THE SO-CALLED REPRESENTATIVE PRINCIPLE.
All schemes of electoral reform hitherto proposed under the name of
proportional representation are based on the so-called "representative
principle"--viz., that every section of the people is entitled to
separate representation in proportion to its numbers. The ideal varies
somewhat, but the usual conception, is that if each member represents a
different section or interest the assembly will represent all sections
or all interests. Now this is simply an attempt to return to what we
have described as the first stage of representation, but without the
fear of the monarchy to keep the sections together. For a deliberative
body or a king's council it might be suitable, but for an assembly
charged with the complete control of government in the interests of all
it is utterly impracticable. Each representative must represent all
interests; he must be elected on a definite policy as to what is best
for all the people. If he is sent in as the agent of one interest or one
section of the people, he ceases to be a representative and becomes a
delegate. All these schemes are therefore not proportional
representation at all, but proportional delegation.
We have shown that representation means the organization of public
opinion into two definite lines of policy, and that this is the only way
to prevent political anarchy. But the proportionalists (as they like to
call themselves) say that it means representing men and the opinions
they hold in proportion to their numbers. The fundamental error is that
they neglect the all-important factor of human nature. They look on
public opinion as something having an independent existence apart from
the questions about which it is expressed and from the means of
expressing it; and they fail to recognize that the character of public
opinion depends on the manner in which it is expressed and organized. It
is but a natural consequence that they also conceive the number of
sections of opinion awaiting representation as pre-existing and
independent of the electoral machinery.
In short, they reduce the whole problem to a nice little exercise in
mathematics, requiring only for its clear exposition some columns of
figures and a few coloured diagrams to represent the different shades of
public opinion. No better example of the dangers of _a priori_
speculation could be adduced than this chimerical idea of the
proportionalists that public opinion is something to be divided into
fractions like a mathematical quantity, unless it be, perhaps, the
conclusion that if you gather together delegates representing these
fractions you will have an assembly representing the sum total of public
opinion.
The issue is quite clear. Are we to have two parties aiming at the
control of administration and appealing to all sections for support, or
the separate delegation of a number of sections? In the one case we will
have parties based on national policies, and in the other case we will
have a number of factions, each wanting something different and
determined to block progress till it gets it. Remember that it is a mere
matter of electoral machinery which will determine the choice. It is
true that at present we do not have two very coherent parties, but that
is the fault of the present electoral system.
It would seem that there can be but one answer to this question, and yet
the "representative principle" shows such wonderful vitality that it is
worth while considering the arguments on which it is based, and the
various stages through which the idea has passed.
+Mr. Hare's Scheme.+--The "representative principle" was first
propounded in England in 1857 by Mr. Thomas Hare. He proposed that the
United Kingdom should be constituted one huge electorate for the return
of the 654 members of the House of Commons. The people were to group
themselves into 654 voluntary unanimous sections, each returning one
member, and each gathered from every corner of the kingdom. We propose
to consider here not the scheme itself but only the principle on which
it was founded. Mr. Hare rightly conceived that the great evil of the
present system is the exclusion of the minority in each electorate, but
he altogether failed to appreciate that the excluded minority nearly
always represented one of the two main parties. He could not see, in
fact, that to divide each electorate into majority and minority is to
divide the whole country into majority and minority, nor that the
injustice is tolerated because it is usually as bad for one party as the
other. Instead, therefore, of proposing to do justice to both the
majority and the minority in each electorate, he proposed to allow
representation to as many minorities as possible. To him, the rule of
the majority was the rule of a majority of interests; this he called the
constitutional majority, as opposed to the "mere rule of numbers." Now,
at the time Mr. Hare wrote party government was rather weak in England.
