THE REFORM: TRUE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
How to give effect to the principles of organization and leadership in
an electoral reform--that is the problem which we shall now attempt to
solve. We have already laid down the theoretical requirements, which are
(1) proportional representation to the two parties--the majority and the
minority, and (2) the election by each party separately of its most
popular leaders; and we shall now have to consider also how these
requirements are modified by practical considerations.
+Proportional Representation to the Two Parties, the Majority and the
Minority.+--It will be as well to illustrate the method proposed by
reference to the conditions imposed by an actual election, such as that
for the Federal Senate. The Commonwealth Bill provides that each State
shall be polled as a single electorate, returning six senators. Suppose
that 120,000 electors vote on party lines in any State. It is clear that
a party which has the support of 20,000 electors is entitled to one
senator; also, that a party which has the support of 40,000 electors is
entitled to two senators; of 60,000 electors to three senators, and so
on. Now, suppose that one party has the support of 50,000 electors, and
the other of 70,000 electors, then the minority is entitled to two and a
half senators, and the majority to three and a half senators. But
senators are living units, and cannot be divided into fractions. The
question therefore arises, Which is entitled to the odd senator, the
majority or the minority? And the answer is that they are both equally
entitled to him; for it is as much a tie as if each party has the
support of 10,000 electors in a single-seat electorate. But if the
minority had the support of 49,999 electors, or one elector less, it
would be entitled to only two senators, and if it had the support of
50,001 electors, or one elector more, it would be entitled to three
senators.
From the above simple facts can be deduced general rules applicable to
any particular case. It is evident that the result is not affected by
the number of votes allowed to each elector, providing only that each
elector has the same number of votes. It is also quite irrespective of
the number of candidates nominated in the interests of each party. But
it would never do to allow party organizations to control nominations.
How are we to combine individual candidature with party nomination? The
only way to do this is to require that each candidate shall declare,
either when nominating or a few days before the election, on which side
of the House he intends to sit, and be classified accordingly as
Ministerialist or Oppositionist. To decide the relative strengths of the
two parties, it is then only necessary to take the aggregate votes
polled by all the candidates nominated for each party as a measure of
the amount of support which it receives.
The great advantages of this provision are at once apparent. There is no
incentive to limit the number of candidates so as to prevent splitting
the votes. On the contrary, it is to the interest of each party to get
as many strong candidates as possible to stand in its interests. There
will be no necessity to ask any candidate to retire for fear of losing a
seat to the party. Thus the control of nominations, which leads to the
worst abuses of the present system, will be entirely obviated.
Now, suppose that in the instance we have already given each elector is
allowed to vote for one candidate only, the total number of votes
recorded will be 120,000. Then the _unit of representation_ or number of
votes which entitle a party to one senator will be 20,000 votes; each
party will be entitled to one senator for every whole unit of
representation, and the odd senator will go to the party having the
larger remainder. For instance, if the aggregate votes polled by all the
Ministerialist candidates be 72,000, and by the Oppositionist candidates
48,000, the Ministerialists, having three units plus 12,000 remainder,
are entitled to four senators, and the Opposition, having two units plus
8,000, to two senators.
Similarly, if each elector be allowed to vote for a number of
candidates, all these figures will be increased in proportion. For
example, if each elector has three votes, the unit of representation
would be 60,000 votes. The following general rules may therefore be
stated:--
1. The unit of representation is equal to the total number of valid
votes cast at the election, divided by the number of seats.
2. Each party is entitled to one seat for every whole unit of
representation contained in the aggregate votes polled by all its
candidates, and the odd seat goes to the party which has the larger
remainder.
