NAVAL ALLIES IN HISTORIC CONFERENCE
FOUR DAYS AFTER WAR WAS DECLARED, BRITISH, FRENCH AND AMERICAN
ADMIRALS MET AT FORTRESS MONROE TO MAP OUT PLANS FOR IMMEDIATE
COÖPERATION--CONFERENCE AT WASHINGTON, APRIL 11TH, FIXED THE POLICY
OF UNITED NAVAL EFFORT--FREQUENT AND FULL INTERCHANGE OF OPINION
WITH ALLIES.
Four days after war was declared, admirals of the United States, Great
Britain and France were in conference at Fortress Monroe. Immediately
upon the action of Congress, without awaiting the arrival of Admiral
Sims, then on the ocean bound for London, arrangements were made to
confer with the commanders-in-chief of the British and French forces on
this side of the Atlantic, who were familiar with conditions overseas
as well as on this coast. When they arrived Admiral Benson asked:
"Where can our Navy render the best immediate service?"
Then these sea fighters sat down to an all-day session to find the best
answer to Benson's question. The Allied admirals, who had been in the
war from the beginning, told what had been attempted, what achieved,
and the ways wherein they hoped America could come to the rescue.
Hampton Roads was the site of a historic conference, between Abraham
Lincoln and Alexander H. Stephens and others in 1865, when there was
hope that the War between the States might be brought to an end.
That conference failed, but this of April 10, 1917, was a pronounced
success; for it was followed the next day by the conference at the Navy
Department in Washington, which laid the foundations for the perfect
coöperation in the war with Allied governments, the first agreement
the United States Navy ever made with foreign naval officials to wage
war together. At the time even the fact that it was held was secret,
and its conclusions were sent abroad only in code. For secrecy was
necessary in regard to this as well as other plans and operations.
Since 1914 both the British and French navies had maintained their
ships in the Western Atlantic from Halifax to Southern waters. Vice
Admiral Browning and Rear Admiral Grasset, in command of the British
and French forces, respectively, were at Bermuda when war was declared
and came at once to Hampton Roads. Admiral Benson, Chief of Naval
Operations, accompanied by Admiral Mayo, Commander-in-Chief of the
fleet, went from Washington on the President's yacht, the _Sylph_, and
were joined by Admiral Wilson, in command of the United States Patrol
Force. In sight of the spot where the _Monitor_ and the _Merrimac_
met in their epoch-making fight over half a century before, these
admirals exchanged views regarding the naval conduct of the war.
Admiral Browning had been in command of a squadron in the North Sea,
and acquainted the American officers with conditions abroad, and they
in turn advised the visiting admirals of conditions here.
At the conclusion of this meeting, all these admirals came to
Washington for a conference with the Secretary of the Navy. They sailed
on the _Sylph_, and the unprecedented spectacle was witnessed of that
little ship flying the flags of staff officers of three nations. It was
symbolic of the unity which marked their joint operations during the
war.
Upon their arrival, in addition to the admirals who had met them in
Hampton Roads, I invited to confer with them the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy, and the members of the General Board. "This conference,"
I stated when we had assembled in the rooms of the General Board, "has
been called to consider and carry out without delay the best plans
for the fullest coöperation of the navy of the United States with the
allied navies, and to place every ounce of our naval strength into the
struggle in the ways where it will do most to win victory."
Turning to the British and French representatives, I said that as their
nations had been long in the war we desired to learn by their successes
and be warned by their failures, if they had made any. The conference
was a protracted one and discussed every phase of the naval situation.
The British and French admirals told of their long and satisfactory
talks with Benson, Mayo and Wilson, and stated that they were
practically agreed as to the plans which they thought would best aid
in the object all had in view. They made certain suggestions and the
following arrangements were made by which, it was agreed, the United
States could best throw its weight into the struggle:--
1. The United States Navy to take over the patrol of the Atlantic coast
from Canada to South American waters. They explained the importance of
that patrol and why they had felt it essential to preserve it since
1914. They gave three reasons for its continued maintenance: (a)
protection of shipping for the Allied armies, including food for their
civilian populations, and oil from Mexico for their fleets and armies;
(b) protection against the coming of U-boats, which was deemed not only
possible but probable; and (c) readiness to destroy German raiders.
They told us that if we could take over this patrol it would serve the
double purpose of protecting shipping on this coast and releasing their
ships, which were needed at home.
At that time both here and abroad there was a general belief that
German strategy would dictate the sending of U-boats to our coast.
There was a fear too (and there were many reports), of possible
submarine bases at out-of-the-way places on the Atlantic and Gulf.
Indeed, from the beginning of the war in 1914 the Navy had been
vigilant in sending craft into all places on our coast, from Canada
to the Panama Canal, which might possibly enable U-boats to subsist
in our waters. That conference agreed that this vigilance should be
continued and made more effective, because it was thought the incentive
to submarine activity on this side of the Atlantic would be stimulated
by the desire to sink transports carrying American troops.
