THE BREAK WITH GERMANY
SURPRISE AND TERROR PLANNED IN STARTING U-BOAT WAR--BERNSTORFF
WITHHELD NOTE UNTIL JUST BEFORE SUBMARINES STRUCK--AMERICA'S
ENTRANCE COULD NOT AFFECT "TREND OF THE WAR," HOLTZENDORFF
INSISTED--FLEET PUT ON WAR BASIS--PLANS MADE TO COOPERATE WITH
ALLIES--"GET AND KEEP THE BEST MEN," PRESIDENT TOLD SECRETARIES OF
WAR AND NAVY.
Germany struck practically without warning in inaugurating ruthless
U-boat warfare. Surprise of Allies and neutrals, giving no time
for negotiations, was one thing upon which its Admiralty insisted.
Terrorizing America was a part of the plan, and if the United States
entered the war, the Teuton naval authorities contended that it would
exert no marked influence, and could furnish little assistance in
troops or vessels.
Admiral von Holtzendorff, head of the German Admiralty, set forth all
this in his memorandum detailing the arrangements for the "U-boat war."
That document, one of the German official papers made public after the
war, is marked "Strictly secret--B-35840-I," and is dated, "Berlin,
Dec. 22, 1916."
"The beginning and the declaration of the unrestricted U-boat war,"
said Holtzendorff, "must follow so quickly one upon the other that
there is no time for negotiations, especially between England and the
neutrals. The wholesome terror will exercise in this case upon enemy
and neutral alike."
The submarines were to begin the general attack not later than February
1, 1917. England was to be starved out in five months, and the
Allies forced to surrender by August 1st. This is all stated in that
memorandum, and those exact dates are given.
The probable entrance of the United States as a belligerent was
discussed, and Holtzendorff took pains to set forth what little
influence this country's participation could have upon the "trend of
the war," saying:
As regards tonnage this influence would be negligible. It is not
to be expected that more than a small fraction of the tonnage of
the Central Powers lying in America and many other neutral harbors
could then be enlisted for the traffic to England. For the far
greatest part of this shipping can be damaged in such a way that it
cannot sail in the decisive time of the first months. Preparations
to this effect have been made. There would also be no crews to be
found for them.
Just as little decisive effect can be ascribed to any considerable
extent to American troops, which, in the first place, cannot be
brought over through lack of tonnage.
Bernstorff, the German Ambassador at Washington, carried out his part
of the plans to the letter. It was not until a few hours before the
submarines were to strike, late in the afternoon of Jan. 31, 1917,
that he presented the note of the German Government to the Secretary
of State. He had that note in his possession twelve days before
he presented it. He admits that it reached the German Embassy in
Washington on January 19, the same day that Zimmermann, the German
Foreign Minister, sent to Mexico his crafty but absurd proposal that
Mexico form an alliance with Japan, and make war with the United States
to recover the "lost territory" of New Mexico, Arizona, and Texas. That
proposal also passed through the Washington embassy, in the Berlin
diplomatic code, and was read by the Ambassador.
Before he presented the note declaring submarine warfare, Bernstorff
had given the order that "the engines of all German ships lying
in American harbors were to be destroyed." "I had already given
instructions to this effect at the time of the _Sussex_ crisis, and
these instructions had now been repeated from Berlin," he says in his
book. "As a matter of fact it was dangerous to allow of any delay,
for on the evening of January 31, our ships were already seized by
the American police. As far as I know, however, all of them without
exception were made unfit for use before this occurred."
The day ruthless U-boat warfare began, new mobilization plans were
prepared and sent out to the entire Navy. Formal action had not then
been taken by our Government. Its course was still under consideration
and the Cabinet was to meet the next day. But the moment I read the
German note, I regarded a break as inevitable, and active hostilities
almost certain to follow.
As the Cabinet assembled on Friday, February 2d, all of us realized the
significance of the occasion. Parley and negotiation were ended. The
time had come for decisive action. That was the conviction, I believe,
of every man who rose to greet the President when he entered the room.
Usually genial and smiling at the gatherings of his official family, he
was now grave and serious. The destiny of a hundred million people lay
in his hands, perhaps the destiny of the world.
The Cabinet members had, of course, read the text of the German note,
whose meaning was plain enough, camouflaged as it was in diplomatic
terms and pretended concessions. All had studied it, and were familiar
with its provisions. But the President read it to us again. He read it
in measured tones, giving weight to every significant syllable.
His mind was already made up, I felt certain. But before giving voice
to his own decision, he called upon his official advisers to state
their views. They spoke freely and frankly, each stating just what he
thought the situation demanded. Expressions varied, of course, and each
man approached the problem in his own way. There were differences of
opinion as to details, but none as to the main point. On that, all were
agreed. They felt that relations with Germany must be severed.
