APPLICATION OF THE REFORM TO AUSTRALIAN LEGISLATURES.
+Federal Legislatures.+--The keynote of the Australian Federal
Constitution, as expressed in the Commonwealth Bill, is full and
unreserved trust in the people. This is in direct contrast with the
American Constitution, which seeks to place checks on the people by
dividing power among the President, the Senate, and the House of
Representatives, and assigning to each separate functions. Do we fully
realize the dangers as well as the glorious possibilities of unfettered
action? Do we sufficiently feel the weight of the responsibility we have
undertaken? In reality we have declared to the world the fitness of the
Australian democracy to work a Constitution from which the most advanced
of the other nations would shrink! We do not hesitate to avow our firm
belief that there is only one thing that can save the situation. Unless
Australia is to show to the world a warning instead of an example, all
her energies must be bent on the formation of two coherent organized
parties, dividing each State on national issues, and competing for the
support of all classes and all interests in every electorate throughout
the Commonwealth.
That is the lesson we have endeavoured to inculcate throughout this
book, and we are tempted to quote in support of it the opinion of an
American author, Professor Paul S. Reinsch, in a work just published on
"World Politics." He says:--
The political experience of the last two centuries has proved that
free government and party government are almost convertible terms.
It is still as true as when Burke wrote his famous defence of
party, in his _Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents_,
that, for the realization of political freedom, the organization of
the electorate into regular and permanent parties is necessary.
Parliamentary government has attained its highest success only in
those countries where political power is held alternately by two
great national parties. As soon as factional interests become
predominant; as soon as the stability of government depends upon
the artificial grouping of minor conflicting interests; as soon as
the nation lacks the tonic effect of the mutual criticisms of great
organizations, the highest form of free government becomes
unattainable. (pp. 327, 328.)
The greatest strain on the Constitution will probably be felt at the
outset. Both people and politicians are suddenly called upon to rise to
a higher plane of political thought and action. The idea that each State
is to send representatives to fight for its own interests must first be
got rid of. The only way in which all interests can be reconciled is by
each State acting through the national parties. The greatest danger
which assails the Commonwealth is the risk of combinations of States
dominating party lines; and it is the more imminent that divergent
opinions between the larger and the smaller States were already apparent
at the Convention. The four smaller States, Western Australia, South
Australia, Queensland, and Tasmania, with about one-third of the
population, will have two-thirds of the representation in the Senate;
while the two large States, Victoria and New South Wales, will have
about two-thirds of the representation in the House of Representatives.
At the Convention the fear was expressed that the former, representing a
majority of the States, and the latter, representing a majority of the
people, might come into conflict, and that a deadlock would ensue. It
was on this issue that the great struggle at the Convention took place,
resulting in the adoption of a double dissolution and a subsequent joint
sitting of the two Houses if necessary. By this machinery all disputes
will be finally settled. But what will happen if some of the States
consider themselves unjustly treated? Even apart from conflicts between
the two Houses, if only one State stood aloof from the main parties it
could paralyze government, just as Ireland did in the Imperial
Parliament. It is evident, then, that the very existence of the Union is
bound up in the immediate formation of national parties.
In the United States this lesson was not learned till the Civil War had
demonstrated the danger of combinations of States. Since then two great
parties have been maintained, even though their existence involves the
spoils system and machine organization. In Switzerland, too, the federal
tie was not drawn close till after the revolution in 1847, in which the
Catholic cantons attempted to secede.
Unfortunately, another cause of dissension menaces the Commonwealth. We
allude to the class representation which we have already animadverted
upon. The separate representation of sections or classes within the
States is just as much to be dreaded as the separate representation of
States, and bodes as much ill. It seems not unlikely that the fate of
the first Federal ministry will be in the hands of the Labour party,
which will be able to dictate its policy. It is utterly inconsistent
with the democratic theory that a small minority should have this power;
and it is to be hoped that in the wider field of federal politics its
true character will be recognized. It is only by the mutual action of
two great national parties that the true direction of progress, favoured
by the people, can be worked out; a small minority studying only its own
interests is sure to be a bad guide. A steady pressure maintained
through the two national parties will ensure the recognition of all just
demands; such extreme and ill-considered demands as that for the
initiative and national referendum can only provoke opposition and cause
reaction. Even those who sympathize with the ultimate objects of the
Labour unions must see the folly of their present unpatriotic and
suicidal tactics.
It is a matter for hope that in the wider sphere of federal politics the
irresponsible leadership of the press is not likely to be the power for
harm that it is in some of the individual States at present. But while
it may not dominate the Federal Parliament as a whole to the same
extent, its control over nominations in the States will be quite as
great, and immeasurably greater if the Block Vote is adopted. Nor are
signs wanting of a union of some of the larger newspaper ventures in the
principal States, with a view to increase their power.
