THE PRESENT POSITION OF PARTY GOVERNMENT.
+England.+--We have seen that the fundamental error of the
proportionalists is that they have failed to distinguish between the two
stages of representation. In constantly appealing back to the earlier
parliaments they altogether overlook the fact that the functions which
Parliament now exercises were then vested in the King. But this error is
not confined to the proportionalists, most of whom, indeed, however
inconsistently, favour party government. It is also put forth as an
argument by those who lay all the blame of present evils on the party
system, and who think that all sections should work together as one
united party. Take, for instance, the diatribe of Mr. W.S. Lilly on "The
Price of Party Government" in the _Fortnightly Review_ for June, 1900.
Mr. Lilly complains bitterly that the infallible oracle in politics
to-day is "the man in the street." He asserts that all issues are
settled "by counting heads, in entire disregard of what the heads
contain." His bugbear is the extension of the franchise. "Representative
institutions, for example," he asks, "what do they represent? The true
theory unquestionably is that they should represent all the features of
national life, all the living forces of society, all that makes the
country what it is; and that in due proportion. And such was the
Constitution of England up to the date of the first _Parliamentary
Reform Act_. Its ideal was, to use the words of Bishop Stubbs, 'an
organized collection of the several orders, states, and conditions of
men, recognized as possessing political power.'" Could anything be more
ridiculous? Political power is to be apportioned in the nineteenth
century as it was in the fourteenth century! The people are to be always
governed by their superiors! Mr. Lilly continues:--"It appears to me
that the root of the falsification of our parliamentary system by the
party game is to be found in the falsification of our representative
system by the principle of political atomism. Men are not equal in
rights any more than they are equal in mights. They are unequal in
political value. They ought not to be equal in political power."
The mistake here is in the premise. Has not the demagogue more power
than his dupes, or the Member of Parliament more power than the elector?
We have hardly yet reached, and are never likely to reach, that ideal of
direct government. But what is this price which Mr. Lilly is railing at?
"The price may be stated in eight words. 'The complete subordination of
national to party interests.' The _complete_ subordination. I use the
adjective advisedly. Party interests are not only the first thought of
politicians in England, but, too often, the last and only thought." All
this is sheer nonsense. The coincidence of party aims with the real
interests of the people which the British Parliament has displayed since
the _Reform Act_ of 1832 has never been even remotely approached by any
other country. Two causes have contributed to this great result; first,
the gradual extension of the franchise to all sections of the people,
and second, the fact that the principles of organization and leadership
have been highly developed. In one respect, however, Mr. Lilly is right.
The zenith has been passed. Party government is not the same to-day in
England as it was twenty years ago. But the fault lies not with the
extension of the suffrage, but with the fact that the principles of
organization and leadership are less operative. True, the extension of
the franchise is indirectly concerned in the failure, but the primary
cause is that the present system of election is unable to bear the
increased strain. It no longer suffices to organize the people into two
coherent parties. The effect on the parties is correctly noted by Mr.
Lilly. "A danger which ever besets them," he declares, "is that of
sinking into factions."
Now, the result of the want of organization is the presence in
Parliament of small independent factions, which, by holding the balance
of power, cause the main parties to degenerate into factions.
This tendency is apparent even in England, and the rock on which the
parties have split is the Irish faction. Into the merits of the Irish
question we do not propose to enter; it is the career of the faction in
Parliament which interests us. But it may be noted that the Irish party
rests on a three-fold basis as a faction; it is based mainly on a class
grievance, and is also partly racial and partly religious. It was the
Irish party in the House of Commons which first discovered that, by
keeping aloof from the two main parties, it could terrorize both; and
thus found out the weak spot in party government. Its tactics were
successful up to a certain point, for Mr. Gladstone succumbed to the
temptation to purchase its support, and brought in the Home Rule Bill.
The result is known to all; the historical Liberal party was rent in
twain; party lines were readjusted; Mr. Gladstone was left in a hopeless
minority; and the remnant of his following is to-day in the same
condition. What is the lesson to be learned from these events? That
these tactics cannot succeed in the long run. All interests suffer, but
the culprits most of all. Moreover, such tactics are unconstitutional,
and would in some circumstances justify retaliatory measures. Let us
trace the constitutional course. The Irish members could have exerted a
considerable influence on the policies of both Liberals and
Conservatives, just as the Scotch did. If they had followed this course,
might they not have been in a better position to-day?
Of course, the Irish faction can hardly be said to be the result of the
present system of election; it is mainly the expression of old wrongs.
But it has set the example, and the disintegration of the old parties is
rapidly proceeding. One feature, however, in connection with the present
system in Ireland may be mentioned, and that is the permanent
disfranchisement of the minority. In the greater part of Ireland there
is no such thing as a contest between the main parties. If a system were
introduced by which the minority could get its share of representation
the parties would compete on even terms for the support of the people,
and good feeling would tend to be restored.
To return to Mr. Lilly. The present position of party government in
England is not due to defects in the institution itself, still less to
the extension of the suffrage, but to imperfect organization. The true
remedy is, therefore, to improve organization, not to restrict the
suffrage. By this means such a condition will be brought about that if
either party favours a faction it will lose in general favour; then,
indeed, we may hope that the main parties themselves will cease to
degenerate into factions.
The same number of the _Fortnightly_ contains an unsigned article on
"Lord Rosebery and a National Cabinet," in which the party system is
alluded to as defunct, and in which the suggestion is thrown out that on
the retirement of Lord Salisbury a national cabinet should be formed,
comprising both Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Rosebery. Impending foreign
complications are given as the excuse for terminating party action. Now,
it is not to be denied that party government is more suitable for what
Mr. Herbert Spencer calls the industrial type of society than for the
militant type. Quite recently Lord Salisbury blamed the British
Constitution for the state of unpreparedness for the present war. But it
is equally true that in foreign affairs party action is generally
suspended: in the control of India, for instance, it is so. The real
question, then, is this: Is the danger of foreign aggression so serious
that all questions of internal policy can be permanently set aside? If
we have reached this stage, the end of modern civilization is in sight.
In effect, the proposal is a return to the first stage of
representation, with the difference that all sections of the people are
expected to be held together by the fear of foreign aggression, instead
of the fear of the aggression of the monarchy.
Mr. David Syme is a censor of a very different type. So far from wishing
to take control from the people, he would give the people absolute
control over everything, and at all times. Seldom has the case against
party government been more powerfully presented than in his work on
"Representative Government in England." But Mr. Syme founds his proposed
remedies on a theory of representation which is based on the literal
meaning of the word. No one has put the delegation theory more clearly
than in the following passage, or gone so far in applying it:--
Representation is a mental act; it is the presentation or
reproduction of the state of mind of another person; and before one
person can represent another person he must first know what the
opinions of that other person are. A representative is a
substitute; he stands in the place of, and acts for, another
person. But one man cannot act for another unless he knows what
that other would do were he acting for himself. In other words, he
requires to know the motives which actuate that other person, or
what influences his motives, namely, his principles and beliefs.
The House of Commons is a representative body, not because every
individual member of it represents the opinions of the whole
nation, but because members in the aggregate represent those
opinions, (p. 170).
