At some time after this new harangue of Demosthenes—how long after

it, or how far in consequence of it, we cannot say—the Athenians

commissioned and sent a body of foreign mercenaries to the aid of

the Olynthians and Chalkidians. The outfit and transport of these

troops was in part defrayed by voluntary subscriptions from rich

Athenian citizens. But no Athenian citizen-soldiers were sent; nor

was any money assigned for the pay of the mercenaries. The expedition

appears to have been sent towards the autumn of 350 B. C., as far as

we can pretend to affirm anything respecting the obscure chronology

of this period.[715] It presently gained some victory over Philip

or Philip’s generals, and was enabled to transmit good news to

Athens, which excited much exultation there, and led the people to

fancy that they were in a fair way of taking revenge on Philip for

past miscarriages. According to some speakers, not only were the

Olynthians beyond all reach of danger, but Philip was in a fair

way of being punished and humbled. It is indeed possible that the

success may really have been something considerable, such as to check

Philip’s progress for the time. Though victorious on the whole, he

must have experienced partial and temporary reverses, otherwise he

would have concluded the war before the early spring of 347 B. C.

Whether this success coincided with that of the Athenian general

Chares over Philip’s general Adæus,[716] we cannot say.

[715] In my view, it is necessary to separate entirely the

proceedings alluded to in the Demosthenic Olynthiacs, from the

three expeditions to Olynthus mentioned by Philochorus during

the following year—349-348 B. C., the archonship of Kallimachus.

I see no reason to controvert the statement of Philochorus,

that there were three expeditions during that year, such as he

describes. But he must be mistaken (or Dionysius must have copied

him erroneously) in setting forth those three expeditions _as the

whole Olynthian war_, and the first of the three as being the

beginning of the war. The Olynthian war began in 350 B. C., and

the three Olynthiacs of Demosthenes refer, in my judgment, to the

first months of the war. But it lasted until the early spring of

347 B. C., so that the armaments mentioned by Philochorus may

have occurred during the last half of the war. I cannot but think

that Dionysius, being satisfied with finding _three_ expeditions

to Olynthus which might be attached as results to the _three_

orations of Demosthenes, was too hastily copied out the three

from Philochorus, and has assigned the date of 349-348 B. C. to

the three _orations_, simply because he found that date given to

the three _expeditions_ by Philochorus.

The revolt in Eubœa, the expedition of Phokion with the battle of

Tamynæ and the prolonged war in that island, began about January

or February 349 B. C., and continued throughout that year and the

next. Mr. Clinton even places these events a year earlier; in

which I do not concur, but which, if adopted, would throw back

the beginning of the Olynthian war one year farther still. It is

certain that there was one Athenian expedition at least sent to

Olynthus _before the Eubœan war_, (Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p.

566-578)—an expedition so considerable that voluntary donations

from the rich citizens were obtained towards the cost. Here is

good proof (better than Philochorus, if indeed it be inconsistent

with what he really said) that the Athenians not only contracted

the alliance of Olynthus, but actually assisted Olynthus, during

the year 350 B. C. Now the Olynthiacs of Demosthenes present to

my mind strong evidence of belonging to the earliest months of

the Olynthian war. I think it reasonable, therefore, to suppose

that the expedition of foreign mercenaries to Olynthus, which the

third Olynthiac implies as having been sent, is the same as that

for which the ἐπιδόσεις mentioned in the Meidiana were required.

See Böhnecke, Forschungen, p. 202; and K. F. Hermann, De Anno

Natali Demosthenis, p. 9.

[716] Theopompus ap. Athenæ;, xii. p. 532. This victory would

seem to belong more naturally (as Dr. Thirlwall remarks) to the

operations of Chares and Onomarchus against Philip in Thessaly,

in 353-352 B. C. But the point cannot be determined.

But Demosthenes had sagacity enough to perceive, and frankness to

proclaim, that it was a success noway decisive of the war generally;

worse than nothing, if it induced the Athenians to fancy that they

had carried their point.

To correct the delusive fancy, that enough had been done—to combat

that chronic malady under which the Athenians so readily found

encouragement and excuses for inaction—to revive in them the

conviction, that they had contracted a debt, yet unpaid, towards

their Olynthian allies and towards their own ultimate security—is the

scope of Demosthenes in his third Olynthiac harangue; third in the

printed order, and third also, according to my judgment, in order

of time; delivered towards the close of the year 350 B. C.[717]

Like Perikles, he was not less watchful to abate extravagant and

unseasonable illusions of triumph in his countrymen, than to raise

their spirits in moments of undue alarm and despondency.[718]

[717] Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 29. μέμνησθε, ὅτ᾽ ἀπηγγέλθη

Φίλιππος ὑμῖν ἐν Θρᾴκῃ τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ἔτος τουτὶ, Ἡραῖον

τεῖχος πολιορκῶν· τότε τοίνυν μὴν μὲν ἦν Μαιμακτηριὼν, etc. This

was the month Mæmakterion or November 352 B. C. Calculating

forward from that date, τρίτον ἔτος means _the next year but

one_; that is the Attic year Olymp. 107. 3, or the year between

Midsummer 350 and Midsummer 349 B. C. Dionysius of Halikarnassus

says (p. 726)—Καλλιμάχου τοῦ τρίτου μετὰ Θέσσαλον ἄρξαντος—though

there was only one archon between Thessalus and Kallimachus. When

Demosthenes says τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ἔτος—it is clear that both

cannot be accurate; we must choose one or the other; and τρίτον

ἔτος brings us to the year 350-349 B. C.

To show that the oration was probably spoken during the first

half of that year, or before February 349 B. C., another point of

evidence may be noticed.

At the time when the third Olynthiac was spoken, _no_ expedition

of Athenian _citizens_ had yet been sent to the help of Olynthus.

But we shall see, presently, that Athenian citizens _were_ sent

thither during the first half of 349 B. C.

Indeed, it would be singular, if the Olynthiacs had been spoken

_after_ the expedition to Eubœa, that Demosthenes should make no

allusion in any one of them to that expedition, an affair of so

much moment and interest, which kept Athens in serious agitation

during much of the year, and was followed by prolonged war in

that neighboring island. In the third Olynthiac, Demosthenes

alludes to taking arms against Corinth and Megara (p. 34). Would

he be likely to leave the far more important proceedings in

Eubœa unnoticed? Would he say nothing about the grave crisis in

which the decree of Apollodorus was proposed? This difficulty

disappears when we recognize the Olynthiacs as anterior to the

Euboic war.

[718] Thucyd. ii. 65. Ὅποτε γοῦν αἴσθοιτό τι αὐτοὺς παρὰ καιρὸν

ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας, λέγων κατέπλησσεν (Perikles) εἰς τὸ φοβεῖσθαι·

καὶ δεδιότας αὖ ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν.

Compare the Argument of the third Olynthiac by Libanius.

“The talk which I hear about punishing Philip (says Demosthenes, in

substance) is founded on a false basis. The real facts of the case

teach us a very different lesson.[719] They bid us look well to our

own security, that we be not ourselves the sufferers, and that we

preserve our allies. There _was_ indeed a time—and that too within

my remembrance not long ago—when we might have held our own and

punished Philip besides; but now, our first care must be to preserve

our own allies. After we have made this sure, then it will be time

to think of punishing others. The present juncture calls for anxious

deliberation. Do not again commit the same error as you committed

three years ago. When Philip was besieging Heræum in Thrace, you

passed an energetic decree to send an expedition against him:

presently came reports that he was sick, and that he was dead: this

good news made you fancy that the expedition was unnecessary, and you

let it drop. If you had executed promptly what you resolved, Philip

would have been put down _then_, and would have given you no further

trouble.[720]

[719] Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 28, 29. Τοὺς μὲν γὰρ λόγους περὶ

τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι Φίλιππον ὁρῶ γιγνομένους, τὰ δὲ πράγματα εἰς

τοῦτο προήκοντα, ὥστε ὅπως μὴ πεισόμεθα αὐτοὶ πρότερον κακῶς

σκέψασθαι δέον.

... τοῦθ᾽ ἱκανὸν προλαβεῖν ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν πρώτην, ὅπως τοὺς

συμμάχους σώσομεν.

[720] Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 30.

“Those matters indeed are past, and cannot be mended. But I advert

to them now, because the present war-crisis is very similar, and I

trust you will not make the like mistake again. If you do not send

aid to Olynthus with all your force and means, you will play Philip’s

game for him now, exactly as you did then. You have been long anxious

and working to get the Olynthians into war with Philip. This has

now happened: what choice remains, except to aid them heartily and

vigorously? You will be covered with shame, if you do not. But this

is not all. Your own security at home requires it of you also; for

there is nothing to hinder Philip, if he conquers Olynthus, from

invading Attica. The Phokians are exhausted in funds—and the Thebans

are your enemies.

“All this is superfluous, I shall be told. We have already resolved

unanimously to succor Olynthus, and we will succor it. We only

want you to tell us how. You will be surprised, perhaps, at my

answer. Appoint Nomothetæ at once.[721] Do not submit to them any

propositions for new laws, for you have laws enough already—but

only repeal such of the existing laws as are hurtful at the present

juncture—I mean, those which regard the Theôric fund (I speak out

thus plainly), and some which bear on the citizens in military

service. By the former, you hand over money, which ought to go

to soldiers on service, in Theôric distribution among those who

stay at home. By the latter, you let off without penalty those who

evade service, and discourage those who wish to do their duty. When

you have repealed these mischievous laws, and rendered it safe to

proclaim salutary truths, then expect some one to come forward with

a formal motion such as you all know to be required. But until you

do this, expect not that any one will make these indispensable

propositions on your behalf, with the certainty of ruin at your

hands. You will find no such man; especially as he would only incur

unjust punishment for himself, without any benefit to the city—while

his punishment would make it yet more formidable to speak out upon

that subject in future, than it is even now. Moreover, the same men

who proposed these laws should also take upon them to propose the

repeal; for it is not right that these men should continue to enjoy

a popularity which is working mischief to the whole city, while the

unpopularity of a reform beneficial to us all, falls on the head of

the reforming mover. But while you retain this prohibition, you can

neither tolerate that any one among you shall be powerful enough to

infringe a law with impunity—nor expect that any one will be fool

enough to run with his eyes open into punishment.”

[721] Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 31, 32.

I lament that my space confines me to this brief and meagre abstract

of one of the most splendid harangues ever delivered—the third

Olynthiac of Demosthenes. The partial advantage gained over Philip

being prodigiously over-rated, the Athenians seemed to fancy that

they had done enough, and were receding from their resolution to

assist Olynthus energetically. As on so many other occasions, so on

this—Demosthenes undertook to combat a prevalent sentiment which he

deemed unfounded and unseasonable. With what courage, wisdom, and

dexterity—so superior to the insulting sarcasms of Phokion—does he

execute this self-imposed duty, well knowing its unpopularity!

Whether any movement was made by the Athenians in consequence of

the third Olynthiac of Demosthenes, we cannot determine. We have no

ground for believing the affirmative; while we are certain that the

specific measure which he recommended—the sending of an armament of

citizens personally serving—was not at that time (before the end of

350 B. C.) carried into effect. At or before the commencement of

349 B. C., the foreign relations of Athens began to be disturbed by

another supervening embarrassment—the revolt of Eubœa.

After the successful expedition of 358 B. C., whereby the Athenians

had expelled the Thebans from Eubœa, that island remained for some

years in undisturbed connection with Athens. Chalkis, Eretria, and

Oreus, its three principal cities, sent each a member to the synod

of allies holding session at Athens, and paid their annual quota

(seemingly five talents each) to the confederate fund.[722] During

the third quarter of 352 B. C., Menestratus the despot or principal

citizen of Eretria is cited as a particularly devoted friend of

Athens.[723] But this state of things changed shortly after Philip

conquered Thessaly and made himself master of the Pagasæan Gulf (in

353 and the first half of 352 B. C.). His power was then established

immediately over against Oreus and the northern coast of Eubœa, with

which island his means of communication became easy and frequent.

Before the date of the first Philippic of Demosthenes (seemingly

towards the summer of 351 B. C.) Philip had opened correspondences

in Eubœa, and had despatched thither various letters, some of which

the orator reads in the course of that speech to the Athenian

assembly. The actual words of the letters are not given; but from the

criticism of the orator himself, we discern that they were highly

offensive to Athenian feelings; instigating the Eubœans probably

to sever themselves from Athens, with offers of Macedonian aid

towards that object.[724] Philip’s naval warfare also brought his

cruisers to Geræstus in Eubœa, where they captured several Athenian

corn-ships;[725] insulting even the opposite coast of Attica at

Marathon, so as to lower the reputation of Athens among her allies.

Accordingly, in each of the Eubœan cities, parties were soon formed

aiming at the acquisition of dominion through the support of Philip;

while for the same purpose detachments of mercenaries could also be

procured across the western Eubœan strait, out of the large numbers

now under arms in Phokis.

[722] Æschines adv. Ktesiphont. p. 67, 68.

[723] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 661. φέρ᾽, ἐὰν δὲ δὴ καὶ

Μενέστρατος ἡμᾶς ὁ Ἐρετριεὺς ἀξιοῖ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ αὑτῷ ψηφίσασθαι, ἢ

Φάϋλλος ὁ Φωκεὺς, etc.

[724] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 51.

