slight; the mean age of marriage for all husbands in England has
increased from 28.43 in 1896 to 28.88 in 1909, and the mean age of all
wives from 26.21 in 1896 to 26.69 in 1909. This seems a very trifling
rate of progression. If, however, we look at the matter in another way
we find that there has been an extremely serious reduction in the number
of marriages between 15 to 20, normally the most fecund of all
age-periods. Between 1876 and 1880 (according to the Registrar-General's
Report for 1909) the proportion of minors in 1000 marriages in England
and Wales was 77.8 husbands and 217.0 wives. In 1909 it had fallen to
only 39.8 husbands and 137.7 wives. It has been held that this has not
greatly affected the decline in the birth-rate. Its tendency, however,
must be in that direction. It is true that Engelmann argued that delayed
marriages had no effect at all on the birth-rate. But it has been
clearly shown that as the age of marriage increases fecundity distinctly
diminishes.[119] This is illustrated by the specially elaborate statistics
of Scotland for 1855;[120] the number of women having children, that is,
the fecundity, was higher in the years 15 to 19, than at any subsequent
age-period, except 20 to 24, and the fact that the earliest age-group is
not absolutely highest is due to the presence of a number of immature
women. In New South Wales, Coghlan has shown that if the average number
of children is 3.6, then a woman marrying at 20 may expect to have five
children, a woman marrying at 28 three children, at 32 two children, and
at 37 one child. Newsholme and Stevenson, again, conclude that the
general law of decline of fertility with advancing age of the mother is
shown in various countries, and that in nearly all countries the mothers
aged 15 to 20 have the largest number of children; the chief exception
is in the case of some northern countries like Norway and Finland, where
women develop late, and there it is the mothers of 20 to 25 who have the
largest number of children.[121] The postponement in the age of marriage
during recent years is, however, so slight that it can only account for
a small part of the decline in the birth-rate; Coghlan calculates that
of unborn possible children in New South Wales the loss of only about
one-sixth is to be attributed to this cause. In London, however, Heron
considers that the recognized connection between a low birth-rate and a
high social standing might have been entirely accounted for sixty years
ago by postponement of marriage, and that such postponement may still
account for 50 per cent of it.[122]
It is not enough, however, to consider the mechanism by which the
birth-rate declines; to realize the significance of the decline we must
consider the causes which set the mechanism in action.
We begin to obtain a truer insight into the meaning of the curve of a
country's birth-rate when we realize that it is in relation with the
industrial and commercial activity of the country.[123] It is sometimes
stated that a high birth-rate goes with a high degree of national
prosperity. That, however, is scarcely the case; we have to look into
the matter a little more closely. And, when we do so, we find that, not
only is the statement of a supposed connection between a high birth-rate
and a high degree of prosperity an imperfect statement; it is altogether
misleading.
If, in the first place, we attempt to consider the state of things among
savages, we find, indeed, great variations, and the birth-rate is not
infrequently low. But, on the whole, it would appear, the marriage-rate,
the birth-rate, and, it may be added, the death-rate are all alike high.
Karl Ranke has investigated the question with considerable care among
the Trumai and Nahuqua Indians of Central Brazil.[124] These tribes are
yet totally uncontaminated by contact with European influences;
consumption and syphilis are alike unknown. In the two villages he
investigated in detail, Ranke found that every man over twenty-five
years of age was married, and that the only unmarried woman he
discovered was feeble-minded. The average size of the families of those
women who were over forty years of age was between five and six
children, while, on the other hand, the mortality among children was
great, and a relatively small proportion of the population reached old
age. We see therefore that, among these fairly typical savages, living
under simple natural conditions, the fertility of the women is as high
as it is among all but the most prolific of European peoples; while, in
striking contrast with European peoples, among whom a large percentage
of the population never marry, and of those who do, many have no
children, practically every man and woman both marries and produces
children.