He quotes with approval a statement of Mr. Sidney Herbert, M.P., that
the House was divided into many parties, or rather no party, because the
country was divided into many parties or no party, and that the division
into two parties would never be restored again. It is amusing, in view
of after events, to find Mr. Hare asking what would be the result of any
contrivance to re-establish party. Assuming that _party_ representation
was dead, Mr. Hare proposed to substitute _personal_ representation. It
is positively ludicrous at this interval of time to note how the
electors were expected to group themselves. They were to take personal
merit as the basis of representation; every vote cast was to be a
spontaneous tribute to the qualities and attainments of the person for
whom it was given. And in order, presumably, that they should choose
good men in preference to corrupt men, the polling-day was to be set
apart as a sacred holiday, and church services were to be held to
solemnize the public act and seek for the Divine blessing!
The maintenance of a responsible ministry in such a House presented no
difficulty to Mr. Hare. The electors were to indicate whom they
considered the most illustrious statesmen, and no one would dare to
question their decision!
It seems strange now that this scheme should have received serious
consideration. Mr. Hare was so much under the spell of the apparent
justice of the underlying principle that he was blind to its results.
But it was soon perceived that the electors would not group themselves
as Mr. Hare supposed; that the personal ideal of every class of electors
would be simply men of their own class. It was further pointed out that
cranks and faddists and every organization founded on questions of the
remotest interest would combine to secure representation. Mr. Disraeli
declared it to be "opposed to every sound principle, its direct effect
being to create a stagnant representation ... an admirable scheme for
bringing crotchety men into the House." Mr. Shaw-Lefevre condemned it
as "a vicious principle based upon a theory of classes," and Mr.
Gladstone said that it regarded electors "not as rational and thinking
beings, but merely as the equivalents of one another." Walter Bagehot,
in his standard work on the "English Constitution," opposes the
principle of voluntary constituencies, because it would promote a
constituency-making trade. "But upon the plan suggested," he writes,
"the House would be made up of party politicians selected by a party
committee, chained to that committee, and pledged to party violence, and
of characteristic, and therefore unmoderate, representatives for every
'ism' in all England. Instead of a deliberate assembly of moderate and
judicious men, we should have a various compound of all sorts of
violence. I may seem to be drawing a caricature, but I have not reached
the worst. Bad as these members would be if they were left to
themselves--if in a free Parliament they were confronted with the perils
of government, close responsibility might improve them, and make them
tolerable. But they would not be left to themselves. A voluntary
constituency will nearly always be a despotic constituency."
The practical difficulties in the application of Mr. Hare's scheme are
almost insuperable, but it is not worth while pursuing the subject,
since it is now admitted by recent advocates that the faddist argument
is fatal. This is an admission that Mr. Hare completely neglected the
factor of human nature. Professor Nanson writes:--"Hare proposed that
there should be only one electorate, consisting of the whole State. It
is unfortunate that this proposal was made. There can be no doubt that
it has retarded the progress of true electoral reform for at least a
generation ... it would inevitably lead to the election of a certain
number of faddists."
+John Stuart Mill.+--The great vogue which the Hare system has obtained
is to be traced more to the influence of John Stuart Mill than to that
of anyone else. Mill was captivated by the apparent justice of the
proposal, and devoted a chapter of his "Representative Government" to
it, wherein he declared:--"Mr. Hare's scheme has the almost unparalleled
merit of carrying out a great principle of government in a manner
approaching to ideal perfection, while it attains incidentally several
other things of scarcely inferior importance." Believing in the absolute
justice of the principle, Mill and Hare were certainly consistent in
setting no limit to its application except the size of the assembly.
Mill is emphatic on this point. "Real equality of representation," he
asserted, "is not obtained unless any set of electors, amounting to
average number of a constituency, wherever they happen to reside, have
the power of combining with one another to return a representative."
Now, the recent disciples of Mr. Hare are never tired of claiming the
support of Mill, although they have thrown this definition to the
winds. But they are guilty of far more than that, for in another chapter
of Mill's book we find that his conception of a representative assembly
elected by the Hare system is a purely deliberative body. He expressly
declares it to be radically unfit for legislation, which he proposes to
hand over to a commission appointed by the Crown. The value of his
testimony is very much discounted by this fact.