This position is diametrically opposed to the principles we have laid
down, for it eliminates entirely the ideas of organization and
leadership. Again, Mr. Syme says:--"If the government is to be carried
on for the benefit of all classes, representatives should be chosen from
all classes. We had class representation in the early parliaments, but
then all classes were fairly represented." We have shown that the
analogy from early parliaments is fallacious. Representatives should now
be chosen irrespective of class, and not as class delegates. But Mr.
Syme does not carry his theory to its logical conclusion. For if
representatives merely express the thoughts of others, and should be
class delegates, surely all classes are entitled to have their thoughts
"represented;" and Mr. Syme should range himself among the disciples of
Mr. Hare. But here comes in an interesting difference. Mr. Syme would
retain the present system and make members continually responsible to a
majority of their constituents; he would even give this majority power
to dismiss them at any time. Now, this is practically an admission that
representation involves the existence of a majority and a minority, or,
in other words, is a means of organizing the people into a majority and
a minority. Again, as regards leadership, the theory will hardly bear
the test of facts. Could a man like Gladstone be said to merely express
the thoughts of his constituents? Was he not rather a guide and leader
of the thoughts of a great part of the British nation?
In addition to the continual responsibility of members to their
constituents, Mr. Syme would also make the individual ministers of state
responsible to a majority of the members. He adds:--"The whole system of
party government could in this manner be quietly and effectively got rid
of." We do not propose to criticise the latter suggestion, as we do not
believe it would be put forward to-day, in the light of fuller
knowledge. Mr. Syme's book was written nearly twenty years ago. But, as
regards the continual responsibility of members, we consider it
important that the electors should not have their way on single
questions. They should periodically express their opinion as to the
general line of progress, and the representatives should then have
complete control. The necessity for this is to save the people from
their anti-social tendencies, which we have already stated as the great
objection to all forms of direct government. Lord Macaulay once defined
the position exactly in a letter addressed to the electors of Edinburgh.
"My opinion," he declared, "is that electors ought at first to choose
cautiously; then to confide liberally; and when the term for which they
have selected their member has expired to review his conduct equitably,
and to pronounce on the whole taken together."
We hope to have left on the reader's mind by this time no doubt as to
the intimate connection between the machinery of election and the
resulting character of the legislature. Now it is a most extraordinary
fact that this connection is hardly noticed by the leading
constitutional authorities. It is true they often recognize that
suggested changes like the Hare system would debase our legislatures,
but it never seems to occur to them that present evils might be cured by
a change in the electoral machinery. They point out the evils indeed,
but only to indulge in gloomy forebodings at the onward march of
democracy, or as warnings of the necessity for placing checks on the
people.
Take Bagehot's study of the House of Commons in his standard work on
"The English Constitution," where he classifies the functions exercised
by the House. He insists that the most important of these is the
elective function--its power to elect and dismiss the ministry. In
addition, it exercises an expressive function, a teaching function, an
informing function, and, lastly, the function of legislation. But not a
word is said of the relation of these functions to representation, or to
the method of election. It is asserted that the reason the House of
Commons is able to exercise these functions is because England is a
deferential nation, and the people leave government in the hands of
their betters, the higher classes. On one point he is emphatic, and that
is the absolute necessity of party. He writes:--
The moment, indeed, that we distinctly conceive that the House of
Commons is mainly and above all things an elective assembly, we at
once perceive that party is of its essence. The House of Commons
lives in a state of perpetual potential choice; at any moment it
can choose a ruler and dismiss a ruler. And therefore party is
inherent in it, is bone of its bone, and breath of its breath.
As to the present trend of affairs, the opinion of a foreign observer,
Gneist--"History of the English Constitution"--may be quoted:--
England, too, will experience the fact that the transition to the
new order of industrial society is brought about through a process
of dissolution of the old cohesions, upon which the constitution of
Parliament is based. The unrepresented social mass, which is now
flooding the substructure of the English Constitution, will only
stay its course at a universal suffrage, and a thorough and
arithmetical equalization of the constituencies, and will thus
attempt, and in a great measure achieve, a further dissolution of
the elective bodies. To meet the coming storm a certain fusion of
the old parties seems to be immediately requisite, though the
propertied classes, in defending their possessions, will certainly
not at first display their best qualities. As, further, a regular
formation in two parties cannot be kept up, a splitting up into
fractions, as in the parliaments of the Continent, will ensue, and
the changing of the ministry will modify itself accordingly, so
that the Crown will no longer be able to commit the helm of the
state in simple alternation to the leader of the one or the other
majority. And then a time will recur in which the _King in Council_
may have to undertake the actual leadership. (Vol. ii., pp. 452,
453.)
In other words, that an industrial society is incapable of
self-government! Note the reason for this remarkable conclusion--a
splitting up into fractions, _i.e._, imperfect organization.
Take now the evidence of the distinguished historian and publicist, Mr.
W.E.H. Leeky, M.P., as given in his recent work on "Democracy and
Liberty":--
After all due weight has been given to the possible remedies that
have been considered, it still seems to me that the parliamentary
system, when it rests on manhood suffrage, or something closely
approaching to manhood suffrage, is extremely unlikely to be
permanent. This was evidently the opinion of Tocqueville, who was
strongly persuaded that the natural result of democracy was a
highly concentrated, enervating, but mild despotism. It is the
opinion of many of the most eminent contemporary thinkers in France
and Germany, and it is, I think, steadily growing in England. This
does not mean that parliaments will cease, or that a wide suffrage
will be abolished. It means that parliaments, if constructed on
this type, cannot permanently remain the supreme power among the
nations of the world. Sooner or later they will sink by their own
vices and inefficiencies into a lower plane. They will lose the
power of making and unmaking ministries, and it will be found
absolutely necessary to establish some strong executive
independently of their fluctuations. Very probably this executive
may be established, as in America and under the French Empire, upon
a broad basis of an independent suffrage. Very possibly upper
chambers, constituted upon some sagacious plan, will again play a
great restraining and directing part in the government of the
world. Few persons who have watched the changes that have passed
over our own House of Commons within the last few years will either
believe or wish that in fifty years' time it can exercise the power
it now does. It is only too probable that some great catastrophe or
the stress of a great war may accelerate the change. (Vol. i., pp.
300, 301.)
And the reason assigned for this very unsatisfactory state of affairs is
precisely as before:
All the signs of the times point to the probability in England as
elsewhere of many ministries resting on precarious majorities
formed out of independent or heterogeneous groups. There are few
conditions less favourable to the healthy working of parliamentary
institutions or in which the danger of an uncontrolled House of
Commons is more evident. One consequence of this disintegration of
Parliament is a greatly increasing probability that policies which
the nation does not really wish for may be carried into effect. The
process which the Americans call "log-rolling" becomes very easy.
One minority will agree to support the objects of another minority
on condition of receiving in return a similar assistance, and a
number of small minorities aiming at different objects, no one of
which is really desired by the majority of the nation, may attain
their several ends by forming themselves into a political syndicate
and mutually co-operating. (Vol. i., pp. 152, 153.)
Mr. Lecky, too, holds out very little hope for the future:--
When the present evils infecting our parliamentary system have
grown still graver; when a democratic House, more and more broken
up into small groups, more and more governed by sectional and
interested motives, shall have shown itself evidently incompetent
to conduct the business of the country with honour, efficiency, and
safety; when the public has learned more fully the enormous danger
to national prosperity as well as individual happiness of
dissociating power from property and giving the many an unlimited
right of confiscating by taxation the possessions of the few--some
great reconstruction of government is sure to be demanded. Fifty or
even twenty-five years hence the current of political opinion in
England will be as different from that of our own day as
contemporary political tendencies are different from those in the
generation of our fathers. Experience and arguments that are now
dismissed may then revive, and play no small part in the politics
of the future.
