SENDING SIMS TO EUROPE
COÖPERATION WITH ALLIES THE KEYNOTE OF OUR POLICY--ADMIRAL WILSON
FIRST CHOSEN--SIMS' MISSION AND INSTRUCTIONS--SAILED AS "S. W.
DAVIDSON," PRIVATE CITIZEN--BRITISH HAD NO PLANS THAT PROMISED
SUCCESS, LORD JELLICOE TOLD HIM--CARSON PRAISED AMERICA'S "SPEEDY
ACTION."
The most important thing, perhaps, that I discussed with the President
when he visited the Navy Department March 24th was sending to London an
officer of high rank who would put us in more intimate touch with the
British Admiralty.
The text of that discussion was the following cablegram just received
from the American Ambassador:
London, March 23, 1917, 7 p. m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
Mr. Balfour has shown me the informal suggestion conveyed by the
Navy Department through Gaunt [British naval attaché on duty in
Washington] regarding closer relations and his reply. The British
Government will heartily fall in with any plan we propose as soon
as coöperation can be formally established. It was intimated to
me that a submarine base on the coast of Ireland would then be
assented to.
The whole subject of active coöperation and the best methods to
bring it about have been informally discussed by me with Mr.
Balfour, Mr. Bonar Law, the Prime Minister, Admiral Jellicoe, and
others at their invitation, and they will most gladly assent to any
proposals that we are likely to make. They withhold proposals of
their own until the way has formally been opened by us lest they
should seem to push themselves upon us, which they, of course, do
not wish to do.
I know personally and informally that they hope for the
establishment of full and frank naval interchange of information
and coöperation. Knowing their spirit and their methods, I can not
too strongly recommend that our government send here immediately
an admiral of our own navy who will bring our navy's plans and
inquiries. The coming of such an officer of high rank would be
regarded as a compliment and he would have all doors opened to him
and a sort of special staff appointed to give him the results and
methods of the whole British naval work since the war began. Every
important ally has an officer of such high rank here. In a private
conversation with me today at luncheon Mr. Balfour expressed his
enthusiastic hope that such a plan would be immediately carried
out. Many things of the greatest value would be verbally made known
to such an officer which would never be given in a routine way nor
reduced to writing.
Admiral Jellicoe has privately expressed the hope to me that our
navy may see its way to patrol our coast and possibly relieve the
British cruisers now on our side of the Atlantic. He hopes too that
in case more German raiders go out we may help capture them in
waters where they prey on shipping from Mexico or South America.
If our Navy Department will send an admiral it would be
advantageous for me to be informed as soon as possible. The
confidential information that he will come by would be of immediate
help. Such an officer could further definite plans for full
coöperation.
PAGE.
We had presented the proposition informally through the British naval
attaché, as the Ambassador pointed out. Captain McDougall, our naval
attaché in London, was given access to all records which were not
confidential, and his intimate association with the officers of the
Admiralty enabled him to keep the Navy Department in constant touch
with the situation and to give us data bearing on many phases of naval
effort. But there were, of course, many things kept secret, unrevealed
to any neutral. Our break with Germany brought about new conditions,
and made possible a more intimate exchange of views between the
American and British navies. Ruthless U-boat warfare begun only a few
weeks before, the Germans sinking shipping by the million tons, and
the British naturally concealing their losses and their plans, made
it important for us to secure the fullest information as to the exact
situation, and what steps were being taken to meet it. And in case war
was declared, to have in London an admiral to aid the Department in
putting into immediate effect the coöperation with the Allies which we
were planning.
That Saturday afternoon I discussed Ambassador Page's cablegram
and the whole matter with the President, and he approved the plan.
Then the question arose as to what officer should be selected for
this important mission. The choice was Admiral Henry B. Wilson,
later commander-in-chief of the Atlantic Fleet, then commanding the
battleship _Pennsylvania_. But we were creating a strong patrol force
and Admiral Wilson was regarded as the best man to organize and command
it.