+Sir John Lubbock.+[1]--We have asserted that the proportional principle
should be applied to two parties only--the majority and the minority,
and that every section can then be represented. Mill and Hare thought
that no limit should be set except the size of the assembly. All the
recent advocates of the system take up an intermediate position.
Appreciating the serious objections against allowing independent
representation to a large number of small sections, Sir John Lubbock,
president of the English Proportional Representation Society, proposes
to constitute electorates returning only three to five members each,
thus confining representation to only three to five sections in each
electorate, and sacrificing to a great extent accurate proportional
representation. In his book on "Representation," he writes:--"I have
assumed that Parliament should be 'a mirror of the nation;' if the
object were to secure unity of action rather than freedom of discussion,
to form an executive body such as a Government, a Board of Directors, or
a Vestry, the case would be quite different. It is, however, I presume,
our wish that Parliament should be a deliberative assembly in which all
parties should be fairly represented." But to make Parliament a
deliberative body is to destroy its power to secure unity of action at
all, and to render it useless as a working machine.
+Miss Spence.+--An active campaign has for some time been carried on for
the adoption of the Hare system in Australia. Miss C.H. Spence, of South
Australia, was the pioneer reformer, and has laboured in the cause by
pen and voice for no less than forty years. Great credit is undoubtedly
due to Miss Spence for the clear and simple manner in which she has
expounded the system, and for the good work she has done in exposing the
defects of the present methods. Not only has she lectured in all parts
of Australia, but she has made visits to England, where she met Mr. Hare
and Sir John Lubbock, and also to America. But we may admire Miss
Spence's courage and devotion to principle without agreeing with her
conclusions.
At a meeting held at River House, Chelsea, London, in 1894, Miss Spence
submitted an analysis of 8,824 votes recorded at 50 public meetings in
South Australia. The audiences were in each case asked to select six
representatives out of twelve candidates. The result of a scrutiny of
all the votes combined was that the following six "parties" secured one
"representative" each--viz., Capital, Labour, Single Tax, Irish
Catholic, Prohibition, and Women's Suffrage. Miss Spence frankly
confesses that these "parties" are minorities, but holds that a majority
can be formed by the union of minorities, and that party responsible
government can still be carried on. Now, can any sensible man or woman
imagine a working ministry formed by a union of any four of these
"parties?" Capital would certainly be permanently opposed to Labour and
to Single Tax, and as for the others, there is not a single principle in
common. How, then, could a union be formed? The only possible way is by
log-rolling; they must make a bargain to support one another's demands.
Such a union could not possibly be stable, because the minority is free
to offer a better bargain to any one of the "parties" to induce it to
desert. Again, it may be called the rule of the majority, but what sort
of a majority? Is it not plainly the rule of a majority in the interests
of minorities? That is very different to the rule of the majority in the
interests of all, which free government demands. The simple truth is
that the "parties" are factions, and that the "representatives" are mere
delegates of those factions.
But in practice the case would be far worse than we have assumed. There
is not the slightest guarantee that the same six factions would be
elected in each six-seat electorate. We might have an unlimited number
of delegates of various religions, classes, races, localities, and
political organizations on all kinds of single questions. An assembly
formed on these lines could hardly be dignified with the name of a
representative assembly.
Mr. G. Bradford, in his work on "The Lesson of Popular Government,"
displays a more intimate knowledge of human nature than any other recent
writer. Of these schemes for the representation of minorities he says:--
As an illustration of the effect in popular government of looking
to popular impulse for the initiation of measures, it may be
observed that perhaps the worst of all expedients for remedying the
defective working of a government by a legislature like ours, that
which combines the evils of them all, is one which is urged by
perfectly disinterested advocates of reform, and is known as
proportional representation. If there is one principle at the base
of popular government it is that the majority shall rule. If the
largest of three or four fractions is to rule it ceases to be
popular government, and becomes government by faction. If the
tyranny of the majority is bad a tyranny of the minority is still
worse. (Vol. i., p. 505.)