Why make democracy the scapegoat for all these evils, when they are
simply due to the imperfect organization of democracy? In any case, the
most that could rightly be urged would be that universal suffrage had
come before its time. The conclusion that its time will never come is
certainly not warranted. Universal suffrage cannot be condemned till it
has had a fair trial under a rational system of election. Mr. Lecky
appreciates so little the connection between the method of election and
the splitting up into groups that he views without alarm the Hare
system, which would still further develop groups.
But perhaps no one has caught the spirit of party government more truly
than Mr. Lecky. Dealing with the motives which should actuate the
statesman, in his latest work, "The Map of Life," he writes:--
In free countries party government is the best if not the only way
of conducting public affairs, but it is impossible without a large
amount of moral compromise; without a frequent surrender of private
judgment and will. A good man will choose his party through
disinterested motives, and with a firm and honest conviction that
it represents the cast of policy most beneficial to the country. He
will on grave occasions assert his independence of party, but in
the large majority of cases he must act with his party, even if
they are pursuing courses in some degree contrary to his own
judgment.
Everyone who is actively engaged in politics--everyone especially
who is a member of the House of Commons--must soon learn that if
the absolute independence of individual judgment were pushed to its
extreme, political anarchy would ensue. The complete concurrence of
a large number of independent judgments in a complicated measure is
impossible. If party government is to be carried on there must be,
both in the Cabinet and in Parliament, perpetual compromise. The
first condition of its success is that the Government should have a
stable, permanent, disciplined support behind it, and in order that
this should be attained the individual member must in most cases
vote with his party. Sometimes he must support a measure which he
knows to be bad, because its rejection would involve a change of
government, which he believes would be a still greater evil than
its acceptance, and in order to prevent this evil he may have to
vote a direct negative to some resolution containing a statement
which he believes to be true, (p. 112.)
Mr. Lecky goes on to point out that "many things have to be done from
which a very rigid and austere nature would recoil;" but he
adds:--"Those who refuse to accept the conditions of parliamentary life
should abstain from entering into it." Moreover, he holds that
"inconsistency is no necessary condemnation of a politician, and
parties as well as individual statesmen have abundantly shown it." But
still "all this curious and indispensable mechanism of party government
is compatible with a high and genuine sense of public duty."
The American theory of government is that checks must be placed on a
democratic legislature by a fixed Constitution and a separate executive
exercising a veto. The late Professor Freeman Snow, of Harvard
University, was a strong supporter of this school. His objections to
cabinet government are given in the "Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science" for July, 1892:--
Cabinet government is the government of a party; and for its
successful operation it must have at all times a majority at its
back in Parliament. If it were possible to direct the current of
public opinion into exactly two channels, there would be but two
parties, one of which would generally be in the ascendency; but in
practice this is found to be a very difficult thing to accomplish,
and it becomes the more difficult as the right of suffrage is
extended to the mass of the people, with their ever-varying
interests. In the countries of continental Europe parties, if
indeed they may be said to exist, are broken up into groups, no two
or more of which ever act together for any considerable length of
time; and ministries are without a moment's notice confronted at
brief intervals with opposing majorities, and must give place to
others, whose tenure of office is, however, equally unstable and
ephemeral. There is no other alternative; one of the two great
parties must yield to any faction which becomes strong enough to
hold the balance of power between them, or suffer the inevitable
consequences--instability and impotence of government.
Dr. Snow evidently thought that it is not possible to direct the
current of public opinion into exactly two channels. He certainly had
not the slightest idea that it might be a matter of electoral machinery.
Finally, we may quote the opinion of Mr. James Bryce, M.P., whose
"American Commonwealth" is one of the most complete studies of the
tendencies of democracy in existence. Comparing the English and American
systems, he writes of the former:--
That system could not be deemed to have reached its maturity till
the power of the people at large had been established by the Reform
Act of 1832. For its essence resides in the delicate equipoise it
creates between the three powers, the ministry, the House of
Commons, and the people. The House is strong because it can call
the ministry to account for every act, and can by refusing supplies
compel their resignation. The ministry are not defenceless, because
they can dissolve Parliament, and ask the people to judge between
it and them. Parliament, when it displaces a ministry, does not
strike at executive authority; it merely changes its agents. The
ministry when they dissolve Parliament do not attack Parliament as
an institution; they recognise the supremacy of the body in asking
the country to change the individuals who compose it. Both the
House of Commons and the ministry act and move in the full view of
the people, who sit as arbiters, prepared to judge in any
controversy that may arise. The House is in touch with the people,
because every member must watch the lights and shadows of sentiment
which play over his own constituency. The ministry are in touch
with the people, because they are not only themselves
representatives, but are heads of a great party, sensitive to its
feelings, forced to weigh the effect of every act they do upon the
confidence which the party places in them.... The drawback to this
system of exquisite equipoise is the liability of its equilibrium
to be frequently disturbed, each disturbance involving either a
change of government, with immense temporary inconvenience to the
departments, or a general election, with immense expenditure of
money and trouble in the country. It is a system whose successful
working presupposes the existence of two great parties and no more,
parties each strong enough to restrain the violence of the other,
yet one of them steadily predominant in any given House of Commons.
Where a third, perhaps a fourth, party appears, the conditions are
changed. The scales of Parliament oscillate as the weight of this
detached group is thrown on one side or the other; dissolutions
become more frequent, and even dissolutions may fail to restore
stability. The recent history of the French Republic has shown the
difficulties of working a Chamber composed of groups, nor is the
same source of difficulty unknown in England. (Vol. i., pp. 286,
287.)
Thus we find the opinion unanimously held that the one great fault to
which cabinet government is liable is instability of the ministry, owing
to imperfect organization of public opinion into two definite lines of
policy. Bagehot called it a case of unstable equilibrium, and Bradford,
in "The Lesson of Popular Government," goes further when he
declares:--"Not to speak disrespectfully, the ministry is like a company
of men who, after excessive conviviality, are able to stand upright only
by holding on to each other."
Yet, after all, the amount of stability simply depends on the state of
organization; and England has demonstrated in the golden period of her
political history (about the middle of the present century) that the
cabinet form of government can be quite as stable as the presidential
form. Therefore, if the present position gives cause for alarm, it is
not in the abolition of the cabinet or the restriction of the suffrage
that the remedy must be sought, but in improved organization. And this,
we hope to show, involves improved electoral machinery.
+France.+--Turn to France. Is there no lesson to be drawn from the
history of that unstable country since the Revolution let loose its
flood of human passions, ambitions, and aspirations? Has not every
attempt at popular government failed for the same cause--want of
organization?
France before the Revolution had groaned for centuries under the burden
of a decayed feudalism and an absolute monarchy. The last vestige of
constitutional forms had disappeared. The representatives of the estates
had not been convened since the meeting of the States-General in 1614.
