[504] Diodor. xvi. 22; Plutarch, Alexand. c. 3.
It was during this interval too that Philip married Olympias,
daughter of Neoptolemus prince of the Molossi,[505] and descended
from the ancient Molossian kings, who boasted of an heroic Æakid
genealogy. Philip had seen her at the religious mysteries in the
island of Samothrace, where both were initiated at the same time. In
violence of temper—in jealous, cruel, and vindictive disposition—she
forms almost a parallel to the Persian queens Amestris and Parysatis.
The Epirotic women, as well as the Thracian, were much given to the
Bacchanalian religious rites, celebrated with fierce ecstasy amid
the mountain solitudes in honor of Dionysius.[506] To this species
of religious excitement Olympias was peculiarly susceptible. She is
said to have been fond of tame snakes playing around her, and to have
indulged in ceremonies of magic and incantation.[507] Her temper and
character became, after no long time, repulsive and even alarming to
Philip. But in the year 356 B. C. she bore to him a son, afterwards
renowned as Alexander the Great. It was in the summer of this year,
not long after the taking of Potidæa, that Philip received nearly at
the same time, three messages with good news—the birth of his son;
the defeat of the Illyrians by Parmenio; and the success of one of
his running horses at the Olympic games.[508]
[505] Justin, vii. 6.
[506] Plutarch, Alexand. c. 2. 3. The Bacchæ of Euripides
contains a powerful description of these exciting ceremonies.
[507] Plutarch, Alexand. c. 2. ἡ δὲ Ὀλυμπιὰς μᾶλλον ἑτέρων
ζηλώσασα τὰς κατοχὰς, καὶ τοὺς ἐνθουσιασμοὺς ἐξάγουσα
βαρβαρικώτερον, ὄφεις μεγάλους χειροήθεις ἐφείλκετο τοῖς θιάσοις,
etc.
Compare Duris apud Athenæum, xiii. p. 560.
[508] Plutarch, Alexand. c. 3; Justin, xii. 19.
CHAPTER LXXXVII.
FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SACRED WAR TO THAT OF THE OLYNTHIAN WAR.
It has been recounted in the preceding chapter, how Philip,
during the continuance of the Social War, aggrandized himself in
Macedonia and Thrace at the expense of Athens, by the acquisition
of Amphipolis, Pydna, and Potidæa—the two last actually taken from
her, the first captured only under false assurances held out to her
while he was besieging it: how he had farther strengthened himself by
enlisting Olynthus both as an ally of his own, and as an enemy of the
Athenians. He had thus begun the war against Athens, usually spoken
of as the war about Amphipolis, which lasted without any formal
peace for twelve years. The resistance opposed by Athens to these
his first aggressions had been faint and ineffective—partly owing to
embarrassments. But the Social War had not yet terminated, when new
embarrassments and complications, of a far more formidable nature,
sprang up elsewhere—known by the name of the Sacred War, rending
the very entrails of the Hellenic world, and profitable only to the
indefatigable aggressor in Macedonia.
The Amphiktyonic assembly, which we shall now find exalted into an
inauspicious notoriety, was an Hellenic institution ancient and
venerable, but rarely invested with practical efficiency. Though
political by occasion, it was religious in its main purpose,
associated with the worship of Apollo at Delphi and of Dêmêtêr at
Thermopylæ. Its assemblies were held twice annually—in spring at
Delphi, in autumn at Thermopylæ; while in every fourth year it
presided at the celebration of the great Pythian festival near
Delphi, or appointed persons to preside in its name. It consisted
of deputies called Hieromnemones and Pylagoræ, sent by the twelve
ancient nations or fractions of the Hellenic name, who were
recognized as its constituent body: Thessalians, Bœotians, Dorians,
Ionians, Perrhæbians, Magnêtes, Lokrians, Œtæans or Ænianes, Achæans,
Malians, Phokians, Dolopes. These were the twelve nations, sole
partners in the Amphiktyonic sacred rites and meetings: each nation,
small and great alike, having two votes in the decision and no more;
and each city, small and great alike, contributing equally to make
up the two votes of that nation to which it belonged. Thus Sparta
counted only as one of the various communities forming the Dorian
nation: Athens, in like manner in the Ionian, not superior in rank to
Erythræ or Priênê.[509]
[509] Æschines, De Fals. Legat. p. 280. c. 36. For particulars
respecting the Amphiktyonic assembly see the treatise of Tittman,
Ueber den Amphiktyonischen Bund, p. 37, 45, _seqq._
That during the preceding century, the Amphiktyonic assembly had
meddled rarely, and had never meddled to any important purpose,
in the political affairs of Greece—is proved by the fact that it
is not once mentioned either in the history of Thucydides, or in
the Hellenica of Xenophon. But after the humiliation of Sparta at
Leuktra, this great religious convocation of the Hellenic world,
after long torpor, began to meet for the despatch of business.
Unfortunately its manifestations of activity were for the most
part abusive and mischievous. Probably not long after the battle
of Leuktra, though we do not know the precise year—the Thebans
exhibited before the Amphiktyons an accusation against Sparta, for
having treacherously seized the Kadmeia (the citadel of Thebes) in
a period of profound peace. Sentence of condemnation was pronounced
against her,[510] together with a fine of five hundred talents,
doubled after a certain interval of non-payment. The act here put in
accusation was indisputably a gross political wrong; and a pretence,
though a very slight pretence, for bringing political wrong under
cognizance of the Amphiktyons, might be found in the tenor of the old
oath taken by each included city.[511] Still, every one knew that
for generations past, the assembly had taken no actual cognizance
of political wrong; so that both trial and sentence were alike
glaring departures from understood Grecian custom—proving only the
humiliation of Sparta and the insolence of Thebes. The Spartans of
course did not submit to pay, nor were there any means of enforcement
against them. No practical effect followed therefore, except
(probably) the exclusion of Sparta from the Amphiktyonic assembly—as
well as from the Delphian temple and the Pythian games. Indirectly,
however, the example was most pernicious, as demonstrating that the
authority of a Pan-hellenic convocation, venerable from its religious
antiquity; could be abused to satisfy the political antipathies of a
single leading state.
[510] Diodor. xvi. 23-29; Justin, viii. 1.
[511] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. p. 279. c. 35.
In the year 357 B. C., a second attempt was made by Thebes to employ
the authority of the Amphiktyonic assembly as a means of crushing
her neighbors the Phokians. The latter had been, from old time,
border-enemies of the Thebans, Lokrians, and Thessalians. Until
the battle of Leuktra, they had fought as allies of Sparta against
Thebes, but had submitted to Thebes after that battle, and had
continued to be her allies, though less and less cordial, until the
battle of Mantinea and the death of Epaminondas.[512] Since that
time, the old antipathy appears to have been rekindled, especially
on the part of Thebes. Irritated against the Phokians probably as
having broken off from a sworn alliance, she determined to raise
against them an accusation in the Amphiktyonic assembly. As to the
substantive ground of accusation, we find different statements.
According to one witness, they were accused of having cultivated
some portion of the Kirrhæan plain, consecrated from of old to
Apollo; according to another, they were charged with an aggressive
invasion of Bœotia; while, according to a third, the war was caused
by their having carried off Theano, a married Theban woman. Pausanias
confesses that he cannot distinctly make out what was the allegation
against them.[513] Assisted by the antipathy of the Thessalians and
Lokrians, not less vehement than her own, Thebes had no difficulty in
obtaining sentence of condemnation against the Phokians. A fine was
imposed upon them; of what amount we are not told, but so heavy as to
be far beyond their means of payment.
[512] Compare Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 5, 23, and vii. 5, 4. About
the feud of the Thessalians and Phokians, see Herodot. vii. 176,
viii. 27; Æschines, De Fals. Leg. p. 289. c. 43—of the Lokrians
and Phokians, Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 5, 3; Pausanias, iii. 9, 4.
[513] Diodor. xvi. 23; Justin, viii. 1; Pausanias, x. 2, 1; Duris
ap. Athenæum, xiii. p. 560. Justin says, “Causa et origo hujus
mali, Thebani fuere; qui cum rerum potirentur, secundam fortunam
imbecillo animo ferentes, victos armis Lacedæmonios et Phocenses,
quasi parva supplicia cædibus et rapinis luissent, apud commune
Græciæ concilium superbe accusaverunt Lacedæmoniis crimini datum,
quod arcem Thebanam induciarum tempore occupassent; Phocensibus,
quod Bœotiam depopulati essent; prorsus quasi post arma et bellum
locum legibus reliquissent.”
It was thus that the Thebans, who had never been able to attach
to themselves a powerful confederacy such as that which formerly
held its meetings at Sparta, supplied the deficiency by abusing
their ascendency in the Amphiktyonic assembly to procure vengeance
upon political enemies. A certain time was allowed for liquidating
the fine, which the Phokians had neither means nor inclination
to do. Complaint of the fact was then made at the next meeting
of the Amphiktyons, when a decisive resolution was adopted, and
engraven along with the rest on a column in the Delphian temple, to
expropriate the recusant Phokians, and consecrate all their territory
to Apollo—as Kirrha with its fertile plain had been treated two
centuries before. It became necessary, at the same time, for the
maintenance of consistency and equal dealing, to revive the mention
of the previous fine still remaining unpaid by the Lacedæmonians;
against whom it was proposed to pass a vote of something like
excommunication.
Such impending dangers, likely to be soon realized under the
instigation of Thebes, excited a resolute spirit of resistance among
the Phokians. A wealthy and leading citizen of the Phokian town
Ledon, named Philomelus son of Theotimus, stood forward as the head
of this sentiment, setting himself energetically to organize means
for the preservation of Phokian liberty as well as property. Among
his assembled countrymen, he protested against the gross injustice
of the recent sentence, amercing them in an enormous sum exceeding
their means; when the strip of land, where they were alleged to
have trespassed on the property of the god, was at best narrow and
insignificant. Nothing was left, now, to avert from them utter
ruin, except a bold front and an obstinate resistance, which he
(Philomelus) would pledge himself to conduct with success, if they
would intrust him with full powers. The Phokians (he contended) were
the original and legitimate administrators of the Delphian temple—a
privilege of which they had been wrongfully dispossessed by the
Amphiktyonic assembly and the Delphians. “Let us reply to our enemies
(he urged) by re-asserting our lost rights and seizing the temple; we
shall obtain support and countenance from many Grecian states, whose
interest is the same as our own, to resist the unjust decrees of the
Amphiktyons.[514] Our enemies the Thebans (he added) are plotting the
seizure of the temple for themselves, through the corrupt connivance
of an Amphiktyonic majority: let us anticipate and prevent their
injustice.”[515]
[514] Diodor. xvi. 23, 24; Pausanias, x. 2, 1.
[515] That this design, imputed to the Thebans, was a part of
the case made out by the Phokians for themselves, we may feel
assured from the passage in Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 347. s.
22. Demosthenes charges Æschines with having made false promises
and statements to the Athenian assembly, on returning from his
embassy in 346 B. C. Æschines told the Athenians (so Demosthenes
affirms) that he had persuaded Philip to act altogether in the
interest and policy of Athens; that the Athenians would very
presently see Thebes besieged by Philip, and the Bœotian towns
restored; and furthermore, τῷ θεῷ δὲ τὰ χρήματα εἰσπραττόμενα, οὐ
παρὰ Φωκέων, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ~Θηβαίων τῶν βουλευσάντων τὴν κατάληψιν
τοῦ ἱεροῦ~ διδάσκειν γὰρ αὐτὸς ἔφη τὸν Φίλιππον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἧττον
~ἠσεβήκασιν οἱ βεβουλευκότες τῶν ταῖς χερσὶ πραξάντων~, καὶ διὰ
ταῦτα χρήμαθ᾽ ἑαυτῷ τοὺς Θηβαίους ἐπικεκηρυχέναι.
How far Æschines really promised to the Athenians that which
Demosthenes here alleges him to have promised—is a matter to
be investigated when we arrive at the transactions of the year
346 B. C. But it seems to me clear that the imputation (true
or false) against the Thebans, of having been themselves in
conspiracy to seize the temple, must have emanated first from the
Phokians, as part of the justification of their own proceedings.
If the Thebans ever conceived such an idea, it must have been
_before_ the actual occupation of the temple by the Phokians, if
they were falsely charged with conceiving it, the false charge
would also be preferred at the time. Demosthenes would hardly
invent it twelve years after the Phokian occupation.
Here a new question was raised, respecting the right of presidency
over the most venerated sanctuary in Greece; a question fraught
with ruin to the peace of the Hellenic world. The claim of the
Phokians was not a mere fiction, but founded on an ancient reality,
and doubtless believed by themselves to be just. Delphi and its
inhabitants were originally a portion of the Phokian name. In the
Homeric Catalogue, which Philomelus emphatically cited, it stands
enumerated among the Phokians commanded by Schedius and Epistrophus,
under the name of the “rocky Pytho,”—a name still applied to it by
Herodotus.[516] The Delphians had acquired sufficient force to sever
themselves from their Phokian brethren—to stand out as a community
by themselves—and to assume the lucrative privilege of administering
the temple as their own peculiar. Their severance had been first
brought about, and their pretensions as administrators espoused by
Sparta,[517] upon whose powerful interest they mainly depended. But
the Phokians had never ceased to press their claim, and so far was
the dispute from being settled against them, even in 450 B. C.,
that they then had in their hands the actual administration. The
Spartans despatched an army for the express purpose of taking it away
from them and transferring it to the Delphians; but very shortly
afterwards, when the Spartan forces had retired, the Athenians
marched thither, and dispossessed the Delphians,[518] restoring
the temple to the Phokians. This contest went by the name of the
Sacred War. At that time the Athenians were masters of most parts of
Bœotia, as well as of Megara and Pegæ; and had they continued so, the
Phokians would probably have been sustained in their administration
of the holy place; the rights of the Delphians on one side, against
those of the Phokians on the other, being then obviously dependent
on the comparative strength of Athens and Sparta. But presently evil
days came upon Athens, so that she lost all her inland possessions
north of Attica, and could no longer uphold her allies in Phokis. The
Phokians now in fact passed into allies of Sparta, and were forced
to relinquish their temple-management to the Delphians; who were
confirmed in it by a formal article of the peace of Nikias in 421
B. C.,[519] and retained it without question, under the recognized
Hellenic supremacy of Sparta, down to the battle of Leuktra. Even
then, too, it continued undisturbed; since Thebes was nowise
inclined to favor the claim of her enemies the Phokians, but was on
the contrary glad to be assisted in crushing them by their rivals
the Delphians, who, as managers of the temple, could materially
contribute to a severe sentence of the Amphiktyonic assembly.
