In 1663 the British Government made a treaty with the Sultan empowering

it to attack and punish the Algerines without being charged with a

breach of amity with the Porte. It frequently availed itself of this,

and many naval attacks were made on these nests of pirates, without,

however, very effectual results. In some of its naval operations in

the Ægean Sea the Porte received assistance from the fleets of these

two Barbary States. But this was entirely at the discretion of their

virtual rulers and was not considered obligatory on them. For our

present purpose, it is sufficient to point out that the States became

virtually independent of the Ottoman Empire about the year 1650. In

the case of Algiers this independence continued till the State was

conquered and annexed by France in 1830. In Tunis the same process took

place, with the difference that an hereditary Beyship was eventually

formed under a Greek adventurer whose descendants retained power there

till 1881, when the French invaded the province and eventually annexed

it to France.

Ibrahim was succeeded by his son, Mahomet IV. He reigned for

thirty-nine years. During the first eight of these there was chaos in

the Empire. The government remained in the hands of the harem. The

position was aggravated by fierce dissension in that institution. There

were two rival parties, the one led by the ex-Sultana Validé, the

mother of the late Sultan, who was loath to part with the power she

had acquired during her son’s reign, the other by the mother of the

new Sultan, Torchan by name. Both of them had their supporters among

the Janissaries and Spahis, with the result that there were frequent

disorders and encounters in the streets of the capital. Grand Viziers

were made and deposed with startling rapidity, as one or other of these

parties prevailed. Outbreaks occurred in many parts of the Empire and

there was no one with sufficient authority to cope with them. The

dispute between the two ladies was eventually settled by the murder of

the elder one. Meanwhile it was fortunate for the Empire that Austria

was so exhausted by thirty years of war in Germany that she was not

able to avail herself of the opportunity afforded to invade the Ottoman

Empire and recover Hungary and other provinces. But the war with Venice

resulting from the unprovoked attack by Ibrahim on Crete was continued

without intermission. A Venetian fleet under command of Admiral

Macenigo defeated and destroyed an Ottoman fleet off the Dardanelles

and took possession of the islands of Lemnos and Tenedos. It blockaded

the Dardanelles. Strange to say, this did not put a stop to the siege

of Candia by the Ottomans. This was maintained with pertinacity, but

for a long time without success. Meanwhile anarchy prevailed in the

Empire. Relief most unexpectedly came from the appointment of a Grand

Vizier by Sultana Torchan, by which she made some amends for her

previous misdeeds.

XIII

THE KIUPRILI VIZIERS

1656-1702

AT this stage, when the ruin of the Empire seemed to be imminent, owing

to the failure of vigour and authority of so many Sultans, the general

corruption of officials, and the lawlessness and mutinous conduct of

the army, there rose to the front a man, or rather a succession of men

of the same family, who were able to stem the evil tide and to restore,

for a time, the credit and prestige of the Empire. In the following

forty-six years four members of the Kiuprili family filled the post

of Grand Vizier—not, however, without more than one unfortunate

interregnum. They ruled the Empire in the name of the incompetent

Mahomet and his successor. This advent of a family was the more notable

as in Turkey there never was any trace of hereditary rank. While the

throne had been filled without a break by members of the Othman family,

who, in the first three hundred years, deservedly acquired prestige

so great that it has survived a yet longer succession of degenerates,

it has never been supported by an hereditary class of any kind. The

structure of the political and social system of the Ottoman Turks

has always been democratic. The highest posts in the State, equally

with the lowest, were accessible to all, irrespective of merit, often

by mere personal favour, or even, it would seem, by chance, without

consideration of birth or wealth. The unique exception to this, where

members of the same family rose to the highest position of the State

under the Sultan, was that of the Kiuprili family.