The widespread and unprecedented misery of the people caused them to
revolt against being taxed without their consent, and a cry went up for
a convocation of the estates. The finances were in such a bad way that
Louis XVI. was forced to consent, and the three estates--clergy, nobles,
and commons--met at Versailles in 1789. At first they called themselves
the National Assembly, but the King foolishly took up such a position
with regard to the people's representatives that they swore solemnly
that they would not separate till they had laid the foundation of a new
Constitution, and henceforth were known as the Constituent Assembly. It
was determined that the King should no longer be absolute, and the
choice lay between a constitutional monarchy and a republic. The
Declaration of the Rights of Man was first drawn up, and the Assembly
settled down to its task. The leading spirit was Mirabeau. He had been
to England, and had studied the British Constitution, and he rightly saw
that France was too distracted by faction to maintain an independent
executive. He therefore openly advocated a constitutional monarchy with
a cabinet chosen from among the majority of the representatives. But,
unfortunately, the Assembly refused to follow his lead; nor would the
King take his advice to make a separate appeal to the people. In the
midst of the negotiations Mirabeau died, and the last chance of
establishing a constitutional monarchy disappeared. The King realized
this, and tried to escape to the German frontier but was brought back.
He then accepted the new Constitution, and the Legislative Assembly was
elected in 1791. From the first it had no elements of stability, being
split up into groups, and subject to the fear of the Paris mob. The King
continued to plot with the emigrant nobles against the Constitution, and
the foreign armies massed on the frontier. The danger brought on the
triumph of the revolutionary spirit in 1792. The Paris commune
overwhelmed both the King and the Assembly, and the republic was
proclaimed. Then followed the execution of the King, the Reign of
Terror, the control of the Committee of Public Safety, till finally the
anarchy was ended by the military despotism of Bonaparte, who became
First Consul and afterwards Emperor.
What is the significance of these events in the light of our previous
examination of English history? Simply this: That the French, in passing
at once from absolutism and feudalism to complete self-government, were
trying to jump to the Second stage of representation without passing
through the first stage. Mirabeau was right; the republic was foredoomed
to failure because the people had learned neither the power of nor the
necessity for organization.
In many respects the French Revolution parallels the English Revolution.
In each case the King was beheaded; in each case the anarchy of a
disorganized representative body was succeeded by a military despotism;
and in each case the monarchy was restored.
It was after the restoration that the English system of party government
was developed. Why did this system not now take root in France? Partly
because France was not blessed with a king like William of Orange, and
partly because the new _systeme de bascule_, the balance system, in
which the king allows each faction in turn to hold the reins of power,
was discovered. So, instead of the gradual growth of constitutional
liberty which took place in England, the tendency in France was back to
absolutism. In 1830 Charles X., finding that he could not manage the
Chamber of Deputies, issued the ordinances of St. Cloud, suspending the
liberty of the press and dissolving the Legislature. Paris immediately
broke out into insurrection, and the King was forced to abdicate. The
crown was offered to Louis Philippe, and a second attempt at
constitutional monarchy was made. But France was too divided by her
unfortunate legacy of faction to maintain a continuous policy. The
Legitimists, the Republicans, and the Bonapartists were all awaiting
their opportunity. In 1848 the second revolution broke out in Paris; the
king fled to England, and a republic was again tried. But the
imperialist idea revived when Louis Napoleon was elected President. In
1851 he carried out his famous _coup d'etat,_ and again the Constitution
was swept away. In the following year he was accepted as Emperor by an
almost unanimous vote. Thus France again elected to be ruled by an
irresponsible head. The Third Empire ended with the capture of Napoleon
III. at Sedan in 1870, and since then France has carried on her third
experiment in republicanism. But still the fatal defect of
disorganization retards her progress; the Legislature is still split up
into contending factions, and in consequence it has been found
impossible to maintain a strong executive. Occasionally the factions
sink their differences for a time when their patriotism is appealed to,
as they have agreed to do during the currency of the present Exhibition,
but it is abundantly evident that France can never be well governed
till the people are able to organize two coherent parties. There is
ground for hope that the monarchical and imperialist ideas are
declining, and that the people are settling down to the conviction that
there is nothing left but the republic. What makes recovery difficult is
that the national character has been affected by the continual strife in
the direction of excitability and desire for change.
Those who wish to understand the forces which brought about the
different changes and revolutions, traced by one who has grasped their
meaning, should read the account in the first volume of Mr. Bradford's
"Lesson of Popular Government." His conclusion only need be quoted
here:--
As has been said, that which constitutes the strength of the
English. Government, that which has made up its history for the
last two hundred years, is the growth and continuity of two solid
and coherent parties. Occasionally they have wavered when available
leaders and issues were wanting, but as soon as a strong man came
forward to take the reins the ranks closed up and the work of
mutual competition again went on. On the other hand, the curse and
the cause of failure of representative government on the Continent
of Europe is the formation within the legislature of unstable and
dissolving groups. In France the Extreme Eight, the Eight, the
Eight Centre, the Left Centre, the Left, and the Extreme Left are
names of differing factions which unite only for temporary purposes
and to accomplish a victory over some other unit, but which are
fatal to stable and firm government. The same is true of Italy,
Spain, and Austria, and if not of Germany it is because military
despotism holds all alike in subjection.
Mr. Bodley has come to the same conclusion in his work on "France." He
writes:--
There is no restraining power in the French parliamentary system to
arrest a member on his easy descent, and he knows that if he
escapes penal condemnation he will enjoy relative impunity. Many
deputies are men of high integrity; but virtue in a large assembly
is of small force without organization, and, moreover, a group of
legislators leagued together as a vigilance committee would have
neither consistency nor durability, which the discipline of party
can alone effect. Corruption of this kind, which has undermined the
republic, could not co-exist with party government. A party whose
ministers or supporters had incurred as much suspicion as fell on
the politicians acquitted in the Panama affair would under it be
swept out of existence for a period. When the first denunciations
appeared, the leaders of the party, to avert that fate, would have
said to their implicated colleagues--"In spite of your abilities
and of the manifest exaggeration of these charges we must part
company, for though you may have been culpable only of
indiscretion, we cannot afford to be identified with doubtful
transactions;" and the Opposition, eager not to lose its vantage,
would scan with equal keenness the acts of its own members. With
party government the electorate would not have appeared to condone
those scandals. But as it was, when a deputy involved in them went
down before his constituents, whose local interest he had well
served, with no opponent more formidable than the nominee of some
decayed or immature group, they gave their votes to the old member,
whose influence with the prefecture in the past had benefited the
district, rather than to the new comer, whose denunciations had no
authority; whereas, had each electoral district been the scene of a
contest between organized parties, the same spectacle would not
have been presented." (Vol. ii., pp. 302, 303.)
Mr. Bodley has, in this last sentence, touched the heart of the
problem. If the salvation of France depends on making each electoral
district the scene of a contest between two organized parties, is not
electoral machinery destined to play an important part in the solution?
+The United States.+--The third great experiment in representative
democracy which the nineteenth century has furnished is that which is
being conducted in the United States. The contrast with France is
remarkable. Just as France is the supreme example of want of
organization, so America is the most conspicuous instance of perfect
organization into two great national parties which the world has seen.
Yet both experiments were started by a revolution, and practically at
the same time. The difference lay in the fact that the Americans
inherited the capacity for self-government from their British ancestors,
and had already practised it in colonial times, while the French only
inherited innumerable causes of dissension.