[725] Demosthen. Philipp. i. p. 49.

About the beginning of 349 B. C.—while the war of Philip, unknown

to us in its details, against the Olynthians and Chalkidians, was

still going on, with more or less of help from mercenaries sent by

Athens—hostilities, probably raised by the intrigues of Philip, broke

out at Eretria in Eubœa. An Eretrian named Plutarch (we do not know

what had become of Menestratus), with a certain number of soldiers at

his disposal, but opposed by enemies yet more powerful, professed to

represent Athenian interests in his city, and sent to Athens to ask

for aid. Demosthenes, suspecting this man to be a traitor, dissuaded

compliance with the application.[726] But Plutarch had powerful

friends at Athens, seemingly among the party of Eubulus; one of whom,

Meidias, a violent personal enemy of Demosthenes, while advocating

the grant of aid, tried even to get up a charge against Demosthenes,

of having himself fomented these troubles in Eubœa against the

reputed philo-Athenian Plutarch.[727] The Athenian assembly

determined to despatch a force under Phokion; who accordingly crossed

into the island, somewhat before the time of the festival Anthesteria

(February) with a body of hoplites.[728] The cost of fitting out

triremes for this transport, was in part defrayed by voluntary

contributions from rich Athenians; several of whom, Nikêratus,

Euktêmon, Euthydemus, contributed each the outfit of one vessel.[729]

A certain proportion of the horsemen of the city were sent also; yet

the entire force was not very large, as it was supposed that the

partisans there to be found would make up the deficiency.

[726] Demosthenes, De Pace, p. 58.

[727] Demosthenes cont. Meidiam, p. 550. ... καὶ τῶν ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ

πραγμάτων, ἃ Πλούταρχος ὁ τούτου ξένος καὶ φίλος διεπράξατο, ὡς

ἐγὼ αἴτιός εἰμι κατεσκεύαζε, πρὸ τοῦ τὸ πρᾶγμα γενέσθαι φανερὸν

διὰ Πλουτάρχου γεγονός.

[728] Demosth. cont. Meidiam, p. 558; cont. Bœotum de Nomine, p.

999. The mention of the χόες in the latter passage, being the

second day of the festival called Anthesteria, identifies the

month.

[729] Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p. 566, 567.

This hope however turned out fallacious. After an apparently friendly

reception and a certain stay at or near Eretria, Phokion found

himself betrayed. Kallias, an ambitious leader of Chalkis, collected

as much Eubœan force as he could, declared openly against Athens,

and called in Macedonian aid (probably from Philip’s commanders in

the neighboring Pagasæan Gulf); while his brother Taurosthenes hired

a detachment of mercenaries out of Phokis.[730] The anti-Athenian

force thus became more formidable than Phokion could fairly cope

with; while the support yielded to him in the island was less

than he expected. Crossing the eminence named Kotylæum, he took a

position near the town and hippodrome of Tamynæ, on high ground

bordered by a ravine; Plutarch still professing friendship, and

encamping with his mercenaries along with him. Phokion’s position

was strong; yet the Athenians were outnumbered and beleaguered so

as to occasion great alarm.[731] Many of the slack and disorderly

soldiers deserted; a loss which Phokion affected to despise—though he

at the same time sent to Athens to make known his difficulties and

press for reinforcement. Meanwhile he kept on the defensive in his

camp, which the enemy marched up to attack. Disregarding his order,

and acting with a deliberate treason which was accounted at Athens

unparalleled—Plutarch advanced forward out of the camp to meet them;

but presently fled, drawing along with his flight the Athenian horse,

who had also advanced in some disorder. Phokion with the infantry was

now in the greatest danger. The enemy, attacking vigorously, were

plucking up the palisade, and on the point of forcing his camp. But

his measures were so well taken, and his hoplites behaved with so

much intrepidity and steadiness in this trying emergency, that he

repelled the assailants with loss, and gained a complete victory.

Thallus and Kineas distinguished themselves by his side; Kleophanes

also was conspicuous in partially rallying the broken horsemen; while

Æschines the orator, serving among the hoplites, was complimented

for his bravery, and sent to Athens to carry the first news of

the victory.[732] Phokion pursued his success, expelled Plutarch

from Eretria, and captured a strong fort called Zaretra, near the

narrowest part of the island. He released all his Greek captives,

fearing that the Athenians, incensed at the recent treachery, should

resolve upon treating them with extreme harshness.[733] Kallias seems

to have left the island and found shelter with Philip.[734]

[730] Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. p. 399. ... Ταυροσθένης, τοὺς

Φωκικοὺς ξένους διαβιβάσας, etc. There is no ground for inferring

from this passage (with Böhnecke, p. 20, and others), that the

Phokians themselves seconded Philip in organizing Eubœan parties

against Athens. The Phokians were then in alliance with Athens,

and would not be likely to concur in a step alike injurious and

offensive to her, without any good to themselves. But some of

the mercenaries on service in Phokis might easily be tempted to

change their service and cross to Eubœa, by the promise of a

handsome gratuity.

[731] Demosth. cont. Meidiam, p. 567. ἐπειδὴ δὲ πολιορκεῖσθαι

τοὺς ἐν Ταμύναις στρατιώτας ἐξηγγέλλετο, etc.

[732] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 300. c. 53; cont. Ktesiphont. p.

399. c. 32. Plutarch, Phokion, c. 13. Plutarch has no clear idea

of the different contests carried on in the island of Eubœa. He

passes on, without a note of transition, from this war in the

island (in 349-348 B. C.) to the subsequent war in 341 B. C.

Nothing indeed can be more obscure and difficult to disentangle

than the sequence of Eubœan transactions.

It is to be observed that Æschines lays the blame of the

treachery, whereby the Athenian army was entrapped and

endangered, on Kallias of Chalkis; while Demosthenes throws it on

Plutarch of Eretria. Probably both Plutarch and Kallias deserved

the stigma. But Demosthenes is on this occasion more worthy of

credit than Æschines, since the harangue against Meidias, in

which the assertion occurs, was delivered only a few months

after the battle of Tamynæ; while the allegation of Æschines is

contained in his harangue against Ktesiphon, which was not spoken

till many years afterwards.

[733] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 13.

[734] Æschines indeed says, that Kallias, having been forgiven by

Athens on this occasion, afterwards, gratuitously and from pure

hostility and ingratitude to Athens, went to Philip. But I think

this is probably an exaggeration. The orator is making a strong

point against Kallias, who afterwards became connected with

Demosthenes, and rendered considerable service to Athens in Eubœa.

The treason of Kallias and Taurosthenes is alluded to by

Deinarchus in his harangue against Demosthenes, s. 45.

The news brought by Æschines (before the Dionysiac festival) of

the victory of Tamynæ, relieved the Athenians from great anxiety.

On the former despatch from Phokion, the Senate had resolved to

send to Eubœa another armament, including the remaining half of

the cavalry, a reinforcement of hoplites, and a fresh squadron of

triremes. But the victory enabled them to dispense[735] with any

immediate reinforcement, and to celebrate the Dionysiac festival

with cheerfulness. The festival was on this year of more than usual

notoriety. Demosthenes, serving in it as chorêgus for his tribe

the Pandionis, was brutally insulted, in the theatre and amid the

full pomp of the ceremony, by his enemy the wealthy Meidias; who,

besides other outrages, struck him several times with his fist on

the head. The insult was the more poignant, because Meidias at this

time held the high office of Hipparch, or one of the commanders

of the horse. It was the practice at Athens to convene a public

assembly immediately after the Dionysiac festival, for the special

purpose of receiving notifications and hearing complaints about

matters which had occurred at the festival itself. At this special

assembly Demosthenes preferred a complaint against Meidias for the

unwarrantable outrage offered, and found warm sympathy among the

people, who passed a unanimous vote of censure. This procedure

(called Probolê), did not by itself carry any punishment, but served

as a sort of _præjudicium_, or finding of a true bill; enabling

Demosthenes to quote the public as a witness to the main fact of

insult, and encouraging him to pursue Meidias before the regular

tribunals; which he did a few months afterwards, but was induced to

accept from Meidias the self-imposed fine of thirty minæ before the

final passing of sentence by the Dikasts.[736]

[735] Demosthenes cont. Meidiam, p. 567.

[736] Æschines cont. Ktesiph. p. 61; Plutarch, Demosth. c. 12.

Westermann and many other critics (De Litibus quas Demosthenes

oravit ipse, p. 25-28) maintain that the discourse against

Meidias can never have been really spoken by Demosthenes to the

Dikastery, since if it had been spoken, he could not afterwards

have entered into the compromise. But it is surely possible,

that he may have delivered the discourse and obtained judgment

in his favor; and then afterwards—when the second vote of the

Dikasts was about to come on, for estimation of the penalty—may

have accepted the offer of the defendant to pay a moderate fine

(compare Demosth. cont. Neæram, p. 1348) in fear of exasperating

too far the powerful friends around Meidias. The action of

Demosthenes against Meidias was certainly an ἀγὼν τιμητός. About

προβολὴ, see Meier and Schömann, Der Attische Prozess, p. 271.

From the despatches of Phokion, the treason of Plutarch of Eretria

had become manifest; so that Demosthenes gained credit for his

previous remarks on the impolicy of granting the armament; while

the friends of Plutarch—Hegesilaus and others of the party of

Eubulus—incurred displeasure; and some, as it appears, were

afterwards tried.[737] But he was reproached by his enemies for

having been absent from the battle of Tamynæ; and a citizen named

Euktêmon, at the instigation of Meidias, threatened an indictment

against him for desertion of his post. Whether Demosthenes had

actually gone over to Eubœa as a hoplite in the army of Phokion, and

obtained leave of absence to come back for the Dionysia—or whether

he did not go at all—we are unable to say. In either case, his

duties as chorêgus for this year furnished a conclusive excuse; so

that Euktêmon, though he formally hung up before the statues of the

Eponymous Heroes public proclamation of his intended indictment,

never thought fit to take even the first step for bringing it to

actual trial, and incurred legal disgrace for such non-performance

of his engagement.[738] Nevertheless the opprobrious and undeserved

epithet of deserter was ever afterwards applied to Demosthenes by

Æschines and his other enemies; and Meidias even heaped the like

vituperation upon most of those who took part in that assembly[739]

wherein the Probolê or vote of censure against him had been passed.

Not long after the Dionysiac festival, however, it was found

necessary to send fresh troops, both horsemen and hoplites, to Eubœa;

probably to relieve either some or all of those already serving

there. Demosthenes on this occasion put on his armor and served

as a hoplite in the island. Meidias also went to Argura in Eubœa,

as commander of the horsemen: yet, when the horsemen were summoned

to join the Athenian army, he did not join along with them, but

remained as trierarch of a trireme the outfit of which he had himself

defrayed.[740] How long the army stayed in Eubœa, we do not know.

It appears that Demosthenes had returned to Athens by the time when

the annual Senate was chosen in the last month of the Attic year

(Skirrophorion—June); having probably by that time been relieved. He

was named (by the lot) among the Five Hundred Senators for the coming

Attic year (beginning Midsummer 349 B. C. = Olymp. 107, 4);[741] his

old enemy Meidias in vain impugning his qualification as he passed

through the Dokimasy or preliminary examination previous to entering

office.

[737] Demosthenes, De Pace, p. 58; De Fals. Leg. p. 434—with the

Scholion.

[738] Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p. 548. ... ἐφ᾽ ᾗ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος

(Euktemon) ἠτίμωκεν αὑτὸν οὐκ ἐπεξελθὼν, οὐδεμιᾶς ἔγωγ᾽ ἔτι

προσδέομαι δίκης, ἀλλ᾽ ἱκανὴν ἔχω.

Æschines says that Nikodemus entered an indictment against

Demosthenes for deserting his place in the ranks; but that he was

bought off by Demosthenes, and refrained from bringing it before

the Dikastery (Æsch. Fals. Leg. p. 292).

[739] Demosth. cont. Meid. p. 577.

[740] Demosth. cont. Meid. p. 558-567.

[741] Demosth. cont. Meid. p. 551.

What the Athenian army did farther in Eubœa, we cannot make

out. Phokion was recalled—we do not know when—and replaced by a

general named Molossus; who is said to have managed the war very

unsuccessfully, and even to have been made prisoner himself by the

enemy.[742] The hostile parties in the island, sided by Philip, were

not subdued, nor was it until the summer of 348 B. C. that they

applied for peace. Even then, it appears, none was concluded, so that

the Eubœans remained unfriendly to Athens until the peace with Philip

in 346 B. C.

[742] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 14; Pausanias, i. 36, 3.

But while the Athenians were thus tasked for the maintenance of

Eubœa, they found it necessary to undertake more effective measures

for the relief of Olynthus, and they thus had upon their hands at

the same time the burthen of two wars. We know that they had to

provide force for both Eubœa and Olynthus at once;[743] and that

the occasion which called for these simultaneous efforts was one

of stringent urgency. The Olynthian requisition and communications

made themselves so strongly felt, as to induce Athens to do, what

Demosthenes in his three Olynthiacs had vainly insisted on during

the preceding summer and autumn—to send thither a force of native

Athenians, in the first half of 349 B. C. Of the horsemen who had

gone from Athens to Eubœa, under Meidias, to serve under Phokion,

either all, or a part, crossed by sea from Eubœa to Olynthus, during

that half-year.[744] Meidias did not cross with them, but came back

as trierarch in his trireme to Athens. Now the Athenian horsemen were

not merely citizens, but citizens of wealth and consequence; moreover

the transport of them by sea was troublesome as well as costly.