If we leave savages out of the question and return to Europe, it is
still instructive to find that among those peoples who live under the
most primitive conditions much the same state of things may be found as
among savages. This is notably the case as regards Russia. In no other
great European country do the bulk of the women marry at so early an
age, and in no other is the average size of the family so large. And,
concomitantly with a very high marriage-rate and a very high birth-rate,
we find in Russia, in an equally high degree, the prevalence among the
masses of infantile and general mortality, disease (epidemical and
other), starvation, misery.[125]
So far we scarcely see any marked connection between high fertility and
prosperity. It is more nearly indicated in the high birth-rate of
Hungary--only second to that of Russia, and also accompanied by a high
mortality--which is associated with the rapid and notable development of
a young nationality. The case of Hungary is, indeed, typical. In so far
as high fertility is associated with prosperity, it is with the
prosperity of a young and unstable community, which has experienced a
sudden increase of wealth and a sudden expansion. The case of Western
Australia illustrates the same point. Thirty years ago the marriage-rate
and the birth-rate of this colony were on the same level as those of the
other Australian colonies; but a sudden industrial expansion occurred,
both rates rose, and in 1899 the fertility of Western Australia was
higher than that of any other English-speaking community.[126]
If now we put together the facts observed in savage life and the facts
observed in civilized life, we shall begin to see the real nature of the
factors that operate to raise or lower the fertility of a community. It
is far, indeed, from being prosperity which produces a high fertility,
for the most wretched communities are the most prolific, but, on the
other hand, it is by no means the mere absence of prosperity which
produces fertility, for we constantly observe that the on-coming of a
wave of prosperity elevates the birth-rate. In both cases alike it is
the absence of social-economic restraints which conduces to high
fertility. In the simple, primitive community of savages, serfs, or
slaves, there is no restraint on either nutritive or reproductive
enjoyments; there is no adequate motive for restraint; there are no
claims of future wants to inhibit the gratification of present wants;
there are no high standards, no ideals. Supposing, again, that such
restraints have been established by a certain amount of forethought as
regards the future, or a certain calculation as to social advantages to
be gained by limiting the number of children, a check on natural
fertility is established. But a sudden accession of prosperity--a sudden
excess of work and wages and food--sweeps away this check by apparently
rendering it unnecessary; the natural reproductive impulse is liberated
by this rising wave, and we here see whatever truth there is in the
statement that prosperity means a high birth-rate. In reality, however,
prosperity in such a case merely increases fertility because its sudden
affluence reduces a community to the same careless indifference in
regard to the future, the same hasty snatching at the pleasures of the
moment, as we find among the most hopeless and least prosperous
communities. It is a significant fact, as shown by Beveridge, that the
years when the people of Great Britain marry most are the years when
they drink most. It is in the absence of social-economic restraints--the
absence of the perception of such restraints, or the absence of the
ability to act in accordance with such perception--that the birth-rate
is high.
