ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE THE PRESENT SYSTEM.
+The Double Election.+--In the preceding chapter we have strongly
insisted that the different methods considered for ensuring the return
of the candidate acceptable to all sections are not applicable to the
election of legislators. The true principles of political representation
require, not the election of the candidate most in general favour with
both parties, but the election by each party separately of its own most
favoured candidates. But as it is impossible for both parties to be
represented in a single-membered electorate, the best alternative is
that both should contest the seat and one be represented. The present
system of election has largely tended to realize this alternative,
especially in those countries in which party government was strong, such
as England and the United States; and representation has in consequence
been confined to the two main parties. In England, where the party
system was gradually developed, this result was attained without any
rigid control of nominations, because the true party spirit prevailed
and personal ambition was subordinated to political principle; and in
the United States it was only brought about at the cost of "machine"
control of nominations. But on the Continent of Europe, where party
government was transplanted from England, it has never really taken
root. Each small group nominated its own candidates, and the successful
candidate represented only a plurality, and not a majority, of the
electors. Instead of a contest between two organized parties there was a
scramble among numerous factions.
In France, Belgium, Italy, and Germany an attempt has been made to check
this evil by the double election. If at the first election no candidate
secures an absolute majority of the votes, a second election is held,
for which only the two candidates who head the poll at the first
election are allowed to compete. One must then get an absolute majority.
The double election has undoubtedly tended to prevent a further
splitting up into groups, but the Continental countries offer such poor
soil for the growth of party government that it has only restricted the
contest to two factions in each electorate; and, of course, the dominant
factions are not the same in the various electorates.
+The Advance Vote.+--In Australia the same evil has become increasingly
evident, and it is now no uncommon thing for a candidate to be elected
by less than one-third or one-quarter of the total votes. In Queensland
a plan has been introduced to meet the evil, under the name of the
Advance Vote, which is designed to secure the advantages of the French
plan without the trouble and expense of a second election. The electors
simply declare in advance at the first election how they would vote at
the second election. All that is necessary is that they place the
candidates in order of preference, 1, 2, 3, 4, &c. Then, instead of
holding a second election between the two who have the greatest number
of first preferences, it is merely necessary for the returning officer
to consult each ballot paper and see which of these two candidates is
higher in order of favour. Thus if one is marked 3 and the other 4, the
vote is counted to the candidate marked 3. This device is assumed to
give exactly the same result as the French plan, providing only that the
same electors vote at both elections, and do not change their views
between the two elections.
But in reality it possesses hardly any of the advantages of the French
plan. It is another instance of the danger of neglecting the factor of
human nature. The French do not go to the trouble and expense of a
second election for nothing. Their plan is far the better. First of all,
consider the candidates. They know well beforehand that unless one of
them gets an absolute majority of the votes at the first election they
will be put to the expense and delay of a second election, therefore it
is to their interest that the number of candidates be restricted. This
tends to keep down the representation to two sections. Next, consider
the electors. They know also that unless they give a majority of votes
to one of the candidates they will be put to the trouble of voting a
second time, therefore they will take good care the votes are not split
up, even if the candidates wanted it. What is the result? Simply that in
the vast majority of cases one of the candidates gets a majority at the
first election, and no second election is necessary; and, most important
of all, the tendency to split up is counteracted.
Now take the Queensland system. None of these checks operate. The
splitting up into groups is actually encouraged, and it is to the
interest of each group to see as many more groups as possible formed, in
order to increase its own relative importance, for the delegates of the
two strongest groups have a chance of election instead of the strongest
group only.
In practice the plan threatens to break down, owing to a practical point
being overlooked. It is evident that the success of the Advance Vote
depends on the electors marking all the preferences. The ballot paper
should be made informal unless all the preferences are given. In
Queensland this has not been done, and the consequence is that a large
proportion of the electors refuse to give more than one preference. No
more conclusive evidence is needed that the scheme has promoted the
growth of factions. These electors voluntarily disfranchise themselves
rather than vote for any of the other candidates, and of course the very
object of the scheme is defeated; the successful candidate cannot secure
a majority of the votes cast.
+The Exhaustive Ballot.+--A bill has just been introduced into the
Legislative Assembly of Victoria, providing for a further extension of
the principle of the Advance Vote. The plan is favoured by Professor
Nanson, and professes to be an improvement on the Queensland plan,
although it is only an "instalment of reform" in view of the ultimate
adoption of the more perfect Preferential Voting. The Queensland plan is
objected to because all but the two highest candidates are thrown out.
Suppose, for instance, two candidates stand for the weaker party and
three for the stronger party, it is quite likely that all the candidates
of the stronger party will be thrown out. Therefore the lowest candidate
only of the five should be thrown out. All his papers should be
transferred to the candidate who is marked 2 on them; and those below
him on all the papers should go up one point in order of favour. If he
stood 3 on a paper, the candidate who was 4 would now become 3. Another
count of first preferences should then be made, and the lowest again
thrown out; and so on till one candidate gets an absolute majority. It
is pointed out triumphantly that this plan, which is known as the
Exhaustive Ballot, actually saves in this instance all the trouble and
expense of no less than three separate elections. The process of
elimination is the same as that adopted in the Hare system, and is
little, if at all, better than the Queensland plan in securing the
election of the right candidate, while as regards the formation of
groups it is worse. For this plan actually encourages the groups to
split up, since if one candidate nominated by a group is thrown out his
vote will be transferred to the others. Therefore the double election is
much better than either form of the Advance Vote. They would do nothing
towards restoring the one redeeming merit of the single electorate, of
confining representation to the two main parties. And all other
mathematical schemes founded on the _a priori_ assumption that the
candidate most favoured by all sections is entitled to the seat are just
as objectionable.
The conclusion that must be reached from all these considerations is
that, except when there is a single candidate standing in the interests
of each of the two main parties, it is impossible to say with the
present system who ought to be elected. The difficulty is one of
fundamental principle. The only way to do justice to both parties is to
enlarge the electorates so that each can get its proportionate share of
representation, and then to provide such machinery as will allow each
party separately to elect its most favoured candidates. In no other way
can the people be induced to organize into two coherent parties.