THE CONDITIONS OF SOCIAL PROGRESS.
+The Agent of Progress.+--If the analysis made in the preceding pages of
the principles underlying political representation comes to be regarded
as correct, the science of sociology must be profoundly affected: for it
is a fact that not only the importance but the very existence of the
principles involved has been completely missed by speculators in that
field. The view we have taken is that representation is the most
important sociological invention which has been made in the whole
history of the human race; that the successive steps taken in the
evolution of the British Constitution mark a series of inventions
scarcely less important, and that the resulting institution of party and
responsible government is the indispensable agent of democratic
progress. We have traced throughout the electoral and parliamentary
machinery on which the institution is based the action of two great
principles--organization and responsible leadership--and we have shown
that these are the mainsprings of the whole mechanism. Yet we find even
such an authority as Mr. Herbert Spencer objecting to the party system,
on the ground that it lends itself to a one-man or a one-party
tyranny.[9] The fact is that it is only when representative government
is weak, and approaches direct government, that such a result can
happen, and the distinction is so little recognized that a brief
recapitulation may be permitted.
The fundamental error is in conceiving representation as merely a means
of registering the popular will; many even go so far as to regard it as
an imperfect means of ensuring that each single question will be decided
according to the will of the majority. All such conceptions really
amount to direct government, and where they are given effect to, whether
by the referendum or sectional delegation, society is not organized for
consistent progress. Indeed, if the lessons of history can be trusted,
such a state of society is bound to be wrecked from within by
anti-social influences; political power becomes the object of factious
strife, and the rule of the majority degenerates into the tyranny of the
majority.
We have endeavoured to show that the true conception of representative
government involves a recognition of the principles of organization and
leadership, and that representation is in consequence a means not only
of registering the popular will, but also of organizing and guiding it.
In both cases, therefore, the popular will is the ultimate motive force,
but in the one case the desires of the people clash, while in the other
they are directed into channels conducive to the general welfare. We
have regarded it as an essential condition of representative government
that the popular will be expressed only as to the direction of progress,
that is to say on general policy and not on single questions, and that
complete control of progress be then left to the representative body. In
no other way can the people be saved from their anti-social tendencies,
and induced to express their opinion as to what is best for all. We have
seen how the electoral machinery is adapted to organize this expression
of the popular will into two alternative directions of progress; how
this is effected by the fact of two parties competing for the support of
the people on policies expressing these lines of progress; and how the
parliamentary machinery allows the stronger of these two parties for the
time being complete control of administration and of the direction of
progress. The effect of this organization is that the popular will is
reduced to effective action in one direction at a time--a result which
is not possible with direct government.
Nor is the principle of responsible leadership which is involved in the
reciprocal relation of the representative body and the people any less
important. Society cannot progress faster than the individual units
composing it. True progress lies therefore in raising the standard of
public opinion, and it is this principle which ensures that result by
reacting upon and moulding individual character. Hence we find that in
countries like England, where the principle is operative, progress is
effected without supervision and undue interference in the affairs of
the individual by the State, while in countries where the principle is
not operative, such as the Continental countries of Europe and some of
the Australian colonies, the contrary is the case. Legislation should
therefore be directed to changing the nature of the individual, and
should not be too far in advance of public opinion. This is what Mr.
Lester F. Ward, in his work on "Outlines of Sociology," calls attractive
legislation. He writes:--
The principle involved in attraction, when applied to social
affairs, is simply that of _inducing_ men to act for the good of
society. It is that of harmonizing the interests of the individual
with those of society, of making it advantageous to the individual
to do that which is socially beneficial; not merely in a negative
form as an alternative of two evils, as is done when a penalty is
attached to an action, but positively, in such a manner that he
will exert himself to do those things that society most needs to
have done. The sociologist and the statesman should co-operate in
discovering the laws of society and the methods of utilizing them,
so as to let the social forces flow freely and strongly,
untrammelled by penal statutes, mandatory laws, irritating
prohibitions, and annoying obstacles. (p. 274.)