[516] Herodot. i. 54.
[517] Strabo, ix. p. 423.
[518] Thucyd. i. 12.
[519] Thucyd. v. 18.
We see thus that the claim now advanced by Philomelus was not
fictitious, but genuine, and felt by himself as well as by other
Phokians to be the recovery of an ancient privilege, lost only
through superior force.[520] His views being heartily embraced by
his countrymen, he was nominated general with full powers. It was
his first measure to go to Sparta, upon whose aid he counted, in
consequence of the heavy fine which still stood imposed upon her
by the Amphiktyonic sentence. He explained his views privately to
king Archidamus, engaging, if the Phokians should become masters
of the temple, to erase the sentence and fine from the column of
record. Archidamus did not dare to promise him public countenance or
support; the rather, as Sparta had always been the chief supporter
of the Delphian presidency (as against the Phokian) over the temple.
But in secret he warmly encouraged the scheme; furnishing a sum
of fifteen talents, besides a few mercenary soldiers, towards its
execution. With this aid Philomelus returned home, provided an equal
sum of fifteen talents from his own purse, and collected a body of
peltasts, Phokians as well as strangers. He then executed his design
against Delphi, attacking suddenly both the town and the temple,
and capturing them, as it would appear, with little opposition. To
the alarmed Delphians, generally, he promised security and good
treatment; but he put to death the members of the Gens (or Clan)
called Thrakidæ, and seized their property: these men constituted one
among several holy Gentes, leading conductors of the political and
religious agency of the place.[521] It is probable, that when thus
suddenly assailed, they had sent to solicit aid from their neighbors,
the Lokrians of Amphissa; for Philomelus was scarcely in possession
of Delphi, when these latter marched up to the rescue. He defeated
them however with serious loss, and compelled them to return home.
[520] Justin (viii. 1) takes no notice of this first position of
the Phokians in regard to the temple of Delphi. He treats them as
if they had been despoilers of the temple even at first; “velut
deo irascentes.”
[521] Diodor. xvi. 24. Hesychius (v. Λαφριάδαι) mentions another
phratry or gens at Delphi, called Laphriadæ. See Wilhelm Götte,
Das Delphische Orakel, p. 83. Leipsic, 1839.
It is stated by Pausanias, that the Phokians were bent upon
dealing with Delphi and its inhabitants in the harshest manner;
intending to kill all the men of military age, to sell the
remaining population as slaves, and to raze the whole town to
the ground. Archidamus, king of Sparta, (according to Pausanias)
induced the Phokians to abandon this resolution (Pausan. iii. 10,
4).
At what moment the Phokians ever determined on this step—or,
indeed, whether they ever really determined on it—we cannot feel
any certainty. Nor can we decide confidently, whether Pausanias
borrowed the statement from Theopompus, whom he quotes a little
before.
Thus completely successful in his first attempt, Philomelus lost
no time in announcing solemnly and formally his real purpose. He
proclaimed that he had come only to resume for the Phokians their
ancient rights as administrators; that the treasures of the temple
should be safe and respected as before; that no impiety or illegality
of any kind should be tolerated; and that the temple and its oracle
would be opened, as heretofore, for visitors, sacrificers, and
inquirers. At the same time, well aware that his Lokrian enemies at
Amphissa were very near, he erected a wall to protect the town and
temple, which appears to have been hitherto undefended,—especially
its western side. He further increased his levies of troops. While
the Phokians, inspirited with this first advantage, obeyed his
call in considerable numbers, he also attracted new mercenaries
from abroad by the offer of higher pay. He was presently at the
head of five thousand men, strong enough to hold a difficult post
like Delphi against all immediate attack. But being still anxious
to appease Grecian sentiment and avert hostility, he despatched
envoys to all the principal states,—not merely to Sparta and Athens,
but also to his enemy Thebes. His envoys were instructed to offer
solemn assurances, that the Phokians had taken Delphi simply to
reclaim their paternal right of presidency, against past wrongful
usurpation; that they were prepared to give any security required by
the Hellenic body, for strict preservation of the valuables in the
temple, and to exhibit and verify all, by weight and number, before
examiners; that conscious of their own rectitude of purpose, they
did not hesitate to entreat positive support against their enemies,
or at any rate, neutrality.[522] The answers sent to Philomelus were
not all of the same tenor. On this memorable event, the sentiments
of the Grecian world were painfully divided. While Athens, Sparta,
the Peloponnesian Achæans and some other states in Peloponnesus,
recognized the possession of the Phokians, and agreed to assist them
in retaining it,—the Thebans and Thessalians declared strenuously
against them, supported by all the states north of Bœotia,
Lokrians, Dorians, Ænianes, Phthiot-Achæans, Magnêtes, Perrhæbians,
Athamânes, and Dolopes. Several of these last were dependents of
the Thessalians, and followed their example; many of them moreover
belonging to the Amphiktyonic constituency, must have taken part in
the votes of condemnation just rescinded by the Phokians.
[522] Didorus xvi. 27. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας τὰς
ἐπισημοτάτας τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πόλεων ἀπέστειλεν,
ἀπολογούμενος, ὅτι κατείληπται τοὺς Δελφοὺς, οὐ τοῖς ἱεροῖς
χρήμασιν ἐπιβουλεύων, ἀλλὰ τῆς τοῦ ἱεροῦ προστασίας ἀμφισβητῶν·
εἶναι γὰρ Φωκέων αὐτὴν ἰδίαν ἐν τοῖς παλαιοῖς χρόνοις
ἀποδεδειγμένην. Τῶν δὲ χρημάτων τὸν λόγον ἔφη πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν
ἀποδώσειν, καὶ τόν τε σταθμὸν καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀναθημάτων
ἕτοιμος εἶναι παραδιδόναι τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐξετάζειν. Ἠξίου δὲ,
ἄν τις δι᾽ ἐχθρὰν ἢ φθόνον πολέμῃ Φωκεῦσι, μάλιστα μὲν ξυμμαχεῖν,
εἰ δὲ μή γε, τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν.
In reference to the engagement taken by Philomelus, that he
would exhibit and verify, before any general Hellenic examiners,
all the valuable property in the Delphian temple, by weight
and number of articles—the reader will find interesting matter
of comparison in the Attic Inscriptions. No. 137-142, vol. i.
of Boeckh’s Corpus Inscriptt. Græcarum—with Boeckh’s valuable
commentary. These are the records of the numerous gold and
silver donatives, preserved in the Parthenon, handed over by the
treasurers of the goddess annually appointed, to their successors
at the end of the year, from one Panathenaic festival to the
next. The weight of each article is formally recorded, and the
new articles received each year (ἐπέτεια) are specified. Where an
article is transferred without being weighed (ἄσταθμον), the fact
is noticed. That the precious donatives in the Delphian temple
also, were carefully weighed, we may judge by the statement of
Herodotus, that the golden lion dedicated by Krœsus had lost
a fraction of its weight in the conflagration of the building
(Herodot. i. 50).
Pausanias (x. 2, 1) does not advert to the difference between
the first and the second part of the proceedings of Philomelus;
first, the seizure of the temple, without any spoliation of the
treasure, but simply upon the plea that the Phokians had the
best right to administer its affairs; next, the seizure of the
treasure and donatives of the temple—which he came to afterwards,
when he found it necessary for defence.
We may clearly see that it was not at first the intention of
Philomelus or his Phokian comrades to lay hands on the property
of the Delphian temple; and Philomelus, while taking pains to set
himself right in the eyes of Greece, tried to keep the prophetic
agency of the temple in its ordinary working, so as to meet the
exigencies of sacrificers and inquirers as before. He required
the Pythian priestess to mount the tripod, submit herself to the
prophetic inspiration, and pronounce the word thus put into her
mouth, as usual. But the priestess,—chosen by the Delphians,
and probably herself a member of one among the sacred Delphian
Gentes,—obstinately refused to obey him; especially as the first
question which he addressed concerned his own usurpation, and his
chances of success against enemies. On his injunctions, that she
should prophesy according to the traditional rites,—she replied
that these rites were precisely what he had just overthrown; upon
which he laid hold of her, and attempted to place her on the tripod
by force. Subdued and frightened for her own personal safety, the
priestess exclaimed involuntarily, that he might do what he chose.
Philomelus gladly took this as an answer, favorable to his purpose.
He caused it to be put in writing and proclaimed, as an oracle from
the god, sanctioning and licensing his designs. He convened a special
meeting of his partisans and the Delphians generally, wherein appeal
was made to this encouraging answer, as warranting full confidence
with reference to the impending war. So it was construed by all
around, and confirmatory evidence was derived from farther signs and
omens occurring at the moment.[523] It is probable, however, that
Philomelus took care for the future to name a new priestess, more
favorable to his interest, and disposed to deliver oracular answers
under the new administrators in the same manner as under the old.
[523] Diodor. xvi. 25, 26, 27.
Though so large a portion of the Grecian name had thus declared war
against the Phokians, yet none at first appear to have made hostile
movements, except the Lokrians, with whom Philomelus was fully
competent to deal. He found himself strong enough to overrun and
plunder their territory, engaging in some indecisive skirmishes.
At first the Lokrians would not even give up the bodies of his
slain soldiers for burial, alleging that sacrilegious men were
condemned by the general custom of Greece to be cast out without
sepulture. Nor did they desist from their refusal until he threatened
retaliation towards the bodies of their own slain.[524] So bitter
was the exasperation arising out of this deplorable war throughout
the Hellenic world! Even against the Lokrians alone, however,
Philomelus soon found himself in want of money, for the payment
of his soldiers,—native Phokians as well as mercenary strangers.
Accordingly, while he still adhered to his pledge to respect the
temple property, he did not think himself precluded from levying a
forced contribution on the properties of his enemies, the wealthy
Delphian citizens; and his arms were soon crowned with a brilliant
success against the Lokrians, in a battle fought near the Rocks
called Phædriades; a craggy and difficult locality so close to
Delphi, that the Lokrians must evidently have been the aggressors,
marching up with a view to relieve the town. They were defeated with
great loss, both in slain and in prisoners; several of them only
escaping the spear of the enemy by casting themselves to certain
death down the precipitous cliffs.[525]
[524] Diodor. xvi. 25.
[525] Diodor. xvi. 28.
This victory, while imparting courage to the Phokians, proved the
signal for fresh exertions among their numerous enemies. The loud
complaints of the defeated Lokrians raised universal sympathy; and
the Thebans, now pressed by fear, as well as animated by hatred, of
the Phokians, put themselves at the head of the movement. Sending
round envoys to the Thessalians and the other Amphiktyonic states,
they invoked aid and urged the necessity of mustering a common
force,—“to assist the god,”—to vindicate the judicial dignity
of the Amphiktyonic assembly,—and to put down the sacrilegious
Phokians.[526] It appears that a special meeting of the assembly
itself was convened; probably at Thermopylæ, since Delphi was in
possession of the enemy. Decided resolutions were here taken to form
an Amphiktyonic army of execution; accompanied by severe sentences
of fine and other punishments, against the Phokian leaders, by name
Philomelus and Onomarchus,—perhaps brothers, but at least joint
commanders, together with others.[527]
[526] Diodor. xvi. 28. ψηφισαμένων δὲ τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων τὸν πρὸς
Φωκεῖς πόλεμον, πολλὴ ταραχὴ καὶ διάστασις ἦν καθ᾽ ὅλην τὴν
Ἑλλάδα. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔκριναν βοηθεῖν τῷ θεῷ, καὶ τοὺς Φωκεῖς,
ὡς ἱεροσύλους, κολάζειν· οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τῶν Φωκέων βοήθειαν
ἀπέκλιναν.
[527] Diodor. xvi. 32. about Onomarchus—πολλαῖς γὰρ καὶ μεγάλαις
δίκαις ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων ἦν καταδεδικασμένος ὁμοίως τοῖς
ἄλλοις, etc.
Onomarchus is denominated the colleague of Philomelus, cap. 31,
and his brother, cap. 61.
The perils of the Phokians now became imminent. Their own unaided
strength was nowise sufficient to resist the confederacy about to
arm in defence of the Amphiktyonic assembly;[528] nor does it appear
that either Athens or Sparta had as yet given them anything more
than promises and encouragement. Their only chance of effective
resistance lay in the levy of a large mercenary force; for which
purpose neither their own funds, nor any farther aid derivable from
private confiscation, could be made adequate. There remained no other
resource except to employ the treasures and valuables in the Delphian
temple, upon which accordingly Philomelus now laid hands. He did so,
however, as his previous conduct evinced, with sincere reluctance,
probably with various professions at first of borrowing only a given
sum, destined to meet the actual emergency, and intended to be repaid
as soon as safety should be provided for.[529] But whatever may have
been his intentions at the outset, all such reserves or limits, or
obligations to repay, were speedily forgotten in practice. When the
feeling which protected the fund was broken through, it was as easy
to take much as little, and the claimants became more numerous and
importunate; besides which the exigencies of the war never ceased,
and the implacable repugnance raised by the spoliation amidst half of
the Grecian world, left to the Phokians no security except under the
protection of a continued mercenary force.[530] Nor were Philomelus
and his successors satisfied without also enriching their friends and
adorning their wives or favorites.