Admiral Jellicoe was, as Ambassador Page said, particularly anxious
that our Navy might "see its way to patrol our coast and possibly
relieve the British cruisers now on our side of the Atlantic," and
also, in case more German raiders got out, as was feared, to "help
capture them in waters where they prey on shipping from Mexico or South
America." This was in line with the policy we had already adopted.
Formally organized on March 28, Admiral Wilson was put in command
of this force, which accomplished just what Admiral Jellicoe then
suggested, and what was one of the first requests made, after war was
declared, by Admirals Browning and Grasset.
The Germans, naval officers pointed out, might well conclude as soon
as we declared war to send submarines across the Atlantic to attack
shipping and cut down the flow of munitions and supplies to Europe. One
or two operating in the Gulf might interrupt the shipment of oil from
Mexican fields, the largest source of supply for the British Fleet. A
strong patrol force would not only protect all shipping on this side of
the ocean, but, well organized and equipped, would be ready when called
upon, to operate in European waters, as it did later on. So, it was
determined to assign Wilson to that duty and Admiral William S. Sims
was then chosen for the London mission.
On Monday, March 26, I telegraphed him to come to Washington. He
arrived on the 28th and came to the Navy Department in the afternoon.
Referring to Mr. Page's telegram, I told him the President had decided
to send an admiral to England, and he had been selected. Informing him,
in confidence, of our belief that the time was near at hand when the
United States would enter the war, I told him that, in that event, we
must prepare for the fullest coöperation with the British Navy. But his
immediate duty, I pointed out, was to secure all possible information
as to what the British were doing, and what plans they had for more
effective warfare against the submarines.
In the course of the conversation, I said: "You have been selected for
this mission not because of your Guildhall speech, but in spite of it."
In that speech Sims had said, "If the time ever comes when the British
Empire is seriously menaced by an external enemy, it is my opinion that
you may count upon every man, every dollar, every drop of blood of your
kindred across the sea." Impressing upon him the fact that the United
States was still neutral, and that until Congress should declare war
his mission must be a secret and confidential one, I informed him that
it had been decided not to issue written orders detaching him from his
duties at Newport, but for him to go quietly as a civilian passenger,
and report to Ambassador Page personally before any public announcement
was made.
Among the matters discussed was the extent of the sinkings by
submarines. Ambassador Page had written me confidentially that the
situation was more serious than the British admitted. I told Admiral
Sims that the President believed the British had not taken the
necessary vigorous offensive to prevent destruction of shipping by the
U-boats and that he strongly believed two things ought to be done:
First, that every effort should be made to prevent the submarines
getting into the Atlantic--that they ought to be shut up in their own
coasts, or some method should be found to prevent their ingress and
egress.
Second, that all ships ought to be convoyed. The President had been of
this opinion for a long time, and had insisted that it was essential to
give protection to shipping. The General Board had strongly recommended
convoy, and I favored it. But, as I told Admiral Sims, I had taken this
matter up with naval officers in the Department, and there was division
of opinion, most of them seeming to agree with the British Admiralty,
which apparently opposed the convoy system. It had not been adopted
abroad.
Admiral Sims seemed pleased with his mission and instructions. And the
only official instructions he received were those I gave him. But,
someone may ask about the sensational statement in his letter that he
was given the explicit admonition, "Don't let the British pull the wool
over your eyes. It is none of our business pulling their chestnuts out
of the fire. We would as soon fight the British as the Germans."
I never heard of that until I read it in Sims' letter of January 7,
1920. Later, testifying before the Senate investigating Committee he
stated that the remark was made by Benson, who afterwards in Paris made
a similar statement. "I will admit that I had completely forgotten the
incident," said Sims in regard to the latter. "It was recalled to me by
a member of my staff who was present, and who heard it. I think that
the reason I did not remember that distinctly was because I regarded
it as a personal idiosyncrasy of the Admiral. I had known the general
opinion that he was intensely anti-British, but it did not affect me
particularly."