But organization is not the only characteristic feature of American
politics. Strange to say, it is accompanied by a suppression of
individuality just as complete. It is organization without responsible
leadership. For, in the first place, the politicians look on themselves
not as leaders but as followers of the people; and in the second place,
there are no leaders in Congress, corresponding to the cabinet ministers
of British countries.
Now, the view which we wish to emphasize here is that the present
position of American politics is the natural result of the principles
embodied in the Constitution adopted in 1789, when the Union was formed.
The complete organization and the want of leadership are directly to be
traced to the labours of George Washington and his associates. A brief
glance at the Constitution and the early history of its working will
make this clear.
The thirteen States which revolted from England worked fairly well
together under the "Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union" as
long as the war lasted, but as soon as peace was proclaimed it was, as
Washington said, no better than anarchy. The famous Convention of 1787
was therefore held, and the Constitution was drawn up. One guiding
principle of its framers was to divide power so as to place checks on
the will of the people, and on outbursts of popular passion, which were
then greatly dreaded. One means of attaining this object was the
attempted separation of the legislative and executive functions. We say
attempted advisedly, for time has but shown that the two are
inseparable. But the framers of the Constitution divided the legislative
function between the two Houses, and vested the executive function
almost entirely, as they thought, in the President. Montesquieu, in his
"_Esprit des Lois_" had laid down that the great merit of the English
Constitution was the separation of these functions, and the Americans
accepted this view. But, in truth, the English cabinet system had not
then been fully developed. The King was still, not only in appearance,
but to some extent also in fact, the head of the executive, and there
was nothing to indicate that ministers were so soon to become the real
leaders.
The effect of this provision was a struggle between the two branches for
supremacy, and the legislatures have won. The President has been
degraded to a mere agent, and the legislatures have absorbed the greater
part of executive functions, even to the control of finance. Now, the
framers of the Constitution were apprehensive that the President might
become a mere party agent, and they tried to strengthen his position by
two devices. First, they gave him the power to veto statutes unless
overruled by a two-thirds majority of Congress; and, secondly, they
provided for his election by an electoral college, or by a double system
of election. This second provision was designed to ensure the election
of a President for personal instead of for party reasons; but it has
proved a complete failure. Almost from the first the electoral delegates
have had to pledge themselves to support the party nominee. The veto,
therefore, has also become practically useless. Thus it has come about
that Congress is a body entirely without leaders.
A second defect in the Constitution was that it said nothing about the
right of any State to withdraw from the Union. After nearly 70 years
this omission was responsible for the Civil War. The legal basis for
secession was then abandoned, but combinations of States have since been
regarded with the greatest apprehension. This conviction that the Union
must be maintained at any price has had very important consequences on
the party system. The danger of allowing combinations of States to
dominate party lines was demonstrated; and the division of each State by
the same national parties was recognized as essential to safety.
In the meantime, as we have seen, Congress had practically got control
of the executive functions, which were supposed to be exercised by the
President, including the nominations to office. Thus every member of the
party in a majority had a share of the plunder, and "the spoils to the
victors" became the basis of party organization. The system soon
underwent such a remarkable development that nearly 200,000 public
offices were at the disposal of the victors at each election. The party
organizations immediately became omnipotent. The secret of their power
lay in the control of nominations. Each party would nominate one
candidate only, and the electors voted neither for men nor measures, but
blindly for party. As Mr. Bryce declares:--"The class of professional
politicians was therefore the first crop which the spoils system--the
system of using public office as private prize of war--bore. Bosses
were the second crop."
The development which these party organizations have now reached is
extraordinary. Practically we may say that there are only two
parties--Republicans and Democrats--and they dominate not only Federal
and State politics but also city government. Each party has its list of
registered electors, and each holds a primary election before the real
election, to decide the party candidate. But these primary elections are
a mere matter of form. Only a small fraction of the electors attend
them, and only those who have always supported the party are allowed to
vote. The nominations are therefore really controlled, by fraud if
necessary, by the "ring" of party managers. Generally there is one man
who can pull the most strings, and he becomes the "boss." All power is
centred in the hands of this irresponsible despot. The men who are
elected owe their positions to him, and are responsible to him, not to
the public.
Remember that these "machine" organizations have absolute sway in every
electorate, from one end of the United States to the other. It may be
wondered why the people tolerate them, but they are powerless. Sometimes
an independent movement is attempted, but it very rarely succeeds, and
even when it does the two "machines" combine against it and agree to
divide the spoils. Mr. Bryce writes:--
The disgust is less than a European expects, for it is mingled
with amusement. The "boss" is a sort of joke, albeit an expensive
joke. "After all," people say, "it is our own fault. If we all went
to the primaries, or if we all voted an independent ticket, we
could make an end of the 'boss.'" There is a sort of fatalism in
their view of democracy. (Vol ii., p. 241.)
What is the meaning of all this wonderful party machinery? It is this:
that organization without responsible leadership can only be founded on
corruption. In other words, _the spoils system is the price which the
United States pay for maintaining the Union under the present
Constitution_. The fault lies ultimately, therefore, in the
Constitution, which tends to repress responsible leadership.
Now, the mass of public opinion in America, as Mr. Bryce continually
points out, is sound, and attempts have not been wanting to put an end
to the system of rotation in public offices. A sustained agitation for
civil service reform was entered upon, and the system of competitive
examination was applied to a large number of offices. Now at last, the
reformers thought, American politics would be purified. But, no! The
corruption, simply took a new and more alarming turn. Direct money
contributions took the place of the spoils. It became the practice to
levy blackmail on corporations either to be let alone, or for the
purpose of fleecing the public. The monopolies granted to protected
industries are the source of a large share of these "campaign funds."
The Legislatures are crowded by professional lobbyists, and it is, in
consequence, impossible to obtain justice against the corporations.
Surely no stronger proof can be needed that corruption is and must
remain the basis of organization so long as there is no responsible
leadership.
It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that the Americans are not
alive to the failure of their representative institutions. Since Mr.
Bryce's great work on "The American Commonwealth" was published two
books by American authors have appeared which are very outspoken in
condemnation. These are "The Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy," by Mr.
E.L. Godkin; and "The Lesson of Popular Government," by Mr. Gamaliel
Bradford. The keynote of the first of these two books is to abolish
corruption by destroying the power of the "machine" and the "boss," and
of the second to introduce responsible leadership. Mr. Godkin traces the
disappearance of distinguished men from public life to the control of
all entrance to it by the "machine." The reform of primary elections, he
holds, is then the first necessity, since "independent voting" has
ceased to be a remedy. But he fails to find a solution. The conclusion
he comes to is as follows:--
Is the situation then hopeless? Are we tied up inexorably simply to
a choice of evils? I think not. It seems to me that the nomination
of candidates is another of the problems of democracy which are
never seriously attacked without prolonged perception and
discussion of their importance. One of these was the formation of
the federal government; another was the abolition of slavery;
another was the reform of the civil service. Every one of them
looked hopeless in the beginning; but the solution came in each
case, through the popular determination to find some better way.
(Pp. 92, 93.)
But the evil goes far deeper than Mr. Godkin appears to think. To
abolish corruption is to take away the present basis of organization
without substituting any other. If irresponsible leadership is to be
abandoned, responsible leadership must be introduced. Mr. Bradford's
plan, therefore, promises more, for if responsible leadership could be
introduced into Congress corruption would then be abolished also.