2. The United States to have in readiness squadrons to operate against
any raider in either the North or South Atlantic. That was regarded as
of great importance by the French and British conferees, and it was one
of the chief duties of our Patrol Squadron. Speaking later of that,
Admiral Badger, head of the General Board, said: "While a discussion
of the general subject was had, the British and French admirals were
particularly concerned as to the patrol of the east coast of North and
South America, for which their forces were considered inadequate." The
Chief of Naval Operations was directed, at this meeting, to strengthen
the patrol force and to send it wherever it would render the quickest
and best service against the enemy. It was later sent to Gibraltar, to
protect the vast volume of shipping plying between the Mediterranean
and Northern Europe. The Pacific fleet, under Admiral William B.
Caperton, was later on duty on the coast of Brazil and other South
American countries for the protection of Allied shipping in the South
Atlantic.
3. Recognizing the accepted naval doctrine of all countries that
destroyers should be provided for operation with every dreadnaught,
the British and French admirals said they hesitated to request the
detachment of any destroyer from the fleet. "Of course your fleet
naturally would not be willing to part with or weaken the screen of
destroyers," said Admiral Browning, but he expressed the hope that we
might send at once one or two destroyers to Europe for the moral effect
this would inspire, as well as their aid in combatting submarines.
Though the commander-in-chief felt it would be taking desirable
protection from his fleet, it was agreed immediately to send six.
"We will send a division at once," I informed the British and French
admirals, "and all other aid in our power." Admirals Benson and Mayo
were then directed to issue the necessary orders for the destroyers to
make ready for distant service. Later the number was increased, and
by the end of May twenty-eight were at or on their way to Queenstown.
In pursuance of the policy of the United States adopted at this
conference, the American Navy continued to send destroyers, submarine
chasers, yachts and other craft overseas until the number in Europe
reached 373.
4. Our Navy agreed to look after the west coast of North America from
Canadian to Colombian boundaries.
5. It was promised that United States armed government vessels would
maintain continuous service to Chile, from which country America and
the Allies obtained nitrates indispensable for the manufacture of
munitions. All during the war there was fear that the steady flow of
nitrates might be interrupted, and every effort was made to transport
large quantities as rapidly as possible. It was gratifying when
Admiral Browning reported that the British relations with Chile were
"excellent." While our relations with that country were also cordial,
scarcity of ships and hazards of transportation were such that the
United States spent many millions to establish nitrate plants within
its own borders.
6. It was agreed that our Asiatic fleet should be maintained. It
operated in close coöperation with Allied fleets all during the war and
they acted together when conditions in Russia became acute.
7. Our Navy undertook to supervise the Gulf of Mexico and Central
American waters as far south as the Colombian boundary and as far east
as Jamaica and the Virgin Islands. It was through this area that Allied
navies transported their oil, chiefly from Tampico. The protection of
tankers was always of prime importance and the patrol of those waters,
begun before we entered the war, was carried on until its close, first
under Admiral Wilson and afterwards by Admiral Anderson. The vigilance
of this patrol was never relaxed.
8. Our Navy assumed the duty of sending submarines to Canadian waters,
"if and when enemy submarines appeared off that coast."
9. The French Admiralty was assured that, as soon as possible, we would
send patrol vessels to the French coast. This was done, our armed
yachts sailing early in June for Brest.
10. We also undertook to send armed naval transports for carrying
needed railway material to France, one immediately, and others as soon
as possible.
After the conference adjourned, I suggested that the Chief of
Operations and the French and British admirals perfect the details of
coöperation agreed upon. They did so, and a cablegram was sent by these
admirals to their governments setting forth the foregoing definite
steps agreed upon for active participation by the United States with
the naval forces of the Allies.
Many other conferences followed, some of them notable, with Allied
officers and government officials who came to Washington for
consultation. All the Allied nations sent naval officers to Washington,
many of whom remained during the entire war for the specific duty
of expediting coöperation with our Navy. Some of them had authority
virtually to conclude arrangements. There was always frequent, frank
exchange of views, and the same spirit of oneness existed on this as on
the other side of the Atlantic.
The French mission, which came in April, 1917, headed by Marshal
Joffre and Viviani, was a distinguished body, embracing soldiers and
sailors who had seen hard service. Joffre, the beloved "hero of the
Marne," was the commanding military figure, and Washington, accustomed
as it was to celebrities, gave him a reception never excelled in its
wild enthusiasm. Everybody fell in love with him. Unaffected, simple,
charming, he was the embodiment of French courage and comradeship.
Other representatives of foreign governments had pressed the need of
money and ships; but Joffre said, "Send fresh soldiers. We can arm
them, and they can be trained in France as well as here."