The fact that the last seat has to be assigned to the party which has
the larger remainder is sometimes advanced as an objection, but it is
evidently the fairest possible division that the size of the electorate
will permit. Of course, the larger the electorate the more accurately
proportioned will be the representation. Hence the representation would
be most accurate if the whole assembly were elected in one large
electorate. But if, for the sake of convenience, the assembly be elected
in a large number of electorates in which the relative proportions of
two parties vary the gains which a party makes in some electorates will
be balanced by losses in others, so that the final result would be
almost as accurate as if the whole country were polled as one
electorate. It must be remembered that the result in any electorate
cannot be foreseen, and that it is a matter of chance which party gains
the advantage. Now, if the limits of variation comprise even a single
unit of representation, each party will stand an equal chance of
gaining, and therefore the laws of chance will ensure that the gains
balance the losses in the different electorates. Supposing a party which
averages 40 per cent. in the whole country to vary between 30 per cent.
and 50 per cent, in the different electorates (which may be taken as a
fair assumption), the unit of representation should equal 20 per cent.,
or one-fifth. Under these conditions the laws of chance will ensure
correct representation, so long as the electorates do not contain less
than five seats.
The above facts furnish a complete answer to the arguments advanced by
Mr. J.W. M'Cay, ex-M.L.A., in a series of articles in the _Age_ against
the application of proportional representation to the Federal Senate.
While apparently recognizing that it is utterly impossible for the
minority to secure a majority of the representation, he based his
objection solely on the fact that a minority is able with electorates
containing an even number of seats to secure one-half of the
representation, and thus lead to what he terms "the minority block."
The force of the objection will entirely depend on the size of the
minority which is able thus to thwart the will of the majority. The
Federal Senate will consist of 36 senators, each of the original States
contributing six. No reasonable man would complain if the minority,
being only entitled to 17 senators, actually returned 18, but Mr. M'Cay
points out that it is possible for a minority entitled to 15 senators to
return 18. To bring about this result he makes the absurd assumption
that in each of the six States the minority polls exactly two whole
units of representation, and a bare majority of a third unit. It is safe
to say that this would not happen once in a thousand years. If the
relative proportions of the two parties vary in the slightest in the
different States some must be under and some over the assumed
proportion. It is most probable that it will be under it in three States
and over it in the other three States; and, under these circumstances,
the party will return 15 senators, the exact number to which it is
entitled. It may happen to be under the assumed proportion in only two
of the States and over in the other four, and that the party will get
one more senator than it is entitled to; but it is extremely improbable
that it will get two more, and virtually impossible that it will get
three more senators than its just proportion. Mr. M'Cay's conclusion
that proportional representation can only be used in electorates
returning an odd number of representatives is shown to be entirely
unwarranted. Equally fallacious is Professor Nanson's rebutting
statement that "scientific proportionalists recommend odd electorates."
While the number of States remains even, the mathematical chance of a
minority securing one-half of the representation is precisely the same
whether the States return an odd or an even number of senators. As a
matter of fact, the danger of a minority securing one-half of the
representation is much greater at the intermediate elections for the
Senate, when each State returns three senators, the reason being the
smaller field.
We have dwelt at some length on the preceding example, because it serves
to refute another error into which some of the proportionalists have
fallen. It is held that the unit of representation should be ascertained
by dividing the total votes, not by the number of seats, but by the
seats increased by one. This unit is generally known as the Droop quota,
having been proposed in a work published by Mr. H.R. Droop in 1869.
Since one vote more than one-half of the total votes is sufficient for
election in a single-seat electorate, it is argued that one vote more
than one-third suffices in a two-seat electorate, one vote more than
one-fourth in a three-seat electorate, and so on. The unit in a six-seat
electorate would be one-seventh of the votes instead of one-sixth, and
it is pointed out that by this means the whole six seats would be filled
by whole units, leaving an unrepresented residuum of one-seventh of the
votes divided between the two parties.
