OF THE MODES OF THINKING.
1. Sensation, Remembrance, Contemplation, &c., modes of thinking.
When the mind turns its view inwards upon itself, and contemplates its
own actions, THINKING is the first that occurs. In it the mind observes
a great variety of modifications, and from thence receives distinct
ideas. Thus the perception or thought which actually accompanies, and
is annexed to, any impression on the body, made by an external object,
being distinct from all other modifications of thinking, furnishes the
mind with a distinct idea, which we call SENSATION;—which is, as it
were, the actual entrance of any idea into the understanding by the
senses. The same idea, when it again recurs without the operation of
the like object on the external sensory, is REMEMBRANCE: if it be
sought after by the mind, and with pain and endeavour found, and
brought again in view, it is RECOLLECTION: if it be held there long
under attentive consideration, it is CONTEMPLATION: when ideas float in
our mind without any reflection or regard of the understanding, it is
that which the French call REVERIE; our language has scarce a name for
it: when the ideas that offer themselves (for, as I have observed in
another place, whilst we are awake, there will always be a train of
ideas succeeding one another in our minds) are taken notice of, and, as
it were, registered in the memory, it is ATTENTION: when the mind with
great earnestness, and of choice, fixes its view on any idea, considers
it on all sides, and will not be called off by the ordinary
solicitation of other ideas, it is that we call INTENTION or STUDY:
sleep, without dreaming, is rest from all these: and DREAMING itself is
the having of ideas (whilst the outward senses are stopped, so that
they receive not outward objects with their usual quickness) in the
mind, not suggested by any external objects, or known occasion; nor
under any choice or conduct of the understanding at all: and whether
that which we call ECSTASY be not dreaming with the eyes open, I leave
to be examined.
2. Other modes of thinking.
These are some few instances of those various modes of thinking, which
the mind may observe in itself, and so have as distinct ideas of as it
hath of white and red, a square or a circle. I do not pretend to
enumerate them all, nor to treat at large of this set of ideas, which
are got from reflection: that would be to make a volume. It suffices to
my present purpose to have shown here, by some few examples, of what
sort these ideas are, and how the mind comes by them; especially since
I shall have occasion hereafter to treat more at large of REASONING,
JUDGING, VOLITION, and KNOWLEDGE, which are some of the most
considerable operations of the mind, and modes of thinking.
3. The various degrees of Attention in thinking.
But perhaps it may not be an unpardonable digression, nor wholly
impertinent to our present design, if we reflect here upon the
different state of the mind in thinking, which those instances of
attention, reverie, and dreaming, &c., before mentioned, naturally
enough suggest. That there are ideas, some or other, always present in
the mind of a waking man, every one’s experience convinces him; though
the mind employs itself about them with several degrees of attention.
Sometimes the mind fixes itself with so much earnestness on the
contemplation of some objects, that it turns their ideas on all sides;
marks their relations and circumstances; and views every part so nicely
and with such intention, that it shuts out all other thoughts, and
takes no notice of the ordinary impressions made then on the senses,
which at another season would produce very sensible perceptions: at
other times it barely observes the train of ideas that succeed in the
understanding, without directing and pursuing any of them: and at other
times it lets them pass almost quite unregarded, as faint shadows that
make no impression.
4. Hence it is probable that Thinking is the Action, not the Essence of
the Soul.
This difference of intention, and remission of the mind in thinking,
with a great variety of degrees between earnest study and very near
minding nothing at all, every one, I think, has experimented in
himself. Trace it a little further, and you find the mind in sleep
retired as it were from the senses, and out of the reach of those
motions made on the organs of sense, which at other times produce very
vivid and sensible ideas. I need not, for this, instance in those who
sleep out whole stormy nights, without hearing the thunder, or seeing
the lightning, or feeling the shaking of the house, which are sensible
enough to those who are waking. But in this retirement of the mind from
the senses, it often retains a yet more loose and incoherent manner of
thinking, which we call dreaming. And, last of all, sound sleep closes
the scene quite, and puts an end to all appearances. This, I think
almost every one has experience of in himself, and his own observation
without difficulty leads him thus far. That which I would further
conclude from hence is, that since the mind can sensibly put on, at
several times, several degrees of thinking, and be sometimes, even in a
waking man, so remiss, as to have thoughts dim and obscure to that
degree that they are very little removed from none at all; and at last,
in the dark retirements of sound sleep, loses the sight perfectly of
all ideas whatsoever: since, I say, this is evidently so in matter of
fact and constant experience, I ask whether it be not probable, that
thinking is the action and not the essence of the soul? Since the
operations of agents will easily admit of intention and remission: but
the essences of things are not conceived capable of any such variation.
But this by the by.