"I have always had the best possible personal relations with Admiral
Benson," he continued. "I regard him as an upstanding and honest
man who has exceedingly strong convictions and who is very firm in
adherence to those convictions. I believe everything he has done during
the war has been done conscientiously, and to get along with the war."
Benson said he could not recall just what was said; that he strongly
approved Sims' selection, but probably used "very forcible language" in
impressing upon him the seriousness of the situation and the importance
of being very careful that "his feelings toward the British did not
lead him into any indiscretion." He denied strongly that his words
could be interpreted to mean anything else.
In view of these statements and the known fact that Admiral Benson and
everybody else in our navy earnestly coöperated with the British, and
that Benson had a large part in arranging this coöperation before Sims
reached London, I think there is no occasion for any further allusion
to the remark.
On the last day of March, a week before war was declared, Admiral Sims
and his aide, Commander J. V. Babcock, boarded the steamship _New
York_, entered upon the passenger list as "S. W. Davidson" and "V. J.
Richardson." Their fellow voyagers had no idea that "Mr. Davidson"
was an admiral of the United States Navy going abroad on an important
mission, and "Mr. Richardson" was his aide.
Reaching Liverpool April 9th, after an uneventful voyage, the _New
York_, as it approached the outer harbor, struck a mine. Though
the ship was not damaged beyond repair, it was crippled, and the
passengers were transferred to another vessel and taken ashore. At
the dock the American officers were welcomed by Rear Admiral Hope,
and they found that a special train, provided by the Admiralty, was
waiting to take them to London. Admiral Sims on arrival there at once
conferred with Ambassador Page and the British naval authorities, and
was admitted to the confidence of the Admiralty.
Since his departure from America, there had been a radical change in
the situation. The United States had declared war against Germany,
and we were free to deal with the Allies as associates in the
great conflict. While Sims was having his first interview with the
authorities in London, we were in conference at Washington with the
ranking British and French admirals in the Western Atlantic. In fact
a working agreement was perfected, and orders had been issued to send
destroyers to Europe before we received Sims' first dispatch. Thus
Sims in London and our authorities in Washington carried out with the
utmost cordiality that splendid coöperation between the British and
American navies which continued throughout the war and which has hardly
a parallel in naval history.
In his first cablegram from London, April 14, 1917, Sims reported:
The submarine issue is very much more serious than the people
realize in America. The recent success of operations and the
rapidity of construction constitute the real crisis of the war. The
morale of the enemy submarines is not broken, only about fifty-four
are known to have been captured or sunk and no voluntary surrenders
have been recorded. * * *
Supplies and communications of forces on all fronts, including the
Russians, are threatened and control of the sea actually imperilled.
German submarines are constantly extending their operations into
the Atlantic, increasing areas and the difficulty of patrolling.
Russian situation critical. Baltic fleet mutiny, eighty-five
admirals, captains, and commanders murdered, and in some armies
there is insubordination.
The amount of British, neutral and Allied shipping lost in February
was 536,000 tons, in March 571,000 tons, and in the first ten days
of April 205,000 tons. With short nights and better weather these
losses are increasing.
The Germans, he said, had seventy mine-laying submarines, and were
building new ones at a rate approaching three a week.
What were the British doing to meet this perilous situation? What plans
did they have to defeat the U-boats? That was what we particularly
wanted to know, and were surprised when it was not stated in that
dispatch.
Describing his first interview with Lord Jellicoe, Admiral Sims says,
in his book, published three years later:
"It looks as though the Germans were winning the war," I remarked.
"They will win, unless we can stop these losses--and stop them
soon," the Admiral replied.
"Is there no solution for the problem?" I asked.
"Absolutely none that we can see now," Jellicoe announced.
What the British were doing in regard to protecting ships was set forth
clearly in Sims' letter of April 19, in which he said:
After trying various methods of controlling shipping, the
Admiralty now believes the best policy to be one of dispersion.
They use about six relatively large avenues or arcs of approach
to the United Kingdom and Channels, changing their limits or area
periodically if necessity demands.