The error lies precisely as before in concentrating attention on one of
the electorates, and in neglecting the theory of probability. The Droop
quota introduces the condition that each party must pay a certain
minimum number of votes for each seat, and the real distinction is that,
instead of the minority and the majority having an equal chance of
securing any advantage, the chances are in the same proportion as their
relative strengths. If the majority be twice as strong as the minority,
it will have twice the chance of gaining the advantage. To prove this,
consider the position of a one-third minority in a number of five-seat
electorates. The Droop quota being one-sixth of the votes, the minority
will secure two seats or 40 per cent. in those electorates where it is
just over one-third, and one seat or 20 per cent. where it is just
under. Since the mathematical chances are that it will be over in one
half and under in the other half, it will, on the average, secure only
30 per cent., although entitled to 33 per cent. Again, if the 670
members of the House of Commons were elected in three to five-seat
electorates, and the Droop quota used as proposed by Sir John Lubbock,
and if the Ministerialists were twice as strong as the Oppositionists,
they would, on the average, return 30 more members than the two-thirds
to which they are entitled, and this would count 60 members on a
division.
The following table illustrates the erroneous result obtained by
applying the Droop quota when a number of grouped-electorates are
concerned. It will be noticed that where parties are nearly equal it
makes very little difference which unit is used:--
+-------------+--------------------------------------------+
| STRENGTH OF | AVERAGE REPRESENTATION. |
| +----------------------+---------------------+
| PARTY |Five-Seat Electorates.|Ten-Seat Electorates.|
+-------------+----------------------+---------------------+
| 10 per cent.| 2 per cent. | 6 per cent. |
| 20 " " | 14 " " | 17 " " |
| 30 " " | 26 " " | 28 " " |
| 40 " " | 38 " " | 39 " " |
| 50 " " | 50 " " | 50 " " |
+-------------+----------------------+---------------------+
The Droop quota, therefore, gives, not proportional, but disproportional
representation.
+Election by Each Party of its Most Popular Candidates.+--Still keeping
in mind the six-seat electorate for the Federal Senate, we may note that
there are two rival systems in the field--the _scrutin de liste_ or
Block Vote, in which each elector votes for any six of the candidates,
and the Hare system, which allows each elector an effective vote for one
candidate only. The adoption of either of these systems would be
unfortunate. To force each elector to vote for six candidates is
probably to require him to vote for more than he is inclined to support,
and certainly for more than his party is entitled to return; and, also,
to put it in the power of the majority to return all six senators. To
allow him to vote for one candidate only, on the other hand, is to break
up both parties into factions by allowing the favourites of sections
within the parties to be elected, instead of those most in general
favour with all sections composing each party. An intermediate position
is therefore best. No elector should be required to vote for more than
three candidates, and no elector should be allowed to vote for less.
Because in the first place it is evident that each party will, on the
average, return three senators, and, secondly, it may be taken for
granted that even the minority will nominate at least three candidates.
Two alternative proposals may be submitted as fulfilling these
conditions:--
_1. Each elector should vote for any three candidates, or
2. Each elector should have six votes, and have the option of giving
two votes to individual candidates._
The first plan is the simpler, but the second is probably the better, as
it allows more discrimination without sacrificing any of the advantages.
Either proposal is practically equivalent to applying the Block Vote to
each party separately; and whatever may be the objections to applying
the Block Vote to two or more parties it is the simplest and best system
to elect the candidates most in general favour when one party only is
concerned. It is true that the majority will return rather more than
one-half of the representatives and the minority rather less than
one-half, so that the minority will have more votes in proportion to its
strength. But with two parties of fairly equal but fluctuating strength
the fairest way is to require each elector to vote for at least one-half
of the number of representatives. Besides, apart from the fact that it
is not known before the election how many seats each party will obtain,
it is absolutely necessary that each elector shall have the same number
of votes in order that each party be allotted its just share of
representation. Moreover it is not proposed to limit the elector's
freedom of choice in the slightest by confining him to the candidates of
one party. The great majority of electors will vote on party lines,
because every vote given to a candidate of the opposing party tells
against the representation of their own party. The reason of this is
that every vote counts individually for the candidate and collectively
for the whole party. Any elector, therefore, who divides his voting
power equally between the two parties practically wastes it as far as
the party representation is concerned. But it is neither necessary nor
desirable to bring about such a rigid party division as prevails in
America, for instance, where a man is born, lives, and dies Republican
or Democrat. If electors were confined to the candidates of one party,
an elector who wished to vote for an individual candidate of the
opposing party would be placed in the dilemma of deserting either his
favourite or his party. The division into parties is really required in
the elected body, and not in the constituent body.
