so many strongholds and the defeat of the Turkish armies. There was
a general demand that the Sultan himself, the incompetent Mahomet,
should endeavour to restore confidence to the Turkish soldiers, by
putting himself at the head of them, as his predecessors had done in
past times. He was urged to unfurl the standard of the Prophet, and to
appeal to the religious fervour and fanaticism of the army. Mahomet
was most unwilling to adopt this course. He preferred to remain in
the Seraglio at Constantinople. The Sultana Baffo, fearing that her
influence might be lost if her son was out of her sight, backed his
refusal to march. On the other hand, his preceptor, the historian
Seadeddin, who had great influence over him, made every effort in the
opposite direction. At last the Janissaries refused to go to the front
unless their Padishah led them, and Mahomet, much against his will, was
compelled to put himself at the head of his army. The sacred standard
of the Prophet and his mantle, a most prized relic, were brought out
for the occasion. With much pomp the Ottomans marched northwards to
meet the invaders. The Austrians and Hungarians fell back at the
approach of this great army of Turks. They abandoned all the fortresses
they had captured in Bulgaria. They recrossed the Danube. The two
armies at last came into conflict on the plain of Cerestes, in Hungary,
on the 24th of October, 1596, where a memorable battle took place,
extending over three days.
It does not appear that Mahomet took any part in the direction of his
army. The Grand Vizier was virtually in command. The second in command
was Cicala, an Italian by birth who had embraced Islam, a most brave
and resolute soldier, greatly favoured by the ladies of the harem. The
Sultan, however, was present in the field, surrounded by his bodyguard.
The sacred banner of the Prophet was unfurled and roused, it was said,
the fervour of the Turkish soldiers. On the first day the Turks met
with a reverse, and a division of their army was defeated. A council
of war was held, at which Mahomet expressed his wish to retreat and to
avoid further battle. Seadeddin stoutly opposed this. “It has never
been seen or heard of,” he said, “that a Padishah of the Ottomans
turned his back upon the enemy without the direst necessity.” Mahomet
then suggested that he himself should withdraw from the battle, and
that the Grand Vizier, Hassan Pasha, should take command of the army.
“This is no affair for pashas,” said Seadeddin, “the presence of the
Padishah is indispensably necessary.” It was decided to continue the
battle in the presence of the Sultan.
The second day was no better for the Ottomans than the first. On the
third day, October 26th, the two main armies came into closer quarters.
The Hungarians, under Count Pfalfi, attacked the Ottoman artillery in
flank and captured all the guns. The battle seemed to be irretrievably
lost. The Sultan, seated on a tall camel, surrounded by his bodyguard,
watched the rout of his army. He wished to fly while there was time. He
was dissuaded again by Seadeddin, who quoted a verse from the Koran:
“It is patience which wins victory, and joy succeeds to sorrow.” The
Sultan, wrapping the Prophet’s mantle round him, consented to remain on
the field.
The Austrians now charged the Ottoman camp. The Imperial soldiers,
breaking their ranks, devoted themselves to plunder. At this point
Cicala, at the head of a large body of irregular cavalry, which had
taken no part so far in the battle, charged with irresistible force the
scattered host of the Christians. They carried everything before them.
The Austrians, in their turn, were driven from the field. Maximilian
and Sigismund were compelled to fly for their lives.
The Ottomans, as a result of this gallant charge, regained all that
they had lost. Thirty thousand Austrians and Hungarians perished.
Ninety-five of their guns were captured. The camp and the treasure
of the Archduke were taken. Never was a more complete and unexpected
victory. No thanks, however, were due to the Sultan. There can be no
doubt that if he had acted on his own impulse and had fled, the battle
would have been lost. He was a timid spectator of the conflict, and of
much the same use as the sacred standard and the cloak of the Prophet.
The victory was undoubtedly due to the courage of Cicala and the
splendid charge of his cavalry, and to the determination of Seadeddin
in compelling his master the Sultan, against his will, to remain on the
field of battle.
No more important battle had taken place beyond the Danube since that
of Mohacz in the time of Mahomet II. If the victory had resulted to
the Christians, the whole of the Ottoman possessions north of the
Danube would have been lost. The Christian army, under Maximilian,
would again have crossed that river and have advanced into Bulgaria and
Macedonia, and the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire might have been
precipitated by two or three centuries.