Such is a brief review of the outlook. The great requisites essential
for progress are the organization of two national parties and
responsible leadership in the Federal Parliament. The dangers to the
Commonwealth may be summed up under the two heads of lack of
organization and irresponsible leadership outside Parliament. Is it
possible that the dangers may be avoided and the requisites secured by a
change in electoral machinery? Those who have no conception of the
working of social forces, and who do not trace the law of causation into
the realm of mind, will be inclined to scoff at the suggestion. To them
the only hope of improvement lies in appealing to the people to elect
better men. They ignore entirely the reciprocal relation of the
Parliament and the people, and while recognizing the influence of the
people on the character of Parliament, they deny the influence of
Parliament on the character of the people. They declare that the people
are "free agents" and will have better government when they make up
their minds to get it; and no electoral machinery or parliamentary
machinery can influence the result. Such is the passive attitude which
consciously or unconsciously is almost universally assumed. Yet who can
study the history of the British Constitution without being impressed
with the fact that every step in the evolution of its machinery was a
true sociological invention and had the effect of directing the people's
will, which is the motive force, into channels conducive to the general
welfare? Take away the responsible leadership of the Cabinet in the
British Parliament, and it would become a sink of corruption like the
United States Congress; take away its organization into two national
parties, and it would become a rabble like the French Chambers. Now, is
not the electoral machinery the connecting link between the people and
Parliament, and therefore a vital part in the machinery of government?
Does it not actually decide the constitution of Parliament? If this be
granted, it follows that unless the electoral machinery be adapted to
give effect to these two great principles, parliaments will inevitably
decline; and that the present method of election is a very inadequate
means of giving effect to them few will deny.
Our claim for the application of the electoral reform set forth in the
preceding pages rests simply on the fact that it will give effect to
these principles under conditions in which the present system would
fail. We press especially for its application to the Federal House of
Representatives, which will be the most important Australian
representative assembly; for it it there that organization and
responsible leadership are most urgently needed. That they will not be
obtained if the present schemes of dividing the States into
single-membered electorates are adopted is morally certain; and the
result can only be disaster and bitter disappointment. If the
mathematical devices described in the last chapter are added, the
disorganization will be still more complete. And as for the scheme for
allowing separate delegation to a number of sections, which is advocated
under the name of the Hare system, it would be absolutely fatal. Who can
believe that if Mr. Hare's wild scheme to divide the British people into
several hundred sections had been adopted 40 years ago the Imperial
Parliament would now be an organized assembly?
Take the conditions presented by the first elections for the Federal
Parliament, to be held early next year. In some respects it is fortunate
that a definite issue is available as a basis of party organization; for
there is a general consensus of opinion that all other considerations
must be subordinated to a pronouncement on the tariff issue. In an
article on "The Liberal Outlook" in _United Australia_, the Hon. Alfred
Deakin writes:--"By the very circumstances of the case the tariff issue
cannot but dominate the first election, and determine the fate of the
first ministry of the Commonwealth. There will be no time for second
thoughts or for suspense of judgment. The first choice of the people
will be final on this head. The first Parliament must be either
Protectionist or anti-Protectionist, and its first great work an
Australian tariff. That is the clear-cut issue. The risk is that a
proportion of the representatives may be returned upon other grounds, as
the electors as a whole may not realize all that is at stake or make the
necessary sacrifices of opinions and preferences to express themselves
emphatically on this point." Now, the only way to avoid the risk
indicated is to take this one definite issue as the basis of
proportional representation. Each State should be divided on it, and
should elect its proportional number of Freetrade and Protectionist
representatives. Tasmania and Western Australia could conveniently be
polled for this purpose each as one electorate; South Australia might be
divided into two electorates, Queensland into three, and Victoria and
New South Wales into four or five.
It is very desirable that the first election be contested on definite
policies advanced by the prospective party leaders; the suggestion that
the first ministry should be merely a provisional ministry, to act till
the first responsible ministry is formed after the election, is
therefore open to serious objection. The leader of the Freetrade party
or the leader of the Protectionist party should be chosen as first
Federal Premier, and the first election should decide which policy is to
be adopted.
Contrast this scheme with the proposals now under consideration. In
Victoria, New South Wales, and Queensland bills have been introduced
dividing the States into single-membered electorates, and some of the
smaller States are inclined to use the Block Vote. In Victoria a bad
precedent has been established by giving the party in power the duty of
determining boundaries. From time to time it will be necessary to
rearrange the boundaries, not only on account of movements of population
within the State, but also because the number of representatives which
the State is entitled to will vary. Look forward to the time when the
State becomes entitled to one more representative; every one of the 23
electorates, in which vested interests will have been created, will have
to be altered These are precisely the conditions which have led to the
growth of the gerrymander in the United States.
Already the first scheme submitted to the Assembly has been defeated by
a combination of country members, who held that Melbourne was allotted a
larger share of representation than it now has in the local Parliament.
Whatever may be the arguments by which the disparity between the size
of town and country electorates be supported in local affairs, surely
they cannot apply where national issues only are at stake. The principle
of equal electorates is recognized in the Commonwealth Bill by the rules
for allotting representation to the States. Why not, then, for the
divisions of each State? It is said that a larger proportion of the
electors vote in the town, but it is not those only who vote who are
represented.