This was the President's position. He had never wavered from the firm
stand he had taken a year before that, if unrestricted submarine
warfare was continued, or resumed, the United States could have no
further relations with Germany. It was no surprise to him that his
colleagues, to a man, shared his views that the Cabinet was a unit for
the dismissal of Bernstorff, and the sharpest possible warning to the
German Government.
Although the session lasted several hours, this decision was soon
reached. It had required no debate. The German note itself was a
compelling argument.
Most of the time was devoted to discussing what steps each department
should take, particularly State, War and Navy. It was recognized
thoroughly that the severance of relations would create a difficult
situation, one likely in a few weeks at most to lead to open warfare.
It was realized that Germany might strike without waiting for formal
declaration from the United States. The sinking of American vessels
without warning would be, in itself, an overt act, an act of war. We
had to prepare for any eventuality, to map out a program for immediate
action.
The following telegram was sent to the entire Navy that night:
Six Alnav. In view of the present international situation, take
every precaution to protect Government plants and vessels.
All who received that message knew what it meant, that they were to
guard against surprise, and be ready for anything that might arise.
The next afternoon at two o'clock, the President, addressing a joint
session of the two houses of Congress, pointed out that Germany had
"suddenly and without prior intimation of any kind," deliberately
withdrawn the solemn assurances given in its note of May 4, 1916, and
announced that all diplomatic relations with Germany had been severed.
At the very hour the President began his address, and Bernstorff was
handed his passports, Admiral Mayo, in Cuban waters, issued the first
campaign order, putting into effect the plan for the defense of the
fleet in Guantanamo Bay. As soon as I returned from the Capitol, this
order was sent out:
One Alatl. Radicode. Mobilize Naval Communications.
SECNAV.
That placed all our communications--radio, telegraphs, telephones, and
signals--on a war basis. This message was just going out by wireless,
when I was called to the White House, where I found the Secretary of
War, who had likewise been summoned.
The President was concerned about the safety of Government property.
There was enough cause for this anxiety, for there were thousands
of aliens who could not be interned legally unless or until war was
declared. Among them were hostile Germans who would resort to almost
any violence to vent their resentment or to cripple this Government in
its manifold preparations for war.
Navy yards and army posts were closed, and orders sent to every naval
and military plant in the United States, Porto Rico, the Virgin
Islands, Hawaii, Alaska, Guam and the Philippines, to exclude all
visitors and strengthen the guards. The guards in the Panama Canal Zone
were doubled, and special precautions were taken to protect the canal.
To prevent information from reaching Germans, we stopped publishing
the movements of naval vessels and the daily orders to naval officers.
Since the outbreak of the war in Europe we had maintained along the
coast a number of naval vessels to enforce neutrality regulations. Now
this force was increased, and a virtual coast patrol established.
That night I sent out the order, "Alnav availability," which directed
all vessels to report their actual readiness for war.
The President kept in close touch with all our preparations. Not
satisfied with general reports, he wanted to know just what was being
done. Monday afternoon, while I was hard at work with officers on plans
and orders, Mr. Wilson suddenly appeared in my office. Glad as I was to
see him, his visit was a surprise. Documents concerning a number of the
matters we were working upon were on my desk, and in a few moments I
reviewed in detail the plans, told him what we had done and were doing,
and asked his directions as to certain operations.
Then he suggested that we go to the War Department, to talk matters
over with the Secretary of War. Mr. Baker was in his office and the
three of us held a long conference, discussing the situation in all its
phases. Some things the President said to us are indelibly impressed on
my memory.
The breach in diplomatic relations, he pointed out, did not necessarily
mean war, but it brought us so close to the possibility that we must
put our house in order, and be ready for any emergency.
Men concerned him quite as much as measures, and he inquired
particularly about the officers in important positions and commands.
If there were any who did not seem equal to the tremendous tasks they
would be called upon to perform, he wanted them replaced. If abler men
were available, he wished us to secure them.
"Each of you must surround yourself with the ablest men you have,"
he said. Turning to me, he asked whether I felt that my immediate
advisers, those in the Navy Department and in command afloat, were the
men to retain in those positions.
"They are the best men in the Navy," I replied.
He asked the same question of the Secretary of War. Mr. Baker told him
that the officers in responsible positions in the War Department and
the Army knew their jobs and were going ahead earnestly with them. Some
were necessarily slated for early retirement, but to anticipate this,
he thought, would be unwise, as it might occasion needless alarm and
disturb morale.
The President listened intently to us. When we finished, he again
impressed upon us that only the ablest, most alert and energetic
officers should be put in places of responsibility.
"Get and keep the best," he said as our conference ended.