[528] Even in 374 B. C., three years before the battle of
Leuktra, the Phokians had been unable to defend themselves
against Thebes without aid from Sparta (Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1, 1).
[529] Diodor. xvi. 30. ἠναγκάζετο (Philomelus) τοῖς ἱεροῖς
ἀναθήμασιν ἐπιβαλεῖν τὰς χεῖρας καὶ συλᾷν τὸ μαντεῖον. A similar
proposition had been started by the Corinthian envoys in the
congress at Sparta, shortly before the Peloponnesian war; they
suggested as one of their ways and means the borrowing from
the treasures of Delphi and Olympia, to be afterwards repaid
(Thucyd. i. 121). Perikles made the like proposition in the
Athenian assembly; “for purposes of security,” the property
of the temples might be employed to defray the cost of war,
subject to the obligation of replacing the whole afterwards
(χρησαμένους τε ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ ἔφη χρῆναι μὴ ἐλάσσω ἀντικαταστῆσαι
πάλιν, Thucyd. ii. 13). After the disaster before Syracuse,
and during the years of struggle intervening before the close
of the war, the Athenians were driven by financial distress to
appropriate to public purposes many of the rich donatives in the
Parthenon, which they were never afterwards able to replace. Of
this abstraction, proof is found in the Inscriptions published by
Boeckh, Corp. Inscript. No. 137-142, which contain the official
records of the successive Boards of Treasurers of Athênê. It is
stated in an instructive recent Dissertation, by J. L. Ussing
(De Parthenone ejusque partibus Disputatio, p. 3. Copenhagen,
1849), “Multæ in arce Athenarum inventæ sunt tabulæ Quæstorum
Minervæ, in quibus quotannis inscribebant, quænam vasa aurea
aliæque res pretiosæ in æde Minervæ dedicata extarent. Harum
longe maxima pars ante Euclidem archontem scripta est...: Nec
tamen una tabula templi dona continebat universa, sed separatim
quæ in Pronao, quæ in Hecatompedo, quæ in Parthenone (the part
of the temple specially so called), servabantur, separatim suis
quæque lapidibus consignata erant. Singulari quadam fortuna
contigit, ut inde ab anno 434 B. C., ad 407 B. C., tam multa
fragmenta tabularum servata sint, ut hos donorum catalogos
aliquatenus restituere possimus. In quo etiam ad historiam
illius temporis pertinet, quod florentibus Athenarum rebus opes
Deæ semper augeri, fractis autem bello Siculo, inde ab anno 412
B. C., eas paulatim deminui videmus.... Urgente pecuniæ inopia
Athenienses ad Deam confugiebant, et jam ante annum 406 B. C.,
pleraque Pronai dona ablata esse videmus. Proximis annis sine
dubio nec Hecatompedo nec Parthenoni pepercerunt; nec mirum est,
post bellum Peloponnesiacum ex antiquis illis donis fere nulla
comparere.”
[530] Theopompus, Frag. 182, ed. Didot; Athenæ. xiii. p. 605, vi.
p. 232; Ephorus, Frag. 155, ed. Didot; Diodor. xvi. 64.
Availing himself of the large resources of the temple, Philomelus
raised the pay of his troops to a sum half as large again as before,
and issued proclamations inviting new levies at the same rate.
Through such tempting offers he was speedily enabled to muster a
force, horse and foot together, said to amount to 10,000 men;
chiefly, as we are told, men of peculiarly wicked and reckless
character, since no pious Greek would enlist in such a service.
With these he attacked the Lokrians, who were however now assisted
by the Thebans from one side, and by the Thessalians with their
circumjacent allies from the other. Philomelus gained successive
advantages against both of them, and conceived increased hopes from a
reinforcement of 1500 Achæans who came to him from Peloponnesus. The
war assumed a peculiarly ferocious character; for the Thebans,[531]
confident in their superior force and chance of success, even
though the Delphian treasure was employed against them, began by
putting to death all their prisoners, as sacrilegious men standing
condemned by the Amphiktyonic assembly. This so exasperated the
troops of Philomelus, that they constrained him to retaliate upon
the Bœotian prisoners. For some time such rigorous inflictions were
continued on both sides, until at length the Thebans felt compelled
to desist, and Philomelus followed their example. The war lasted a
while with indecisive results, the Thebans and their allies being
greatly superior in number. But presently Philomelus incautiously
exposed himself to attack in an unfavorable position, near the town
of Neon, amidst embarrassing woods and rocks. He was here defeated
with severe loss, and his army dispersed; himself receiving several
wounds, and fighting with desperate bravery, until farther resistance
became impossible. He then tried to escape, but found himself driven
to the brink of a precipice, where he could only avoid the tortures
of captivity by leaping down and perishing. The remnant of his
vanquished army was rallied at some distance by Onomarchus.[532]
[531] Isokrates, Orat. v. (ad Philippum) s. 60. τελευτῶντες δὲ
πρὸς Φωκέας πόλεμον ἐξήνεγκαν (the Thebans), ὡς τῶν τε πόλεων
ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ κρατήσοντες, τόν τε τόπον ἅπαντα τὸν περιέχοντα
κατασχήσοντες, τῶν τε χρημάτων τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς περιγενησόμενοι
ταῖς ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων δαπάναις.
[532] Diodor. xvi. 31; Pausan. x. 2, 1. The dates and duration
of these events are only known to us in a loose and superficial
manner from the narrative of Diodorus.
The Thebans and their allies, instead of pressing the important
victory recently gained over Philomelus, seem to have supposed that
the Phokians would now disperse or submit of their own accord, and
accordingly returned home. Their remissness gave time to Onomarchus
to reorganize his dispirited countrymen. Convening at Delphi a
general assembly of Phokians and allies, he strenuously exhorted them
to persevere in the projects, and avenge the death, of their late
general. He found, however, no inconsiderable amount of opposition;
for many of the Phokians—noway prepared for the struggle in which
they now found themselves embarked, and themselves ashamed of the
spoliation of the temple—were anxious by some accommodation to put
themselves again within the pale of Hellenic religious sentiment.
Onomarchus doubtless replied, and with too good reason, that peace
was unattainable upon any terms short of absolute ruin; and that
there was no course open except to maintain their ground as they
stood, by renewed efforts of force. But even if the necessities
of the case had been less imperative, he would have been able to
overbear all opposition of his own countrymen through the numerous
mercenary strangers, now in Phokis and present at the assembly
under the name of allies.[533] In fact, so irresistible was his
ascendency by means of this large paid force under his command,
that both Demosthenes and Æschines[534] denominate him (as well as
his predecessor and his successor) not general, but despot, of the
Phokians. The soldiers were not less anxious than Onomarchus to
prosecute the war, and to employ the yet unexhausted wealth of the
temple in every way conducive to ultimate success. In this sense the
assembly decreed, naming Onomarchus general with full powers for
carrying the decree into effect.
[533] Diodor. xvi. 32. Οἱ δὲ Φωκεῖς—ἐπανῆλθον εἰς Δελφοὺς καὶ
συνελθόντες ~μετὰ τῶν συμμάχων~ εἰς κοινὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐβουλεύοντο
περὶ τοῦ πολέμου.
[534] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 286. c. 41. τῶν ἐν Φωκεῦσι
τυράννων, etc. Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 661. s. 147.
Φαύλλος ὁ Φωκεὺς ἤ τις ἄλλος δυναστὴς, etc.
His energetic measures presently retrieved the Phokian cause.
Employing the temple-funds still more profusely than Philomelus, he
invited fresh soldiers from all quarters, and found himself, after
some time, at the head of a larger army than before. The temple
exhibited many donatives, not only of gold and silver, but also of
brass and iron. While Onomarchus melted the precious metals and
coined them into money, he at the same time turned the brass and
iron into arms;[535] so that he was enabled to equip both his own
soldiers disarmed in the recent defeat, and a class of volunteers
poorer than the ordinary self-armed mercenaries. Besides paying
soldiers, he scattered everywhere presents or bribes to gain
influential partisans in the cities favorable to his cause; probably
Athens and Sparta first of all. We are told that the Spartan king
Archidamus, with his wife Deïnicha, were among the recipients;
indeed the same corrupt participation was imputed, by the statement
of the hostile-minded Messenians,[536] to the Spartan ephors and
senate. Even among enemies, Onomarchus employed his gold with effect,
contriving thus to gain or neutralize a portion of the Thessalians;
among them the powerful despots of Pheræ, whom we afterwards find
allied to him. Thus was the great Delphian treasure turned to account
in every way; and the unscrupulous Phokian despot strengthened his
hands yet farther, by seizing such of his fellow-countrymen as had
been prominent in opposition to his views, putting them to death, and
confiscating their property.[537]
[535] Diodor. xvi. 33. The numerous iron spits, dedicated by the
courtezan Rhodôpis at Delphi, may probably have been applied to
this military purpose. Herodotus (ii. 135) saw them at Delphi;
in the time of Plutarch, the guide of the Temple only showed the
place in which they had once stood (Plutarch, De Pythiæ Oraculis,
p. 400).
[536] Theopompus, Frag. 255, ed. Didot; Pausanias, iii. 10, 2;
iv. 5, 1. As Archidamus is said to have furnished fifteen talents
privately to Philomelus (Diodor. xvi. 24), he may, perhaps, have
received now repayment out of the temple property.
[537] Diodor. xvi. 33.
Through such combination of profuse allurement, corruption, and
violence, the tide began to turn again in favor of the Phokians.
Onomarchus found himself shortly at the head of a formidable army,
which he marched forth from Delphi, and subdued successively the
Lokrians of Amphissa, the Epiknemidian Lokrians, and the neighboring
territory of Doris. He carried his conquests even as far as the
vicinity of Thermopylæ; capturing Thronium, one of the towns which
commanded that important pass, and reducing its inhabitants to
slavery. It is probable that he also took Nikæa and Alpônus—two other
valuable positions near Thermopylæ, which we know to have been in
the power of the Phokians until the moment immediately preceding
their ruin—since we find him henceforward master of Thermopylæ, and
speedily opening his communications with Thessaly.[538] Besides this
extension of dominion to the north and east of Phokis, Onomarchus
also invaded Bœotia. The Thebans, now deprived of their northern
allies, did not at first meet him in the field, so that he was
enabled to capture Orchomenus. But when he proceeded to attack
Chæroneia, they made an effective effort to relieve the place. They
brought out their forces, and defeated him, in an action not very
decisive, yet sufficient to constrain him to retire into Phokis.
[538] Diodor. xvi. 33. His account of the operations of
Onomarchus is, as usual, very meagre—εἰς δὲ τὴν πολεμίαν
ἐμβαλὼν, Θρόνιον μὲν ἐκπολιορκήσας ἐξηνδραποδίσατο, Ἀμφισσεῖς δὲ
καταπληξάμενος, τὰς δ᾽ ἐν Δωριεῦσι πόλεις πορθήσας, τὴν χώραν
αὐτῶν ἐδῄωσεν.
That Thronium, with Alpônus and Nikæa, were the three places
which commanded the pass of Thermopylæ—and that all the three
were in possession of the Phokians immediately before they
were conquered by Philip of Macedon in 346 B. C.—we know from
Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 286. c. 41.
... πρέσβεις πρὸς ὑμᾶς (the Athenians) ἦλθον ἐκ Φωκέων, βοηθεῖν
αὑτοῖς κελεύοντες, καὶ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι παραδώσειν Ἀλπωνὸν καὶ
Θρόνιον καὶ Νίκαιαν, τὰ τῶν παρόδων τῶν εἰς Πύλας χωρία κύρια.
In order to conquer Thronium, Onomarchus must have marched
through and mastered the Epiknemidian Lokrians; and though no
place except Thronium is specified by Diodorus, it seems plain
that Onomarchus can not have conquered Thronium alone.
Probably the Thebans were at this time much pressed, and prevented
from acting effectively against the Phokians, by want of money. We
know at least that in the midst of the Phokian war they hired out
a force of 5000 hoplites commanded by Pammenes, to Artabazus the
revolted Phrygian satrap. Here Pammenes with his soldiers acquired
some renown, gaining two important victories over the Persians.[539]
The Thebans, it would seem, having no fleet and no maritime
dependencies, were less afraid of giving offence to the Great King
than Athens had been, when she interdicted Chares from aiding
Artabazus, and acquiesced in the unfavorable pacification which
terminated the Social War. How long Pammenes and the Thebans remained
in Asia, we are not informed. But in spite of the victories gained
by them, Artabazus was not long able to maintain himself against
the Persian arms. Three years afterwards, we hear of him and his
brother-in-law Memnon as expelled from Asia, and as exiles residing
with Philip of Macedon.[540]
[539] Diodor. xvi. 34.
[540] Diodor. xvi. 52.
While Pammenes was serving under Artabazus, the Athenian general
Chares recaptured Sestos in the Hellespont, which appears to have
revolted from Athens during the Social War. He treated the captive
Sestians with rigor; putting to death the men of military age,
and selling the remainder as slaves.[541] This was an important
acquisition for Athens, as a condition of security in the Chersonese
as well as of preponderance in the Hellespont.
[541] Diodor. xvi. 34.
Alarmed at the successes of Chares in the Hellespont, the Thracian
prince Kersobleptes now entered on an intrigue with Pammenes in Asia,
and with Philip of Macedon (who was on the coast of Thrace, attacking
Abdêra and Maroneia), for the purpose of checking the progress of the
Athenian arms. Philip appears to have made a forward movement, and
to have menaced the possessions of Athens in the Chersonese; but his
access thither was forbidden by Amadokus, another prince of Thrace,
master of the intermediate territory, as well as by the presence of
Chares with his fleet off the Thracian coast.[542] Apollonides of
Kardia was the agent of Kersobleptes; who however finding his schemes
abortive, and intimidated by the presence of Chares, came to terms
with Athens, and surrendered to her the portion of the Chersonese
which still remained to him, with the exception of Kardia. The
Athenians sent to the Chersonese a farther detachment of Kleruchs
or out-settlers, for whom considerable room must have been made as
well by the depopulation of Sestos, as by the recent cession from
Kersobleptes.[543] It was in the ensuing year (352 B. C.) that the
Athenians also despatched a fresh batch of 2000 citizens as settlers
to Samos, in addition to those who had been sent thither thirteen
years before.[544]
[542] Polyænus, iv. 2, 22, seems to belong to this juncture.
