CHAPTER XVIII.

OTHER SIMPLE MODES.

1. Other simple Modes of simple Ideas of sensation.

Though I have, in the foregoing chapters, shown how from simple ideas

taken in by sensation, the mind comes to extend itself even to

infinity; which, however it may of all others seem most remote from any

sensible perception, yet at last hath nothing in it but what is made

out of simple ideas: received into the mind by the senses, and

afterwards there put together, by the faculty the mind has to repeat

its own ideas; —Though, I say, these might be instances enough of

simple modes of the simple ideas of sensation, and suffice to show how

the mind comes by them, yet I shall, for method’s sake, though briefly,

give an account of some few more, and then proceed to more complex

ideas.

2. Simple modes of motion.

To slide, roll, tumble, walk, creep, run, dance, leap, skip, and

abundance of others that might be named, are words which are no sooner

heard but every one who understands English has presently in his mind

distinct ideas, which are all but the different modifications of

motion. Modes of motion answer those of extension; swift and slow are

two different ideas of motion, the measures whereof are made of the

distances of time and space put together; so they are complex ideas,

comprehending time and space with motion.

3. Modes of Sounds.

The like variety have we in sounds. Every articulate word is a

different modification of sound; by which we see that, from the sense

of hearing, by such modifications, the mind may be furnished with

distinct ideas, to almost an infinite number. Sounds also, besides the

distinct cries of birds and beasts, are modified by diversity of notes

of different length put together, which make that complex idea called a

tune, which a musician may have in his mind when he hears or makes no

sound at all, by reflecting on the ideas of those sounds, so put

together silently in his own fancy.

4. Modes of Colours.

Those of colours are also very various: some we take notice of as the

different degrees, or as they were termed shades, of the same colour.

But since we very seldom make assemblages of colours, either for use or

delight, but figure is taken in also, and has its part in it, as in

painting, weaving, needleworks, &c.;—those which are taken notice of do

most commonly belong to MIXED MODES, as being made up of ideas of

divers kinds, viz. figure and colour, such as beauty, rainbow, &c.

5. Modes of Tastes.

All compounded tastes and smells are also modes, made up of the simple

ideas of those senses. But they, being such as generally we have no

names for, are less taken notice of, and cannot be set down in writing;

and therefore must be left without enumeration to the thoughts and

experience of my reader.

6. Some simple Modes have no Names.

In general it may be observed, that those simple modes which are

considered but as different DEGREES of the same simple idea, though

they are in themselves many of them very distinct ideas, yet have

ordinarily no distinct names, nor are much taken notice of, as distinct

ideas, where the difference is but very small between them. Whether men

have neglected these modes, and given no names to them, as wanting

measures nicely to distinguish them; or because, when they were so

distinguished, that knowledge would not be of general or necessary use,

I leave it to the thoughts of others. It is sufficient to my purpose to

show, that all our simple ideas come to our minds only by sensation and

reflection; and that when the mood has them, it can variously repeat

and compound them, and so make new complex ideas. But, though white,

red, or sweet, &c. have not been modified, or made into complex ideas,

by several combinations, so as to be named, and thereby ranked into

species; yet some others of the simple ideas, viz. those of unity,

duration, and motion, &c., above instanced in, as also power and

thinking, have been thus modified to a great variety of complex ideas,

with names belonging to them.

7. Why some Modes have, and others have not, Names.

The reason whereof, I suppose, has been this,—That the great

concernment of men being with men one amongst another, the knowledge of

men, and their actions, and the signifying of them to one another, was

most necessary; and therefore they made ideas of ACTIONS very nicely

modified, and gave those complex ideas names, that they might the more

easily record and discourse of those things they were daily conversant

in, without long ambages and circumlocutions; and that the things they

were continually to give and receive information about might be the

easier and quicker understood. That this is so, and that men in framing

different complex ideas, and giving them names, have been much governed

by the end of speech in general, (which is a very short and expedite

way of conveying their thoughts one to another), is evident in the

names which in several arts have been found out, and applied to several

complex ideas of modified actions, belonging to their several trades,

for dispatch sake, in their direction or discourses about them. Which

ideas are not generally framed in the minds of men not conversant about

these operations. And thence the words that stand for them, by the

greatest part of men of the same language, are not understood: v. g.

COLTSHIRE, DRILLING, FILTRATION, COHOBATION, are words standing for

certain complex ideas, which being seldom in the minds of any but those

few whose particular employments do at every turn suggest them to their

thoughts, those names of them are not generally understood but by

smiths and chymists; who, having framed the complex ideas which these

words stand for, and having given names to them, or received them from

others, upon hearing of these names in communication, readily conceive

those ideas in their minds;-as by COHOBATION all the simple ideas of

distilling, and the pouring the liquor distilled from anything back

upon the remaining matter, and distilling it again. Thus we see that

there are great varieties of simple ideas, as of tastes and smells,

which have no names; and of modes many more; which either not having

been generally enough observed, or else not being of any great use to

be taken notice of in the affairs and converse of men, they have not

had names given to them, and so pass not for species. This we shall

have occasion hereafter to consider more at large, when we come to

speak of WORDS.

An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1 MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2 · 第 18 / 33 章