The sending of such troops implies a strenuous effort and sense of

urgency on the part of Athens. We may farther conclude that a more

numerous body of hoplites were sent along with the horsemen at the

same time; for horsemen would hardly under any circumstances be sent

across sea alone; moreover Olynthus stood most in need of auxiliary

hoplites, since her native force consisted chiefly of horsemen and

peltasts.[745]

[743] Demosthen. cont. Neæram, p. 1346. ... συμβάντος τῇ

πόλει καιροῦ τοιούτου καὶ πολέμου, ἐν ᾧ ἦν ἢ κρατήσασιν ὑμῖν

μεγίστοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἶναι, καὶ ἀναμφισβητήτως τά τε ὑμέτερα

αὐτῶν κεκομίσθαι καὶ ~καταπεπολεμηκέναι Φίλιππον—ἢ ὑστερήσασι

τῇ βοηθείᾳ καὶ προεμένοις τοὺς συμμάχους~, δι᾽ ἀπορίαν χρημάτων

καταλυθέντος τοῦ στρατοπέδου, τούτους τ᾽ ἀπολέσαι καὶ τοῖς

ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν ἀπίστους εἶναι δοκεῖν, καὶ κινδυνεύειν περὶ

τῶν ὑπολοίπων, περί τε Λήμνου καὶ Ἴμβρου καὶ Σκύρου καὶ

Χεῤῥονήσου—καὶ ~μελλόντων στρατεύεσθαι ὑμῶν πανδημεὶ εἴς τε

Εὔβοιαν καὶ Ὄλυνθον~—ἔγραψε ψήφισμα ἐν τῇ βουλῇ Ἀπολλόδωρος

βουλεύων, etc.

This speech was delivered before the Dikastery by a person named

Theomnestus, in support of an indictment against Neæra—perhaps

six or eight years after 349 B. C. Whether Demosthenes was the

author of the speech or not, its value as evidence will not be

materially altered.

[744] Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p. 578. ... οὗτος τῶν μεθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ

στρατευσαμένων ἱππέων, ~ὅτε εἰς Ὄλυνθον διέβησαν, ἐλθὼν~ πρὸς

ὑμᾶς εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν κατηγόρει. Compare the same oration, p.

558—περὶ δὲ τῶν συστρατευσαμένων εἰς Ἄργουραν (in Eubœa) ἴστε

δήπου πάντες οἷα ἐδημηγόρησε παρ᾽ ὑμῖν, ~ὅτ᾽ ἧκεν ἐκ Χαλκίδος~,

κατηγορῶν καὶ φάσκων ὄνειδος ἐξελθεῖν τὴν στρατιὰν ταύτην τῇ

πόλει.

This transit of the Athenian horsemen to Olynthus, which took

place after the battle of Tamynæ, is a distinct occurrence from

the voluntary contributions at Athens towards an Olynthian

expedition (ἐπιδόσεις εἰς Ὄλυνθον—Demosth. cont. Meidiam, p.

566); which contributions took place before the battle of Tamynæ,

and before the expedition to Eubœa of which that battle made part.

These horsemen went from Eubœa to Olynthus _before Meidias

returned to Athens_. But we know that he returned to Athens

before the beginning of the new Attic or Olympic year (Olymp.

107, 4, 349-348 B. C.); that is, speaking approximatively, before

the 1st of July 349 B. C. For he was present at Athens and

accused Demosthenes in the senatorial Dokimasy, or preliminary

examination, which all senators underwent before they took their

seats with the beginning of the new year (Demosth. cont. Meid. p.

551).

It seems, therefore, clear that the Athenian expedition—certainly

horsemen, and probably hoplites also—went to Olynthus before July

1, 349 B. C. I alluded to this expedition of Athenian citizens

to Olynthus in a previous note—as connected with the date of the

third Olynthiac of Demosthenes.

[745] Xenoph. Hellen. v. 2, 41; v. 3, 3-6.

The evidence derived from the speech against Neæra being thus

corroborated by the still better evidence of the speech against

Meidias, we are made certain of the important fact, that the first

half of the year 349 B. C. was one in which Athens was driven to

great public exertions—even to armaments of native citizens—for

the support of Olynthus as well as for the maintenance of Eubœa.

What the Athenians achieved, indeed, or helped to achieve, by these

expeditions to Olynthus—or how long they stayed there—we have no

information. But we may reasonably presume—though Philip during this

year 349 B. C., probably conquered a certain number of the thirty-two

Chalkidic towns—that the allied forces, Olynthian, Chalkidic and

Athenian, contended against him with no inconsiderable effect, and

threw back his conquest of Chalkidikê into the following year. After

a summer’s campaign in that peninsula, the Athenian citizens would

probably come home. We learn that the Olynthians made prisoner a

Macedonian of rank named Derdas, with other Macedonians attached to

him.[746]

[746] Theopompus, Fragm. 155; ap. Athenæum, x. p. 436; Ælian, V.

H. ii. 41.

So extraordinary a military effort, however, made by the Athenians

in the first half of 349 B. C.—to recover Eubœa and to protect

Olynthus at once—naturally placed them in a state of financial

embarrassment. Of this, one proof is to be found in the fact, that

for some time there was not sufficient money to pay the Dikasteries,

which accordingly sat little; so that few causes were tried for some

time—for how long we do not know.[747]

[747] See Demosthenes adv. Bœotum De Nomine, p. 999. ... καὶ εἰ

μισθὸς ἐπορίσθη τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, εἰσῆγον ἂν δῆλον ὅτι. This

oration was spoken shortly after the battle of Tamynæ, p. 999.

To meet in part the pecuniary wants of the moment, a courageous

effort was made by the senator Apollodorus. He moved a decree in

the Senate, that it should be submitted to the vote of the public

assembly, whether the surplus of revenue, over and above the ordinary

and permanent peace establishment of the city, should be paid to

the Theôric Fund for the various religious festivals—or should be

devoted to the pay, outfit, and transport of soldiers for the actual

war. The Senate approved the motion of Apollodorus, and adopted a

(probouleuma) preliminary resolution authorizing him to submit it

to the public assembly. Under such authority, Apollodorus made the

motion in the assembly, where also he was fully successful. The

assembly (without a single dissentient voice, we are told) passed a

decree enjoining that the surplus of revenue should under the actual

pressure of war be devoted to the pay and other wants of soldiers.

Notwithstanding such unanimity, however, a citizen named Stephanus

impeached both the decree and its mover on the score of illegality,

under the Graphê Paranomon. Apollodorus was brought before the

Dikastery, and there found guilty; mainly (according to his friend

and relative the prosecutor of Neæra) through suborned witnesses

and false allegations foreign to the substance of the impeachment.

When the verdict of guilty had been pronounced, Stephanus as accuser

assessed the measure of punishment at the large fine of fifteen

talents, refusing to listen to any supplications from the friends of

Apollodorus, when they entreated him to name a lower sum. The Dikasts

however, more lenient than Stephanus, were satisfied to adopt the

measure of fine assessed by Apollodorus upon himself—one talent—which

he actually paid.[748]

[748] Demosthen. cont. Neær. p. 1346, 1347.

There can hardly be a stronger evidence both of the urgency and

poverty of the moment, than the fact, that both Senate and people

passed this decree of Apollodorus. That fact there is no room for

doubting. But the additional statement—that there was not a single

dissentient, and that every one, both at the time and afterwards,

always pronounced the motion to have been an excellent one[749]—is

probably an exaggeration. For it is not to be imagined that the

powerful party, who habitually resisted the diversion of money from

the Theôric Fund to war purposes, should have been wholly silent

or actually concurrent on this occasion, though they may have been

outvoted. The motion of Apollodorus was one which could not be made

without distinctly breaking the law, and rendering the mover liable

to those penal consequences which afterwards actually fell upon him.

Now, that even a majority, both of senate and assembly, should have

overleaped this illegality, is a proof sufficiently remarkable how

strongly the crisis pressed upon their minds.

[749] Demosthen. cont. Neær. p. 1346. ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν ἔτι, ἄν που

λόγος γέγνηται, ὁμολογεῖται παρὰ πάντων, ὡς τὰ βέλτιστα εἴπας

ἄδικα πάθοι.

The expedition of Athenian citizens, sent to Olynthus before

Midsummer 349 B. C., would probably return after a campaign of two

or three months, and after having rendered some service against

the Macedonian army. The warlike operations of Philip against

the Chalkidians and Olynthians were noway relaxed. He pressed

the Chalkidians more and more closely throughout all the ensuing

eighteen months (from Midsummer 349 B. C. to the early spring of

347 B. C.). During the year Olymp. 407, 4, if the citation from

Philochorus[750] is to be trusted, the Athenians despatched to

their aid three expeditions; one, at the request of the Olynthians,

who sent envoys to pray for it—consisting of two thousand peltasts

under Chares, in thirty ships partly manned by Athenian seamen. A

second under Charidemus, at the earnest entreaty of the suffering

Chalkidians; consisting of eighteen triremes, four thousand peltasts

and one hundred and fifty horsemen. Charidemus, in conjunction

with the Olynthians, marched over Bottiæa and the peninsula of

Pallênê, laying waste the country; whether he achieved any important

success, we do not know. Respecting both Chares and Charidemus,

the anecdotes descending to us are of insolence, extortion, and

amorous indulgences, rather than of military exploits.[751] It is

clear that neither the one nor the other achieved anything effectual

against Philip, whose arms and corruption made terrible progress

in Chalkidikê. So grievously did the strength of the Olynthians

fail, that they transmitted a last and most urgent appeal to Athens;

imploring the Athenians not to abandon them to ruin, but to send them

a force of citizens in addition to the mercenaries already there.

The Athenians complied, despatching thither seventeen triremes, two

thousand hoplites, and three hundred horsemen, all under the command

of Chares.

[750] Philochorus ap. Dionys. Hal. ad Amm. p. 734, 735.

Philochorus tells us that the Athenians _now_ contracted the

alliance with Olynthus; which certainly is not accurate. The

alliance had been contracted in the preceding year.

[751] Theopomp. Fragm. 183-238; Athenæus, xii. p. 532.

To make out anything of the successive steps of this important war

is impossible; but we discern that during this latter portion of

the Olynthian war, the efforts made by Athens were considerable.

Demosthenes (in a speech six years afterwards) affirms that the

Athenians had sent to the aid of Olynthus four thousand citizens,

ten thousand mercenaries, and fifty triremes.[752] He represents

the Chalkidic cities as having been betrayed successively to

Philip by corrupt and traitorous citizens. That the conquest was

achieved greatly by the aid of corruption, we cannot doubt; but

the orator’s language carries no accurate information. Mekyberna

and Torônê are said to have been among the towns betrayed without

resistance.[753] After Philip had captured the thirty-two Chalkidic

cities, he marched against Olynthus itself, with its confederate

neighbors,—the Thracian Methônê and Apollonia. In forcing the passage

of the river Sardon, he encountered such resistance that his troops

were at first repulsed; and he was himself obliged to seek safety

by swimming back across the river. He was moreover wounded in the

eye by an Olynthian archer, named Aster, and lost the sight of that

eye completely, notwithstanding the skill of his Greek surgeon,

Kritobulus.[754] On arriving within forty furlongs of Olynthus,

he sent to the inhabitants a peremptory summons, intimating that

either they must evacuate the city, or he must leave Macedonia.[755]

Rejecting this notice, they determined to defend their town to the

last. A considerable portion of the last Athenian citizen-armament

was still in the town to aid in the defence;[756] so that the

Olynthians might reasonably calculate that Athens would strain every

nerve to guard her own citizens against captivity. But their hopes

were disappointed. How long the siege lasted,—or whether there was

time for Athens to send farther reinforcement, we cannot say. The

Olynthians are said to have repulsed several assaults of Philip with

loss; but according to Demosthenes, the philippizing party, headed

by the venal Euthykrates and Lasthenes, brought about the banishment

of their chief opponent Apollonides, nullified all measures for

energetic defence, and treasonably surrendered the city. Two defeats

were sustained near its walls, and one of the generals of this

party, having five hundred cavalry under his command, betrayed them

designedly into the hands of the invader.[757] Olynthus, with all its

inhabitants and property, at length fell into the hands of Philip.

His mastery of the Chalkidic peninsula thus became complete towards

the end of winter, 348-347 B. C.

[752] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 426.

[753] Diodor. xvi. 52.

[754] Kallisthenes ap. Stobæum, t. vii. p. 92; Plutarch,

Parallel. c. 8; Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 117. Kritobulus could

not save the sight of the eye, but he is said to have prevented

any visible disfigurement. “Magna et Critobulo fama est, extracta

Philippi regis oculo sagitta et citra deformitatem oris curata,

orbitate luminis” (Pliny, H. N. vii. 37).

[755] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 113.

[756] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 30.

[757] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 125-128; Fals. Leg. p. 426;

Diodor. xvi. 53.

Miserable was the ruin which fell upon this flourishing peninsula.