[543] We derive what is here stated from the comparison of two
passages, put together as well as the uncertainty of their tenor
admits, Diodor. xvi. 34, with Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p.
681. s. 219 (s. 183, in Weber’s edition, whose note ought to be
consulted). Demosthenes says, Φιλίππου γὰρ εἰς Μαρώνειαν ἐλθόντος
ἔπεμψε (Kersobleptes) πρὸς αὐτὸν Ἀπολλωνίδην, πίστεις δοὺς ἐκείνῳ
καὶ Παμμένει· καὶ εἰ μὴ κρατῶν τῆς χώρας Ἀμάδοκος ἀπεῖπε Φιλίππῳ
μὴ ἐπιβαίνειν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ἐν μέσῳ πολεμεῖν ἡμᾶς πρὸς Καρδιανοὺς
ἤδη καὶ Κερσοβλέπτην. Καὶ ὅτι ταῦτ᾽ ἀληθῆ λέγω, λαβὲ τὴν Χάρητος
ἐπιστολήν.
The mention of Pammenes, as being within reach of communication
with Kersobleptes—the mention of Chares as being at the
Chersonese, and sending home despatches—and the notice of Philip
as being at Maroneia—all conspire to connect this passage with
the year 353-352 B. C., and with the facts referred to that
year by Diodorus, xvi. 34. There is an interval of five years
between the presence of Chares here alluded to, and the presence
of Chares noticed before in the same oration, p. 678. s. 206,
immediately after the successful expedition to Eubœa in 358 B.
C. During these five years, Kersobleptes had acted in a hostile
manner towards Athens in the neighborhood of the Chersonese (p.
680. s. 214), and also towards the two rival Thracian princes,
friends of Athens. At the same time Sestos had again revolted;
the forces of Athens being engaged in the Social War, from 358
to 355 B. C. In 353 B. C. Chares is at the Hellespont, recovers
Sestos, and again defeats the intrigues of Kersobleptes, who
makes cession to Athens of a portion of territory which he
still held in the Chersonese. Diodorus ascribes this cession
of Kersobleptes to the motive of aversion towards Philip and
good-will towards the Athenians. Possibly these may have been
the motives pretended by Kersobleptes, to whom a certain party
at Athens gave credit for more favorable dispositions than the
Demosthenic oration against Aristokrates recognizes—as we may see
from that oration itself. But I rather apprehend that Diodorus,
in describing Kersobleptes as hostile to Philip, and friendly to
Athens, has applied to the year 353 B. C. a state of relations
which did not become true until a later date, nearer to the time
when peace was made between Philip and the Athenians in 346 B. C.
[544] Dionysius, Hal. Judic. de Dinarcho, p. 664; Strabo. xiv. p.
638.
The mention of Philip as attacking Maroneia and menacing the
Thracian Chersonese, shows the indefatigable activity of that
prince and the steady enlargement of his power. In 358 B. C., he
had taken Amphipolis; before 355 B. C., he had captured Pydna and
Potidæa, founded the new town of Philippi, and opened for himself
the resource of the adjoining auriferous region; he had established
relations with Thessaly, assisting the great family of the Aleuadæ
at Larissa in their struggle against Lykophron and Peitholaus, the
despots of Pheræ:[545] he had farther again chastised the interior
tribes bordering on Macedonia, Thracians. Pæonians, and Illyrians,
who were never long at rest, and who had combined to regain their
independence.[546] It appears to have been in 354-353 B. C., that
he attacked Methônê, the last remaining possession of Athens on
the Macedonian coast. Situated on the Thermaic Gulf, Methônê was
doubtless a convenient station for Athenian privateers to intercept
trading vessels, not merely to and from Macedonian ports, but also
from Olynthus and Potidæa; so that the Olynthians, then in alliance
with Philip against Athens, would be glad to see it pass into his
power, and may perhaps have lent him their aid. He pressed the siege
of the place with his usual vigor, employing all the engines and
means of assault then known; while the besieged on their side were
not less resolute in the defence. They repelled his attacks for so
long a time, that news of the danger of the place reached Athens, and
ample time was afforded for sending relief, had the Athenians been
ready and vigorous in their movement. But unfortunately they had not
even now learnt experience from the loss of Pydna and Potidæa. Either
the Etesian winds usual in summer, or the storms of winter, both
which circumstances were taken into account by Philip in adjusting
the season of his enterprises[547]—or (which is more probable) the
aversion of the Athenian respectable citizens to personal service
on shipboard, and their slackness even in pecuniary payment—caused
so much delay in preparations, that the expedition sent out did not
reach Methônê until too late.[548] The Methonæans, having gallantly
held out until all their means were exhausted, were at length
compelled to surrender. Diodorus tells us that Philip granted terms
so far lenient as to allow them to depart with the clothes on their
backs.[549] But this can hardly be accurate, since we know that
there were Athenian citizens among them sold as slaves, some of whom
were ransomed by Demosthenes with his own money.[550]
[545] Diodor. xvi, 14. This passage relates to the year 357-356
B. C., and possibly Philip may have begun to meddle in the
Thessalian party-disputes even as early as that year; but his
effective interference comes two or three years later. See the
general order of Philip’s aggressions indicated by Demosthenes,
Olynth. i. p. 12. s. 13.
[546] Diodor. xvi. 22.
[547] See a striking passage in Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p.
48. s. 35. There was another place called Methônê—the Thracian
Methônê—situated in the Chalkidic or Thracian peninsula, near
Olynthus and Apollonia—of which we shall hear presently.
[548] Demosthenes, Philipp. i. p. 50. s. 40; Olynth. i. p. 11. s.
9.
[549] Diodorus (xvi. 31-34) mentions the capture of Methônê by
Philip twice, in two successive years: first, in 354-353 B. C.;
again, more copiously, in 353-352 B. C. In my judgment, the
earlier of the two dates is the more probable. In 353-352 B. C.,
Philip carried on his war in Thrace, near Abdera and Maroneia—and
also his war against Onomarchus in Thessaly; which transactions
seem enough to fill up the time. From the language of Demosthenes
(Olynth. i. p. 12. s. 13), we see that Philip did not attack
Thessaly until after the capture of Methônê. Diodorus as well as
Strabo (vii. p. 330), and Justin (vii. 6) state that Philip was
wounded and lost the sight of one eye in this siege. But this
seems to have happened afterwards, near the Thracian Methônê.
Compare Justin, vii. 6; Polyænus, iv. 2. 15. Under the year
354-353 B. C., Diodorus mentions not only the capture of Methônê
by Philip, but also the capture of _Pagæ_. Παγὰς δὲ χειρωσάμενος,
ἠνάγκασεν ὑποταγῆναι. _Pagæ_ is unknown, anywhere near Macedonia
and Thessaly. Wesseling and Mr. Clinton suppose _Pagasæ_ in
Thessaly to be meant. But it seems to me impossible that Philip,
who had no considerable power at sea, can have taken Pagasæ,
before his wars in Thessaly, and before he had become master of
Pheræ, which events did not occur until one year or two years
afterwards. Pagasæ is the port of Pheræ, and Lykophron the despot
of Pheræ was still powerful and unconquered. If, therefore, the
word intended by Diodorus be Παγασὰς instead of Παγὰς, I think
the matter of fact asserted cannot be correct.
[550] This fact is mentioned in the public vote of gratitude
passed by the Athenian people to Demosthenes (Plutarch, Vitæ X.
Orat. p. 851).
Being now master of the last port possessed by Athens in the Thermaic
Gulf—an acquisition of great importance, which had never before[551]
belonged to the Macedonian kings—Philip was enabled to extend his
military operations to the neighborhood of the Thracian Chersonese
on the one side, and to that of Thermopylæ on the other. How he
threatened the Chersonese, has been already related; and his campaign
in Thessaly was yet more important. That country was, as usual, torn
by intestine disputes. Lykophron the despot of Pheræ possessed the
greatest sway; while the Aleuadæ of Larissa, too weak to contend
against him with their own forces, invited assistance from Philip;
who entered Thessaly with a powerful army. Such a reinforcement so
completely altered the balance of Thessalian power, that Lykophron
in his turn was compelled to entreat aid from Onomarchus and the
Phokians.
[551] Thucyd. vi. 7. Μεθώνην τὴν ὅμορον Μακεδονίᾳ, etc.
So strong were the Phokians now, that they were more than a match
for the Thebans with their other hostile neighbors, and had means to
spare for combating Philip in Thessaly. As their force consisted
of a large body of mercenaries, whom they were constrained for
security to retain in pay—to keep them employed beyond the border
was a point not undesirable. Hence they readily entered upon the
Thessalian campaign. At this moment they counted, in the comparative
assessment of Hellenic forces, as an item of first-rate magnitude.
They were hailed both by Athenians and Spartans as the natural
enemy and counterpoise of Thebes, alike odious to both. While the
Phokians maintained their actual power, Athens could manage her
foreign policy abroad, and Sparta her designs in Peloponnesus,
with diminished apprehensions of being counterworked by Thebes.
Both Athens and Sparta had at first supported the Phokians against
unjust persecution by Thebes and abuse of Amphiktyonic jurisdiction,
before the spoliation of the Delphian temple was consummated or even
anticipated. And though, when that spoliation actually occurred, it
was doubtless viewed with reprobation among Athenians, accustomed
to unlimited freedom of public discussion—as well as at Sparta, in
so far as it became known amidst the habitual secrecy of public
affairs—nevertheless political interests so far prevailed, that the
Phokians (perhaps in part by aid of bribery) were still countenanced,
though not much assisted, as useful rivals to Thebes.[552] To
restrain “the Leuktric insolence of the Thebans,”[553] and to see
the Bœotian towns Orchomenus, Thespiæ, Platæa, restored to their
pristine autonomy, was an object of paramount desire with each of
the two ancient heads of Greece. So far both Athens and Sparta felt
in unison. But Sparta cherished a farther hope—in which Athens
by no means concurred—to avail herself of the embarrassments of
Thebes for the purpose of breaking up Megalopolis and Messênê,
and recovering her former Peloponnesian dominion. These two new
Peloponnesian cities, erected by Epaminondas on the frontier of
Laconia, had been hitherto upheld against Sparta by the certainty of
Theban interference if they were menaced. But so little did Thebes
seem in a condition to interfere, while Onomarchus and the Phokians
were triumphant in 353-352 B. C., that the Megalopolitans despatched
envoys to Athens to entreat protection and alliance, while the
Spartans on their side sent to oppose the petition.
[552] Such is the description of Athenian feeling, as it then
stood, given by Demosthenes twenty-four years afterwards in the
Oration De Coronâ, p. 230. s. 21.
Τοῦ γὰρ Φωκικοῦ συστάντος πολέμου, πρῶτον μὲν ὑμεῖς οὕτω
διέκεισθε, ὥστε Φωκέας μὲν βούλεσθαι σωθῆναι, καίπερ οὐ δίκαια
ποιοῦντας ὁρῶντες, Θηβαίοις δ᾽ ὁτιοῦν ἂν ἐφησθῆναι παθοῦσιν, οὐκ
ἀλόγως οὐδ᾽ ἀδίκως αὐτοῖς ὀργιζόμενοι, etc.
[553] Diodor. xvi. 58. Βουλόμενος τὰ Λευκτρικὰ φρονήματα
συστεῖλαι τῶν Βοιωτῶν, etc., an expression used in reference to
Philip a few years afterwards, but more animated and emphatic
than we usually find in Diodorus, who, perhaps, borrowed it from
Theopompus.
It is on occasion of the political debates in Athens during the
years 354 and 353 B. C., that we first have before us the Athenian
Demosthenes, as adviser of his countrymen in the public assembly. His
first discourse of public advice was delivered in 354-353 B. C., on
an alarm of approaching war with Persia; his second, in 353-352 B.
C., was intended to point out the policy proper for Athens in dealing
with the Spartan and Megalopolitan envoys.
A few words must here be said about this eminent man, who forms the
principal ornament of the declining Hellenic world. He was about
twenty-seven years old; being born, according to what seems the
most probable among contradictory accounts, in 382-381 B. C.[554]
His father, named also Demosthenes, was a citizen of considerable
property, and of a character so unimpeachable that even Æschines
says nothing against him; his mother Kleobulê was one of the
two daughters and coheiresses of a citizen named Gylon,[555] an
Athenian exile, who, having become rich as a proprietor of land and
exporter of corn in Bosphorus, sent his two daughters to Athens;
where, possessing handsome dowries, they married two Athenian
citizens—Demochares and the elder Demosthenes. The latter was a man
of considerable wealth, and carried on two distinct manufactories;
one of swords or knives, employing thirty-two slaves—the other, of
couches or beds, employing twenty. In the new schedule of citizens
and of taxable property, introduced in the archonship of Nausinikus
(378 B. C.), the elder Demosthenes was enrolled among the richest
class, the leaders of Symmories. But he died about 375 B. C., leaving
his son Demosthenes seven years old, with a younger daughter about
five years of age. The boy and his large paternal property were
confided to the care of three guardians named under his father’s
will. These guardians—though the father, in hopes of ensuring
their fidelity, had bequeathed to them considerable legacies, away
from his own son, and though all of them were rich men as well as
family connections and friends—administered the property with such
negligence and dishonesty, that only a sum comparatively small was
left, when they came to render account to their ward. At the age of
sixteen years complete, Demosthenes attained his civil majority, and
became entitled by the Athenian law to the administration of his own
property. During his minority, his guardians had continued to enrol
him among the wealthiest class (as his father had ranked before), and
to pay the increased rate of direct taxation chargeable upon that
class; but the real sum handed over to him by his guardians was too
small to justify such a position. Though his father had died worth
fourteen talents,—which would be diminished by the sums bequeathed
as legacies, but ought to have been increased in greater proportion
by the interest on the property for the ten years of minority, had
it been properly administered—the sum paid to young Demosthenes on
his majority was less than two talents, while the guardians not only
gave in dishonest accounts, but professed not to be able to produce
the father’s will. After repeated complaints and remonstrances,
he brought a judicial action against one of them—Aphobus, and
obtained a verdict carrying damages to the amount of ten talents.