Mr. Bradford's whole book may be said to be a study of the relations of
the executive to the legislature, and the conclusions at which he
arrives are a complete vindication of cabinet government. But he finds
one fault, and that is the instability of ministries, which he confesses
has not been apparent so far in the British House of Commons. He holds,
however, that it will become more apparent with the rising tide of
democracy. It is rather amusing to find that the greatest obstacle which
has to be overcome in proposing a responsible executive is the
veneration in which the Constitution is still held and the dislike to
copying anything from England. His plan is, therefore, an adaptation of
the cabinet to the conditions imposed by the Constitution. He holds that
the ministers appointed by the President should sit in Congress and have
control of the initiation of legislation. It is to be feared that this
would hardly realize the idea of responsible leadership. Mr. Bradford
establishes a chain of responsibility by the fact that the ministers are
responsible to the President and the President is responsible to the
people; but that is a very different thing to the continual
responsibility of the cabinet to a majority of the legislature. It is
probable that the President's ministers would have to encounter the
opposition of a majority in one or both Houses, and it is difficult to
see how a deadlock could be avoided. Mr. Bradford contemplates that the
people would settle any issues which arise between the two branches at
the end of the Presidential term of four years; but it is just as likely
that there would then be a new President in any case. We are driven to
the conclusion, therefore, that responsible leadership is incompatible
with the American system of divided powers and fixed terms of office.
Mr. Bryce comments on the proposal as follows:--
It is hard to say, when one begins to make alterations in an old
house, how far one will be led on in rebuilding, and I doubt
whether this change in the present American system, possibly in
itself desirable, might not be found to involve a reconstruction
large enough to put a new face upon several parts of that system.
(Vol. i, pp. 290, 291.)
This is very true, but is not a new building required? Is not the old
house built on a rotten foundation? Mr. Bradford has certainly
overlooked the effect of his proposal on party organization for one
thing. If the power over legislation, and especially over expenditure of
public money, is to be taken away from the irresponsible committees of
Congress, the basis of party organization would cease to be corruption,
and both representatives and parties would have to take on an entirely
new character. As to the present character of representatives, Mr. Bryce
advances a number of reasons why the best men do not go in for politics,
such as the want of a social and commercial capital, the residential
qualification, the comparative dullness of politics, the attractiveness
of other careers, &c, but Mr. Bradford declares that the one explanation
which goes further than all these is the absorption of all the powers of
the government by the legislature, and the consequent suppression of
individuality. He writes:--
The voters are urged to send to Congress men of character, ability,
and public spirit. They might as well be asked to select men of
that quality to follow the profession of burglars, a comparison
which is not intended to convey any disrespect to the number of
honest and respectable men who constantly are sent to Congress.
Chosen as burglars, they would fail just the same in the
business.... It is the organization of Congress which offers every
facility to those who wish to buy and those who wish to be bought.
Again, as to the present character of parties, Mr. Bradford declares:--
The names of the two great parties, Republicans and Democrats, have
in themselves and at the present time no meaning at all.
Simply because the basis of organization is corruption, and not
questions of public policy. For the same reason recent elections have
been fought on popular "crazes," such as the silver question. But Mr.
Bradford says:--
New parties cannot be formed on constantly changing issues, since
to have any strength they must have a certain degree of permanence.
The only two nations which have succeeded in forming great national
parties are Great Britain and the United States. In other European
countries the splitting into groups has almost made representative
government impossible.
What Mr. Bradford has failed to appreciate is that the absolutely rigid
division into two camps which prevails in America is founded on
corruption, and will disappear when corruption is abolished. In the
United States such a thing as a Congressman deserting one party for the
other is practically unknown. In Great Britain, on the contrary, party
lines do continually change as new issues arise; and when they are
founded on questions of public policy it must be so. What gives them
permanence is that certain principles underlie most questions, and men
who have the same political principles are likely to think the same on
any single question; and further that a member would rather follow his
party and sacrifice his opinion on a single question than sacrifice most
of his principles.
Therefore, even if the Americans do succeed in purifying their politics,
they will be faced with the same difficulty as exists elsewhere--namely,
such improved organization as will secure the return of representatives
on questions of general public policy only. The present system of
single-membered electorates will not suffice. The only remedy lies in
enlarged electorates with electoral machinery which will organize public
opinion into two definite lines of policy, and will, by allowing
individual candidature merge the primary election into the actual
election.
All this involves a radical alteration, both in the Constitution and in
the methods of election. But the United States have the great advantage
over France that it does not involve also a serious change in the
national character. It is not unlikely that some such reform must be
brought about before long.
The present position cannot last. The Republican party has so long
identified itself with Capital in all its forms, with the protected
monopolists, the trusts and the corporations, that the mass of Labour
threatens to support the Democrats; and as the latter party maintains
the doctrines of direct government and the infallibility of the
majority, the result will be such a financial crisis and such an
industrial revolution that the Americans will have at last to admit that
their government needs total reconstruction.
+Australia.+--On the first day of the nineteenth century the Union of
the Parliaments of Great Britain and Ireland was accomplished; on the
first day of the twentieth century Britain's daughters in the southern
seas will inaugurate, under her ægis, a new experiment in
democracy--the Australian Commonwealth. The time is opportune, then, for
a review of the tendencies of Australian politics, and for a comparison
with the other great democracies. Thus only can we attempt to cast the
horoscope of the new nation.
Australia starts with many advantages over France and America. The
science of government is better understood now than when they started;
the folly of placing too many checks on the people is recognized; and
the British system of responsible leadership by a cabinet in the
legislature is fully developed. All these features are embodied in the
Constitution, and it only remains for the people to prove their fitness
to work it.
Applying the same tests as we have used in the case of the great
democracies to the present position of Australian politics, what is the
result? First, as regards organization, where do we stand? It must be
confessed that we are far behind Great Britain and America, though
certainly we are not in the same sad plight as France. Still there is
the fact that we are classed among the failures. Take the evidence of
Mr. E.L. Godkin in "Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy:"--
In his Journals during a visit to Turin in 1850, Senior records a
conversation with Cesare Balbo, a member of the Chamber in the
first Piedmontese Parliament, in which Balbo said, after an
exciting financial debate:--"We have not yet acquired parliamentary
discipline. Most of the members are more anxious about their own
crotchets or their own consistency than about the country. The
ministry has a large nominal majority, but every member of it is
ready to put them in a minority for any whim of his own." This was
probably true of every legislative body on the Continent, and it
continues true to this day in Italy, Greece, France, Austria,
Germany, and the new Australian democracies. (Pp. 102, 103.)
He adduces in support of the statement the fact that the three colonies
of New South Wales, South Australia, and Victoria have had respectively
twenty-eight, forty-two, and twenty-six ministries in forty years. Is
the prospect any brighter for the new Commonwealth? It is to be feared
not, if the present tendencies towards disintegration are allowed to
grow. For in the last decade a change has come over Australian politics
which portends the gravest danger. We refer to the direct class
representation which, under the name of Labour parties, has spread all
over the colonies. These so-called Labour "parties" are neither more nor
less than class factions. Their policy is everywhere the same--viz., the
use of the "balance system," which has proved so disastrous to France.
