From Australia comes the same story of the decline of Anglo-Saxon

fertility. In nearly all the Australian colonies the highest birth-rate

was reached some twenty or thirty years ago. Since then there has been a

more or less steady fall, accompanied by a marked decrease in the number

of marriages, and a tendency to postpone the age of marriage. One

colony, Western Australia, has a birth-rate which sometimes fluctuates

above that of England; but it is the youngest of the colonies, and, at

present, that with the smallest population, largely composed of recent

immigrants. We may be quite sure that its comparatively high birth-rate

is merely a temporary phenomenon. A very notable fact about the

Australian birth-rate is the extreme rapidity with which the fall has

taken place; thus Queensland, in 1890, had a birth-rate of 37, but by

1899 the rate had steadily fallen to 27, and the Victorian rate during

the same period fell from 33 to 26 per thousand. In New South Wales, the

state of things has been carefully studied by Mr. Coghlan, formerly

Government statistician of New South Wales, who comes to the conclusion

that the proportion of fertile marriages is declining, and that (as in

the United States) it is the recent European immigrants only who show a

comparatively high birth-rate. Until 1880, Coghlan states, the

Australasian birth-rate was about 38 per thousand, and the average

number of children to the family about 5.4. In 1901 the birth-rate had

already fallen to 27.6 and the size of the family to 3.6 children.[100] It

should be added that in all the Australasian colonies the birth-rate

reached its lowest point some years ago, and may now be regarded as in a

state of normal equipoise with a slight tendency to rise. The case of

New Zealand is specially interesting. New Zealand once had the highest

birth-rate of all the Australasian colonies; it is without doubt the

most advanced of all in social and legislative matters; a variety of

social reforms, which other countries are struggling for, are, in New

Zealand, firmly established. Its prosperity is shown by the fact that it

has the lowest death-rate of any country in the world, only 10.2 per

thousand, as against 24 in Austria and 22 in France; it cannot even be

said that the marriage-rate is very low, for it is scarcely lower than

that of Austria, where the birth-rate is high. Yet the birth-rate in New

Zealand fell as the social prosperity of the country rose, reaching its

lowest point in 1899.

We thus find that from the three great Anglo-Saxon centres of the

world--north, west, and south--the same story comes. We need not

consider the case of South Africa, for it is well recognized that there

the English constitute a comparatively infertile fringe, mostly confined

to the towns, while the earlier Dutch element is far more prolific and

firmly rooted in the soil. The position of the Dutch there is much the

same as that of the French in Canada.

Thus we find that among highly civilized races generally, and not least

among the English-speaking peoples who were once regarded as peculiarly

prolific, a great diminution of reproductive activity has taken place

during the past forty years, and is in some countries still taking

place. But before we proceed to consider its significance it may be well

to look a little more closely at our facts.

We have seen that the "crude" birth-rate is not an altogether reliable

index of the reproductive energy of a nation. Various circumstances may

cause an excess or a defect of persons of reproductive age in a

community, and unless we allow for these variations, we cannot estimate

whether that community is exercising its reproductive powers in a fairly

normal manner. But there is another and still more important

consideration always to be borne in mind before we can attach any

far-reaching significance even to the corrected birth-rate. We have,

that is, to bear in mind that a high or a low birth-rate has no meaning,

so far as the growth of a nation is concerned, unless it is considered

in relation to the death-rate. The natural increase of a nation is not

the result of its birth-rate, but of its birth-rate minus its

death-rate. A low birth-rate with a low death-rate (as in Australasia)

produces a far greater natural increase than a low birth-rate with a

rather high death-rate (as in France), and may even produce as great an

increase as a very high birth-rate with a very high death-rate (as in

Russia). Many worthy people might have been spared the utterance of

foolish and mischievous jeremiads, if, instead of being content with a

hasty glance at the crude birth-rate, they had paused to consider this

fairly obvious fact.

There is an intimate connection between a high birth-rate and a high

death-rate, between a low birth-rate and a low death-rate. It may not,

indeed, be an absolutely necessary connection, and is not the outcome of

any mysterious "law." But it usually exists, and the reasons are fairly

obvious. We have already encountered the statement from an official

Canadian source that the large infantile mortality of French Canadian

families is due to parental carelessness, consequent, no doubt, not only

on the dimly felt consciousness that children are cheap, but much more

on inability to cope with the manifold cares involved by a large family.

Among the English working class every doctor knows the thinly veiled

indifference or even repulsion with which women view the seemingly

endless stream of babies they give birth to. Among the Berlin working

class, also, Hamburger's important investigation has indicated how

serious a cause of infantile mortality this may be. By taking 374

working-class women, who had been married twenty years and conceived

3183 times, he found that the net result in surviving children was

relatively more than twice as great among the women who had only had one

child when compared to the women who had had fifteen children. The women

with only one child brought 76.47 per cent of these children to

maturity; the women who had produced fifteen children could only bring

30.66 of them to maturity; the intermediate groups showed a gradual fall

to this low level, the only exception being that the mothers of three

children were somewhat more successful than the mothers of two children.