Mahomet Kiuprili, the first of this remarkable stock, was of Albanian

descent. His grandfather had migrated to Kiupril, a small town in

Amasia, in Asia Minor, whence the family took their name. Their

position must have been a very humble one, for Mahomet commenced his

career as kitchen-boy in the palace of the Sultan. He rose to be chief

cook and, later, steward and grand falconer, and thence by favour of

the harem was appointed as governor successively of Damascus, Tripoli,

and Jerusalem, acquiring in all of them the reputation of a just, firm,

and humane ruler. At the full age of seventy, on the advice of the

Sultana Validé, he was finally appointed Grand Vizier, in spite of the

protests of all the pashas, ulemas, and other officials, who alleged

that Kiuprili was in his dotage, that he could neither read nor write,

and that he was quite incompetent for the post. Never were experts more

mistaken. Kiuprili only consented to take the post upon the conditions,

solemnly swore to by the Sultana Validé on behalf of her son, who was

then only fifteen years of age, that all his acts as Grand Vizier would

be ratified by the Sultan without examination or discussion, and that

he would have a free hand in the distribution of other offices and in

the award of honours. He further fortified his position by getting from

the Mufti a _fetva_ sanctioning by anticipation all his measures.

Armed with this authority, Kiuprili entered upon the work of his

high office, and at once proceeded to use his powers with inflexible

firmness and with the utmost severity. He emulated Sultan Murad IV

in his relentless war against wrongdoers of every class, high and

low, throughout the Empire. There was not the same spirit of cruelty

or bloodthirstiness as in Murad’s case, but there was the deliberate

policy to extirpate abuses by the forcible removal of those concerned

in them. Corrupt officials, unjust judges, incompetent officers in the

army, and mutinous soldiers were promptly put to death. The same fate

befell those who were suspected of intriguing against the new Vizier.

It was said that during his five years of office thirty-five thousand

persons were executed by his orders. The number included a great many

mutinous soldiers. The principal executioner at Constantinople admitted

that he had strangled four thousand persons of some position during

this period. Terrible as was this retribution on wrongdoers of all

kinds, there cannot be a doubt that in the main it was salutary. The

effect of Kiuprili’s inflexible will and determination was speedily

apparent throughout the Empire. Corruption and injustice were stayed.

Disorders of all kinds were repressed. Discipline and subordination

were restored in the army.

Kiuprili, by his vigorous action, was able to extinguish the revolts

in Asia Minor and elsewhere. He reconstructed the Ottoman navy, with

the result that naval supremacy was again asserted in the Ægean Sea

and the war with Venice took a favourable turn. The islands of Lemnos

and Tenedos were recovered by the Porte. The siege of Candia was again

prosecuted with the utmost vigour.

Kiuprili practically ruled the Empire with unquestioned authority

for five years, till his death in 1661. In prospect of that event he

obtained from the Sultana Validé and the Sultan the reversion of the

Grand Vizierate for his son, Ahmed Kiuprili. On his deathbed he is said

to have given to the young Sultan the following heads of advice:—

Never to listen to the advice of women.

Never to allow a subject to become too rich.

To keep the treasury of the State well filled.

To be always on horseback and to keep the army on the move.

Ahmed Kiuprili, when he succeeded his father as Grand Vizier in 1661,

was only twenty-six years of age. He has rightly been considered by

Turkish historians as the most eminent in the long list of statesmen

of the Ottoman Empire, with the exception only of Sokolli. He had been

given the best of education by his father, and had early experience

in public affairs as governor of a province. He had all his father’s

inflexible will and firmness, without carrying them to excess by

wholesale executions. For a year after his accession to power he

continued his father’s régime of severity, but when he felt assured of

his position he relaxed it, and thenceforward his administration was

humane and just. He had most engaging manners, dignified and modest.

He spoke with reserve and without verbiage. He ruled the Empire for

fifteen years, until his death in 1676. During this time he enjoyed the

full confidence of Sultan Mahomet, who, though he had reached the age

of twenty when Ahmed Kiuprili was appointed Grand Vizier, and might in

due course have taken part in public affairs, devoted himself wholly to

the pleasures of the chase and never interfered with the conduct of

affairs by his great minister.

Ahmed was a most strict observer of the religious precepts of Islam.

In spite of this, he was noted for his enlightened tolerance of

other religions. He abolished the restrictions against the building

of churches by the Christian subjects of the Porte. He did his best

to improve the condition and lighten the burden of the rayas. His

administration was free from abuses. He gave an example to all below

him by refusing to take money for appointments to offices or for

any administrative acts. He kept the treasury well filled, in spite

of the many wars he was engaged in. It was, in fact, in the civil

administration of the Empire that his ability and wisdom were chiefly

conspicuous. His military career was chequered, for though he succeeded

in adding to the Empire not a few important territories, he encountered

for the first time in its history a great and historic defeat at the

hands of the Austrians and a second serious defeat by the Poles.