The worst effect is that they prevent the main parties from working out
definite policies on public questions, and cause them also to degenerate
into factions. In Victoria we have actually had the ludicrous spectacle
of the Opposition saving the Government time after time when deserted by
its own followers. In New South Wales the individual member is sunk in
the party; he must vote as the majority decides. Mr. Reid's term of
office was ended by one such caucus. In Queensland, where the party is
strongest, it has now practically become one of the main parties, and
the whole colony is divided on class lines. Already an Intercolonial
Labour Conference has been held, and a pledge drawn up which must be
signed by all candidates for the party support at Federal elections. The
danger of these tactics is not rightly apprehended in Australia. In
reality they mark the first step towards social disruption. We may cite
the authority of Mr. James Bryce on this point. After pointing out in
"The American Commonwealth" that since the Civil War combinations of
States have always acted through the national parties, he writes:--
This is an important security against disruption. And a similar
security against the risk of civil strife or revolution is to be
found in the fact that the parties are not based on or sensibly
affected by differences either of wealth or of social position.
Their cleavage is not horizontal, according to social strata, but
vertical. This would be less true if it were stated either of the
Northern States separately, or of the Southern States separately:
it is true of the Union taken as a whole. It might cease to be true
if the new Labour party were to grow till it absorbed or superseded
either of the existing parties. The same feature has characterized
English politics as compared with those of most European countries,
and has been a main cause of the stability of the English
government and of the good feeling between different classes in the
community. (Vol. ii., p. 38.)
How is it that the public conscience is not alive to the enormity of
this anti-social crime? Mainly, we think, because the true principles of
representation are not properly understood. It is almost universally
assumed that there is no real distinction between direct and
representative government. Minorities are tacitly allowed to have as
much right to representation as the minority, and the confusion of terms
is passed over. The working classes are told by self-seeking demagogues
that they are in a majority; that the majority is entitled to rule; and
that they have only to organize to come into their heritage. These
sycophants, who, as Aristotle of old pointed out, bear the greatest
resemblance to the court favourite of the tyrant, ask the people to
believe the silly paradox that the united wisdom of the whole people is
greater than that of the wisest part. The truth is that no people is fit
to exercise equal political rights which is not sensible enough to
choose the wisest part to carry on the government, providing only they
have control over their selection, and can hold them responsible. Are
the working classes in Australia going to demonstrate that they are
unfit for the exercise of political rights? Are they going to justify
the prognostications of the opponents of popular government? That is the
real question at issue. Unless public opinion be aroused to the iniquity
of class delegation, the further degradation of Australian politics is
inevitable. Let it not be thought that we are decrying the organization
of the working classes for political purposes. On the contrary, we hold
that the organization of every class and every interest is necessary in
order that it shall exert its just share of influence. But the only way
in which every class can get its just share is by acting through the
two main parties. A class which holds aloof can exert for a short time
an undue share of influence, as a faction holding the balance of power,
but only at the expense of paralyzing the government.
But the working classes are hardly to be blamed in this matter, for it
is a fact that before their action they were not able to exert their
just share of influence. The government was such as to promote the rule
of private interests instead of the general welfare, and, consequently,
their interests were shamefully neglected. The real cause of the
mischief was, as in America, the nominating system, which is inseparably
connected with the present method of election. The consideration of this
question brings us to the second characteristic of Australian
politics--namely, the irresponsible leadership of the press.
We have seen how in America organization has been effected without
responsible leadership in Congress, only at the expense of the
irresponsible leadership of the "rings" and "bosses" who control the
"machines." In Australia an analogous result has been brought about by
different causes. We have not had civil strife to teach us the necessity
of organization, nor have we a spoils system available as a basis, but
the disorganized state of the legislatures and the consequent weakness
of the executive have thrown a large share of leadership into the hands
of the press. Both in America and in Australia the prevalence of the
ultra-democratic theory that representatives should follow and not lead
the people has been a powerful contributing cause. And yet it is as
clear as possible that the choice lies between two alternatives. The
people must either submit to responsible leadership in Parliament or to
irresponsible leadership outside. The ultra-democrats hold that
responsible leadership in Parliament is incompatible with popular
government. We believe that this is the fundamental error which is
leading both the Australian and the American democracies astray. On the
contrary, it is the irresponsible despotism which is exercised by the
"bosses" in America and the newspapers in Australia which is really
incompatible with free government.
The source of the error lies in the failure to grasp the meaning of the
term "responsible leadership." It is assumed that either the people must
lead and the representatives follow, or the representatives must lead
and the people follow. Bagehot may be taken as an exponent of the latter
position. He thought that cabinet government was only possible with a
deferential nation as opposed to a democratic nation. England he held to
be the type of deferential nations, because the people were content to
leave the government to the "great governing families"--_i.e._, to defer
to caste, which is in principle the same as deferring to a king, who is
supposed to rule by divine right. Mr. Bradford also gives a somewhat
exaggerated idea of the importance of the force of personality when he
declares that the mass of the people have no "views" on public
questions; all they want is to be well governed. The late Professor
Freeman Snow, of Harvard University, U.S., was a supporter of the
ultra-democratic view. In the "Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science" for July, 1892, he declares:--
Mr. Bryce thinks that, "like other crowds, a legislature must be
led and ruled." And he has formulated a theory which he believes to
be "the essence of free or popular government, and the
justification for vesting power in numbers." "Every question that
arises in the conduct of government," he asserts, "is either a
question of ends or a question of means." And as the "masses are
better judges of what will conduce to their happiness than are
the-classes placed above them, they must be allowed to determine
ends." But, assuming the end to be given, they--the masses--should
leave to their leaders--the trained statesmen--the choice of means.
The defect in this theory is that it depends for its successful
operation upon the continued "deference of the multitude for the
classes placed above them ... upon the principle of _noblesse
oblige_," a principle, by the way, derived from feudal monarchy,
which has no existence in the United States, and which ought to be
considered a misfortune in any free country....
Mr. Bryce has made a step in advance of Mr Bagehot in trusting the
people to determine ends, whatever they may be; why not go one step
further, and trust them to determine all questions of policy?
These are the two opposite points of view. They are both equally wrong.
The first is simply irresponsible leadership, and the second amounts to
the same thing in practice, however much the people may appear to lead
in theory. The true position is that the relation between the
representatives and the people is reciprocal. Both lead and both follow.
The people defer to the representatives, not on account of rank or
caste, nor upon the principle of _noblesse oblige_, but only in so far
as the representatives are able to demonstrate their fitness to devise
measures for the general welfare. The people, on the other hand, are the
ultimate judges, both of measures and of men. This mutual action and
reaction constitutes the responsible leadership, which is one of the
fundamental principles underlying the device of representation. To it we
have already traced the virtue of representation as a social force,
capable of moulding national character and of appealing to the higher
nature of the people.
An elector who is unable or unwilling to decide grave questions of
public policy himself may be a very shrewd judge as to who is best
fitted to decide them; and deference to ability is totally different in
principle to deference to caste. In a country in the transitional stage
between aristocracy and democracy, his judgment may be based partly on
the principle of _noblesse oblige_; but there is not the slightest
reason why in a democratic country he should require the representative
to defer to him. He will merely require a higher standard and a closer
and a more constant demonstration that the measures proposed are
conducive to the public well-being. Moreover, it is still necessary that
the representatives should be judged periodically on general lines of
policy, and that the elector should not have the power of exercising
control on single questions. Under these conditions the result of the
mutual relation will be an improvement on both sides. But if, under the
influence of irresponsible leadership outside Parliament, the people
insist on increasing control over their representatives, then not only
is Parliament degraded, but progress towards government in the general
welfare is stopped.
