_How the Causes of the unquiet bearing of Taxes may be lessened._
We have slightly gone through all the six Branches of the Publick
Charge, and have (though imperfectly and in haste) shewn what would
encrease, and what would abate them.
We come next to take away some of the general Causes of the unquiet
bearing of Taxes, and yielding to Contributions, _viz._
2. 1. That the people think, the Sovereign askes more then he
needs. To which we answer, 1. That if the Sovereign were sure to
have what he wanted in due time, it were his own great dammage
to draw away the money out of his Subjects hands, who by trade
increase it, and to hoard it up in his own Coffers, where ’tis of
no use even to himself, but lyable to be begged or vainly expended.
3. 2. Let the Tax be never so great, if it be proportionable unto
all, then no man suffers the loss of any Riches by it. For men (as
we said but now) if the Estates of them all were either halfed or
doubled, would in both cases remain equally rich. For they would
each man have his former state, dignity, and degree; and moreover,
the Money leavied not going out of the Nation, the same also would
remain as rich in comparison of any other Nation; onely the Riches
of the Prince and People would differ for a little while, namely,
until the money leavied from some, were again refunded upon the
same, or other persons that paid it: In which case every man also
should have his chance and opportunity to be made the better or
worse by the new distribution; or if he lost by one, yet to gain by
another.
4. 3. Now that which angers men most, is to be taxed above their
Neighbours. To which I answer, that many times these surmizes
are mistakes, many times they are chances, which in the next Tax
may run more favourable; and if they be by design, yet it cannot
be imagined, that it was by design of the Sovereign, but of some
temporary Assessor, whose turn it may be to receive the _Talio_
upon the next occasion from the very man he has wronged.
5. 4. Men repine much, if they think the money leavyed will be
expended on Entertainments, magnificent Shews, triumphal Arches,
&c. To which I answer, that the same is a refunding the said moneys
to the Tradesmen who work upon those things; which Trades though
they seem vain and onely of ornament, yet they refund presently to
the most useful; namely, to Brewers, Bakers, Taylours, Shoemakers,
&c. Moreover, the Prince hath no more pleasure in these Shews and
Entertainments then 100000. others of his meanest Subjects have,
whom, for all their grumbling, we see to travel many miles to be
spectators of these mistaken and distasted vanities.
6. 5. The people often complain, that the King bestows the money
he raises from the people upon his Favourites: To which we
answer; that what is given to Favourites, may at the next step or
transmigration, come into our own hands, or theirs unto whom we
wish well, and think do deserve it.
7. Secondly, as this man is a Favourite to day, so another, or
our selves, may be hereafter; favour being of a very slippery and
moveable nature, and not such a thing as we need much to envy; for
the same way that----leads up an hill, leads also down the same.
Besides, there is nothing in the Lawes or Customes of _England_,
which excludes any the meanest mans Childe, from arriving to the
highest Offices in this Kingdom, much less debars him from the
Personall kindness of his Prince.
8. All these imaginations (whereunto the vulgar heads are subject)
do cause a backwardness to pay, and that necessitates the Prince
to severity. Now this lighting upon some poor, though stubborn,
stiff-necked Refuser, charged with Wife and Children, gives the
credulous great occasion to complain of Oppression, and breeds ill
blood as to all other matters; feeding the ill humours already in
being.
9. 6. Ignorance of the Number, Trade, and Wealth of the people, is
often the reason why the said people are needlesly troubled, viz.
with the double charge and vexation of two, or many Levies, when
one might have served: Examples whereof have been seen in late
Poll-moneys; in which (by reason of not knowing the state of the
people, _viz._ how many there were of each Taxable sort, and the
want of sensible markes whereby to rate men, and the confounding of
Estates with Titles and Offices) great mistakes were committed.
10. Besides, for not knowing the Wealth of the people, the Prince
knows not what they can bear; and for not knowing the Trade, he
can make no Judgment of the proper season when to demand his
Exhibitions.
11. 7. Obscurities and doubts, about the right of imposing, hath
been the cause of great and ugly Reluctancies in the people, and of
Involuntary Severities in the Prince; an eminent Example whereof
was the Ship-money, no small cause of twenty years calamity to the
whole Kingdom.
12. 8. Fewness of people, is real poverty; and a Nation wherein are
Eight Millions of people, are more then twice as rich as the same
scope of Land wherein are but Four; For the same Governours which
are the great charge, may serve near as well, for the greater, as
the lesser number.
13. Secondly, If the people be so few, as that they can live, _Ex
sponte Creatii_, or with little labour, such as is Grazing, &c.,
they become wholly without Art. No man that will not exercise his
hands, being able to endure the tortures of the mind, which much
thoughtfulness doth occasion.