The persons of the Olynthians,—men, women and children,—were sold

into slavery. The wealth of the city gave to Philip the means of

recompensing his soldiers for the toils of the war; the city itself

he is said to have destroyed, together with Apollonia, Methônê,

Stageira, etc.,—in all, thirty-two Chalkidic cities. Demosthenes,

speaking about five years afterwards, says that they were so

thoroughly and cruelly ruined as to leave their very sites scarcely

discernible.[758] Making every allowance for exaggeration, we may

fairly believe that they were dismantled, and bereft of all citizen

proprietors; that the buildings and visible marks of Hellenic

city-life were broken up or left to decay; that the remaining

houses, as well as the villages around, were tenanted by dependent

cultivators or slaves,—now working for the benefit of new Macedonian

proprietors, in great part nonresident, and probably of favored

Grecian grantees also.[759] Though various Greeks thus received

their recompense for services rendered to Philip, yet Demosthenes

affirms that Euthykrates and Lasthenes, the traitors who had sold

Olynthus, were not among the number; or at least that, not long

afterwards, they were dismissed with dishonor and contempt.[760]

[758] Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 117; Justin, viii. 3.

[759] Demosthenes, (Fals. Leg. p. 386) says, that both

Philokrates and Æschines received from Philip, not only presents

of timber and corn, but also grants of productive and valuable

farms in the Olynthian territory. He calls some Olynthian

witnesses to prove his assertion; but their testimony is not

given at length.

[760] Demosth. De Chersones. p. 99. The existence of these

Olynthian traitors, sold to Philip, proves that he could not

have needed the aid of the Stageirite philosopher Aristotle to

indicate to him who were the richest Olynthian citizens, at

the time when the prisoners were put up for sale as slaves.

The Athenian Demochares, about thirty years afterwards, in his

virulent speech against the philosophers, alleged that Aristotle

had rendered this disgraceful service to Philip (Aristokles

ap. Eusebium, Præp. Ev. p. 792) Wesseling (ad Diodor. xvi.

53) refutes the charge by saying that Aristotle was at that

time, along with Hermeias, at Atarneus; a refutation not very

conclusive, which I am glad to be able to strengthen.

In this Olynthian war,—ruinous to the Chalkidic Greeks, terrific to

all other Greeks, and doubling the power of Philip,—Athens too must

have incurred a serious amount of expense. We find it stated loosely,

that in her entire war against Philip,—from the time of his capture

of Amphipolis in 358-357 B. C. down to the peace of 346 B. C. or

shortly afterwards,—she had expended not less than fifteen hundred

talents.[761] On these computations no great stress is to be laid;

but we may well believe that her outlay was considerable. In spite

of all reluctance, she was obliged to do something; what she did was

both too little, and too intermittent,—done behind time so as to

produce no satisfactory result; but nevertheless, the aggregate cost,

in a series of years, was a large one. During the latter portion of

the Olynthian war, as far as we can judge, she really seems to have

made efforts, though she had done little in the beginning. We may

presume that the cost must have been defrayed, in part at least, by a

direct property-tax; for the condemnation of Apollodorus put an end

to the proposition of taking from the Theôric Fund.[762] Means may

also have been found of economizing from the other expenses of the

state.

[761] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 37. c. 24. Demosthenes (Olynth.

iii. p. 36) mentions the same amount of public money as having

been wasted εἰς οὐδὲν δέον—even in the early part of the

Olynthiac war and before the Eubœan war. As evidences of actual

amount, such statements are of no value.

[762] Ulpian, in his Commentary on the first Olynthiac, tells us

that after the fine imposed upon Apollodorus, Eubulus moved and

carried a law, enacting that any future motion to encroach on the

Theôric Fund should be punished with death.

The authority of Ulpian is not sufficient to accredit this

statement. The fine inflicted by the Dikastery upon Apollodorus

was lenient; we may therefore reasonably doubt whether the

popular sentiment would go along with the speaker in making the

like offence capital in future.

Though the appropriation of the Theôric Fund to other purposes

continued to be thus interdicted to any formal motion, yet, in the

way of suggestion and insinuation it was from time to time glanced

at by Demosthenes, and others;—and whenever money was wanted for

war, the question whether it should be taken from this source or

from direct property-tax, was indirectly revived. The appropriation

of the Theôric Fund, however, remained unchanged until the very eve

of the battle of Chæroneia. Just before that Dies Iræ, when Philip

was actually fortifying Elateia, the fund was made applicable to

war-purposes; the views of Demosthenes were realized,—twelve years

after he had begun to enforce them.

This question about the Theôric expenditure is rarely presented by

modern authors in the real way that it affected the Athenian mind. It

has been sometimes treated as a sort of almsgiving to the poor,—and

sometimes as an expenditure by the Athenians upon their pleasures.

Neither the one nor the other gives a full or correct view of the

case; each only brings out a part of the truth.

Doubtless, the Athenian democracy cared much for the pleasures of

the citizens. It provided for them the largest amount of refined and

imaginative pleasures ever tasted by any community known to history;

pleasures essentially social and multitudinous, attaching the

citizens to each other, rich and poor, by the strong tie of community

of enjoyment.

But pleasure, though an usual accessory, was not the primary idea or

predominant purpose of the Theôric expenditure. That expenditure was

essentially religious in its character, incurred only for various

festivals, and devoted exclusively to the honor of the gods. The

ancient religion, not simply at Athens, but throughout Greece and

the contemporary world,—very different in this respect from the

modern,—included within itself and its manifestations nearly the

whole range of social pleasures.[763] Now the Theôric Fund was

essentially the Church-Fund at Athens; that upon which were charged

all the expenses incurred by the state in the festivals and the

worship of the gods. The Diobely, or distribution of two oboli to

each present citizen, was one part of this expenditure; given in

order to ensure that every citizen should have the opportunity of

attending the festival, and doing honor to the god; never given

to any one who was out of Attica because, of course, he could not

attend;[764] but given to all alike within the country, rich or

poor.[765] It was essential to that universal communion which formed

a prominent feature of the festival, not less in regard to the

god, than in regard to the city;[766] but it was only one portion

of the total disbursements covered by the Theôric Fund. To this

general religious fund it was provided by law that the surplus of

ordinary revenue should be paid over, after all the cost of the

peace establishment had been defrayed. There was no appropriation

more thoroughly coming home to the common sentiment, more conducive

as a binding force to the unity of the city, or more productive of

satisfaction to each individual citizen.

[763] Among the many passages which illustrate this association

in the Greek mind, between the idea of a religious festival, and

that of enjoyment—we may take the expressions of Herodotus about

the great festival at Sparta called Hyakinthia. In the summer

of 479 B. C., the Spartans were tardy in bringing out their

military force for the defence of Attica—being engaged in that

festival. Οἱ γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὅρταζόν τε τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον, καί

σφι ἦν Ὑακίνθια· ~περὶ πλείστου δ᾽ ἦγον τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πορσύνειν~

(Herod. ix. 7). Presently the Athenian envoys come to Sparta

to complain of the delay in the following language: Ὑμεῖς μὲν,

ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, αὐτοῦ τῇδε μένοντες, ~Ὑακίνθιά τε ἄγετε καὶ

παίζετε~, καταπροδόντες τοὺς συμμάχους.

Here the expressions “to fulfil the requirements of the god,”

and “to amuse themselves,” are used in description of the same

festival, and almost as equivalents.

[764] Harpokration, v. Θεωρικά ... διένειμεν Εὔβουλος εἰς τὴν

θυσίαν, ἵνα πάντες ἑορτάζωσι, καὶ μηδεὶς τῶν πολιτῶν ἀπολίπηται

δἰ᾽ ἀσθένειαν τῶν ἰδίων.... Ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἐξῆν τοῖς ἀποδημοῦσι

θεωρικὸν λαμβάνειν, Ὑπερίδης δεδήλωκεν ἐν τῷ κατ᾽ Ἀρχεστρατίδου.

[765] See Demosth. adv. Leocharem, p. 1091, 1092; Philipp. iv. p.

141. Compare also Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Att. s. 69.

[766] See the directions of the old oracles quoted by Demosthenes

cont. Meidiam, p. 531. ἱστάναι ὡραίων Βρομίῳ χάριν ~ἄμμιγα

πάντας~, etc. στεφανηφορεῖν ἐλευθέρους καὶ δούλους, etc.

We neither know the amount of the Theôric Fund, nor of the

distributions connected with it. We cannot, therefore, say what

proportion it formed of the whole peace-expenditure,—itself

unknown also. But we cannot doubt that it was large. To be sparing

of expenditure in manifestations for the honor of the gods, was

accounted the reverse of virtue by Greeks generally; and the

Athenians especially, whose eyes were every day contemplating the

glories of their acropolis, would learn a different lesson,—moreover,

magnificent religious display was believed to conciliate the

protection and favor of the gods.[767] We may affirm, however,

upon the strongest presumptions, that this religious expenditure

did not absorb any funds required for the other branches of a

peace-establishment. Neither naval, nor military, nor administrative

exigencies, were starved in order to augment the Theôric surplus.

Eubulus was distinguished for his excellent keeping of the docks and

arsenals, and for his care in replacing the decayed triremes by new

ones. And after all the wants of a well-mounted peace-establishment

were satisfied, no Athenian had scruple in appropriating what

remained under the conspiring impulses of piety, pleasure and social

brotherhood.

[767] See the boast of Isokrates, Orat. iv. (Panegyr.) s. 40;

Plato, Alkibiad. ii. p. 148. Xenophon (Vectigal. vi. 1.), in

proposing some schemes for the improvement of the Athenian

revenue, sets forth as one of the advantages, that “the religious

festivals will be celebrated then with still greater magnificence

than they are now.”

It is true that the Athenians might have laid up that surplus

annually in the acropolis, to form an accumulating war-fund. Such

provision had been made half a century before, under the full energy

and imperial power of Athens, when she had a larger revenue, with

numerous tribute-paying allies, and when Perikles presided over

her councils. It might have been better if she had done something

of the same kind in the age after the Peloponnesian war. Perhaps,

if men like Perikles, or even like Demosthenes, had enjoyed marked

ascendency, she would have been advised and prevailed on to

continue such a precaution. But before we can measure the extent

of improvidence with which Athens is here fairly chargeable, we

ought to know what was the sum thus expended on the festivals.

What amount of money could have been stored up for the contingency

of war, even if all the festivals and all the distributions had

been suppressed? How far would it have been possible, in any other

case than that of obvious present necessity, to carry economy into

the festival-expenditure,—truly denominated by Demades the cement

of the political system,[768]—without impairing in the bosom of

each individual that sentiment of communion, religious, social

and patriotic, which made the Athenians a City, and not a simple

multiplication of units? These are points on which we ought to have

information, before we can fairly graduate our censure upon Athens

for not converting her Theôric Fund into an accumulated capital to

meet the contingency of war. We ought also to ask, as matter for

impartial comparison, how many governments, ancient or modern, have

ever thought it requisite to lay up during peace a stock of money

available for war?

[768] Plutarch, Quæstion. Platonic. p. 1011. ὡς ἔλεγε Δημάδης,

κόλλαν ὀνομάζων τὰ θεωρικὰ τοῦ πολιτεύματος (erroneously written

θεωρητικὰ).

The Athenian peace-establishment maintained more ships of war, larger

docks, and better-stored arsenals, than any city in Greece, besides

expending forty talents annually upon the Horsemen of the state, and

doubtless something farther (though we know not how much) upon the

other descriptions of military force. All this, let it be observed,

and the Theôric expenditure besides, was defrayed without direct

taxation, which was reserved for the extraordinary cost incident to a

state of war, and was held to be sufficient to meet it, without any

accumulated war-fund. When the war against Philip became serious,

the proprietary classes at Athens, those included in the schedule of

assessment, were called upon to defray the expense by a direct tax,

from which they had been quite free in time of peace. They tried to

evade this burthen by requiring that the festival-fund should be

appropriated instead;[769] thus menacing what was dearest to the

feelings of the majority of the citizens. The ground which they took

was the same in principle, as if the proprietors in France or Belgium

claimed to exempt themselves from direct taxation for the cost of a

war, by first taking either all or half of the annual sum voted out

of the budget for the maintenance of religion.[770] We may judge how

strong a feeling would be raised among the Athenian public generally,

by the proposal of impoverishing the festival expenditure in order

to save a property-tax. Doubtless, after the proprietary class had

borne a certain burthen of direct taxation, their complaints would

become legitimate. The cost of the festivals could not be kept up

undiminished, under severe and continued pressure of war. As a second

and subsidiary resource, it would become essential to apply the whole

or a part of the fund in alleviation of the burthens of the war. But

even if all had been so applied, the fund could not have been large

enough to dispense with the necessity of a property-tax besides.

[769] According to the author of the oration against Neæra,

the law did actually provide, that in time of war, the surplus

revenue should be devoted to warlike purposes—κελευόντων τῶν

νόμων, ὅταν πόλεμος ᾖ, τὰ περιόντα χρήματα τῆς διοικήσεως

στρατιωτικὰ εἶναι (p. 1346). But it seems to me that this must be

a misstatement, got up to suit the speaker’s case. If the law had

been so, Apollodorus would have committed no illegality in his

motion; moreover, all the fencing and manœuvring of Demosthenes

in his first and third Olynthiacs would have been to no purpose.

[770] The case here put, though analogous in principle, makes

against the Athenian proprietors, in degree; for, even in time

of peace, one half of the French revenue is raised by direct

taxation.

