing her
as a treacherous and worthless ally.[711] Philip would be glad to
entrap them into some plausible capitulation; and though they knew
that they could have no security for his keeping the terms of it
afterwards, still he might succeed, if Athens remained idle. Now,
if ever, was the time for Athenians to come forward and do their
duty without default; to serve in person and submit to the necessary
amount of direct taxation. They had no longer the smallest pretence
for continued inaction; the very conjuncture which they had so long
desired, had turned up of itself—war between Olynthus and Philip,
and that too upon grounds special to Olynthus—not at the instigation
of Athens.[712] The Olynthian alliance had been thrown in the way of
Athens by the peculiar goodness of the gods, to enable her to repair
her numerous past errors and short-comings. She ought to look well
and deal rightly with these last remaining opportunities, in order
to wipe off the shame of the past; but if she now let slip Olynthus
and suffer Philip to conquer it, there was nothing else to hinder him
from marching whithersoever he chose. His ambition was so insatiable,
his activity so incessant, that, assuming Athens to persist in her
careless inaction, he would carry the war forward from Thrace into
Attica—of which the ruinous consequences were but too clear.[713]
[708] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 12, 13.
[709] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 9.
[710] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 14. Φημὶ δὴ διχῆ βοηθητέον εἶναι
τοῖς πράγμασιν ὑμῖν· ~τῷ τε τὰς πόλεις τοῖς Ὀλυνθίοις σῴζειν~,
καὶ τοὺς τοῦτο ποιήσοντας στρατιώτας ἐκπέμπειν—καὶ τῷ τὴν ἐκείνου
χώραν κακῶς ποιεῖν καὶ τριήρεσι καὶ στρατιώταις ἑτέροις· εἰ δὲ
θατέρου τούτων ὀλιγωρήσετε, ὀκνῶ μὴ μάταιος ὑμῶν ἡ στρατεία
γένηται.
[711] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 9, 10.
[712] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 11.
[713] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 12, 13, 16. ... εἰ δὲ προησόμεθα
καὶ τούτους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, εἶτ᾽ Ὄλυνθον ἐκεῖνος καταστρέψεται,
φρασάτω τις ἐμοὶ, τί τὸ κωλῦον ἔτ᾽ αὐτὸν ἔσται βαδίζειν ὅποι
βούλεται.
... τίς οὕτως εὐήθης ἐστὶν ὑμῶν ὅστις ἀγνοεῖ τὸν ἐκεῖθεν πόλεμον
δεῦρο ἥξοντα, ἂν ἀμελήσωμεν;
“I maintain (continued the orator) that you ought to lend aid at the
present crisis in two ways; by preserving for the Olynthians their
confederated cities, through a body of troops sent out for that
express purpose—and by employing at the same time other troops and
other triremes to act aggressively against Philip’s own coast. If you
neglect either of these measures, I fear that the expedition will
fail. As to the pecuniary provision, you have already more money than
any other city, available for purposes of war; if you will pay that
money to soldiers on service, no need exists for farther provision—if
not, then need exists; but above all things, money _must_ be found.
What then! I shall be asked—are you moving that the Theôric fund
shall be devoted to war purposes? Not I, by Zeus. I merely express
my conviction, that soldiers _must_ be equipped, and that receipt of
public money, and performance of public service, ought to go hand in
hand; but your practice is to take the public money, without any such
condition, for the festivals. Accordingly, nothing remains except
that all should directly contribute; much, if much is wanted—little,
if little will suffice. Money must be had; without it, not a single
essential step can be taken. There are moreover different ways
and means suggested by others. Choose any one of these which you
think advantageous; and lay a vigorous grasp on events while the
opportunity still lasts.”[714]
[714] Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 15.
It was thus that Demosthenes addressed his countrymen some time after
the Olynthians had been received as allies, but before any auxiliary
force had been either sent to them or even positively decreed—yet
when such postponement of action had inspired them with mistrust,
threatening to throw them, even without resistance, into the hands of
Philip and their own philippizing party. We observe in Demosthenes
the same sagacious appreciation, both of the present and the future,
as we have already remarked in the first Philippic—foresight of the
terrible consequences of this Olynthian war, while as yet distant and
unobserved by others. We perceive the same good sense and courage
in invoking the right remedies; though his propositions of personal
military service, direct taxation, or the diversion of the Theôric
fund—were all of them the most unpopular which could be made. The
last of the three, indeed, he does not embody in a substantive
motion; nor could he move it without positive illegality, which would
have rendered him liable to the indictment called Graphê Paranomon.
But he approaches it near enough to raise in the public mind the
question as it really stood—that money must be had; that there were
only two ways of getting it—direct taxation, and appropriation of
the festival fund; and that the latter of these ought to be restored
as well as the former. We shall find this question about the Theôric
Fund coming forward again more than once, and shall have presently to
notice it more at large.