Mr. Wilson had no sympathy with the fear of hurting some man's
"feelings," which, he said, is the rock upon which efficient public
service often goes to pieces. The big job called for the big man, and
no personal consideration had any weight with him in getting the thing
done, and done in the best way. "Get and keep the best," without regard
to friendship, past performance, prestige, social or political pull,
guided the President in his entire conduct of the war. It was that
policy which enabled American power to be thrown into the scales so
quickly and decisively.
It is gratifying to recall that under the rigid test of war, every
responsible officer in the Navy Department measured up to his full
duty. Not one failed to meet the requirements of his position. No
change whatever was required. Franklin D. Roosevelt was Assistant
Secretary of the Navy, Admiral William S. Benson was Chief of Naval
Operations, Rear Admiral Charles J. Badger head of the General Board.
The bureau chiefs were: Rear Admirals Robert S. Griffin, Engineering;
David W. Taylor, Construction and Repair; Ralph Earle, Ordnance; Leigh
C. Palmer, Navigation; Samuel McGowan, Supplies and Accounts; William
C. Braisted, Medicine and Surgery; F. R. Harris, Yards and Docks.
Captain W. C. Watts was Judge Advocate General, and Major General
George Barnett, Commandant of the Marine Corps. When Admiral Harris
resigned in December, 1917, to become head of the U. S. Emergency Fleet
Corporation, he was succeeded as Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks
by Rear Admiral Charles W. Parks. Captain Watts, requesting sea duty
in March, 1918, was succeeded by Rear Admiral George R. Clark as Judge
Advocate General. Thus, practically all those who were in office when
war began served to its end. And no men ever did better service. Able
and energetic, they worked together with a harmony and efficiency never
excelled.
U-boat warfare being aimed directly at shipping, our own as well as
that of other nations, the protection of American merchantmen was of
prime importance. As the President was announcing the severance of
relations with Germany, February 3d, the steamer _Housatonic_ was sunk
in European waters, and on February 12th, the schooner _Lyman M. Law_
was sent down by the Germans.
Though he considered that under the general powers of the Executive he
had the authority to arm merchant vessels for protection, the President
desired, before taking such an important step, which must almost
inevitably result in gunfire engagements with U-boats, to ask the
support of Congress. Before that time, at a cabinet meeting at which
this matter was discussed, the President turned to me and asked:
"Daniels, has the Navy the guns and gunners for this job?"
"We can arm them as fast as the ships are ready," I replied.
On February 26th, in an address to the two houses, President Wilson
requested that Congress authorize him to "supply our merchant ships
with defensive arms, should that become necessary, and with the means
of using them, and to employ any other instrumentalities or methods
that may be necessary and adequate to protect our ships and our people
in their legitimate and peaceful pursuits on the seas." A bill to
this effect, introduced at once, promptly passed the House by a large
majority, but failed in the Senate by reason of a filibuster conducted
by a handful of Senators who by continual debate prevented the bill
from coming to a vote before the end of that Congress on March 4th.
It was this filibuster that called forth the President's denunciation
of the "little group of willful men" who had, with reckless disregard
of the country's needs, prevented important legislation, and his
suggestion that the rules of the Senate be changed so as to make
impossible any such occurrence in the future. Before adjournment a
large majority of the senators signed a document stating that they
favored the bill to arm American merchantmen, and would have voted for
it, had they been given the opportunity.
Confident that he had the power under the Constitution, and a large
majority of Congress having expressed its willingness to grant him
specific authority, the President on March 12 directed me to furnish
guns and naval gunners to American ships. Guns and men were ready, and
the work of arming merchantmen began immediately. In two days guns were
installed on the _Manchuria_, _St. Louis_ and _Aztec_, and four days
later the _New York_ and _St. Paul_ were equipped. The _Manchuria_
sailed for England March 15, and thereafter a constant succession of
merchant ships carrying armed guards left our ports for Europe.
The day after Bernstorff was dismissed the General Board had submitted
the following specific steps to be taken in case of conflict with
Germany:
G. B. No. 425. Confidential. Serial No. 666.
February 4, 1917.
From: Senior member present.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Steps to be taken to meet a possible condition of war with
the Central European Powers.
On account of existing conditions, the General Board recommends
that the following steps be taken to meet a possible condition of
war with the Central European Powers:
1. Complete complements and allowances of all kinds, first of the
A and B fleet, then of the C fleet, and naval districts.
2. Mobilize the A fleet in the Lower Chesapeake, and increase it
immediately to the B fleet. (See Black Plan.)
3. Dock and repair all ships in reserve and ordinary that will be
used.
4. Arrange for the supply of fuel to the fleet and stock all fuel
depots to capacity.
5. Establish additional recruiting stations and increase
personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps to the total number
required to supply complements for all the ships built,
building, and authorized, and to maintain shore establishments
and naval defense districts, including aviation service, with
10 per cent additional for casualties as follows: Enlisted
force--Navy, 150,000; Marines, 30,000; officers in the proportion
prescribed by law.