In 1663 war broke out with Austria, and the Grand Vizier, in command

of an army of a hundred and twenty thousand men with a hundred

and twenty-three guns, crossed the Danube at Belgrade and marched

northwards to Neuhausel, one of the three most important strongholds

in the hands of the Austrians, which, after a siege of five weeks, was

compelled to surrender. Meanwhile the Khan of the Crimea, at the head

of a horde of irregular horsemen, overran Moravia, committing the most

frightful devastation and carrying off eighty thousand Christians as

captives for sale as slaves.

After the capture of Neuhausel, Ahmed Kiuprili took other minor

strongholds in the neighbourhood, and then returned to Belgrade for

winter quarters. In the following year he again issued from Belgrade

with his army and marched to Neuhausel. He then crossed the River Mur

and captured Serivar, and on July 26 he reached Komorn, on the River

Raab, on the frontier of Hungary and Styria. The Austro-Hungarian

army, under the command of the Comte Montecuculi, a general of great

reputation—an Italian by birth and the rival of Turenne—held a position

on the River Raab not far from Komorn. It was greatly inferior in

numbers to that of the Ottomans. But since the last great battle

between the two Powers at Cerestes the Austrians had greatly improved

in the quality of their generals and officers and in their armaments.

The discipline of the Ottoman troops was no longer what it had been,

and they had not kept pace in the improvement in guns.

On August 1, 1664, the two armies met near to the Convent of St.

Gotthard, which gave its name to a memorable battle. In spite of their

great numerical superiority, the Ottomans met with a severe defeat,

largely due to the charge of heavy cavalry of the Austrians, under

the command of Prince Charles of Lorraine, soon to become famous as a

general. The Turks lost ten thousand men, many of whom were driven into

the River Raab and were drowned. Thirty thousand of their cavalry, who

were spectators of the battle from the other side of the River Raab,

took to flight when they saw the issue of the battle and abandoned

fifteen guns. The Grand Vizier was able to draw off the main body of

his army without further loss. The Austrian losses were heavy, and they

made no effort to follow up their victory. The battle, however, was of

supreme importance, for it was the first great defeat of the Ottomans

in the field by the Austrians. It broke the prestige of the former,

which had been unquestioned since the battle of Mohacz in 1526.

In spite of their victory, the Austrians were willing to negotiate with

the Grand Vizier for terms of peace, and ten days after the battle a

treaty was signed at Vascar, where the Turks were encamped. It was, in

the main, a renewal of the treaty of Silvatorok. So far as it differed,

it was favourable to the Ottomans. It provided that Transylvania was to

be evacuated by both Austrians and Turks. It recognized Apafy, whose

claims had been maintained by the latter, as prince of that province,

subject to payment of tribute to the Sultan. Serivar and Neuhausel were

to remain in the hands of the Sultan. Of seven palatinates occupied

by the Ottomans, four were to remain in their hands and three were

to be restored to the Emperor. Ahmed Kiuprili had every reason to be

satisfied with this treaty. Though defeated in a pitched battle, he

had added to the Empire of the Sultan. He led his armies into winter

quarters again at Belgrade at the end of October, and on his return to

Constantinople received a popular ovation.

In 1667 Ahmed entered upon another campaign. He was determined to bring

to a successful issue the siege of Candia, which for so many years had

baffled all the efforts of his predecessors. He landed in the island of

Crete with large reinforcements. The city of Candia was defended with

the utmost tenacity and courage by the Venetians, under the command

of Morosini, later famous for the conquest of the Morea. Ahmed spent

nearly three years before the city. He urged on the siege with great

engineering skill. The Venetians made every effort to retain possession

of the city and of the island by offers of large sums of money. Ahmed

Kiuprili proudly replied to these overtures: “We are not money-dealers.

We make war to win Candia, and at no price will we abandon it.”