We see this conflict of interests,—between direct taxation on one

side, and the festival-fund on the other as a means of paying for

war,—running through the Demosthenic orations, and especially marked

in the fourth Philippic.[771] Unhappily, the conflict served as an

excuse to both parties for throwing the blame on each other, and

starving the war; as well as for giving effect to the repugnance,

shared by both rich and poor, against personal military service

abroad. Demosthenes sides with neither, tries to mediate between

them, and calls for patriotic sacrifice from both alike. Having

before him an active and living enemy, with the liberties of Greece

as well as of Athens at stake,—he urges every species of sacrifice

at once—personal service, direct-tax payments, abnegation of the

festivals. Sometimes the one demand stands most prominent, sometimes

the other; but oftenest of all, comes his appeal for personal

service. Under such military necessities, in fact the Theôric

expenditure became mischievous, not merely because it absorbed the

public money, but also because it chained the citizens to their home

and disinclined them to active service abroad. The great charm and

body of sentiment connected with the festival, essentially connected

as it was with presence in Attica, operated as a bane; at an exigency

when one-third or one-fourth of the citizens ought to have been

doing hard duty as soldiers on the coasts of Macedonia or Thrace,

against an enemy who never slept. Unfortunately for the Athenians,

they could not be convinced, by all the patriotic eloquence of

Demosthenes, that the festivals which fed their piety and brightened

their home-existence during peace, were unmaintainable during such a

war, and must be renounced for a time, if the liberty and security

of Athens were to be preserved. The same want of energy which made

them shrink from the hardship of personal service, also rendered

them indisposed to so great a sacrifice as that of their festivals;

nor indeed would it have availed them to spare all the cost of their

festivals, had their remissness as soldiers still continued. Nothing

less could have saved them, than simultaneous compliance with all

the three requisitions urged by Demosthenes in 350 B. C.; which

compliance ultimately came, but came too late, in 339-338 B. C.

[771] Demosth. Philipp. iv. p. 141-143; De Republicâ Ordinandâ,

p. 167. Whether these two orations were actually delivered in

their present form may perhaps be doubted. But I allude to them

with confidence as Demosthenic compositions; put together out of

Demosthenic fragments and thoughts.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER LXXXVIII

ON THE ORDER OF THE OLYNTHIAC ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.

Respecting the true chronological order of these three harangues,

dissentient opinions have been transmitted from ancient times, and

still continue among modern critics.

Dionysius of Halikarnassus cites the three speeches by their initial

words, but places them in a different chronological order from that

in which they stand edited. He gives the second as being first in the

series; the third, as second; and the first, as third.

It will be understood that I always speak of and describe these

speeches by the order in which they stand edited; though, as far as I

can judge, that order is not the true one.

Edited Order I. II. III.

Order of Dionysius II. III. I.

The greater number of modern critics defend the edited order; the

main arguments for which have been ably stated in a dissertation

published by Petrenz in 1833. Dindorf, in his edition of Demosthenes,

places this Dissertation in front of his notes to the Olynthiacs;

affirming that it is conclusive, and sets the question at rest.

Böhnecke also, (Forschungen, p. 151), treats the question as no

longer open to doubt.

On the other hand, Flathe (Geschichte Makedoniens, p. 183-187)

expresses himself with equal confidence in favor of the order stated

by Dionysius. A much higher authority, Dr. Thirlwall, agrees in

the same opinion; though with less confidence, and with a juster

appreciation of our inadequate means for settling the question. See

the Appendix iii. to the 5th volume of his History of Greece, p. 512.

Though I have not come to the same conclusion as Dr. Thirlwall, I

agree with him, that unqualified confidence, in any conclusion as

to the order of these harangues, is unsuitable and not warranted by

the amount of evidence. We have nothing to proceed upon except the

internal evidence of the speeches, taken in conjunction with the

contemporaneous history; of which we know little or nothing from

information in detail.

On the best judgment that I can form, I cannot adopt wholly either

the edited order or that of Dionysius, though agreeing in part with

both. I concur with Dionysius and Dr. Thirlwall in placing the second

Olynthiac _first_ of the three. I concur with the edited order in

placing the third _last_. I observe, in Dr. Thirlwall’s Appendix,

that this arrangement has been vindicated in a Dissertation by

Stueve. I have not seen this Dissertation; and my own conclusion

was deduced (even before I knew that it had ever been advocated

elsewhere) only from an attentive study of the speeches.

Edited Order I. II. III.

Order of Dionysius II. III. I.

Order of Stueve }

(which I think the most probable) } II. I. III.

To consider, first, the proper place of the _second_ Olynthiac (I

mean that which stands second in the edited order).

The most remarkable characteristic of this oration is, that scarcely

anything is said in it about Olynthus. It is, in fact, a Philippic

rather than an Olynthiac. This characteristic is not merely admitted,

but strongly put forward, by Petrenz, p. 11:—“Quid! quod ipsorum

Olynthiorum hac quidem in causâ tantum uno loco facta mentio est—ut

uno illo versiculo sublato, vix ex ipsâ oratione, quâ in causâ esset

habita, certis rationibus evinci posset.” How are we to explain the

absence of all reference to Olynthus? According to Petrenz, it is

because the orator had already, in his former harangue, said all

that could be necessary in respect to the wants of Olynthus, and

the necessity of upholding that city even for the safety of Athens;

he might now therefore calculate that his first discourse remained

impressed on his countrymen, and that all that was required was, to

combat the extraordinary fear of Philip which hindered them from

giving effect to a resolution already taken to assist the Olynthians.

In this hypothesis I am unable to acquiesce. It may appear natural

to a reader of Demosthenes, who passes from the first printed

discourse to the second without any intervening time to forget what

he has just read. But it will hardly fit the case of a real speaker

in busy Athens. Neither Demosthenes in the fluctuating Athenian

assembly—nor even any orator in the more fixed English Parliament or

American Congress—could be rash enough to calculate that a discourse

delivered some time before had remained engraven on the minds of

his audience. If Demosthenes had previously addressed the Athenians

with so strong a conviction of the distress of Olynthus, and of the

motives for Athens to assist Olynthus, as is embodied in the first

discourse—if his speech, however well received, was not acted upon,

so that in the course of a certain time he had to address them

again for the same purpose—I cannot believe that he would allude

to Olynthus only once by the by, and that he would merely dilate

upon the general chances and conditions of the war between Athens

and Philip. However well calculated the second Olynthiac may be “ad

concitandos exacerbandosque civium animos” (to use the words of

Petrenz), it is not peculiarly calculated to procure aid to Olynthus.

If the orator had failed to procure such aid by a discourse like the

first Olynthiac, he would never resort to a discourse like the second

Olynthiac to make good the deficiency; would repeat anew, and more

impressively than before, the danger of Olynthus, and the danger to

Athens herself if she suffered Olynthus to fall. This would be the

way to accomplish his object, and at the same time to combat the fear

of Philip in the minds of the Athenians.

According to my view of the subject, the omission (or mere single

passing notice) of Olynthus clearly shows that the wants of that

city, and the urgency of assisting it, were _not_ the main drift of

Demosthenes in the second Olynthiac. His main drift is, to encourage

and stimulate his countrymen in their general war against Philip;

taking in, thankfully, the new ally Olynthus, whom they have just

acquired—but taking her only as a valuable auxiliary (ἐν προσθήκης

μέρει), to coöperate with Athens against Philip as well as to receive

aid from Athens—not presenting her either as peculiarly needing

succor, or as likely, if allowed to perish, to expose the vitals of

Athens.

Now a speech of this character is what I cannot satisfactorily

explain, as following after the totally different spirit of the first

Olynthiac; but it is natural and explicable, if we suppose it to

precede the first Olynthiac. Olynthus does not approach Athens at

first in _formâ pauperis_, as if she were in danger and requiring

aid against an overwhelming enemy. She presents herself as an equal,

offering to coöperate against a common enemy, and tendering an

alliance which the Athenians had hitherto sought in vain. She will,

of course, want aid,—but she can give coöperation of equal value.

Demosthenes advises to assist her; this comes of course, when her

alliance is accepted:—but he dwells more forcibly upon the value of

what she will _give_ to the Athenians, in the way of coöperation

against Philip. Nay, it is remarkable that the territorial vicinity

of Olynthus to Philip is exhibited, not as a peril to _her_ which the

Athenians must assist her in averting, but as a godsend to enable

them the better to attack Philip in conjunction with her. Moreover

Olynthus is represented, not as apprehending any danger from Philip’s

arms, but as having recently discovered how dangerous it is to be

in alliance with him. Let us thank the gods (says Demosthenes at

the opening of the second Olynthiac)—τὸ τοὺς πολεμήσοντας Φιλίππῳ

γεγενῆσθαι καὶ ~χώραν ὅμορον~ καὶ δύναμίν τινα κεκτημένους, καὶ τὸ

μέγιστον ἁπάντων, τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ πολέμου γνώμην τοιαύτην ἔχοντας, ὥστε

τὰς πρὸς ἐκεῖνον διαλλαγὰς, πρῶτον μὲν ἀπίστους, εἶτα τῆς ἑαυτῶν

πατρίδος νομίζειν ἀνάστασιν εἶναι, δαιμονίᾳ τινι καὶ θείᾳ παντάπασιν

ἔοικεν εὐεργεσίᾳ (p. 18).

The general tenor of the second Olynthiac is in harmony with this

opening. Demosthenes looks forward to a vigorous aggressive war

carried on by Athens and Olynthus jointly against Philip, and he

enters at large into the general chances of such war, noticing the

vulnerable as well as odious points of Philip, and striving (as

Petrenz justly remarks) to “excite and exasperate the minds of the

citizens.”

Such is the first bright promise of the Olynthian alliance with

Athens. But Athens, as usual, makes no exertions; leaving the

Olynthians and Chalkidians to contend against Philip by themselves.

It is presently found that he gains advantages over them; bad news

comes from Thrace, and probably complaining envoys to announce

them. It is then that Demosthenes delivers his first Olynthiac, so

much more urgent in its tone respecting Olynthus. The main topic is

now—“Protect the Olynthians; save their confederate cities; think

what will happen if they are ruined; there is nothing to hinder

Philip, in that case, from marching into Attica.” The views of

Demosthenes have changed from the offensive to the defensive.

I cannot but think, therefore, that all the internal evidence of

the Olynthiacs indicates the second as prior in point of time both

to the first and to the third. Stueve (as cited by Dr. Thirlwall)

mentions another reason tending to the same conclusion. Nothing

is said in the second Olynthiac about meddling with the Theôric

Fund; whereas in the first, that subject is distinctly adverted

to—and in the third, forcibly and repeatedly pressed, though with

sufficient artifice to save the illegality. This is difficult to

explain, assuming the second to be posterior to the first; but noway

difficult, if we suppose the second to be the earliest of the three,

and to be delivered with the purpose which I have pointed out.

On the other hand, this manner of handling the Theôric Fund in the

third oration, as compared with the first, is one strong reason for

believing (as Petrenz justly contends) that the third is posterior to

the first—and not prior, as Dionysius places it.

As to the third Olynthiac, its drift and purpose appear to me

correctly stated in the argument prefixed by Libanius. It was

delivered after Athens had sent some succor to Olynthus; whereas,

both the first and the second were spoken before anything at all had

yet been done. I think there is good ground for following Libanius

(as Petrenz and others do) in his statement that the third oration

recognizes Athens as having done _something_, which the two first do

not; though Dr. Thirlwall (p. 509) agrees with Jacobs in doubting

such a distinction. The successes of mercenaries, reported at Athens

(p. 38), must surely have been successes of mercenaries commissioned

by her; and the triumphant hopes, noticed by Demosthenes as actually

prevalent, are most naturally explained by supposing such news

to have arrived. Demosthenes says no more than he can help about

the success actually gained, because he thinks it of no serious

importance. He wishes to set before the people, as a corrective to

the undue confidence prevalent, that all the real danger yet remained

to be dealt with.

Though Athens had done something, she had done little—sent no

citizens—provided no pay. This Demosthenes urges her to do without

delay, and dwells upon the Theôric Fund as one means of obtaining

money along with personal service. Dr. Thirlwall indeed argues that

the first Olynthiac is more urgent than the third, in setting forth

the crisis; from whence he infers that it is posterior in time.

His argument is partly founded upon a sentence near the beginning

of the first Olynthiac, wherein the safety of _Athens herself_ is

mentioned as involved—τῶν πραγμάτων ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἀντιληπτέον ἐστὶν,

εἴπερ ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας ~αὑτῶν~ φροντίζετε: upon which I may remark, that

the reading ~αὑτῶν~ is not universally admitted. Dindorf, in his

edition, reads ~αὐτῶν~, referring it to πραγμάτων: and stating in

his note that ~αὐτῶν~ is the reading of the vulgate, first changed

by Reiske into ~αὑτῶν~ on the authority of the Codex Bavaricus. But

even if we grant that the first Olynthiac depicts the crisis as more

dangerous and urgent than the third, we cannot infer that the first

is posterior to the third. The third was delivered immediately after

news received of success near Olynthus; Olynthian affairs did really

prosper for the moment and to a certain extent—though the amount of

prosperity was greatly exaggerated by the public. Demosthenes sets

himself to combat this exaggeration; he passes as lightly as he can

over the recent good news, but he cannot avoid allowing something for

them, and throwing the danger of Olynthus a little back into more

distant contingency. At the same time he states it in the strongest

manner, both section 2 and sections 9, 10.