Arsène Dumont seems to have been one of the first who observed this
significance of the oscillation of the birth-rate, though he expressed
it in a somewhat peculiar way, as the social capillarity theory. It is
the natural and universal tendency of mankind to ascend, he declared; a
high birth-rate and a strong ascensional impulse are mutually
contradictory. Large families are only possible when there is no
progress, and no expectation of it can be cherished; small families
become possible when the way has been opened to progress. "One might
say," Dumont puts it, "that invisible valves, like those which direct
the circulation of the blood, have been placed by Nature to direct the
current of human aspiration in the upward path it has prescribed." As
the proletariat is enabled to enjoy the prospect of rising it comes
under the action of this law of social capillarity, and the birth-rate
falls. It is the effort towards an indefinite perfection, Dumont
declares, which justifies Nature and Man, consoles us for our griefs,
and constitutes our sovereign safeguard against the philosophy of
despair.[127]
When we thus interpret the crude facts of the falling birth-rate,
viewing them widely and calmly in connection with the other social facts
with which they are intimately related, we are able to see how foolish
has been the outcry against a falling birth-rate, and how false the
supposition that it is due to a new selfishness replacing an ancient
altruism.[128] On the contrary, the excessive birth-rate of the early
industrial period was directly stimulated by selfishness. There were no
laws against child-labour; children were produced that they might be
sent out, when little more than babies, to the factories and the mines
to increase their parents' income. The fundamental instincts of men and
women do not change, but their direction can be changed. In this field
the change is towards a higher transformation, introducing a finer
economy into life, diminishing death, disease, and misery, making
possible the finer ends of living, and at the same time indirectly and
even directly improving the quality of the future race.[129] This is now
becoming recognized by nearly all calm and sagacious inquirers.[130] The
wild outcry of many unbalanced persons to-day, that a falling birth-rate
means degeneration and disaster, is so altogether removed from the
sphere of reason that we ought perhaps to regard it as comparable to
those manias which, in former centuries, have assumed other forms more
attractive to the neurotic temperament of those days; fortunately, it is
a mania which, in the nature of things, is powerless to realize itself,
and we need not anticipate that the outcry against small families will
have the same results as the ancient outcry against witches.[131]
It may be proper at this stage to point out that while, in the foregoing
statement, a high birth-rate and a high marriage-rate have been regarded
as practically the same thing, we need to make a distinction. The true
relation of the two rates may be realized when it is stated that, the
more primitive a community is, the more closely the two rates vary
together. As a community becomes more civilized and more complex, the
two rates tend to diverge; the restraints on child-production are
deeper and more complex than those on marriage, so that the removal of
the restraint on marriage by no means removes the restraint on
fertility. They tend to diverge in opposite directions. Farr considered
the marriage-rate among civilized peoples as a barometer of national
prosperity. In former years, when corn was a great national product, the
marriage-rate in England rose regularly as the price of wheat fell. Of
recent years it has become very difficult to estimate exactly what
economic factors affect the marriage-rate. It is believed by some that
the marriage-rate rises or falls with the value of exports.[132] Udny
Yule, however, in an expertly statistical study of the matter,[133] finds
(in agreement with Hooker) that neither exports nor imports tally with
the marriage-rate. He concludes that the movement of prices is a
predominant--though by no means the sole--factor in the change of
marriage-rates, a fall in prices producing a fall in the marriage-rates
and also in the birth-rates, though he also thinks that pressure on the
labour market has forced both rates lower than the course of prices
would lead one to expect. In so far as these causes are concerned, Udny
Yule states, the fall is quite normal and pessimistic views are
misplaced. Udny Yule, however, appears to be by no means confident that
his explanation covers a large part of the causation, and he admits that
he cannot understand the rationale of the connection between
marriage-rates and prices. The curves of the marriage-rates in many
countries indicate a maximum about or shortly before, 1875, when the
birth-rate also tended to reach a maximum, and another rise towards
1900, thus making the intermediate curve concave. There was, however, a
large rise in money wages between 1860 and 1875, and the rise in the
consuming power of the population has been continuous since 1850. Thus
the factors favourable to a high marriage-rate must have risen from 1850
to a maximum about 1870-1875, and since then have fallen continuously.
This statement, which Mr. Udny Yule emphasizes, certainly seems highly
significant from our present point of view. It falls into line with the
view here accepted, that the first result of a sudden access of
prosperity is to produce a general orgy, a reckless and improvident
haste to take advantage of the new prosperity, but that, as the effects
of the orgy wear off, it necessarily gives place to new ideals, and to
higher standards of life which lead to caution and prudence. Mr. N.A.
Hooker seems to have perceived this, and in the discussion which
followed the reading of Udny Yule's paper he set forth what (though it
was not accepted by Udny Yule) may perhaps fairly be regarded as the
sound view of the matter. "During the great expansion of trade prior to
1870," he remarked, "the means of satisfying the desired standard of
comfort were increasing much more rapidly than the rise in the standard;
hence a decreasing age of marriage and a marriage-rate above the normal.