In the course of 1669 the prospect of a successful defence of the

city was increased by the arrival of a French fleet, commanded by

the Duc de Noailles, and having on board the flower of the French

nobility and six thousand soldiers. They were joined later by auxiliary

squadrons of the Pope and the Knights of Malta. The combined fleet,

consisting of seventy vessels, bombarded the Ottomans from the sea,

while the besieged opened fire on their front. The allies hoped to

place the Turks between two fires and to draw them from the trenches

which invested the city by land. The attack, however, failed owing

to the accidental blowing up of some of the attacking vessels. This

brought confusion into the whole line. A sortie of the garrison was

also unsuccessful. Later, a serious misunderstanding arose between

Morosini and the Duc de Noailles, which led to the departure of the

allied fleet and the abandonment of the city to its own resources. The

garrison was now reduced to four thousand men capable of bearing arms.

Defence against the overwhelming forces of the Turks was impossible.

Terms of surrender were agreed to. The siege, which had lasted for

nearly twenty-five years, was brought to an end. Favourable terms were

accorded to Morosini and the garrison. The whole island fell into the

hands of the Ottomans, and shortly after this a treaty of peace was

effected with the Republic of Venice, which recognized the transfer of

Crete, with the exception of three small ports on its coast, which were

retained for commercial purposes.

A third war was undertaken in 1672 by Ahmed Kiuprili against Poland in

support of the Cossacks of the Ukraine, who had risen against their

oppressors, the Poles, and had appealed to the Porte for protection

against the invasion of their country by Sobieski. It was decided by

Ahmed to support these insurgents. An army of six thousand was sent

there, in concert with a much larger force of Tartars from the Crimea.

The Czar of Russia joined with the King of Poland in protesting against

this intervention of the Porte. The proud answer of the Porte was:—

God be praised, such is the strength of Islam that the union of

Russians and Poles matters not to us. Our Empire has increased in

might since its origin; nor have all the Christian kings that have

leagued against us been able to pluck a hair from our beard. With

God’s grace it shall ever be so, and our Empire shall endure to the

Day of Judgment.

Ahmed Kiuprili himself, in a letter written in his own hand to the

Polish envoy, defended his action in terms which might well have been

quoted later when the Christian subjects of Turkey rose in arms against

their oppressors and claimed the assistance of Russia.

The Cossacks [he said], a free people, placed themselves under the

Poles, but being unable to endure Polish oppression any longer,

they have sought protection elsewhere, and they are now under the

Turkish banner. If the inhabitants of an oppressed country, in order

to obtain deliverance, implore the aid of a mighty emperor, is it

prudent to pursue them in such an asylum? When the most mighty

and most glorious of all emperors is seen to deliver and succour

from their enemies those who are oppressed, and who ask him for

protection, a wise man will know on which side the blame of breaking

peace ought to rest. If, in order to quench the fire of discord,

negotiation is wished for, so let it be. But if the solution of

differences is referred to that keen and decisive judge called ‘the

Sword,’ the issue of the strife must be pronounced by God, by whose

aid Islam has for a thousand years triumphed over its foes.[26]

In the campaign of 1672, the important city of Kaminiec, the capital

of Podolia, was captured. The King of Poland then sued for peace,

and the treaty of Bucsacs was agreed to, under which the province of

Podolia was ceded to the Sultan. The treaty, however, was disavowed

by Sobieski and the principal nobles of Poland. They renewed the war

against the Turks. It lasted for four years. In 1673 the Turkish army,

under Ahmed Kiuprili, met with a crushing defeat from the Poles, under

Sobieski, near Choczim. His camp was surprised. The Wallachians and

Moldavians deserted him on the field and went over to the enemy. There

was great slaughter of the Turks. In the following year the Turks

returned to the charge, but were again worsted. In 1675 Sobieski,

aided by the Russians, gained another great victory over the Turks at

Lemberg. But in the following year the Turks, under the command of

Ibrahim Pasha, turned the tables on the Poles. The superior resources

of the Turks, under the able administration of Kiuprili, told at last

in their favour. Sobieski, who had become King of Poland, was defeated.

The whole of Podolia fell into the hands of the Ottomans. Sobieski was

now willing to come to terms. Under the treaty of Zurawna (October 27,

1676) terms rather more favourable than those under the repudiated

treaty of Bucsacs were conceded to the Ottomans. Podolia was ceded to

them.