The craven Sultan returned to Constantinople immediately after the
battle. He received there a great ovation for the victory due to
Cicala. Never again did he lead an army on the field. He devoted
himself thenceforth to a voluptuous life in his harem. The government
of the Empire remained in the hands of the Sultana Validé.
Cicala, as a reward for his successful charge, was immediately
promoted to be Grand Vizier. It was a most unfortunate selection. He
treated with great severity the Ottoman troops who had misbehaved at
the battle of Ceresties. He accused them of cowardice. He inflicted
summary punishment on their leaders. Thirty thousand of the soldiers,
mostly belonging to Asia Minor, dispersed and returned to their homes,
spreading disaffection and rebellion in their several districts.
After this signal victory war of a desultory character was continued
with Austria for some years, now one and now the other getting the
better of it in the capture and recapture of fortresses. In 1606
peace was arrived at. A treaty was concluded between the two Powers
at Silvatorok, which was, on the whole, unfavourable to the Ottomans.
Transylvania was practically freed from their rule. They were confirmed
in the possession of one-half of Hungary, but the other half was freed
from tribute. The fortresses of Gran, Erlau, and Gradiscka were secured
to Ottoman possession, Raab and Komorn to Austria. The annual payment
of 30,000 ducats by Austria, which the Turks regarded as a tribute, was
also to cease, but a lump sum of 200,000 ducats was to be paid to the
Porte.
By the surrender of its claims on Transylvania the Ottoman Empire in
Europe entered upon a course of shrinkage, which thenceforth, up to the
present time, has been the normal course of events.
This decadence was soon to be illustrated in another direction. War
had again broken out with Persia, and the Turks sustained a series of
defeats. In 1618 peace was patched up for a time, by the terms of which
all the provinces which had been captured under Murad III and Mahomet
III were ceded again to Persia, and the boundaries between the two
Empires were restored to what they had been under Selim II. Meanwhile,
as a result of misgovernment, the Turkish Empire was going headlong to
ruin. We have a very authoritative account of the deplorable condition
into which it had fallen at this period in the reports of Sir Thomas
Roe, who was sent as the first British Ambassador to the Porte by James
I. Queen Elizabeth had already, a few years previously, entered into
correspondence with the Porte, and had urged the Sultan to join in a
naval alliance in the Mediterranean against Philip II, who was then
threatening to invade England. The reply of the Porte was friendly, but
nothing more.
In 1622 Sir Thomas Roe was sent on a mission, mainly for the purpose
of protesting against the piratical destruction of British commerce
by corsairs from Algiers and Tunis. He remained at Constantinople for
five years, and succeeded in obtaining promises of redress from the
Porte. The Pasha of Algiers was recalled and a successor was appointed.
But apparently this had very little effect in abating piracy. The
reports of Sir Thomas Roe are full of descriptions of the misery of
the inhabitants of Turkey, of symptoms of decay, and of the falling
grandeur of the Empire.
All the territory of the Grand Seignior [he says] is dispeopled
for want of pasture and by reason of violent oppression—so much so
that, in the best parts of Greece and Anatolia, a man may ride three
or four, or sometimes six, days and not find a village to feed him
or his horse, whereby the revenue is so lessened that there is not
wherewithal to pay the soldiers and to maintain the Court. It may be
patched up for a while out of the Treasury, and by exactions which
are now onerous upon the merchants and labouring men to satisfy the
harpies.[22]
I can say no more than that the disease works internally that must
ruin this Empire; we daily expect more changes and effusion of blood.
The wisest men refuse to sit at the helm, and fools will soon run
themselves and others upon the rocks.
This State for sixteen months since the death of Othman hath been a
stage of variety; the soldiers usurping all government, placing and
displacing _more vulg._ as the wynd of humour or dissatisfaction
moved them. In this kind I have seen three Emperors, seven Grand
Viziers, two Capitan Pashas, five Agas of the Janissaries, and, in
proportion, as many changes of governors in all the provinces, every
new Vizier making use of his time displacing those in possession and
selling their favours to others.[23]
In another passage he points out that the hope of booty was the main
motive for war and invasion by the Turks:—
The Turkish soldier is not only apt but desirous to make invasion
because all things are prey and all kinds of licence allowed to them;
and his hope is more upon booty and prisoners than upon conquest.