+Rules for the Reform.+--We are now in a position to draw up a list of
rules for the proposed reform, applicable to all legislatures in which
party government prevails:--
1. Electorates to be grouped so as to contain at least three seats, and
preferably not less than five seats nor more than twenty seats.
2. Candidates to declare when nominating, or a few days before the
election, whether they are in favour of or opposed to the party in
power, and to be classified accordingly as Ministerialists or
Oppositionists.
3. Ballot papers to contain the names of all candidates nominated,
arranged in two parallel columns, one headed Ministerialists, and the
other Oppositionists. The list of candidates under each heading to be
arranged in alphabetical order.
4. Each elector to have as many votes as there are seats, and to be
allowed to give either one or two votes to any candidate. The votes to
be distributed as he pleases among all the candidates of both lists.
5. The total number of valid votes cast at the election to be divided by
the number of seats; the quotient to be known as the "unit of
representation."
6. Each party to be allowed one seat for every whole unit of
representation contained in the aggregate votes polled by all its
candidates, and the last seat to go to the party which has the larger
remainder.
7. The candidates of each party having the highest number of votes to be
declared elected to the number of seats to which each party is entitled
in accordance with the preceding rule.
8. In case of a tie between candidates or parties the lot decides.
The alternative plan for rule 4, which is somewhat simpler, would read
as follows:--
4. Each elector to vote for half the number of candidates that there are
seats, _i.e._, three votes in a five or six-seat electorate, four votes
in a seven or eight-seat electorate, &c. The votes to be distributed as
he pleases among all the candidates of both lists.
It is unnecessary to dwell on the absolute simplicity of these rules.
They involve no radical departure from existing methods of voting or of
counting votes. Once the totals are added up, the calculations necessary
to decide the successful candidates are within the reach of a school
child.
EXAMPLE.--Take as an example 13 candidates in a six-seat electorate who
poll as follows:--
MINISTERIALISTS. OPPOSITIONISTS.
BROWN 83,000 YOUNG 53,000
RYAN 74,000 BELL 51,000
COX 44,000 HUME 47,000
WHITE 42,000 JONES 45,000
PEEL 38,000 BLACK 34,000
ADAMS 35,000 -------
GREY 33,000 230,000
SWIFT 21,000
-------
370,000
Total votes = 370,000 + 230,000 = 600,000.
Unit of representation = 600,000/6 = 100,000.
Ministerialists: 3 units + 70,000 remainder = 4 seats.
Oppositionists: 2 units + 30,000 remainder = 2 seats.
The Ministerialists, having the larger remainder, secure the last seat.
The successful candidates are Brown, Ryan, Cox, and White (M.), Young
and Bell (O.)
It will be noted that without the proportional principle the
Ministerialists would have returned two members only, and the
Oppositionists four.
It is to be distinctly understood that the simpler plan of voting for
half the number of candidates that there are seats is practically as
good as the other. In order to show, however, that the plan we have
favoured may be simplified, we illustrate by a sample ballot paper a
method which has been used in Belgium. Two white spots are printed
opposite each candidate's name. An ink pad and stamp are then provided
at each polling booth, and the elector stamps out a white spot for each
vote he wishes to give. In the paper illustrated two votes are given to
Brown, two to Jones, one to Grey, and one to Swift. This elector has,
therefore, given two-thirds of his voting power to the Ministerial
party, and one-third to the Opposition, and has thus directly influenced
both policies. A further advantage of the proposal is the ease with
which such a paper can be read by the returning officer.