Without being insensible, therefore, to the fallibility of all

opinions founded upon such imperfect evidence, I think that the true

chronological order of the Olynthiacs is that proposed by Stueve, II.

I. III. With Dionysius I agree so far as to put the second first; and

with the common order, in putting the third last.

CHAPTER LXXXIX.

FROM THE CAPTURE OF OLYNTHUS TO THE TERMINATION OF THE SACRED WAR BY

PHILIP.

It was during the early spring of 347 B. C., as far as we can make

out, that Olynthus, after having previously seen the thirty Chalkidic

cities conquered, underwent herself the like fate from the arms of

Philip. Exile and poverty became the lot of such Olynthians and

Chalkidians as could make their escape; while the greater number

of both sexes were sold into slavery. A few painful traces present

themselves of the diversities of suffering which befel these unhappy

victims. Atrestidas, an Arcadian who had probably served in the

Macedonian army, received from Philip a grant of thirty Olynthian

slaves, chiefly women and children, who were seen following him

in a string as he travelled homeward through the Grecian cities.

Many young Olynthian women were bought for the purpose of having

their persons turned to account by their new proprietors. Of these

purchasers, one, an Athenian citizen who had exposed his new purchase

at Athens, was tried and condemned for the proceeding by the

Dikastery.[772] Other anecdotes come before us, inaccurate probably

as to names and details,[773] yet illustrating the general hardships

brought upon this once free Chalkidic population. Meanwhile the

victor Philip was at the maximum of his glory. In commemoration of

his conquests, he celebrated a splendid festival to the Olympian

Zeus in Macedonia, with unbounded hospitality, and prizes of every

sort, for matches and exhibitions, both gymnastic and poetical. His

donations were munificent, as well to the Grecian and Macedonian

officers who had served him, as to the eminent poets or actors who

pleased his taste. Satyrus the comic actor, refusing all presents for

himself, asked and obtained from him the release of two young women

taken in Olynthus, daughters of his friend the Pydnæan Apollophanes,

who had been one of the persons concerned in the death of Philip’s

elder brother Alexander. Satyrus announced his intention not only

of ensuring freedom to these young women, but likewise of providing

portions for them and giving them out in marriage.[774] Philip also

found at Olynthus his two exile half-brothers, who had served as

pretexts for the war—and put both of them to death.[775]

[772] Deinarchus cont. Demosth. p. 93; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p.

439, 440. Demosthenes asserts also that Olynthian women were

given, as a present, by Philip to Philokrates (p. 386-440). The

outrage which he imputes (p. 401) to Æschines and Phrynon in

Macedonia, against the Olynthian woman—is not to be received as

a fact, since it is indignantly denied by Æschines (Fals. Leg.

init. and p. 48). Yet it is probably but too faithful a picture

of real deeds, committed by others, if not by Æschines.

[773] The story of the old man of Olynthus (Seneca, Controv. v.

10) bought by Parrhasius the painter and tortured in order to

form a subject for a painting of the suffering Prometheus—is more

than doubtful: since Parrhasius, already in high repute as a

painter before 400 B. C. (see Xenoph. Mem. iii. 10), can hardly

have been still flourishing in 347 B. C. It discloses, however,

at least, one of the many forms of slave-suffering occasionally

realized.

[774] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 384-401; Diodor. xvi. 55.

[775] Justin, viii. 3.

It has already been stated that Athens had sent to Olynthus more than

one considerable reinforcement, especially during the last year of

the war. Though we are ignorant what these expeditions achieved, or

even how much was their exact force, we find reason to suspect that

they were employed by Chares and other generals to no good purpose.

The opponents of Chares accused him, as well as Deiares and other

mercenary chiefs, of having wasted the naval and military strength of

the city in idle enterprises or rapacious extortions upon the traders

of the Ægean. They summed up 1500 talents and 150 triremes thus lost

to Athens, besides wide-spread odium incurred among the islanders by

the unjust contributions levied upon them to enrich the general.[776]

In addition to this disgraceful ill-success, came now the fearful

ruin in Olynthus and Chalkidikê, and the great aggrandizement

of their enemy Philip. The loss of Olynthus, with the miserable

captivity of its population, would have been sufficient of themselves

to excite powerful sentiment among the Athenians. But there was a

farther circumstance which came yet more home to their feelings.

Many of their own citizens were serving in Olynthus as an auxiliary

garrison, and had now become captives along with the rest.[777] No

such calamity as this had befallen Athens for a century past, since

the defeat of Tolmides at Koroneia in Bœotia. The whole Athenian

people, and especially the relations of the captives, were full

of agitation and anxiety, increased by alarming news from other

quarters. The conquest threatened the security of all the Athenian

possessions in Lemnos, Imbros, and the Chersonese. This last

peninsula, especially, was altogether unprotected against Philip,

who was even reported to be on his march thither; insomuch that the

Athenian settlers within it began to forsake their properties and

transfer their families to Athens. Amidst the grief and apprehension

which disturbed the Athenian mind, many special assemblies were held

to discuss suitable remedies. What was done, we are not exactly

informed. But it seems that no one knew where the general Chares,

with his armament, was; so that it became necessary even for his

friends in the assembly to echo the strong expressions of displeasure

among the people, and to send a light vessel immediately in search of

him.[778]

[776] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 37. c. 24.

[777] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 30.

[778] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 37.

The gravity of the crisis forced even Eubulus and others among the

statesmen hitherto languid in the war, to hold a more energetic

language than before against Philip. Denouncing him now as the common

enemy of Greece,[779] they proposed missions into Peloponnesus and

elsewhere for the purpose of animating the Grecian states into

confederacy against him. Æschines assisted strenuously in procuring

the adoption of this proposition, and was himself named as one of the

envoys into Peloponnesus.[780]

[779] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 434. καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ δήμῳ κατηρῶ (you,

Eubulus) Φιλίππῳ, καὶ κατὰ τῶν παίδων ὤμνυες ἦ μὴν ἀπολωλέναι

Φίλιππον ἂν βούλεσθαι, etc.

[780] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 438, 439.

This able orator, immortalized as the rival of Demosthenes, has

come before us hitherto only as a soldier in various Athenian

expeditions—to Phlius in Peloponnesus (368)—to the battle of

Mantineia (362)—and to Eubœa under Phokion (349 B. C.); in which

last he had earned the favorable notice of the general, and had been

sent to Athens with the news of the victory at Tamynæ. Æschines was

about six years older than Demosthenes, but born in a much humbler

and poorer station. His father Atromêtus taught to boys the elements

of letters; his mother Glaukothea made a living by presiding over

certain religious assemblies and rites of initiation, intended

chiefly for poor communicants; the boy Æschines assisting both one

and the other in a mental capacity. Such at least is the statement

which comes to us, enriched with various degrading details, on the

doubtful authority of his rival Demosthenes;[781] who also affirms,

what we may accept as generally true, that Æschines had passed his

early manhood partly as an actor, partly as a scribe or reader to

the official boards. For both functions he possessed some natural

advantages—an athletic frame, a powerful voice, a ready flow of

unpremeditated speech. After some years passed as scribe, in which

he made himself useful to Eubulus and others, he was chosen public

scribe to the assembly—acquired familiarity with the administrative

and parliamentary business of the city—and thus elevated himself by

degrees to influence as a speaker. In rhetorical power, he seems to

have been surpassed only by Demosthenes.[782]

[781] Demosthenes affirms this at two distinct times—Fals. Leg.

p. 415-431; De Coronâ, p. 313.

Stechow (Vita Æschinis, p. 1-10) brings together the little which

can be made out respecting Æschines.

[782] Dionys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Dicend. Demosth. p. 1063; Cicero,

Orator, c. 9, 29.

As envoy of Athens despatched under the motion of Eubulus, Æschines

proceeded into Peloponnesus in the spring of 347; others being

sent at the same time to other Grecian cities. Among other places,

he visited Megalopolis, where he was heard before the Arcadian

collective assembly called the Ten Thousand. He addressed them

in a strain of animated exhortation, adjuring them to combine

with Athens for the defence of the liberties of Greece against

Philip, and inveighing strenuously against those traitors who, in

Arcadia as well as in other parts of Greece, sold themselves to

the aggressor and paralyzed all resistance. He encountered however

much opposition from a speaker named Hieronymus, who espoused the

interest of Philip in the assembly: and though he professed to

bring back some flattering hopes, it is certain that neither in

Arcadia, nor elsewhere in Peloponnesus, was his influence of any real

efficacy.[783] The strongest feeling among the Arcadians was fear

and dislike of Sparta, which rendered them in the main indifferent,

if not favorable, to the Macedonian successes. In returning from

Arcadia to Athens, Æschines met the Arcadian Atrestidas, with the

unhappy troop of Olynthian slaves following; a sight which so deeply

affected the Athenian orator, that he dwelt upon it afterwards in his

speech before the assembly, with indignant sympathy; deploring the

sad effects of Grecian dissension, and the ruin produced by Philip’s

combined employment of arms and corruption.

[783] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 344-438; Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 38.

The conduct of Æschines at this juncture is much the same, as

described by his rival, and as admitted by himself. It was, in

truth, among the most honorable epochs of his life.

Æschines returned probably about the middle of the summer of 347 B.

C. Other envoys, sent to more distant cities, remained out longer;

some indeed even until the ensuing winter. Though it appears that

some envoys from other cities were induced in return to visit Athens,

yet no sincere or hearty coöperation against Philip could be obtained

in any part of Greece. While Philip, in the fulness of triumph,

was celebrating his magnificent Olympic festival in Macedonia, the

Athenians were disheartened by finding that they could expect little

support from independent Greeks, and were left to act only with

their own narrow synod of allies. Hence Eubulus and Æschines became

earnest partisans of peace, and Demosthenes also seems to have been

driven by the general despondency into a willingness to negotiate.

The two orators, though they afterwards became bitter rivals, were

at this juncture not very discordant in sentiment. On the other

hand, the philippizing speakers at Athens held a bolder tone than

ever. As Philip found his ports greatly blocked up by the Athenian

cruisers, he was likely to profit by his existing ascendency for the

purpose of strengthening his naval equipments. Now there was no place

so abundantly supplied as Athens, with marine stores and muniments

for armed ships. Probably there were agents or speculators taking

measures to supply Philip with these articles, and it was against

them that a decree of the assembly was now directed, adopted on the

motion of a senator named Timarchus—to punish with death all who

should export from Athens to Philip either arms or stores for ships

of war.[784] This severe decree, however, was passed at the same

time that the disposition towards peace, if peace were attainable,

was on the increase at Athens.

[784] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 433. This decree must have been

proposed by Timarchus either towards the close of Olymp. 108,

1—or towards the beginning of the following year, Olymp. 108, 2;

that is, not long before, or not long after, Midsummer 347 B.

C. But which of these two dates is to be preferred, is matter

of controversy. Franke (Prolegom. ad Æschin. cont. Timarchum,

p. xxxviii.—xli.) thinks that Timarchus was senator in Olymp.

108, 1—and proposed the decree then; he supposes the oration of

Æschines to have been delivered in the beginning of Olymp. 108,

3—and that the expression (p. 11) announcing Timarchus as having

been senator “the year before” (πέρυσιν), is to be construed

loosely as signifying “the year but one before.”

Mr. Clinton, Boeckh, and Westermann, suppose the oration of

Æschines against Timarchus to have been delivered in Olymp.

108, 4—not in Olymp. 108, 3. On that supposition, if we take

the word πέρυσιν in its usual sense, Timarchus was senator in

108, 3. Now it is certain that he did not propose the decree

forbidding the export of naval stores to Philip, at a date so

late as 108, 3; because the peace with Philip was concluded

in Elaphebolion Olymp. 108, 2. (March, 346 B. C.) But the

supposition might be admissible, that Timarchus was senator in

two different years,—both in Olymp. 108, 1 and in Olymp. 108, 3

(not in two consecutive years). In that case, the senatorial year

of Timarchus, to which Æschines alludes (cont. Timarch. p. 11),

would be Olymp. 108, 3, while the other senatorial year, in which

Timarchus moved the decree prohibiting export, would be Olymp.

108, 1.

Nevertheless, I agree with the views of Böhnecke (Forschungen,

p. 294) who thinks that the oration was delivered Olymp. 108,

3—and that Timarchus had been senator and had proposed the

decree prohibiting export of stores to Philip, in the year

preceding,—that is, Olymp. 108, 2; at the beginning of the

year,—Midsummer 347 B. C.

Some months before the capture of Olynthus, ideas of peace had

already been started, partly through the indirect overtures of Philip

himself. During the summer of 348 B. C., the Eubœans had tried to

negotiate an accommodation with Athens; the contest in Eubœa, though

we know no particulars of it, having never wholly ceased for the

last year and a half. Nor does it appear that any peace was even

now concluded; for Eubœa is spoken of as under the dependence of

Philip during the ensuing year.[785] The Eubœan envoys, however,

intimated that Philip had desired them to communicate from him a

wish to finish the war and conclude peace with Athens.[786] Though

Philip had at this time conquered the larger portion of Chalkidikê,

and was proceeding successfully against the remainder, it was still

his interest to detach Athens from the war, if he could. Her manner

of carrying on war was indeed faint and slack; yet she did him much

harm at sea, and she was the only city competent to organize an

extensive Grecian confederacy against him; which, though it had not

yet been brought about, was at least a possible contingency under her

presidency.