Now, we submit that this attractive legislation is possible only when
there is no oppressed minority, and is therefore the peculiar province
of representative government; for we have shown that the whole machinery
is adapted to induce the people to desire only what is best in the
interests of society.
Let us briefly examine the bearing of the view that representative
machinery is the agent of progress on previous theories of social
progress.
+Professor Huxley.+--No one has more clearly laid down the conditions of
social progress than the late Professor Huxley in his essay on
_Evolution and Ethics_. The gradual strengthening of the social bond by
the practise of self-restraint in the interests of society he called the
ethical process, and he showed that social progress means a checking of
the cosmic process at every step and the substitution of this ethical
process. This action he compares to that of a gardener in clearing a
patch of waste ground. If he relaxes his efforts to maintain the state
of art within the garden, weeds will overrun it and the state of nature
will return. So the human race is doomed to a constant struggle to
maintain the state of art of an organized polity in opposition to the
state of nature; to substitute as far as possible social progress for
cosmic evolution. He says:--
Let us understand, once for all, that the ethical progress of
society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in
running away from it, but in combating it. It may seem an audacious
proposal thus to pit the microcosm against the macrocosm, and to
set man to subdue nature to his higher ends; but I venture to think
that the great intellectual difference between the ancient times
with which we have been occupied and our day, lies in the solid
foundation we have acquired for the hope that such an enterprise
may meet with a certain measure of success....[10]
Moreover, the cosmic nature born with us, and to a large extent
necessary for our maintenance, is the outcome of millions of years
of severe training, and it would be folly to imagine that a few
centuries will suffice to subdue its masterfulness to purely
ethical ends. Ethical nature may count upon having to reckon with a
tenacious and powerful enemy as long as the world lasts. But, on
the other hand, I see no limit to the extent to which intelligence
and will, guided by sound principles of investigation, and
organized in common effort, may modify the conditions of existence
for a period longer than that now covered by history. And much may
be done to change the nature of man himself. The intelligence which
has converted the brother of the wolf into the faithful guardian of
the flock ought to be able to do something towards curbing the
instincts of savagery in civilized men.[11]
But Huxley never realized that the real cause of the better prospects of
success in modern as contrasted with ancient times is the discovery of
representative machinery. "The business," he declared, "of the sovereign
authority--which is, or ought to be, simply a delegation of the people
appointed to act for its good--appears to me to be not only to enforce
the renunciation of the anti-social desires, but wherever it may be
necessary to promote the satisfaction of those which are conducive to
progress."[12] There is no conception here of the principles of
organization and responsible leadership, so necessary in constituting
this "delegation."
+Herbert Spencer.+--By a great many sociologists it is denied that man
has his destiny in his own hands, or can by common effort modify the
conditions of existence so as to promote progress. The conception which
is held to justify this view is that there is an exact correspondence
between the progress of human society and the growth of an organism.
Foremost among those who take this view is Mr. Herbert Spencer. The
close analogy which the progress of the assumed social organism bears to
the growth of the physiological organism is worked out in great detail
throughout the "Synthetic Philosophy," and is taken to establish "that
Biology and Sociology will more or less interpret each other." The
practical conclusion which is drawn is that the growth of society must
not be interfered with; if the State goes beyond the duty of protection,
it becomes an aggressor. So Mr. Spencer is a most uncompromising
opponent of State action, even education and public sanitation coming in
for his condemnation. Moreover, he holds that if the social organism be
let alone it will tend to a future state of society in which social
altruism will be so developed that the individual will voluntarily
sacrifice himself in the interests of society.
In an essay on _The Social Organism_ ("Essays," Second Series), he
writes:--
Strange as the assertion will be thought, our Houses of Parliament
discharge in the social economy functions that are, in sundry
respects, comparable to those discharged by the cerebral masses in
a vertebrate animal.... We may describe the office of the brain as
that of _averaging_ the interests of life, physical, intellectual,
moral, social; and a good brain is one in which the desires
answering to their respective interests are so balanced that the
conduct they jointly dictate sacrifices none of them. Similarly we
may describe the office of Parliament as that of _averaging_ the
interests of the various classes in a community; and a good
Parliament is one in which the parties answering to these
respective interests are so balanced that their united legislation
concedes to each class as much as consists with the claims of the
rest.