BALLOT PAPER
* * * * *
Ministerialists. Oppositionists.
+---------------+ +---------------+
| | | | | |
| o o | ADAMS | | o o | BELL |
| | | | | |
+---------------+ +---------------+
| | | | | |
| x x | BROWN | | o o | BLACK |
| | | | | |
+-----+---------+ +---------------+
| | | | | |
| o o | COX | | o o | HUME |
| | | | | |
+-----+---------+ +---------------+
| | | | | |
| o x | GREY | | x x | JONES |
| | | | | |
+-----+---------+ +---------------+
| | | | | |
| o o | PEEL | | o o | YOUNG |
| | | | | |
+-----+---------+ +---------------+
| | |
| o o | RYAN |
| | |
+-----+---------+
| | |
| x o | SWIFT |
| | |
+-----+---------+
| | |
| o o | WHITE |
| | |
+-----+---------+
1. You are allowed Six votes, and can give either one or two votes to
any candidate on either list.
2. Stamp out one of the white spots if you wish to give a candidate one
vote.
3. Stamp out the two white spots if you wish to give a candidate two
votes.
4. Your ballot paper will be invalid if you stamp out more or less than
Six white spots.
+Character of Parties.+--We must now prove that the methods proposed
will actually organize the people into two coherent parties. Let us
suppose either party to be composed of three sections. The problem is to
induce these three sections to work together, and to sink their petty
differences in the general interest, in short to unite as a party,
aiming at the control of administration with a definite policy on public
questions. Let us further suppose the party entitled to three
representatives. Now, it is quite conceivable that exactly the same
three candidates would be elected if each elector had any number of
votes from one to three, and this would actually tend to be the case the
more united the party is. But herein lies the difference: that with one
vote only any one section holding narrow and violent views can return an
independent delegate, and therefore has a direct inducement to do so,
while with three votes it is forced to work with the other two sections,
for if it refuses to do so it is in their power to exclude its nominee.
It is this power to exclude independent factions which is the first
requisite to prevent the main parties degenerating into factions. Now,
the advocates of the Hare system declare that each elector should have
one effective vote only, no matter how many seats the party is entitled
to. The elector would therefore only express his opinion as to the
delegate of his own section, and not as to the constitution of the whole
party, and there would be nothing whatever to prevent the election of
the favourites of sections, instead of the representatives most in
general favour with all sections.
But if there were only one party it would be impossible to make all the
sections work together in this manner. Some of them would combine into a
majority of the party, and would exclude the minority. With two great
competing parties, however, the case is quite different. So far from
either party wishing to exclude any small minority, both will compete
for its support, providing only that it will fall into line with the
other sections on the main questions of policy. Each section will
therefore support the party which will consent to embody the most
favourable compromise of its demands in its policy. If its demands are
such that both parties refuse to entertain them, it will exercise no
influence in the direction of furthering its own views. From this
statement it is evident that no system of independent direct
proportional representation within the party can be recognized as a
right to which the different sections are entitled, as it would
inevitably break up the party, and lead to sectional delegation. The
sections would then change in character, and become violent factions.
But, nevertheless, if the sections work together as described, every
section will be proportionately represented in the party policy, and
therefore by every representative of the party. Moreover, no section can
dictate to either party, or obtain more than a fair compromise. For all
the sections are interdependent, and any section which attempts to exert
more than its just share of influence will sink in general favour, and
will find those who are inclined to support its pretensions rejected at
the election.
The difference between the two stages of representation may now be
clearly appreciated. In the first stage we have seen that the fear of
the aggression of the monarchy held all sections together in one party.
In the second stage, however, it has been abundantly demonstrated by
experience that the fear of each other will not hold the sections of the
two parties together. The electoral machinery must, therefore, supply
the deficiency.