Among well-to-do mothers Hamburger found no such marked contrast

between the net product of large families as compared to small

families.[101]

It we look at the matter from a wider standpoint we can have no

difficulty in realizing that a community which is reproducing itself

rapidly must always be in an unstable state of disorganization highly

unfavourable to the welfare of its members, and especially of the

new-comers; a community which is reproducing itself slowly is in a

stable and organized condition which permits it to undertake adequately

the guardianship of its new members. The high infantile mortality of the

community with a high birth-rate merely means that that community is

unconsciously making a violent and murderous effort to attain to the

more stable and organized level of the country with a low birth-rate.

The English Registrar-General in 1907 estimated the natural increase by

excess of births over deaths as exceptionally high (higher than that of

England) in several Australian Colonies, in the Balkan States, in

Russia, the Netherlands, the German Empire, Denmark, and Norway, though

in the majority of these lands the birth-rate is very low. On the other

hand, the natural increase by excess of births over deaths is below the

English rate in Austria, in Hungary, in Japan, in Italy, in Sweden,

Switzerland, Spain, Belgium, and Ontario, though in the majority of

these lands the birth-rate is high, and in some very high.[102] In most

cases it is the high death-rate in infancy and childhood which exercises

the counterbalancing influence against a high birth-rate; the death-rate

in adult life may be quite moderate. And with few exceptions we find

that a high infantile mortality accompanies a high birth-rate, while a

low infantile mortality accompanies a low birth-rate. It is evident,

however, that even an extremely high infantile mortality is no

impediment to a large natural increase provided the birth-rate is

extremely high to a more than corresponding extent. But a natural

increase thus achieved seems to be accompanied by far more disastrous

social conditions than when an equally large increase is achieved by a

low infantile death-rate working in association with a low birth-rate.

Thus in Norway on one side of the world and in Australasia on the

opposite side we see a large natural increase effected not by a profuse

expenditure of mostly wasted births but by an economy in deaths, and the

increase thus effected is accompanied by highly favourable social

conditions, and great national vigour. Norway appears to have the lowest

infantile death-rate in Europe.[103]

Rubin has suggested that the fairest measure of a country's well-being,

as regards its actual vitality--without direct regard, of course, to the

country's economic prosperity--is the square of the death-rate divided

by the birth-rate.[104] Sir J.A. Baines, who accepts this test, states

that Argentina with its high birth-rate and low death-rate stands even

above Norway, and Australia still higher, while the climax for the world

is attained by New Zealand, which has attained "the nearest approach to

immortality yet on record."[105] The order of descending well-being in

Europe is thus represented (at the year 1900) by Norway, Sweden,

Denmark, Holland, England, Scotland, Finland, Belgium, Switzerland,

Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Austria, France, and Spain.

On the other hand, in all the countries, probably without exception, in

which a large natural increase is effected by the efforts of an immense

birth-rate to overcome an enormous death-rate the end is only effected

with much friction and misery, and the process is accompanied by a

general retardation of civilization.

"The greater the number of children," as Hamburger puts it, "the greater

the cost of each survivor to the family and to the State."

Russia presents not only the most typical but the most stupendous and

appalling example of this process. Thirty years ago the mortality of

infants under one year was three times that of Norway, nearly double

that of England. More recently (1896-1900) the infantile mortality in

Russia has fallen from 313 to 261, but as that of the other countries

has also fallen it still preserves nearly the same relative position,

remaining the highest in Europe, while if we compare it with countries

outside Europe we find it is considerably more than four times greater

than that of South Australia. In one town in the government of Perm,

some years ago if not still, the mortality of infants under one year

regularly reached 45 per cent, and the deaths of children under five

years constituted half the total mortality. This is abnormally high even

for Russia, but for all Russia it was found that of the boys born in a

single year during the second half of the last century only 50 per cent

reached their twenty-first year, and even of these only 37.6 per cent

were fit for military service. It is estimated that there die in Russia

15 per thousand more individuals than among the same number in England;

this excess mortality represents a loss of 1,650,000 lives to the State

every year.[106]

Thus Russia has the highest birth-rate and at the same time the highest

death-rate. The large countries which, after Russia, have the highest

infantile mortality are Austria, Hungary, Prussia, Spain, Italy, and

Japan; all these, as we should expect, have a somewhat high birth-rate.