After about 1873, however, the means of satisfying the standard of
comfort no longer increased with the same rapidity, and then a new
factor, he thought, became important, viz. the increased intelligence of
the people."[134] This seems to be precisely the same view of the matter
as I have here sought to set forth; prosperity is not civilization, its
first tendency is to produce a reckless abandonment to the satisfaction
of the crudest impulses. But as prosperity develops it begins to
engender more complex ideals and higher standards; the inevitable result
is a greater forethought and restraint.[135]
If we consider, not the marriage-rate, but the average age at marriage,
and especially the age of the woman, which varies less than that of the
man, the results, though harmonious, would not be quite the same. The
general tendency as regards the age of girls at marriage is summed up by
Ploss and Bartels, in their monumental work on Woman, in the statement:
"It may be said in general that the age of girls at marriage is lower,
the lower the stage of civilization is in the community to which they
belong."[136] We thus see one reason why it is that, in an advanced stage
of civilization, a high marriage-rate is not necessarily associated
with a high birth-rate. A large number of women who marry late may have
fewer children than a smaller number who marry early.
We may see the real character of the restraints on fertility very well
illustrated by the varying birth-rate of the upper and lower social
classes belonging to the same community. If a high birth-rate were a
mark of prosperity or of advanced civilization, we should expect to find
it among the better social class of a community. But the reverse is the
case; it is everywhere the least prosperous and the least cultured
classes of a community which show the highest birth-rate. As we go from
the very poor to the very rich quarters of a great city--whether Paris,
Berlin, or Vienna--the average number of children to the family
diminishes regularly. The difference is found in the country as well as
in the towns. In Holland, for instance, whether in town or country,
there are 5.19 children per marriage among the poor, and only 4.50 among
the rich. In London it is notorious that the same difference appears;
thus Charles Booth, the greatest authority on the social conditions of
London, in the concluding volume of his vast survey, sums up the
condition of things in the statement that "the lower the class the
earlier the period of marriage and the greater the number of children
born to each marriage." The same phenomenon is everywhere found, and it
is one of great significance.
The significance becomes clearer when we realize that an urban
population must always be regarded as more "civilized" than a rural
population, and that, in accordance with that fact, an urban population
tends to be less prolific than a rural population. The town birth-rate
is nearly always lower than the country birth-rate. In Germany this is
very marked, and the rapidly growing urbanization of Germany is
accompanied by a great fall of the birth-rate in the large cities, but
not in the rural districts. In England the fall is more widespread, and
though the birth-rate is much higher in the country than in the towns
the decline in the rural birth-rate is now proceeding more rapidly than
that in the urban birth-rate. England, which once contained a largely
rural population, now possesses a mainly urban population. Every year it
becomes more urban; while the town population grows, the rural
population remains stationary; so that, at the present time, for every
inhabitant of the country in England, there are more than three
town-dwellers. As the country-dweller is more prolific than the
town-dweller, this means that the rural population is constantly being
poured into the towns. The larger our great cities grow, the more
irresistible becomes the attraction which they exert on the children of
the country, who are fascinated by them, as the birds are fascinated by
the lighthouse or the moths by the candle. And the results are not
altogether unlike those which this analogy suggests. At the present
time, one-third of the population of London is made up of immigrants
from the country. Yet, notwithstanding this immense and constant stream
of new and vigorous blood, it never suffices to raise the urban
population to the same level of physical and nervous stability which
the rural population possesses. More alert, more vivacious, more
intelligent, even more urbane in the finer sense, as the urban
population becomes,--not perhaps at first, but in the end,--it
inevitably loses its stamina, its reserves of vital energy. Dr. Cantlie
very properly defines a Londoner as a person whose grandparents all
belonged to London--and he could not find any. Dr. Harry Campbell has
found a few who could claim London grandparents; they were poor
specimens of humanity.[137] Even on the intellectual side there are no
great Londoners. It is well known that a number of eminent men have been
born in London; but, in the course of a somewhat elaborate study of the
origins of British men of genius, I have not been able to find that any
were genuinely Londoners by descent.[138] An urban life saps that calm and
stolid strength which is necessary for all great effort and stress,
physical or intellectual. The finest body of men in London, as a class,
are the London police, and Charles Booth states that only 17 per cent of
the London police are born in London, a smaller proportion than any
other class of the London population except the army and navy. As Mr.