Every boy or girl is to them magazine and brings them the best of
merchandise and worth 100 dollars, so that every village is to them
a magazine and they return rich.... But I am persuaded versâ vice
if they were invaded and the war were brought to their doors they
would be found the weakest, unprovided and undisciplined enemy in the
world.[24]
The pirates of Algiers have cast off all obedience to the Empire,
not only upon the sea where they are masters, but presuming to do
many insolences even upon the land and in the best parts of the Grand
Seignior.[25]
There can be no doubt that at the beginning of the seventeenth century,
when Sir Thomas Roe wrote these dispatches, the Ottoman Empire was in
a condition of unparalleled disorganization, and its various races
were in a state of untold misery, owing in part to the want of strong
men at its head, and in greater part to the system of corruption which
had infected every branch of its administration. If at this time any
neighbouring Power had been in a position to attack it, the Empire
would not have been able to offer resistance. But Spain, after the
reign of Philip II, was almost as decadent as Turkey. Germany was
distracted by internal religious wars and was unable to concentrate on
external foes, while Russia had not as yet developed a position which
made her formidable to the Turks.
It has already been stated that there was a break in the disastrous
rule of the harem when Murad IV came of age and was able to take the
reins of government from the hands of his mother. The Sultana Validé
was a very clever woman, with excellent intentions, and practically
ruled the State during his minority. But she was not equal to the task
of coping with the grave difficulties of the time. The Empire was
going to the bad in all directions. The Persians, taking advantage
of the confusion in Turkey, declared war and successfully invaded
the provinces of Erivan and Bagdad. The two Barbary provinces of
Algiers and Tunis were asserting independence. They engaged in
piratical attacks on the commerce of the allies of the Porte, and were
negotiating separate treaties with them. The internal condition of
the Empire became worse than ever. There were frequent outbreaks of
Janissaries, who imposed their will on the Sultana.
In 1632, Murad, on reaching the age of twenty-one, took command of the
State, and soon showed that he was of very different fibre from his
six incapable predecessors. His first experience was an outbreak of
the Janissaries, who demanded that the Grand Vizier and sixteen other
prominent officials should be executed. Murad was compelled to yield.
But he felt deeply the humiliation of his surrender and was determined
to avenge it. He gathered round him a faithful band of Spahis, and
suddenly, when it was least expected, dealt with the leaders of the
Janissaries by putting them to death. This had the effect of cowing
that mutinous body. He then devoted himself to the task of purging the
State of corrupt and unjust officials of all ranks. He pursued this
task with most ruthless energy. On the slightest suspicion officials
in the highest positions were secretly put to death by his orders,
and their bodies were flung into the Bosphorus. He became a terror to
evildoers of all ranks. But he also became bloodthirsty and callous of
life in the process. Brutal as were his deeds, they had the effect of
restoring order in the State and discipline in the army. Throughout the
length and breadth of the Empire his dominant will made itself felt,
and his authority as Sultan was soon completely re-established.
Murad showed himself equally vigorous and competent as a general. His
effective reign, after taking over the government from his mother, did
not extend over more than eight years. During this time he personally
led two expeditions against the Shah of Persia, each of them occupying
two years. In the first of them he conquered Erivan. In the second he
recaptured the city of Bagdad, after a most desperate resistance by
the Persians. Of the garrison of twenty thousand men only six hundred
survived. The Ottoman army was then allowed to sack the city, and
thirty thousand of the inhabitants were massacred. The whole province
was restored to the Ottoman rule. More than eighty years passed before
another war took place with Persia.
In these campaigns Murad showed immense vigour. He marched at the
head of his army and shared with the soldiers their hardships. His
saddle was his pillow at night. There was no pitched battle with the
Persians. The campaigns consisted of sieges and captures of fortresses.
On his return to the capital after the second campaign, in 1639, Murad
received a great popular ovation. He died soon after, in 1640, from
fever, aggravated by intemperance, to which he was addicted. When he
was on the point of death he gave orders for the execution of his
brother, Ibrahim, the only surviving male of the descendants of Othman.