+Party Lines.+--With the altered character of parties there is ground
for hope that the basis of division will become questions of general
public policy, and that all causes of factious dissension and of social
disruption will tend to be repressed. This improvement is indeed
urgently needed. For if in any country party lines are decided by
geographical considerations, as town _v._ country; by class, as Capital
_v._ Labour; by race as in South Africa; by religion as in Belgium; or
by personal ambition for the spoils of office--in any of these cases the
future of that country is open to the gravest doubt.
Perhaps the greatest danger which assails most democratic countries
to-day is the risk of the working classes being persuaded by demagogues
that equal political rights have been extended to them in order that
they shall govern, instead of in order that they shall not be
misgoverned. If the general welfare is to be advanced, all classes must
influence the policies of both parties. This condition is indispensable
to bring about the ideal condition of two parties differing only as to
what is best for all.
Equally to be condemned is the narrow-minded and intolerant view of
those who can see no virtue in an opposing party; who define, for
instance, the distinction between parties as the party for things as
they are, and the party for things as they ought to be; the latter
being, of course, their own party. This is one of the objectionable
features of Australian newspaper-made politics.
A more rational view of the distinction which often underlies party
divisions is between those who desire change and those who oppose
change. J.S. Mill points out how the latter may often be useful in
preventing progress in a wrong direction. There are times when such
attitude is called for, but generally speaking we may say that the
fundamental distinction between parties should be a difference of
opinion as to the direction of progress. Nor is it inconsistent for a
party to change its opinion or alter its policy; on the contrary, it is
essential to progress. The majority must often modify its policy in the
light of the criticism of the minority, and the minority must often drop
the unpopular proposals which have put it in a minority. These features
are all essential to the working of the political machine.
+The Character of Representatives.+--Granting that all sections of each
party can be induced to work together, the beneficial effect on the
character of representatives would be incalculable. Instead of being
forced to pander to every small section for support, they would appeal
to all sections. The enlarged electorates which are contemplated would
be arranged to embrace the widest diversity of interest, and a
representative would then be free to follow his own independent
judgment, unfettered by the dictation of small cliques. His actions
might offend some sections who supported his election; but he has a wide
field, and may gain the support of other sections by them. Therefore, he
may actually improve his position by gaining more supporters than he
loses. Contrast this with the present system, in which the
representatives are cooped up in single-membered electorates to denned
sets of supporters. The very principle of community of interest on which
these electorates must be arranged in order to get a fair result is
destructive of the idea of representation. It is no wonder, then, that
the present system is tending towards delegation. Local delegation we
have always had, more or less, but we are now threatened by class
delegation also.
The conclusion of Mr. Kent in "The English Radicals" may be quoted on
this point. He says:--
The question of the relationship of members to their constituents
is at the present time perplexed and undetermined; for though the
control of Parliament by the people is an indisputable fact, yet it
is maintained by means of quite another kind from those which the
early Radicals proposed. The result is somewhat paradoxical, for
while the system of pledges has been contemptuously rejected, yet
the theory that a member is a delegate tacitly prevails in English
politics. That members of the House of Commons have tended and do
tend to lose their independence it is impossible to doubt. A
distinguished French publicist, M. Boutmy, for instance, has
remarked the fact; and he thinks that in consequence a
deterioration of the tone of politicians is likely to recur. Mr.
E.L. Godkin, an American writer, whose judgments are entitled to
respect, has expressed much the same opinion; "the delegate
theory," he says, "has been gaining ground in England, and in
America has almost completely succeeded in asserting its sway, so
that we have seen many cases in which members of Congress have
openly declared their dissent from the measures for which they
voted in obedience to their constituents."
It is one of the greatest merits of the proposed reform that this vexed
question of representation or delegation would be definitely settled.
For, although the area of independent action is enlarged, definite
limits are set to it.
+Possible Objections.+--We may now reply to some objections which have
been or might be urged. At the outset we would point out that the
critics nearly always base their objections on the conditions which have
prevailed in the past or do exist in the present chaotic state of
parties; and seldom appreciate the fact that they would lose force if a
better condition could be brought about. Let us take the Melbourne
_Argus_ report of Professor Nanson's objections:--
Professor Nanson pointed out that the scheme depended for its
efficacy on the existence of party government, which the Professor
was glad to say was being pushed more and more into the background.