14. 9. Scarcity of money, is another cause of the bad payment of
Taxes; for if we consider, that of all the wealth of this Nation,
_viz._ Lands, Housing, Shipping, Commodities, Furniture, Plate, and
Money, that scarce one part of an hundred is Coin; and that perhaps
there is scarce six millions of Pounds now in _England_, that is
but twenty shillings a head for every head in the Nation. We may
easily judge, how difficult it is for men of competent estates, to
pay a Summe of money on a sudden; which if they cannot compass,
Severities, and Charges ensue; and that with reason, though
unluckie enough, it being more tolerable to undoe one particular
Member, then to endanger the whole, notwithstanding indeed it be
more tolerable for one particular Member to be undone with the
whole, then alone.
15. 10. It seems somewhat hard, that all Taxes should be paid in
money, viz., (when the King hath occasion to Victual his Ships at
_Portsmouth_) that Fat Oxen, and Corn should not be received in
kind, but that Farmers must first carry their Corn perhaps ten
Miles to sell, and turn into money; which being paid to the King,
is again reconverted into Corn, fetcht many miles further.
16. Moreover, the Farmer for haste is forced to under-sell his
Corn, and the King for haste likewise, is forced to over-buy his
provisions. Whereas the paying in kinde, _Pro Hic & Nunc_, would
lessen a considerable grievance to the poor people.
17. The next confederation shall be of the consequences, and
effects of too great a Tax, not in respect of particular men, of
which we have spoken before, but to the whole people in general:
To which I say, that there is a certain measure, and proportion
of money requisite to drive the trade of a Nation, more or less
then which would prejudice the same. Just as there is a certain
proportion of Farthings necessary in a small retail Trade, to
change silver money, and to even such reckonings as cannot be
adjusted with the smallest silver pieces. For money, (made of Gold
and silver) is to the τἁ χρἠϛα (that is to the matter of our Food
and Covering) but as Farthings, and other local extrinsick money,
is to the Gold and Silver species.
18. Now as the proportion of the number of Farthings requisite in
comerse is to be taken from the number of people, the frequency of
their exchanges; as also, and principally from the value of the
smallest silver pieces of money; so in like maner, the proportion
of money requisite to our Trade, is to be likewise taken from the
frequency of commutations, and from the bigness of the payments,
that are by Law or Custome usually made otherwise. From whence
it follows, that where there are Registers of Lands, whereby the
just value of each mans interest in them, may be well known; and
where there are Depositories of the τἁ χρἠϛα, as of Metals, Cloth,
Linnen, Leather, and other Usefuls; and where there are Banks of
money also, there less money is necessary to drive the Trade.
For if all the greatest payments be made in Lands, and the other
perhaps down to ten pound, or twenty pound be made by credit in
Lombars or Money-Banks: It follows, that there needs onely money to
pay sums less then those aforementioned; just as fewer Farthings
are requisite for change, where there be plenty of silver two
Pences, then where the least silver piece is six Pence.
19. To apply all this, I say, that if there be too much money in a
Nation, it were good for the Commonalty, as well as the King, and
no harm even to particular men, if the King had in his Coffers,
all that is superfluous, no more then if men were permitted to pay
their Taxes in any thing they could best spare.
20. On the other side, if the largeness of a publick Exhibition
should leave less money then is necessary to drive the Nations
Trade, then the mischief thereof would be the doing of less work,
which is the same as lessening the people, or their Art and
Industry; for a hundred pound passing a hundred hands for Wages,
causes a 10000_l._ worth of Commodities to be produced, which hands
would have been idle and useless, had there not been this continual
motive to their employment.
21. Taxes if they be presently expended upon our own Domestick
Commodities, seem to me, to do little harm to the whole Body of
the people, onely they work a change in the Riches and Fortunes of
particular men; and particularly by transferring the same from the
Landed and Lazy, to the Crafty and Industrious. As for example, if
a Gentleman have let his Lands to Farm for a hundred pound _per
annum_, for several years or lives, and he be taxed twenty pound
_per annum_, to maintain a Navy; then the effect hereof will be,
that this Gentleman’s twenty pound _per annum_, will be distributed
amongst Seamen, Ship-Carpenters, and other Trades relating to
Naval matters; but if the Gentleman had his Land in his own hands,
then being taxed a Fifth part, he would raise his Rents near the
same proportion upon his under Tenants, or would sell his Cattle,
Corn, and Wooll a Fifth part dearer; the like also would all other
subdependents on him do; and thereby recover in some measure, what
he paid. Lastly, but if all the money levied were thrown into the
Sea, then the ultimate effect would onely be, that every man must
work a fifth part the harder, or retrench a fifth part of his
consumptions, _viz._ the former, if forreign Trade be improveable,
and the latter, if it be not.
22. This, I conceive, were the worst of Taxes in a well policyed
State; but in other States, where is not a certain prevention of
Beggary and Theevery, that is a sure livelihood for men wanting
imployment; there, I confess, an excessive Taxe, causes excessive
and insuperable want, even of natural necessities, and that on a
sudden, so as ignorant particular persons, cannot finde out what
way to subsist by; and this, by the law of Nature, must cause
sudden effects to relieve it self, that is, Rapines, Frauds; and
this again must bring Death, Mutilations, and Imprisonments,
according to the present Laws which are Mischiefs, and Punishments,
as well unto the State, as to the particular sufferers of them.