And the following picture could hardly be better drawn:--
If the basis of carrying on the government is to be the wishes of
some millions of units, it is evident that they must to a greater
or less extent agree in wishing for something. It is equally
evident that they cannot all agree in wishing for the same thing at
the same time, while if they, or any considerable number of groups,
want different things at the same time, the result in so far is
anarchy. Government is paralysed, and with the well-known
excitability of humanity in groups men begin to confound the
importance of the thing wanted with the importance of getting what
they want. The clash of contending factions is apt to suggest the
clash of arms. The first necessity, therefore, is the formation of
large and coherent parties, not merely for the purpose of
accomplishing what is desired by the majority of the people, but
also for suppressing agitation and social disturbance on behalf of
what may be called merely objects of passion or private interest
with comparatively small groups, at least until those objects
enlist the support of a large minority. (Vol. i., pp. 492, 493.)
+Professor Nanson.+--In Victoria the Hare system is championed by Mr.
E.J. Nanson, Professor of Mathematics at Melbourne University. Professor
Nanson approaches the subject entirely from a mathematical standpoint,
and resolutely refuses to admit the factor of human nature into his
calculations. Following Mr. Hare, he is a declared opponent of party
government, and "would like to see it pushed further into the
background." Moreover, he regards every step in the process as an end in
itself. Thus the act of voting is one end, representation is another,
and the rule of the majority a third. Leaving aside for the present,
however, the elaborate mathematical devices which are proposed for
attaining these supposed ends, let us take only the principles on which
they are based. These are laid down as follows:--
(_a_) The rule of the majority.
(_b_) The fair representation of all parties in proportion to their
strength.
(_c_) Perfect freedom to every elector to vote exactly as he
pleases.
(_d_) The emancipation of the voters from the tyranny of the
political "boss" or caucus.
(_e_) The full value of his vote to each voter without loss or
waste.
The principles involved, we are assured, "must appeal to every democrat,
to every Liberal, to every lover of true and just representation."
As to the first claim, we are willing to grant the rule of the majority,
if the words are added "in the interests of minorities." The second
could also be granted if by "all parties" were meant both parties, for
there cannot be more than two parties in the true sense of the word. But
Professor Nanson proposes such large electorates that any small section,
from one-sixth to one-twelfth, can secure independent representation.
Notwithstanding this, he claims that it is quite possible to give fair
representation to the main parties and to small sections at the same
time. In illustrating the system he avoids the issue as to the character
of these sections by giving them a "scientific" nomenclature, such as
Colour, Place, Pursuits, Qualities, &c. These abstractions are very
misleading, as attention is diverted from the fact that they refer to
voluntary groups of men united for some political purpose. The real
question is, on what basis are these groups likely to be formed? When
the element of human nature is taken into account it must be apparent
that they will be formed for the propaganda of some sectional interest;
some on a religious basis, others on a class basis, &c. Now, if we were
to ask each candidate to declare his religion, we could easily take
religions as the basis of representation and allow proportional
representation to each religion; and similarly with classes, races, and
so on. But we could only take one basis at a time, and the important
deduction is that if we were to take religions as the basis of
representation, the people would be induced to vote according to
religion; if we were to take classes, according to class, and so on.
Now, no one but the fanatic or the demagogue will claim that the
majority is entitled to rule where religions only or classes only are
represented. The questions then arise--What is the correct basis of
representation? How should the people be induced to vote? And the answer
is clearly that the people should be induced to vote on questions of
general public policy, on the leading questions of the day which decide
the party lines, and that, therefore, _the policies of the two main
parties should form the primary basis of proportional representation_.