This long digression as to the real meaning of responsible leadership is
necessary in order to gauge the drift of the prevailing tendency towards
the irresponsible leadership of the press in Australia. The evil exists
in all the colonies, but it is perhaps worse in our own colony of
Victoria than in any other country in the world, although it is said to
be very bad in Switzerland since the referendum was introduced. We have
two morning newspapers in Melbourne, which take opposite sides on nearly
every question which arises. They admit into their columns no facts and
no arguments which tell against the position they have taken up; nay,
more, they resort to downright misrepresentation to support it. It will
be said that this is only a form of the party game, but the danger lies
in the fact that they circulate in different classes, and therefore
these classes see only one side of every question. Moreover, in their
competition for the support of classes in which they desire to increase
their circulation they use their influence to secure legislation which
will appeal to class prejudices, or even undertake a prolonged agitation
to relieve special interests from legitimate charges. The _Age_ has for
a long time thrived by pandering to the prejudices of the working
classes, and especially of the artisans; the _Argus_ now seeks to get
even by creating dissension between town and country.
All this interference with the functions of Parliament has a baneful
influence on the working of the political machine. The party lines are
practically decided by the newspaper contest. We have spoken of the
resemblance to the "machine" control over American politics. One of the
newspapers is, in effect, managed by a "ring," the other by a "boss."
The despotism of David Syme in Melbourne is as unquestioned as that of
Richard Croker in New York, or Matthew Quay in Pennsylvania. How close
the analogy is may be inferred from the fact that Mr. Syme has
exercised, and still claims the right to exercise, control over
nominations to Parliament. It is notorious that the ten delegates who
"represented" Victoria at the Federation Convention were elected on the
_Age_ "ticket." Again, Mr. Syme is known as "the father of protection,"
and has been able, by the force of his indomitable will, to impose on
the colony a tariff which can be compared only to the M'Kinley tariff
in America, thus showing that irresponsible leadership in either form is
more favourable to the rule of private interests than to the general
welfare.
We have said enough to show that in internal affairs the influence of
the press, when it directly interferes with Parliament is an anti-social
force. In matters of foreign policy the case is still worse. The press
is almost universally jingoistic, because it is financially interested
in sensationalism. A war generally means a fortune to newspaper
proprietors. In such matters, therefore, responsible leadership by
Parliament is still more urgently required.
We now come to the claim of those ultra-democrats who preach the
poisonous doctrines of direct government and of unrestrained majority
rule, that responsible leadership is incompatible with popular
government. This claim, is of course, supported by the radical press in
Australia. We have already quoted from Mr. Syme's work on
"Representative Government in England" the extreme views in which he
confuses representation with delegation. "Popular government," he
declares, "can only exist where the people can exercise control over
their representatives at all times and under all circumstances." The
method proposed to obtain this control is to give a majority of the
constituents power to dismiss a representative at any time, and is
utterly impracticable. Imagine the position of a member elected by a
majority of one or two votes! The true way to prevent members abusing
their trust is not to increase the direct control of the people, but to
prevent the control of the press and all other irresponsible agencies
over them; and so to ensure the return of better men.
Perhaps the most striking anomaly in Mr. Syme's position is that, while
he would confine the office of Parliament to expressing public opinion,
he declares in the same work that "the press at once forms and expresses
public opinion."[2] Now, it is quite true that if Parliament is weak and
disorganized, or occupies itself in fighting for the spoils of office,
the power of forming public opinion is thrown into the hands of the
press. But the more power is seized by the press, the more Parliament is
degraded, and the less is the chance of recovery. The situation presents
little difficulty to Mr. Syme. Every newspaper reader, he declares,
"becomes, as it were, a member of that vast assembly, which may be said
to embrace the whole nation, so widely are newspapers now read. Had we
only the machinery for recording the votes of that assembly, we might
easily dispense with Parliament altogether."
These ideas are not of mere academic interest; they have dominated the
trend of Victorian politics for many years. The time has now arrived for
the people to consider whether it is better to keep a Parliament of weak
delegates to express the public opinion which is formed by the press
than to elect a Parliament of "leaders of the people," highly-trained
legists, economists, and sociologists, to form and direct the public
opinion which is expressed by the newspapers. Why should the principle
of leadership, as exemplified in Mr. Syme's own career, be given full
scope in the press, and entirely repressed in Parliament? As to the kind
of influence we mean, no better description could be given than that of
the well-known Labour leader, Mr. H.H. Champion. In an open letter to
Mr. David Syme in the _Champion_ of 22nd June, 1895, he wrote:--
Yet, if you rose to-morrow morning with the resolve to dismiss the
ministry or to reverse the policy of the country, to stop
retrenchment or to recommence borrowing, that resolve would
infallibly translate itself into fact in a few weeks.
In no country that I know of has any organ in the press so much
influence as your paper. It is practically the sole source of
information for the majority of the people. It has no competitors.
It can make any person or policy popular or unpopular. It can fail
to report any man or thing, and for four-fifths of the citizens it
is as though that man or thing were not. It can misrepresent any
speech or movement, and the printed lie alone will reach the
electors. It could teach the people anything you choose. It has
ruled the country for a couple of decades. It rules the country
to-day.
Professor Jethro Brown shows himself alive to the danger of press
domination in Australia. In "The New Democracy" he writes:--"The
_prestige_ of Parliament is destroyed when its deliberations and
conclusions cease to be the determining factor in legislation. The
transfer of the real responsibility for legislation to a new power
implies the discrediting of the old school for training leaders." And he
quotes with approval the expression of opinion by the Honourable B.R.
Wise in the Federal Convention:--
There may be, as Mr. David Syme suggests, no risk involved in the
change of masters; but for my part I would sooner trust the
destinies of the country to the worst Parliament the people of
Australia would elect than to the best newspaper the mind of man
has ever imagined.
It is little use, therefore, for the press to further degrade Parliament
in the eyes of the people by railing at it in the following terms:--
So it is that Parliament as a working machine is about the
clumsiest and least effective that can be conceived of. All our
Parliaments are modelled on the necessities of bygone centuries. We
want a working Parliament improved up to date; but we lack
political invention, and have to jog along with the old lumbering
machine--a sort of bullock dray trying to compete with an age of
electric railways and motor cars.[3]
The remedy lies with the press itself. Let it abandon all illegitimate
influence, and use its power in a legitimate direction to give effect to
the principles of organization and responsible leadership in Parliament.
But just as the Labour faction cannot altogether be blamed for the
present disintegration of Parliament, so the press cannot be held
responsible for its degradation. In both eases cause and effect have
been interrelated. The mistake which the press has made has been in not
perceiving that the more it interferes with the legitimate functions of
Parliament, even although with the best intentions, the more it degrades
Parliament.
We have now passed in review the two great dangers which assail the
Commonwealth at the inception of federation. We have shown how
intimately related they are to the two great principles underlying
representative government--organization and leadership. Nay, we have
seen that all the varied phenomena presented by the great democracies of
the world can be expressed in terms of the same two principles.
It remains to show that to give effect to the expression of these two
principles in a more perfect manner than ever yet attained is a problem
of electoral machinery. This task we shall now undertake.
FOOTNOTES:
[2] "Representative Government in England," p. 123.
[3] _Age_, 28th June, 1900.