Ibrahim had been immured in ‘the Cage’ during the lifetime of his
brother. He was quite unfit to rule the Empire, and Murad must have
well known this. It was surmised that Murad preferred to go down in
history as the last Sultan of the Othman race rather than hand over the
throne to such an incapable successor. Others thought that he intended
his last and favourite Grand Vizier to be his successor. His mother,
the Sultana Validé, with the object of saving the life of her second
son, Ibrahim, feigned to carry out Murad’s order. She sent a message to
the dying Sultan that Ibrahim had been put to death in accordance with
his instructions. Murad, it is said, when he heard of this “grinned a
horrible and ghastly smile and then expired.”
It may well have been that those who wished for the destruction of
the Ottoman Empire regarded with complaisance the failure of Murad’s
intention of putting an end to the Othman dynasty. It was obviously
impossible that Sultans of the type of those who had succeeded the
great Solyman could for long hold the Empire intact. A new dynasty,
founded by an ambitious vizier, or some other bold adventurer, might
have invigorated the Empire and have long delayed its dismemberment.
But _Dîs aliter visum est_.
If Murad’s intention to put his brother to death was prompted by the
conviction that Ibrahim was unfit to rule the Empire, he was fully
justified by subsequent events. In his short reign of eight years
Ibrahim succeeded in undoing all the good which Murad had effected by
his ruthless vigour. He proved to be a degenerate, whose original evil
nature had been worsened by many years of immurement and constant dread
of death at the hands of his brother. He was as bloodthirsty as Murad,
without the same motive of restoring discipline in the army and order
and justice throughout the Empire. He was also cowardly and mean. He
wasted the resources of the State, which had been wisely accumulated by
Murad, in self-indulgence and in gratifying the caprices of his harem.
He was the most confirmed debauchee of the long line of the Ottoman
Sultans. The Sultana Validé pandered to his passions by presenting to
him every Friday a new female slave. By this means she obtained full
influence over him and used it in every case to the great detriment of
the State. Every abuse and evil which Murad had checked grew apace, and
the Turkish Empire, so far as internal affairs were concerned, entered
on a new course of decadence. The rule of the harem again prevailed,
without any motive but that of gratifying the caprices of its inmates.
Disaffection and rebellion spread among the Janissaries and Spahis,
and also among the ulemas and all classes of people at Constantinople.
A conspiracy was formed to get rid of Ibrahim. It was supported by
the main body of ulemas. At a meeting of the conspirators the charge
against Ibrahim was formulated as follows:—
The Padishah has ruined the Ottoman world by pillage and tyranny.
Women wield the sovereignty. The treasury cannot satiate their
expense. The subjects are ruined. The armies of the infidels
are besieging towns on the frontiers. Their fleets blockade the
Dardanelles.
It was determined to dethrone Ibrahim and to replace him by his son
Mahomet, a lad of seven years of age. The Sultana Validé did her best
to shield her son from the threatened blow, but she was ultimately
induced to give her consent to his deposition. A large body of
Janissaries then invaded the palace and insisted on Ibrahim appearing
before them. They announced to him the decision to depose him. He was
compelled to submit and was conducted to prison. The question was then
submitted to the Mufti, “Is it lawful to dethrone and put to death a
Padishah who confers all the posts of dignity in the Empire, not on
those who are worthy of them, but on those who have bought them for
money?” The Mufti replied by a _fetva_ in the laconic word “Yes.” There
was a threat of an _émeute_ among the Spahis in favour of Ibrahim.
He was promptly put to death and his son Mahomet IV was installed as
Sultan.
The eight years of Ibrahim’s reign, however, were not without some
importance as regards the external affairs of the Empire. They showed
that there were still some capable men in the service of the Sultan. In
1641 an expedition was fitted out for the recapture of the important
city of Azoff, which of late years had fallen into the hands of the
Cossacks. It was a failure and met with a reverse. In the next year a
much larger force was sent out, and was supported by a hundred thousand
Tartars from the Crimea. It succeeded in its object. The Cossacks,
before surrendering the city, destroyed all its fortifications and
burnt the town. The Turks rebuilt it and left a garrison of twenty-six
thousand in this important frontier fortress.