But the Hare system, by taking individual candidates as the basis of
representation, induces the elector to vote on any basis or on sectional
lines. It promotes dissension instead of repressing it, and instead of
encouraging all sections to express their opinion as to what is best for
the general well-being, it encourages them to express their opinion as
to what they imagine to be best for themselves. Public opinion expressed
on these lines would be worse than useless. But Professor Nanson thinks
that the electors would still have regard for the main parties, even
though they grouped themselves into small sections. He declares that
"any party amounting to anything like a quota would not only have two
candidates of its own--one Liberal and one Conservative--but would also
be wooed by candidates of both leading parties." We may well question
whether factions would trouble themselves about the main parties; but,
granting the assumption, the small parties might just as well be single
electorates as far as the main parties are concerned. The Liberal
candidates might be successful in all of them, and the Conservatives be
unrepresented. The peculiar feature is that the defeated Conservatives
are expected to transfer their votes to the Liberals to make up the
quotas for the small parties!
The third claim is that electors should have perfect freedom to vote
exactly as they please, and yet Professor Nanson, in condemning Mr.
Hare's original scheme, has denied that they are free to vote as
faddists; but he still holds that they are free to vote on any basis if
only they form one-sixth to one-twelfth of an electorate. Thus the
amount of freedom is variable and a matter of opinion. Now, we
altogether deny that electors should be given the opportunity to
subordinate the national interests to factious interests. Just as the
faddist argument is fatal to Mr. Hare's original scheme, so the
splitting up into factions is fatal to Professor Nanson's present
scheme. Where is the freedom which Professor Nanson claims under the
present system of election? Is it not the fact that throughout England,
America, and Australia the electors have very often a choice between two
candidates only--one Ministerialist and one Oppositionist? By all means
let us have as many political organizations as possible to make known
the wishes of all sections; but the true function of all such
organizations is to influence the policies of the two main parties, and
not to secure independent delegates in Parliament. This means simply
that the compromise among the different sections supporting a party must
be effected in the electors' minds, and at the elections, and not on the
floor of the Legislature.
The fourth claim is the emancipation of the voters from the tyranny of
the "boss." Now, the power of the "boss" lies in the control of
nominations, and although to some extent this control is necessary with
the present system of election, it is not essential to party government,
as we hope to show. But with government by faction there would be no
escape from this control. The tyranny of a faction is worse than the
tyranny of the "boss." The voters need saving from their own selfish
passions far more than from the "boss."
The final claim that each elector is entitled to the full value of his
vote, regardless of the way in which it is used, is really a claim to an
equality of political power, _i.e._, to direct government. It means
that electors are absolutely free to combine for their own interests, or
for their interest as a class, in opposition to the public welfare.
These combinations would, with an equality of direct political power,
soon bring on social disruption.
+Professor Jethro Brown.+--In the preface to "The New Democracy," by
Professor Jethro Brown, the two fundamental difficulties of present-day
politics are correctly stated to be--how to express public opinion, and
how to improve its value. For the first of these Professor Brown
recommends the Hare system, and for the second the study of history.
Later on he writes:--"How is the amelioration of popular sovereignty to
be effected? Not, I venture to believe, by the pursuit of the policy
which hopes to play off ignorance against ignorance and prejudice
against prejudice, and to secure good government by the arts of
flattery, manipulation, and intrigue; nor, indeed, by the improvement of
democratic machinery, though this is extremely desirable, and calls for
immediate attention. For, above all, towers the question of character."
It is quite evident that Professor Brown shares the delusion of the
other advocates of the Hare system, that the manner of expressing public
opinion has nothing to do with the character of public opinion. The two
difficulties laid down are essentially one. The cardinal fact underlying
representation is that it is a real social force, capable of reacting
upon and moulding character, and therefore of improving the value of
public opinion. The independence, love of freedom, respect for
minorities, and capacity for self-government, which are the most
distinctive traits in the English character, are not innate, but are
largely the products of the British Constitution. If the only chance of
improving the value of public opinion lay in the hope of inducing the
individual electors to study the lessons of history, the prospect would
be indeed gloomy.