In dividing a State into electorates for the purpose of the reform, the
number of electors in each division should therefore form the basis of
proportional distribution. The unit of representation would be the total
number of electors in the State divided by the number of seats. One
representative would be allowed to each division of the State for each
unit of representation, and the remaining seats, if any, would go to
those divisions with the largest remainders.
Coming now to the Federal Senate, the bill provides that every State,
except Queensland, must be polled as one electorate for the election of
six senators at the first election and in case of a double dissolution;
at intermediate elections three senators only will be elected, as they
retire in rotation. This equal representation of the States might be
taken to imply that the Senate is intended to represent State rights,
and the provision that each State is to be polled as one electorate
would seem to support that view. On the other hand, the senators are not
required to vote according to States, for it is provided that "each
senator shall have one vote;" the vote of a State may therefore be
neutralized by its representatives. And again, the Senate is to be
elected directly by the people and not by the State legislatures, as at
first proposed. To some extent, therefore, the Federal Senate as now
constituted presents a new problem in representation, on which it is not
advisable to dogmatize. Personal considerations will probably have more
weight than in the selection of representatives; but when we reflect
that it is really little more than a revising assembly, elected by the
same voters as the House of Representatives to deal with the same
questions, and having no special functions of its own, the conclusion
seems irresistible that the election must be contested by the same
national parties, and that the same method of election should be
adopted.
Until the Parliament of the Commonwealth prescribes a uniform method of
choosing senators, the duty is to be left to the State parliaments; and
it is to be regretted that the States have taken no steps to secure
uniform action at the first election. In Victoria a fierce newspaper
contest is being waged over the Block Vote and the Hare system, and the
arguments, being mutually destructive, only go to prove that both are
equally objectionable. The _Age_ naturally wishes to have the privilege
of electing six senators as it did ten delegates to the Federal
Convention, and contends that the majority should elect all the
senators; the _Argus_ rushes to the other extreme in declaring that six
separate minorities ought to be represented, and ignores the risk that
these minorities would be formed on a class or religious basis. The
middle position advocated in this book--namely, that majority and
minority should each return its proportional share of representation--is
free from the objections to both these extreme views.
+State Legislatures.+--Even after federation the State Houses will still
continue to touch at most points the daily lives of the people; they
will merely be shorn of some of their powers and drained of some of
their best leaders. The fiscal issue, which has had great influence in
deciding party lines in the past, will be removed from the arena of
strife, leaving no other than an indefinite line of division into
Liberals and Conservatives, which in practice tends to become a division
into lower and upper classes. This is the danger ahead; and it can only
be avoided by the formation of strong party organizations appealing to
all classes to work together for the general welfare. Party government
is just as necessary in State politics as in national politics.
The present position is intolerable; the disintegration of parties is so
complete that there is not a responsible ministry in Australia worthy of
the name. Among the causes which have led to this deplorable state of
affairs the present method of election is undoubtedly the most potent;
it frequently happens that four or five candidates, representing as
many groups, contest a single seat. In Victoria, where the state of
chaos is perhaps worst, the influence of the press, the existence of a
strong Labour section in the Lower House, and the class character of the
Upper House, representing property and capital, have been the principal
contributing causes.
With the advent of federation a revision of the State constitution is
widely demanded, and is likely to be conceded. One of the first steps
necessary to restore harmony must be reform of the Upper House by a
gradual extension of the franchise and a lowering of the qualification,
so as to ensure that elections are freely contested; it is its present
unrepresentative character which gives force to the appeals of the
radical press and intensifies class divisions.
The relation of State parties to the national parties is an important
subject. In the article from which we have already quoted, in _United
Australia_, Mr. Deakin writes:--"There cannot be a series of Liberal
parties, one Federal and the others in the States, each going its own
way. There must be but one party, with one programme, to which effect
will require to be given continuously in both the States and the
Commonwealth." He therefore deplores that the Liberal party, together
with its "left wing," the Labour class, will be split on the fiscal
issue. "It is this apparently unavoidable rupture in the party," he
declares, "which endangers its prospects and presents an opportunity to
the Conservative classes of either seizing or sharing an authority to
which they could not otherwise aspire." If this means that the "Liberal"
and Labour classes are entitled by reason of their numbers to a
perpetual lease of power in both domains, there can be no more dangerous
doctrine. Parties should be decided by questions of progress and
financial policy, and not on class lines; and since the State and
Federal legislatures have separate spheres of action, parties should be
separate also, unless, indeed, they are to be founded on corruption, as
in the United States, where the same two parties control not only
national and State politics, but city government also.
In the consolidation of public opinion into two definite lines of policy
based on the questions to be dealt with lies the only hope, then, of the
progress of the individual States within their own range; and in
promoting this desirable result the reform advocated in these pages
finds its true application.