There was considerable criticism of the Admiralty, he said, "for not
taking more effective steps," and one of the principal demands was for
"convoys of merchant shipping, and more definite and real protection
within the war zone." But not only officers but ship owners and
captains opposed convoy, favoring the arming of merchant vessels and
independent sailings, he informed us, saying:
The Admiralty has had frequent conferences with merchant masters
and sought their advice. Their most unanimous demand is: "Give us
a gun and let us look out for ourselves." They are also insistent
that it is impracticable for merchant vessels to proceed in
formation, at least in any considerable numbers, due principally
to difficulty in controlling their speed and to the inexperience
of their subordinate officers. With this view I do not personally
agree but believe that with a little experience merchant vessels
could safely and sufficiently well steam in open formations.
In this Sims was right, as was shown when, later, convoy was adopted.
The system President Wilson had long advocated, which shipping
interests and many naval officers had opposed, proved not only
practicable, but a very effective measure.
Urging that the maximum number of destroyers and anti-submarine craft
be sent to Europe, Sims in his first cablegram informed us:
It is very likely the enemy will make submarine mine-laying raids
on our coasts or in the Caribbean to divert attention and to keep
our forces from the critical areas in the Eastern Atlantic through
effect upon public opinion.
We had to expect this and to provide against it; and at the same time
extend all possible aid to our Allies in Europe. Destroyers had already
been ordered abroad, the first arriving May 4, and others were sent
over in rapid succession.
Was this quick response? The English so considered it. Sir Edward
Carson, First Civil Lord of the Admiralty, called it "speedy action"
when he said in his address to the British Navy League on May 17:
"The toast that I have to propose is that of the American Navy.
I give it to you from the bottom of my heart. The date of this
particular function is very opportune. It almost coincides with
the arrival in our seas of the first installment of the assistance
which the American Navy is going to give us in the terrible task
that is before us. It enables us who are members of our Navy
League, and it enables me as for the moment presiding over the
great service of the Admiralty in this country, to express and
demonstrate our appreciation of the speedy action of the American
Navy and to offer a hearty welcome to the officers and men who have
reached our shores. * * *
I don't underestimate the submarine menace. It is a great, a novel,
and a terrible menace. It is a menace that has been unsolved by any
navy--our own navy, the German navy, the Austrian navy, the Italian
navy, or the American navy. But don't imagine you will solve it by
abuse or funk. No, the way to look upon it is that it is a real
danger, and it is the work of men to face and solve real dangers."
The problem being still unsolved, it was up to our Navy to devise
some plan that might solve it. And we did propose, nine days after
this country entered the war, the biggest project that was put into
effect--mine barrages to shut in the U-boats, preventing their egress
into the Atlantic. On April 15 our Bureau of Ordnance presented plans
for mine barriers across the North Sea and the English Channel. On
April 17, I cabled Sims to report on the practicability of blocking the
German coast, to prevent submarines from getting out from their bases.
He replied that this had been tried and found "unfeasible," and said:
To the best of my knowledge and experience we should adopt present
British methods and base further developments only upon actual
experience in coöperation with them.
That the barrage was unfeasible was the opinion of the Admiralty
officers, but it was not the view of the Prime Minister, Lloyd George,
who like President Wilson and our own ordnance officers, did not regard
it as impossible, for Sims in his mail report to us April 19th said:
The Prime Minister only two days ago expressed to me the opinion
that it ought to be possible to find physical means of absolutely
sealing up all escape for submarines from their own ports. The
fact that all such methods (nets, mines, obstructions, etc.)
inherently involve the added necessity of continuous protection
and maintenance by our naval forces is seldom understood and
appreciated. I finally convinced the Prime Minister of the fallacy
of such propositions by describing the situations into which we
would be led: namely, that in order to maintain our obstructions we
would have to match the forces the enemy brought against them until
finally the majority if not all of our own forces would be forced
into dangerous areas where they would be subject to continual
torpedo and other attack, in fact in a position most favorable to
the enemy.
But the naval administration at Washington had faith in that idea, and
urged it again and again, until it was adopted, and the vast barrage
was laid across the North Sea.