He took a practical illustration from the defeat of the O'Loghlen
Government in 1883. In that case, after the election the Government
came back with a following of one-tenth. The other combined party
had nine-tenths, and of these a little more than half were Liberals
and a little less than half were Conservatives. He pointed out that
under Mr. Ashworth's system the Liberals would have got the whole
of the Opposition seats and the Conservatives none, whereas under
any intelligent modification of the Hare system the parties would
have been returned in the proportion of five Liberals, four
Conservatives, and one O'Loghlenite. The system contained the evils
of the _scrutin de liste_ doubled by being applied to two parties,
the evils of the Limited Vote, which had been condemned by all
leading statesmen, and it played into the hands of these who were
best able to organize.
Take the latter statements first. The evil of the Block Vote or
_scrutin de liste_ is that it gives all the representation to the
majority, and excludes the minority; its merit is that it prevents the
formation of a number of minorities. How this evil will be doubled if it
is entirely removed by allowing both majority and minority their just
share of representation we leave the Professor to explain. The statement
that the scheme would play into the hands of those who are best able to
organize is absolutely without foundation. On the contrary, the
organization is automatic. It would certainly encourage the formation of
organizations to influence the policies of the parties, since every
organization would be able to exert its proportionate influence, but
that is an advantage, not an evil. We will leave the statement about
party government alone, and now take the "practical illustration." The
Professor here assumes three distinct parties, but it is quite evident
there are only two. It is not usual for Liberal Unionists and
Conservatives to fight one another at elections in Great Britain at
present. In the same way, if a section of Liberals and a section of
Conservatives unite to oppose a Government, they will work together and
not try to exclude one another. Moreover, they will have a common
policy, so that it matters little who are elected so long as they are
the best men to carry out the policy. Is it likely the Conservatives
would join the Liberals, if the latter were trying to get all the
seats? Thus all the Professor's assumptions are incorrect. But even if
they were correct the conclusion is still wrong. The Liberal section
could not get all the seats if they tried. Imagine a ten-seat
electorate, in which the combined party is entitled to nine members. The
electors would not be required to vote for more than five candidates,
whereas the Professor has assumed that they would be forced to vote for
nine. He has forgotten that the Block Vote becomes the Limited Vote
under the conditions named, and that the Limited Vote allows the
minority a share of representation. Besides, in any case, these
conditions would never arise in a country in a healthy state of
political activity, because then parties would tend more nearly to
equalize each other in strength.
It has also been objected that a Ministerialist candidate, say, might
stand as an Oppositionist, if the votes of the Opposition candidates
were more split up and it was likely to require less votes for election
in that party. This is a rather fantastic suggestion. The candidate in
question would have to declare himself in favour of a number of things
which he would oppose immediately he was elected. If not, he would have
to openly declare his intention, but that could easily be made illegal.
In any case there would be very little gained, and there is further the
risk that, if defeated, all his votes would count to the Opposition.
Another possible objection is that too many candidates might stand,
since it is to the interest of each party to get all the support it can.
But candidates are not likely to stand to oblige the party or when there
is no chance of being elected. It is quite possible that, in a country
already split up into numerous groups, the groups would refuse to act
together, and that each group would nominate its own list. This is an
extreme assumption, and certainly would not happen in British countries.
And there would be a constant incentive to the groups to compromise,
since a combination can return its candidates.
We hope now to have at least established the fact that the organization
of a democracy into two coherent parties--a majority and a minority--is
vitally connected with the electoral machinery. We do not claim that the
method we have proposed will induce a people to vote on true party lines
all at once, for human nature cannot be changed in a day; but we do
confidently assert that it will greatly accelerate that desirable
result, and will tend to give effect to the principles of organization
and responsible leadership.