THE DAY OF DECISION
MOST IMPORTANT CABINET MEETING OF WILSON ADMINISTRATION HELD MARCH
20, 1917, WHEN IT WAS DECIDED TO CALL CONGRESS IN SPECIAL SESSION
TO DECLARE WAR--"I WANT TO DO RIGHT, WHETHER IT IS POPULAR OR NOT,"
SAID THE PRESIDENT--FLEET ORDERED NORTH--NAVY AND MARINE CORPS
INCREASED TO EMERGENCY STRENGTH.
Tuesday, March 20, 1917, is not fixed in the war chronologies, so far
as I can find. But it should be, for that was the Day of Decision.
That was the occasion of the most important Cabinet meeting of the
Wilson administration, in fact without doubt the most important of our
generation.
Eleven days earlier the President had called Congress to meet in
special session April 16th, "to receive such communication as may be
made by the Executive." But events were moving rapidly. Four American
vessels had been sunk without warning--the _Algonquin_, _City of
Memphis_, _Illinois_, and _Vigilancia_--with the loss of American
lives. German U-boats were destroying shipping by the hundred thousand
tons. We had been arming merchant vessels, but it was evident that this
"armed neutrality" in itself was insufficient, valuable as it was.
The "overt act" had occurred. The Germans were sinking our ships,
killing our citizens on the high seas. There were matters of vital
importance to be discussed when the Cabinet met. Congress had already
been summoned to meet within a month. But every day counted.
Should the special session be called at an earlier date? What message
should be sent to Congress in view of the situation? These were the
questions propounded by the President, who was grave, feeling the deep
sense of responsibility. He wished every member of the Cabinet to
state his conviction of the national duty, he told us, and each spoke
from his standpoint.
I have often wished that it might have been possible to preserve a
record of Cabinet meetings, particularly in the months preceding and
during the war. If the American people could have seen the President
and heard him as he spoke to us on March 20th, they would have felt a
confidence and admiration which nothing else could have imparted. I do
not feel at liberty to give from memory what he said, or the statements
of the ten members of the Cabinet. His severest critics have praised
President Wilson's power to express national sentiment and set forth
problems and solutions in living sentences in his public addresses.
That power was even more markedly displayed in the bosom of his
official family.
That day he began by sketching the steps this country had taken to
protect American lives. He was disinclined to the final break. As
he so often did in laying weighty matters before the cabinet, Mr.
Wilson clearly stated the events culminating in repeated sinking of
American ships by German submarines, and then, with a sort of seeming
detachment, invited the views of the Cabinet.
It was a supreme moment. Some of us, fully in harmony with the
President's patient and long successful efforts to protect American
rights by peaceful means, had at last, like himself, lost hope of
world and national safety without resort to war. Others, approving
of steps taken, had earlier wished entrance into the struggle. It is
interesting, even when the matter is not one greater than life and
death, as was this determination, to observe how ten men with the
same objective will differ in the presentation of their views or the
reasons which prompt their conclusions. No two of the Cabinet on that
day gave expression to precisely the same reasons, or rather, I should
say, aside from the impelling reason, each had been influenced by
some incident or argument he presented. But all were convinced that
the character of the warfare being waged by the Central Powers could
no longer be tolerated and that no course was open but for America to
throw the weight of its great power into the scales against Germany.
After all had advised that Congress be called in session as early
as practicable, one member read a number of telegrams conveying the
impression that popular opinion was strongly in favor of our early
entrance into the war.
"We are not governed by public opinion in our conclusion," said the
President. "I want to do right whether it is popular or not."
The next morning the proclamation was issued summoning Congress to
meet April 2, "to receive a communication by the Executive on grave
questions of national policy which should be taken under consideration."
War was only a matter of days. Under the conditions, the place for
the fleet was in home waters. When I returned to the Department after
the Cabinet meeting, orders were sent to Admiral Mayo to bring the
fleet north at once. Some smaller vessels were left in the Caribbean
to protect tankers coming from Mexico and Texas. Though the day
previous I had asked the General Board to consider carefully whether
everything possible was being done for the protection of our ships
entering the proscribed area, that afternoon, accompanied by Admiral
Benson, I attended a meeting of the Board, informing its members that
the President wished them to outline every measure that the Navy could
employ for protection of American shipping entering European ports,
beyond the provision of armed guards which we had already undertaken. I
told the Board that we desired the fullest and most ample protection,
regardless of effort or expense.
Replying immediately, the Board recommended:
Escort vessels to deep water from our ports, and similarly from
deep water to our ports.
Arrange with British and French Governments for the convoy of our
ships through the barred zones.
Merchant ships to proceed on high seas from points of leaving and
receiving escorts, depending upon their guns for protection and
upon changes of course to follow alternate routes.