Payment however was still evaded by the debtor. Five speeches remain
delivered by Demosthenes, three against Aphobus, two against Onêtor,
brother-in-law of Aphobus. At the date of the latest oration,
Demosthenes had still received nothing; nor do we know how much he
ultimately realized, though it would seem that the difficulties
thrown in his way were such as to compel him to forego the greater
part of the claim. Nor is it certain whether he ever brought the
actions, of which he speaks as intended, against the other two
guardians Demophon and Therippides.[556]
[554] The birth-year of Demosthenes is matter of notorious
controversy. No one of the statements respecting it rests upon
evidence thoroughly convincing.
The question has been examined with much care and ability both
by Mr. Clinton (Fasti Hellen. Appen. xx.) and by Dr. Thirlwall
(Histor. G. vol. v. Appen. i. p. 485 seq.); by Böhnecke
(Forschungen, p. 1-94) more copiously than cautiously, but still
with much instruction; also by K. F. Hermann (De Anno Natali
Demosthenis), and many other critics.
In adopting the year Olymp. 99. 3 (the archonship of Evander,
382-381 B. C.), I agree with the conclusion of Mr. Clinton and
of K. F. Hermann; differing from Dr. Thirlwall, who prefers the
previous year (Olymp. 99. 2)—and from Böhnecke, who vindicates
the year affirmed by Dionysius (Olymp. 99. 4).
Mr. Clinton fixes the _first month_ of Olymp. 99. 3, as the
month in which Demosthenes was born. This appears to me greater
precision than the evidence warrants.
[555] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 4; Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 78.
c. 57; Demosth. cont. Aphob. B. p. 835. According to Æschines,
Gylon was put on his trial for having betrayed Nymphæum to the
enemy; but not appearing, was sentenced to death in his absence,
and became an exile. He then went to Bosphorus (Pantikapæum),
obtained the favor of the king (probably Satyrus—see Mr.
Clinton’s Appendix on the kings of Bosphorus—Fasti Hellenic.
Append. xiii, p. 282), together with the grant of a district
called Kepi, and married the daughter of a rich man there; by
whom he had two daughters. In after-days, he sent these two
daughters to Athens, where one of them, Kleobulê, was married
to the elder Demosthenes. Æschines has probably exaggerated the
gravity of the sentence against Gylon, who seems only to have
been fined. The guardians of Demosthenes assert no more than that
Gylon was fined, and died with the fine unpaid, while Demosthenes
asserts that the fine _was_ paid.
Upon the facts here stated by Æschines, a few explanatory remarks
will be useful. Demosthenes being born 382-381 B. C., this would
probably throw the birth of his mother Kleobulê to some period
near the close of the Peloponnesian war, 405-404 B. C. We see,
therefore, that the establishment of Gylon in the kingdom of
Bosphorus, and his nuptial connection there formed, must have
taken place during the closing years of the Peloponnesian war;
between 412 B. C. (the year after the Athenian catastrophe at
Syracuse) and 405 B. C.
These were years of great misfortune to Athens. After the
disaster at Syracuse, she could no longer maintain ascendency
over, or grant protection to, a distant tributary like Nymphæum
in the Tauric Chersonese. It was therefore natural that the
Athenian citizens there settled, engaged probably in the export
trade of corn to Athens, should seek security by making the best
bargain they could with the neighboring kings of Bosphorus. In
this transaction Gylon seems to have stood conspicuously forward,
gaining both favor and profit to himself. And when, after the
close of the war, the corn-trade again became comparatively
unimpeded, he was in a situation to carry it on upon a large and
lucrative scale. Another example of Greeks who gained favor,
held office, and made fortunes, under Satyrus in the Bosphorus,
is given in the Oratio (xvii.) Trapezitica of Isokrates, s. 3,
14. Compare also the case of Mantitheus the Athenian (Lysias pro
Mantitheo, Or. xvi. s. 4), who was sent by his father to reside
with Satyrus for some time, before the close of the Peloponnesian
war; which shows that Satyrus was at that time, when Nymphæum was
probably placed under his protection, in friendly relations with
Athens.
I may remark that the woman whom Gylon married, though Æschines
calls her a Scythian woman, may be supposed more probably to have
been the daughter of some Greek (not an Athenian) resident in
Bosphorus.
[556] Demosth. cont. Onetor. ii. p. 880. κεκομισμένον μηδ᾽
ὁτιοῦν, καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐθέλοντα ποιεῖν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς, εἴτι τῶν δεόντων
ἐβούλεσθε πράττειν.
That he ultimately got much less than he was entitled to, appears
from his own statement in the oration against Meidias, p. 540.
See Westermann, De Litibus quas Demosthenes oravit ipse, cap. i.
p. 15, 16.
Plutarch (Vit. X Oratt. p. 844) says that he voluntarily
refrained from enforcing the judgment obtained. I do not clearly
understand what is meant by Æschines (cont. Ktesiph. p. 78), when
he designates Demosthenes as τὰ πατρῷα καταγελάστως προέμενος.
Demosthenes received during his youth the ordinary grammatical and
rhetorical education of a wealthy Athenian. Even as a boy, he is said
to have manifested extraordinary appetite and interest for rhetorical
exercise. By earnest entreaty, he prevailed on his tutors to conduct
him to hear Kallistratus, one of the ablest speakers in Athens,
delivering an harangue in the Dikastery on the matter of Oropus.[557]
This harangue, producing a profound impression upon Demosthenes,
stimulated his fondness for rhetorical studies. Still more was the
passion excited, when on attaining his majority, he found himself
cheated of most of his paternal property, and constrained to claim
his rights by a suit at law against his guardians. Being obliged,
according to Athenian practice, to plead his own cause personally,
he was made to feel keenly the helpless condition of an incompetent
speaker, and the necessity of acquiring oratorical power, not simply
as an instrument of ambition, but even as a means of individual
defence and safety.[558] It appears also that he was, from childhood,
of sickly constitution and feeble muscular frame; so that partly from
his own disinclination, partly from the solicitude of his mother,
he took little part either as boy or youth in the exercises of the
palæstra. His delicate clothing, and somewhat effeminate habits,
procured for him as a boy the nickname of Batalus, which remained
attached to him most part of his life, and which his enemies tried
to connect with degrading imputations.[559] Such comparative bodily
disability probably contributed to incite his thirst for mental and
rhetorical acquisitions, as the only road to celebrity open. But
it at the same time disqualified him from appropriating to himself
the full range of a comprehensive Grecian education, as conceived
by Plato, Isokrates, and Aristotle; an education applying alike to
thought, word, and action—combining bodily strength, endurance, and
fearlessness, with an enlarged mental capacity and a power of making
it felt by speech. The disproportion between the physical energy,
and the mental force, of Demosthenes, beginning in childhood, is
recorded and lamented in the inscription placed on his statue after
his death.[560]
[557] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 5; Vit. X Orator. p. 844; Hermippus
ap. Aul. Gell. iii. 13. Nothing positive can be made out
respecting this famous trial; neither the date, nor the exact
point in question, nor the manner in which Kallistratus was
concerned in it—nor who were his opponents. Many conjectures have
been proposed, differing materially one from the other, and all
uncertain.
These conjectures are brought together and examined in Rehdantz,
Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, p. 111-114.
In the month of November, 361 B. C., Kallistratus was in exile
at Methônê in the Thermaic Gulf. He had been twice condemned to
death by the Athenians (Demosth. cont. Polykl. p. 1221). But when
these condemnations took place, we do not know.
[558] Plutarch. Demosth. c. 4. Such a view of the necessity of
a power of public speaking, is put forward by Kallikles in the
Gorgias of Plato, p. 486, 511. c. 90, 142. τὴν ῥητορικὴν τὴν ἐν
τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ~διασώζουσαν~, etc. Compare Aristot. Rhetoric,
i. 1, 3. Ἄτοπον, εἰ τῷ σώματι μὲν αἰσχρὸν μὴ δύνασθαι ~βοηθεῖν
ἑαυτῷ~, λόγῳ δὲ, οὐκ αἰσχρόν· ὃ μᾶλλον ἴδιόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπου τῆς
τοῦ σώματος χρείας.
The comparison of Aristotle is instructive as to the point of
view of a free Greek. “If it be disgraceful not to be able to
protect yourself by your bodily force, it is equally so not to be
able to protect yourself by your powers of speaking; which is in
a more peculiar manner the privilege of man.” See also Tacitus,
Dialog. de Orator. c. 5.
[559] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 4; Æschines cont. Timarch. p. 17, 18.
c. 27, with Scholia, De Fal. Leg. p. 41. c. 31. εἰ γάρ τις σοῦ τὰ
κομψὰ ταῦτα χλανίσκια περικλώμενος καὶ τοὺς μαλακοὺς χιτωνίσκους,
ἐν οἷς τοὺς κατὰ τῶν φίλων λόγους γράφεις, περιενέγκας, δοίη εἰς
τὰς χεῖρας τῶν δικαστῶν, οἶμαι ἂν αὐτοὺς εἴτις μὴ προειπὼν ταῦτα
ποιήσειεν, ἀπορήσειν εἴτε γυναικὸς εἴτε ἀνδρὸς εἰλήφασιν ἐσθῆτα.
Compare Æsch. Fal. Leg. p. 45.
The foundation of the nickname _Batalus_ is not clear, and
was differently understood by different persons; compare also
Libanius, Vita Demosth. p. 294, ap Westermann, Scriptores
Biographici. But it can hardly have been a very discreditable
foundation, since Demosthenes takes the name to himself, De
Coronâ, p. 289.
[560] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 30.
Εἴπερ ἴσην ῥώμην γνώμῃ, Δημόσθενες, εἶχες,
Οὔποτ᾽ ἂν Ἑλλήνων ἦρξεν Ἄρης Μακεδών.
As a youth of eighteen years of age, Demosthenes found himself
with a known and good family position at Athens, being ranked in
the class of richest citizens and liable to the performance of
liturgies and trierarchy as his father had been before him;[561]
yet with a real fortune very inadequate to the outlay expected from
him—embarrassed by a legal proceeding against guardians wealthy as
well as unscrupulous—and an object of dislike and annoyance from
other wealthy men, such as Meidias and his brother Thrasylochus,[562]
friends of those guardians. His family position gave him a good
introduction to public affairs, for which he proceeded to train
himself carefully; first as a writer of speeches for others, next as
a speaker in his own person. Plato and Isokrates were both at this
moment in full celebrity, visited at Athens by pupils from every
part of Greece; Isæus also, who had studied under Isokrates, was in
great reputation as a composer of judicial harangues for plaintiffs
or defendants in civil causes. Demosthenes put himself under the
teaching of Isæus (who is said to have assisted him in composing the
speeches against his guardians), and also profited largely by the
discourse of Plato, of Isokrates, and others. As an ardent aspirant
he would seek instruction from most of the best sources, theoretical
as well as practical—writers as well as lecturers.[563] But besides
living teachers, there was one of the past generation who contributed
largely to his improvement. He studied Thucydides with indefatigable
labor and attention; according to one account, he copied the whole
history eight times over with his own hand; according to another,
he learnt it all by heart, so as to be able to rewrite it from
memory when the manuscript was accidentally destroyed. Without
minutely criticising these details, we ascertain at least that
Thucydides was the object of his peculiar study and imitation. How
much the composition of Demosthenes was fashioned by the reading
of Thucydides—reproducing the daring, majestic and impressive
phraseology, yet without the overstrained brevity and involutions of
that great historian—and contriving to blend with it a perspicuity
and grace not inferior to Lysias—may be seen illustrated in the
elaborate criticism of the rhetor Dionysius.[564]
[561] Position of Demosthenes, πατὴρ τριηραρχικὸς—χρυσέα κρηπὶς,
κατὰ Πίνδαρον, etc. (Lucian, Encomium Demosth. vol. iii. p. 499,
ed. Reitz.)
[562] See the account given by Demosthenes (cont. Meidiam, p.
539, 540) of the manner in which Meidias and Thrasylochus first
began their persecution of him, while the suit against his
guardians was still going on. These guardians attempted to get
rid of the suit by inducing Thrasylochus to force upon him an
exchange of properties (Antidosis), tendered by Thrasylochus, who
had just been put down for a trierarchy. If the exchange had been
effected, Thrasylochus would have given the guardians a release.
Demosthenes could only avoid it by consenting to incur the cost
of the trierarchy—20 minæ.
[563] Demosthenes both studied attentively the dialogues, and
heard the discourse, of Plato (Cicero, Brutus, 31, 121; Orator.
4, 15; Plutarch, Vit. X Orator. p. 844). Tacitus, Dialog. de
Orator. c. 32.
[564] Dionys. Hal. De Thucydide Judicium, p. 944; De Admirab. Vi.
Dicend. Demosthen. p. 982, 983.
While thus striking out for himself a bold and original style,
Demosthenes had still greater difficulties to overcome in regard to
the external requisites of an orator. He was not endowed by nature,
like Æschines, with a magnificent voice; nor, like Demades, with
a ready flow of vehement improvisation. His thoughts required to
be put together by careful preparation; his voice was bad and even
lisping—his breath short—his gesticulation ungraceful; moreover he
was overawed and embarrassed by the manifestations of the multitude.