N.C. Macnamara has pointed out, it is found that London men do not
possess the necessary nervous stability and self-possession for police
work; they are too excitable and nervous, lacking the equanimity,
courage, and self-reliance of the rural men. Just in the same way, in
Spain, the bull-fighters, a body of men admirable for their graceful
strength, their modesty, courage, and skill, nearly always come from
country districts, although it is in the towns that the enthusiasm for
bull-fighting is centred. Therefore, it would appear that until urban
conditions of life are greatly improved, the more largely urban a
population becomes, the more is its standard of vital and physical
efficiency likely to be lowered. This became clearly visible during the
South African War; it was found at Manchester (as stated by Dr. T.P.
Smith and confirmed by Dr. Clayton) that among 11,000 young men who
volunteered for enlistment, scarcely more than 10 per cent could pass
the surgeon's examination, although the standard of physique demanded
was extremely low, while Major-General Sir F. Maurice has stated[139]
that, even when all these rejections have been made, of those who
actually are enlisted, at the end of two years only two effective
soldiers are found for every five who enlist. It is not difficult to see
a bearing of these facts on the birth-rate. The civilized world is
becoming a world of towns, and, while the diminished birth-rate of towns
is certainly not mainly the result of impaired vitality, these phenomena
are correlative facts of the first importance for every country which
is using up its rural population and becoming a land of cities.
From our present point of view it is thus a very significant fact that
the equipoise between country-dwellers and town-dwellers has been lost,
that the towns are gaining at the expense of the country whose surplus
population they absorb and destroy. The town population is not only
disinclined to propagate; it is probably in some measure unfit to
propagate.
At the same time, we must not too strongly emphasize this aspect of the
matter; such over-emphasis of a single aspect of highly complex
phenomena constantly distorts our vision of great social processes. We
have already seen that it is inaccurate to assert any connection between
a high birth-rate and a high degree of national prosperity, except in so
far as at special periods in the history of a country a sudden wave of
prosperity may temporarily remove the restraints on natural fertility.
Prosperity is only one of the causes that tend to remove the restraint
on the birth-rate; and it is a cause that is never permanently
effective.
III
To get to the bottom of the matter, we thus find it is necessary to look
into it more closely than is usually attempted. When we ask ourselves
why prosperity fails permanently to remove the restraints on fertility
the answer is, that it speedily creates new restraints. Prosperity and
civilization are far from being synonymous terms. The savage who is
able to glut himself with the whale that has just been stranded on his
coast, is more prosperous than he was the day before, but he is not more
civilized, perhaps a trifle less so. The working community that is
suddenly glutted by an afflux of work and wages is in exactly the same
position as the savage who is suddenly enabled to fill himself with a
rich mass of decaying blubber. It is prosperity; it is not
civilization.[140] But, while prosperity leads at first to the reckless
and unrestrained gratification of the simplest animal instincts of
nutrition and reproduction, it tends, when it is prolonged, to evolve
more complex instincts. Aspirations become less crude, the needs and
appetites engendered by prosperity take on a more social character, and
are sharpened by social rivalries. In place of the earlier easy and
reckless gratification of animal impulses, a peaceful and organized
struggle is established for securing in ever fuller degree the
gratification of increasingly insistent and increasingly complex
desires. Such a struggle involves a deliberate calculation and
forethought, which, sooner or later, cannot fail to be applied to the
question of offspring. Thus it is that affluence, in the long run,
itself imposes a check on reproduction. Prosperity, under the stress of
the urban conditions with which it tends to be associated, has been
transformed into that calculated forethought, that deliberate
self-restraint for the attainment of ever more manifold ends, which in
its outcome we term "civilization."