Marshal Joffre expressed more than once his admiration of the
appearance of the ships and crews on the American warships which
he visited. "It is evident from their appearance, they are ready,
enthusiastically ready, and their spic and span appearance is in marked
contrast to the grimness of the French naval vessels," he said upon the
occasion of his visit to Mt. Vernon, where in his tribute to Washington
he said the early coming of American troops to France "will tighten the
links of affection and esteem which have ever united France and the
United States."
With Joffre came Admiral Chocheprat of the French Navy. He was met at
Hampton Roads by Assistant Secretary Franklin D. Roosevelt, and came
to Washington for conference with naval officials, who obtained from
him valuable information from the seat of war. This enabled our Navy
to render better assistance in French waters and led to the opening of
more French ports for the landing of American troops and the quicker
turn-around of transports.
The British mission, which was headed by the distinguished Mr. Balfour,
arrived on April 21st. Its members brought the inside story of
conditions, particularly in the desperate fight against the submarine.
They had been met at Halifax and welcomed on behalf of the Navy by
Admiral Frank F. Fletcher, who accompanied them to Washington. Mr.
Balfour had, until a short time before, been First Civil Lord of the
Admiralty. With him as naval representative was Admiral Dudley S. de
Chair. They emphasized the seriousness of the submarine sinkings,
holding back nothing. American officials discussed the necessity of
new naval offenses; attacking the German bases or constructing mine
barrages to prevent egress and ingress of submarines and other plans
to end the U-boat menace. As representative of the foremost sea power,
the interchange of views between Admiral de Chair and our naval experts
was most helpful. The Admiral was well pleased with the arrangements
completed earlier in the month with Admiral Browning and with our broad
plans and construction program.
Naval Allied coöperation was strengthened by conferences with the
Prince of Udine, and the Italian mission; the Belgian mission headed by
Baron Ludovic Moncheur; the Russian mission, whose naval representative
was the ill-fated Admiral Kolchak; the Japanese mission, which
included the able Vice Admiral Takeshita--all these and other special
representatives who came from time to time or remained attached to
their embassies in Washington. Later the British Admiralty sent as its
representative Admiral Lowther Grant, who was in almost daily touch
with officers of the Navy Department until the close of the war and won
the regard of all.
Through the United States Naval Representative in London, American
admirals on duty at Brest and Gibraltar and naval attachés abroad, the
representatives of the Allied navies in Washington, who were kept fully
informed by their governments, and the diplomatic and naval missions,
the Navy Department was enabled to reach its decisions with all the
possible lights before it. It never had to depend upon any single
source of information.
These conferences at Washington were of the utmost importance because
all large policies had to be settled by the Navy Department. Officers
abroad were in command of ships assigned to them, and in emergencies
upon their own initiative employed their forces to the best advantage.
The ships overseas never were under independent command, but, as
distinctly stated in orders, constituted a "task force of the Atlantic
Fleet." Their orders stated: "The individuality of the United States
forces should be such that they may be continuously ready to change
their areas of operations as may be made necessary or by orders of the
Navy Department."
In the World War it was necessary for the Navy to maintain close
relationship with the President, the Council of National Defense, the
State and War Departments, the War Industries Board, the War Trade
Board, the Shipping Board and other war agencies, and the supply system
for Army as well as Navy. It was essential to be in constant touch with
the plans for the sending of troops and to have daily interchange of
views with representatives of Allied navies. Intimate contact made for
prompt action. The efficiency secured and maintained would have been
impossible if the naval control had ever passed from Washington.
The decisions to establish bases at Brest, at Gibraltar and in the
Azores were made by the Navy Department in Washington after conference
with Allied powers. The result of their establishment justified
the action taken. Routing of ships called for joint action between
Allied and American naval agencies working together on both sides of
the Atlantic. The movement of vessels carrying troops and supplies
was necessarily dependent upon daily conference with War Department
officials in Washington. Admiral William V. Pratt, who was Assistant
Chief of Operations during the war, thus stated the main naval duty:
"Our total naval effort in this war consisted less in the operation of
forces at the front than in a logistic effort in the rear, in which
the greatest problems we had to contend with originated and had to be
solved, here at home. It must be noted that in this war the main united
naval effort was one of logistics."
Building ships by the hundred; training men by the hundred thousand
to operate them; producing munitions, materials and supplies by
millions of tons; providing vessels to carry troops and men-of-war
to protect them--all these problems of production and transportation
were necessarily settled in Washington. It was this vast effort in
America, directed from the Navy Department, which made possible all our
activities in Europe, all the assistance we were able to render to the
Allies and the general cause.
[Illustration: AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN QUEENSTOWN HARBOR
The depth charges are conspicuous on each stern.]
[Illustration:
From the painting by Bernard F. Gribble
THE RETURN OF THE MAYFLOWER
First American destroyers arriving in Queenstown harbor, May 4, 1917.]