Such an accumulation of natural impediments were at least equal to
those of which Isokrates complains, as having debarred him all his
life from addressing the public assembly, and restrained him to a
select audience of friends or pupils. The energy and success with
which Demosthenes overcame his defects, in such manner as to satisfy
a critical assembly like the Athenian, is one of the most memorable
circumstances in the general history of self-education. Repeated
humiliation and repulse only spurred him on to fresh solitary
efforts for improvement. He corrected his defective elocution
by speaking with pebbles in his mouth; he prepared himself to
overcome the noise of the assembly by declaiming in stormy weather
on the sea-shore of Phalerum; he opened his lungs by running, and
extended his powers of holding breath by pronouncing sentences in
marching up-hill; he sometimes passed two or three months without
interruption in a subterranean chamber, practising night and day
either in composition or declamation, and shaving one half of his
head in order to disqualify himself from going abroad. After several
trials without success before the assembly, his courage was on the
point of giving way, when Eunomus and other old citizens reassured
him by comparing the matter of his speeches to those of Perikles,
and exhorting him to persevere a little longer in the correction
of his external defects. On another occasion, he was pouring forth
his disappointment to Satyrus the actor, who undertook to explain
to him the cause, desiring him to repeat in his own way a speech
out of Sophokles, which he (Satyrus) proceeded to repeat after him,
with suitable accent and delivery. Demosthenes, profoundly struck
with the difference, began anew the task of self-improvement;
probably taking constant lessons from good models. In his unremitting
private practice, he devoted himself especially to acquiring a
graceful action, keeping watch on all his movements while declaiming
before a tall looking-glass.[565] After pertinacious efforts for
several years, he was rewarded at length with complete success.
His delivery became full of decision and vehemence, highly popular
with the general body of the assembly; though some critics censured
his modulation as artificial and out of nature, and savoring of
low stage-effect; while others, in the same spirit, condemned his
speeches as over-labored and smelling of the lamp.[566]
[565] These and other details are given in Plutarch’s Life of
Demosthenes, c. 4, 9. They depend upon good evidence; for he
cites Demetrius the Phalerean, who heard them himself from
Demosthenes in the latter years of his life. The subterranean
chamber where Demosthenes practised, was shown at Athens even in
the time of Plutarch.
Cicero (who also refers to Demetrius Phalereus), De Divinat. ii.
46, 96. Libanius, Zosimus, and Photius, give generally the same
statements, with some variations.
[566] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 9. Ἐπεὶ τόλμαν γε καὶ θάρσος οἱ
λεχθέντες ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ λόγοι τῶν γραφέντων μᾶλλον εἶχον· εἴ τι δεῖ
πιστεύειν Ἐρατοσθένει καὶ Δημητρίῳ τῷ Φαληρεῖ καὶ τοῖς κωμικοῖς.
Ὧν Ἐρατοσθένης μέν φησιν αὑτὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ~πολλαχοῦ γεγονέναι
παράβακχον~, ὁ δὲ Φαληρεὺς τὸν ἔμμετρον ἐκεῖνον ὅρκον ὀμόσαι
ποτε πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ~ὥσπερ ἐνθουσιῶντα~. Again, c. 11. Τοῖς μὲν
οὖν πολλοῖς ὑποκρινόμενος ἤρεσκε θαυμαστῶς, οἱ δὲ χαριέντες
~ταπεινὸν~ ἡγοῦντο καὶ ~ἀγεννὲς αὐτοῦ τὸ πλάσμα καὶ μαλακὸν~, ὧν
καὶ Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεύς ἐστιν.
This sentence is illustrated by a passage in Quintilian, i. 8.
2. “Sit autem in primis lectio virilis, et cum suavitate quadam
gravis: et non quidem prosæ similis—quia carmen est, et se poetæ
canere testantur—non tamen in canticum dissoluta, nec _plasmate_
(ut nunc a plerisque fit) effeminata.”
The meaning of _plasma_, in the technical language of
rhetoricians contemporary with Quintilian, seems different from
that which it bears in Dionysius, p. 1060-1061. But whether
Plutarch has exactly rendered to us what Demetrius Phalereus
said of Demosthenes—whether Demetrius spoke of the modulation
of Demosthenes as being _low_ and _vulgar_—I cannot but doubt.
Æschines urges very different reproaches against him—overmuch
labor and affectation, but combined with bitterness and malignity
(adv. Ktesiph. p. 78-86). He denounces the _character_ of
Demosthenes as low and vulgar—but not his oratorical delivery.
The expression ὥσπερ ἐνθουσιῶν, which Plutarch cites from
Demetrius Phalereus, hardly suits well with ταπεινὸν καὶ ἀγεννές.
So great was the importance assigned by Demosthenes himself to
these external means of effect, that he is said to have pronounced
“Action” to be the first, second, and third requisite for an orator.
If we grant this estimate to be correct, with reference to actual
hearers, we must recollect that his speeches are, (not less truly
than the history of Thucydides), “an everlasting possession rather
than a display for momentary effect.” Even among his contemporaries,
the effect of the speeches, when read apart from the speaker,
was very powerful. There were some who thought that their full
excellence could only be thus appreciated;[567] while to the
after-world, who know them only by reading, they have been and still
are the objects of an admiration reaching its highest pitch in the
enthusiastic sentiment of the fastidious rhetor Dionysius.[568] The
action of Demosthenes,—consummate as it doubtless was, and highly
as he may himself have prized an accomplishment so laboriously
earned,—produced its effect only in conjunction with the matter of
Demosthenes; his thoughts, sentiments, words, and above all, his
sagacity in appreciating and advising on the actual situation. His
political wisdom, and his lofty patriotic _idéal_, are in truth quite
as remarkable as his oratory. By what training he attained either
the one or the other of these qualities, we are unfortunately not
permitted to know. Our informants have little interest in him except
as a speaker; they tell us neither what he learned, nor from whom,
nor by what companions, or party-associates, his political point
of view was formed. But we shall hardly err in supposing that his
attentive meditation of Thucydides supplied him, not merely with
force and majesty of expression, but also with that conception of
Athens in her foretime which he is perpetually impressing on his
countrymen,—Athens at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war,
in days of exuberant energy, and under the advice of her noblest
statesman.
[567] Plutarch, Demosth. c. 11. Αἰσίωνα δέ φησιν Ἕρμιππος,
ἐρωτηθέντα περὶ τῶν πάλαι ῥητόρων καὶ τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὸν, εἰπεῖν, ὡς
ἀκούων μὲν ἄν τις ἐθαύμασεν ἐκείνους εὐκόσμως καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς
τῷ δήμῳ διαλεγομένους, ~ἀναγινωσκόμενοι δὲ οἱ Δημοσθένους λόγοι~
πολὺ τῇ κατασκευῇ καὶ δυνάμει διαφέρουσιν.
[568] Dionys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Dicend. Demosth. p. 1022, a very
remarkable passage.
In other respects, we are left in ignorance as to the mental history
of Demosthenes. Before he acquired reputation as a public adviser, he
was already known as a logographer, or composer of discourses to be
delivered either by speakers in the public assembly or by litigants
in the Dikastery; for which compositions he was paid, according to
usual practice at Athens. He had also pleaded in person before the
Dikastery; in support of an accusation preferred by others against a
law, proposed by Leptines, for abrogating votes of immunity passed
by the city in favor of individuals, and restraining such grants
in future. Nothing can be more remarkable, in this speech against
Leptines, than the intensity with which the young speaker enforces
the necessity of strict and faithful adherence to engagements on the
part of the people, in spite of great occasional inconvenience in so
doing. It would appear that he was in habitual association with some
wealthy youths,—among others, with Apollodorus son of the wealthy
banker, Pasion, whom he undertook to instruct in the art of speaking.
This we learn from the denunciations of his rival, Æschines;[569]
who accuses him of having thus made his way into various wealthy
families,—especially where there was an orphan youth and a widowed
mother,—using unworthy artifices to defraud and ruin them. How
much truth there may be in such imputations, we cannot tell. But
Æschines was not unwarranted in applying to his rival the obnoxious
appellations of logographer and sophist; appellations all the more
disparaging, because Demosthenes belonged to a trierarchic family, of
the highest class in point of wealth.[570]
[569] Æschines cont. Timarch. p. 16, 24.
[570] Æschines cont. Timarchum, p. 13, 17, 25, cont. Ktesiphont.
p. 78. Περὶ δὲ τὴν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν δίαιταν τίς ἐστιν; Ἐκ τριηράρχου
λογογράφος ἀνεφάνη, τὰ πατρῷα καταγελάστως προέμενος, etc.
See also Demosthenes, De Fals. Legat. p. 417-420.
Compare the shame of the rich youth Hippokrates, in the Platonic
dialogue called Protagoras, when the idea is broached that he is
about to visit Protagoras for the purpose of becoming himself a
sophist (Plato, Protagor. p. 154 F, 163 A, cap. 8-19).
It will be proper here to notice another contemporary adviser, who
stands in marked antithesis and rivalry to Demosthenes. Phokion was
a citizen of small means, son of a pestle-maker. Born about the year
402 B. C., he was about twenty years older than Demosthenes. At what
precise time his political importance commenced, we do not know; but
he lived to the great age of eighty-four, and was a conspicuous man
throughout the last half-century of his life. He becomes known first
as a military officer, having served in subordinate command under
Chabrias, to whom he was greatly attached, at the battle of Naxos in
376 B. C. He was a man of thorough personal bravery, and considerable
talents for command; of hardy and enduring temperament, insensible
to cold or fatigue; strictly simple in his habits, and above all,
superior to every kind of personal corruption. His abstinence
from plunder and peculation, when on naval expeditions, formed an
honorable contrast with other Athenian admirals, and procured for him
much esteem on the part of the maritime allies. Hence, probably, his
surname of Phokion the Good.[571]
[571] Ælian, V. H. iii. 47; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 10; Cornelius
Nepos, Phokion, c. 1.
I have already remarked how deep and strong was the hold acquired
on the Athenian people, by any public man who once established
for himself a character above suspicion on the score of personal
corruption. Among Athenian politicians, but too many were not
innocent on this point; moreover, even when a man was really
innocent, there were often circumstances in his life which rendered
more or less of doubt admissible against him; thus Demosthenes,—being
known not only as a person of somewhat costly habits, but also
as frequenting wealthy houses, and receiving money for speeches
composed or rhetoric communicated,—was sure to be accused, justly or
unjustly, by his enemies, of having cheated rich clients, and would
never obtain unquestioned credit for a high pecuniary independence,
even in regard to the public affairs; although he certainly was not
corrupt, nor generally believed to be corrupt,—at least during the
period which this volume embraces, down to the death of Philip.[572]
But Phokion would receive neither money nor gifts from any one,—was
notoriously and obviously poor,—went barefoot and without an upper
garment even in very cold weather,—had only one female slave to
attend on his wife; while he had enjoyed commands sufficient to
enrich him if he had chosen. His personal incorruptibility thus
stood forth prominently to the public eye; and combined as it was
with bravery and fair generalship, procured for him testimonies
of confidence greater than those accorded even to Perikles. He
was elected no less than forty-five times to the annual office of
Stratêgus or General of the city,—that is, one of the Board of Ten so
denominated, the greatest executive function at Athens,—and elected
too, without having ever on any occasion solicited the office, or
even been present at the choice.[573] In all Athenian history, we
read of no similar multiplication of distinct appointments and honors
to the same individual.
[572] I introduce here this reservation as to time, not as
meaning to affirm the contrary with regard to the period after
Philip’s death, but as wishing to postpone for the present the
consideration of the later charges against Demosthenes—the
receipt of money from Persia, and the abstraction from the
treasures of Harpalus. I shall examine these points at the proper
time.
[573] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 8. Ὁμολογεῖται γὰρ, ὅτι πέντε καὶ
τεσσαράκοντα στρατηγίας ἔλαβεν οὐδ᾽ ἅπαξ ἀρχαιρεσίοις παρατυχὼν,
ἀλλ᾽ ἀπόντα μεταπεμπομένων αὐτὸν ἀεὶ καὶ χειροτονούντων,
ὥστε θαυμάζειν τοὺς οὐκ εὖ φρονοῦντας τὸν δῆμον, ὅτι πλεῖστα
τοῦ Φωκίωνος ἀντικρούοντος αὐτῷ καὶ μηδὲν εἰπόντος πώποτε
μηδὲ πράξαντος πρὸς χάριν, ὥσπερ ἀξιοῦσι τοὺς βασιλεῖς τοῖς
κόλαξι χρῆσθαι μετὰ τὸ κατὰ χειρὸς ὕδωρ, έχρῆτο οὗτος τοῖς μὲν
κομψοτέροις καὶ ἱλαροῖς ἐν παιδιᾶς μέρει δημαγωγοῖς, ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς
ἀρχὰς ἀεὶ νήφων καὶ σπουδάζων τὸν αὐστηρότατον καὶ φρονιμώτατον
ἐκάλει τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ μόνον ἢ μᾶλλον ταῖς βουλήσεσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ
ὁρμαῖς ἀντιτασσόμενον.
According to the picture of Athens and her democracy, as usually
presented by historians, we are taught to believe that the only road
open to honors or political influence, was, by a seductive address,
and by courting the people with fine speeches, unworthy flattery,
or unmeasured promises. Those who take this view of the Athenian
character, will find it difficult to explain the career of Phokion.
He was no orator,—from disdain rather than incompetence.[574] Besides
receiving a good education, he had profited by the conversation of
Plato, as well as of Xenokrates, in the Academy;[575] and we are
not surprised that in their school he contracted a contempt for
popular oratory, as well as a love for brief, concentrated, pungent
reply. Once, when about to speak in public, he was observed to be
particularly absorbed in thought. “You seem meditative, Phokion,”
said a friend. “Ay, by Zeus,” was the reply; “I am meditating whether
I cannot in some way abridge the speech which I am just about to
address to the Athenians.” He knew so well, however, on what points
to strike, that his telling brevity, strengthened by the weight of
character and position, cut through the fine oratory of Demosthenes
more effectively than any counter-oratory from men like Æschines.