Professor Brown regards party government as a necessary evil, resulting
from the mechanical difficulty of securing unity of action from a
plurality of wills. This is practically equivalent to saying that
legislation itself is a necessary evil. But he writes:--"Whatever may be
the evils of party government, there can be no doubt of the utility as
well as of the necessity of the institution itself. The alternative to
party government is the system of government by small groups. In
Australia the evils of this alternative have been occasionally displayed
in practical politics; but it is to France that we must look for their
supreme illustration." Turning to the chapter on the Hare system, we
find that Professor Brown believes that the electors would still divide
themselves into two parties, even if given the opportunity to form small
groups. "I cannot believe," he writes, "that the reputation of our race
for sound common-sense is so far misplaced that a provision for the
faithful representation of the people would end in an immoderate
Legislature! For, although the Hare system is not perfect, it does
undoubtedly afford an opportunity for an absolutely _fair
representation_. Of course the opportunity would be abused by some; but
to argue that the abuse would be general, or if at all general, would
long continue, is to argue that the people would prove themselves
unworthy of the opportunity offered." While he was at the University of
Tasmania the first election under the Hare system was held, and
Professor Brown's opinions are based on the result. A second election
has, however, just been held, which shows the futility of his hopes.
+The Tasmanian Experiment.+--Despite the fact that it has been advocated
for over forty years, the trial now being made of the Hare system in
Tasmania is the first application of the "representative principle" to
any assembly modelled on the English plan of party government, and
therefore deserves more than passing notice. But the experiment is on
such a small scale, and has been conducted for such a short time, that
the result can hardly be expected to be conclusive as yet. The objection
against the Hare system is not so much that it is not suitable to
present conditions as that it will speedily bring about altered
conditions. It is interesting to find that this is exactly what is
taking place. The system is applied in two electorates only, at Hobart
and Launceston the former returning six members and the latter four. At
the first election, in 1897, the possibilities of the system were not
appreciated, and electors voted on the old lines; and although the
results were rather erratic and unexpected, they were considered fairly
satisfactory. But the second election, held early in the present year,
proved a great blow to the system. No less than three of the successful
candidates were intensely unpopular; and one of them, an ex-minister,
had recently been banished from public life on the report of a select
committee of the House. His reinstatement aroused a storm of indignation
throughout the colony, and he was forced to retire again before
Parliament met. It will be as well to take the evidence of a strong
advocate of the system--the _Argus_ correspondent. Of one candidate he
writes:--"Judging by all available definite evidences, it seemed that
five-sixths of the electors of Hobart were directly in favour of the
construction of the railway by the present Great Western Railway
Syndicate; while those of the remaining sixth were variously opposed to
the company or to the project of constructing such a railway by private
enterprise at all. This sixth is represented by Mr. R.C. Patterson, who
headed the poll." Of another candidate we learn that "Mr. Mulcahy had
fought a hard fight, and it is a fair assumption that on the list of the
elected he represents the Roman Catholic vote. As a member of a
generally popular Government, the extent of Mr. Mulcahy's personal
unpopularity was remarkable and probably unique." But it was over the
return of Mr. Miles that the storm raged most. The excuse is made that
"the fault of Mr. Miles's return (assuming that it is a fault) lies with
the electors who returned him, and not with the system under which his
return was accomplished.... Once grant that a section of Hobart electors
have the right to select for their representative whom they choose, and
it would seem that the Hare system must be held free of all
responsibility for the return of Mr. Miles." But this is precisely what
cannot be granted for a moment, as we have endeavoured to show. The
assertion is made that Mr. Miles would have been returned as easily
under the old system, but this is not a fact. He polled only one-eighth
of the votes, so that, even supposing that his supporters were twice as
strong in a single electorate, he would have had only one-fourth of the
votes. It is safe to say, from the small proportion of second and third
preferences which he secured, that if the Block Vote had been adopted he
would have been at the bottom of the poll. Commenting on these results,
the _Argus_ declares that the Hare system does not pretend to reform or
guide the people. Very likely not! But is it not quite evident that it
has the opposite effect?