The case of Japan is interesting as that of a vigorous young Eastern

nation, which has assimilated Western ways and is encountering the evils

which come of those ways. Japan is certainly worthy of all our

admiration for the skill and vigour with which it has affirmed its young

nationality along Western lines. But when the vital statistics of Japan

are vaguely referred to either as a model for our imitation or as a

threatening peril to us, we may do well to look into the matter a little

more closely. The infantile mortality of Japan (1908) is 157, a very

high figure, 50 per cent higher than that of England, much more than

double that of New Zealand, or South Australia. Moreover, it has rapidly

risen during the last ten years. The birth-rate of Japan in 1901-2 was

high (36), though it has since fallen to the level of ten years ago. But

the death-rate has risen concomitantly (to over 24 per 1000), and has

continued to rise notwithstanding the slight decline in the birth-rate.

We see here a tendency to the sinister combination of a falling

birth-rate with a rising death-rate.[107] It is obvious that such a

tendency, if continued, will furnish a serious problem to Japanese

social reformers, and at the same time make it impossible for Western

alarmists to regard the rise of Japan as a menace to the world.

It is behind China that these alarmists, when driven from every other

position, finally entrench themselves. "The ultimate future of these

islands may be to the Chinese," incautiously exclaims Mr. Sidney Webb,

who on many subjects, unconnected with China, speaks with authority. The

knowledge of the vital statistics of China possessed by our alarmists is

vague to the most extreme degree, but as the knowledge of all of us is

scarcely less vague, they assume that their position is fairly safe.

That, however, is an altogether questionable assumption. It seems to be

quite true--though in the absence of exact statistics it may not be

certain--that the birth-rate in China is very high. But it is quite

certain that the infantile death-rate is extremely high. "Out of ten

children born among us, three, normally the weakest three, will fail to

grow up: out of ten children born in China these weakest three will die,

and probably five more besides," writes Professor Ross, who is

intimately acquainted with Chinese conditions, and has closely

questioned thirty-three physicians practising in various parts of

China.[108] Matignon, a French physician familiar with China, states that

it is the custom for a woman to suckle her child for at least three

years; should pregnancy occur during this period, it is usual, and quite

legal, to procure abortion. Infants brought up by hand are fed on

rice-flour and water, and consequently they nearly all die.[109]

Putting aside altogether the question of infanticide, such a state of

things is far from incredible when we remember the extremely insanitary

state of China, the superstitions that flourish unchecked, and the

famines, floods, and pestilences that devastate the country. It would

appear probable that when vital statistics are introduced into China

they will reveal a condition of things very similar to that we find in

Russia, but in a more marked degree. No doubt it is a state of things

which will be remedied. It is a not unreasonable assumption, supported

by many indications, that China will follow Japan in the adoption of

Western methods of civilization.[110] These methods, as we know, involve

in the end a low birth-rate with a general tendency to a lower

death-rate. Neither in the near nor in the remote future, under present

conditions or under probable future conditions, is there any reason for

imagining that the Chinese are likely to replace the Europeans in

Europe.[111]

This preliminary survey of the ground may enable us to realize that not

only must we be cautious in attaching importance to the crude birth-rate

until it is corrected, but that even as usually corrected the birth-rate

can give us no clue at all to natural increase because there is a marked

tendency for the birth-rate and the infantile death-rate to rise or sink

together. Moreover, it is evident that we have also to realize that from

the point of view of society and civilization there is a vast difference

between the natural increase which is achieved by the effort of an

enormously high birth-rate to overcome an almost correspondingly high

death-rate and the natural increase which is attained by the dominance

of a low birth-rate over a still lower death-rate.

Having thus cleared the ground, we may proceed to attempt the

interpretation of the declining birth-rate which marks civilization, and

to discuss its significance.

II

It must be admitted that it is not usual to consider the question of the

declining birth-rate from a broad or scientific standpoint. As we have

seen, no attempt is usually made to correct the crude birth-rate; still

more rarely is it pointed out that we cannot consider the significance

of a falling birth-rate apart from the question of the death-rate, and

that the net increase or decrease in a nation can only be judged by

taking both these factors into account. It is scarcely necessary to add,

in view of so superficial a way of looking at the problem, that we

hardly ever find any attempt to deal with the more fundamental question

of the meaning of a low birth-rate, and the problematical character of

the advantages of rapid multiplication. The whole question is usually

left to the ignorant preachers of the gospel of brute force, would-be

patriots who desire their own country to increase at the cost of all

other countries, not merely in ignorance of the fact that the crude

birth-rate is not the index of increase, but reckless of the effect

their desire, if fulfilled, would have upon all the higher and finer

ends of living.