[785] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 348-445.

[786] Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 29.

An Athenian of influence named Phrynon had been captured by Philip’s

cruisers, during the truce of the Olympic festival in 348 B. C.:

after a certain detention, he procured from home the required ransom

and obtained his release. On returning to Athens, he had sufficient

credit to prevail on the public assembly to send another citizen

along with him, as public envoy from the city to Philip; in order to

aid him in getting back his ransom, which he alleged to have been

wrongfully demanded from one captured during the holy truce. Though

this seems a strange proceeding during mid-war,[787] yet the Athenian

people took up the case with sympathy; Ktesiphon was named envoy, and

went with Phrynon to Philip, whom they must have found engaged in the

war against Olynthus. Being received in the most courteous manner,

they not only obtained restitution of the ransom, but were completely

won over by Philip. With his usual good policy, he had seized the

opportunity of gaining (we may properly say, of bribing, since

the restoration of ransom was substantially a bribe) two powerful

Athenian citizens, whom he now sent back to Athens as his pronounced

partisans.

[787] There is more than one singularity in the narrative given

by Æschines about Phrynon. The complaint of Phrynon implies an

assumption, that the Olympic truce suspended the operations of

war everywhere throughout Greece between belligerent Greeks. But

such was not the maxim recognized or acted on; so far as we know

the operations of warfare. Vœmel (Proleg. ad Demosth. De Pace, p.

246) feeling this difficulty, understands the Olympic truce, here

mentioned, to refer to the Olympic festival celebrated by Philip

himself in Macedonia, in the spring or summer of 347 B. C. This

would remove the difficulty about the effect of the truce; for

Philip of course would respect his own proclaimed truce. But it

is liable to another objection: that Æschines plainly indicates

the capture of Phrynon to have been _anterior_ to the fall of

Olynthus. Besides, Æschines would hardly use the words ἐν ταῖς

Ὀλυμπικαῖς σπονδαῖς, without any special addition, to signify the

Macedonian games.

Phrynon and Ktesiphon, on their return, expatiated warmly on the

generosity of Philip, and reported much about his flattering

expressions towards Athens, and his reluctance to continue the war

against her. The public assembly being favorably disposed, a citizen

named Philokrates, who now comes before us for the first time,

proposed a decree, granting to Philip leave to send a herald and

envoys, if he chose, to treat for peace; which was what Philip was

anxious to do, according to the allegation of Ktesiphon. The decree

was passed unanimously in the assembly, but the mover Philokrates

was impeached some time afterwards before the Dikastery, as for an

illegal proposition, by a citizen named Lykinus. On the cause coming

to trial, the Dikastery pronounced an acquittal so triumphant,

that Lykinus did not even obtain the fifth part of the suffrages.

Philokrates being so sick as to be unable to do justice to his own

case, Demosthenes stood forward as his supporter, and made a long

speech in his favor.[788]

[788] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 30. c. 7; cont. Ktesiph. p. 63.

Our knowledge of these events is derived almost wholly from one,

or other, or both, of the two rival orators, in their speeches

delivered four or five years afterwards, on the trial De Falsâ

Legatione. Demosthenes seeks to prove that before the embassy

to Macedonia, in which he and Æschines were jointly concerned,

Æschines was eager for continued war against Philip, and only

became the partisan of Philip during and after the embassy.

Æschines does not deny that he made efforts at that juncture to

get up more effective war against Philip; nor is the fact at

all dishonorable to him. On the other hand, he seeks to prove

against Demosthenes, that he (Demosthenes) was at that time both

a partisan of peace with Philip, and a friend of Philokrates to

whom he afterwards became so bitterly opposed. For this purpose

Æschines adverts to the motion of Philokrates about permitting

Philip to send envoys to Athens—and the speech of Demosthenes in

the Dikastery in favor of Philokrates.

It would prove nothing discreditable to Demosthenes if both these

allegations were held to be correct. The motion of Philokrates

was altogether indefinite, pledging Athens to nothing; and

Demosthenes might well think it unreasonable to impeach a

statesman for such a motion.

The motion of Philokrates determined nothing positive, and only made

an opening; of which, however, it did not suit Philip’s purpose

to avail himself. But we see that ideas of peace had been thrown

out by some persons at Athens, even during the last months of the

Olynthian war, and while a body of Athenian citizens were actually

assisting Olynthus against the besieging force of Philip. Presently

arrived the terrible news of the fall of Olynthus, and of the

captivity of the Athenian citizens in garrison there. While this

great alarm (as has been already stated) gave birth to new missions

for anti-Macedonian alliances, it enlisted on the side of peace

all the friends of those captives whose lives were now in Philip’s

hands. The sorrow thus directly inflicted on many private families,

together with the force of individual sympathy widely diffused among

the citizens, operated powerfully upon the decisions of the public

assembly. A century before, the Athenians had relinquished all their

acquisitions in Bœotia, in order to recover their captives taken in

the defeat of Tolmides at Koroneia; and during the Peloponnesian

war, the policy of the Spartans had been chiefly guided for three or

four years by the anxiety to ensure the restoration of the captives

of Sphakteria. Moreover, several Athenians of personal consequence

were taken at Olynthus; among them, Eukratus and Iatrokles. Shortly

after the news arrived, the relatives of these two men, presenting

themselves before the assembly in the solemn guise of suppliants,

deposited an olive branch on the altar hard by, and entreated that

care might be had for the safety of their captive kinsmen.[789]

This appeal, echoed as it would be by the cries of so many other

citizens in the like distress, called forth unanimous sympathy in

the assembly. Both Philokrates and Demosthenes spoke in favor of it;

Demosthenes probably, as having been a strenuous advocate of the war,

was the more anxious to shew that he was keenly alive to so much

individual suffering. It was resolved to open indirect negotiations

with Philip for the release of the captives, through some of the

great tragic and comic actors; who, travelling in the exercise of

their profession to every city in Greece, were everywhere regarded

in some sort as privileged persons. One of these, Neoptolemus,[790]

had already availed himself of his favored profession and liberty

of transit to assist in Philip’s intrigues and correspondences

at Athens; another, Aristodemus, was also in good esteem with

Philip; both were probably going to Macedonia to take part in the

splendid Olympic festival there preparing. They were charged to make

application, and take the best steps in their power, for the safety

or release of the captives.[791]

[789] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 30. c. 8. Ὑπὸ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς

χρόνους Ὄλυνθος ἥλω, καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν ὑμετέρων ἐγκατελήφθησαν

πολιτῶν, ὧν ἦν Ἰατροκλῆς καὶ Εὔκρατος. Ὑπὲρ δὴ τούτων ἱκετηρίαν

θέντες οἱ οἰκεῖοι, ἐδέοντο ὑμῶν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιήσασθαι·

παρελθόντες δ᾽ αὐτοῖς συνηγόρουν Φιλοκράτης καὶ Δημοσθένης, ἀλλ᾽

οὐκ Αἰσχίνης.

To illustrate the effect of this impressive ceremony upon the

Athenian assembly, we may recall the memorable scene mentioned

by Xenophon and Diodorus (Xen. Hell. i. 7, 8; Diodor. xiii. 101)

after the battle of Arginusæ, when the relatives of the warriors

who had perished on board of the foundered ships, presented

themselves before the assembly with shaven heads and in mourning

garb. Compare also, about presentments of solemn supplication to

the assembly, Demosthenes, De Coronâ, p. 262—with the note of

Dissen, and Æschines contra Timarchum p. 9. c. 13.

[790] Demosth. De Pace, p. 58.

[791] Æschines (Fals. Leg. p. 30. c. 8) mentions only

Aristodemus. But from various passages in the oration of

Demosthenes (De Fals. Leg. p. 344, 346, 371, 443), we gather

that the actor Neoptolemus must have been conjoined with him;

perhaps also the Athenian Ktesiphon, though this is less certain.

Demosthenes mentions Aristodemus again, in the speech De Coronâ

(p. 232) as the first originator of the peace.

Demosthenes (De Pace, p. 58) had, even before this, denounced

Neoptolemus as playing a corrupt game, for the purposes of

Philip, at Athens. Soon after the peace, Neoptolemus sold up all

his property at Athens, and went to reside in Macedonia.

It would appear that these actors were by no means expeditious in

the performance of their mission. They probably spent some time in

their professional avocations in Macedonia; and Aristodemus, not

being a responsible envoy, delayed some time even after his return,

before he made any report. That his mission had not been wholly

fruitless, however, became presently evident from the arrival of

the captive Iatrokles, whom Philip had released without ransom. The

Senate then summoned Aristodemus before them, inviting him to make

a general report of his proceedings, which he did; first before the

Senate,—next, before the public assembly. He affirmed that Philip

had entertained his propositions kindly, and that he was in the

best dispositions towards Athens; desirous not only to be at peace

with her, but even to be admitted as her ally. Demosthenes, then a

senator, moved a vote of thanks and a wreath to Aristodemus.[792]

[792] Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 30. c. 8.

This report, as far as we can make out, appears to have been made

about September or October 347 B. C.; Æschines, and the other

roving commissioners sent out by Athens to raise up anti-Macedonian

combinations, had returned with nothing but disheartening

announcement of refusal or lukewarmness. And there occurred also

about the same time in Phokis and Thermopylæ, other events of grave

augury to Athens, showing that the Sacred War and the contest between

the Phokians and Thebans was turning,—as all events had turned for

the last ten years,—to the farther aggrandizement of Philip.

During the preceding two years, the Phokians, now under the

command of Phalækus, in place of Phayllus, had maintained their

position against Thebes; had kept possession of the Bœotian towns,

Orchomenus, Koroneia, and Korsia, and were still masters of

Alpônus, Thronium, and Nikæa, as well as of the important pass of

Thermopylæ adjoining.[793] But though on the whole successful in

regard to Thebes, they had fallen into dissension among themselves.

The mercenary force, necessary to their defence, could only be

maintained by continued appropriation of the Delphian treasures; an

appropriation becoming from year to year both less lucrative and

more odious. By successive spoliation of gold and silver ornaments,

the temple is said to have been stripped of ten thousand talents

(about two million three hundred thousand pounds), all its available

wealth; so that the Phokian leaders were now reduced to dig for an

unauthenticated treasure, supposed (on the faith of a verse in the

Iliad, as well as on other grounds of surmise), to lie concealed

beneath its stone floor. Their search, however, was not only

unsuccessful, but arrested, as we are told, by violent earthquakes,

significant of the anger of Apollo.[794]

[793] Diodor. xvi. 58; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 385-387; Æschines,

Fals. Leg. p. 45. c. 41.

[794] Diodor. xvi. 56.

As the Delphian treasure became less and less, so the means of

Phalækus to pay troops and maintain ascendency declined. While

the foreign mercenaries relaxed in their obedience, his opponents

in Phokis manifested increased animosity against his continued

sacrilege. So greatly did these opponents increase in power, that

they deposed Phalækus, elected Deinokrates with two others in

his place, and instituted a strict inquiry into the antecedent

appropriation of the Delphian treasure. Gross peculation was

found to have been committed for the profit of individual leaders,

especially one named Philon; who, on being seized and put to the

torture, disclosed the names of several accomplices. These men

were tried, compelled to refund, and ultimately put to death.[795]

Phalækus however still retained his ascendency over the mercenaries,

about eight thousand in number, so as to hold Thermopylæ and the

places adjacent, and even presently to be re-appointed general.[796]

[795] Diodor. xvi. 56, 57.

[796] Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 62. c. 41; Diodor. xvi. 59. Φάλαικον,

πάλιν τῆς στρατηγίας ἠξιωμένον, etc.

Such intestine dispute, combined with the gradual exhaustion of

the temple-funds, sensibly diminished the power of the Phokians.

Yet they still remained too strong for their enemies the Thebans;

who, deprived of Orchomenus and Koroneia, impoverished by military

efforts of nine years, and unable to terminate the contest by their

own force, resolved to invoke foreign aid. An opportunity might

perhaps have been obtained for closing the war by some compromise,

if it had been possible now to bring about an accommodation

between Thebes and Athens; which some of the philo-Theban orators,

(Demosthenes seemingly among them), attempted, under the prevalent

uneasiness about Philip.[797] But the adverse sentiments in both

cities, especially in Thebes, were found invincible; and the Thebans,

little anticipating consequences, determined to invoke the ruinous

intervention of the conqueror of Olynthus. The Thessalians, already

valuable allies of Philip, joined them in soliciting him to crush

the Phokians, and to restore the ancient Thessalian privilege of the

Pylæa, (or regular yearly Amphiktyonic meeting at Thermopylæ), which

the Phokians had suppressed during the last ten years. This joint

prayer for intervention was preferred in the name of the Delphian

god, investing Philip with the august character of champion of

the Amphiktyonic assembly, to rescue the Delphian temple from its

sacrilegious plunderers.

[797] Æschines cont. Ktesiph. p. 73. c. 44; Demosth. De Coronâ,

p. 231. Demosthenes, in his oration De Coronâ, spoken many years

after the facts, affirms the contingency of alliance between

Athens and Thebes at this juncture, as having been much more

probable than he ventures to state it in the earlier speech De

Falsâ Legatione.