Is it too much to say that, if the Hobart experiment be persevered with,
the ultimate tendency will be the return of six members, each acceptable
to one-sixth of the electors, and obnoxious to the other five-sixths?
It is quite obvious already that the usual party lines are entirely
disregarded.
+Professor Commons.+--The best book on the subject yet published is the
"Proportional Representation" of John E. Commons, Professor of Sociology
in Syracuse University, U.S. Its great merit is that the political and
social bearings of the reform are fully treated. Professor Commons
rejects the Hare system in favour of the Free List system. He
writes:--"The Hare system is advocated by those who, in a too
_doctrinaire_ fashion, wish to abolish political parties. They
apparently do not realize the impossibility of acting in politics
without large groupings of individuals." He makes a great step in
advance of the disciples of Mr. Hare in recognizing that the
proportional principle should be applied to parties, and not to
individuals, and he even defines parties correctly as being based "not
altogether on sectional divisions, but on social and economic problems
of national scope;" but, unfortunately, he fails to see that there can
be only two parties, and that the representation of small parties would
not reform the main parties, but break them up altogether. At the same
time he is no mere theorist, for he declares:--"If a practicable and
effective method of proportional representation cannot be discovered,
the theoretical principle is a mere dream." Moreover, he prudently
recognizes that his arguments as regards Federal and State Legislatures
in America are in advance of what the public is ready to accept, and
adds:--"We, as a people are not yet ready to abandon the notion that
party responsibility in Federal affairs is essential to safety." His
immediate object is, therefore, the reform of city councils, which in
America are controlled by the national parties, and are exploited by the
notorious "machine" organizations. We may sympathize with this object,
for parties in an administrative body are a serious evil, but with
legislatures the case is quite different. Professor Commons admits that
third and fourth parties, if given their proportionate weight in
legislation, would hold the balance of power, but he declares that "the
weight of this objection, the most serious yet presented against
proportional representation, varies in different grades of government."
He then proceeds to examine the objection "as applied to Congress (and
incidentally to the State Legislatures), where it has its greatest
force, and where pre-eminently party responsibility may be expected to
be decisive." And the only answer he can find is that the objection
"overlooks the principle of equality and justice in representation. It
may prove here that justice is the wisest expediency. It is a curious
anomaly, showing confusion of thought regarding democracy, that a people
who insist on universal suffrage, and who go to ludicrous limits in
granting it, should deny the right of representation to those minor
political parties whose existence is the natural fruit of this
suffrage." But these minor parties would not be denied representation if
they were allowed to exercise freely their true function, which is to
influence the policies of the main parties; and it is essential to the
working of the political machine that they be limited to that function.
Professor Commons continues:--"The argument, however, of those who fear
that third parties will hold the balance of power is not based solely on
a dread of the corrupt classes, but rather of the idealists, the
reformers, 'faddists,' and 'cranks,' so called. They would retain
exclusive majority rule and party responsibility in order to prevent the
disproportionate influence of these petty groups. They overlook, of
course, the weight of the argument already made that individual
responsibility is more important for the people than the corporate
responsibility of parties." The assumption is here made that the
complete suppression of individuality is an essential feature of party
government, whereas it is in fact a peculiar feature of American
politics, due to "machine" control of nominations. The one point which
Professor Commons has missed is that individual candidature can be
permitted and representation still be confined to the two main parties.
+Conclusion.+--The advocates of proportional delegation have failed to
grasp the importance of the principles of organization and leadership,
which underlie representation. Mr. Hare thought that the effect of doing
away with organization would be to improve leadership. But he reckoned
without his host--Human Nature. Organization cannot be dispensed with
without destroying leadership and bringing on the strife of factions.
FOOTNOTE:
[1] Now Lord Avebury.