6. Mobilize the naval districts, including the Coast Guard and
Lighthouse services, and put patrol vessels, mine sweepers, etc.,
of the Atlantic coast districts, on their stations; no commercial
vessels to be mobilized in the Pacific coast districts at present.
7. Prepare to the utmost detail for the employment of mines along
our coast as may be necessary.
8. Prepare nets and other obstruction for submarines, ready
for immediate use, at the Chesapeake Capes, Delaware Capes,
entrance to New York Bay, eastern entrance to Long Island Sound,
Narragansett Bay, Panama Canal, and Guantanamo. Other places as
their need becomes apparent. The General Board considers it of
the utmost importance that net protection shall be immediately
provided for the fleet during its mobilization in Chesapeake Bay.
9. Establish immediately the guards at all navy yards, magazines,
radio stations, powder factories, munition plants, bases,
shipbuilding yards, and naval shore utilities in accordance with
the mobilization plans.
10. Reduce the force of Marines in Haiti and Santo Domingo to
the smallest number that can maintain order there, transferring
these men to the United States to perform necessary guard duty at
navy yards, magazines, radio stations, shipbuilding plants, and
to form cadres for the organization of new regiments as recruits
are obtained. Organize the advanced base force and complete its
equipment.
11. Leave in the Caribbean a sufficient number of light cruisers
to keep a lookout for submarines in those waters and for the
protection of our interests there. Protect the Canal and
Guantanamo as far as possible, by the use of mines and where
possible by monitors, submarines and nets.
12. For the present use the greater part of the destroyer
flotillas as patrol for submarines in the vicinity of the
principal ports or entrances leading to them.
13. Base the submarines at Canal, Guantanamo, and points along
the coast in accordance with the Black Plan.
14. Rush to completion all naval vessels building or authorized;
also build up the Aviation Service as rapidly as possible.
15. Guard all bays and harbors on the coast of Maine to prevent
their use as bases of supply. Patrol waters of Haiti, Santo
Domingo, Porto Rico, and Danish West Indies, the Cuban Coast
Guard Service to assist in patrolling all bays and gulfs of the
coast of Cuba.
16. Prepare to close entrances to all ports at night and
discontinue or change such aids to navigation as may be
necessary.
17. Organize a comprehensive system of intelligence service
covering the whole theater of war in accordance with the plans of
the Office of Naval Intelligence.
18. Take possession of all interned vessels of war of Central
Powers; also take control of all commercial vessels of Central
Powers now in United States waters.
19. Place under surveillance all citizens of the Central Powers
in the Navy or in Government employ in naval establishments, and
remove them from positions in which they may do possible harm.
20. Arm our merchant ships for purposes of defense.
21. In accordance with Black Plan, carry out the following:
(a) Issue proclamation prescribing defensive sea areas and put
rules in regard to them in force.
(b) Issue proclamation prescribing press regulations and
establishing censorship of cable and radio, including naval
control of all commercial and private radio stations.
(c) Issue President's order in regard to visit and search,
capture, etc.
22. And as most important, arrange, as soon as possible, plans
of coöperation with the naval forces of the Allies for the joint
protection of trans-Atlantic commerce and for offensive naval
operations against the common enemy.
CHAS. J. BADGER.
General war plans, as I have stated, had been developed years before
under the direction of Admiral Dewey. Among these was the "Black Plan"
designated for "war in the Atlantic," really for war with Germany.
Revised from time to time as the progress of the European conflict
suggested changes, this was constantly kept up to date, and covered
thoroughly general policies and operations. The recommendations of
February 4th and various others submitted later were for specific
things to be done in consonance with the general scheme.
A week after the break with Germany, I sent the following to the
General Board:
February 10, 1917.
To: The General Board.
Subject: Solution of Problem.
1. The Department desires the General Board to consider the
following problem and submit its solution as soon as practicable:
PROBLEM
General situation--Conditions as at present except that war with
Germany is declared.
Special situation--The Allies do not desire our battleship force
at present.
Required--Naval estimate of the situation: first, as to the grand
strategy demanded by the situation; second, as to the disposition
of the battleship force; third, as to the method of assisting
in maintaining communications with Europe, including scheme
for coöperation with Allies; fourth, as to method of driving
submarines from the sea.
Assume--Mobilization of all naval vessels and possibility of
mobilizing merchant vessels as required.
JOSEPHUS DANIELS.
Anti-submarine warfare, coöperation with the Allies, was the keynote of
all our plans, as of this "problem," the solution of which the General
Board submitted on February 17. We were then, as always, planning
"for the joint protection of trans-Atlantic commerce," as the Board
expressed it, "and for offensive naval operations against the common
enemy."