Arrange with British and French Governments a code of signals to be
used in directing merchant ships as to routes to be followed and
points of meeting escorts.
Establish a patrol of the Atlantic coast.
Recruit up to the limit allowed by law for emergencies in order
to provide crews for patrols and auxiliaries, and fill battleship
complements which have been depleted to supply gun crews to
merchant ships.
[Illustration:
© Harris & Ewing
PRESIDENT WILSON AND THE WAR CABINET
Around the table, from left to right: the President, Secretary of
the Treasury McAdoo, Attorney General Gregory, Secretary of the Navy
Daniels, Secretary of Agriculture Houston, Secretary of Labor Wilson,
Secretary of Commerce Redfield, Secretary of the Interior Lane,
Postmaster General Burleson, Secretary of War Baker, Secretary of State
Lansing (in light suit).]
[Illustration: AMERICAN DREADNOUGHTS, THE EMBODIMENT OF SEA POWER]
At the next meeting of the Cabinet, on Friday, I presented the
authority granted by Congress to increase the enlisted strength of
the Navy to 87,000, and the President directed me to fill up the Navy
and Marine Corps to the full number authorized in case of national
emergency.
On Saturday afternoon the President called at the Navy Department.
Mrs. Wilson came with him. The rapid approach of war weighed upon him,
and he wished to keep in close touch with all military preparations.
It was then that I brought up the matter of sending to London a naval
officer of high rank, which resulted, a few days later, in the sending
of Admiral Sims.
I also informed him of the result of the important conference we had
held that morning with shipbuilders to secure rapid construction of
additional destroyers. Before that time we had always insisted upon and
been able to secure "fixed price" contracts, under which it could be
known precisely what a vessel would cost, the builders being under bond
to deliver it to us at the price agreed upon. But this was no longer
possible. With the rising cost of labor and materials, the builders
were unwilling to name specific figures. Reluctantly, I agreed to a
contract based on actual cost of construction with ten per cent profit.
Destroyers were sorely needed, we wanted all the shipyards could build,
and expedition was worth all it might cost. As a matter of fact, no
other construction during the war was accomplished with so little
increased cost.
That night the President signed the order directing that the authorized
enlisted strength of the Navy be increased to 87,000 men, and the next
day I sent a telegram to the newspapers of the country, more than a
thousand of them, asking them to print the order on the first page and
also make an editorial appeal for recruits, saying:
New ships and ships in reserve are being fully commissioned as
rapidly as possible, and the need is imperative for a larger
enlistment to man them. There has been a net increase of over 6,500
in enlistment since Congress recently authorized an increase, but
many more are needed and needed now.
This appeared in nearly every paper in the United States, and most of
them accompanied it with an editorial. It was an example of the fine
spirit of coöperation and patriotism shown by the American press during
the entire war. Every recruiting station was telegraphed to increase
the force and to engage doctors to examine applicants, so there would
be no delay. Within a few hours after the President signed the order to
increase the Navy, the recruiting campaign was under way in every part
of the Union.
Thursday afternoon at 4:30 o'clock, as I was holding the daily
interview with the press, President Wilson, unannounced, came into the
Navy Department. It was several minutes before I knew he was there.
There had been a rapid fire of interrogations and answers between
the Secretary and the correspondents when an officer came to my desk
and said, "The President is here." He was sitting quietly at the
other end of the big room, listening to the cross-examination which
a cabinet officer undergoes at the hands of press representatives
twice every day. And they always ask "searching questions." As soon as
the newspaper men knew the President was in the room, they lost all
interest in me and I asked to be excused from further questioning.
"Do you have to undergo that ordeal every day?" Mr. Wilson asked.
"Yes, twice every day," was my reply; "but it is not usually an ordeal.
Being a newspaper man myself, I recall that most of my life has been
spent in doing to other public officers what those reporters are doing
to me--and, besides, I rather like it."
What to do with the interned German ships was still a puzzling and
undecided question, and that was one of the matters that Mr. Wilson had
come to discuss.
"We must keep in close touch," he said, as he opened the conversation.
He spoke of the submarine situation and the interned ships, and then
showed me a letter from a man of importance to the effect that an
Austrian had arrived in the United States on a submarine, had called
upon the Austrian Consul at New York, and given him important papers
which had been brought from Europe in the undersea boat. He understood
that two submarines had come over from Germany, the writer said.
While this seemed improbable, a telegram was sent in code to all naval
commanders and stations to be on the lookout. That night a message
was received from the Commandant of the New York district that two
submarines had been sighted off Montauk Point. Destroyers and motor
boats were sent there to search the vicinity.
This proved to be a "false alarm," as did so many reports which were
sent forth with every particularity in that early period. But we had to
investigate all that seemed possible, for we could not afford to take
any chances of surprise attacks.