The error of regarding society merely as an aggregate is here clearly
shown, for if the "parties" in Parliament were based on class
delegation, as assumed, social progress would be blocked. The only real
foundation for the resemblance between society and an organism is this:
that unless the individual units composing society reduce themselves to
unity of action in a definite direction, society as a whole cannot
progress; or, in other words, that the principles of organization and
leadership are essential to progress. Yet Mr. Spencer denies that there
is any sphere of collective action for the operation of these
principles!
+Benjamin Kidd.+--The "social organism" theory is also the foundation of
the theory of social progress with which Mr. Benjamin Kidd startled the
scientific world a few years ago in "Social Evolution." While
appreciating the importance of the factor of individual reason, he
contended that self-restraint by the individual in the interests of
society is impossible without an ultra-rational sanction; that, in
fact, without this the reason is the most anti-social and
anti-evolutionary of all human qualities. The central fact therefore
with which we are confronted in our progressive societies is stated as
follows:--"_The interests of the social organism and those of the
individuals comprising it at any particular time are actually
antagonistic; they can never be reconciled; they are inherently and
essentially irreconcilable._" What becomes of this extraordinary
proposition if it is clearly established that the amount of
reconciliation depends on the extent to which the principles of
organization and responsible leadership are given effect to by
representative machinery?
+Past Progress.+--The question will naturally be raised: If a
representative body is now the indispensable agent of social progress,
how can progress previous to the introduction of representation be
explained? The answer is that the same principles were operative, but in
different forms, more suited to the stage of social development. Indeed,
we may say that, from the time that man emerged from the brute stage and
became a social animal, the types of society which have survived in the
struggle for existence with the state of nature and with other types
have been those in which the principles of organization and leadership
have been most active. Even the lowest types of savages, such as the
native tribes studied by Professor Baldwin Spencer and Mr. Gillen in
Central Australia, have a complicated system of organization, the
peculiar feature of which is totemism, or group marriage; but this is
more the result of development than of conscious effort. Leadership also
is rudimentary, for, although the old men have control of the elaborate
ceremonies described, they conform almost entirely to custom and
tradition. Out of this savage stage there grew in favoured countries the
second type of human society--the patriarchal, in which leadership
becomes personal, and centred in a chief who exercises despotic
authority. Patriarchal society grew out of the necessities of a pastoral
existence; indeed, it was the discovery of the domestication of animals
which gave rise to it. Among other interesting features which were
developed are permanent marriage, slavery, and ancestor worship. There
can be no doubt that the latter played an important part in binding the
tribe into one organization, and in inducing all the tribe to submit to
the leadership of the chief. There is a second stage of patriarchal
society in which the large tribes break up into clans and become less
nomadic. Professor Jenks has shown, in his "Short History of Politics,"
how this stage originated in the adoption of agriculture. We begin now
to have the village community, bound by the tie of kinship, and
submitting to the leadership of a lord; and are already on the threshold
of modern political society, in which all these ancient barriers are
broken down and the individual becomes the social unit. The cause of
this momentous change is development of the art of warfare. But before
we reach the modern State there is an intermediate stage, namely,
feudalism. The feudal chief is simply the successful warrior--the leader
of a band of adventurers who get control of a definite territory and
exact military allegiance from its inhabitants. Out of the consolidation
of these bands, or by conquest, modern States were founded. Leadership
was now vested in an irresponsible despot--the king; and the trouble was
to render this new institution permanent, and to induce the people to
submit to it. The former result was attained by making the kingship
hereditary, but the latter has always been a difficult task. It is
doubtful if it would ever have been accomplished but for a significant
alliance--that of Church and State. The convenient fiction of the divine
right of kings was invented, and religion was used to bolster up the
institution and to provide a sanction for submission to absolutism. In
other words, irresponsible leadership was tolerated because
responsibility was supposed to exist to a Higher Power. So we find that
all the great religious movements--Christianity, Mohammedanism, and even
Buddhism--have been associated with the establishment of mighty
kingdoms. Moreover, the only two kingdoms in Europe in which absolutism