Ahmed Kiuprili died a few days after the signature of this treaty

from the effect of drink. Though he had incurred severe defeats at

the hands of the Austrians and Poles, he had retrieved them by his

persistence and by the effective use of the resources of the Empire,

which he enlarged by the province of Podolia, the island of Crete,

and the district of Neuhausel and Serinvar, in Hungary. These entitle

him to be ranked among the makers of the Empire so far as Europe was

concerned. His enlightened administration, his humane and just bearing,

his insistence on equal justice for all, irrespective of religious

creeds, his strict observance of his plighted faith in public and

private affairs, in matters great and small, his patronage of science

and literature, earned for him a place in the first rank of Turkish

statesmen.

It was hoped in many quarters that the Sultan would appoint as

successor to Ahmed Kiuprili his brother, Zadé Mustapha Kiuprili, who

had shown as governor of provinces that he had many of Ahmed’s high

qualities. In an evil moment Mahomet conferred the post of Grand

Vizier on his son-in-law, a favourite companion in the chase, Kara

Mustapha—the black Mustapha—who was notorious for his bloodthirsty

disposition and his avidity and corruption. This seems to have been

one of the few acts of the Sultan Mahomet IV where he exercised his

royal prerogative, for as a rule he left everything to his Vizier, when

appointed, and cared for nothing but the pleasures of the chase. A

more unfortunate appointment could not have been made. Thirteen years

elapsed before Zadé Kiuprili was at last invested with the office. They

were years fraught with disaster to the Empire.

The first military effort of the new Grand Vizier was to lead an army

in 1678 across the Danube into the Ukraine. He came into conflict there

with the Russians as well as the Poles, and met with a severe defeat.

The war, however, simmered on with varying results till 1681. Peace was

then concluded with Russia, and the Turks gave up the disputed country.

In 1682 the population in that part of Hungary which was under the

rule of the Emperor Leopold revolted against his bigoted tyranny.

Kara Mustapha thought that this afforded an opportunity for attacking

Austria. He seems also to have been inflated with ambition to create

a kingdom for himself. He collected an enormous army at Adrianople,

and in the spring of the following year, 1683, he crossed the Danube

at the head of two hundred and seventy-five thousand men, without

counting a horde of irregular Tartars and camp followers. He met with

little resistance in his march northwards till he reached the walls of

Vienna at the head of two hundred thousand men. The Emperor, on his

part, was very ill-provided with troops to meet this enormous host of

invaders. He had no more than thirty-five thousand men under arms.

Of these, eleven thousand were left to garrison Vienna, and the main

body was quite insufficient to meet the Turks in the field. In his

peril the Emperor appealed for aid to Sobieski, the King of Poland.

The Poles had very recently concluded peace with the Turks. But this

made no difficulty. Sobieski undertook by treaty to send an army of

fifty thousand men in support of the Emperor. There was a clause in the

treaty of a significant character. It was not to be annulled by any

future dispensation of the Pope. The Polish army, however, was at some

distance and could not reach Vienna in less than eight weeks. There

can be little doubt that if Kara Mustapha had pressed the siege with

vigour Vienna must have fallen before the arrival of the Polish army.

This second great siege of Vienna began on July 15, 1683. The Emperor

and his family fled to Bavaria. The fortifications of Vienna had

been much neglected and offered no serious obstacle. But the city

was heroically and obstinately defended by its commander, Count von

Stahremberg, who emulated Count Salms of the first siege. Twenty

thousand of its citizens enrolled in its defence. The Turkish batteries

shattered the walls. There were frequent sorties without avail. It was

said that the Ottoman army, with its enormous superiority in numbers,

might easily have carried the city by storm, but that Kara Mustapha

hoped to gain it by capitulation, in which case the wealth of the city

would be at his own disposal as representative of the Sultan, whereas,

if it were taken by assault, the great booty would fall mainly to the

soldiers. He delayed, therefore, the final attack. Meanwhile Sobieski

had time to bring up his army from Poland and to join Prince Charles

of Lorraine, who was in command of the Imperial troops, making a total

force of eighty thousand. They crossed the Danube at Tulm by a bridge

of boats, and then made a detour through a most difficult country

behind the Kalemberg, so as to attack the Turkish army before the city

from the rear. Kara Mustapha was guilty of incredible neglect in not

offering resistance to the crossing of the Danube by the Christian

force, or to their passage through the difficult country behind the

Kalemberg. On September 6th rockets from the Kalemberg announced to the

garrison of the city that the relieving army had occupied these heights

behind the Turkish camp.

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