Demosthenes himself greatly feared Phokion as an opponent, and was
heard to observe, on seeing him rise to speak, “Here comes the
cleaver of my harangues.”[576] Polyeuktus,—himself an orator and a
friend of Demosthenes,—drew a distinction highly complimentary to
Phokion, by saying, that “Demosthenes was the finest orator, but
Phokion the most formidable in speech.”[577] In public policy, in
means of political effect, and in personal character,—Phokion was the
direct antithesis of Demosthenes; whose warlike eloquence, unwarlike
disposition, paid speech-writing, and delicate habits of life, he
doubtless alike despised.
[574] Tacit. Dialog. de Clar. Orator. c. 2. “Aper, communi
eruditione imbutus, contemnebat potius literas quam nesciebat.”
[575] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 4, 14.
[576] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 5. ἡ τῶν ἐμῶν λόγων κοπὶς πάρεστιν.
[577] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 5. εἰπεῖν—ὅτι ῥήτωρ μὲν ἄριστος εἴη
Δημοσθένης, εἰπεῖν δὲ δεινότατος ὁ Φωκίων.
As Phokion had in his nature little of the professed orator, so
he had still less of the flatterer. He affected and sustained the
character of a blunt soldier, who speaks out his full mind without
suppression or ornament, careless whether it be acceptable to
hearers or not.[578] His estimate of his countrymen was thoroughly
and undisguisedly contemptuous. This is manifest in his whole
proceedings; and appears especially in the memorable remark ascribed
to him, on an occasion when something that he had said in the public
assembly met with peculiar applause. Turning round to a friend, he
asked, “Have I not, unconsciously, said something bad?” His manners,
moreover, were surly and repulsive, though his disposition is said
to have been kind. He had learnt, in the Academy, a sort of Spartan
self-suppression and rigor of life.[579] No one ever saw him either
laughing, or weeping, or bathing in the public baths.
[578] So Tacitus, after reporting the exact reply of the tribune
Subrias Flavius, when examined as an accomplice in the conspiracy
against Nero—“Ipsa retuli verba: quia non, ut Senecæ, vulgata
erant; nec minus nosci decebat sensus militaris viri incomptos
sed validos.”
[579] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 4, 5.
If, then, Phokion attained the unparalleled honor of being chosen
forty-five times general, we may be sure that there were other
means of reaching it besides the arts of oratory and demagogy. We
may indeed ask with surprise, how it was possible for him to attain
it, in the face of so many repulsive circumstances, by the mere
force of bravery and honesty; especially as he never performed any
supereminent service,[580] though on various occasions he conducted
himself with credit and ability. The answer to this question may be
found in the fact that Phokion, though not a flatterer of the people,
went decidedly along with the capital weakness of the people. While
despising their judgment, he manifested no greater foresight, as
to the public interests and security of Athens, than they did. The
Athenian people had doubtless many infirmities and committed many
errors; but the worst error of all, during the interval between
360-336 B. C., was their unconquerable repugnance to the efforts,
personal and pecuniary, required for prosecuting a hearty war against
Philip. Of this aversion to a strenuous foreign policy, Phokion made
himself the champion;[581] addressing, in his own vein, sarcastic
taunts against those who called for action against Philip, as if
they were mere brawlers and cowards, watching for opportunities to
enrich themselves at the public expense. Eubulus the orator was among
the leading statesmen who formed what may be called the peace-party
at Athens, and who continually resisted or discouraged energetic
warlike efforts, striving to keep out of sight the idea of Philip
as a dangerous enemy. Of this peace-party, there were doubtless
some who acted corruptly, in the direct pay of Philip. But many
others of them, without any taint of personal corruption, espoused
the same policy merely because they found it easier, for the time,
to administer the city under peace than under war—because war was
burdensome and disagreeable, to themselves as well as to their
fellow-citizens—and because they either did not, or would not, look
forward to the consequences of inaction. Now it was a great advantage
to this peace-party, who wanted a military leader as partner to their
civil and rhetorical leaders, to strengthen themselves by a colleague
like Phokion; a man not only of unsuspected probity, but peculiarly
disinterested in advising peace, since his importance would have
been exalted by war.[582] Moreover most of the eminent military
leaders had now come to love only the license of war, and to disdain
the details of the war-office at home; while Phokion,[583] and he
almost alone among them, was content to stay at Athens, and keep up
that combination of civil with military efficiency which had been,
formerly, habitual. Hence he was sustained, by the peace-party and by
the aversion to warlike effort prevalent among the public, in a sort
of perpetuity of the strategic functions, without any solicitation or
care for personal popularity on his own part.
[580] Cornelius Nepos (Phocion, c. 1) found in his authors no
account of the military exploits of Phokion but much about his
personal integrity.
[581] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 8. Οὕτω δὲ συντάξας ἑαυτὸν
ἐπολιτεύετο μὲν ἀεὶ πρὸς εἰρήνην καὶ ἡσυχίαν, etc.
[582] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16. See the first repartee there
ascribed to Phokion.
[583] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7.
The influence of Phokion as a public adviser, during the period
embraced in this volume, down to the battle of Chæroneia, was
eminently mischievous to Athens: all the more mischievous, partly
(like that of Nikias) from the respectability of his personal
qualities—partly because he espoused and sanctioned the most
dangerous infirmity of the Athenian mind. His biographers mislead our
judgment by pointing our attention chiefly to the last twenty years
of his long life, after the battle of Chæroneia. At that time, when
the victorious military force of Macedonia had been fully organized,
and that of Greece comparatively prostrated, it might be argued
plausibly (I do not say decisively, even then) that submission to
Macedonia had become a fatal necessity; and that attempts to resist
could only end by converting bad into worse. But the peace-policy
of Phokion—which might be called prudence after the accession of
Alexander—was ruinously imprudent as well as dishonorable during
the reign of Philip. The odds were all against Philip in his early
years; they shifted and became more and more in his favor, only
because his game was played well, and that of his opponents badly.
The superiority of force was at first so much on the side of Athens,
that if she had been willing to employ it, she might have made sure
of keeping Philip at least within the limits of Macedonia. All
depended upon her will; upon the question, whether her citizens were
prepared in their own minds to incur the expense and fatigue of a
vigorous foreign policy—whether they would handle their pikes, open
their purses, and forego the comforts of home, for the maintenance
of Grecian and Athenian liberty against a growing, but not as yet
irresistible destroyer. To such a sacrifice the Athenians could not
bring themselves to submit; and in consequence of that reluctance,
they were driven in the end to a much graver and more irreparable
sacrifice—the loss of liberty, dignity, and security. Now it was
precisely at such a moment, and when such a question was pending,
that the influence of the peace-loving Phokion was most ruinous.
His anxiety that the citizens should be buried at home in their own
sepulchres—his despair, mingled with contempt, of his countrymen
and their refined habits—his hatred of the orators who might profit
by an increased war-expenditure[584]—all contributed to make him
discourage public effort, and await passively the preponderance of
the Macedonian arms; thus playing the game of Philip, and siding,
though himself incorruptible, with the orators in Philip’s pay.
[584] See the replies of Phokion in Plutarch, Phokion, c. 23.
The love of peace, either in a community or in an individual, usually
commands sympathy without farther inquiry, though there are times of
growing danger from without, in which the adviser of peace is the
worst guide that can be followed. Since the Peloponnesian war, a
revolution had been silently going on in Greece, whereby the duties
of soldiership had passed to a great degree from citizen militia
into the hands of paid mercenaries. The resident citizens generally
had become averse to the burden of military service; while on the
other hand the miscellaneous aggregate of Greeks willing to carry
arms anywhere and looking merely for pay, had greatly augmented.
Very differently had the case once stood. The Athenian citizen of
432 B. C.—by concurrent testimony of the eulogist Perikles and of
the unfriendly Corinthians—was ever ready to brave the danger,
fatigue, and privation, of foreign expeditions, for the glory of
Athens. “He accounted it holidaywork to do duty in her service (it
is an enemy who speaks[585]); he wasted his body for her as though
it had been the body of another.” Embracing with passion the idea
of imperial Athens, he knew that she could only be upheld by the
energetic efforts of her individual citizens, and that the talk in
her public assemblies, though useful as a preliminary to action,
was mischievous if allowed as a substitute for action.[586] Such
was the Periklean Athenian of 431 B. C. But this energy had been
crushed in the disasters closing the Peloponnesian war, and had
never again revived. The Demosthenic Athenian of 360 B. C. had as it
were grown old. Pugnacity, Pan-hellenic championship, and the love
of enterprise, had died within him. He was a quiet, home-keeping,
refined citizen, attached to the democratic constitution, and
executing with cheerful pride his ordinary city-duties under it;
but immersed in industrial or professional pursuits, in domestic
comforts, in the impressive manifestations of the public religion,
in the atmosphere of discussion and thought, intellectual as well as
political. To renounce all this for foreign and continued military
service, he considered as a hardship not to be endured, except under
the pressure of danger near and immediate. Precautionary exigencies
against distant perils, however real, could not be brought home to
his feelings; even to pay others for serving in his place, was a duty
which he could scarcely be induced to perform.
[585] I have more than once referred to the memorable picture of
the Athenian character, in contrast with the Spartan, drawn by
the Corinthian envoy at Sparta in 432 B. C. (Thucyd. i. 70, 71).
Among the many attributes, indicative of exuberant energy and
activity, I select those which were most required, and most found
wanting, as the means of keeping back Philip.
1. Παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταὶ, καὶ παρὰ γνώμην κινδυνευταὶ, καὶ ἐν
τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες.
2. Ἄοκνοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς μελλητὰς καὶ ~ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους~
(in opposition to _you_, Spartans).
3. ~Τοῖς μὲν σώμασιν ἀλλοτριωτάτοις ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως χρῶνται~, τῇ
γνώμῃ δὲ οἰκειοτάτῃ ἐς τὸ πράσσειν τι ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς, etc.
4. ~Καὶ ταῦτα μετὰ πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων δι᾽ ὅλου τοῦ αἰῶνος
μοχθοῦσι~, καὶ ~ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλάχιστα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων~, διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ
κτᾶσθαι καὶ μήτε ~ἑορτὴν ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ τὰ δέοντα πρᾶξαι~,
ξυμφοράν τε οὐχ ἧσσον ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα ἢ ἀσχολίαν ἐπίπονον, etc.
To the same purpose Perikles expresses himself in his funeral
oration of the ensuing year; extolling the vigor and courage
of his countrymen, as alike forward and indefatigable—yet as
combined also with a love of public discussion, and a taste for
all the refinements of peaceful and intellectual life (Thucyd.
ii. 40, 41).
[586] Thucyd. ii. 40, 41, 43. τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἔργῳ
θεωμένους καὶ ἐραστὰς γιγνομένους αὐτῆς, καὶ ὅταν ὑμῖν μεγάλη
δόξῃ εἶναι, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τολμῶντες καὶ γιγνώσκοντες τὰ
δέοντα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυνόμενοι ἄνδρες αὐτὰ ἐκτήσαντο, etc.
Compare ii. 63—the last speech of Perikles.
Not merely in Athens, but also among the Peloponnesian allies of
Sparta, the resident citizens had contracted the like indisposition
to military service. In the year 431 B. C., these Peloponnesians
(here too we have the concurrent testimony of Perikles and
Archidamus[587]) had been forward for service with their persons, and
only backward when asked for money. In 383 B. C., Sparta found them
so reluctant to join her standard, especially for operations beyond
sea, that she was forced to admit into her confederacy the principle
of pecuniary commutation;[588] just as Athens had done (about 460-450
B. C.) with the unwarlike islanders enrolled in her confederacy of
Delos.[589]
[587] Thucyd. i. 80, 81, 141.
[588] Xenoph. Hellen. v. 2, 21. The allied cities furnished money
instead of men in the expedition of Mnasippus to Korkyra (Xenoph.
Hellen. vi. 2, 16).
[589] Thucyd. i. 99.
Amidst this increasing indisposition to citizen military service,
the floating, miscellaneous bands who made soldiership a livelihood
under any one who would pay them, increased in number from year to
year. In 402-401 B. C., when the Cyreian army (the Ten Thousand
Greeks) were levied, it had been found difficult to bring so many
together; large premiums were given to the chiefs or enlisting
agents; the recruits consisted, in great part, of settled men tempted
by lucrative promises away from their homes.[590] But active men
ready for paid foreign service were perpetually multiplying, from
poverty, exile, or love of enterprise[591]; they were put under
constant training and greatly improved, by Iphikrates and others,
as peltasts or light infantry to serve in conjunction with the
citizen force of hoplites. Jason of Pheræ brought together a greater
and better trained mercenary force than had ever been seen since
the Cyreians in their upward march[592]; the Phokians also in the
Sacred War, having command over the Delphian treasures, surrounded
themselves with a formidable array of mercenary soldiers. There arose
(as in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in modern Europe)
Condottieri like Charidemus and others—generals having mercenary
bands under their command, and hiring themselves out to any prince or
potentate who would employ and pay them. Of these armed rovers—poor,
brave, desperate, and held by no civic ties—Isokrates makes repeated
complaint, as one of the most serious misfortunes of Greece.[593]
Such wanderers, indeed, usually formed the natural emigrants in new
colonial enterprises. But it so happened that few Hellenic colonies
were formed during the interval between 400-350 B. C.; in fact, the
space open to Hellenic colonization was becoming more circumscribed
by the peace of Antalkidas—by the despotism of Dionysius—and by the
increase of Lucanians, Bruttians, and the inland powers generally.
Isokrates, while extolling the great service formerly rendered to the
Hellenic world by Athens, in setting on foot the Ionic emigration,
and thus providing new homes for so many unsettled Greeks—insists on
the absolute necessity of similar means of emigration in his own day.