When the question is thus narrowly and ignorantly considered, it is

usual to account for the decreased birth-rate, the smaller average

families, and the tendency to postpone the age of marriage, as due

mainly to a love of luxury and vice, combined with a newly acquired

acquaintance with Neo-Malthusian methods,[112] which must be combated, and

may successfully be combated, by inculcating, as a moral and patriotic

duty, the necessity of marrying early and procreating large families.[113]

In France, the campaign against the religious Orders in their

educational capacity, while doubtless largely directed against

educational inefficiency, was also supported by the feeling that such

education is not on the side of family life; and Arsène Dumont, one of

the most vigorous champions of a strenuously active policy for

increasing the birth-rate, openly protested against allowing any place

as teachers to priests, monks, and nuns, whose direct and indirect

influence must degrade the conception of sex and its duties while

exalting the place of celibacy. In the United States, also, Engelmann,

who, as a gynæcologist, was able to see this process from behind the

scenes, urged his fellow-countrymen "to stay the dangerous and criminal

practices which are the main determining factors of decreasing

fecundity, and which deprive women of health, the family of its highest

blessings, and the nation of its staunchest support."[114]

We must, however, look at these phenomena a little more broadly, and

bring them into relation with other series of phenomena. It is almost

beyond dispute that a voluntary restriction of the number of offspring

by Neo-Malthusian practices is at least one of the chief methods by

which the birth-rate has been lowered. It may not indeed be--and

probably, as we shall see, is not--the only method. It has even been

denied that the prevalence of Neo-Malthusian practices counts at all.[115]

Thus while Coghlan, the Government Statistician of New South Wales,

concludes that the decline in the birth-rate in the Australian

Commonwealth was due to "the art of applying artificial checks to

conception," McLean, the Government Statistician of Victoria, concludes

that it was "due mainly to natural causes." [116] He points out that when

the birth-rate in Australia, half a century ago, was nearly 43 per 1000,

the population consisted chiefly of men and women at the reproductive

period of life, and that since then the proportion of persons at these

ages has declined, leading necessarily to a decline in the crude

birth-rate. If we compare the birth-rate of communities among women of

the same age-periods, McLean argues, we may obtain results quite

different from the crude birth-rate. Thus the crude birth-rate of

Buda-Pesth is much higher than that of New South Wales, but if we

ascertain the birth-rate of married women at different age-periods (15

to 20, 20 to 25, etc.) the New South Wales birth-rate is higher for

every age-period than that of Buda-Pesth. McLean considers that in young

communities with many vigorous immigrants the population is normally

more prolific than in older and more settled communities, and that

hardships and financial depression still more depress the birth-rate. He

further emphasizes the important relationship, which we must never lose

sight of in this connection, between a high birth-rate and a high

death-rate, especially a high infantile death-rate, and he believes,

indeed, that "the solution of the problem of the general decline in the

birth-rate throughout all civilized communities lies in the preservation

of human life." The mechanism of the connection would be, he maintains,

that prolonged suckling in the case of living children increases the

intervals between childbearing. As we have seen, there is a tendency,

though not a rigid and invariable necessity,[117] for a high birth-rate to

be associated with a high infantile death-rate, and a low birth-rate

with a low infantile death-rate. Thus in Victoria, we have the striking

fact that while the birth-rate has declined 24 per cent the infantile

death-rate has declined approximately to the still greater extent of 27

per cent.

No doubt the chief cause of the reduction of the birth-rate has been its

voluntary restriction by preventive methods due to the growth of

intelligence, knowledge, and foresight. In all the countries where a

marked decline in the birth-rate has occurred there is good reason to

believe that Neo-Malthusian methods are generally known and practised.

So far as England is concerned this is certainly the case. A few years

ago Mr. Sidney Webb made inquiries among middle-class people in all

parts of the country, and found that in 316 marriages 242 were thus

limited and only 74 unlimited, while for the ten years 1890-9 out of 120

marriages 107 were limited and only 13 unlimited, but as five of these

13 were childless there were only 8 unlimited fertile marriages out of

120. As to the causes assigned for limiting the number of children, in

73 out of 128 cases in which particulars were given under this head the

poverty of the parents in relation to their standard of comfort was a

factor; sexual ill-health--that is, generally, the disturbing effect of

child-bearing--in 24; and other forms of ill-health of the parents in 38

cases; in 24 cases the disinclination of the wife was a factor, and the

death of a parent had in 8 cases terminated the marriage.[118] In the

skilled artisan class there is also good reason to believe that the

voluntary limitation of families is constantly becoming more usual, and

the statistics of benefit societies show a marked decline in the

fertility of superior working-class people during recent years; thus it

is stated by Sidney Webb that the Hearts of Oak Friendly Society paid

benefits on child-birth to 2472 per 10,000 members in 1880; by 1904 the

proportion had fallen to 1165 per 10,000, a much greater fall than

occurred in England generally.

The voluntary adoption of preventive precautions may not be, however,

the only method by which the birth-rate has declined; we may have also

to recognize a concomitant physiological sterility, induced by delayed

marriage and its various consequences; we have also to recognize

pathological sterility due to the impaired vitality and greater

liability to venereal disease of an increasingly urban life; and we may

have to recognize that stocks differ from one another in fertility.

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