In 1644 another expedition was fitted out against the island of Crete,
which then belonged to the Republic of Venice. It had been bought many
years previously from the Marquis of Montserrat, to whom it had been
allotted as his share in the spoil of the Greek Empire, after the
capture of Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1204.
It appears that a fleet of merchant vessels, on their way from
Constantinople to Egypt, was captured by corsairs from Malta, who
sought shelter for a time for themselves and their prizes in one of the
ports of Crete. The Sultan was greatly incensed at this, the more so
as some of the captured vessels belonged to one of the eunuchs of his
harem. His first design was to send a fleet to attack Malta, but he was
dissuaded from this course. He decided, as an alternative, to attack
Crete, although the Porte was at peace with Venice, and the Republic
was willing to make amends for the violation of its neutrality by the
Maltese corsairs.
A fleet was thereupon fitted out, in 1645, ostensibly to attack Malta,
but with sealed orders to divert its course when at sea to Crete. It
consisted of a hundred and four vessels carrying upwards of fifty
thousand men. The fleet, under the above orders, steered for Crete,
and made a sudden attack on Canea, one of the chief ports of the
island. Having captured this city and also Retino, the army was landed.
It overran the whole island and invested Candia, its chief fortress
and capital. A memorable siege then commenced. It lasted for nearly
twenty-five years. The Republic of Venice made desperate efforts to
save the city. It was not supported by the native Greek population of
the island, who hated their Venetian rulers, and were not unwilling to
exchange them for Ottomans.
While the Porte was thus engaged in the endeavour to add to its domain
at the expense of the Republic of Venice, it was incurring a very
serious shrinkage of Empire in the Mediterranean, along the northern
coast of Africa. Historians agree in assigning to the middle of the
seventeenth century the virtual severance from Ottoman rule of the
two Barbary States of Algiers and Tunis. It is not possible to fix a
precise date in either case, for the process of amputation was slow and
was spread over some years, and long after the Sultan had practically
ceased to exercise any real power over these dependencies the semblance
and form of suzerainty was maintained. The main cause for the loss of
these provinces was the practice which had grown up, under the corrupt
administration of the Porte, of selling the posts of governors of
them to the highest bidders in money. In place of men of energy and
of capacity, able to control the unruly elements of mutinous soldiers
and disaffected Moors and Arabs, governors were appointed under a
system of purchase who were quite incapable of performing the duties
of their office, and who merely thought of filling their pockets and
recouping themselves for their outlay. The practice then arose for the
Janissaries and other Ottoman soldiers forming the garrisons of Algiers
and Tunis to elect their own chiefs. The appointments of these men,
Deys, as they were called, were for a time submitted to the Sultan for
approval or veto, but later this form was discontinued, and the Deys
elected by the soldiery became the real dominant authorities in these
States, and eventually superseded in form, as well as in substance, the
feeble pashas sent nominally as governors from Constantinople. Virtual
independence was thus achieved. Both States provided themselves with
fleets of powerful war vessels, which roamed over the Mediterranean and
the Atlantic as far as the coasts of Ireland and Madeira, preying upon
the commerce of all countries, irrespective of whether they were at war
with the Porte or not. They were, in fact, pirates. The captured crews
were employed as slaves in the bagnios of Algiers and Tunis. The best
evidence of the actual, though not yet of the formal, independence of
these Barbary States was that other Powers sent their fleets to attack
and bombard them, and to destroy, if possible, their pirate craft,
without declaring war against the suzerain power, the Porte. Thus, as
early as 1617 a French fleet, under Admiral Beaulieu, made an attack on
the Algerian fleet of forty vessels of from two hundred to four hundred
tons, and destroyed many of them. In 1620 a British fleet, under Sir
Richard Mansel, in retaliation for the capture of no less than four
hundred British merchant ships in the previous five years, made a
similar attack on Algiers, without, however, much result. In 1655,
another British fleet, commanded by Admiral Blake, under orders from
Protector Cromwell, bombarded Tunis, and destroyed a great part of its
fleet, and having effected this proceeded to Algiers. There was much
consternation there, and the captives of British birth were given up
without a struggle. In both these cases there was no declaration of war
against the Porte, and no offence was taken by the Sultan at the action
of England.