He urges on Philip to put himself at the head of an Hellenic conquest
of Asia Minor, and thus to acquire territory which might furnish
settlement to the multitudes of homeless, roving, exiles, who lived
by the sword, and disturbed the peace of Greece.[594]
[590] Isokrates, Orat. v. (Philipp.) s. 112. ... ἐν ἐκείνοις δὲ
τοῖς χρόνοις οὐκ ἦν ξενικὸν οὐδὲν, ὥστ᾽ ἀναγκαζόμενοι ξενολογεῖν
ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, πλέον ἀνήλισκον εἰς τὰς διδομένας τοῖς συλλέγουσι
δωρεὰς, ἢ τὴν εἰς τοὺς στρατιώτας μισθοφοράν.
About the liberal rewards of Cyrus to the generals Klearchus,
Proxenus, and others, for getting together the army, and to the
soldiers themselves also, see Xenoph. Anabas. i. 1, 9; i. 3, 4;
iii. 1, 4; vi. 8, 48.
[591] See the mention of the mercenary Greeks in the service of
the satrapess Mania in Æolis—of the satraps, Tissaphernes and
Pharnabazus, and of the Spartan Agesilaus—Iphikrates and others,
Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 1, 13; iii. 3, 15; iv. 2, 5; iv. 3, 15; iv.
4, 14; iv. 8, 35; vii. 5, 10.
Compare Harpokration—Ξενικὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ—and Demosthenes, Philipp.
i. p. 46.
[592] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1, 5.
[593] Isokrates pours forth this complaint in many places: in
the fourth or Panegyrical Oration (B. C. 380); in the eighth or
Oratio de Pace (356 B. C.); in the fifth or Oratio ad Philippum
(346 B. C.). The latest of these discourses is delivered in the
strongest language. See Orat. Panegyr. s. 195 τοὺς δ᾽ ἐπὶ ξένης
μετὰ παιδῶν καὶ γυναικῶν ἀλᾶσθαι, πολλοὺς δὲ δι᾽ ἔνδειαν τῶν
καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἐπικουρεῖν (_i. e._ to become an ἐπικοῦρος, or paid
soldier in foreign service) ἀναγκαζομένους ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐχθρῶν τοῖς
φίλοις μαχομένους ἀποθνήσκειν. See also Orat. De Pace (viii.) s.
53, 56, 58; Orat. ad. Philipp. (v.) s. 112. οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει τὰ τῆς
Ἑλλάδος, ὥστε ῥᾷον εἶναι συστῆσαι στρατόπεδον μεῖζον καὶ κρεῖττον
ἐκ τῶν πλανωμένων ἢ τῶν πολιτευομένων, etc.... also s. 142,
149; Orat. de Permutat. (xv.) s. 122. ἐν τοῖς στρατοπέδοις τοῖς
πλανωμένοις κατατετριμμένος, etc. A melancholy picture of the
like evils is also presented in the ninth Epistle of Isokrates,
to Archidamus, s. 9, 12. Compare Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p.
665. s. 162.
For an example of a disappointed lover who seeks distraction by
taking foreign military service, see Theokritus, xiv. 58.
[594] Isokrates ad Philipp. (v.) s. 142-144. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις
κτίσαι πόλεις ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ, καὶ κατοικίσαι τοὺς νῦν μὲν
πλανωμένους δι᾽ ἔνδειαν τῶν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν καὶ λυμαινομένους οἷς ἂν
ἐντύχωσιν. Οὓς εἰ μὴ παύσομεν ἀθροιζομένους, βίον αὐτοῖς ἱκανὸν
πορίσαντες, λήσουσιν ἡμᾶς τοσοῦτοι γενόμενοι τὸ πλῆθος, ὥστε
μηδὲν ἧττον αὐτοὺς εἶναι φοβεροὺς τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἢ τοῖς βαρβάροις,
etc.
This decline of the citizen militia, and growing aversion to personal
service, or military exercises—together with the contemporaneous
increase of the professional soldiery unmoved by civic obligations—is
one of the capital facts of the Demosthenic age. Though not peculiar
to Athens, it strikes us more forcibly at Athens, where the spirit
of self-imposed individual effort had once been so high wrought—but
where also the charm and stimulus[595] of peaceful existence was
most diversified, and the activity of industrial pursuit most
continuous. It was a fatal severance of the active force of society
from political freedom and intelligence breaking up that many-sided
combination, of cultivated thought with vigorous deed, which formed
the Hellenic _idéal_—and throwing the defence of Greece upon armed
men looking up only to their general or their paymaster. But what
made it irreparably fatal, was that just at this moment the Grecian
world was thrown upon its defence against Macedonia led by a young
prince of indefatigable enterprise; who had imbibed, and was capable
even of improving, the best ideas of military organization[596]
started by Epaminondas and Iphikrates. Philip (as described by his
enemy Demosthenes) possessed all that forward and unconquerable love
of action which the Athenians had manifested in 431 B. C., as we know
from enemies as well as from friends; while the Macedonian population
also retained, amidst rudeness and poverty, that military aptitude
and readiness which had dwindled away within the walls of the Grecian
cities.
[595] Thucyd. ii. 41 (the funeral harangue of Perikles)—ξυνελών
τε λέγω τήν τε πόλιν πᾶσαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος παίδευσιν εἶναι, καὶ καθ᾽
ἕκαστον δοκεῖν ἄν μοι τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνδρα παρ᾽ ἡμῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστ᾽ ἂν
εἴδη καὶ μετὰ χαρίτων μάλιστ᾽ ἂν εὐτραπέλως τὸ σῶμα αὔταρκες
παρέχεσθαι.
[596] The remarkable organization of the Macedonian army, with
its systematic combination of different arms and sorts of
troops—was the work of Philip. Alexander found it ready made
to his hands, in the very first months of his reign. It must
doubtless have been gradually formed; year after year improved
by Philip; and we should be glad to be enabled to trace the
steps of his progress. But unfortunately we are left without any
information about the military measures of Philip, beyond bare
facts and results. Accordingly I am compelled to postpone what
is to be said about the Macedonian military organization until
the reign of Alexander, about whose operations we have valuable
details.
Though as yet neither disciplined nor formidable, they were an
excellent raw material for soldiers, in the hands of an organizing
genius like Philip. They were still (as their predecessors had
been in the time of the first Perdikkas,[597] when the king’s wife
baked cakes with her own hand on the hearth), mountain shepherds
ill-clothed and ill-housed—eating and drinking from wooden platters
and cups—destitute to a great degree, not merely of cities, but
of fixed residences.[598] The men of substance were armed with
breastplates and made good cavalry; but the infantry were a rabble
destitute of order,[599] armed with wicker shields and rusty swords,
and contending at disadvantage, though constantly kept on the alert,
to repel the inroads of their Illyrian or Thracian neighbors. Among
some Macedonian tribes, the man who had never slain an enemy was
marked by a degrading badge.[600] These were the men whom Philip on
becoming king found under his rule; not good soldiers, but excellent
recruits to be formed into soldiers. Poverty, endurance, and bodies
inured to toil, were the natural attributes, well appreciated by
ancient politicians, of a military population destined to make
conquests. Such had been the native Persians, at their first outburst
under Cyrus the Great; such were even the Greeks at the invasion of
Xerxes, when the Spartan King Demaratus reckoned poverty both as an
inmate of Greece, and as a guarantee of Grecian courage.[601]
[597] Herodot. viii. 137.
[598] This poor condition of the Macedonian population at the
accession of Philip, is set forth in the striking speech made
thirty-six years afterwards by Alexander the Great (in 323 B.
C., a few months before his death) to his soldiers, satiated
with conquest and plunder, but discontented with his increasing
insolence and Orientalism.
Arrian, Exp. Alex. vii. 9. Φίλιππος γὰρ παραλαβὼν ὑμᾶς πλανήτας
καὶ ἀπόρους, ἐν διφθέραις τοὺς πολλοὺς νέμοντας ἀνὰ τὰ ὄρη
πρόβατα κατὰ ὀλίγα, καὶ περὶ τούτων κακῶς μαχομένους Ἰλλυρίοις
καὶ Τριβαλλοῖς καὶ τοῖς ὁμόροις Θρᾳξὶ, χλαμύδας μὲν ὑμῖν ἀντὶ τῶν
διφθερῶν φορεῖν ἔδωκε, κατήγαγε δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὀρῶν ἐς τὰ πεδία, etc.
Other points are added in the version given by Quintus Curtius
of the same speech (x. 10)—“En tandem! Illyriorum paulo ante et
Persarum tributariis, Asia et tot gentium spolia fastidio sunt.
Modo sub Philippo seminudis, amicula ex purpura sordent: aurum et
argentum oculi ferre non possunt; lignea enim vasa desiderant, et
ex cratibus scuta et rubiginem gladiorum.”
[599] Thucydides (ii. 100) recognizes the goodness of the
Macedonian cavalry: so also Xenophon, in the Spartan expedition
against Olynthus (Hellen. v. 2, 40).
That the infantry were of little military efficiency, we see from
the judgment of Brasidas—Thucyd. iv. 26. compare also ii. 100.
See O. Müller’s short tract on the Macedonians, annexed to his
History of the Dorians, s. 33.
[600] Aristot. Polit. vii. 2, 6.
[601] Herodot. vii. 102. τῇ Ἑλλάδι πενίη μὲν αἰεί κοτε σύντροφός
ἐστι, etc.
About the Persians, Herodot. i. 71; Arrian, v. 4, 13.
Now it was against these rude Macedonians, to whom camp-life
presented chances of plunder without any sacrifice, that the
industrious and refined Athenian citizen had to go forth and fight,
renouncing his trade, family, and festivals; a task the more severe,
as the perpetual aggressions and systematized warfare of his new
enemies could only be countervailed by an equal continuity of effort
on his part. For such personal devotion, combined with the anxieties
of preventive vigilance, the Athenians of the Periklean age would
have been prepared, but those of the Demosthenic age were not; though
their whole freedom and security were in the end found to be at stake.
Without this brief sketch of the great military change in Greece
since the Peloponnesian war—the decline of the citizen force and the
increase of mercenaries—the reader would scarcely understand either
the proceedings of Athens in reference to Philip, or the career of
Demosthenes on which we are now about to enter.
Having by assiduous labor acquired for himself these high powers both
of speech and of composition, Demosthenes stood forward in 354 B. C.
to devote them to the service of the public. His first address to the
assembly is not less interesting, objectively, as a memorial of the
actual Hellenic political world in that year—than subjectively, as
an evidence of his own manner of appreciating its exigencies.[602]
At that moment, the predominant apprehension at Athens arose from
reports respecting the Great King, who was said to be contemplating
measures of hostility against Greece, and against Athens in
particular, in consequence of the aid recently lent by the Athenian
general Chares to the revolted Persian satrap Artabazus. By this
apprehension—which had already, in part, determined the Athenians
(a year before) to make peace with their revolted insular allies,
and close the Social War—the public mind still continued agitated. A
Persian armament of three hundred sail, with a large force of Grecian
mercenaries—and an invasion of Greece—was talked of as probable.[603]
It appears that Mausôlus, prince or satrap of Karia, who had been
the principal agent in inflaming the Social War, still prosecuted
hostilities against the islands even after the peace, announcing that
he acted in execution of the king’s designs; so that the Athenians
sent envoys to remonstrate with him.[604] The Persians seem also to
have been collecting inland forces, which were employed some years
afterwards in reconquering Egypt, but of which the destination was
not at this moment declared. Hence the alarm now prevalent at Athens.
It is material to note—as a mark in the tide of events—that few
persons as yet entertained apprehensions about Philip of Macedon,
though that prince was augmenting steadily his military force as well
as his conquests. Nay, Philip afterwards asserted that during this
alarm of Persian invasion, he was himself one of the parties invited
to assist in the defence of Greece.[605]
[602] The oration De Symmoriis is placed by Dionysius of
Halikarnassus in the archonship of Diotimus, 354-353 B. C.
(Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum. p. 724). And it is plainly composed
prior to the expedition sent by the Thebans under Pammenês to
assist the revolted Artabazus against the Great King; which
expedition is placed by Diodorus (xvi. 34) in the ensuing year
353-352 B. C. Whoever will examine the way in which Demosthenes
argues, in the Oration De Symmoriis (p. 187. s. 40-42), as to the
relations of the Thebans with Persia—will see that he cannot have
known anything about assistance given by the Thebans to Artabazus
against Persia.
[603] Diodor. xvi. 21.
[604] Demosthenes cont. Timokratem, s. 15; see also the second
Argument prefixed to that Oration.
[605] See Epistola Philipp. ap. Demosthen. p. 160. s. 6.
Though the Macedonian power had not yet become obviously formidable,
we trace in the present speech of Demosthenes that same Pan-hellenic
patriotism which afterwards rendered him so strenuous in blowing the
trumpet against Philip. The obligation incumbent upon all Greeks, but
upon Athens especially, on account of her traditions and her station,
to uphold Hellenic liberty against the foreigner at all cost, is
insisted on with an emphasis and dignity worthy of Perikles.[606]
But while Demosthenes thus impresses upon his countrymen noble
and Pan-hellenic purposes, he does not rest content with eloquent
declamation, or negative criticism on the past. His recommendations
as to means are positive and explicit; implying an attentive survey
and a sagacious appreciation of the surrounding circumstances. While
keeping before his countrymen a favorable view of their position,
he never promises them success except on condition of earnest and
persevering individual efforts, with arms and with money: and he
exhausts all his invention in the unpopular task of shaming them,
by direct reproach as well as by oblique insinuation, out of that
aversion to personal military service, which, for the misfortune of
Athens, had become a confirmed habit. Such positive and practical
character as to means, always contemplating the full exigencies of
a given situation—combined with the constant presentation of Athens
as the pledged champion of Grecian freedom, and with appeals to
Athenian foretime, not as a patrimony to rest upon, but as an example
to imitate—constitute the imperishable charm of these harangues of
Demosthenes, not less memorable than their excellence as rhetorical
compositions. In the latter merit, indeed, his rival Æschines is less
inferior to him than in the former.