The King of Macedon, with his past conquests and his well-known

spirit of aggressive enterprise, was now a sort of present deity,

ready to lend force to all the selfish ambition, or blind fear and

antipathy, prevalent among the discontented fractions of the Hellenic

world. While his intrigues had procured numerous partisans even in

the centre of Peloponnesus,—as Æschines, on return from his mission,

had denounced, not having yet himself enlisted in the number,—he was

now furnished with a pious pretence, and invited by powerful cities,

to penetrate into the heart of Greece, within its last line of common

defence, Thermopylæ.

The application of the Thebans to Philip excited much alarm in

Phokis. A Macedonian army under Parmenio did actually enter

Thessaly,—where we find them, three months later, besieging

Halus.[798] Reports seem to have been spread, about September 347

B. C., that the Macedonians were about to march to Thermopylæ; upon

which the Phokians took alarm, and sent envoys to Athens as well

as to Sparta, entreating aid to enable them to hold the pass, and

offering to deliver up the three important towns near it,—Alpônus,

Thronium, and Nikæa. So much were the Athenians alarmed by the

message, that they not only ordered Proxenus, their general at Oreus,

to take immediate possession of the pass, but also passed a decree

to equip fifty triremes, and to send forth their military citizens

under thirty years of age, with an energy like that displayed when

they checked Philip before at the same place. But it appears that the

application had been made by the party in Phokis opposed to Phalækus.

So vehemently did that chief resent the proceeding, that he threw

the Phokian envoys into prison on their return; refusing to admit

either Proxenus or Archidamus into possession of Thermopylæ, and even

dismissing without recognition the Athenian heralds, who came in

their regular rounds to proclaim the solemn truce of the Eleusinian

mysteries.[799] This proceeding on the part of Phalækus was dictated

seemingly by jealousy of Athens and Sparta, and by fear that they

would support the party opposed to him in Phokis. It could not have

originated (as Æschines alleges) in superior confidence and liking

towards Philip; for if Phalækus had entertained such sentiments,

he might have admitted the Macedonian troops at once; which he

did not do until ten months later, under the greatest pressure of

circumstances.

[798] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 392.

[799] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 40. c. 41. It is this notice of

the μυστηριωτίδες σπονδαὶ which serves as indication of time for

the event. The Eleusinian mysteries were celebrated in the month

Boëdromion (September). These events took place in September, 347

B. C., Olymp. 108, 2—the archonship of Themistokles at Athens.

There is also a farther indication of time given by Æschines:

that the event happened before he was nominated envoy,—πρὶν

ἐμὲ χειροτονηθῆναι πρεσβευτήν (p. 46. c. 41). This refutes the

supposition of Vœmel (Proleg. ad Demosth. de Pace, p. 255),

who refers the proceeding to the following month Elaphebolion

(March), on the ground of some other words of Æschines,

intimating “that the news reached Athens while the Athenians were

deliberating about the peace.” Böhnecke, too, supposes that the

mysteries here alluded to are the lesser mysteries, celebrated

in Anthesterion; not the greater, which belong to Boëdromion.

This supposition appears to me improbable and unnecessary. We may

reasonably believe that there were many discussions on the peace

at Athens, before the envoys were actually nominated. Some of

these debates may well have taken place in the month Boëdromion.

Such insulting repudiation of the aid tendered by Proxenus at

Thermopylæ, combined with the distracted state of parties in Phokis,

menaced Athens with a new embarrassment. Though Phalækus still held

the pass, his conduct had been such as to raise doubts whether he

might not treat separately with Philip. Here was another circumstance

operating on Athens,—besides the refusal of coöperation from other

Greeks and the danger of her captives at Olynthus,—to dishearten her

in the prosecution of the war, and to strengthen the case of those

who advocated peace. It was a circumstance the more weighty, because

it really involved the question of safety or exposure to her own

territory, through the opening of the pass of Thermopylæ. It was

here that she was now under the necessity of keeping watch; being

thrown on the defensive for her own security at home,—not, as before,

stretching out a long arm for the protection of distant possessions

such as the Chersonese, or distant allies such as the Olynthians.

So speedily had the predictions of Demosthenes been realized, that

if the Athenians refused to carry on strenuous war against Philip

on _his_ coast, they would bring upon themselves the graver evil of

having to resist him on or near their own frontier.

The maintenance of freedom in the Hellenic world against the

extra-Hellenic invader, now turned once more upon the pass of

Thermopylæ; as it had turned one hundred and thirty-three years

before, during the onward march of the Persian Xerxes.

To Philip, that pass was of incalculable importance. It was his only

road into Greece; it could not be forced by any land-army; while at

sea the Athenian fleet was stronger than his. In spite of the general

remissness of Athens in warlike undertakings, she had now twice

manifested her readiness for a vigorous effort to maintain Thermopylæ

against him. To become master of the position, it was necessary that

he should disarm Athens by concluding peace,—keep her in ignorance

or delusion as to his real purposes,—prevent her from conceiving

alarm or sending aid to Thermopylæ,—and then overawe or buy off the

isolated Phokians. How ably and cunningly his diplomacy was managed

for this purpose, will presently appear.[800]

[800] It is at this juncture, in trying to make out the

diplomatic transactions between Athens and Philip, from the

summer of 347 to that of 346 B. C., that we find ourselves

plunged amidst the contradictory assertions of the two rival

orators,—Demosthenes and Æschines; with very little of genuine

historical authority to control them. In 343-342 B. C.,

Demosthenes impeached Æschines for corrupt betrayal of the

interest of Athens in the second of his three embassies to

Philip (in 346 B. C.). The long harangue (De Falsâ Legatione),

still remaining, wherein his charge stands embodied, enters

into copious details respecting the peace with its immediate

antecedents and consequents. We possess also the speech delivered

by Æschines in his own defence, and in counter-accusation of

Demosthenes; a speech going over the same ground, suitably to his

own purpose and point of view. Lastly, we have the two speeches,

delivered several years later (in 330 B. C.), of Æschines in

prosecuting Ktesiphon, and of Demosthenes in defending him;

wherein the conduct of Demosthenes as to the peace of 346 B. C.

again becomes matter of controversy. All these harangues are

interesting, not merely as eloquent compositions, but also from

the striking conception which they impart of the living sentiment

and controversy of the time. But when we try to extract from

them real and authentic matter of history, they become painfully

embarrassing; so glaring are the contradictions not only between

the two rivals, but also between the earlier and later discourses

of the same orator himself, especially Æschines; so evident is

the spirit of perversion, so unscrupulous are the manifestations

of hostile feeling, on both sides. We can place little faith

in the allegations of either orator against the other, except

where some collateral grounds of fact or probability can be

adduced in confirmation. But the allegations of each as to

matters which do not make against the other, are valuable; even

the misrepresentations, since we have them on both sides, will

sometimes afford mutual correction: and we shall often find it

practicable to detect a basis of real matter of fact which one or

both may seek to pervert, but which neither can venture to set

aside, or can keep wholly out of sight. It is indeed deeply to be

lamented that we know little of the history except so much as it

suits the one or the other of these rival orators, each animated

by purposes totally at variance with that of the historian, to

make known either by direct notice or oblique allusion.

On the other hand, to Athens, to Sparta, and to the general cause

of Pan-hellenic independence, it was of capital moment that Philip

should be kept on the outside of Thermopylæ. And here Athens had

more at stake than the rest; since not merely her influence abroad,

but the safety of her own city and territory against invasion,

was involved in the question. The Thebans had already invited the

presence of Philip, himself always ready even without invitation,

to come within the pass; it was the first interest, as well as the

first duty, of Athens, to counterwork them, and to keep him out.

With tolerable prudence, her guarantee of the past might have been

made effective; but we shall find her measures ending only in shame

and disappointment, through the flagrant improvidence, and apparent

corruption, of her own negotiators.

The increasing discouragement as to war, and yearning for peace,

which prevailed at Athens during the summer and autumn of 347 B.

C., has been already described. We may be sure that the friends of

the captives taken at Olynthus would be importunate in demanding

peace, because there was no other way of procuring their release;

since Philip did not choose to exchange them for money, reserving

them as an item in political negotiation. At length, about the month

of November, the public assembly decreed that envoys should be sent

to Philip to ascertain on what conditions peace could be made; ten

Athenian envoys, and one from the synod of confederate allies,

sitting at Athens. The mover of the decree was Philokrates, the same

who had moved the previous decree permitting Philip to send envoys if

he chose. Of this permission Philip had not availed himself, in spite

of all that the philippizers at Athens had alleged about his anxiety

for peace and alliance with the city. It suited his purpose to have

the negotiations carried on in Macedonia, where he could act better

upon the individual negotiators of Athens.

The decree having been passed in the assembly, ten envoys were

chosen: Philokrates, Demosthenes, Æschines, Ktesiphon, Phrynon,

Iatroklês, Derkyllus, Kimon, Nausiklês, and Aristodemus the

actor. Aglaokreon of Tenedos was selected to accompany them, as

representative of the allied synod. Of these envoys, Ktesiphon,

Phrynon, and Iatroklês, had already been gained over as partisans

by Philip while in Macedonia; moreover, Aristodemus was a person

to whom, in his histrionic profession, the favor of Philip was

more valuable than the interests of Athens. Æschines was proposed

by Nausiklês; Demosthenes, by Philokrates the mover.[801] Though

Demosthenes had been before so earnest in advocating vigorous

prosecution of the war, it does not appear that he was now adverse to

the opening of negotiations. Had he been ever so adverse, he would

probably have failed in obtaining even a hearing, in the existing

temper of the public mind. He thought indeed that Athens inflicted so

much damage on her enemy by ruining the Macedonian maritime commerce,

that she was not under the necessity of submitting to peace on bad or

humiliating terms.[802] But still he did not oppose the overtures,

nor did his opposition begin until afterwards, when he saw the turn

which the negotiations were taking. Nor, on the other hand, was

Æschines as yet suspected of a leaning towards Philip. Both he and

Demosthenes obeyed, at this moment, the impulse of opinion generally

prevalent at Athens. Their subsequent discordant views and bitter

rivalry grew out of the embassy itself; out of its result and the

behavior of Æschines.

[801] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 30. s. 9. p. 31. c. 10. p. 34. c.

20; Argumentum ii ad Demosth. Fals. Leg.

[802] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p 442. Compare p. 369, 387, 391.

The eleven envoys were appointed to visit Philip, not with any power

of concluding peace, but simply to discuss with him and ascertain on

what terms peace could be had. So much is certain; though we do not

possess the original decree under which they were nominated. Having

sent before them a herald to obtain a safe-conduct from Philip, they

left Athens about December 347 B. C., and proceeded by sea to Oreus,

on the northern coast of Eubœa, where they expected to meet the

returning herald. Finding that he had not yet come back, they crossed

the strait at once, without waiting for him, into the Pagasæan Gulf,

where Parmenio with a Macedonian army was then besieging Halus.

To him they notified their arrival, and received permission to

pass on, first to Pagasæ, next to Larissa. Here they met their own

returning herald, under whose safeguard they pursued their journey to

Pella.[803]

[803] Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 392.

Our information respecting this (first) embassy proceeds almost

wholly from Æschines. He tells us that Demosthenes was, from the

very day of setting out, intolerably troublesome both to him and

to his brother envoys; malignant, faithless, and watching for such

matters as might be turned against them in the way of accusation

afterwards; lastly, boastful even to absurd excess, of his own

powers of eloquence. In Greece, it was the usual habit to transact

diplomatic business, like other political matters, publicly before

the governing number—the council, if the constitution happened to

be oligarchical—the general assembly, if democratical. Pursuant to

this habit, the envoys were called upon to appear before Philip in

his full pomp and state, and there address to him formal harangues

(either by one or more of their number as they chose), setting forth

the case of Athens; after which Philip would deliver his reply in

the like publicity, either with his own lips or by those of a chosen

minister. The Athenian envoys resolved among themselves, that when

introduced, each of them should address Philip, in the order of

seniority; Demosthenes being the youngest of the Ten, and Æschines

next above him. Accordingly, when summoned before Philip, Ktesiphon,

the oldest envoy, began with a short address; the other seven

followed with equal brevity, while the stress of the business was

left to Æschines and Demosthenes.[804]

[804] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 31. c. 10, 11.

Æschines recounts in abridgment to the Athenians, with much

satisfaction, his own elaborate harangue, establishing the right

of Athens to Amphipolis, the wrong done by Philip in taking it

and holding it against her, and his paramount obligation to make

restitution—but touching upon no other subject whatever.[805] He

then proceeds to state—probably with yet greater satisfaction—that

Demosthenes, who followed next, becoming terrified and confused,

utterly broke down, forgot his prepared speech, and was obliged to

stop short, in spite of courteous encouragements from Philip.[806]

Gross failure, after full preparation, on the part of the greatest

orator of ancient or modern times, appears at first hearing so

incredible, that we are disposed to treat it as a pure fabrication

of his opponent. Yet I incline to believe that the fact was

substantially as Æschines states it; and that Demosthenes was

partially divested of his oratorical powers by finding himself not

only speaking before the enemy whom he had so bitterly denounced, but

surrounded by all the evidences of Macedonian power, and doubtless

exposed to unequivocal marks of well-earned hatred, from those

Macedonians who took less pains than Philip to disguise their real

feelings.[807]