still holds out are Russia and Turkey, in which the head of the State is
also head of the Church. But military despotism, which was based solely
on the exploitation of weaker communities, of which ancient Rome was
the culminating type, wanted the elements of permanent progress, and was
bound to disappear before a new type which rested on the development of
internal resources. Militarism must therefore be looked on as a real
stage of progress; for in contrast with patriarchal society it was
competitive, and it broke down many ancient barriers, and prepared the
way for industrial co-operation. Thus we arrive at the conditions
favourable to the rise of representative institutions. For when the cost
of wars had to be raised out of the national resources kings found it
convenient to get the consent of the people to taxation. Hence the great
movement throughout Western Europe for the establishment of parliaments
in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Why is it that in England alone
this movement was successful? Partly no doubt because its isolated
position was favourable to internal progress, but mainly because it was
the only State in which the principles of organization and responsible
leadership were continuously given effect to. So it is that in England
there was developed that wonderful machinery of representative
government which has enabled the people to substitute responsible for
irresponsible leadership, and has made the national character what it
is. This machinery has now been adopted nearly all over the world,
wherever it has been desired to make the popular will felt, but in no
case has it sufficed to give effect to the underlying principles to the
same extent; and success has been attained only in so far as they have
been effective. The lesson of the last century has been that the
machinery which proved sufficient in England, where progress was uniform
through several centuries, breaks down when the pace of progress is
increased. An extreme instance is the recent attempt to introduce party
government into Japan, a country just emerging from the feudal stage, an
interesting account of which is given in the _Nineteenth Century_ for
July, 1899. The experiment failed because the clans could not be divided
on questions of political principle. In a greater or less degree that is
the fundamental source of difficulty everywhere; if the representative
machinery produces only sectional delegation the tendency is back
through anarchy to absolutism. Is it not an extraordinary fact, then,
that the vital distinction between representation and delegation is so
universally ignored?
Such is a brief outline of the evolution of human society; however
inadequate it may be, it at least serves to illustrate the truth that
social progress has never been made in the past except when the
principles of organization and leadership have been operative.
+Future Progress.+--As to the ultimate tendency of future progress it
would be pedantry to dogmatize; our task has been the humbler one of
pointing out the means by which progress is to be attained. We have
assumed, however, that there is a separate sphere of collective action
in which government is an instrument for the positive amelioration of
social conditions. We are aware that this conclusion is at variance with
the two extreme schools of modern thought; on the one hand, with the
individualists, who hold that government should only be used for mutual
protection and to keep order; and on the other hand, with the
socialists, who would leave nothing to individual action. Professor
Huxley has reduced the claims of these two schools to absurdity and
impossibility respectively; and we believe that the problem of the
future is to find out that middle course between the anarchy of the one
and the despotism of the other which makes for progress. It seems likely
that the state of society we are approaching will be one in which, while
natural inequalities will be recognized, neither the artificial
inequalities of fanatical individualism nor the artificial equalities of
regimental socialism will be tolerated, and every man will enter the
rivalry of life on terms of an equality of opportunity. This is the
state foreshadowed by Mr. Lester Ward in his "Outlines of Sociology" and
called by him _Sociocracy_. Such ideals, however, serve only to refute
false conceptions and offer little practical guidance. What is wanted is
a clear recognition of the fact that _progress depends on collective
effort acting through representative machinery, the efficiency of which
depends on the extent to which the principles of organization and
responsible leadership are operative._ The question with which
democratic countries are faced to-day is this: Must it be acknowledged
that the people are unfit for self-government, or is the representative
machinery defective? We have supported the view that the latter is the
case as regards English-speaking-countries at all events; and we have
shown that in British countries the remedy lies in improved electoral
machinery, while in the United States both electoral and parliamentary
machinery are at fault.
FOOTNOTES:
[9] "Principles of Ethics."
[10] "Collected Essays," vol. ix., p. 83.
[11] _Ibid._, p. 85.
[12] "Collected Essays," vol. i., pp. 275-276.